

Chapter VI

Summary and Conclusion

The present discourse on the Quebecois nationalism, arising out of the province of Quebec, revealed that it is a pertinent issue in Canada. Having gone through it, Canada faces and continues to deal it in order to build the federation into a coherent whole. Despite the fact that the Confederation culminated in bringing about the French-Canadians into the fold, the later continues to assert for sovereignty in the wake of the argument that they are under threat within the federation. It is on this ground that divergent aspects of assertions have been formulated by the French-Canadians. Over the course of time, Quebecers have initiated different strategies as the nationalism itself evolved with the changing time and transformed itself into more of a civic nationalism since the 1960s.

Quebec nationalism is perhaps the longest surviving movement seeking a political solution in the Western world. At times, it is equated with resistance to and the rejection of an “imagined” Quebecois political community for a separate nation. As it evolved into a more civic form of nationalism, it disbanded the purely ethnic French-Canadian nature to incorporate all those living within the territory of Quebec, irrespective of the origin and identity to challenge the authorities and boundaries of existing state, demanding control over the political and economic processes, and justifies these demands in terms of Quebecois inherent right for self-determination. In such a situation, nationalism is understood as first and foremost a theory of political legitimacy, which arose and developed in opposition to various theories that derived political legitimacy from other principles and competes as well as assert for political legitimacy with others for acceptance. Similarly, the Quebecois nationalism too changes their strategies of achieving their aspirations to suit the prevailing scenarios.

In Chapter 1, the theoretical foundation of nationalism has been dealt along with the argument as to how nationalism as a political ideology aimed to bring about or to increase the political representation or power of the “nation.” In fact, in almost

all forms of nationalisms, the common features are the use of a culturally defined national identity in a quest for political representation, legitimacy or power based on the sharing of any number of real or perceived characteristics, such as common ancestry, language, religion, culture, specific institutions, historic traditions, or shared territory. As a doctrine or ideology, nationalism also mean the aspirations, the policy orientation of a state, or to a sentiment of attachment to one's own nation or state reflects upon the socio-political movement for state-formation or any anti-imperialist movement, or to the nation-building activities or mobilisation of a government. Therefore, both as ideology and movement the concept could be used either in speaking of a state, a group of ethnic communities or a single ethnic community. Nevertheless, nationalism evolves and transforms itself in due process with the changing times and to suit to the contemporary realities.

As observed since the First World War, nationalism was linked to the concept of nation-state in the formulations justifying the right to self-determination. This made nationalism a purely political movement primarily focusing on the collective level of identity and the idea of a community longing to establish a nation. The underlying basis being in a state of mind that permeates to the large majority of a people. Further, it recognises the nation-state as the ideal form of political organisation and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural life and economic well-being. Thus, nationalism is equated with resistance to outside rule and the rejection of standards imposed from outside.

This rise of nationalism also valorised the people. State boundaries do not just circumscribe legal jurisdictions, but also define a 'people' or 'nation' who form a common political community, and who share several commonalities. Ironically, the boundaries of states rarely coincide exactly with people's national identities. Like the present study on Quebecois nationalism showed, the Quebecois do not feel a part of the dominant national community because they have and cherish their own distinct national identity, and so do not wish to integrate into the Canadian federation. However, separatist Quebecois accept the argument that political communities should

adhere to liberal norms even although they simply wish to form their own separate and self-governing liberal-democratic political community.

As mentioned and examined, liberal democracies have aspired to forge a common national identity amongst the people permanently residing on their territory. In the Quebecois case, the aim has been to revise people's national identities to better fit existing boundaries. This results as Western states have used a wide range of 'nation-building' tools – such as compulsory education, national media, official language laws, naturalisation policies, national holidays and symbols, compulsory military service – to help diffuse and consolidate this sense of nationhood. Again, state efforts to promote a particular language or identity may seem closer to a communitarian politics of the common good than to a liberal politics of state neutrality.

Another important aspect of Quebecois nationalism revolves around citizenship. Like Marshall's conception of citizenship, which is also about identity and an expression of one's membership in a political community, Quebecois nationalism in the present context extends citizenship to all residents of the territory. In this way, the traditional model of 'citizenship-as-rights' was deeply connected to ideas of national integration to pursue the collective goals of the Quebecers. It also divulged that the struggle of their nationalism brings out to the question of recognition. In response, Canada, like other western liberal democracies, has adopted a different attitude. Empirically, the evidence shows that pressuring national minorities to integrate into the dominant national group simply will not work. Western states badly misjudged the durability of minority national identities. Moreover, the suppression of minority nationalism is difficult to defend normatively. To be sure, liberal principles set limits on how national groups go about nation-building.

