PART THREE

OBSERVATIONS
CHAPTER VIII

SOME OBSERVATIONS

In addition to the matters dealt with in the earlier chapters, we find certain observations made by the author in the course of the work. They are dealt with here classified as conceptual, phonological and interpretational.

Conceptual

In this work, aimed at commenting on the Mbh and the Prdp, NBh has referred to certain important grammatical theories and has expressed his views in them concisely whereas they are dealt with in full detail in other works of his own.

1. Sphota

NBh refers to the tradition ascribing this theory to sage Sphotāyana, mentioned as an authority by Pāṇ himself and assumes that he has arranged and expounded
the sphota theory. He has referred to this theory in many places in Udy whereas he has dealt with the same in all its detail in his other works like Sphotavāda and Manj.

The term Sphota is derived from the root sphut which means 'to burst' and linguistically the word means that from which the meaning bursts forth i.e., shines forth. In other words sphota is vacaka i.e., that which expresses a meaning and is established to be an entity manifested by letters. NBh says that the justification for the existence of sphota and its unity, is the realization in the form, 'This is one word, this is one sentence'.

   "vaiyākaranaṁ āgeśāḥ sphotaṁ anarṣermaṁ
   pariskṛtyoktāvāmstena priyataṁ jagadīśvarah" and
   Ast "avaṁ sphotāyanasya" (6-1-123).

2. Vide Sphotavāda p.5. 'sphutati prakāśate'rtho'smāditi
   sphotah.

   pratyayah sphotasatve tadaikye ca pramāṇam."
The sphota, the word or the sentence located in the minds of the speaker and the listener and taken as an integral symbol, is revealed by the sounds produced in a fixed order. The sounds are only the manifesting agencies and have no function other than that of revealing the word symbol. Each sound helps in manifesting this sphota the first one vaguely, the next one more clearly and so on, until the last one, aided by the impressions of the preceding perceptions, reveal it clearly and distinctly. It is one and the same sphota that is revealed by each one of these letters. The sphota is one and indivisible, the sounds uttered to reveal this sphota cannot be considered as parts of the essential word or sphota, but only as diacritical marks to reveal the identity of the whole word.

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and

Vākyapadīya

"nādairāhitabijāyām antyena dhvaninā saha /
āvṛttiparipākāyām buddhau 'sabdo'vadhāryate // (1-85)"
NBh enumerates eight different varieties of the sphota. The fundamental argument in all these cases is meaningfulness (vācakātva). The eight sub-divisions of sphota are 1. Varnasphota, 2. Padasphota, 3. Vakyasphota, 4. Akhandapadasphota, 5. Akhandavākyasphota, 6. Varnajātisphota, 7. Padajātisphota, and 8. Vākyajātisphota. Of these eight, NBh says that Vākyasphota, (ie, vākyajātisphota) is the one accepted as the most important by the grammarians.

2. Ākṛtipakṣa and Vyaktipakṣa

The speculations in regard to the sense conveyed by a word has led the grammarians to formulate views known as Ākṛtipakṣa and vyaktipakṣa. These are also called jātipakṣa and dravyavāda respectively. NBh points out that the word ākṛti denotes both the form and the genus since


6. Vide Udy p.46. "anye vaiyākaraṇāḥ. apare-ta eva mukhyāḥ" on Prdp "anye varṇavyatiriktam padasphoṭam icchanti, vākyasphoṭam apare saṅgirante".
both distinguish their abode from another one belonging
to another group or category. He also points out
that the form is indicative of genus. That the form,
denoted by the word ākṛti, is also regarded to be
comprised in the meaning conveyed by a word, is pointed
out by NBh by quoting the rule of Gautama namely
"jatyākṛtivyaktyayastu padarthāh". Vyakativāda is that
the word denotes the individual. Pāṇī has accepted
both the views; he has formulated the rule "jatyākhyāyām
ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām" (1-2-58) on the basis
of jātipakṣa and the rule "sarupāṇām ekāesa ekavibhaktau"
(1-2-64) on the basis of vyaktipakṣa. NBh points out
that these two viewpoint are accepted by grammarians
wherever they facilitate the justification of the
derivation of a correct word and also refutes the view of
Kṣ that the maxim "sakrd gatau vipratisedhe yad bādhitaṁ
tad bādhitaṁ eva" can be accepted only on the basis
of jātipakṣa and the maxim 'punah prasangavijñānāt siddham'
on the basis of vyaktipakṣa alone. 8

7. Vide Udy p.16. "ākṛtiḥ jātih samsthānam ca ākriyate
vyavacchidyate svāsrayo'naya iti vyutpatītītī bhāvaḥ".
3. **Sakti**, the expressive power of a word.

The nature of *sakti* or the exact nature of the relation existing between the word and what it denotes, form the subject matter of a hot controversy between Naiyāyikas and Vaiyakaranas. The traditional views of Vaiyakaranas is that the relation existing between a word and the object denoted by it is one of identity-cum-difference; the distinction between language and thought is real, the identity between the two being conjured up by imagination. But NBh propounds a new theory of his own. He asserts that the relation between the word and its corresponding concept is not one of identity-cum-difference, but one of complete identity i.e., the word and that which is denoted by it are identical in essence. Thus according to him the identity between the word and the object denoted by it is called *sakti*. That is why, he says, one meets with expressions such as "the disyllabic word Rama leads to annihilation of the pride of archers", in which

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the identity of word Rama and the meaning i.e., the
person conveyed by it, is accepted\(^\text{10}\).

However NBh anticipates an objection. It is
pointed out that as the word resides in the cavity of
our mouth because our speech organ produces the transient
sound, and the concept or the thing resides in the
objectives world outside, there is no spatial association
between them and things between which there is no
spatial or temporal association are never identical
with one another. In reply to this possible objection
NBh asserts that by word is meant that word, which is
mental in construction and consequently resides in our
mind in the form of eternal unit\(^\text{11}\). This word is that
principle which is referred to by the term sphota, a name
which brings into light its dual role that it is revealed
by the transient sound produced by our speech organs
and delivers the meaning. By meaning also, NBh says,
that thing is signified which resides in the realm of
our intellect and not necessarily in the empirical world

\(^{10}\) Vide Udy p.8.

\(^{11}\) Vide Par.Lagh.Manj p.24 - vastuto baudha evarthah
\[\text{śakyah.padam api sphoṭatmakam prasiddham tayoṣṭadatmyam.}\]
outside. He points out that words, signify things that reside in the realm of our intellect. These things may not have objective existence in the outside world of our experience. When the relation of identity is declared as existing between word and its corresponding concept, what is actually meant is this, that a word which is intellectual in construction is identified with a concept which resides in the realm of intellect. Thus as both the word and the meaning reside in the realm of intellect and consequently as spatial association is capable of being predicated of the two, Nāh contends, nothing stands in the way of establishment of the relation of identity between the two. He calls this establishment of identity as adhyāsa and this justifies the acceptance of words like vandhyāsuta etc. mentioned in the verse.

"esa vandhyāsuto yāti khaṇḍupakṛtasekharah /
kūrmakṣīrācaye snātah sasasrīgadhanurduhah //,

as meaningful. So also the question of the pronunciation of the word 'fire' leading to a feeling of burning sensation in the tongue, or the word 'honey' leading to

the enjoyment of a sweet taste, does not arise because it is always asserted that the identify between a word and its corresponding concept is only a mental construction, though they are always different in the outside world.

*4. The conception "Gunasamooah dravyam"

NBh refers to this theory while explaining Kt's elucidative assertion on the bhāṣya passage in the Paspaśānñhika, "atha gaur ity-atra kassabadha". He points out that this theory is favoured by Pat in the rule "tasya bhāvastvatalau" (5-1-119). Pat has also referred to this under the rules "striyam" (4-1-3) and "samkhya-avayave tayap" (5-2-42)\(^1\)\(^3\). The word guna here, denotes the organs and qualities or attributes comprising guna\(^4\). The components and qualities make the dravya. Hence the samooha of gunas is treated as dravya.

