Chapter Three:

United States Relations with Pakistan: A Friend and an Ally
MAP 2: Pakistan

For almost a decade now Pakistan has been bordering on the status of a ‘failed state’. A nation that Jinnah emphasized

"... is to play its proper role in the world to which its size, manpower and resources entitle it; it must develop industrial potential side by side with its agriculture and give its economy an industrial base. By industrializing...., we shall decrease our dependence on the outside world for necessities of life; we will give more employment to our people and will also increase the resources of the State." (Burke 2000: 49).

He wanted Pakistan

"...as a bulwark of Islam and as one the greatest nations, whose ideal is peace within and peace without....The scrupulous maintenance and enforcement of law and order are the prerequisites of all progress....". (Burke 2000: 71).

Replying to the speech made by the American Ambassador while accepting his credentials he said

"...The people of Pakistan desire nothing which is not their own, nothing more than the good will and friendship of all the free nations of the world....(we will) contribute in the fullest possible measure to international peace and prosperity...."(Burke 2000: 128).

Today, the reality is far from this vision. International attention has increasingly focused on the gradual erosion of law and order in the country. There is recognition that the economy is facing a slow growth rate with mounting debts having serious implications for Pakistan’s defense spending and more importantly for other development projects which are much needed in the country. The country seems to have very few friends and of the few that it has, not many who are willing to take the burden to bail it out of its problems, quite contrary to the claims of the founding father at his inaugural speech to the constituent assembly in Karachi on 14 August 1947, in which he had proudly stated that Pakistan “...shall not be wanting in friendly spirit with our neighbors and with all nations of the world.” (Burke 2000: 34).

The relationship between Pakistan and America over the past quarter century has been one that oscillates between close partnership and divorce, between engagement and withdrawal. Few could have predicted the course the relationship has taken between the United States and Pakistan. Adversity pulls the two countries together, but when common threats recede, divergent national interests seem to pull them apart. This chapter looks at
some of the major contours of United States foreign assistance policy to Pakistan. It discusses the association that has developed between the two counties and points out the factors in United States foreign policy that have promoted a policy of assistance or determined in some way not to give any. It studies the changes that the relationship is experiencing as a result of the terrorist attacks in America and the future role that America wants Pakistan to play in its strategy for peace in South Asia.

**Historical Background of American Pakistan Ties**

When Pakistan gained independence, like many other newly independent nations, it faced the daunting task of establishing a new central government from scratch, of feeding, protecting and providing homes and employment to the millions of refugees and addressing a host of other administrative and political issues. However, the death of two of its most powerful and charismatic leaders- Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan - early in the nation building process and the disintegration of the Muslim League, the main political party, continued to haunt the stability of Pakistan state. Due to the various political problems faced by the new nation, Pakistan was unable to adopt a constitution till 1954. Crucial time was lost by the new nation in discussing the various provisions of the constitution and the political parties were not united on many of the issues. The imbalance between the various provinces further complicated the matter, paving the way for the military to take over power time and again.

Ayub Khan was the country’s first military ruler, who was followed by Yahya Khan and then Zia ul Haq. The military’s takeovers were checkered by the inability of the civilian governments to stabilize the political atmosphere or gain the confidence of the people of Pakistan. Thus, it came as no surprise that the take over of power by the military under General Musharaff was not contested by the people. This leads one to argue that though the people would prefer a democratically elected civilian government, they are not opposed to the military taking over the power structures. Despite the number of times that the military has stepped out of its designated areas from the barracks into politics, the people of Pakistan have great respect for the country’s armed forces. The defense establishment continues to have a reputation for functioning effectively and for
professional and organizational integrity. Many feel that it is the only organization that is capable of representing Pakistan and to a large extent it does. In a survey conducted by the United States Institute of Peace, titled ‘Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy and Relations with the US’, it was found that, ‘in sharp contrast to their negative views of many civilian institutions, Pakistanis express substantial confidence in the armed forces and give the army high ratings for performing traditional military functions. However, when it comes to the army’s role in the governance of the country, views are complex. While the army is seen as capable, few believe that it has a positive influence on Pakistan’s economy and politics. A plurality says that the role of the army should be limited to military matters.’ (Fair, Ramsay and Kull 2008:18).

Historians of Pakistan have pointed to some of the significant factors that provide its salience in the international system. For instance, Pakistan is a medium sized country that is strategically placed geographically in close proximity to Iran, Afghanistan and India. All countries that the United States would like to have some degree of influence on, if not close relations with. There are certain key concerns regarding Pakistan not just within the United States but also within the international community. A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is considered vital for American interests. Current top-tier American concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; domestic political stability and democratization; weapons proliferation; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions, nuclear weapons proliferation and security; human rights protection; and economic development. Pakistan remains a vital ally in American led anti-terrorism efforts. (Kronstadt 2009:1). Despite all pressures from religious parties and differences within the communities in Pakistan, it has been able to remain moderate in its political views. Nonetheless, for many Americans, especially those outside the realm of foreign policy, Pakistan is a country that is plagued by military coups, instability and the country from where terrorist organizations are able to operate.

After its creation, Pakistan was looking for friends in order to persuade them to provide it with financial support for its infrastructure development and modernization of its armed
forces. Pakistan sent its representatives to Washington to ask for financial and military assistance. In August 1947, Washington anticipated friendly relations but perceived very few important interests in the new nation of Pakistan. America did not view a very strong relation with Pakistan as being useful. The interest in the new state was for the moment very limited. For example when Pakistan sought $5 billion in economic and military assistance in 1947, it was provided with only $10 million. (Kux 2001 a: 65). The United States during this period was preoccupied with the reconstruction processes in Europe and consolidation of its positions in Japan and the Middle East. Despite this Pakistan continued to court America in the hope that it would be able to gain support of a major power to balance India’s power in the region.

To overcome the grave challenges that Pakistani security faced, the first task of Pakistani diplomacy was to find an equalizer to India. After independence Pakistan had placed its hopes on the Commonwealth and Britain, but soon found the Commonwealth under British patronage to be more favorable to India. Pakistan also explored Pan Islamism to see if it could bring the weightage of the numerous Islamic states behind it. However, it drew a blank and its call for an Islamic bloc even aroused uneasiness in countries like Egypt which were seemingly, worried that Pakistan would become a rival for leadership in the Islamic world. This left Pakistan with the option of turning to either of the two global power blocs. As it turned out under Stalin, the Soviet policy towards both India and Pakistan showed certain ideological reservations. (Amin 2000: 42-43). It was under these circumstances that Pakistan decided to become a part of the various military alliances supported by the United States. This was not an unnatural alliance. Pakistan argued that in the post war international arena, Pakistan as a nation had no affiliations towards the Soviet Union, which was in confrontation with the United States and most countries of Western Europe. In ideological terms Pakistan felt closer to the West than to communism. Moreover, the Russians had historically been on an expansionist course over the previous two centuries. As a result they had annexed vast Muslim territories in Central Asia with whom the Pakistani people had age old links. This had aroused negative perceptions about Russian intentions in Pakistan. Pakistan’s closest friends in the international arena, Iran and Turkey, were keen to join pacts sponsored by America,
as both felt threatened by Soviet Union and their attitudes influenced Pakistan. (Amin 2000: 43). Thus, Pakistan positioned itself to the United States as a natural ally in a region where the Soviets wanted to increase their influence.

**Pakistani Perceptions and their Influence on United States Policy**

Pakistan was born in an environment of insecurity and its political leadership was inadequately prepared to run an independent state. (Haqqani 2003: 35). Pakistan's external relations have been and continue to be fuelled by a sense of victimization and a never ending quest for security. It felt that it had not been treated fairly by the British in the distribution of the resources after partition and was wary of the Indian thinking that Pakistan was a nation that would not survive for long and would ultimately merge with the larger nation of India. As former Pakistani foreign minister Abdul Sattar stated, ‘Pakistan inherited neither a capital nor a government nor the financial resources to establish and equip the administration, economic and military institutions of a new state.’ (Haqqani 2003: 35). The Kashmir dispute and what it perceived to be India's hegemonic ambitions placed Pakistan in a perpetual state of confrontation with New Delhi. To make matters worse, India's relations with the then Soviet Union, a power with expansionist designs in the region, compounded Pakistan's security dilemma. It was the size of India that has always been a factor in the relations between the two nations. Pakistan's geographical location and historic legacy confronted the country with a grave threat to its security and territorial integrity.

Pakistan's need to establish a relationship with the United States was based on its need to have American support vis-a-vis any confrontation it might have with India over Kashmir. The Kashmir factor in United States-Pakistan India relations has been strongly debated by the scholars of all three countries. According to Howard B. Schaffer a veteran of the Unites States foreign services, the focus of American interest has shifted over a period of time. From 1948 to 1963 the focus of American diplomacy was usually to the United Nations, which was seen as the appropriate forum for resolving the dispute. The 1960’s saw the American policymakers’ disinclination to play a role in the efforts to
resolve the Kashmir issue. (Schaffer 2009: 3-4). The conflict is one of the oldest unresolved territorial disputes in the world. The United States has been especially concerned about the nuclearization of the two countries and the rise of radical groups in the valley in the past few years. (Fernandes 2008:120). The United States has applied different labels to the Kashmir issue from ‘self-determination’ to ‘aspiration of the Kashmiri people’ to being ‘a nuclear flash-point’ endangering international security. The constantly changing stand of the United States is reflective of the fact that the United States stand on the Kashmir issue is flexible and can be said to be dependent on two factors at a given point in time: (1) Tenor of India-United States relations and; (2) The strategic utility of Pakistan for any intended United States strategic moves in South West Asia.