Liberal principles preclude any attempts at ethnic cleansing, or stripping people of their citizenship or the violation of human rights. These principles also insist that any national group engaged in a project of nation-building must respect the

right of other nations within its jurisdiction to protect and build their own national institutions. For example, the Quebecois are entitled to assert national rights vis-à-vis the rest of Canada, but only if they respect the rights of Aboriginals within Quebec to assert national rights vis-à-vis the rest of Quebec. All else being equal, national minorities should have the same tools of nation-building available to them as the minority nation, subject to the same liberal limitations. What we need, in other words, is a consistent theory of permissible forms of nation-building within liberal democracies like Canada. The situation regarding the self-government claims of national minorities complicated and create the phenomenon of competing nationalisms within a single state. However, even here there is significant evidence that recognising self-government for national minorities assists, rather than threatens, political stability. But the claim of it is now put to question by the new phenomenon of globalisation.

The common argument regarding globalisation is that it either erodes national identity or re-invigorates national identity. What is seen in the present context revealed that nationalist ideologies and membership in nationalist groups offer a sense of purpose, belonging, and power that would not otherwise exist. Yet, globalisation threatens to wash away all cultural difference, undermining the foundation of distinct social and political institutions. The alternative then is to invoke nationalism to construct either a thick and exclusive conservative form of national identity or a thin and inclusive liberal form. The phenomenon that is attached to nationalism has been attracting the national minorities like Quebecois in their pursuit of their long-cherished dream of a separate nation from Canada. The discourse and strategies applied by the Quebecois nationalism in the present context is the emphasis on collectivity unlike the earlier French-Canadian only nationalism of the pre-1960s. This brought it closer to a communitarian perspective of nationalism but it does not necessarily mean to be so since Quebecers adapt their nationalism to the changing times. Simultaneously, it also attempts to reveal over the assumption commonly made when discussing the economic integration on minority nationalism of Quebec. As (Graefe 2004: 428) argues that the hollowing out of the national state

shifts responsibilities for governing economic development to sub-national or regional scales, territorially concentrated minority nations find the opportunity to take the lead in fostering economic growth.

In Chapter II, the issues highlighted above and examined are put into practice in the discourse on the ethnic and civic dimension of Quebecois nationalism. This chapter focuses on the ethnic dimension of the Quebecer nationalism, seen more clearly before the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, and the changing nature and course of the nationalism into a territorial civic form, which is more open and inclusive of all the people within the province of Quebec.

Initially, the French Canadian community was originally a colonial offshoot of France and gradually became a distinct community after Canada was established as an uneasy accommodation of the “Two Founding Nations” of French and English descendants. This inclination evolved and manifested into different scenarios by which the nationalism had recourse to the entrenchment of active political parties at both the national and provincial levels dedicated primarily to Quebec’s secession, and Quebec’s isolation and exclusion from the Canadian constitution. Here, the specific case of Quebec is one that concern the issue of nation. For the French Canadians, the term ‘nation’ simply mean “people” or society and, thus, they have the dualistic conception of a political system of Quebec and the rest of the country. This conception of Quebec as a separate nation is based on the history of the province. Importantly, one should not confuse the nationalists of Quebec with Quebec itself. Aside from the considerable resistance to nationalist ideas among the bulk of the population, there exist of a significant population of Anglophones, Allophones and Natives in Quebec who have remained largely impervious to nationalist ideas. It is interesting to observe how the nationalism changed its conception of who constitute the Quebec nation.

In the initial stage of ethnic nationalism of the French-Canadians, clericalism reigned supreme over Quebec and reached extraordinary levels by 1896. The class that carried the nationalist message in Quebec, after 1840, was the clerico-nationalist

class and propounded an ultramontane form of nationalism. Prior to 1840, the nation had been “la nation canadienne”. If the English-speaking population became “Canadians”, then the French speaking population could not remain “Canadiens”. As the nation wished to continue its separate course of existence, a new self definition was needed: the nation of the *French Canadians* was born. It affirmed clearly the existence of a separate people, of a nation. Indeed the “we” shifted from “Canadien” to “French Canadian”. In general, the ultramontane nationalists were not involved in politics.