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\(^{14}\) Vide Chāyā p.9. "atra gunaśabdenavayava dharmasca" and "ayutasiddhāvayavavisesānugatah samooho dravyam iti patañjaliriti patañjalibhāsyoktasyaiddhāntapakṣa ityarthah".
Kt points out that several concepts appear in the mind of the hearer when one utters the word gauh and the question "ata: a gaur ity_atra kassabdaḥ" enquires the one which among these is designated by the term 'sabda'¹⁵. Elucidating this assertion of Kt, NBh says that the different concepts that appear in mind when one utters gauh, are the individuality cow, her action, her qualities, genus cow, the shape of the cow and also the word made up of g, au and visarga. Justifying the question doubting quality action etc. to be the sabda, NBh says that qualities action etc. can be well treated as being denoted by the word gauh. The word gauh denotes the dravya which is the samudāya or sum-total of qualities. So when the word denotes the samudāya it goes without saying that it denotes the guṇas of which the samudāya is made up and hence the question doubting qualities action etc. to be the sabda.

¹⁵. Vide Prdp p.8. "atha.gauḥ iti viñāne prati-
   bhasamānesu vastuṣu kah sabdāḥ ityarthaḥ"
Yoga and Rudhi are the expressive powers of words on the basis of which words are grouped as yaugika and rudha. When a word retains the signification which belongs to it according to its etymology it is called yaugika or derivative and the expressive power is known as yoga. The meaning of such words is determined by those of its component parts and it does not signify anything more or less other than the meanings of its parts. When a word has a meaning which is not directly connected with its derivation it is called rudha or conventional and the expressive power is known as rudhi. In this case the meaning is determined by the whole word independently of the part meanings. It is generally

16. Words are usually divided into four classes according to the different ways in which their meaning is determined, yaugika rudha, yogarudha and yaugikarudha. Corresponding to these the expressive powers are called yoga, rudhi yogarudhi and yaugikarudhi. Vide K. Kunjunni Rajah, Indian theories of Meaning, pp. 59-69.
accepted, as pointed out in the statement rūdhiryogā-paharini, the meaning got by rūdhi is more authoritative than etymological meaning. Grammarians too admit this. NBh points out that though it is true that rūdhi versus etymology, one has to adhere to yoga in certain instances and he dwells on such instances.

Under the rule "bahugaṇavatuḍati saṁkhya" (1-1-25) Pat refers to the maxim "krtrimākrtrimayoh krtrime kāryasampratyayah" and states that one resorts to krtrima on the basis of the said maxim only because of the context or a particular sense which favours the resort to krtrima. But Pat continues, when one says 'bring gopalaka or 'bring katajaka' to a man who has just come and is quite unaware of the context of the conversation; he may understand from the word gopalaka, the person named gopalaka as well as the person who protects cows (with a stick in his hand).

17. Vide Par. Sekh Paribhāsa No. 191 - "avayavaprasiddheh samudāyapraprasiddhirbaliyasi"
Pat than adds that, it is more probable that he may understand one who protects cows.

Here NBh points out that the word \textit{gopālaka} denotes the person named \textit{gopālaka} when it is treated as the \textit{rudha sabda}; the same word conveys the sense of a person who protects cows, when it is treated as a \textit{yaugika sabda}. Thus he draws our attention to the fact that it is by \textit{rudhi} that the idea of the person named \textit{gopālaka} is got and it is by \textit{yoga} that the person who protects cows is understood from the word. Even so, Pat. says that most probably the man may understand from the word, the person who protects cows. This is because of the fact that though generally \textit{rudhi} versus \textit{yoga}, \textit{yoga} can supersede \textit{rudhi}, if the former is favoured by the context.

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18. "\textit{nanu coktam} - "\textit{itaraṁtha hyasampratyayo yathā loke iti? naśa dośaḥ - arthāt prakāraṇād va loke krtrimākrtrimayoh krtrime sampratyayo bhavati. artho va'syaivamsamjñakena bhavati. prakrtam va tatra bhavati idamevamsamjñakena kartavyam iti. ataścārthāt prakāraṇād va. aṅga hi bhavān grāmyam pāmsurāpādam aprakāraṇajñām āgatam bravītu, gopālakam ānaya katajakam ānayeti. ubhayagatistasya bhavati, sādhiyo va yaśtihastam gamisyati.} (\textit{Nbh. p.194})

19. Vide \textit{Udy} p.194. "\textit{yadyapi rudhir yogapahārīnītyaṇyaṭra bhavati tathāpi prakaranādīśahakrto yogo'pi balavānītyaḥhiṣtyeṣadāmevoktam.}
has just come, may entertain a doubt as to what is
intended to be conveyed by the term gopālaka, but so
long as he is not aware of a person named gopālaka, he
may take by the word only that person who protects
cows.

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the fact that it is by rudhi that the idea of the person
named gopālaka is got and it is by yoga that the
person who protects cows is understood from the word.
Even so, Pat says that most probably the man may
understand from the word, the person who protects cows.
This is because of the fact that though generally rudhi
versus yoga, yoga can supercede rudhi, if the former
is favoured by the context. The man who has just
come may entertain a doubt as to what is intended to be
conveyed by the term gopālaka, but so long as he is
not aware of a person named gopālaka, he may take by
the word only that person who protects cows. Thus
NBh specifies the fact that *rudhi* versus *yoga* only when one is aware of the sense got by *rudhi* and not otherwise\(^{20}\).

Under the rule "tulyasyaprayatnam savarnam"

"(1-1-10) Pat says the word *asya* in the rule does not denote the idea of the mouth, but it denotes the sense, 'asye bhavam', the word *asya* being derived by the addition of the suffix *yat* to the base *asya*\(^{21}\).

Here NBh points out that the word *asya* denotes the sense of the mouth by *rudhi* whereas it denotes the idea *asya bhavam* by virtue of *yoga* and thus it can be seen that here *yoga* versus *rudhi* quite contradictory to what is said, in the statement *rudhir yogapaharini*\(^{22}\).

This is because of the fact that if Pan intended to convey the idea of the mouth, he would never have used the word *asya*, he could have framed the rule as "tulyadesaprayatnam savarnam" in which case, the word *desa* will refer to mouth alone. But Pan has used the word *asya* and it is the usage of the same in the said rule that favours the denotation of the sense got by *yoga*.

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\(^{20}\) Vide Udy p.195.

\(^{21}\) Vide Mbh p.154 and Pan's rule "sarırašavayaśaça"(4-3-55)

\(^{22}\) Udy p.155.
6. The dyotakatva and vacakatva of upasargas and nipatas.

NBh maintains that all the nipatas are dyotakas as well as vacakas and the criterion which determines their dyotakatva and vacakatva is laksyanurodha i.e, accordance with the correct usage. In certain instances like sumadrah formed as tatpurusa compound which is uttarapadarthapradhana, nipatas are dyotakas and in certain instances like sumadram wherein the compound forming the same is avyayibhava which is purvpadarthapradhâna, nipatas are vacakas. This view of NBh is based on the statement of Pat under the rule "avyayam vibhaktisamipasamrddhi..." (2-1-6), in answering to the question why avyayibhavasamasa does not occur in instances like sumadrah suputrah etc. 23 There it has been made clear that in sumadrah the sense of samrddhi is conveyed by the uttarapada itself viz. madrah and the nipata, su is only dyotaka of that sense. Avyayibhava is enjoined only when the nipatas are the vacaka of the particular senses mentioned in the rule "avyayam vibhaktisamipasamrddhi..." (2-1-6) Thus NBh holds "nipatanam dyotakatvam vacakatvam ca. Lakṣyanurodhād vyavastheti bhāvah.

