PART TWO

ANALYTICAL EXAMINATION
CHAPTER III

ELUCIDATION OF MAHĀBHĀSYA

Though ordinarily viewed as the gloss on Prdp, the Uddyota can be seen to be to some extent a gloss on Mbh as well. Many passages of Mbh are elucidated in regard to the particular expressions found in them and their significance. They are specified to be as that of the siddhantin or of the ekadesin and explained in such a way as to refute the erroneous views or interpretations pertaining to them. Some variant readings are also noted by the author.

Expressions

We find that while interpreting the sūtras every attempt is made to see whether each and every

1. Vide Supra pp 514-52
word, even a particle, in the sūtras is purposeful
But with regard to the text of Mbh which is a discussion on the sūtras and vārttikas every expression cannot be full of significance, but only be either befitting to the context or be explanatory. Yet there are certain expressions in the Mbh which have particular bearing in the context and some others which require further explanation. Among them those which are left untouched by Kt are dealt with by NBh.

1. 'Ayam' in "athetyayam ūabdo'dhikārārthāḥ prayujyate".

Pat says at the beginning of his work "atha śabdānuśāsanam athetyayam ūabdo'dhikārārthāḥ prayujyate" NBh brings out the significance of the pronoun ayam in the sentence-athetyayam etc. meaning that this śabda namely atha is used in the sense of commencement. He points out that if the sentence were without this pronoun, for example 'atheti ūabdo'dhikārārthāḥ' it may mean that the nipāta atha possesses the sense of commencement alone and the meanings namely ānāntaryā and the like will be misunderstood to be not of the

2. Vide Amarakośa: "mangalānantharārambhaprasnakārt-snyesvatho atha"
nipāta atha. What Pat wishes to convey is that the nipāta,atha which is in the previous sentence 'atha śabdānuśāsanam' is used in the sense of commencement.

NBh says that it is in order to serve this purpose that the word ayam is used here. It specifies the fact that the sense of commencement spoken of as being expressed by 'atha' is in the sentence 'atha śabdānuśāsanam' and hence this does not contradict its denotation of other senses in which it may be used in other sentences.

2. 'Yājñikāh' in 'yājñikāh pathanti'

This word is used many times by Pat. In all his usages except the one which is to be dealt with presently, the word is elucidated by NBh as yajñakāndabhavāh vaidikāh śabdāh. One such usage of Pat is quoted here - "yājñikāh pathanti. sthūlapṛṣatīm āgnivārunīm anadvāhīm ālabheta iti".

3. Vide MBh pp.20,29 & 37
In such usages NBh derives this word by the addition of the suffix 'thak' to the base 'yajña' on the strength of the rule "kratuyajñebhysca" (4-3-68). So the word means yajñe bhavah. NBh says that the sentence yajnikāḥ pathanti, therefore means that scriptures dealing with sacrifice read thus. Since reading is a thing that could be done by a person and not by abdas this sentence may seem to present an ambiguity. NBh says that this is a rare usage just like rsih pathati, śrnoti grāvānah etc. made by Pat under the rule "dhātoḥ karmanah samānakartkādīcchayām vā" (3.1-7). The word rsih there means Veda and pathati means informs.

In the bhāsyā passage 'Vede yājñikāḥ samjñām kurvanti' under the rule vrddhivādaic (1-1-1), NBh allots another sense to the word yājnikāḥ. He says yajnakandastrārāh rsaya ityarthah. The derivation of the word in this sense is worth discussion. The word cannot be derived on the strength of the rule "kratuyajñebhyaśca (4-3-68) since the sense allotted to 'thak' by the same, is 'tatra bhavah' which does

5. Bh p.106.
not suit here. The rule "kratukthadisutranthathak" (4-2-60) gives to the suffix thak the sense 'tad adhite tad veda'. The word yajña belongs to the ukthadigana and the derivation as 'yajnaam vidanti iti yajnikah' corroborates the meaning given by NBh, yajnakandadrasrarah rsayah. Sages who have cognised the Vedas can well be considered as those who know the scriptures dealing with sacrifices.

3. 'ekaikasah' in "tadyathā rsisahasram ēkām kapilām ēkaikasah ... etc."

Pat uses this expression in the passage 'tadyathā rsisahasram ēkām kapilām ekaikasah sahasrakrtva datvā tayā sarve te sahasradaksiṇāh sampannāh' which means that a thousand of seers get the fruit of having given away in charity thousand cows, though there is only one brown cow, each giving her thousand times. NBh is of opinion that 'ekaikasah' is an expression like yathajātiyakah and gargyayani. In yathajātiyakah there are two suffixes namely thāl and jātiyar both of which are enjoined in the sense of prakāra i.e.

