CONCLUSION
A study of the nature and status of appearance and reality has made great importance in Saṅkara’s philosophy of Advaita Vedānta and Kant’s critical philosophy. We have seen that the nature and status of appearance and reality is very complicated and comprehensive. We have examined appearance and reality in the framework of ontology, metaphysics, epistemology and so on. In order to resolve the problem of not comprehending the noumenon in Kant’s philosophy, I have proposed an Advaitic view. In the conclusion, I shall summarize the main arguments concerning Nature and Status of Appearance and Reality in Sankarācārya and Immanuel Kant: A Comparative and Critical Study.

As far as appearance and reality are concerned in Saṅkara’s philosophy of Advaita Vedānta, appearance, for him, contains ābhāsa, mithyā, bhrama, māyā, avidyā, ajñāna, adhyaśa, vivarta, vikāra, anya, pratībhāsa, vyāvahāra, bhāvabāvavilakṣaṇa, sadasadanirvacaniya, prapañca, jagat, pratyakṣa, anumāna, Sabda and so on. And Reality comprises of Satya, Vāstava, Yathārtha, Paramārtha, Param Purūṣārtha, Cit, Ānanda, Jñāna, Anant, Bhūmā, Brahman, Atman, Sākṣin, Mokṣa, Tattva, Turiya, Ananya, Nitya and so on. However, in appearance also, there is an element of reality but it is regarded by Saṅkara as reality of lower level. Likewise between Paramārtha and vyāvahāra, there is no separation in terms of reality and appearance. But there is difference in terms of degrees of reality. Vyāvahāra is less element of reality more of appearance, whereas, Paramārtha is more of real but is less in term of appearance. The object, which is more of real, is the ground of appearance which is reality of lower level. Appearance is taken as reality as long as we do not know the element which is more of real as the ground of appearance. Just like pratībhāsa, which is more of appearance and less of reality in term of vyāvahārika sat, is
taken as reality as long as *vyāvahāra* is not known and, *vyāvahāra*, which is more of appearance and less of reality in term of *Paramārthika sat*, is known as reality when we do not realize *Paramārtha*. On the one hand, *pratibhāsa* is taken as appearance in reference to *vyāvahāra* and, *vyāvahāra* is taken as appearance in reference to *Paramārtha*. On the other hand, *pratibhāsa*, *vyāvahāra* and *Paramārtha* are taken as reality but it is imaginary reality in the case of former, empirical or phenomenal reality in the case of middle and Ultimate Reality in the case of latter. The nature and status of appearance and reality has been elaborated by Śaṅkara in the philosophy of *Advaita Vedānta* into the framework of ontology, metaphysics and epistemology. Ontological status of Reality, as the evolution of consciousness, has been explained in terms of *Pañca kośas* (five sheaths), i.e., *Annamaya Kośa*, *Prāṇamaya Kośa*, *Manomaya Kośa*, *Vijñānamaya Kośa* and *Ānandamaya Kośa*. Śaṅkara, to establish his metaphysical system, explains Reality as *Brahman* in terms of *Sat*, *Cit*, *Ānanda* and *Satya*, *Jñāna*, *Ananta*. The three terms, i.e. *Satya*, *Jñāna* and *Ananta*, contain three different meaning of Reality and separate among themselves. But they are related to Reality as *Brahman* and show his characteristics. The characterization of metaphysical status of Reality as *Brahman* in terms of *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda* are not synonymous (*aparyāya*). Although they all denote, not connote, one and the same entity, i.e., *Brahman*. These are not concepts or predicate, nor qualities, nor essential attributes, nor even aspects or phases of *Brahman* itself, but the very nature of *Brahman* or rather *Brahman* itself. Whenever we refer to *Brahman* as *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda*, it must be recognized that the other term necessarily included. He distinguishes two aspects or modes of *Brahman*, as transcendental perspective and empirical viewpoint. He accepts the former as Highest Reality who is the stage of *Nirguṇa Brahman* and latter as lower reality who is the stage of *Sagguṇa Brahman*. *Nirguṇa Brahman* cannot be a category of thought. It can be spoken only in negative term as 'Not this, Not this'. Śaṅkara explains the epistemological status of appearance and reality with reference to *antahkaraṇa*, *pramāṇa-vicāra*, *anirvacaniya khyātivāda* and *vivartavāda*. *Antahkaraṇa* receive and arrange what is conveyed