By the 1930s a new emergent form of nationalism in Quebec start to challenge the anti-statist views of the ultramontane nationalists. Earlier nationalism focuses on the nation as a Catholic nation, with a Catholic mission, on a Protestant continent. Apparently the national contract guaranteed French-English duality whereas the political contract protected French Canadians from the imposition of imperial military obligations by their English-Canadian compatriots. This made Bourassa to proclaim that Quebec was ‘the particular inheritance of French Canada’. For him, Canada was an Anglo-French nation. Despite the fact that Canada and Quebec entered the phase of industrialisation and helped Quebec to pull out of the agricultural crisis, improved the standard of living of the population and, eventually, slowed down considerably the emigration of French Canadians to the United States, nationalists of this period were strong believers in agriculturalism.

The Quiet Revolution changed the nature of Quebec nationalism. It fostered a stronger Quebec identity and greater economic and political power for French-speaking Quebecers. Consequent to all these effects, French Canadian nationalism was largely supplanted within Quebec, by a new Quebec-centred nationalism. Quebec nationalists grew more confident that they took concrete steps to protect and promote the French language, culture and advocates for Quebec separatism began to emerge. For instance, during the eight years before the accession to power in November 1976, the PQ detailed many aspects of the social, economic and political organisation of an independent Quebec. On the question of independence, the party presented a new nation-state model. Its preamble declared that the good of Quebec, as well as the

interests of Canada, necessitate that “in the measure compatible without collective interests, the nation accedes to sovereignty in a perspective of economic continuity”. Quebec would finally assume the powers of a state, but would maintain a relatively high level of economic integration with the rest of Canada. Despite presenting such mode of Quebec’s political sovereignty, the PQ softened its attitude and did not go to the length of demanding a complete break up with Canada. Its vision was that in order to exist as a nation, Quebec needed control on the process of political decision-making. It also proposed the establishment of a Canada-Quebec common market, with governments of Quebec and Canada as equal partners. While the ultramontane nationalists were very active for over a century, they were not very successful in the political dimension of Quebec nationalism.

Over the past two decades, the nationalist discourse elaborated both by the state and intellectuals in Quebec has progressively rejected, at least in public documents, the traditional, ethnic and cultural connotations, which until about the early 1980s, essentially informed Quebec nationalism. Accordingly, today Quebec nationalists claim to understand *la nation québécoise* no longer as the sum total of an historically determined, common cultural experience shared mainly by French-speaking Quebecers, but as the gathering through citizenship, of reasonable and equal social and political beings around rational, democratic institutions upon which they all have agreed, regardless of their differences and diverging interests.

Quebec’s civic nationalism encourages pluralism beyond the historical, culturally determined confines that used to define *la nation québécoise*, celebrates diversity, promotes the integrity of minority cultures, and posits at the same time the Quebec state as the rallying point with which all can and should identify. Political self-determination, and eventually, the full independence of the Quebec state from Canada are matters for all Quebecers to decide and not simply the francophone majority. Effectively, the movement underscores the power and passion of the French-Canadian ethnic nationalist spirit and demonstrates the notion that, though deeply rooted in the historical homogeneity of *le Canada français*, the ethnic concept of nationalism began to encompass the notion of ‘civic nationalism’ and identification

with a pluralistic concept of a Quebec nation (Coulombe 1993: 189). The relatively new expression of Quebec nationalism vindicates the will of most liberal proponents of nationalism to make it a morally, intellectually and politically sustainable project. Quebec nationalism went from a conservative defence of French-Canadian social, cultural, and moral values against the British ruler, to confident, self-possessing, at times aggressive, claims of self-determination and political independence for the socio-economic promotion of French-speaking *Québécois*.

Quebec civic nationalists endorse in fact the same fundamental values and guiding principles of political community and social cohesion that inform the current, prevailing vision of the Canadian state on issues of national unity; that is, unadulterated reason and “common sense,” the fusion of social and ethno-cultural singularities into one unified conception of the community, and the dominance of liberal-democratic norms of socio-political transactions. On the face of it, the argument over the civic nationalism may seem like a more “advanced,” more civilised form of communal expression, but to the extent that it waters down Quebec’s pre-political collective identity – that very same identity in defence and promotion of which much of Quebec’s political mobilisations of the past four decades against Ottawa were championed – it also dulls the sense of outrage and injury necessary to galvanise political energies in support of Quebec sovereignty.

In Chapter III, as the Québécois nationalism itself evolved, the strategy initiated was to counter the federal government by way of influence to uphold their distinctiveness and avoid the centralising tendencies of the federal government. What emerged then is that the province of Quebec and its relationship with the federal government gradually transformed into a complex and multi-faceted dimensions with varying degrees of relationship. From the 1950s onward, the relative weakening of power on the part of the national government and the strengthening of the provinces became the highlight of Canadian federalism. Significantly, the redefinition of Quebec from the election of the Lesage government in 1960 was crucial in the process.