With regard to the upasargas, NBh holds that they are always dyotakas. It is clear from the statements of Pat and NBh under the rule "gatiragatau" (8-1-70) that a root first becomes united with a particular sense and then it gets the suffix namely ti or krt denoting the different karakas and then to indicate the sense in which the root is used the upasargasabda which is the dyotaka of that particular sense is added to it\(^{24}\). It is on the basis of the dyotakatva of nipātas, that usages like anubhūyate sukhām, saksātkriyate guruḥ, etc. wherein, the suffix is in the sense of karman, are obtained. If upasargas were vācakas, the root bhū which is akarama cannot take after it the suffix which is in the sense of karman\(^ {25}\).

\(^{24}\) NBh Vol. III, pp. 346 & 347.

\(^{25}\) Bhaṭṭoджidīksita maintains that the nipātas are also, just like the upasargas, dyotakas. His argument is that there is no propriety in accepting the vācakatva of nipātas when with regard to upasargas which also come under nipātas, one accepts the dyotakatva. He is even ready to admit the fact that both the nipātas and upasargas are vācakas. But he is quite against the view of accepting a difference between the two in nīpātas as vācakas and upasargas as dyotakas. Vide Śabdakaustubha p. 2.
7. Conception of the four phases of speech

Pat refers to the Rig Vedic hymn "catvarī vākparimitāni padāni...etc. while enumerating the benefits accrued from the study of Vyākaraṇa. NBh while commenting on the words of Pat on the said hymn, speaks about the four phases of speech (vāk).

He points out that the transition of the eternal sphota or sābdabrahman from the highest level to the form of the spoken or audible word or sound at the lowest level is described as occurring in four stages technically known as para, pāśyanti, madhyama and vaikhari. Para is too subtle to be comprehended. Pāśyanti also is too subtle to be comprehended except by the yogins. Madhyama stage may be comprehended through practice like japa while the vaikhari is what is uttered by vocal organs, and is capable of being heard by ordinary people.

26. Mbh p.34.
27. Udy p.35
28. Vide Paññālagh. Maj p.60
Parā is the eternal sabdabrahman. This also is referred to as nada. Since it is too subtle to be comprehended. The phases of speech are also referred as trayī says NBh. Both Parā and Pasyanti are classed as sūkṣma sphota (subtle). Madhyama is referred to as antara sphota (internal). Vaikhari is manifested as bāhya (external)-sphota, by vocal organs and is capable of being heard by others.

8. Yadṛcchāśabdās

Yadṛcchāśabdās form one group among the four categories of standard sounds spoken by Pat under the Śiṁśaṇa “rlk”. Based on the pravṛttinimitta or connotation of words which are categorized as universal (sāmānyā or jāti), quality (guna), action (kriyā) and the substance (dravya) there are four divisions of sounds namely jātisabda, gunasabda, kriyāsabda and samjnasabda. The fourth category, samjnasabda or proper names are sounds like devadatta.

29. Vide Vāk (1-43)

"paśyantyā madhyamayā vaikharyāścasedamadbhutam /
anekatīrthabhедayāstrayyā vácaḥ param padam //
ditha, etc. The essential difference between the proper names and the three other categories is that while the usage of the latter is conditioned by the objectivity of one of these three attributes, namely universal, quality, and action, there is no conditioning factor, the absence or the presence of which can prevent or promote the usage of what are known as proper names. It is because of this that the proper names have been significantly styled as **yadrcchāsabdas** (words coined at random or words of casual utterance). Hence NBh remarks - *evaṇca svecchayā ekasyām vyaktau saṅketyamānāh śabdo yadrcchāsabda ityuktam*.

NBh also points out that the imitative sounds (anukaranaśabdas) are treated as **jātisabdas** by Kt. This is because the imitative sounds indicate sounds which are anukāryas and in which universal or **jāti** is always present. The **anukārya sabda** possessed of the universal is indicated by the **anukaranaśabda** and this is the basis of Kt's

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30. *Udī* p.72
assertion. But, NBh says that certain other scholars consider anukarana-sabdas as yadṛcchasabdas since these imitative sounds are used according to the will of the speaker to denote a particular sound.\(^\text{31}\).

\(\text{NBh}\) brings home to our mind that though there is thus a fourth variety of sounds known as yadṛcchasabdas, only those which are used by sīṣṭas (the learned men) and are in keeping with grammatical rules are accepted as yadṛcchasabdas or proper names and not all of them as such. That is why Pat refutes the enunciation, of the letter \(l\) in the Sīvasūtras, which is meant for bringing \(\text{ackārva}\) i.e., vowel operation in regard to yadṛcchasabdas like \(\text{ltaka}\) saying that there is no fourth variety of sabdas known as yadṛcchasabdas. By this, \(\text{NBh}\) says, Pat means that sounds like \(\text{ltaka}\) being not used by sīṣṭas need not be accepted.\(^\text{32}\).

\(^{31}\) NBh p.73.

\(^{32}\) "evam yadṛcchasabdan āṅgikṛtya sāstrānvitānām kvacīcchistaprayuktānāmeva yatra kutracit samjnātvena viniyogo nānyesam ityevam ltakal- phiddinām sāstrāvīyatvabhavannā tadrathā \(\text{kāropadesa ityuktam} \)." (Udy p.74)
9. The conceptions "udbhūtavayavabhedah samudāyah" and 'avayavāvayāh samudāyahavayavāh'.

Dealing with the samudāya and avayavā, NBh elucidates in Udy the two conceptions, 'udbhūtavayavabhedah samudāyah' and avayavāvayāh samudāyahavayavāh. In the Mbh under the rule "uran raparah" (1-1-51), the pūrvapakṣin argues that the raparatva enjoined to the an which is to substitute r must be extended to that an also which substitutes r and another letter and is called ekādesa. Pat points out that there is no necessity of the extension of raparatva to the ekādesa an also since the an which replaces the samudāya constituted of r and another letter can well be treated as the substitute of the part of that samudāya, i.e., r. He illustrates the same saying that when it is said "māsa" shall not be eaten the substance which is mixed with māsa also is not consumed. It says that ekādesa is enjoined in the place of the two sthanins, the pūrva and the para by the rule "ekah pūrvaparayoh" (6-1-84) which denotes udbhūtavayavabhedah samudāyah.

33. Mbh p.278.
udbhūtavayavyabhedaḥ samudāyah.

NBh elucidates the conception 'udbhūtavayavyabhedaḥ samudāyah'. In the rule "ekah pūrvaparāyaḥ" (6-1-84) the samudāya is mentioned as identical with the avayavas. The samudāya constituted of the pūrva and para sthānīn is denoted by pūrvaparyoh which is an expression by the itaretarayogadvandva compound in dual number. Otherwise, if the samudāya was not treated as identical with the avayavas, the expression ought to be pūrvaparasya which is formed as a samaharadvandva compound. This treatment of the samudāya as identical with the avayavas is what is known as udbhūtavayavyabhedaḥ samudāyah. Therefore the ekādesa an replacing the pūrva and parasthānīn i.e., r and another letter, can well be treated as the substitute of r also.