to it through the senses. Through the function of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and its modification, i.e. *vṛtti-jñāna*, we move from the sphere of appearance towards the sphere of reality. It makes possible for a person to come in contact with the world around him, i.e. *vṛyāvahārika jagat*. *Pramāṇas* are required to justify what is in appearance, what is in reality and what is in both. Through the function of *pramāṇas*, we can transform appearances into reality. Absolute Reality is comprehended by means of *pramāṇas* and what appearance is, from the Absolute point of view, is also known by means of *pramāṇas*. In other words, the world of appearance and Absolute Reality is known through the function of *pramāṇas*. Therefore, *pramāṇas* are applicable for both appearance and reality. We establish the existence and non-existence of a thing only by means of *pramāṇa*. Śaṅkara accepts six *pramāṇas* through which our all knowledge is possible whether it is empirical or transcendental. Śaṅkara proves the world of appearance by the theory of *vivartaviśāda*. According to this theory, the cause is real and the effect is appearance. The cause (*kāraṇa*) produces the effect (*kārya*) without undergoing any change in itself. In the context of *Advaita Vedānta*, the world (*jagat*) is only appearance of *Brahman*. The world has no independent existence apart from *Brahman*. *Brahman* appears as the world, and being the substratum of the world of appearance, it is a transfigurative material cause. But for describing the rope-snake or shell-silver analogy, which is seen only by the person who is concerned at the time of illusion, he proposes the theory of *anirvacanīya khyāti* in terms of being neither *Sat* and *asat*. *Advaita Vedāntins* use the phrases *abhāsa*, *mithyā*, bhrama, māyā, avidyā, sadasadinirvacanīya* and so on for the term 'appearance.' These phrases are applied in the theory of error, i.e. *anirvacaniya khyātivāda*. According to this theory, illusion consists in the superimposition of one thing or the characteristic of one thing on another. It is known as *adhyāsa*. Śaṅkara describes the status of consciousness as reality in terms of *avasthātraya*, i.e., *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *sūpti*. This could be considered as psychological framework. Consciousness illuminates all the objects though it may be appearance or it may be reality, whether it is in waking stage or in dreaming stage, even it is present in deep sleep stage in which there is no
object. Therefore, it has been interpreted as Reality in term of avasthātraya. Consciousness is the witness of all the three episodes. The witnessing consciousness is designated as Sākṣīn in Advaita Vedānta. This self is always existing and unchanging entity. In this sense, it is accepted as Reality. But consciousness as such cannot be known under the knowledge-situation just as tongue cannot taste itself. This is the fourth state, the nameless, i.e., Turiya. It is at this state that Ātman is to be entirely identified with the Brahman. This is Absolute Reality, Absolute Consciousness. Śankara advocates the doctrine of Jivan-mukti which is also known in term of Reality. According to Advaita, when jīva comes to realize his true nature, he is liberated from the worldly bondage (bandhana), pang of all evil and suffering. It is the stage which Advaita calls as Reality in term of Mokṣa or Jīvan-mukti (liberation from worldly bondage). When the māyā, avidyā, adhyāśa, all the appearances and illusions are resolved, it is called the stage of Jīvan-mukti. It means that the Mokṣa is not reserved after the death, it can be attained in this life. Advaita Vedānta distinguishes three levels of being or reality, namely, Absolute or Ultimate Reality (Paramārthika sat), phenomenal or empirical reality (vyāvahārika sat) and imaginary reality (pratibhāsika sat). Brahman (Paramārthika sat) is the Ultimate Reality. The phenomenal world is empirical reality (vyāvahārika sat) and rope-snake is imaginary reality (pratibhāsika sat). Pure being or the Ultimate Reality is Brahman. It is beyond our empirical experience, beyond senses, thought and language, as the foundational reality of all. It is Paramārthika, the Absolute Real. Next comes our empirical world, valid for senses, thought and language, valid for all empirical experience, but not real in itself. It is the sphere of ‘becoming’ or ‘appearance’, of space-time causation, ruled by thought. This phenomenal world is vyāvahāra. Brahman is the reality of this world; its phenomenal character is a superimposition on Brahman and is, therefore, mithyā. Is phenomenal world completely nothing or something or both? Indeed, it is not nothing because its factual position is clear in our day to day life. Therefore, phenomenal world is empirical reality (vyāvahārika sat). But world also cannot be taken as real, because if it is taken so, then the