6. Mbh p.68.
similarity, by separate rules and here they jointly express the sense of prakara. So also in gārgyayănī the two suffixes śpha and śip jointly express the sense of strītvā. Similarly in ekaikasah there are two factors namely reduplication of eka and the suffix śas, both of which are enjoined separately in the sense of vīpsa, by the rules "nityavīpsayoh"(8-1-4) and "saṅghyaikavacanācca vīpsayām"(5-4-45) respectively. Therefore NBh says that in ekaikasah, these two jointly indicate the sense of vīpsa. However this joined indication of vīpsa by both the reduplication and śas is not seen from numerals like dvi since there is the anabhidhāna of such forms. With regard to ekasabda, the sense of vīpsa is indicated by either of these two or by both jointly. The reason is that such forms are in vogue. NBh adds that with regard to the ekasabda there are instances where there are both the reduplication and śas, but reduplication alone indicates the sense of vīpsa. An instance is 'ekaikāśo dehi'. This statement of NBh is based on the words of Pat under the rule "nityavīpsayoh"(8-1-4)

7. Vide Infra p.485
'Yatra ca taddhitenanukta vīpsa bhavati tatra dvirvacanam, tadyathā ekaikaśo dadātītī', commenting on which NBh establishes that this passage shows that there is a suffix 'sas' which is svārthika and hence the rule "saṅkhāikavacanācca vīpsayam" (5-4-43) prescribes 'sas' in the sense of vīpsa as well as in svārtha. NBh adds that in instances like māgaśāh, 'sas' itself conveys the sense of vīpsa and reduplication also is never used for the purpose.

4. 'iti' in 'yat tarhi tat śuklo nīlāh kapilāh kapota iti sa śabdah'9

In the first āhnika of the Mbh, Pat discusses at the outset the question which is 'śabda' among those concepts that appear in mind when one utters gauḥ. Concepts like the individuality cow, its action, its qualities and genus cow, appear in mind when one utters gauḥ. In the line "yat tarhi tat śuklo nīlāh kapilāh kapota iti sa śabdah", the colour of the cow is doubted to be the 'śabda' and the doubt is refuted afterwards.

showing that it is not śabda but a guṇa, i.e. quality. NBh gives the significance of the word iti used in this line. When one utters gauḥ, its qualities appear in mind and the same need not be her colour alone but be other qualities also like its m smell whether fragrant or otherwise, touch, gender, number etc. But in the said passage one quality namely, colour alone is doubted to be the śabda and hence the said passage may seem to be less correct. NBh points that it is here that the word iti comes into play. It is used in the sense of prakāra i.e., similarity and by virtue of the same the question means whether colour like white, black, brown and similar other qualities (like smell, touch, gender, number, etc.) can be regarded as śabda and now the question becomes free from ambiguity.

5. 'Ācāryah' referring to Pat

Pat uses this word several times. In all such instances except one which is to be dealt with

10. Mbh pp. 41, 49, 82, 100, 116, 128, 139.
presently, it is clear from the context that either Pan or Kat is referred to by this term and hence NBh keeps mum. But in the passage *evam viprati-pannabuddhibhyah sisyebhyah acaryah suh cpu tva anvasting imani prayojanani adhyeyam vyakaranam iti* NBh gives his comment on the word acarya, acaryapadena sastradhyapako bhasyakrdeva vivaksitah. This passage is the concluding remark while giving the reason for the fact that the enumeration of the benefits accrued from the study of grammar alone is made and not with regard to the study of Vedas. NBh feels that the specification of the fact that the word acarya here denotes Pat is necessary since unlike this, in all other instances the term refers to Pan or Kat. Prof. Weber takes this comment, of NBh on the word acarya, as a strong support to favour his theory that Mbh ought to be more properly be considered the work of the pupils of Pat rather than the work of their master. Kielhorn on the other hand, refutes this view and maintains that the Mbh is the masterly production of one and the same individual scholar, though he admits the fact that it is Pat who is referred to here by the word acarya.12

6. 'Vakṣyāmi' in "evam tarhi aṣṭādasaḍadhā bhinnām
nivṛttakalādikām avarnasya pratyāpattim vakṣyāmi"\(^{13}\)

In the first āhniKA of the MBH, to the question concerning the purpose to be derived from the 14 Mahēsvara sūtras, the ekadesin replies that the said sūtras are for the understanding of correct pronunciation and in this case the necessity of uttering correct vowels like those that are grave, acute etc., no longer arises, as there is the authoritative utterance of their general forms i.e. ākṛtyupadesa in the Śivasūtras.

Here it is pointed out that if ākṛtyupadesa be accepted, prohibition of the comprehension of letters, that are possessed of the faults such as saṃvrta, kala and the like, has to be laid down.\(^{14}\) This necessity arises since the incorrect letters also will be comprehended by way of ākṛtyupadesa. To this, the ekadesin replies "evam tarhi aṣṭādasaḍadhā bhinnām nivṛttakalādikām avarnasya pratyāpattim vakṣyāmi", meaning "Well,

\(^{13}\) MBH p.61.

\(^{14}\) Though 'a' is saṃvrta and the same is not a fault with regard to 'a', it is definitely a fault in regard to letters like ā, ī, ū, etc. (vide Udy p.60.) "ākāraṇīnāṃ saṃvrtaṇaṃ dosaḥ na tvakārasya samvṛtagunatv"
then, I shall prescribe for 'a' such a substitute which would be characterised by its eighteen varieties, but which would be devoid of the faults such as 'kala' and others.' NBh says that there is an inconsistency in the wording vaksyāmi. Pān has already framed the rule "a a" (8-4-68) which prescribes the correct (samvrta) a as the substitute and so how can Pat state 'vaks.-yāmi' i.e., 'I shall prescribe'. NBh removes the discrepancy saying that the word avarnasya here stands for all vowels. The statement therefore means that just like the rule "a a" (8-4-68) rules like "i i" "u u" shall be made so that faultless letters will substitute the faulty letters comprehended by i u etc. in the Sivasūtras by way of ākṛtyupadesa. Since rules like 'i i', 'u u' are not already made by Pān, Pat, says, 'I shall prescribe' and so the wording vaksyāmi is quite consistent.