With regard to the conception "avayavāvayavah samudāyāvayavah" which means the part of an organ of a samudāya is the part of the samudāya itself, NBh says that the treatment of the part of an organ as the part of the samudāya can be accepted only when the organ along
with that part can be pointed out as possessed of the
dharma which was there on the organ of the samudaya. This is just like considering fingers as the part of the body, since the hand which is the organ of the body can be treated as the organ of the body when the hand is possessed of fingers. Similarly in grammar also when an augment to the arthavatsabda i.e., the vikarana suffix tas(i), the augment too can be treated as the avayava of the anga of the suffix da in the instance bhū+itas+(d)a of the verb bhavīta. This is because the suffix tās which is arthavat and part of the anga can be treated as an arthavat part of the anga when the same (tās) is combined with the augment it i.e., when it becomes itās. Therefore it too is being treated as avayava of anga and that is why Pāṇḥ frames the rule "didhivevitām" (1-1-6) wherein the augment the augment is prohibited of the gunārddhi which replaces the ik which is āngāvayava. NBh continues saying that under the rule "alonyasya" (1-1-52) Pat says that the genitive case which is in the sense of sthāne alone is the basis for the function of the rule "alonyasya" (1-1-52).

If all the genitive cases, irrespective of their meaning is subjected to the rule "alōntyasya" there is the contingency of all augments i.e., tit, kit and mit, to be the avayava of the final letter.\(^{35}\)

Kt says that if such a contingency occurs the maxim 'arthavata āgamastadguṇibhūtaḥ tadgraḥanaena grhyate' cannot function. NBh adds that at such a contingency of the augment, occurring as the part of the final letter, cannot be treated as the avayava of the whole samudāya. This is because the dharma on the final letter cannot be said to be existing on the same when it is combined with the augment. That is why NBh says, Pat points out that if the rule "alōntyasya" function on all genitive cases it will cause an undesirable contingency.

\(^{35}\) NBh p.285.
Certain phonological observations are made by NBh while commenting on the Mbh and Prdp under the rule "tulyāsyaprayatnam savarnam" (1.1-9). They mainly relate to sthāna and prayatna.

1. The nose as the place of articulation (sthāna)

Indian grammarians classify sounds mainly from two points of view, viz. 1. the place of articulation and 2. the mode or process of articulation. The place of articulation is known as sthāna. However an important terminological distinction underlying a large number of the ancient descriptions is that of sthāna and karaṇa (literally meaning place and organ) which generally speaking denote the passive and active organs of articulation. The terms closely correspond to the point of articulation and articulator. 36

To apply the system of specifications of sthāna to the feature of nasality leads to confusion, the nose being stated by some treatises to be the articulator and by others the point of articulation. NBh maintains that nose is the sthāna i.e., place or point of articulation. His opinion in regard to the question of considering the nose as the sthāna within the buccal cavity or external to it, as also the question of considering the nose as the sthāna for all the nasal sounds, is noteworthy.

Kt maintains that the nāśika is not a sthāna outside the buccal cavity. He considers nose as the line connected with the inner skin which lies spread within the buccal cavity and by the striking of the breath stream there, a nasal sound is produced. NBh maintains that in regard to the production of sounds, nose is considered to be a sthāna outside the buccal cavity. The rule "mukhanāśikāvacaṇanunāśikāh" (1-1-8) itself proves the same. Pat gives the splitting of the part mukhanāśika in the word mukhanāśikāvacaṇah, as mukham ca nāśika ca and also as mukhadvitiya nāśika.
NBh points out that if the nose is treated as a sthāna within the buccal cavity, Pat could never have split the word as pointed out above, since such a derivation does not suit to a compound formed of two sounds denoting the part (avayava) and the whole (avayawin). In compounds like sahasto (devadattah) the pūrvapada saha is used in the sense of the word vidyamanah. This is because devadatta being the avayavin and hasta being the avayava, the derivation of the word sahastah with saha in the usual sense of sahita is not correct and hence is split saha (vidyamanah) hasta yasya sah.

Moreover under the rule "mukhāsikāvacanōnunāsikah" Pat says "mukhāvacanōnunāsika ityatyucyamane kaca tatapanāmeva prasajyaeta" meaning if the wording of the rule be in the form mukhāvacanōnunāsikah, the term shall extend only to the sounds k, c, t, t, and p which are mukhācana. NBh points out that if nose is treated as a sthāna within the buccal cavity yama sounds and consonant nasals like ŋ ŋ ŋ ŋ ŋ ŋ m can also be described as mukhācana and so the

word _eva_ used by Pat in the cited passage, with the intention of excluding _yama_ and consonantal nasal sounds, would be of no avail.

He adds that the _prasādavāsinyāya_ resorted to by Pat to refute the part _mukha_ in the rule "mukhanāsikāvacano'nunāsikah" also implies the fact that nose is never considered as a _sthāna_ within the buccal cavity. On the strength of the _prasādavāsinyāya_ Pat refutes the part _mukha_ in the expression _mukhanāsikāvacanah_ since even in the wording _nasikāvacanah_ the term shall extend to those sounds that are purely _nasikāvacana_ and also to those sounds which are _mukhanāsikāvacanah_. This implies that the nose is not the _sthāna_ within the buccal cavity, and if it were so, Pat could not say that even in the wording _nasikāvacana_, the term shall extend to those that are _mukhanāsikāvacanam_.

In the opinion of Kt who maintains that nose is the _sthāna_ within the buccal cavity, NBh reminds us that the part _mukha_ in _mukhanāsikāvacanah_ is to be taken as denoting the sense, _mukhāvāyava_ by which,
on the basis of brahmanavasisthanyāya, all the organs, within the buccal cavity, except the nose is to be comprehended and the word eva in the cited passage is to be understood in the sense of the nipata, api.

In regard to treating the nose as the sthāna, he points out that in regard to the vowel sounds, nose is never a sthāna for them, since the distinction of breath stream as any vowel sound is made by means of the respective sthāna namely kantha tālu, etc. and the nose gives only a colouring i.e., rāga to the vowels. But with regard to the consonants ň, n, n and m nose is also the sthāna for them since they cannot be produced by one alone, i.e., not merely by kantha tālu etc. or not merely by the nose.

2. Yāvatsthānasāmya (identity of the place(s) of articulation) a deciding factor of cognateness

The rule "tulyāsyaprayatnam savarnam" (1-1-9) points out identity of place of articulation and the process of articulation within the buccal cavity as the deciding factor of homogeneity (sāvarnya) between sounds. In this regard NBh furnishes an additional information that in order to secure cognateness of two sounds one has to ascertain whether the sounds in question have identity with regard to the place(s) of articulation. For instance the sound v which has danta as sthāna is never a cognate of the sound l which has the same sthāna because v is produced jointly by the two places of articulation namely danta and oṣṭha and v and l thus lack yāvatsthānasāmya, identity of all the places of articulation. NBh states that this fact has been indicated by Pan by the expression tadvān in the rule "tadvānasāmupadhāno mantra..." (4-4-125). If l and v were regarded as cognates the rule "torli" (8-4-60) enjoining parasavarna on the precedance of l ought to have operated here since, v is also to be comprehended by the letter l mentioned in the rule as 'lī' and the absence of the same points.
out that \( \gamma \) is never a cognate of \( \lambda \) which shows that
\( \text{yavatsthanasāmya} \) is the deciding factor of cognateness.

He adds that it is with this idea in his mind that
Pat refutes the assertion of cognateness between the
sounds \( \text{ai} \) and \( \text{au} \). The contingency is brought about
by the fact that these \( \text{ai} \) and \( \text{au} \) have identity of the
process of articulation. Pointing out that they have
no identity of place of articulation in as much as
one i.e., \( \text{ai} \) has the \( \text{sthāna(s)} \) \text{kantha} and \( \text{tālu} \) and the
other i.e., \( \text{au} \) has the \( \text{sthāna(s)} \) namely \text{kantha} and \( \text{ostha} \)
Pat states "naitau tulyasthānāu". Here it is
to be remembered that \( \text{ai} \) and \( \text{au} \) have one identical
place of articulation, i.e., \text{kantha}. Even then the
negation of identity of place of articulation by Pat
shows that identity of all the places of articulation,
i.e., \text{kantha}. Even then the negation of identity
of place of articulation by Pat shows that identity
of all the places of articulation is the deciding
factor of cognateness, says NBh.