Quebec then assumed the role to counter the federal government and espouses their cause. The more influential Quebec's distinct character is in Canada, the more distinct Canada's own character appears. The province tries to preserve its jurisdiction and provincial powers by limiting the centralising tendencies, most importantly, in the financial aspects. The evolving pattern of Quebec-federal relations is the product of several related, and persisting, trends. In the meantime, Quebec acquired a certain political autonomy insofar as the central government scrupulously respected the jurisdictions reserved for the provinces. Yet in the gradual evolution of the federal system, Ottawa began to intervene in areas that the provinces and Quebec in particular, regarded as theirs. The scope and scale of federal government has thus expanded steadily. Over the decades, the federal government and the provinces have responded in varying ways to issues raised by Quebec.

Of all the provinces, Quebec is the most sensitive about its powers. The government is the expression of the community. That is why constitutional powers assigned to that government are seen as so important in Quebec. Protecting and extending Quebec's areas of jurisdiction, then, contributed to satisfying these needs and justified this strong sensitivity to what Quebec governments would come to call "federal intrusions into provincial jurisdictions." Only Quebec has attempted to use this kind of influence. With the coming to power of the Lesage administration in June 1960, the strategy of successive Quebec governments has been of decisive importance in the disposition of federal and provincial governments to press their interests in increasingly rationalised and comprehensive terms.

For decades afterward, Quebec governments emphasised provincial autonomy, in a more or less coherent fashion. Over the course of the next several decades, Quebec demands, under federalist Quebec Premiers of Liberal and the Union Nationale alike, advance from acceptance of a "special" constitutional status for Quebec within the federal system, reflecting the "French fact" in culture and language in Quebec, to a more euphemistic "particular" status.

As the federal government proceeded to create the postwar welfare state, it recognised that it had a political problem with Quebec, but it was not moved by Quebec's objections. The federal proposals were discussed with the provinces at conferences on reconstruction of 1945 and 1946. While the federal government championed a pan-Canadian welfare state, it was forced to retreat in the face of stiff opposition from Maurice Duplessis and the government of Quebec, as well from some other provinces. The Duplessis government objected to almost every element of the new social union, but the federal government simply dismissed him as a reactionary. Under relentless demands by successive Quebec governments to provide a constitutional justification for conditional grants, the Trudeau government advanced the doctrine of the spending power.

Quebec's view of federalism is inspired by its desire to maintain its particularity. For instance, when the federal government spends money in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction - either directly on individuals or through provincial governments with conditional grants - Quebec believes that its ability to protect its particularity is jeopardised. Quebec's opposition to the spending power is thus fundamental. For the other provinces, the primary concerns are that the spending power can distort provincial policy priorities and the reliability of the federal government as a fiscal partner.

The dispute over the spending power entails more than the definition of federalism. Many Canadians outside Quebec cannot grasp how threatening it can be - but it is probably not coincidental that the sovereigntist Parti Quebecois was formed after Quebec had vigorously resisted the social policies the federal government had advanced (through the spending power) for more than two decades. For many Quebecers, the pursuit of universality through the spending power has transcended the division of powers in the Constitution and thereby threatened Quebec's power to maintain its particularity. Relatedly, national social programmes are deeply problematic in federations, particularly if the responsibility for social programming lies with provincial or state governments.

For many Canadians outside Quebec, the principles of universal citizenship require Ottawa to pursue policies of redistributive justice and social equality, and these can be achieved only through the spending power and a circumstantial understanding of the division of powers. For the government of Quebec, the province's particularity can be assured only if it can exercise the powers accorded to the provinces under the Constitution without external interference. The divergent conceptions of federalism and citizenship are deeply rooted in the political culture of Quebec and Canada outside Quebec respectively. There have been numerous attempts to limit the federal spending power, with only modest success at best. At the same time, Quebec has viewed constitutional solutions as effective safeguards of its particularity, while Canadians outside Quebec generally have rejected these solutions out of fear that they would compromise the Canadian social union.

It may be noted that, the federal Liberal Party was viewed as the natural governing party of the twentieth century because it so effectively brokered a political coalition between Quebec and other parts of Canada, but its commitment to redistributive justice through the spending power was completely at odds with Quebec's theory of federalism. While Trudeau had always resisted Quebec nationalism, Brian Mulroney was eager to satisfy the province's "minimum" constitutional demands. Quebec premier Robert Bourassa was delighted with the new provision. In conjunction with the recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society," Bourassa believed he had obtained a constitutional settlement that would protect the province's cultural particularity. But in Charlottetown, the federal government committed itself to establishing a framework for the future use of the spending in all areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. While premier Bourassa reluctantly accepted Charlottetown, other Quebecers concluded that it did not meet Quebec's concerns. It contained a framework for the spending power designed to protect Quebec's particularity, while the social charter was included to assure Canadians outside Quebec that the federal and provincial governments were committed to universal social justice.