In domestic politics, it became an article of faith that Pakistan was jilted by the United States after doing Washington’s bidding. Anti-American sentiments are widespread throughout Pakistan and a significant segment of the populace has viewed years of American support for the Pakistani military as an impediment to, rather than facilitator of, the process of democratization and development there. Majority of the opinion towards the United States is negative. Large majorities say that the United States cannot be trusted to act responsibly and also believe that it has extraordinary influence over Pakistan. United States military presence in the region is viewed as a threat to Pakistan. A large and growing majority believe it is a United States goal to weaken and divide the Muslim world. A plurality disapproves of how Pakistan’s government has handled relations with the United States. Only one in four feels that security cooperation with the United States has brought Pakistan any benefit. (Fair, Ramsay and Kull 2008:29). Underlying the anti-American sentiment is a pervasive, but perhaps malleable perception that the United States is fighting a war against Islam. Pakistan’s Islamist political parties are notable for their expressions of anti-American sentiment, at times calling for “jihad” against the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty, they believe an alliance with Washington entails. (Linden 2003:185). Some observers identify a causal link between the poor state of Pakistan’s public education system and the persistence of xenophobia and religious extremism in that country. Anti-American sentiment is not limited to
Islamic groups, however, many across the spectrum of Pakistani society express anger at United States global foreign policy, in particular when such policy is perceived to be unfriendly or hostile to the Muslim world [as in, for example, Palestine and Iraq]. (Kronstadt and Katzman 2008:10). Irfan Husain, in a column published in the Pakistani newspaper, The Dawn wrote,

"...we in Pakistan are quick to blame the Americans for the rise of fundamentalism in our region. We are forever recalling how they walked out after the Soviets withdrew, leaving us with the jihadis who had helped win the Afghan war. But we have had years to prevent the problem from reaching this point. However, in our version of the history of the period, the Americans are to blame.... A generation of Pakistanis has been taught that our military's position was rendered difficult due to the arms embargo the Americans had imposed on both sides at the start of the conflict.... What our students and young military cadets are not told is that in terms of the military agreement under which American arms were supplied to us, they could only be used against a communist threat. Thus, by using them against India, we had breached our agreement. Similarly, many Pakistanis blame the Americans for not bailing us out during the 1971 war. ... Cumulatively, these misinterpretations of past events have made the Americans hugely unpopular with both the Pakistani right and left. ..." (Husain 2010: Website)

The Genesis of the Relationship

In view of these arguments, this section aims at presenting evidence of the genesis of American assistance relationship with Pakistan and highlights the continued salience of certain variables that suffuse the relationship over the years. The long and checkered Pakistan-United States relationship has its roots in the Cold War and South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. With Truman in the White House, the United States sought good relations with both India and Pakistan and tried to avoid taking sides between the two countries. The principal American interest in the sub-continent was in solving the Kashmir dispute in order to prevent further instability in South Asia. The first United Nations peacekeeping operation, established during President Truman's administration, monitored the armistice ending the 1948 war between the new State of Israel and its neighbors. The second, also during Truman's tenure in the White House, observed the peace between the newly independent states of India and Pakistan. (Harry S. Truman Library News Release, 2008: Website). Since, at this time the Soviet Union was aloof
from the region, Cold War considerations were not a 'major factor in the United States policy, except with regards to Pakistan’s troubles with Afghanistan. (Kux 2001 b: 49).

The United States at this point of time was interested in establishing relations with both Pakistan and India. It wanted the two newly independent states to be part of the group of nations that supported the United States on issues in various international forums. The United States was probably helped in this notion, because of the fact that both India and Pakistan were former colonies of Britain, which was already a part of the American led bloc. In view of the realities of geopolitics in the region, the United States was not overtly enthusiastic about a relation with Pakistan lest it antagonized larger and more important India. American policymakers also felt that while India continued to maintain cordial relations with Britain, it became very clear that independent India was not going to rely on Britain for domestic or foreign affairs. American assessment in part was also the result of consultations with their British counterparts on how to deal with these two countries at that time. There were some who felt that Britain was not the central player in South Asia or should be the focus of American policy there. H.R. Mathews, of the South Asia office was of the view that, the residue of imperialism and the flowering of nationalism had diminished British view in the region to a point that only the United States could influence the situation positively. Indian leaders recognized this as their request for American assistance showed, and the United States thus had an historical opportunity to influence India not only in the Kashmir crisis but in other regional matters and in larger strategic matters as well. (McNay 2001,113-116). However, officials in Washington preferred Pakistan’s pro-western foreign policy approach to the neutralist foreign policy of India. They found Pakistani officials much easier to deal with and understand than their Indian counter parts. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s relation with Prime Minister Nehru, the embodiment of Indian nationalism and anti imperialism was an uneasy one. When the Prime Minister went on an official visit to Washington in October 1945, he came, in the words of Acheson’s confidant, George McGhee, “with a chip on his shoulder.” This estimate was hardly conducive for fruitful negotiations. (McNay 2001, 113-116)
As the Cold War intensified, American concern about Soviet expansionism merged with Pakistan's desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India that eventually prompted the two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement. Pakistan focused on building a close relationship with the United States to compensate for its limited military capacity and to build security shield against the larger and more powerful neighbor. This astute policy served Pakistan well as the state received economic and military assistance. In early 1952 Pakistan received $10 million in direct economic assistance and later that year was granted a $15 million loan by the Export-Import Bank. Pakistan faced possible famine in 1953 and the United States acted in a generous fashion. (Cloughley 2002: 37). In return, Pakistan agreed upon a Mutual Defense Agreement in 1954 which gave the United States access to facilities to monitor the activities of the Soviet Union. (Tahir-Kheli 1998: 5). Under the terms of the agreement, Pakistan received about $270 million from 1951-1958 through the PL-480 (public law 480) While the loans mainly provided for purchase of American wheat, 30 percent was designated for military sales, 11 percent for providing loans to American and Pakistani firms engaged in marketing of American goods and 3 percent for the United States for its propaganda activities in Pakistan. (Shah 2006: 58). The underlying reasons for this generous economic and military assistance was the need felt by Washington to build a major buffer against the Soviets in the regions. The 1959 exclusive defense agreement between the two provided Pakistan with additional weapons for its armed forces. Islam was seen as natural counter to communism and Pakistan was Muslim state located near the world's two biggest communist states.

It was under President Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles that the relationship between the United States and Pakistan became very close. When assistance was requested, President Eisenhower asked Congress to authorize a grant of over a million tons of wheat. Between the mid 1950's to mid 1960's, American arms assistance amounted to $650 million. This made Pakistan one of the largest recipients of American assistance in the third world. (Tahir Kheli 1998: 33). Later it was stated by the Secretary of State Dulles,
"... (Pakistan and the United States are) very friendly to each other, that the people of Pakistan (are) very strong in their Islamic faith which is absolutely opposed as our faith, to the view of Soviet Communism which treats man as a mechanical thing to be dealt with on a purely materialistic basis." (Cloughley 2002: 38)

As a democratic ally Pakistan was held up as a model for the Islamic world, although no other Muslim state regarded it as such. (Cohen 2006: 302). By 1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization to become what General Ayub called America’s ‘most allied ally in Asia’ in an article “The Pakistan America Alliance” he wrote for the Foreign Affairs magazine in 1964. Thus, Pakistan was associated with the United States through not one, but four mutual security arrangements. In his State of the Union Address (1956), the President spoke of how,

"... the free world has seen major gains for the system of collective security: the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Western European Union of the sovereign Federal German Republic; the developing cooperation under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty; and the formation in the Middle East of the Baghdad Pact among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. ... While maintaining our military deterrent, we must intensify our efforts to achieve a just peace. In Asia we shall continue to give help to nations struggling to maintain their freedom against the threat of Communist coercion or subversion.” (Eisenhower 1956: Website).

Pakistan continued joining western alliances under Ayub Khan as a part of his defensive foreign policy- a kind of foreign policy designed with the intention of protecting the country from foreign aggression of offensive states. This had an impact on foreign relationships under Ayub Khan. He inherited a pro-United States foreign relationship, the direction of which since the fifties forcefully advocated the country’s participation in British-sponsored Middle East Defense Organization-MEDO- which later became popularly known as Baghdad Pact- and associated hope of foreign assistance from the United States. Ayub Khan himself gave reasons for the alliance in his political autobiography, ‘Friends Not Masters’. He wrote that, it would bring together like-minded Islamic countries such as Turkey, the then Royal Iraq and Iran. As a result of these alliances, Islamabad received nearly $2 billion in American assistance from 1953 to 1961, including $508 million in military assistance. This assistance was given to withstand the onslaught of oppressive regimes, making Pakistan one of America’s most
important security assistance partners of the period. (Kronstadt 2009: 32). In turn, Pakistan allowed America to set a large intelligence communication center and allowed America to use Pakistan air force bases to carry out operations against the Soviet Union. The consequences of these resulted in the U-2 spy plane incident which brought Pakistan in direct confrontation with USSR. A diplomatic row erupted between two countries. The U-2 aircraft incident indeed created security hazards for Pakistan. The plane was shot down by the Russians and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, arrested on its soil. The Soviet Premier Khrushchev warned Pakistan of its consequences as the plane had flown from the Pakistani soil from the facilities, it afforded to United States for surveillance and intelligence purposes. After Soviet leader Khrushchev found out about the flights from Pakistan soil, he was furious. He sent a threatening message to Pakistani President Ayub Khan which told him that Badabare was now a targeted city in case of a hot war between the United States and the USSR. (Ansari, The Pakistan Daily 2010: website). The base was closed in 1968 after Pakistan denied the extension of the contract for another decade to United States. In his article on Pakistan, in ‘Perspective of President’ published in Foreign Affairs in July 1960, Ayub Khan wrote: “The next 15 to 20 years are going to be most crucial for Pakistan. Either we make the grade in this period or we do not. If we fail to make the grade, we are bound to submerge under tidal wave of communism which is constantly lashing its fury all around us. Since we do not seek this fate, we must move forward and do so quickly. It is here that our eyes turn towards our friends and allies.”