Advaitism cannot be proved. Thus, the crucial problem regarding the status of phenomenal world was first analysed and solved by Śaṅkara by propounding the doctrine of māyā, according to which the world is māyā and, the magic character of the world proves it anirvacanīya. Because of anirvacanīyatā, the magic world is neither completely Sat like Brahma nor completely asat like hare's horn or the son of a barren women. Further, neither it is both Sat and asat and nor even different from both. However, it is something and thus anirvacanīya. On the third level, stand imaginary illusions, dreams, rope-snake, etc., which are taken as ‘real’ as long as they last and then rejected as ‘unreal’ when their ground-reality is known. This is the level of the illusory called pratibhāsika. In contrast to these three levels of being, the ‘non-being’ stands as the ‘utterly unreal’ (asat), as a pseudo-concept like a barren woman's son or a sky-flower, which cannot even appear as an object in knowledge at any time. The significant distinction between the anirvacanīya and the utterly unreal (asat) is that while the former appears in our knowledge as real and is mistaken by us to be real until it is set aside as unreal by the sublating knowledge of its ground, the latter has no power even to appear as real. The imaginary reality, i.e. rope-snake, is real during illusion and set aside when the rope is known and world is real as long as we view it through senses and thought and realized as unreal when Brahma is known. Thus, pratibhāsika is real during illusion and it does not exist when we see empirical thing as its ground. Finally, vyāvahārika is real as long as we perceive it through our senses and mind and it becomes illusion when Paramārtha is realised. Pratibhāsa is real due to avidyā and vyāvahāra is real due to māyā. Basically, Śaṅkara is Brahmavādi. Māyā and avidyā comes only in the course of philosophical investigation that Śaṅkara undertakes.

Nature and status of appearance and reality occupy an important place in ontology and epistemology of Kant's critical philosophy. Appearance and reality could be found in the phenomenon. Appearance could be the object of knowledge whereas reality is a category to be used. But noumenon and thing-
in-itself transcend the categories of reality. Appearance, for him, is the manifold of sensible intuitions posited and ordered in space and time, in so far as they are not determined by the categories of understanding. But appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, are called phenomenon. In other words, when the manifold of sensible intuitions are determined in accordance with the unity of the categories, they become phenomenon. Noumenon is the postulation of Kant which is mere object of understanding and can never be given to sensible intuition. Noumena are neither the ground nor the cause of the appearances, because they can never affect our senses and nor be conceived in terms of existence. Appearances are the representations of things-in-themselves. Thing-in-itself is the ground and cause of the appearances. It affects our senses and thereby furnishes the material element in our cognition. Kant, on various occasions, uses noumenon and thing-in-itself as identical concepts but the distinction between them cannot be undermined. As for as reality is concerned in Kant’s critical philosophy, it is a concept under the category of Quality which makes an affirmative judgement. For example: “All men are mortal” is an affirmative judgement because the concept of subject has a positive predicate. In an affirmative judgement a concept of reality is involved. Kant deduces the concept of reality from the judgement in which the concept of subject has a positive predicate. In order to explain the nature and status of appearance and reality, Kant, in the sphere of ontology, draws a distinction between phenomenon, noumenon and thing-in-itself. These aspects are interrelated and constitute the totality of Kant’s ontology. The sphere of noumenon is what constitutes the spiritualist aspect of Kant’s ontology wherein lies the basis of his moral laws. He advocates the possibility of moral laws by postulating immortality of soul, freedom of will and existence of God. These are what Kant calls ‘ideas of reason’ and postulates of moral laws. Different from noumenon is the sphere of thing-in-itself which presents the materialist aspect of Kant’s ontology. Kant assumes the existence of things-in-themselves on the basis that when appearances are given through the