From the 1990s a new and different perspective of Quebec-federal relationship emerged. The Quebec-Canada confrontation has also transformed itself. Consequently, the legislature and government of Quebec have a role to protect and develop the unique character of Quebec society within Canada. With respect to the spending power, Chrétien sought to restore a federal role in social programmes in the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA). SUFA permits Ottawa to use its spending power to establish new social programmes in areas of provincial jurisdiction. The spending power provisions in SUFA are much more in accordance with theories of federalism and citizenship held by Canadians outside Quebec.

Quebec sees federal-provincial relations as more than the constitutional issue. The new paradigm in the relations that was initiated saw Quebec government undoing the traditional discourse. Symbolic recognition of Quebec costs little, but is worth a lot to neo-liberal politicians if the results are electoral support in Quebec and a general weakening of the federal social role.

The Policy Declaration of the Harper Conservatives, adopted in March 2005 in anticipation of an impending federal election, endorsed the notion of “open federalism” which included a restoration of “the constitutional balance between the federal and provincial and territorial governments,” “strong provinces,” and a limitation on the federal spending power that would authorise the provinces “to use the opting out formula with full compensation if they want to opt out of a new or modified programme, in areas of shared or exclusive jurisdiction”. Harper’s open federalism is a vision that combines the advancement of Quebec with the development of Canada.

Quebec’s opposition of the federal spending power is long-standing and arises from its understanding that the division of responsibilities among governments in the Constitution Act, 1867, was designed to protect the social institutions of Quebec. This is historically accurate: Canada would not have been created as a federal rather than unitary system of government had it not been for the existence of a large, French-speaking national minority centred in Quebec. It argues that the federal government

has a broad swath of power under the Constitution and can involve itself in any policy area, except those that the Constitution designates as matters of “exclusive” provincial jurisdiction.

In Chapter IV, the concept of social economy in Quebec has been examined in the context of the policy-makers to address poverty, social exclusion, structural unemployment, economic recession and trade-induced inequalities. It is in this area that Quebec develops its own model of social and economic advancement to further their cause. The Quebec model of social economy reflects a convergence of otherwise parallel paths in which social movements, community based activists, the labour movement, etc., have been the architects of alternative economic strategies that are addressing the above issues through economic revitalisation. There is a growing documentation on community based initiatives, new investment instruments including labour solidarity funds, community trusts, collective enterprise, and so on. In Quebec, the social economy has achieved a great deal of visibility in recent years with the central focus on the capacity of actors within the social economy to successfully create alternative and sustainable economic development strategies which is democratic.

Similarly, in Quebec, there has been a longstanding relationship between the social economy and the social doctrine of the Church. Anyone can develop their own a priori conception of the social economy, simply by placing more or less emphasis on either its economic or its social dimensions, both of which are wide-ranging. Indeed, any economic phenomenon that has a social dimension, and any social phenomenon that has an economic dimension, could be considered part of the social economy.

Different models of development are found with diverse incarnations of Quebec social economy. The state became more involved in modernising the economy of Quebec from the 1950s, laying the basis for what was to become known as Quebec Inc., the concertation model that has characterised the economic development of Quebec ever since. In the context of the de-regulation of markets and

economic globalisation of the 1980s, Quebec's so-called partnership model based on the consultation between the principal socio-economic actors in Quebec society – business, labour and government, that was already present in Quebec, did not yield to the imperatives of de-regulation and neo-liberal strategies wholeheartedly. At the same time, a new wave of community organisations emerged such as the Community Economic Development Corporations (CDECs), Community Futures, known under the name of SADCs (*Sociétés d'aide au développement des collectivités*) in Québec; as well as social economy enterprises: health services users' co-operatives, loan circles, homecare services, etc. Following the demands made by the unions, among other groups, in March of 1996, the Quebec government invited all socio-economic actors to participate in a Conference on the Economic and Social Future of Quebec. This socio-economic summit on the future of Quebec marked a significant turning point in Quebec as it extended what had previously been periodic consultations between labour, business and government to social movements.