7. upadesah

The word upadesa has been used by Pān in various rules like "upadesa janunāsika it" (1-3-2) "ādeca upadeśe'sīti" (6-1-45) etc. and is wellknown in the sense 'the first utterance of a sound to comprehend its svārūpa'. Both Kat and Pat have used this word
several times, but in all such usages, the word does not denote the said meaning. In such instances \textit{Mbh} specifies the sense in which the word \textit{upadesa} is used.

In the first \textit{āhnika} of the \textit{Mbh}, the \textit{pūrvapaksin} points out that if there be \textit{ākrtyupadesa} of the vowels by the 14 \textit{Sivaśūtras}, there arises the necessity of the prohibition of faulty letters like \textit{samvrta kāla} etc. since the same also are comprehended by the authoritative utterance of the general nature of all letters. To this the answer is that defective sounds will never be heard in augments, substitutes suffixes, roots and bases, since all these are read correctly.

Then \textit{pūrvapaksin} poses this question, "yāni tārhi agrahānāni prātipadikāni" meaning, 'what about agrahana prātipadikas?'

The answer is given 'eteśām api svaravarnānupūrvījñānārtham upadesah kartavyah' meaning 'the \textit{upadesa} of these also had to be made so that the accent, letters and order of letters in them can be understood'. This assertion of Pat contradicts his own assertion under the rule, "ādeca upadeśe'sīti" (6-1-45) \textit{i.e.}, \textit{uddesaśca prātipadikānām no'padesah} \textit{\textsuperscript{15}} which means there is only '\textit{uddesa}' of

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Mbh \textit{Vol.}\textit{p.707}
pratipadikas and not upadesa of them. In one place Pat speaks of the upadesa of bases whereas in another place he asserts that there is no upadesa of bases and it is thus contradictory. NBh averts this contradiction by specifying the meaning of the expression agrahanani pratipadikani and of the word upadesah which is used in the said assertions in the first ahnika and the other under the rule adeca upadesesiti. He says that there are bases like garg, avata, etc. which are comprehended by means of ganas like gargadi. Besides these, there are also bases which, unlike the above-mentioned ones, are not comprehended in any way by rules. Those are the bases known as agrahana pratipadikas. To quote NBh "karyavidhav-akrtanuvadanyartah 16. So the question 'yani tarhi agrahanani pratipadikani' means 'how can the letters in bases which are not comprehended in any way by rules be understood as faultless. The answer 'etesamapi....' is that such bases are to be treated as comprehended by the expression pratipadika in rules like nyapprati-padikat (4-1-1). The word upadesa here thus means

anuvādarūpena grahanam. So there is no contradiction since the word upadesa in the passage 'etesām api....' is not used in the sense in which the word is used in the passage uddeśāsca prātipadikanam no' padesah'. To quote NBh on the word in the latter passage, 'anirñjātasvarūpasasya kāryarthaśvarūpajñānartham apurvacaranam'. This is the well known sense of the word upadesa, "the utterance in order to comprehend the svarūpa, which otherwise is unknown, ot a sound, for a particular purpose. The word uddeśaḥ there is used in the sense gunaih prāpanam and NBh says that the word upadesa is used in this sense also.

In the bhāṣya under the rule "snāntā sat" (1-1-23) Pat introduces the vārttika satsamjñāyam upadesavacanam and elucidating the same says satsamjñāyam upadesagrahanam kartavyam. Upadesa sakaranta nakaranta ca samkhyā satsamjñā bhavatīti vakatavyam. It is argued that the word upadesa is to be inserted in the rule snāntā sat (1-1-23). The word upadesa is here used, says NBh, in the sense "prakṛtiprātyayavibhāgena paraḥparaṃ paratipādanarūpam yad gunaiḥ prāpanam tad upadesapadenaḥ grhyate". NBh

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18. Mbh p.263.
thus says that the sense of the words upadesa and uddesa overlap each other and that is why Pat says under the rule "upadesejanunāsika it" (1-3-2), "sankīrnava uddesopadesau".

In the passage under the rule "striyām" (4-1-3), "sarvesāmeva tu prātipadikānaṁ svaravarnānupūrvijñānarthaṁ upadesaṁ kartavyaṁ" the word is used in the sense of derivation i.e. gunaih prapanam. In the passage under the rule 'hayavarat' "yadi ca kiñcidd anyātraṁ upadesa prayojanaṁ asti tatrapyupadesaṁ kartavyaṁ" NBh says that the word upadesa means utterance alone and is not used in the sense of utterance in order to comprehend the svarūpa of a sound.

8. 'yadi' in 'yadi tarhi sicy antaraṅgam bhavati, akārsīt śārīrgune krte raparatve caṇantyaṭvād vrddhir na prāṅoti

Under the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) Pat says that during the stage 'ni+a+nu+is+it' of the

20. Mbh p.87.
22. ni=upasarga, a = adāgama, is = sic preceded by idāgama āt = parāsmaipada termination with idāgama
formation of the word 'nyanuvit' the rule "sici vrddhi parasmaipadesu" (7-2-1) is contingent to substitute the vowel 'u' by vrddhi. If the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) presents the word 'ikah' to this rule, this contingency can be averted by the rule "kniti ca" (1-1-5) which disallows iglaksanavrddhi. The purvapaksin says that the substitute uvan taught by the rule "aci śnudhatubhrūvām yvor iyaṇṇuvaṇau" (6-4-77), here dependent on sic i.e., 'is' is antarāṅga whereas the vrddhi caused by the rule "sici..." (7-2-1), dependent on sic and parasmaipada termination namely 'is+īt' is bahiraṅga. And so 'uvan' will substitute 'u' and there is no contingency of the substitution of 'u' by vrddhi there.