manifold of sensible intuitions then there must exist something as the ground of appearances. Therefore, things-in-themselves are lying behind the appearances as their ground. But things-in-themselves can never be given in a manifold of sensible intuition and categories of understanding cannot be applied to them. Therefore, they remain unknown and unknowable. Though, we cannot know objects as things in themselves but, we can think of them as things in themselves. Appearances are only representations of things-in-themselves. In this sense, the thing-in-itself is related to the sphere of phenomenon, because the material element in the phenomenal world depends on the thing-in-itself. The idealist and materialist aspects of Kant's ontology perform two functions: on the one hand, they limit human cognition to the sphere of phenomenon, and, on the other hand, they open the sphere of morality into which scientific knowledge cannot penetrate. Further, the concept of noumenon is explained by Kant by distinguishing it from the concept of phenomenon. Noumenon and phenomenon are two completely separate spheres with no mediating transitions. The noumenon is completely free from the applicability of categories of understanding like quality, quantity, cause-effect, etc. And phenomenon is the sphere where these categories are applied. The distinction between noumenon and phenomenon is based on the fundamental thesis that scientific knowledge has its jurisdiction within the world of phenomenon and that there is a realm of the spiritual into which scientific knowledge cannot penetrate. Kant limits the sphere of scientific knowledge to phenomenon in order to leave room for faith. The sphere of faith where scientific knowledge cannot penetrate, is what is known as noumenon. But man can never comprehend noumenon because intellectual intuition which comprehends noumenon is of a special kind which he can never possess. So noumenon is unknown and unknowable. However, out of the distinction that Kant draws in the sphere of ontology, his epistemological position logically follows. For Kant, to ask what are the conditions which make scientific knowledge possible is to ask what are the conditions which make 'synthetic a priori' judgements possible. As synthetic, it
amplifies the concept of predicate and is thus more than a mere tautology. As apriori, it expresses universality and necessity. What we seek in science, according to Kant, is such an ampliative knowledge with the characteristics of universality and necessity. Objects are given to us by means of sensibility and they are thought through the understanding. Sensibility is the faculty of intuition and understanding is the faculty of concepts. Through intuitions objects are given, through concepts they are thought. Sensibility furnishes the manifold materials which are absolutely chaotic and unintelligible, while understanding gives them a unifying form and renders them intelligible. Therefore, in Kant’s epistemology, sensibility and understanding are two factors which constitute knowledge. All our knowledge starts with the sense, proceeds from thence to understanding and ends with reason. Reason is never in immediate relation to objects given in sensibility. It is understanding that holds sway in Kant’s epistemology. Reason seeks to unify the concepts and judgements of understanding in order to form a connected system. In Kant’s terminology, the ideas of reason- freedom of will, immortality of soul and existence of God- are ‘regulative’ rather than ‘constitutive’. They do not constitute knowledge but merely regulate it. Kant formulates certain forms in which appearance, i.e. sensibility, is posited and ordered. Those forms themselves cannot be derived from sensibility and must therefore be apriori. Kant calls it as space and time. Sensibility, which is posited and ordered in the form of space and time, becomes the object of knowledge for Kant. It is completely independent of thought, essentially independent of the synthesizing operations of human mind. For Kant, categories are the original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself apriori. But without sensible intuitions, the apriori concepts are empty and without the apriori concepts, sensibility is blind. In other words, concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind. Kant proposes twelve concepts, i.e., unity, reality, causality, existence etc. Kant regards categories as apriori. But categories are empty if they are not applied to the sensible intuitions which are the object of knowledge. Therefore