Pakistan became closer to United States during this second phase of Pakistan’s foreign policy when it depended on American support for political and economic assistance. (Kundi 2009 :192-203).

However the two countries had very divergent interests for pursuing this relationship. The differing interests were apparent when President Kennedy, decided to give assistance to India to fight the war against China, Pakistan was very disappointed. While President Kennedy saw India as a potential partner in containing China, Pakistan saw India as the biggest threat in the region and China as a potential partner against India. However, for America, China was the bigger foe in Asia that needed to be checked. While the President did not wish to dismantle the security pacts that had bound Washington to
Karachi for more than six years, the administration was not fully persuaded that these agreements were as important for American interest as they had seemed earlier. (Schaffer 2009: 65). The decision to arm India, which the Pakistanis bitterly resented, brought into sharp focus the fundamental flaws of the United States-Pakistan alliance. For America, military assistance to India during the Sino India war was part of a global effort to contain the same challenges from Communist aggression that had promoted it to bring Pakistan into the western security camp. For Pakistan, the assistance undercut the very different purpose it had in allying with the United States-to bolster itself militarily, economically and politically against the threat it perceived from India. (Schaffer 2009: 75). President Johnson, continuing to maintain the even handed policy of the previous administration suspended both military and economic assistance to Pakistan (along with India) during the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. This move effected Pakistan more than India as it was more dependent on American assistance. The United States suspension of assistance resulted in a cooling of the Pakistan-United States relationship and a growing perception among many in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally.

Under President Kennedy and President Johnson, Pakistan’s close relations with China was not appreciated. President Ayub went to Washington in December 1965 for talks with President Johnson, who made it very to the Pakistani ruler that the alliance between the United States and Pakistan was now over. The American President also emphasized that the relationship would hinge to a great extent on Pakistan’s willingness to curtail its ties to China. (Cloughley 2002: 132). The administration adopted a tougher policy on American economic assistance to Pakistan and forced a two month postponement of the annual World Bank-chaired aid pledging session. According to Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff, ‘the postponement was designed to show to the Pakistan President Ayub that American assistance was far from automatic, and to be a forceful reminder that his relations with Communist China and other United States-Pakistan difficulties could endanger his nation’s economy.’ (Schaffers 2009: 106).
Prior to the 1965 outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan, the United States provided Pakistan with millions of dollars worth of equipments and services under the military grant assistance, excess property, sales, and ship loan programs. This assistance was provided under the terms of a mutual defense assistance agreement between the Governments of the United States and Pakistan and under other related bilateral agreements. On September 8, 1965, the United States placed an embargo on the supply of military equipment to India and Pakistan because of the outbreak of hostilities between the two countries. However, by 1966 America had second thoughts about the military situation in Pakistan in light of Chinese guarantees and Soviet overturns in the regions. The United States modified the embargo early in 1966 to permit India and Pakistan to purchase non-lethal articles with a case-by-case determination being made by United States officials. (US GAO 1972: 1-2).

In 1967, after an extensive policy review, the United States decided, among other actions, that (1) grant military aid, suspended since 1965, would not be resumed except for a possible small military training program in the United States and (2) requests for the sale of ammunition and spare parts for military equipment previously provided, including previously barred spares for lethal equipment, would be considered on a case-by-case basis, in addition to requests to purchase non-lethal items. (US GAO 1972: 1-2). The United States restarted economic assistance programs to the two countries, and gradually extended this to include the supply of defense material. When the United States started the supply of defense material, it was confined to 'non lethal' items. The following year the embargo was relaxed to permit provision for spare parts and existing American equipment. (Cloughley 2002: 135-136). Nonetheless, America faced antagonism in the two countries. The overwhelming sentiment in Pakistan was that America had failed to honor its treaty obligations and in doing so had betrayed a friend and an ally. The belief was that America was an unfaithful partner and this sentiment would be a powerful influence in shaping Pakistanis’ assessment of Washington’s reliability in dealing with them in the future. In India, Washington faced the criticism of being unable to fulfill its promise that the arms and ammunition that it was supplying to Pakistan under its various
assistance programs would not be used against India. It was a serious set back for American interests in South Asia.

There was a change in United States policy towards Pakistan under President Nixon. This was the period when America "tilted" towards Pakistan. Recently released records of the State department titled "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971", clearly record the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in East Bengal blooming in South Asia during this period in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved, to his "tilt" toward Pakistan was highlighted by the dispatch of the aircraft carrier, The Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war, that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect an emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents this concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. (Smith and Keefer, Office of the Historian 2005: website).

Under President Nixon, Pakistan's close relationship with China was exploited to bring America and China closer to each other. This was the era of 'détente' in which America wanted to pursue its relations with China to contain the Soviet Union and Pakistan provided the means though which Secretary of State Kissinger could establish relations with China. Relations remained close and friendly during the tenure of President Nixon, however, he was unable to lift the arms embargo that had been imposed on Pakistan and India during the 1960's and because of the realities of the problems of East Pakistan, Pakistan was not seen very favorably by the American public. American public opinion was very critical of Pakistan's conduct. They did not want their government to be
supportive of a regime that was suppressive and imprisoning a members of a democratically elected government. On 7 April 1971, an editorial in the New York Times declared, 'Washington’s persistent silence on recent events in Pakistan is increasingly incomprehensible in the light of eyewitness evidence that the Pakistani Army has engaged in indiscriminate slaughter.' Members of the Congress criticized the President on his Pakistan policy. (Haqqani 2005: 81-82). In fact the Department of State stated that, "The advantage of not involving ourselves at this stage is that we do not prematurely harm our relationship with West Pakistan." (Office of Historian, Department of State 1971: website). After reviewing the situation in East Pakistan, the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) agreed that the United States should continue its policy of non-involvement in the dispute between West and East Pakistan. In particular, the United States should avoid being placed in a position where it could be accused of having encouraged the break-up of Pakistan. The WSAG agreed that the United States should delay action on any request that might be forthcoming for recognition of an independent East Pakistani regime. The WSAG agreed that the State Department should be responsible for monitoring developments in Pakistan on a day-to-day basis and for insuring that the White House is fully informed. (Office of Historian, Department of State 1971: website).

The Assistance Program from President Carter to Bush Sr.

According to the USAID, Pakistan received $937.3 million in economic assistance between 1972 and 1977, the years that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto governed the country. The United States military assistance during this period however, stood at a meager $1.7 million, most of it for training of officers and equipment spare parts. In 1975, the United States removed the ban it had imposed on military sales to Pakistan during the 1965 war, but Pakistan had not acquired any new weapons system during the time of Zia’a coup. (Haqqani 2005:105). The election of President Jimmy Carter and his emphasis on ideals of human rights, non proliferation and democracy further strained the relationship and pushed it further in a downward turn. The administration of President Carter was unhappy with Pakistan for the military take over of the government of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto and his subsequent imprisonment and execution despite a global plea for clemency. The United States had to finally halt assistance worth $85 million in April 1979 as the clandestine efforts of Pakistan to develop a nuclear weapon became hard to ignore.

A number of United States laws, amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act\(^1\) of 1961, applied to Pakistan and its program of nuclear weapons development. The 1976 *Symington Amendment*\(^2\) stipulated that economic assistance be terminated to any country that imported uranium enrichment technology. The *Glenn Amendment*\(^3\) of 1977 similarly called for an end to assistance to countries that imported reprocessing technology—Pakistan had done that from France. In April 1979, President Carter had imposed unilateral military and economic sanctions under the Symington amendment after Pakistan reportedly attempted to enrich weapons grade uranium. (Shah 2006: 59).

America's relationship with Pakistan which was already at a low point after the United States cut off assistance in April 1979 over Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, and criticized the human rights record of Pakistani leader General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, hit rock bottom when the United States embassy was attacked in November 1979 leading to the death of embassy officials in what appeared to have been an orchestrated day of anti-American violence while the Pakistani government stood as mute spectators. (BBC 1979 website). The violence had been sparked by a false report that the United States was involved in a fire at the Grand Mosque in Mecca. In the United States, the image of Pakistan as a friend and an ally for the containment of communism was in shreds in what they felt was a delayed response by the law enforcement apparatus of Pakistan.

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1. The Foreign Assistance Act is a United States Act of Congress. The Act recognized United States foreign assistance programs and separated military and non-military aid. It also mandated the creation of an agency to administer economic assistance programs.
2. The Symington Amendment is legislation introduced by Stuart Symington, a Democratic senator from Missouri, authored to strengthen the US position on nuclear non-proliferation. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was amended by the Symington Amendment (Section 669 of the FAA) in 1976. It banned U.S. economic, and military assistance, and export credits to countries that deliver or receive, acquire or transfer nuclear enrichment technology when they do not comply with IAEA regulations and inspections. This provision, as amended, is now contained in Section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).
3. Under the Glenn Amendment, if the President determines that a non-nuclear weapon state [as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)] detonates a nuclear explosive device, certain sanctions apply. The sanctions impose broad-ranging restrictions on various types of assistance, loans, and trade.
President Zia sought to rebuild relations with the United States. The United States was initially not interested but with increased Soviet involvement in Afghanistan it could not ignore the region anymore. Relations changed dramatically with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One may even say that this was the coming of the second America-Pakistan alliance. Between 1978 and 1988, United States provided Pakistan with $2.5 billion in economic and $1.7 billion in military assistance on a bilateral basis. This was far greater than the $937 million in economic assistance and $1.7 million in military sales during the period of President Bhutto’s civilian government. In addition, Pakistan received generous assistance from other western donors as well. Expenditure by the international community on maintaining the Afghan refugees in the country as well as covert assistance channeled to Afghan mujahideen through Pakistan also boosted the Pakistani economy. (Haqqani 2005: 152).