Pat then says "yadi tarhi sicy antarāṅgam bhavati akārsīt, ahārsīt, gune krte raparattive canantyatvād vrddhirna prāpnoti", meaning if, then, antarāṅgaparibhāṣa prevails in sici vrddhi the forms akārsīt and ahārsīt cannot be formed since the final element of the aṅga is not a vowel after the operation of the sūtras enjoining guṇa and raparattive.

23. nyanuvīt = Aorist Third person singular of the root 'nu' prefixed with the upasarga 'ni'

24. Aorist Third person singular of the roots 'kr' and 'hr'
NBh says that the word 'yadi' at the beginning of the assertion is significant. It shows the improbability of the following assertion that antaraṅgaparibhāsā prevails in instances where the rule "sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" (7-2-1) is to operate, and prevents the same. This is because with regard to the rule "sici..." (7-2-1), the operation of antaraṅga rules cannot be accepted, since the former is apavāda of the rules that are antaraṅga, on the basis of the maxim 'yena nāprāpte yo vidhir ārabhyate sa tasyaṇapavādaha'

Therefore the further discussions trying to secure vrddhi in the said instances after the operation of guna are that of siddhāntyekadesin and pūrvapakṣyekadesin. So also are the efforts to establish the fact 'na sicy antaraṅgam' by means of jñapakās with which the discussion ends.

NBh says that it is to suggest the said fact that Pat uses the word 'yadi' here.

9. 'yān in "yān hi bhavān atra saṣṭhyā pratinirdisati etesām anyena vyavāye na bhavitavyam'  

Under the rule "halo'nantarāh samyogah" Pat discusses the question that when there are more than two
contiguous consonants, whether every two severally
gets the designation 'samyoga' or the whole alone
gets the same. This is followed by another query
that whatever be the above case, whether the rule
as it is now, satisfies both the cases. The answer
is given that when more than two take the designation,
the word anantarāḥ in the rule is split 'avidyamānāṁ
antaram esām' and when every two is to get the
designation, it is split 'avidyamānāḥ antara esām.'

Pat adds, with reference to the latter splitting in
which the designation extends to two, "dvayos caivāntara
kascid vidyate va na va" which means 'the existence
or non-existence of anything in the middle is in
relation to two alone.' Now it is pointed out that
"evam api bahūnāmeva prāpnoti.yān hi bhavān atra
sasthya pratinirdiśati etesām anyena vyavāye na bhavitavyam" 
meaning 'Even then (when the part 'anantarāḥ' is split
avidyamānāḥ antara esām) the designation extends to

27. Mbh p.147.

28. P.S. Śāstri has however gone wrong in interpreting
the meaning of this passage. He takes this to be a
question i.e., "is there anything between the two or
not?" Vide lectures on the Mahabhasya of Patañjali
more than two. When those, which you refer to by the sixth case, have interception by another one; they will not get the designation." NBh here says that just after the statement of a fact about two denoted by the expression 'dvayoh' in the previous sentence, the same are referred to in plural number namely yan in the next sentence 'yan hi....' This may seem obscure. NBh elucidates the significance of the expression yan and removes this obscurity. In the sentence 'dvayōṣ caivaṁtara kāścit vidyate vā na vā' the word dvayoh does not denote two single letters alone. If so, these two will be the avadhi of the one which stands as an interception and hence these two being niyatavadhi there must be accusative case from the base dvi and the expression ought to be 'dvau an tartā' etc. But Pat has used the term dvayoh in the genitive case which shows that two each of which is accompanied by another, are intercepted or not intercepted by another. These two when the number of those which accompany them are taken into account amounts to more than two and so they are referred to by the word 'yan' in plural. The passage "yan hi..." etc., means that when there are three contiguous consonants they can be treated as two groups
the former group constituted of the first and second letter and the latter group consisting of the second and third. Since these two groups do not have anything to intercept them, there two groups i.e., the three, will get the designation and thus it can be seen that even in the splitting up as 'avidyamanāḥ antarā
esām' the designation relates to more than two. That is why Pat states that even then the designation extends to more than two, since the two which are referred to by the sixth case, constitute more than two also. Thus NBh says that in the splitting up as 'avidyamanāḥ antarā, two single contiguous consonants as well as three contiguous consonants which can be grouped into two will get the designation and this is the import of the expression 'yan'

10. Adīrgah in "nyābgrahaneśdīrgah ādeśe na sthānivaditi
vaktayam

Under the rule "sthānivad ādeśe'nalvidhau"

(1-1-26) Kāṭ points out thirteen defects caused by the

29. Mbh p. 299.
existence of the rule. One among them is given by
the vârttika namely 'ñyâbgrahane'dîrghah'. Elucidating
this Pat says "ñyâbgrahane'dîrghah âdesa na sthânivaditi
vaktavyam. kim prayojanan? niskausâmbih atikhatvah.
ñyâbgrahanena grahanat sulopo mā bhûditi", meaning "The
non-lengthened âdesa of 'ni' and 'âp' should be prohibited
from taking sthânivadbhâva. Why? So that there may not
be the elision of 'su', the nominative singular suffix
in the words niskausâmbih and atikhatvah (on the strength
of the sutra "ñalnyabhyo dîrghat sutisyaprktam hal"
(6-1-68) taking the final 'i' and 'a' in their stem to
be 'nî' and 'âp' by sthânivadbhâva. NBh brings out
the significance of the word 'adîrghah' by way of advancing
a doubt.