categories and sensible intuitions must come together in order to give knowledge of something. But they can come together only if there is something common both for the categories and the objects of knowledge (sensible intuition). It is transcendental schema which comes in order to bring categories and sensible intuition together. Kant regards the concept of time as the transcendental schema. The concept of time as a transcendental schema leads to the application of the categories of understanding to the manifold of sensibility and hence our knowledge becomes synthetic *a priori*. The conformity of objects given in sensibility to the categories of understanding, can be appreciated by an examination of Kant's 'transcendental synthesis of imagination'. The transcendental synthesis of imagination combines the manifold of sensibility in one time and one space and therefore, every object must be said to be possible, actual and necessary. The transcendental synthesis of imagination, however, is not the ultimate faculty. It is the transcendental consciousness which provides the ultimate unity between sensibility and understanding. The transcendental consciousness, is the awareness of an 'I think' which accompanies every representation. The 'I think' can be regarded as continuous, active and present in the series of representations only if they are given in a unity with one another through it. The transcendental consciousness is the logical presupposition of all knowledge and it is the final condition of every act of knowledge. It can never be given in sensibility and, if the categories of understanding are applied to it, there arise paralogisms, by which, Kant means formally invalid conclusions. It is the ultimate subject of knowledge – the knower – and this is what is central to Kant's much celebrated Copernican hypothesis. Kant, like Copernican who tried an hypothesis that the Earth revolved and the sun remained at rest, puts transcendental consciousness at the centre of the cognitive process. Kant, thus, introduces a radical change in his interpretation of knowledge situation. Kant's basic contention behind Copernican hypothesis has a double significance. Against, rationalism, Kant argues that it is not God but the transcendental consciousness that is responsible for the unity of experience.
And against empiricism, Kant argues that mind has not to conform to objects, rather objects have to conform to mind. Against the theo-centric view of rationalism and against the cosmo-centric view of empiricism, Kant establishes an ego-centric view.

When we develop a comparison and contrast between Śaṅkara and Kant regarding the concept of appearance and reality, we find that Śaṅkara and Kant consider the same question in their epistemology: how our knowledge of the phenomena is possible or, how appearances terminate into reality. According to Śaṅkara, if we have bare sensations of the object, it is indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa pratyakṣa). It is only the appearance of an object. In the state of indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa pratyakṣa), the organ of perception is involved but the internal organs (antahkarana) are absent. So we cannot comprehend the nature and status of the object which is in front of us and we have merely the appearance of the object or the sensation of the object. Here, the form of mental mode (vṛtti) of internal organ (antahkarana) does not apply on these sensations. For Kant, it is the blindness of sensible intuition or meaningless object. In Kant's epistemological situation, the manifold of sensible intuitions, in so far as they are not determined by the categories of understanding, are the appearance. But in savikalpa pratyakṣa, sensation becomes the form of mental mode (vṛtti) of internal organ (antahkarana). Here, appearance of the object terminates into real object. In this state, sensible appearances become reality, i.e., objects exist in phenomenal world. In Kant's philosophy, it is the object on which we apply the categories of understanding. Advaita recognizes the fundamental fact about knowledge which is said to be the distinct contribution to Kant to Western philosophy that knowledge involves both sensation and conception. But hundreds of years ago from Kant, Indian philosophers propounded that our perceptual knowledge is constructed by the senses and mind. Further, pramāṇas in Śaṅkara and categories in Kant play the very vital role to become appearances into reality. Pramāṇas and categories are the appropriate means