During the war against the Soviet occupation, Pakistan served as the primary logistical conduit for the Afghan resistance. (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs US DoS, 2010; website). Pakistan’s security apparatus became the primary means of funneling covert United States assistance to anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union militarily intervened in Afghanistan in the late 1979, all the sanctions applied on Pakistan were swiftly waived to rally Pakistan as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. Washington was mild in its language regarding the return of democracy; it started to underestimate the tensions between India and Pakistan. The United States chose to avert its attention from the nuclear program that was being pursued by Pakistan. The paramount issue for the United States was Pakistan’s cooperation in the war against the Soviet Union in its neighborhood. Pakistan became the ‘frontline state’ and President Carter revived the 1956 American commitment to protect Pakistan (against communism) and offered to resume military and economic assistance. He proposed a $400 million assistance program that was spurned and famously called ‘peanuts’ by Pakistani President Zia but was accepted nonetheless. However, what President Zia and Pakistan did not acknowledge was the fact that the relationship was no longer dictated by non proliferation concerns. Perhaps, it is useful to recall that in a report to the Congress, the Comptroller General had suggested that United States assistance to Pakistan be
reassessed. Writing to both the House and the Senate, the report discussed the basic factors pertaining to Pakistan’s economic condition and the need to reassess United States assistance policy to Pakistan. Effectively, as pointed out by a leading scholar on South Asia, Stephen Cohen, the United States allowed a country in turmoil to continue to develop its nuclear policy. America also failed to acknowledge the uneven economic growth; lack of development of the social infrastructure, the crumbling of the education system and the rapid radicalization of the youth and the growth of fundamental Islam. No American administration thought it important to ask why Pakistan’s education system was collapsing and why Islamic schools were replacing them. The latter were considered ‘soft’ issues and beyond the concern of the American national interest. They now form the core of American nation security policy. (Cohen 2006: 303).

During the Presidency of Ronald Regan the assistance program expanded. From 1980 to 1990, the United States ramped up its contributions for both development and military purposes, sending more than five billion dollars over the course of the decade. (Newsweek Online 2009: website). Pakistan was given assistance packages amounting to $600 million a year and further expansion of covert operations, along with $100 million per year in economic assistance. Presidential waivers for several of the amendments were required for this assistance to be granted. The Regan administration believed that security assistance had four goals: it enabled friends to work for peace and democratic reforms: it provided a tangible means for the transition of rhetoric in to action: it bolstered friendly forces in areas of vital interest to the United States and it brought stability to regimes under the stress. (Tahir Kheli 1998: 45). For the administration the case of Pakistan fulfilled all these criteria. The Regan administration provided a follow-on program of assistance over a further period of six years which gave a $3.2 billion economic and military assistance package, 50% of which was to be tied to the sale of American military equipment. Another $0.4 billion assistance package was signed in 1987. (Shah 2009: 59). While expanding the security assistance program to Pakistan the administration of president Regan also tried to expand ties with India. Washington understood the importance of India to the Afghan efforts. As India was a friend of the Soviet Union, its
policy on Afghanistan counted in Moscow. (Tahir Kheli 1998: 41). It was though that the United States through India could try an end the crisis in Afghanistan.

In September 1981, the Reagan administration negotiated a $3.2 billion, 5-year economic and military assistance package with Pakistan. Congress facilitated the resumption of assistance in December by adding Section 620E to the FAA\textsuperscript{4}, giving the President authority to waive Section 669 for 6 years in the case of Pakistan, on grounds of national interest. Pakistan became a funnel for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as a camp for three million Afghan refugees (Blood 2002: website). However, in 1985 the American Congress passed the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.\textsuperscript{5} The Amendment stated that American assistance and government to government military sales would be cut off unless the President could certify annually that Pakistan did not possess a ‘nuclear explosive device’. Given the need for continued Pakistani cooperation in the anti-Soviet efforts, the United States continued to provide such waiver until 1989 even though Pakistan had declared its capacity to both enrich uranium for weapons purposes and to assemble an atomic weapon. (Shah 2009: 59).

America agreed that the nuclear issue will not be the center piece of the relations, but warned Pakistan against exploding the device. The American policy makers had expressed hope that the renewal of assistance would promote the Pakistan government to give up its desire to posses a nuclear device. As is evident from letters that were exchanged between the Congress and President Reagan and later President George H. W.

\textsuperscript{4} Section 620E of the FAA, adopted by Congress in 1981 following the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, sought to reconcile U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy with urgent U.S. regional security interests. Section 620E is Pakistan-specific, having been adopted to reaffirm a 1959 U.S.-Pakistan bilateral security agreement and to permit the resumption of U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan by granting authority to the President to waive Section 669 in Pakistan’s case if he decides that to do so is in the national interest. The waiver authority was granted initially for a period of 6 years, facilitating the Reagan Administration’s commitment of a 6-year, $3.2 billion package of economic and military aid to Pakistan. The waiver authority was periodically extended by Congress after that date but subject to increasing conditions, especially the Section 620E(e) certification requirement.

\textsuperscript{5} The Pressler Amendment prohibits United States assistance and aid to the government of Pakistan unless the President can certify that Pakistan is not in possession of a nuclear explosive device. In October 1990, economic and military sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, a country-specific law that singles out only one nation on the nuclear issue.
Bush between 1985-1989, required under sec. 620(e) of Foreign Assistance Act (Pressler Amendment)—

'The proposed United States assistance program for Pakistan remains extremely important in reducing the risk that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a device. I am convinced that our security relationship and assistance program are the most effective means available for us to dissuade Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive devices. Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan address its substantial and legitimate security needs, thereby both reducing incentives and creating disincentives for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives.'—President George H.W.Bush, 10/5/89; President Ronald Reagan, 11/18/88; 12/17/87; 10/27/86; & 11/25/85.

Assistant Secretary of State James Malone, in his address before Atomic Industrial Forum, San Francisco, 1 December 1981 stated:

'We believe that this assistance—which is in the strategic interest of the United States—will make a significant contribution to the well-being and security of Pakistan and that it will be recognized as such by that government. We also believe that, for this reason, it offers the best prospect of deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding with the testing or acquisition of nuclear explosives.'(Congressional Record, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998)

Putting the administration in the dock however, Senator John Glenn in his testimony on "U.S./Pakistan Nuclear Issues", before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on 30 July 1992 stated,

"Between 1982 and 1990, America provided over four billion dollars in assistance to Pakistan, about half of which was military. Some people think this aid was solely intended to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan, a goal we shared with Pakistan. My staff, however, has identified 20 official administration statements claiming since 1981 that military assistance would address Pakistan's security concerns and thereby keep Pakistan from acquiring the bomb. Given these many claims, the answer to my first question is crystal clear: the military transfers and other assistance were explicitly justified to Congress as instruments of a nuclear nonproliferation policy.... Unfortunately, the much-heralded nonproliferation benefits never materialized...." (The Pressler Amendment And Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program [Senate - July 31, 1992]).

Despite Pakistan's assurances, the Regan administration, when it came to the Congress to renew the assistance packages to Pakistan, had to accept the amendment that was introduced by Senator Larry Pressler (R,SD) to the Foreign Assistance Act to prohibit all American assistance to Pakistan if the President failed to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device.
The view that Pakistan should refrain from a nuclear program was reinforced time and again during the first Bush administration. However, when Pakistan led by Benazir Bhutto was unable to assure Washington that it would roll back on its final steps of processing the nuclear devise by matching the uranium metal to the bomb core, the Bush administration suspended assistance under the provision of the Pressler amendment then running close to $6 million a year, the largest assistance program after Israel and Egypt. The imposition of the provisions of the Pressler amendment sanction affected the security relations shared by America and Pakistan.

With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, beginning in May 1988 Pakistan’s nuclear activities again came under close United States scrutiny, President George H.W. Bush stopped assistance and imposed sanctions. In fact the years between 1990 to 1993 became crisis ridden years for the two countries. Relations between the two nations passed from one crisis to another. Relations sunk to an all-time low when Washington threatened in 1992-93 to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism for the support that it was giving to terrorist outfits that were operating in Kashmir and Punjab against India. However, despite repeated appeals by India, the State Department did not act upon its threat after assessing that Pakistan had imposed a policy of not supporting the terrorists.

In the summer of 1993 however, additional sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for allegedly receiving missile technology from China. The sanctions mandated a two-year ban on American government contracts and American licensed exports to the defense ministries of Pakistan and China. As a result, the bilateral interaction between Pakistan and China became virtually confined to crisis-management or damage-limitation efforts. The relationship seemed to be a state of free fall. The only silver lining in this downslide was Pakistan-United States...