The adjective 'adîrghah' points out that the
dîrgha substitute of 'ni' and 'âp' may be allowed sthânivadbhâva.
But there is no necessity of the sthânivadbhâva on the
dîrgha âdesa of 'ni' and 'âp'. This is because in the form
khatvā where savarnadîrgha replaces the vowel a of the
base khatvā and the vowel ā of the feminine suffix tāp
the dîrgha substitute namely savarnadîrgha can be treated
as āp by means of parâdivadbhâva enjoined by the rule
'antādivacca' (6-1-85), in spite of the prohibition of sthānovadbhāva of the dīrgha substitute negating the same. Hence the adjective adīrgha may apparently be doubted to be non-essential, says NBh. But it is really essential, since in the absence of the same, the prohibition of sthānovadbhāva, being futile with regard to the substitute namely dīrgha in khatvā where the same can be treated as āp by way of parādivadbhāva, shall relate to the operation procured by sthānāna by whatever means i.e., by way of parādivadbhāva or sthānovadbhāva, on ādesa. Hence in order that in khatvā the savarnadīrgha substitute may be treated as āp by way of either parādivadbhāva or sthānovadbhāva, Pat. gives the adjective adīrgha for the substitute while prohibiting sthānovadbhāva of the same. Thus NBh points out the purpose of the adjective 'adīrghah' to the word ādesa in the bhāṣya passage.

NBh also brings to our attention the fact that to serve the said purpose, the word hrāsava given as the adjective of ādesa won't suffice. This is because in the instance, citrab, meaning citrāyām jātaḥ, derived by the addition of the suffix an to the word citra and wherein
on account of the luk of the suffix an, the feminine suffix tap also has undergone elision, the substitute namely elision replacing a of the feminine suffix, is contingent, by virtue of the rule, "pratyalohe pratyalaksanam" (1-1-62) to procure the elision of the suffix su on the strength of the rule, "naihabbhayo...." (6-1-68). Thus here there is the undesirable probability of the elision which being not a hrawa substitute gets an operation, procured by virtue of its sthanin namely tap. The significance of the adjective adirgha can well be understood when NBh says that elision not being dirgha substitute can be prohibited from causing the lopa of the suffix by virtue of its sthanin on the basis of pratyayalaksana. Hence NBh says that Pat's adjective adirgha to be the substitute for prohibiting the sthanivadbhava is quite significant.

Passages

Significance of passages:

While commenting on the Mbh, NBh has given due attention to the passages in the text of the Mbh. He elucidates their significance.

30. Vide "Luk taddhitaluki"(1-2-49)

1. The significance in the sequence of questions doubting the individuality cow, its action, its qualities and genus cow to be the sense of sabda.

Pat beginning the discussion as to what is sabda when one utters 'gauh' puts forward a series of questions doubting one by one, dravya, kriya, guna and jati to be the import of sabda. Here NBh points out the significance in the sequence of these doubts. He points out that when one utters gauh, concepts like dravya, action, quality and genus appear in the mind. Among them dravya is the receptacle of kriya, guna, etc. So first of all it is doubted to be sabda among all those concepts that appear in the mind of the hearer when one says gauh. The reason for doubting kriya and guna to be the sabda before doubting genus to be the same is that genus is dependant on them. NBh finds a significance in the sequence of doubts with regard to kriya and guna to be the sabda. In the Vaiseshika system of philosophy kriyas like samyoga and vibhaga are treated as gunas and it is to indicate that they are kriya itself, Pat gives the first preference to the doubt whether kriya be the dravya.

While commenting on the rule 'aiun' Pat says that in the instances vrksabhyam and devadatta during the stage vrksa + bhyam and devadatta, when dirgha and pluta are enjoined by the rules; "supica" (7-3-102) and "guroranrtonantyasyapyekaikasya pracām" (8-2-86) the sthanin, i.e., the vowel 'a' which is at the end and is samvṛta, will never make the dirgha and pluta substitute to be samvṛta as there are no dirgha and pluta which are samvṛta. But with regard to the instances sayyanta, savvatsarah, yallokam during the stage sam + yanta, sam + vatsarah, Yam + lokam, the sthanin namely anusvāra which is nasalised will necessarily make the substitutes y, v, and l enjoined by the rule, "anusvārasya yayi parasavarnah" (8-4-58) nasalized. This is because they have their own anunāsīka variety. The exact words of Pat here are "santi hi yañah sanunāsikāh niranunāsikāśca" (There are

32. Mbh p.66.
semi vowels both nasalized and non-nasalized). NBh here points out that among the semivowels r does not have any nasalized variety and y, v, and l alone have nasalized and non-nasalised varieties. Hence it must be understood that Pat has said "santi...." since the majority of letters comprehended by the pratyahāra yan have the said two varieties. He does never mean that r has got the said varieties.