of knowledge. Pramāṇas in Śaṅkara and categories in Kant are required to justify what is in appearance and what is in reality. Without the function of these epistemological elements, we have merely appearance of the object. But, through the function of pramāṇas or the applicability of categories, we can transform appearances into reality. In Śaṅkara's philosophy of Advaita Vedānta, when appearances grasp the form of mental mode of internal organ and pramāṇas are applied to it, they become reality as the object of phenomenal world. In this sense, pramāṇas are taken as reality. For Kant, the manifold of sensible intuitions which are not determined by the categories of understanding are the appearances. But, when appearances are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, become reality as phenomenon. Śaṅkara takes the realms of Paramārtha and vyāvahāra as reality of higher and lower level. It is Ultimate Reality in the case of former and empirical reality in the case of latter. Śaṅkara draws a distinction between higher and lower levels of reality from the epistemological point of view. But from the metaphysical point of view, there is no separation between higher reality and lower reality, just like that there is no separation between Paramārthika sat and vyāvahārika sat. Contrary Śaṅkara, Kant, neither from the epistemological nor ontological point of view, does not differentiate reality between higher and lower level or Ultimate Reality and empirical reality. Even he does not apply the term 'reality' for the realm of noumenon. In his view, appearance and reality could be found in the phenomenon. Appearance could be the object of knowledge whereas reality is a category to be used. But noumenon and thing-in-itself transcend the categories of reality. According to him, reality is a concept under the category of Quality which constitutes an affirmative judgement. "All men are mortal" is an affirmative judgement. In an affirmative judgement a concept of reality is involved. Kant deduces the concept of reality from the judgement in which the concept of subject has a positive predicate. Śaṅkara is Paramārthavādi or in Kantian terminology he is noumenist. But Kant is noumenist and phenomenist both. Śaṅkara makes the distinction between Paramārthika and vyāvahārika sat as Kant makes the
distinction between noumenon and phenomenon. Śaṅkara accepts that "vyāvahāra is the sphere where pramāṇas are applied. Śruti is only informative and justify the meaning of Mahāvīkyas. We cannot realize the Absolute reality through the Śruti but through the Anubhava (pure intuition). Pramāṇas are illusory in Paramārthika point of view and their functions are possible only in the sphere of vyāvahāra. However, Śruti is applicable to Paramārthika level. But Kant's noumenon, unlike Śaṅkara's Paramārtha, is completely free from the applicability of the categories of understanding and phenomenon is the sphere where these categories are applied. The categories are not applicable to noumenon and limited to phenomenon only. For Kant, noumenon and thing-in-themselves are unknown and unknowable. Noumenon can be known only through the intellectual intuition. But intellectual intuition is not that we possess. So we cannot comprehend noumenon because intellectual intuition, through which we can comprehend noumenon, is not possible for man. Therefore, noumenon is unknown and unknowable for us. Kant limits the sphere of scientific knowledge to phenomenon in order to leave room for faith. The sphere of faith is known as noumenon. Thing-in-itself is the ground and cause of appearances but the categories of understanding cannot be applied to it. Therefore, things-in-themselves are unknown and unknowable for us. However, we can think it but we cannot know it. However, Kant and Śaṅkara both hold the view that thing-in-itself or Paramārtha is ground and cause of appearance and it cannot be known as an object by the intellect. But for Śaṅkara, Paramārtha or Absolute Reality is not unknown and unknowable. We can realize it directly through the pure intuition (Anubhava). Thus, he removes the appearances through pure intuition. In Kantian philosophy, space and time are necessary and apriori forms of sensible intuition in which the manifold of sensible-intuition can be posited and ordered. When objects are given in our cognition, we become the objects spatio-temporal and the thing-in-itself which is independent of space and time, we do not grasp it. So, we know only phenomenon but cannot know things-in-themselves. In Śaṅkara's philosophy, we find that world is appearance but not because of