After reaffirming the United States victory in the Cold War President Bush Sr. sent a budget to the Congress that contained a substantial increase in assistance for the former adversaries from that conflict. However, there was a sharp reduction in military assistance request for Pakistan ($100 Million in 1992) while it made no such request in 1993. (Congressional Quarterly 1993: 94-95). By 1993, the economic assistance pipeline had become dry as the Pressler sanctions barred any new assistance commitments. This put the United States, long Pakistan's main and sole source of foreign assistance, out of the assistance bid. The only assistance that was being provided to Pakistan by the United States was humanitarian aid that was not barred by the amendment. Private charitable institutes like CARE and Catholic relief services continued with their modest programs of assistance, like food assistance, in Pakistan. (Kux 2001 b: 320-323). One of the most serious results of the assistance cutoff for Pakistan was the non-delivery of some 71 F-16 fighter aircraft ordered in 1989. A search was made for a third country buyer in order to reimburse Pakistan $658 million it had paid for the fighter planes. Deeply frustrated by the non-delivery of its planes and the non-refund of its money, the Pakistan government considered going to court over the matter. (Blood 2002: online book). The administration's decision to allow commercial sale of military equipment was also attacked by the Senate. Pakistan among the top recipient of American assistance had complained that it was unfairly penalized for a nuclear program that was pursued in response to a similar program in neighboring India. (Congressional Quarterly 1993: 555-556). In Pakistan's view it was no accident that the application of sanctions coincided with the end of the Cold War. According to Pakistani perceptions the Pressler sanctions were applied when Pakistan's co-operation was no longer needed following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent break up of Soviet Union. Pakistanis argued that the nuclear program was not the real issue for the assistance cut off. (Tahir Kheli 1998: 64).
Pakistan bitterly resented this action and the United States was seen as an unreliable friend. Given the economic straits that the country was facing during the 1990's finding financial resources to maintain the defense force, that had seen a dramatic improvement as a result of the Afghan war, proved difficult. In view of these constraints Pakistan developed closer bi-lateral relations with China. Also in view of the fluctuating relations with America, Pakistan faced difficulty in maintaining the conventional force capabilities, in such a situation the nuclear weapons of the country which is under the control of the army achieved significant importance as a deterrent against India. Pakistan's leaders felt that the nuclear option was too important to be held hostage to other interests and that Washington's interests were too intertwined with Pakistan for America to abandon all ties. For Pakistan the end of the Cold War as well as the end of the Afghanistan conflict brought with them their own crises to the nation. The end of the conflict found close to two millions Afghan refugees in Pakistan. There was a rise in the influx of sophisticated weapons and the narcotics trade flourished from Afghanistan to regions of Pakistan.

When President George H. W. Bush left office in 1993, the glue of Cold War and the common struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan no longer cemented United States-Pakistan ties. The end of the Cold War provided the United States with an opportunity to re-evaluate its relations with Pakistan with an eye towards the new global security environment, in which it was the lone super power. In the absence of any other significant shared national interests, bilateral differences began to dominate the relationship. As observers noted, for the United States, Pakistan had lost its strategic importance and instead became a nuclear trouble maker that it could no longer control and a source of regional instability. Thus, one can say that the demise of the Cold War did not leave South Asia in peace. The relations did not improve between the two countries despite the Brown amendment paving the way for Pakistan to overcome the provision of the Pressler amendment.
The Post Cold War Years

President Clinton had to face a world vastly different from the one his predecessors knew. The end of the Cold War had left the United States in a position of unprecedented preponderance, America's economy being 40 percent larger than that of its nearest rival, and its defense spending equaling the next six countries combined. Four of these six countries are close American allies, so America's advantage was even larger. The United States led the world in higher education, scientific research, and advanced technology (especially information technologies), which made it hard for other states to catch up quickly. This extraordinary position of power would endure well into this century. America's unrivaled strategic position has several important but paradoxical implications for the conduct of foreign policy. First, United States preponderance gives it tremendous freedom of action. Because the United States is so secure and has such a large surplus of economic and military power, its leaders can pursue objectives that no other state would contemplate. This situation stands in marked contrast to the Cold War, when the Soviet threat gave the leaders of America a clear set of priorities and imposed discipline on the conduct of foreign policy. But with the Soviet Union gone, American leaders could pursue a wide range of goals without worrying very much about how others would respond. (Walt 2000: website).

With the exception of the nuclear proliferation issue the United States policy towards Pakistan and indeed, India, was largely one of lack of concern. The American attention was diverted by the consequence of the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the war in Iraq (1991). With the turmoil of the international global order as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, America turned its focus from preponderance of foreign policy issues to weighing in domestic policies. The Gulf War (1991) was America's display of power as the lone superpower. It was able to showcase to the world that it had the power and the strength to be the most powerful nation in the international system. However, American economy was facing a recession and with the absence of a visible opponent in the form of the Soviet Union, American policy makers shifted focus to the domestic socio-political and economic issue. As the then Presidential hopeful
Clinton said in his campaign, “It’s the economy stupid”. Americans were concerned about the state of the economy and identified with the then candidate and later President.

The central objective of the Clinton administration, that came to occupy the White House in 1993, was to promote democracy and stability and free market economies. It was under the Clinton administration that the United States truly started to follow a post containment foreign policy. This was nowhere more evident than in President Clinton’s national security statement that linked elements of foreign policy to security assistance, like: maintaining strong military forces with a peace time forward presence commitments, and responding to global threats that are posed by terrorism. (Lindsay & Ripley 1997: 226). He also included the spread of biological and chemical weapons, supporting multilateral peace operations and perhaps the most important was the promotion of democracy and human rights. In the State of the Union address in 1994 he said,

“...there are still dangers in the world: rampant arms proliferation, bitter regional conflicts, ethnic and nationalist tensions in many new democracies, severe environmental degradation the world over, and fanatics who seek to cripple the world's cities with terror. As the world's greatest power, we must therefore maintain our defenses and our responsibilities...the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.” (Clinton 1995:132).

In the State of the Union address a year later President Clinton made it very clear that “Our security still depends on our continued world leadership for peace and freedom and democracy. We still can't be strong at home unless we're strong abroad.” These statements gave the security assistance a prominent role in strengthening America’s ties with its allies and friends.

The United States policy during this period was primarily focused on deterring and reversing the increasing nuclear weaponisation of the subcontinent. Documents from the Clinton administration reveal that the major interests were to prevent a major war, nuclear proliferation, expanding economic growth, trade and investment, promoting robust democratic institutions and cooperating on issues raging from enhancing security across the region to combating trafficking. The Clinton administration, like its
predecessor, sought expanded bilateral relations and a more realistic approach to the issue of non-proliferation. However, both India and Pakistan became de-facto nuclear weapons states since then. This status triggered American sanctions against both nations but Pakistan felt the impact more than India, being more dependent on American assistance. The result was that relations became constrained and the United States had to focus on reestablishing a more stable and sustainable plateau for relations.

Bilateral relations are viewed differently by the leaders and citizens of the two countries involved at different times. As pointed out by noted South Asia expert Dennis Kux, in the case of Pakistan and the United States the gap may be one of the largest existing between basically friendly countries. (Kux 2001: 5). These gaps grew after the end of the Cold War as differencing interests have created rifts in the relations. While the United States wanted an ally against communism during the Cold War, it wants a friend against its fight against terrorism. On the other hand, Pakistan wanted and still does want a partner against the threat of India. From the perspective of the United States while, they were not comfortable with the idea of non-alignment that formed the foundation of Indian foreign policy and were wary of the close friendship that it shared with communist Russia, they did not view India as an enemy. While the relationship between the two nations, unlike Pakistan and America may not have been very close but they were friendly at all times. Washington has always felt a greater affinity to Pakistan which may have led them to believe that it can deal with Pakistan pretty much as it chooses with very few downsides to whatever stance it adopted. What was lost in the equation was the realization that extremely anti-American regimes have sought Pakistan’s cooperation in developing advance military weapons in return for more important financial cooperation. This is evident from the sale of nuclear technology from Pakistan to Libya and North Korea. It is being also speculated that there are other nations that may have got the technology to develop nuclear weapons from Pakistan.

Anti-American feelings in Pakistan stem from a combination of historical and current events as well as domestic and international issues. It involves the inability of the United States to come to the assistance of Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis, using Pakistan
for its own interests, and opposition to Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program, its involvement with the military regimes and support for the generals who come to power undermining the civilian establishments and an amicable settlement of the Afghan issue. Apart from these domestic issues, certain international issues also plague the relationship, like American global policy to support Israel, and use of force to bring about regime change.

America was grateful for the help that Pakistan provided during the Afghanistan war. In an effort to control the Pakistani quest for nuclear power the Clinton administration proposed the sale of 38 new F-16 fighters worth $658 million to Pakistan in exchange for proof that Pakistan has capped its nuclear program. Congressional actions during this period subordinated the bilateral relations to the nuclear issue, most notably in the case of Pakistan and to some extent with respect to India. The House International Relations Committee approved a bill which contained authorization for both the State Department and foreign aid account. The Committee urged the Clinton administration to find a buyer for the F-16 planes purchased by Pakistan several years ago. The committee approved that proceeds from the sale should go towards reimbursing Pakistan. (Congressional Quarterly 1996: 10{4-5}). The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted in favor of an amendment to ease sanctions on military assistance to Pakistan that were imposed in 1990 because of Islamabad's nuclear weapons program. A similar proposal was also approved by the House Committee. The amendment proposed by Senator Hank Brown (R. Colo.) came to be known as the "Brown Amendment". 7 It was in response to the Pressler amendment that was applied to Pakistan. Section 559 of P.L. 104-107, provides a 'clarification' of restrictions on assistance contained in Section 620E (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act. The revised Section 620E narrows the scope of the aid cutoff to military assistance and transfers. It expressly allows cooperation for such purposes as countering terrorism and narcotics trafficking, promoting airport security and safety, and

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7 In May 1995, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted by a near unanimous, bipartisan vote, an amendment moved by Republican Senator, Hank Brown to ease Pressler sanctions. This sought to remove from the purview of Pressler all non-military assistance. In the House of Representatives, a similar effort was spearheaded by the newly elected Republican Chairman of the House International Relations Sub-Committee on South Asia, Doug Bereuter, who proposed an amendment to remove Pressler restrictions on all forms of non-military assistance.
ease restrictions on the transfer of military equipment to Pakistan would upset the balance in the region. (Anonymous 2003: website).