3. **Prayatna, the process of articulation.**

The basic articulatory processes named
prayatna are divided into two main types, \( \text{ābhya} \text{ntara} \),
internal and \( \text{bahya} \), external. The first type
comprizes processes occurring within the buccal cavity (intra-buccal). The sūtra "tulyāsya-prayatnaṃ savarnam" (1-1-9) which lays down conditions for determining the homogeneity (savarnya) between two sounds, speaks of identity of the articulatory processes within the buccal cavity. These intra-buccal process namely sprṣṭa, īsatsprṣṭa vivṛtta samvrṭa are therefore the primary efforts in the determination of savarnya. Their function is mainly articulatory and Nṛh points out why they are called abhyantara and are named sprṣṭa, etc. "asyantargatattatsthanesu jihvāgradinām varnabhivyaktijanakasparsesatsprṣadura- vasthanasamīpaasthanarūpābhyantarakāryakāriprayatna- visesā etaih pradairucyante. tesām casyavṛttitvam āsyantar-gatattatsthanesu vāyusamyogajanakatveneti bodhyam 41.

The other class of efforts whose function is mainly acoustic gives to each sound in the alphabet

its distinctiveness. These are called \textit{bahya} or external in that they occur outside the buccal cavity mostly in the larynx, the term \textit{abhyantara} and \textit{bahya} being used with reference to the mouth within and without. NBh making this clear says, \textit{tatra ye tattasthanabhighatak\textbar{ }yatnaste\textbar{ }asyantargatatattat-\textbar{ }karyakaritvad\textbar{ }asye\textbar{ }prayatna\textbar{ }ityucyante\textbar{ }abhyantar\textbar{ }iti\textbar{ }prarambhah\textbar{ }iti\textbar{ }ca.\textbar{ }galavivaravik\textbar{ }sadikar\textbar{ }sc\textbar{ }sya-\textbar{ }bahirbhutadese\textbar{ }karyakaratvad\textbar{ }bahya\textbar{ }iti}^42. \textit{Bahyaprayatnas} are secondary in the sense that although for deciding s\textbar{ }varnya they are not necessary, they are taken into consideration when the \textit{abhyantaraprayatnas} by themselves are unable to serve the purpose of determining the nearest equivalent (\textit{antaratamyaparikasa\textbar{ }).}

\textbf{Interpretational}

In the course of the work NBh incidentally gives his views in regard to the interpretation of certain rules and makes mention of certain \textit{nyayas} or maxims in order to interpret the \textit{Mbh} and the \textit{Prdp}. 

\textbf{42. Udy p.155.}
He also resorts to the technical device known as *anabhidhāna* to justify or contradict the forms which in spite of any kind of interpretation, fall outside the scope of the grammatical rules. Observations of *NBh* in this regard are now dealt with.

1. The *nipāta,ca* in the rule "karmani ca" (2-2-14)

*NBh* points out that the *nipāta,ca* in this rule is to be interpreted in the sense of the *nipāta iti*. The rule which prohibits *sasthisamāsa* means that the word ending in the genitive case which is sanctioned by a rule possessed of the word 'karmani' does not get compounded with other semantically related words. By taking the *nipāta,ca* of the rule to be in the sense of *iti*, the rule arrives at the sense karmani iti sabdamuccārya vihitā śaṣṭhi na samasyate' and hence the above said idea is got. The prohibition of *samāsa* enjoined by this rule relates to instances where the genitive is sanctioned by the rule "ubhayaprāptau karmani" (2-3-66) and not to

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43. *Udy* p.3.
instances where the genitive case is sanctioned by the rule "kartrkarmanoh krti" (2-3-65). If the nipāta ca is not taken in the sense of iti, the rule may mean that words ending in genitive case which is in the sense of karman does not get compounded. As a result, it may not be easy to get the compound sabdānusasanam wherein the genitive case in sabdanaṁ is enjoined in the sense of karman by the rule "kartrkarmanoh krti" (2-3-65). But the compound is got since as pointed out above the prohibition relates to the genitive case sanctioned by the rule "ubhayaprāptau karmanī" (2-3-66) which alone is possessed of the word karmanī.

2. The anuvṛtti of the nipāta ca, in the rule "samjnāyam" (2-1-44).

Under the rule "īdūtau ca saptamyarthe" (1-1-19) Pat refers to the compounds vapyasvāḥ and nadyātīḥ and gives the vigraha as vāpyāṁ asvāḥ and nadyāṁ ātīḥ in the sentence "athavā pūrvapadasya mā bhūdityevamartham arthagrahanam. vāpyāṁ asvāḥ vāpyasvāḥ, nadyāṁ ātīḥ nadyātīḥ"44. The compound

vāpyaśvah and the like is formed by the rule "samjñāyām" (2-1-44) which means words ending in locative case get compounded with other semantically related subanta forms to denote a proper name. As the rule "samjñāyām" enjoins the formation of the compound only when the compounded word is a proper name, it comes out that the samāsa enjoined by the rule is a nityasamāsa which is defined asvapadavigraha; since the components used without composition are in the form of a sentence and cannot be a proper name. Hence a doubt is quite relevant here as to the propriety of using the components of the compound, without composition as vāpyam asvah. NBh clears this doubt says that it is to be admitted that the compound enjoined by the rule is similar to a nitya-samāsa since the components used without composition i.e., vāpayām asvah is not a proper name. But as there is the anuvṛtti of the word va from the rule "pāremadhye saśthya va" (2-1-18) to the rule "samjñāyām" (2-1-44) the components of the compound can however be used without composition. Hence Pat gives the vigrahavyākya, vāpyām asvah and nadyām atiḥ. NBh adds that one thing to be borne in mind is that the compound obtained
by this rule, "vāpyasvah" and the like are rudhisabdas and the meaning of the components in no way is conveyed by the compound expression. The vigrahāvākya i.e., vāpyam asvah is given only to point out the derivation of the compound. The word rathantara which is the name of a particular hymn, is given the vigrahāvākya, rathena tarati and it is quite obvious that this sense of the components does not relate in any way to the ṛk (hymn) which is named rathantara. Therefore, such samāsas illustrate jahatsvārtha vṛttih whereby a word denotes a particular sense neglecting the sense conveyed by the components. He concludes saying that that is why, learned men say "jahatsvārthā tu tatraiva yatra rūdhir virodhini" which means that the particular expressive power of words known as jahatsvārthā vṛttih is accepted with regard to those words wherein the sense got by rūdhī contradicts the sense delivered by the components. In jahatsvārthā vṛttih the components become devoid of their individual meaning and the word as a whole denotes quite a different idea.
3. The idea behind the rule enjoining luk

Under the rule "kniti ca" (1-1-5) in the

passage "naitani santi prayojanani iha tavada hato

hatah iti prasaktasyabhinirvrttasya pratisedhena

nivrtthi sakya kartum atra ca dhatupadesavasthayame-

vakarh" Pat refutes the assertion of the purvapaksin

that the insertion of the word nimitta in the

rule"kniti ca" (1-1-5) brings the benefit of retaining

of the vowel a in the forms hatah hathah etc. where

a having the designation guna is contingent to be

removed by the rule kniti ca, if read without the

insertion of the word nimitta. What Pat means

is that the rule "kniti ca" which prohibits guna and

vṛddhi cannot remove the a in hatah and hathah. This

is because a rule involving pratisedha can prohibit

anything only at a stage when it is contingent to

operate and has not yet functioned. Hence Pat points

out that the rule cannot avert the a in said instance

since they are already there and are not at a stage

of being contingent to operate.