space and time but because of māyā and avidyā. Here the world is not only appearance but illusion also. Kant does not accept the illusory nature of the world. For him, noumenon and phenomenon are two different spheres and exist separately. Phenomenon is not merged into noumenon. Here the duality, between phenomenon and noumenon or appearance and thing-in-itself, exists permanently. But in Śaṅkara’s philosophy of Advaita Vedānta, world is appearance and illusion from Paramārthika point of view. When we realize the Paramārtha or the Absolute reality, the phenomenal world becomes illusion. In this stage, vyāvahāra is merged into Paramārtha. It is the sphere of Advaita where there is no duality; where all distinction, all categories, all plurality etc. transcended. Kant do not talk about non-duality. Here, the duality and distinction between phenomenon and noumenon always exist. Therefore, on the one hand, for Śaṅkara, there is no duality, no differences at all ultimately, on the other hand, for Kant, the duality between phenomenon and noumenon always exist. Basically, the distinction of appearance and reality are concerned with the fundamental thesis of Kant and Śaṅkara. Kant’s fundamental thesis concerns with scientific knowledge which is possible only in the sphere of phenomenon and in the realm of spirituality, it cannot penetrate. So, for Kant, phenomenon and noumenon are two completely separate spheres with no mediating transitions. Śaṅkara’s fundamental thesis is different from Kant. Śaṅkara’s primary concern is to understand Ātman and its relation to Brahman. So he goes from vyāvahārika level towards Paramārthika level, from the level of appearance towards the level of Absolute Reality and discovers Anubhava (intuition) through which we realize the Ultimate Reality. On the level of the realization of Absolute, we find that world is appearance and illusion. Śaṅkara and Kant reject sensual conceptual process as an appropriate way of approaching noumenal reality. Śaṅkara realized the Absolute reality or the sphere of Paramārtha through the Anubhava (intuition) and Kant proposes intellectual intuition as the means of attaining noumenon. In their philosophy of appearance and reality, the notion of intuitive realization plays a vital role but its relationship to
noumenal reality perceived differently. On the one hand, intellectual intuition failed to comprehend the noumenal entities, on the other hand, Sākṣīn or Self is realized through the Anubhava (pure intuition). Therefore, it is not unknown for Śaṅkara. It is self-evident (Svataḥ siddha). It is not established by extraneous proofs. But, for Kant, the transcendental consciousness can never be given in sensibility. And, if the categories of understanding are applied to it, there arise paralogism, by which, Kant means formally invalid conclusions. For Śaṅkara, Sākṣīn is the witness self and presents in all the levels of experience. It is the logical presupposition of knowledge and experience. It illuminates all the objects presented to it. It is the pure subject and unknowable as an object. Here Kant would like to agree with Śaṅkara. Because he accepts that the unity of apperception or transcendental unity of self consciousness is the pure subject and logical presupposition of the knowledge of objects. It unites all the manifolds which is given in perception. It was for the first time in European philosophy that a view of self approximating to the Advaitic doctrine of the self was so clearly formulated. It goes to the credit of Kant. As we know, noumenon and phenomenon exist independently as two spheres. Kant could not remove this duality. Actually, Kant could not realize the real nature of Self or Ātaman. Therefore, he finds his philosophical conclusion as agnosticism. But Śaṅkara realized the real nature of Ātaman and found that Ātaman is not different from Brahman which is Absolute Reality. Therefore, Śaṅkara gets his philosophical destination as Advaita.

I can thus sum up that the nature and status of appearance and reality play a vital role in the philosophy of Śaṅkara and Kant. By detecting similarities and distinctions between Śaṅkara and Kant regarding appearance and reality, an atmosphere can be created in which mutual supplementation of argument is possible. Most of the issues are consequently clarified and the growth of philosophical heritage is stimulated.