In the bhaṣya on the rules 'eōn' and 'ai añg' Pat gives a discussion on the question whether in letters (ā, ī, ū, ṛ, l, e, o, ai and au) their parts which resemble other letters (ā, ī, ū, ṛ and l), operate like the latter in sandhi etc., or not. Certain defects are pointed out if parts of letters operate like those which they resemble and Pat cites the vārttika 'nāvyavāavrktasyāva-yaye tadvidhir yathā dravyesu' as the answer to meet all the difficulties raised against it. He says that the rules of those letters do not operate in the case of those which resemble them and form part of other letters, but are not taken cognisance of as separate from

33. Mbh p.83.
the whole as in *dravyas*. Elucidating the part

"yathā dravyeṣu" Pat says 'yathā tarhi tailam na vikretavyam māmsam na vikretavyam iti vyapavrktam ca na vikriyate

avyapavrktam gāvah sārṣapāsca vikriyante, tathā lomanakham sprstvā saucam kartavyam iti vyapavrktam sprstvā

niyogatah kartavyam, avyapavrkte kāmacarāh' (so, as, when it is said that oil should not be sold and that meat should not be sold, they are not sold, when they are separated from the whole; but the cows and mustard wherein they are not separated, are sold; as when it is said that one should purify oneself on touching hair and nail, it is obligatory to do it on touching them). Here the part 'avyapavrkte' is worth elucidation. It is because, in the former example the prohibition of the selling of oil and flesh is stated as not related to the selling of cows and mustards, whereas in the latter the necessity of purifying oneself is never stated, as not relating to the touching of hair and nail which are not separated from the body; and so these two examples are not equal as the clause 'avyapavrkte kāmacarāh' may apparently lead one to the conclusion that "avyapavrkte sprste saucē kāmacarāh"

NBh therefore elucidates this as 'sparśe kāmacarāh tena saucēbhavah'. He points that the clause means it does
not matter whether one touches or not, the hair and nail which are not separated from the body and consequently there is no need of purifying oneself on touching them. Now both these examples become equal. In the former the prohibition of selling flesh does not relate to cows and flesh. In the latter the necessity of purifying oneself on touching hair and nail does not relate to the touching of hair and nails not separated from the body.

4. 'yadica kīncid antyatrāpi upadeśe prayojanamastī
tatrāpyupadesāḥ kartavyah'.

To the question enquiring the purpose of mentioning twice of the letter h in the Śivasūtras, the vārttikakara says that it can be included in pratyahāras like 'at' and 'has' as a result of the mention of the same in the rule 'hayaravaṭ'. It can be included in pratyahāras like 'val' 'ral' 'jhal' and 'sal' as it is read in the rule "hal". There Pat makes the above remark. NBh points out that the word upadeśa here simply means

34. Mbh p.87.
utterance and anwātra means in other pratyāhāras. The sentence conveys the sense that if there is any use of its being read elsewhere, there too it should be read. NBh summarises that the purpose of the mention of letters in the Sivasūtras is not the comprehension of their nature but for procuring several purposes by way of grouping them under different pratyāhāras. Therefore Pat means that the repetition of the letter 'h' in the Sivasūtras is no longer a defect. The bhashya admits the fact that 'h' can be included in other pratyāhāras like as in etc. That is why, NBh says, Pat makes under the rule, "Pumyogādākhyāyām" (4-1-48) the usage 'Maṅcā hasanti' where based on the precedence of 'h' which is being taken as 'as' the rule Bhobhago aghoapūrvasya yo'sī" (8-3-17) has operated. Kt has previously remarked that varttikakāra has failed to note that 'h' can be included in as as a result of its mentions in the rule "hayavarat" so as to comprehend the instance bho hasati. Some others too pointed out that varttikakāra failed to point out that h can be included in the pratyāhāra in and the instance benefitted by this

35. Vide Prdp p.57.
36. Udy p.87.
is lilihidhve where h being treated as in can bring the option of lingualization on the strength of the rule "vibhāsetah" (8-3-79). NBh makes clear that this saying of Pat has rectified the said defects pointed out in the varttiika. NBh concludes saying that Pat in this sentence fully admits the necessity of the mention of the letter h twice in the Śivasūtras.

5. "Ya ete'kṣu pratyahārārthā anunandhāh kriyante eteśām ajgrahanena grahanam kasmād na bhavati?"

With this question Pat begins the discussion regarding the non-inclusion of anubandhas like n k and ā in the pratyahāra ac. NBh gives the reason why Pat treats this question as relating to the pratyahāra ac alone and not with other pratyaharas like an ak has etc. wherein also there is the contingency of the comprehension of anubandhas by them. NBh says that there is neither any purpose to be served nor any defect to be caused by the comprehension of n k ā in pratyahāras like an ak and an. But with regard to the pratyahāra ac if it comprehends n k and ā, there is the contingency

37. Mbh p.94.
of yañádesa in the instance Madhu + nakāriyati and the like. With regard to pratyāhāras like has van val, etc. the anubandhas for example t n etc. will never be included in the same for the simple reason that they are uttered in the Āyāras as being devoid of a vowel which is generally added to consonants for the convenience of utterance. All the consonants desired to be included in pratyāhāras are uttered with a vowel. NBh says that all these facts amount to show why the question of non-inclusion of anubandhas is concerned with the pratyāhāra ac alone.

NBh points out another significance of this question. This question shows that vowel a in the lan sutra is not an anubandha. If it were so the question of its non-inclusion in pratyāhāras like hās van etc. ought to be discussed. Since Pat has not done so, it comes out that the vowel a in lan is never an anubandha.