45. Mbh p.137.
Here Kt makes the remarks that though the rule "adiprabhrtibhyah sapah" (2-4-72) enjoins the elision which results in the prohibition of sap at a stage when it has functioned, yet the same is accepted since there is no other go. In the formation of the form hatah, the root han takes lat after it and is substituted by the parasmaipada termination tas after it. The rule "kartari sap" (3-1-68) provides the suffix sap to the root and we reach a state han+(s)a(p)+tas. Now the a of sap is removed by the rule "adiprabhrtibhyah sapah" (2-4-72) and it is in regard to this instance that Kt makes the above remark.

NBh here brings out the idea behind the rule enjoining luk and thus explains the apparent exception pointed by Kt to the statement of Pat. He points out that the rule which enjoins luk to the suffix sap informs us that there is no necessity of the addition of the suffix sap to the roots and the like. Hence it can be stated that when the suffix sap, by virtue of the rule "kartari sap" (3-1-68) is contingent to operate at the stage han+tas, and has
not yet taken effect, the rule "adiprabhṛtibhyah sapah" (2.4-72) prohibits the same. The prohibition is quite normal here since it is made in regard to a suffix which is only contingent to operate and has not yet taken effect.

Nyayas

To achieve the purpose of the elucidation of the NBh and the Prdp NBh makes the application of suitable nyayas. He has made use of a number of nyayas and they are cchatrinyaya bhṛstāvasaranyaya, rājaprapravesanyaya, gobalīvardanyaya, tasyatudurjananyaya vicitaraṅganyaya, kadambamukulanyaya, kṛtvācintānyaya etc., and nyayas in the form of tadabhinnabhinnasya tadabhinnatvam, bahūnamanugraho nyāyasya, agantunam ante nivesah, vṛṣcikabhiyā palāyamanasya āsivisamukhe vinipataḥ, praksalanaddhi paṅkasya dūradasparsanam varam, etc. A few nyāyas among these are now dealt with.

46. 1M 47 A pp. 8, 21, 31, 37, 61, 76, 116, 118, 127, 237, 2325.
1. Chatrinyāya

While examining the necessity of the word ikāḥ in the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3), the objector points out three resources which help in preventing akāra, consonants and dipthongs from being substituted by guna in spite of the absence of the word ikāḥ in the rule. Among those three, one is the upadesasāmarthya of the dipthongs and the other two are jnāpakanas, viz., the diktarāṇa and kitkaraṇa of the suffixes enjoined by the rules "ato'nupasarge kah" (3-2-3) and "saptamyāṁ janerdah" (3-2-97). In the statement of siddhantyekadesin "naitāni santi jnāpakaṁ" all these three are referred to as jnāpakaṁ. The plural in jnāpakāni cannot correspond to these three as one of them i.e, the upadesasāmarthya is only a grammatical technique and not a jnāpaka. This inaccuracy is elucidated by Nāh by the mere mention of the fact that this statement is in accordance with cchatrinyāya. This nyāya derives its origin from the statement cchatrino yānti to designate a group of people among when some alone have

47. Mbh p.116.
umbrellas. It means that all those who pass by belong to one and the same mercandile group. So also as the upadesasāmarthya as well as the two jñāpakas bring forth the one and same benefit of pointing out the non-essentiality of the word ikāḥ in the rule "ikogunavṛddhi" (1-1-3) all these three are designated as jñāpakas in the statement "naitāni santi jñāpakāni"

2. Bhraṣṭāvasaranyāyaya:

Under the rule "iko guṇavṛddhi" (1-1-3) there is a question "is: there another place where the general rule does not operate when there is an exception. The answer is given that "asti ityāha sujāte āśvasūṛte adhvaryo odiḥbhiḥ sutam sukram te anyat iti pūrvarūpe pratiśiddhe ayādayopi na bhavanti. In the instance like sujāte āśvasūrte when a dipthong is followed by the vowel, purvarūpa the apavāda of the rule "eco[yavāyāvah" (6-1-78) is prohibited by the rule "nāntaḥ pāda[mayapare" (6-1-115) and there the rule "eco[yavāyāvah" too does not operate. Here

Nṛbh says "bhṛastāvasaranyāyenyeti bhāvah". The nyāya is ॥ yasyāvasaro bhṛastah tanna ॥ or "bhṛastāvasarano na pravartate" according to which something does not take place when the occasion for the taking place of it, has once gone by. Nṛbh means that in the said instance first of all the rule "ecoyavāyavah" is contingent to operate but this contingency is warded off by its apavāda rule, "enāh padāntād ati" (6-1-109) which teaches pūrvarūpa. Thus the chance of operation being once warded off, the rule "ecoyavāyavah" (6-1-18) does not operate and this non-operation is in accordance with what is known as bhṛastāvasaranyāya. It may be noted here that this statement is pointed out to be the assertion of siddhyāntyekāsin and therefore Nṛbh point out that this nyāya is not resorted to in the science of grammar.

Rajapurapravesanyāya

Under the rule "na padānta ...." (1-1-58) refuting the argument that a separate statement i.e.,

49. Supra pp. 102-105
"svardīṛghayalopesu lopaḥ mano sthanivat" is to be made with regard to the said rule, Pat says that the desired idea intended to be conveyed by making a fresh statement can already be got by connecting semantically the words lopa, ādesa, vidhi, svara, dirgha and yalopa among where the word ādesa is got by anuvṛtti and others are mentioned in the rule itself. The fact that there are not mentioned in the rule in the order by which this semantical relation is derived, does never obstruct the desired judgemental cognition in anyway⁵⁰. He then decisively asserts that the required judgemental cognition is possible even though there be lack of contiguity (anupūravya) with reference to the words denoting concepts that are intended to be semantically related, provided there be the element of syntactical expectancy (yogyata). As an example he refers to the apparently enigmatic group of words saying - "anāmupūrvyenapi sannivistānāṁ yathestam abhisambadho bhavati tadyathā" - anadvāham (the bull)

⁵⁰. Ṇbh p.324.
udahāri (carrying water) ya (who) tvām (thou)
harasi (carriest) kumbham (the pitcher) bhagini
(O sister) sācinam (crookedly) abhidhāvantam (running)
adrākṣih (hast seen)." Here the intended relational ideas i.e., 'O thou sister! who carriest upon thy head a pitcher of water, hast thou seen a bull running crookedly? - is cognised even though the terms are used haphazardly without any heed to the element of contiguity (ānupūrvya) that their interdependence demands. Commentary on this passage Kt refers to the parallel dictum pāthakramād arthakramo batiyām'. In further elucidating this, NŚh cites the maxim known as rājapurapravesanyaye i.e., the simile of the manner of entering a royal city. Just as a mob, when it is about to enter a royal city through a narrow gate-way must arrange itself into a regular file in an orderly fashion, so two concepts even though expressed by words jumbled up together without any heed as to their syntactical contiguity, of necessity relate themselves with one another according to their inherent expectancy before they can form into a self-relational judgement.

51. Udy p.325
Anabhidhāna

Anabhidhāna is a technical device adopted by the Sanskrit grammarians to account for the absence of certain undesired forms which are otherwise contingent by the grammatical rules and contradict certain uniformly accepted and established theories or form an obstruction to drawing certain conclusions. NBh has freely made use of this device while interpreting and the passages of the Mbh, establishing certain jñāpakas and justifying the assertions of Kt.\textsuperscript{53}

We may notice the same below.