President Bill Clinton imposed trade and credit sanction on India and Pakistan shortly after they had exploded nuclear weapons in May 1998 under the provision of the Arms Control Export Act contained in 1994 State Department authorization on law (PL 103-236). The President was allowed to waive the sanctions under the provisions in a house bill (HR 973) that aimed to increase Congressional tracking of United States military arms sales. (Congressional Quarterly 2000: 23 {26}). United States and a number of India’s and Pakistan’s other major trading partners imposed economic sanctions in response to the nuclear tests. Expressing his concern over the nuclear tests, President Clinton in a statement said,

“These tests can only serve to increase tensions in an already volatile region. With their recent tests, Pakistan and India are contributing to a self-defeating cycle of escalation that does not add to the security of either country. Both India and Pakistan need to renounce further nuclear and missile testing immediately and take decisive steps to reverse this dangerous arms race. I will continue to work with leaders throughout the international community to reduce tensions in south Asia, to preserve the global consensus on nonproliferation....” (Clinton 1998:website).

On 12 October 1999, the Pakistani army led by General Pervez Musharraf ousted the civilian government headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a coup. This was the fourth time in Pakistan’s fifty two year history that the army was overthrowing a legitimately constituted civilian government. The United States imposed additional restrictions on assistance to Pakistan because of its delinquency on foreign loan payments and because of the military coup that took place in October 1999. (Lum 2008: website). Most economic sanctions, however, were lifted or eased within a few months of their imposition. Congress gave the President the authority to remove all remaining restrictions.

In the aftermath of the coup, the State Department announced that it would cut off remaining economic assistance to the country, as required by American law. Previous sanctions due to nuclear testing in 1998 had already reduced American assistance to less
than $5 million per year. Aid and trade sanctions imposed on Pakistan following the May 1998 nuclear tests sent the country into an economic tailspin, but the October coup virtually ensured the sanctions would stay in place. The International Monetary Fund had delayed payment of a $1.5 billion credit because of questions about Pakistan's economic policies, and following the coup suspended talks with the government. While ongoing World Bank projects continued and $2.28 billion of a major loan program had already been disbursed, the bank said no new disbursements would be made and payment of another $1.3 billion loan approved was held up until democracy was restored. (Human Rights Watch 2009: website). The coup raised a number of questions for the American policy maker on the issues of political stability and viability of democracy in the country. From an arms control and nonproliferation perspective, the military takeover raised significant questions about nuclear stability in Pakistan in particular and South Asia in general. Although the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, (2000) gave the President authority to permanently waive all nuclear test related sanction, President Clinton waived few restrictions on Pakistan. Assistance to Pakistan dropped dramatically from 1991 to 2000 to a mere $429 million in economic assistance and $5.2 million in military assistance. The United States blocked delivery of major military equipment, including approximately 28 F-16 jets that Pakistan had already purchased. Pakistan continued to receive only a small amount of economic assistance, mostly in the form of food aid and counter-narcotics support. (Korb 2007: website).

During the last two years of the administration of President Clinton and the new term of President George W. Bush, Pakistan was largely ignored for the emerging India. And the American public and the policy makers viewed Pakistan as less of an ally and more as an irritant in the relationship. Relations between the world's two largest democracies witnessed many ups and downs. Natural affinities between the two countries, characterized by pluralistic and open societies, common language, good track record of democracy, common commitment to the rule of law and basic freedoms, did not yield the desired results because of differing positions during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War coinciding with the liberalization of the Indian economy saw steady improvement in United States and India relations with the Clinton administration identifying India as one
of the ten major emerging markets. While the nuclear tests were a temporary set back, the Americans recognized the need to engage India and normalize relations. (Government of India 2010).

**The War on Terrorism and Pakistan- United States Assistance Relationship**

As globalization brought people, cultures, and economies closer together, ethical practices in global governance became crucial. Globalization of social, cultural, and economic forces led to an increased interdependence in the world. New paradigms and frameworks, and an interdisciplinary approach to global social welfare, were required. The “9/11” attacks illustrated how the image of the America, as the dominant superpower in the world, could create a backlash which fuelled an increase in terrorism and resentment towards a perceived imbalance of global power. (Urada 2005: 1). The result following the tragic event heralded a new order, which is still unfolding. There are areas of continuity and change from the previous decades characterizing this transformation. Transnational terrorism that was the major security issue for a large number of states especially developing states, became the primary security concern for the United States. The America foreign policy is in the process of reorienting itself with a view to tackling the menace of terrorism. Pakistan once again assumed the position of a frontline state as Afghanistan became the target of a new American war in Asia. (Kundi 2007:32).

Pakistan was propelled to the position of a pivotal player for the United States in a region which resumed importance as vital to United States security interests. Till the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Pakistan was a pariah state. However, the tragic event and the subsequent war on terror have again brought geo-politics to the fore. Pakistan due to its geo- strategic location and past policies has to bear the brunt of the impact of the war on terrorism. Pakistan’s tactical value became self evident with the source of the terrorist attacks being traced to Afghanistan. (Behera 2004: 3 & 8). Its international isolation was a dramatic turnaround for a country that has been a client state of the United States during the Cold War years.
Pakistan had the cold comfort of knowing that it could be put in the list of 'states sponsoring terrorism'. It is an annual list that is compiled by the Department of State. Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on United States foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. (Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism DoS 2009: website). In the summer of 2001 on his first visit to India to promote the National Missile Defence program that would shield the United States and its allies (in this case, India), the United States Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Armitage lumped Pakistan along with the other rogue states and had stated that the Cold War relationship with Pakistan was a false relationship and worried about its nuclear program. Elaborating the falsity of Pakistan–United States ties, he said, "It's been a relationship that wasn't based on Pakistan. It was based against someone else - in the first instance India and their relationship with the Soviet Union, and later against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan." (Ahmad 2001: website). The symbolism of President Clinton's five hour visit to Islamabad in 1999 clearly had a message for the military regime and yet since the events of 9/11, Pakistan from being the pariah has become the most important ally of the United States in the region. In an interview, Mr. Armitage recounted his now-infamous 12 September 2001, conversation with Pakistani intelligence Chief Gen. Mahmood Ahmed in which he outlined a series of "arduous and onerous" demands on Pakistan. He recalled saying: "No American will want to have anything to do with Pakistan in our moment of peril if you're not with us. It's black or white" (Frontline 2006). After 9/11 the Bush administration embarked on a war against terror based upon unmatched military power and rhetoric of good and evil that left much of the international community skeptical at best and often deeply concerned. (Racine 2006: 198). President Bush Jr. made it clear that those who failed to join hands with them against terrorism were then against them.
After 9/11 it had become incumbent upon President Musharraf to agree to full cooperation in the global war on terror as it was essential to the success of the United States led coalition built against terrorism. One can safely say that the event of 9/11 provided Pakistan with an opening for the resurrection of the Pakistan state and an opportunity to improve its image within the international community. It brought Pakistan out from a decade of international isolation in the form of economic and military assistance and increased opportunities for expanded trade with western countries. To, many marginalized sections within Pakistan, the crisis seemed to be a rare stroke of good luck that might halt the talibanization of Pakistan and its drift towards fundamentalism. For the military establishment it was an opportunity to reduce the disparity with India. (Behera 2004: 11). Pakistan has been watching with concern the growing Indian defense budget, which is reflective of India’s military modernization process, it great power thinking and long term strategic needs. For Pakistan the risks of this cooperation have been very high, given its legacy of nuclear proliferation, its support to militant outfits that create disturbances across its borders. Pakistan also has to face the consequences of supporting these elements in the form of disturbances that they are causing within its boundaries.

To facilitate Pakistan achieve its goal of modernizing its armed forces and to restart the process of assistance with a view on war on terrorism in late September 2001, President Bush waived nuclear weapons sanctions that prohibited military and economic assistance to India and Pakistan. In his speech President Bush stated,

"I hereby determine and certify to the Congress that the application to India and Pakistan of the sanctions and prohibitions... would not be in the national interest of the United States....I hereby waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, to the extent not already waived, the application of any action contained in the...Foreign Assistance Act 1961 as amended." (President Bush, The white House, Office of the Press Secretary 2001: website)

The Bush administration also rescheduled $379 million of Pakistan’s $2.7 billion debt to the United States so that it would be considered in arrears, a requirement for further
In October of the same year the president signed S.1465\(^8\) into law allowing the United States government to waive sanctions related to military coup and authorized presidential waiver authority till 2003, provided the president determined that making foreign assistance available would facilitate democratization and help the United States in its battle against international terrorism. The law also exempted Pakistan from foreign assistance restrictions related to its default on international loans. (Lum 2008: 29). This law was required to waive aside sanctions imposed on Pakistan as a result of the military coup, required under American laws. The President invoked the authority granted to him in section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364) to provide $50 million in Economic Support Funds to Pakistan in September of 2001, without regard to restrictions in that Act or the Foreign Operations Act that are applicable to Pakistan. The President also released $25 million in Emergency Migration and Refugee Funds to Pakistan around the same time. The President made another $100 million available for management of the emerging Afghan refugee crisis – $50 million in food assistance to Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and $50 million in Migration and Refugee Assistance to be administered through the United Nations and associated non-governmental organizations tending to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. (Rennack 2001: website). The Congress in October 2001 passed legislation that waived restriction on American arms export and military assistance to Pakistan and India. Most economic sanctions had been lifted or eased within a few months of their imposition. (Kundi 2007: 32).