6. "Kim punar idam tadbhavitagrahanam, vrddhirityevam ye ākāraikāraukāra bhāvyante teśām grahanam āhosvid adaijmātrasya"38

Pat advances this question under the rule, "vrddhirādaic" (1-1-1). It is doubted whether the term

38. Mbh p.104.
vrddhi denotes only such ā ai and au that are enjoined by rules using the term vrddhi or all of them irrespective of their status as being enjoined by rules or otherwise. NBh explains the basis for these two views. It is found that the terms luk slu and lup relate to the adarsana which occurs as a result of rules using the terms luk slu and lup alone. But the term lopa relates to the adarsana of any sound that is caused by rules without using any particular term. Hence the doubt as to whether the term vrddhi denotes tadbhāvata alone as in the case with the term luk and the doubt as to whether it denotes all, as the term lopa does. NBh continues that the term 'ti' denotes that particular portion, beginning with the last vowel, in any sound. The term 'ghu' is enjoined to any sound having the svarūpa of dā or dhā. These terms thus denote only the atadbhāvata. Hence a doubt as to whether the term vrddhi denotes only such ā ai and au that are originally there in words, may also seem to be relevant here. NBh points out that Pat does never advance such a doubt here. This is because with regard to the terms like 'ti', 'ghu', etc. a portion
beginning with the last vowel or the svarūpa of 'dā' 'dha' is not enjoined anywhere by any rule. Therefore in the absence of tadbhāvita there can be the denotation of a tadbhāvita alone by the term 'ghu'. But with regard to the term vrddhi the case is different. In certain words like mārsti daityah and aupagavah ā ai and au are enjoined by rules namely "mrjervrddhih" (7-2-114) "taddhitesvacamadeh" (7-2-117) using the term vrddhi. In bases like bāla' rai and glau the ā ai and au are originally there. So there being both tadbhāvita and atadbhāvita, the doubt naturally arises as to whether the term vrddhi denotes tadbhāvita alone or both of them. He then adds that if it be tadbhāvitagrahana we have to accept the mention of the word vrddhi in rules like "mrjervrddhih" (7-2-114) to be tantra nirdesa. If it be atadbhāvitagrahana there is no such necessity.

7. "evam tarhi vrddhir bhavati guṇo bhavatīti yatra
bruyāyika ityetattatropasthitam draṣṭavyam" 39

NBh points out that there is a maxim "anuvāde paribhāṣā nopatiṣṭhate". Though this maxim has not

40. Vide Par.Śekh Paribhāṣā No.101 "Vidhau paribhāso-
patiṣṭhate nānuvade".
been orally stated anywhere by Pat it is this passage that forms the source of this maxim and gives its scope. The above passage occurs under the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) after the refutation of the views that the rule is tacchesa or tadapavada. It means that "if so whenever it is said that vrddhi appears or guna appears, one should take that the word ikah presents itself."

NBh says that in the said rule there is the word 'gunavrddhi' and there are also the words gunah and vrddhī got by anuvrtti 41. If these only be the words got by anuvrtti, the rule is liable to mean "where there is the sound guna and vrddhi there the word ikah presents itself". This is because the words got by anuvrtti denote in the previous rule the sounds guna and vrddhi. Consequently there is the contingency of the supply of the word ikah to rules like "ato guna" (6-1-97), where there is the sound guna, though the rule does not enjoin guna. However one cannot say that the words got by anuvrtti denote the sense, since it involves an

41. The previous rules are "vrddhirādaic" (1-1-1) and "2deṇ gunah" (1-1-2)
Therefore as a result of the words got by anuvṛtti and the word gunavṛddhi present in the rule we get the sense gunasabdavān gunah and vṛddhisabdavān vṛddhiḥ. We accept the predicate here to be bhavati which denotes the sense of vidhiyate. We cannot take the predicate in to be varṣate, since the rule may mean "yatra gunasabdavān gunah vartate tatra ikah ityetad upatisthate" and to arrive at such a sense there is no need of the mention of the word 'gunavṛddhi' in this rule in addition to the ones got by anuvṛtti. Moreover 'bhavatikriya' is antarāṅga than astikriya. Therefore also, the predicate ought to be bhavati.

Thus the rule means where guna and vṛddhi are prescribed by the terms guna and vṛddhi there the word 'ikah' presents itself. The paribhāṣā sūtra "iko gunavṛddhi" does not therefore supply the word 'ikah' to rules like "ato gune" (6-1-97) where guna is only 'anuvādyā' and not 'vidheya'. This paves the way for the maxim 'vidhau paribhāsopatiṣṭhate nānumde'. Thus NBh points out that it is the mention of the word gunavṛddhi in the rule in addition to the words got by anuvṛtti that

42. A kind of anuvṛtti by which a word denotes in the rule in which it is got by anuvṛtti a sense, different from the same denoted by that word in the rule where it originally was.

43. NBh here is probably referring to the six 'bhāva-vikāras' mentioned by Yāska, Vide Nirukta, Chapter I, Pada I, p.4.
becomes the source of the said maxim. Based on the same reason, this maxim relates to the rules "iko guna-vṛddhi" (1-1-3) and "acāh" (1-2-28) among which the latter supplies the word acāh to rules that enjoin hrasva dirgha and pluta by using the same terms.