1. The locative forms yayī papi etc.

Under the rule "idūtau ca saptamyarthe" (1-1-18) Pat discusses the purpose served by the word artha. It is pointed out that even in the absence of the word artha the Vedic locative forms like gaurī wherein the locative suffix has dropped obtain the designation. He says "evam tarhi āhāyam", idūtau saptamīti. Na cāsti saptamī īdūtau, tatra vacanād bhavisyati.\textsuperscript{54} The passage means that on the

\textsuperscript{53} Supra op. b3, 135, 443 & 213
\textsuperscript{54} Mbh p.179
authority of the rule with the wording "idūtau śptami" which provide the designation to a locative form ending in \( \ddot{i} \) or \( \ddot{u} \) is available nowhere, the designation shall extend to forms like \( \text{gaurī} \) where the locative suffix has been dropped.

Here a doubt may arise. There are locative forms ending in \( \ddot{i} \) or \( \ddot{u} \) for example \( \text{yayī} \) and \( \text{papī} \). These two are derived by the addition of the suffix \( \ddot{nī} \) to bases \( \text{yayī} \) and \( \text{papī} \) which are endowed with \( \text{nadīsamjña} \). In the resultant forms \( \text{yayī+i} \) and \( \text{papī+i} \) the locative suffix does not get elided but \( \text{pūrvavarna-dīrgha} \) replaces \( \ddot{i}+\ddot{i} \) on the strength of the rule "supām sulukpūrvavarna ...." (7-1-39) and we arrive at the forms \( \text{yayī} \) and \( \text{papī} \) which are locative forms ending in \( \ddot{i} \). So the doubt as to how can the form \( \text{gaurī} \) wherein the locative suffix has dropped, get the designation? Thus it is clear that these forms contradict the assertion of Pat "na cāsti saptāmi idūtau, tatra vacanād bhāvīsyati".

To avert the discrepency, scholars like Narāyana assumes that what Pat meant by the statement
"tatra vacanad bhavisyati" is that even by framing rules in the manner i.e., "idūt saptamī", "adānāh" and "ecca dvivācanam" instead of "idūded dvivacanam pragṛhyam", "adaso māt", and "idūtau ca saptamyarthe", all the desired forms can be provided with pragṛhyam sarjna-55. Hence the reading of the rule as idūtau saptamī as separate from idūdeddvivacanam pragṛhyam, which involves great effort, it can be understood that the designation defined by the rule "idūtau saptamī", devoid of the word artha extends to gaurī, etc. where the locative suffix has b got elided.

Here NBh points out that Pat has stated there are no locative forms ending in i or u and the existence of forms yayī and papi contradict this assertion. Hence it is better to accept the anabhidhāna of these forms. Hence there is no discrepancy in the statement that in the absence of the locative forms ending in i, the term extends to gaurī wherein the locative suffix has elided and that is what Pat implies by this statement.

55. Mbh with the commentary Tattvāloka, p.236.
Yañluganta forms

NBh holds that forms derived by the elision of the suffix yan do not exist in spoken language. The basis of his assumption is the assertion of Pat, "atha va chandasametad drsta nividhih chandasi bhavati". In order to refute the view that the insertion of the word nimitta is necessary in the rule, "kniti ca" to arrive at the form roraviti, Pat makes this assertion. The form roraviti is vedic and hence there need not be the fear that the rule, "kniti ca" (1-1-5) in the absence of the word nimitta may prohibit the guna.

NBh says that this means that in the rule, "yañoci ca" (2.4-74) by virtue of the word ca possessed of in it there is the anuvritti of the words bahulam and chandasi and hence the rule enjoin the elision of yan in vedic usages only. He then refers to the assertion of Pat under the rule "husnuvoh sarvadhatuke" (6-4-57). There it has been said that mention of the word husnuvoh indicates there are forms derived from the elision of the suffix yan added to roots ending in u

56. Mbh p.139.
NBh remarks that on the basis of the assertion, that

\[ \text{h\textasciicircum{}arly forms derived by } \text{h} \text{h} \]

there can be the elision of \( \text{va} \text{n} \) added to roots ending

in \( \text{u} \) and followed by a knit suffix beginning with a

vowel, but it can in no way be the authority for

acceptance of such forms throughout in the spoken

language. Moreover he points that the said assertion

is that of \text{ekadesin}^{57}.

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57. \textit{Udy p.139}.
CHAPTER IX

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CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The avowed aim of NBh in writing the Udy is to provide an original commentary which will be neither too elaborate nor too short, but intelligible to the average student and inspiring to the advanced scholar. In the introductory verses to Udy, NBh has expressed this perspective clearly. The Udy has got the special feature that it happens to be a commentary on two works which are related namely the Prdp as well as the Nbh. This factor has rendered the effort of the author more laudable. The Udy is the product of a master mind dealing with the work of two great personalities, one the most celebrated authority in the science of grammar and the other an illustrious and distinguished writer in the same field. The Udy reveals NBh as an earnest elucidator and able critic.

1. *Supra* p.49.
2. *Supra* p.51.
As an elucidator NBh has attempted sincerely to enlighten us by clearly expounding the ideas of the text of the Nbh and the Prdp. He has full confidence that he is well qualified for it. He has gone through the text of the Nbh several times. In the beginning of Lagh Sab Sekh he refers to himself as:

"patanjale mahabhasye krtabhruparisramah"

Hence he has become an adept in interpreting the ideas of the text of the Nbh and Prdp as stated by himself, 'nagesabhasitarthavicaksanah' in the introductory verses to Udy. This fact can well be acknowledged and that is why the Udy is considered to be a commentary of high value.

The method of interpretation adopted by NBh is noteworthy. His commentary is lucid and intelligible. To interpret and elucidate the idea of a passage in the Nbh or Prdp, NBh uses what may be called the method of introduction. By this process the line to be

interpreted is given the proper background wherein the purpose is made clear. For example at the outset of his gloss Kt says "bhasyakāro vivaranakarativād vyākaranasya sāksat pryojanamāha, atha sabdānusāsanam iti". Here in order to clear the doubt as to why Pan and Kat have not stated this, NBh gives an introduction to the word bhasyakārah used by Kt 'yadyapi pāninīna brahmanena niskaranah ityadisruteh sandhyopasanādaviva pratyavāyapariharararthinārsamadhihikaripravṛttisambhavāt pryojanam noktam, varttikakrtāpi śastrapurvake prayege dharmaḥ ityanena madhyamādhisttarinā paramapayojaṇam darsitam, bhagavamstū vivaranakarativād manadhihkarinām pravṛtteḥ prarocakaprayojanapratiptipravānātvaḥ vyavahiṭṣu svargapurvādisvanāsvasāt sāksat pryojanam sabdavyutpattilaksanam vadatītyahā bhasyakāra iti".

Another principle followed to interpret the text is the method of anticipation of objections and the removal of the same with clear statements. To explain an idea in a passage he gives suitable questions and thus gives the proper background for the sentence

or word to be interpreted. He gives the meaning of words, anvaya of sentences processed of clumsy construction and points out the contextual meaning of words like tad, anya etc. He uses the word manyate to point out that the idea mentioned as such is not actually correct. He uses the ending iti abhimanah to point out the basis of a view which is not perfectly correct. To refute the view of others, he cites them first and stating the reason for their refutation concludes 'etena parastam'.

In interpreting a passage under a particular sūtra MBh refers to the statements of Pat under other sutras for removed from it, and often from other adhyāyas of the Asta, a feature which bears testimony to his thoroughness with the entire MBh and the depth of his grasp. Any passage in the bhasya is readily available in his memory and he points out correctly the passages in the bhasya where relevant discussions are seen. Hence the reader is never at a loss to gather the ideas and clear for himself apparent contradictions.