Among the most noteworthy acts of friendship that was shown by the United States was President G.W. Bush’s decision to designate Pakistan as a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally. Pakistan joined other strong United States allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia in this privileged position. Along with this America signed an agreement with the Government of Pakistan that retired $495 million in debt owed to the American Government. This debt cancellation culminated an extraordinary

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\(^8\) S. 1465, introduced on September 25, 2001, by Senators Brownback and McConnell, and passed, as amended, by the Senate on October 4 by unanimous consent, specifically removes the government of Pakistan from the application of restrictions on foreign assistance because of its military regime. 107\(^{th}\) Congress 2000-2001.
period of debt relief and emergency financial assistance that included a $600 million cash transfer in November 2001 for balance of payments and budget support, the August 2002 rescheduling of the entire stock of $3 billion of bilateral official debt over 38 years, and the April 2003 elimination of $1 billion in bilateral debt. Actual assistance to Pakistan in 2002 was just above $1 billion; up substantially over the $3.5 million for 2001 (amounts exclude food aid). For 2003, Congress allocated about $295 million for Pakistan in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7). In April 2003, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (P.L. 108-11) allocated $200 million in additional security-related assistance to Pakistan. (Powell 2004:website). Such assistance was given to safeguard long term strategic interests of the United States.

The United States made some changes in its policy with regards to Pakistan as the war on terrorism progressed. It realized that to have a more positive impact, the assistance it was providing could not be restricted to just security and the armed forces. It identified four broad areas that constitute foreign policy priorities towards Pakistan which are relevant even today. They are:

* Continuing common efforts in the global war on terrorism,
* Supporting ongoing efforts among the states in the region to enhance regional stability,
* Helping Pakistan to strengthen economic, social, and political development, and,
* Building bridges between the two nations' peoples in order to foster greater mutual understanding between them. (Powell 2004: website).

Washington needs to continue to provide robust economic and military assistance programs to Pakistan, but improve the way it monitors and leverages this assistance. Given the level of corruption and acute poverty assistance has not always reached the designated people or programs. The Bush administration's decision to begin programming through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the $200 million annual direct cash transfer was a positive development. Providing this assistance in the form of socio-economic projects that directly impact the lives of average Pakistanis, rather than through cash transfers to the government, constitutes a major improvement in how the United States disburses and administers its large-scale assistance.
programs to Pakistan. The majority of this assistance went towards public education to boost current American assistance to the education sector, which now stands at about $60 million annually. (Curtis 2008: wesbite). The importance of education can not be undermined in the fight against the spread of radical ideology. Nonetheless, apart from education, economic development is the other very important area. The need to provide employment to the youth who form the foot soldiers of the terrorist organization is imperative if the United States and Pakistan want to win the war against terrorism. The Bush Administration's commitment to provide $750 million to develop the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was also a step in the right direction. (Curtis 2008: website). Broad-based economic development of this impoverished area is necessary to uproot extremism. America also has to make a sustained effort to wean farmers away from the cultivation of opium, the sale of which provides the terrorist organization with the finance to continue their operations. There have been calls from within the United States and the international community to cut the military assistance that is being given to Pakistan. However, cutting military assistance will be detrimental to American interests. The United States delayed the sale of F-16 to Pakistan and imposed sanctions in the past; doing so again will only confirm for many ordinary Pakistanis that the United States is a partner who can not to be trusted. Cutting military assistance to Pakistan would also demoralize the Pakistan Army which is on a path of modernization as a result of the assistance that it is getting. It would in the long term jeopardize America’s ability to garner close counterterrorism cooperation, thus playing into the game plan of extremists seeking to create a sense of chaos in the country.

On June 24, 2003, President Bush Jr. hosted President Musharraf at Camp David and announced a $3 billion assistance package for Pakistan, as well as $1 billion in loan forgiveness, in recognition of its assistance to the United States in fighting al Qaeda. The amount pledged almost equaled the sum given to Pakistan under Ronald Reagan's administration, when fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan was a regional security concern. It certainly helped Pakistan pay down its debt burden, which in 2001 was 115 percent of its gross domestic product. (Otterman 2003: website). In 2004 the administration of President Bush Jr. absolved the Pakistan military establishment from any responsibility of
nuclear proliferation in Iraq, Libya and North Korea. (Racine 2006: 205). Thus, the United States administration solely blamed the scientist, Dr. A.Q. Khan for the acts of proliferation which had the international community worried and looking for more stringent non proliferation laws. In 2005 annual installments of $600 million were given as economic and military assistance. When additional funds for development assistance, law enforcement, and other programs were included, the total assistance that was allocated came close to $700 million. In 2006 the United States signed an agreement with the Pakistan government for arms transfer in excess of $3.5 billion, making Pakistan the first among all the client states. The total value of the arms transfer nearly equaled the total value of all purchases under the foreign military sales programs for the entire period from the year 1950-2001. The rationale expressed by the Bush Jr. administration was, "Given the geo strategic location and partnership in the Global War on Terrorism, Pakistan is vital ally for the United States...The proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping an ally meet its legitimate defense requirements." (Grimmett,2007: website). The arms were used for supporting the NATO troops operations in Afghanistan. The massive amount of assistance was also viewed by Pakistan as an opportunity to acquire modern military equipments and inflows of economic assistance.

The United States set up a Coalition Support Funds (CSF) under the Department of Defense, which reimburses coalition countries for logistical, military, and other expenses incurred in supporting American military operations. These payments are made to cooperating nations, primarily Pakistan and Jordan (for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom respectively), in amounts as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Reimbursing coalition partners helps to ensure their contributions yield the maximum benefit to the overall operations of American military forces fighting terrorism worldwide. Reimbursing coalition contributions is critical to enabling forces from these countries to remain in theater and provide direct support to the American military operations. According to a United States Government Accountability Office report, of the 27 coalition allies who are supporting the American efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan is the largest recipient of CSF payments, receiving $5.56 billion of $6.88 billion (81
percent) of all CFS reimbursements as of May 2008 — receiving more than ten times the amount that went to the second largest recipient, Poland — and that there is scant documentation of how the money was used.

In Pakistan most of the CSF reimbursements are intended to enable the government of Pakistan to attack the terrorist networks and to stabilize its borders. However, concerns have been raised on the amount of reimbursement that is being given to Pakistan under this program. The findings of the report stated that the Department of Defense did conduct macro level analysis of the claims that were made to it under the program, however, it did not obtain sufficient documentation from Pakistan to verify if the claimed amounts were incremental, actually incurred or correctly calculated. The report points out that the Department of Defense paid over $2 billion to Pakistan in reimbursement claims for military activities covering January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining detailed information that would allow a third party to recalculate those costs. (US GAO Report 2008: 3-5).

Along with the Coalition Support Fund, Pakistan also benefited from other funding mechanisms set up in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks. In the three years after the attacks, Pakistan was the third-largest recipient of the Pentagon's new Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, designed to train foreign forces in counterterrorism techniques. More than $23 million was earmarked for Pakistan in fiscal 2006 for "Improving Counter Terrorism Strike Capabilities" under another new Pentagon program referred to colloquially as Section 1206 training, which allows the Pentagon to use a portion of its annual funding from Congress to train and equip foreign militaries. Pakistan finished first in the race for this new Pentagon-controlled training. (Fort 2007:website).

Washington is yet to formulate a concise policy to focus exclusively on Pakistan without looking at it through the various prisms of Cold War, Human Rights, the containment of communism, nuclear proliferation and the war on terror. America has to realize that assistance does not convert itself into leverage in the political establishment. The stop
gap assistance that America has provided Pakistan has not helped American policies at all.

**Conclusion**

Most United States assistance to Pakistan in the past few years have directly or indirectly served American counter terrorism goals. The United States is also looking to improve the quality of education and healthcare, in part to provide an alternative to services provided by terrorist linked charities and schools. It is also hoped that with the increase in education and literacy levels, the youth would be able to get gainful employment and not be lured by the various terrorist organizations. However, the provisions for employment have to be looked in to and is an important aspect that neither Washington nor Islamabad can afford to ignore. It has been found that the terrorist organizations are taking advantage of high levels of unemployment to attract the youth to their fold. To address rising Islamic extremism, Washington needs to encourage the Pakistan government to enforce the rule of law against militants who use the threat of violence to enforce Taliban-style edicts and close down madrasas or schools that are teaching a course of intolerance and hatred and leading to terrorism. Washington has realized that without a complete break from Islamist militancy, Pakistan's security apparatus will be increasingly unable to protect Pakistani citizens from terrorist violence, leading to further destabilization of the country. On the other hand it is not feasible or possible to deploy United States troops to the troubled areas of Pakistan like its Tribal Areas. This could prove to have disastrous consequences for the already fragile Pakistani state and would not provide a lasting solution to the problem. The revelation that President Bush Jr. approved of American defense personals to pursue and fight terrorists who were fleeing from Afghanistan in to Pakistan, both from air and at ground, had the Pakistani government, defense establishment and the people enraged. Pakistan is a sovereign nation and has made it very clear that this policy would undercut cooperation in the war against terrorist groups.
A more effective strategy perhaps needs to involve working cooperatively with Pakistan's military to assert state authority over the tribal areas in the border districts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Once they are secure, substantial assistance should be provided to build up the economy and social infrastructure. Washington has pledged assistance for the tribal areas, nonetheless it has been argued by scholars and military personnel that the assistance should not be forwarded until it is clear the Pakistani authorities have control in the region and can ensure the assistance does not fall into the wrong hands. This will require American access to the region and a clear commitment from the Pakistan government to counter Taliban ideology. The Pakistani approach of pursuing tactical peace deals with the terrorists in this region has proved futile. Washington and Islamabad need to develop a strategic approach to the problem.