The second series of measures concerned the funding of the social economy, in particular, the access to capital for collective enterprise. *Investissement Québec* offers financing and support to all social economy enterprises. The government's involvement in the social economy is an example of the Quebec state's commitment to develop it and to include civil society in economic policy decisions, maintain social solidarity, and enhance economic democracy without giving in to the imperatives of market competitiveness. The state's willingness to support the principles and values of the social economy and foster social economy initiatives represents a renewal of the Quebec model and a positive, enabling and potentially more democratic re-configuration of socio-economic hierarchies involving the state, business, labour, and the community sector. In this way, the Quebec state plays a new role as a partner in social change. The same could be said about community groups or the popular sector. Thus, the role of public enterprise, the commitment to Quebec ownership and social economy initiatives further distinguish the Quebec economy within North America.

Since the 1980s the Quebec state has been regularly encouraging and even actively promoting several socio-institutional innovations aimed at fostering local

business and economic development, curtailing unemployment, and enhancing social solidarity. It reinforces the idea that there is indeed a Quebec model; a distinct Quebec way of tackling the major socio-economic challenges of the day, and that, the model is premised on inherently transformative politics aided by the vitality of the community sector and the labour movement with the approval of the Quebec state on a forward-looking vision of social change.

The transformative politics in contemporary Quebec tends to hinge on the social economy's potential ability to bring about positive social change and create the proper conditions for individuals and community empowerment. The social economy and the private-public partnerships upon which many of its initiatives rest allow the government in the 1990s, in particular, to project an image of itself as a benevolent social partner imbued with a deep commitment to economic justice and democracy. They infuse the province of Quebec with a much needed moral aura of social solidarity.

Even so, to most critics of the Quebec model and of the role assigned to the social economy in its development, the whole thing is nothing but a model of economic exploitation and political domination. The interest of the government in the social economy is basically motivated by its perceived potential ability to lighten the social welfare burden of the Quebec state, without questioning the logic and the process that have created the situations of glaring socio-economic inequality in the first place. To them, the social economy is good insofar as it can check the tendencies to social fragmentation and encourage private initiative. On the other side are those whose typical milieu are social enterprises, non-profit organisations and local, small and medium-sized enterprises; they naturally associate with the labour movement and the community sector.

Concurrently, the apparent failure of the Quebec model and the social economy to secure a stronger showing for Quebec's economy is not the most serious of their limitations. Given their ambition to enhance social solidarity and socio-economic justice, it is more critical that the transformative potential of the social

economy has not been developed to the fullest. As a counter-paradigm of change and empowerment, the Quebec model fails to redress social hierarchies, no matter how hard the community sector and progressive forces try to influence the policy process.

On 14 April, 2003, the Quebec Liberal Party came to power and set out to re-engineer and modernise the Quebec state. Moreover, the Charest government has announced its intention to profoundly revise the policy of recognition and support of the autonomous community action which outlines the funding practices of government. Shortly after coming to power, the Quebec Liberals quickly established new governance mechanisms to respond to the needs of communities and re-structured the system of shared responsibilities between the state and community organisations. With Bill 25, *An Act Respecting Local Health and Social Services Networks*, and Bill 34, *An Act Respecting the Ministère du Développement économique et régional*, adopted in December 2003, the Liberal government gradually set in motion a takeover of institutional arenas, shifting the power from community groups to elected officials.

In the shuffle, community organisations also lost out in favour of business interests. Community organisations no longer have seats guaranteed ex-officio on these bodies. Drawing again on these regional profiles, the Quebec Liberal government also plans to regionalise the distribution of resources to community organisations, devolving even more power to local governments. Part of the Liberal strategy also entails de-collectivising labour and social relations. The Premier of Quebec, Jean Charest, directly attacked the Quebec model of development and its collectivist foundations. Under the discourse of re-structuring, we can observe a general detachment from the social democratic ideal that characterised the Quebec model of policy-making.

The Quebec Liberal government has also questioned corporatist structures that favour a few large national organisations. Moreover, by bypassing the provincial level in favour of regionalised forms of governance, the Quebec Liberal government loses its capacity to enforce comprehensive policy frameworks. Quebecers' sympathy

to social economy initiatives and commitment to improving the various segments of society is a genuine move. Though the Quebec government may be tempted by the ideals of the social economy, it has yet to resolve and apply the social-economic management in any coherent and structured way so as to fundamentally modify the dynamics of social and economic power.