5. Udy pp. 144 & 256.
He elucidates the ideas of Kt even in cases where he has got difference of opinion with him and where he refutes his assertions. This shows the clear understanding of the views of the opponent which is the basic requisite for establishing one's own particular point of view. Moreover this enables the reader in understanding the distinct standpoints of Kt and NBh and also the subtle difference underlying their statements in explaining a passage. For instance Kt says that even without sthānasasthi-nirdesa, there can be sthanyādesabhāva between two sabdas mentioned in a rule. It is NBh who explains this statement of Kt whereby Kt's aim of avoiding sthanyādesabhāva in the rule "vrddhirādaic" (1-1-1) is achieved. It is noteworthy here that he does not favour the explanation of Kt. Even then as a true commentator he has brought out the idea of Kt in his own characteristic way⁹.

In many instances he dwells at length on Prdp in order to justify Kt and says that it is not without a basis that Kt has made the observations.

For instance it is the explanation given by NBh that justifies Kt's usage, "ksudham pratihantum sakyam" in spite of his own statement "pradhānakriyanirupitāṣa- ktyabhidhāne gunakriyasaktiranabhiihitā api abhihitavad prakāsate"9. Wherever Kt says, "vyākhyānāṁantarāmatra klistatvānoktam, NBh gives the vyākhyānāntara implied by Kt and points out the kleśa involved in it.10

The word "yathāmati" in the introductory verse,

"bhāsyaprādipavyākhyānam kurvēham tu yathāmati"
shows that in the Udy we get a critical study of the Mbh and the Prdp and it is in this respect that we find a contrast between Kt and NBh. What Kt says is that:-

"mahābhāṣyāryavāyāmarāpinam vivṛtiplavam / yathāgamam vidhāsyeham .............. \//

9 Udy p.51.
Here the word *yathāgaman* is interpreted by NBh as *sampradayam anatilanghya* meaning 'not trespassing the acknowledged tradition'. This gives the background on which Kt has woven the net work of his gloss. Kt does not go against what has been said by Bhār while commenting on the *Mbh*. That is why he says in his introduction

"tathāpi haribaddhena sāreṇa granthasetunā
kramamanāḥ sanaiḥ pāram tasya praptāsmi paṅguvat".

NBh points out that by comparing the *Mbh* to an ocean and himself to a crippled man intent on crossing over the same, Kt is making himself free from charges of introducing anything purely his own. Probably NBh implies that there is lack of originality in Kt's gloss and this is quite clearly discernable in his statement,

"bhasyapradīpavyākhyānam kurveham tu yathāmati."

As a critic NBh has examined the whole of the *Mbh* and the *Prdp*. He does not follow anyone blindly and so finds many an instance to criticize Kt. It can be seen that his criticisms are logical and based on sound reasoning. When he expresses his difference of
opinion with Kt; we feel inclined to accept his logic. When we consider the fact that the Mbh is a book consisting of statements in the form of dialogues, it can be said that the view held by NBh in regard to interpreting the passage 'kim punah... vyākaranam ...... pathanti' is the more correct.\footnote{11} NBh always tries to explain every passage in the Mbh in consistence with what we find in it earlier and later. Hence his standpoint becomes more acceptable in cases where he and Kt differ in their interpretation. The sharp intelligence of NBh is discernable when he explains the word dvayoḥ in the passage 'na hi dvayorāksara ....... asti\footnote{12}. He gives weight to the usage of sistas. His point of argumentation is clear and correct. The view which he favours shows that he is objective in his criticism. With clear and precise arguments he refutes the assertions of Kt and points out instances where unnecessary objections are raised by him. He vehemently attacks him in certain instances and establishes his own point of view. Such is the force of his criticism that one feels it quite convincing.

\footnote{11} Supra p.296
\footnote{12} Supra p.299-301
He also points out that the mutually contradictory statements occurring in Prdp. He is not fettered by blind veneration to any authority. Hence he has the courage to attempt a slight criticism even on Pañ and Pat. He thus supports what has been stated by Kāt and professes it to what is stated by Pañ.\textsuperscript{13} It seems that he follows the dictum 'dosā vācyā gurorapi'.

In Udy we thus get an elucidation of the Mbh and Prdp as well as a critical examination of the same. There is lucidity of expression even in serious discussions. The author has great reverence for Pat and whom refers to him as bhagavān\textsuperscript{14}.

An attempt is made by some scholars to point out defects in the Udy particularly in comparison with the commentary Uddyotana of Annambhatta. The following statement may be noted in this connection. "It is however unanimously accepted by scholars that NāgESA's commentary is of no mean merit in respect

\textsuperscript{13} Supra P. 434-438.

\textsuperscript{14} Udy p. 424.
of explaining the inner ideas of the *Mahābhāṣya*. But it is defective in that it keeps quite in several places where words or expressions need to be explained for the sake of the ordinary and slow-witted students, while Annambhatta explains them. For instance Annambhatta explains at great length even the name of the first āhnikā called the Paspasāhnika.

(vide page 66 lines 32 to 35 and page 67 lines 2 to 5)

The main aim of Annambhatta appears to be to elucidate, simplify and illustrate the meaning of the *Mahābhāṣya* and *Pradīpa* so that the student seldom entertains any doubt as regards the meaning of the particular text.

Further it would seem not all the special points and difficulties of the *Mahābhāṣya* have been explained by Nāgesa. We are obliged to accord special honour to Annambhatta for well revealing in certain places the idea underlying some portions of the *Mahābhāṣya*, which were not even touched upon by Nāgesa"15.

15. Vide the introduction by T. Chandrasekharan to the *Mbh* with the commentaries *Prdp* and *Uddyotana*, Vol. I pp. X & XI. The explanation given by Annambhatta to the word *paspasa* is:

śāstrasvarambhako granthāḥ upodhāτa itīritah /
so eva granthāḥ sandarbhāḥ paspaśaḥ kathite budhaiḥ //
Here it is to be borne in mind that the aim of NBh in writing the Udy was never to provide a commentary which is simply explanatory but to make it also critical. Though he meant it to be intelligible to average students also, he has not descended to meet the needs of the slow-witted students. So the above criticism need not be taken seriously.

Criticism of NBh's interpretation is also met with. Rudra-dharajha Sarma says that in interpreting the passage 'kimidam sthāneyogeti sthāne yogo'syāḥ seyam sthāneyogā saptamyałopo nipātanād trtiyāyā vā evam. sthānena yogo'syāḥ seyam sthāne yogetī', NBh does not adhere to what is stated in the bhaṣya and the Prdd on it. Here in the expression sthāneyogā, the part sthāne is explained. Kt says that it is by the nipātana as sthāne in sthāneyogā that the said expression with the substitution by e is obtained. NBh says that the instrumental suffix after the base sthāna in the compound split as sthānena yogah yasyaḥ sā, gets elided by the rule "supo dhātuprātipadikayoh" (2-4-71) and
on the strength of the *nipātana*, e is substituted for the final a of sthāna whereby the expression sthaneyoga is got. Rudradharajha Sarma says that on the very strength of the *nipātana* the instrumental suffix after sthāna does not get elided and is substituted by e and the rule "ato gune" (6-1-97) enjoining pararupa operates on the final a of sthāna and e the substitute of the suffix. There is no doubt that vrddhi will replace a+e because the rule "ato gune" (6-1-97) supersedes it. Thus Rudradharajha Sarma claims that he has explained the expression sthaneyoga on the *nipātana* mentioned in Prdp whereas NBh resorts to the *luk* of the suffix and resorts to the *nipātana* only partially for getting the form 16.

When we consider the magnitude and magnificance of what NBh has given us, in his Udy as a result of the penetration of his keen intellect 16. Op. cit. p.366.
into the whole of the *Mbh* and the *Prdp*, criticisms like the above, levelled against his work are insignificant and may be ignored. It can be thus quite justifiably stated that *Udy* is of indispensable and inestimable help for the correct understanding of the full significance of what the *Mbh* and *Prdp* presents to us.