For any long-term relationship to germinate from the post-9/11 scenario promises made will have to be kept. The United States is no longer pushing for a roll back of Pakistan's nuclear option. The administration of President Bush Jr. was concerned about the transfer of nuclear technology and missiles to other nations especially after the revelations of the nexus built by Dr. Khan. The future of United States-Pakistan relations, not to mention Pakistan's domestic and external relations, depends greatly on how Pakistan's leaders define national security. In the past, the national interest has been equated with nuclear and missile transfers, and by the use of proxies to shape the future of Kashmir and Afghanistan. In the future, any one or a combination of these three issues, transfer of nuclear technology, a clash with India or the volatile situation in Afghanistan, could bend United States ties to the breaking point. United States-Pakistan relations will remain steady only as long as the national interests of the two countries remain in alignment. (Krepon 2003: website). Nonetheless, the United States has to also abstain from abruptly stopping assistance to Pakistan and restarting the same as its interests are endangered. As has been found during the course of this study, the sanctions and stoppage of assistance have been detrimental to long term American security interest. Sanctions and the termination of assistance take away from the United States the limited amount of leverage that it can exercise over the Pakistani armed forces and the civilian government. It also sends a wrong signal to the people of Pakistan who in turn form the public opinion
that the government—whether civilian or military has to answer too. It undermines the Pakistani government’s ability to gather public opinion to support the policies of the American government. As a result of the abrupt cut of assistance in the previous decades the United States lost valuable influence with the leaders in Pakistan and created a feeling of mistrust among the local populace. With a lack of faith in the American commitments it has been very difficult for the United States to gather any kind of support for its anti-terror policies. Pakistani soldiers are dying in the battle against terrorism, and average Pakistanis are beginning to question whether these sacrifices are being made solely at the behest of the United States rather than to protect their own country. The United States has to demonstrate that the fight against terrorism is a joint endeavor that benefits Pakistan as much as it does the United States and the international community. For this feeling to remain, America has to continue with the assistance programs. Conditioning assistance only fuels the idea that Pakistan is taking action to fight terrorism under coercion, rather than to protect its own citizens. However, it has to maintain a balance so as not to create condition of an arms race in the region. India has time and again made it very clear that the massive assistance that Pakistan is getting from America for counter-terrorism funds have been used against Indian security personal in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Center for Public Integrity’s International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) data show that when all American programs are combined, Pakistan’s increase in United States military assistance in the three years after 9/11 is a stunning 50,000 percent, growing from just $9 million in the three years before the attacks to nearly $4.7 billion in the three years after. In the process, Pakistan has become the third largest recipient of American military training and assistance, trailing only longtime leaders Israel and Egypt. (Fort 2007: website). India fears that Pakistan will continue to use the weapons and money to create more instability in the region. Confirming this view American intelligence have also come to the conclusion that rather than use the more than $7 billion in United States military assistance to bolster its counter-terrorism capabilities, Pakistan has spent the bulk of it on heavy arms, aircraft and equipment that American officials say are far more suited for conventional warfare with India, its regional rival. This has raised the threats of a
confrontation between nations and the United States and the international community fear of the use of nuclear weapons in any form in the region. The situation also has emerged as a significant obstacle as the United States and Pakistan seek new approaches after a series of failed strategies in the frontier region, where Osama bin Laden and other top Al Qaeda leaders are believed to be hiding. The Americans believe that the arms imbalance has contributed to Al Qaeda’s ability to regroup in the border region, where the Pakistani Frontier Corp which guards the border is ill-equipped to fight the sophisticated machinery of the terrorists. In fact the Bush Jr. administration came under a lot of criticism for the lack of accountability for the assistance that it has provided. The then presidential hopeful Barack Obama had stated that the United States needed to attach more ‘strings’ to the assistance that it was providing. In an interview to Bill O’ Reilly of Fox News, he clearly stated that “We are providing them military aid without having enough strings attached. So they’re using the military aid ... they’re preparing for a war against India.” (Anonymous 2008: website). In a press briefing by Bruce Riedel, ambassador Richard Holbrooke, and Michelle Flournoy on the new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mr. Riedel stated, “…For the last eight years, Pakistan received billions of dollars in support from the United States -- much of it was unaccountable; much the Pakistanis don’t even know where it went.” (Office of the Press Secretary, The White House 2009: website).

Keeping this need for accountability in mind the current administration has introduced the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, that authorizes $1.5 billion in non-military assistance to the Pakistani people every year over the next five years, lays down a provision of a periodical assessment by Secretary of State, who would certify that Pakistan was not allowing its territory to be used for launching attacks on neighboring countries (Office of the Press Secretary The White House 2010: website). The current administration is carrying forward the commitment that was made by the previous administrations towards Pakistan. For the fiscal year 2009 the government had pledged Pakistan close to $600 million in economic and security assistance. Of this it is estimated that about 43% would be used in counter terrorism and border security operations. K. Alan Kronstadt, an expert on South Asia, in a report for the Congressional Research Service, reported that by
August 2006, CSF accounted for roughly $4.75 billion of the military assistance Pakistan received from the United States since the terrorist attacks. Pentagon documents say the money that went to Pakistan was largely for "military operations on the Afghanistan border" without any specifications on the nature and extent of these operations.

Questions have also been raised on the issue of violation of human rights by the government. Some fear that the lack of American interest in these social issues and its preoccupation with just counterterrorism policies is detrimental to the over all development of Pakistan, which should be a part of United States long term strategy for stability in the region. This shows the sharply divergent national security interests of the two countries.

America’s support for the various military regimes that have on a regular basis seized power through unconstitutional means in Pakistan along with its 'on now-off now' relation has tarnished American credibility in the country. Between 1954 and 2002 the United States provided a total of $12.6 billion in economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Of these $9.19 billion was given during the twenty four years of military rule while only $3.4 billion was provided to civilian governments during their nineteen years. On an average, United States assistance to Pakistan amounted to $382.9 million for each year of military rule compared with only $178.9 per annum under civilian rule. This has had a negative influence on the military establishment. It has bolstered the military’s praetorian ambitions. (Haqqani 2005:324). In the present situation this is being used by the terrorist groups to undermine and portray the military and the political leaders as American puppets. Thus, America which never had much support among the conservative elements in Pakistani society is also losing the support of the secular, liberal elements. There have been demands that Pakistan needs to distance itself from ‘America’s War against Terrorism’. The new civilian government is under tremendous pressures to restore the ‘pride of Pakistani foreign policy’. Frustration is also mounting in Washington on what it sees as indirect talks that Islamabad is holding with the extremist groups that have so far have not supported the international community’s efforts to bring stability in Afghanistan. The coalition government that had be formed, after the elections
which where held despite the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is far from stable. As a result of power struggle between the two coalition partners, the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), the government is unable to cope with the economic and terrorist challenges that are facing the country. The political and security situation in Pakistan is not ideal and America has to keep a close watch. Pakistan's future direction is crucial for the United States for a number of reasons. A stable Pakistan is going to be instrumental for the peace and stability of the region, it would also be essential for America to be able to safely withdraw from Afghanistan and for Afghanistan to be stable. The Afghan government has time and again charged the Pakistan government of not doing enough to secure the Afghan-Pakistan border which is used by the destabilizing forces to create havoc in Afghanistan.

The United States is currently engaged in an internal and external struggle to find a new mission and sense of purpose in a rapidly changing world in which new centers of power are emerging to challenge American supremacy in various regions of the world. However, this challenge has yet to be exercised on an international scale. Shaken by the terror attacks on the World Trade Center towers, inspired by a religious outlook, and driven by an awareness of unparallel power, the war on terrorism is being fought. The events that made the United States the sole superpower have ironically also raised the status of other powers with competing interests and policies. The United States has yet to get used to this changed global order where it is both the leader and the partner. Post September 11, it has been a dominating power and resorted to unilateralism, as in Iraq, which, in turn, provokes strong reactions and resistance. American power, therefore, is not absolute. And, on many issues, the United States is walking alone, making its power even less absolute.

The United States has to keep in mind the broader security in consideration when it provides assistance to Pakistan. America's long-term interests in Asia require a deeper relation with India as well as Pakistan. India is not only the leading power in South Asia; it is a rising great power with a reach beyond that region. India can be a stabilizing force in the Persian Gulf as well as a strategic counterweight to China. Both of those
developments would benefit the United States. It is imperative that Washington does not jeopardize the developing strategic partnership with India. Washington also has to lay a lot more emphasis on developing a relation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. With American assistance, Pakistan is working towards securing its long and porous border with Afghanistan to prevent the smuggling of arms, terrorists, and illegal drugs which are fueling the Taliban insurgency.

In conclusion, the United States must remain closely engaged with Pakistani civilian politicians and the military leadership during the political transition. The United States-Pakistan relationship is crossing troubled waters, and anti-Americanism is reaching the boiling point. A strong United States public stance supporting the process of democracy without focusing on any one particular leader or party would help calm the situation. Despite frustration over lack of Pakistani success in uprooting the terrorist safe haven in the border areas, the United States should refrain from cutting military assistance and develop a strategic approach to addressing the problem. A key to stability in the region is to develop the bargaining capabilities of the government vis a vis the extremist. A long term engagement will also help Pakistan in explaining to its public the benefits and the reasons for supporting the United States led forces. Pakistan's transformation into a moderate democracy and a prosperous and open nation is vital to America's own future and safety, as well as the future prosperity and regional stability of South and Central Asia.