The newly enacted policies are already leading to profound structural change as the community movement's links to the Quebec are seriously weakened. Despite the reversal, the social economy can make a number of beneficial contributions to the development of society by providing spaces for learning, for experimentation in democratic administration, for planning local economic and social development, and for mobilising demands on the state. At the same time, the organisation of social and economic activity outside of the strictures of state and market can also serve to satisfy unmet needs in particular communities, and point to innovative strategies and contribute to building social cohesion, consensus and citizenship by enhancing political engagement and feelings of belonging.

In Chapter V, it is stressed in detail that the increased importance of the nation-states by the degree of economic interaction within the borders. It discussed the economic integration and demonstrates the stand of the major political parties on free trade and examined how the scope of economic integration on Quebec's economy into the continental realities helps to shape the cause of Quebecers and the constraints that Quebec encounters in its relationships with the rest of Canada and other countries in the Americas. At the same time the nationalist discourse and strategies on the economic integration in the face of territorial nature of the Quebec nationalism has been examined leading Quebec to adopt several policies to respond the challenges of economic integration which is re-defining the political relations between Quebec with the federal government of Canada and other nations. Indeed, the economic links that unites Quebec to the Canadian and United States markets affect the manner in which Quebec envision to control over its economic future. This is because Quebec has always sought to account for its economic position in the continent which got intensified with the signing on the U.S.-Canada Free Trade

Agreement and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which the Quebecers supported on its own interests.

The economy of Quebec is fundamentally open. The economic dependence on the conditional market is a long-established reality for Quebec making the government to take this into account when developing their economic strategies. Correspondingly, economic integration is expanding the set of actions for the sub-state governments and nationalist movements to ensure their survival as a nation. Quebec has always refused to attribute blame for all its economic woes to foreign investors.

As observed, Quebec provides an interesting case for assessing the interplay of regional economic integration and nationalism. In the past, the government of Maurice Duplessis and the Union Nationale largely shaped post-World War II economic policy of Quebec. This economic strategy drew from the cumulative model where direct foreign investment acted as the primary force in Quebec's economic development. Hence, the economic integration of the Quebec economy into that of North America was the result not only of the economic liberalism put forth under Duplessis, but also of the strong endorsement of his government, which saw in this a means to ensure the conversion of Quebec's economy.

The victory of Quebec Liberal Party (QLP) in 1960 marked a more progressive brand of nationalism and to the pro-active use of the state for economic and social ends. The use of the Quebec state to promote the interests of francophone capital and the francophone new middle class, in turn, accelerated the territorialisation of French-Canadian nationalism around the Quebec state, giving rise to a properly Quebec nationalism. The intention was to seek the integration of foreign-owned subsidiaries and to increase the Quebec content of goods and the access of Quebec's firms to the purchasing and investment networks of multi-national corporations. Likewise, Crown corporations established in economic sectors were channeled towards United States markets. This proved again that the Quebec government is interventionist as in traditional times. Indeed, the continental market

largely determines the structure of Quebec's dependence on Canadian and American markets and inter-provincial trade constitutes a non-negligible portion of Quebec's economic reality. However, given the increased depth in Quebec's foreign economic relations, Quebec's dependence on the Canadian marketplace has been greatly developed, most notably in the area of exports. This illustrates Quebec's economic vulnerability to cyclical changes that may occur with its chief trading partner.

Consistent with nationalist predictions, economic integration has in fact assisted Quebec in reducing its dependence on English-Canada. Apart from the overall governmental strategy of ensuring francophones greater power within the Quebec economy than one of diminishing its dependence on the American market, Quebec's management of its dependence on the continental economy was accomplished in other ways. The Quebec government has opened numerous delegations in the United States. A primary mission of these delegations consists in promoting trade, looking for new technologies that might benefit Quebec, and being on the lookout for investors interested in Quebec.

If the adoption of a pro-free trade strategy on the part of the Quebec government can be explained in part on the basis of adhesion to prevailing neo-mercantilism, it also inspired an emerging discourse within Quebec's sovereignty movement. It added to the array of reasons used to justify Quebec's support for sovereignty. Since Quebec demonstrates strong minority nationalism, one common explanation for why nationalists support economic integration contends that they seek to promote the interests of the nation above all, while free trade doctrine promote the interests of either individuals or the human race as a whole.

The logic of the dominant Quebec nationalist position toward economic integration becomes clearer when contrasted to English-Canada policies of enhancing state-wide Canadian national unity through the creation of a single economic space. Quebec nationalists often note the greater vulnerability of English-Canada than French-Canada to American cultural absorption as a result. Additionally, because of geographical constraints, Quebec nationalists do not have the option of integrating

with a country less culturally “polluting” than the United States to balance English-Canadian economic and political domination. For nationalists in Quebec, the main trade-off is between autonomy and identity: the gains to Quebecois autonomy from English-Canada via continental economic integration and free trade to some extent come at the expense of identity due to added American cultural diffusion into Quebec. For example, for Quebec nationalists the relatively small benefits to cultural identity from a policy of autarky are surpassed by the large gains to autonomy from a policy of continental integration, with the result that there is general consensus among nationalists over foreign economic policy preferences.

Economic integration and the territorial nature of Quebec nationalism bring to light new considerations in the present study. The public perception of the government’s role and the mechanisms of social regulation have been markedly influenced by Quebec’s agreement to free trade. Reduced dependence on the Canadian marketplace takes its full meaning from an increase of the Quebec government’s power to intervene. Moreover, it demonstrates the optical illusion represented by the growth in the control of francophone capital on Quebec economy. Quebec is not seeking to break the dependence resulting from its continental economic integration. In that process, the Quebec government has played an important role. At present, one of the nation-state’s greatest challenges concerns the urgency to redefine national identity.

The significance of the present study lies in examining how Quebecois nationalism has inevitably evolved and transformed itself with new debates leading to different strategies about the way it perceived and continues to perceive itself under the federal Canada. The assumption and continued apprehensions of being threatened within the federation led them to new strategies in pursuit of their demands. In is in this way that they resorts to tactical means available at their disposal to counter the federal government initiatives and constitutional means to adapt them into the federation and in trying to uphold the traditions and aspirations of the founding fathers of Canada. The Quebecois movement is purely, since the Second World War, a modern nationalism based more particularly on a democratic demands without

resorting to militancy unlike what we see in other nationalisms around the world. Their pure political perspectives have been to gain what they long-cherished in a way that will be democratic and just. At the same time, their nationalism is more than national sentiment or nationalist ideology.

Ethnic nations take the reproduction of a particular ethno-cultural culture and identity as one of their most important goals. Civic nations, by contrast, are indifferent to the ethno-cultural identities of their citizens, and define national membership purely in terms of adherence to certain principles of democracy and justice. For minorities to seek special rights, on this view, is a radical departure from the traditional operation of the liberal state. Therefore, the burden of proof lies on anyone who would wish to endorse such minority rights. Sub-state nations like the Quebecers are contenders and aspire to form their own states, but losses out in the struggle for political power.

Sub-state nations have resisted state nation-building, and have fought to maintain or regain their own self-governing institutions, often operating in their own language, so as to live and work in their own culture. They demand to maintain or regain their own schools, courts, media, political institutions and so on. To achieve this, they typically demand some form of autonomy. At the extreme, this may involve claims to outright secession, but more usually it involves some form of regional autonomy. And they typically mobilise along nationalist lines, using the language of 'nationhood' to describe and justify these demands for self-government. While the ideology of nationalism has typically seen full-fledged independence as the 'normal' or 'natural' end point, economic or demographic reasons may make this infeasible for some national minorities. Moreover, it is increasingly clear that substantial forms of self-government can be achieved within the boundaries of a larger state, and so there is a growing interest in exploring these other forms of self-government, such as federalism.

Quebec has always sought to account for its economic position in the continent. In doing so, they have continued to resort within a political framework that

created regional diversity and shaped the development of Quebec. This features a series of factors that work at limiting possible political options in order to minimise unwanted effects as continental market largely determines the structure of Quebec exports. Although, Quebec is one of the most important provincial exporters to the Canadian market, this has diminished during the 1990s in the wake of the increasing integration of economies in the western hemisphere. While Quebec's exports to the United States have largely been limited to a few key sectors, on the other hand, U.S. imports show a much greater diversity. This underlies the vulnerability of Quebec's export base to the tremors that may occur with its principal trading partner. This fragility is greater since Quebec deals largely with neighbouring American states who are confronting a marginalisation problem from the gradual move to the West of the major centres of economic growth. Furthermore, the relative importance of English Canadian and American control of the Quebec economy has limited the latitude available to a Quebec government wishing to minimise the dependence of the Quebec economy on the continental market. The choice of reducing Quebec's economic dependence has never been put in terms of that between a self-sufficient closed economy or an open economy.

Today, Quebec nationalism is still imbued with this forward-looking attitude, and has enlarged its original conception of national identity to include all who live and reside in the Quebec territory as equal and full partners in nation-building. This sense of the Quebec nation has pervaded public documents and policies for over a decade now, and no nationalist leader or intellectual would entertain, at least officially, any other view of the nation. The type of nationalist discourse that currently holds sway in Quebec is premised on inclusiveness and openness to diversity.