8. "adesās-tarhīme bhaviṣyanti anāgamakānaṁ saṇgamakāḥ. tat kathāṁ? sarve sarvapadadesā dāksīṇputrasya pānineḥ/
   ekadeśavikāre hi nityatvam nopapadyate"  

Under the rule "dadhāghvadāp" (1-1-19), Pat says that an augment is taken to be the very part of the original to which it is enjoined. A doubt in regard to the propriety of the prescription of augments to sounds which are nitya and should be made up of letters ever-existing, undying and not allowing elision, augmentation and substitution. To the counter-question whether the prescription of substitutes, to sounds, which are nitya is proper, it is answered that it is quite correct. Substitutes should be taken here as different sabdas and it

44. Mbh p.184.
is but proper that the substitute becomes the object of cognition instead of the original. Now Pat removing the doubt in regard to the propriety of the prescription of augment, says "In that case, words with agama replace those without agama. How is it? In the opinion of Pāṇini, the son of Dāksī, all are the ādesas of all the padas, for the nityatva will be marred even if there is slight change (of the word)."

NBh elucidates this passage which deals with the substitutes. It is pointed out here that the there is no impropriety in their prescription since there is only change of cognition of the original and substitute. It is to be understood that augments though enjoined as additional elements to sounds, are alike substitutes. As a result of the ekavākyatā of the rules "ārdhadhatukasyedvalādeh" (7-2-35) and "ādyantayātakītau" (1-1-46) one may derive the idea that the ārdhadhatuka suffixes like tavya are added with the element 'i' at the beginning. But as this is contradictory to the nityatva of sounds, the idea that instead of the cognition of the suffix tavya the cognition of the suffix itavya
is to be accepted, is arrived at. Hence as in the case of substitutes, here also there is only change of cognition and not any addition of new elements to sounds. Considering that, instead of cognition of the suffix tavya, we get the cognition of a sound itavya which has an element 'ि' at its beginning, the 'ि' can be named as augment. Therefore the contention that if change of cognition is accepted with regard to augments, there will not be anything which can be called augment, is baseless.

NBh then elucidates the verse which is the basis for the acceptance of change of cognition in instances where substitutes and augments are enjoined. Though rules like "eruh" (3=4-86) enjoin the substitution by 'ु' of the final element 'ि' of the termination ti, there is the acceptance of sthanyadesabhāva between the two wholes i.e., between ti and tu as otherwise it is contradictory to the nityatva of sounds. Similarly though augments are enjoined as additional elements to sounds there is the acceptance of stanyadesabhāva between the sound devoid of the augment and the sound having the augment, i.e., between tavya and itavya, and hence augments too can be designated as ādesas though
not primarily but secondarily, so that nityatva of sounds may not be contradicted. Again with regard to substitutes, though a sthānyadesabhāva between ti and tu is conceived, the direct relation of sthānyadesa between i and u is never left out and that is why rules like "acah parasmin pūrvavidhau" (1-1-57) enjoin the sthānivadbhāva of the substitute that replace an element i.e., vowel. Similarly though augments are secondarily treated as substitutes, stānivadbhāva does not relate to itavya and tavya as the element is always the component element of tavya and there the maxim "yadāgamāḥ..." i.e.,'an augment is taken not to vary from the original', operates, and in the rule enjoining sthānivadbhāva, there is the word sthānivat which relates only to the originals like i pointed out by the rule "eruh" (3-4-86) and so on.

9. "Bhavatescāpi na vaktavyah; astisico'prkte iti
dviśakāračako nirdeśāḥ astēḥ sakārantād iti"\(^{45}\)

Under the rule "sthanivad ādeso'nalvidhau" (1-1-56) vārttikakāra points out 13 defects caused by.

\(^{45}\) Mbh p.301.
sthāṇivadbhāva. One among them is that in the form 'abhūt' there is the contingency of the augment 'it' to the termination t on account of sthāṇivadbhāva. The root as in the aorist first person singular, becomes as + ti and takes sic after it. The root gets the substitute bhū by the rule "asterbhūh" (2-4-52) and the augment at by the rule "luṇlaṇlrṇsvadudattah" (6-4-71). A stage like a+bhū+s+ti is arrived at. Sic as well as the vowel 𝑖 of the termination elides on the strength of the rules "gatisthāghupabhūbhyah..." (2-4-77) and "itaśca" (3-4-100). In the resultant form a+bhū+t, the substitute bhū may be treated as 'as' on account of sthāṇivadbhāva and hence there is the contingency of the augment it to the termination t by the rule "astisico'prkte" (7-3-96). Hence vārttikakāra argues that sthāṇivadbhāva need be prohibited in this instance. Refuting this Pat says "It (the prohibition of sthāṇivadbhāva) need not be mentioned with reference to bhū also. The sūtra "astisico'prkte"(7-3-96) is read with two sakāras, so that it may mean 'after the root as which ends in s'.
Elucidating this assertion, NBh says that the form of the rule read with two sakaras is 'astissico'prkte'. If the rule is read in some other way as possessed of two sakaras, the significance of the word 'nirdesah' shall be lost. NBh says that vārttikakāra too favours this form of the rule. In this case the s can be treated as an adjunct of sic and so in instances where there is the elision of sic, there cannot be ādāgama since even by pratyayalaksana or sthānivadbhāva we cannot get a sic which ends in s. That is why vārttikakāra does advance the necessity to prohibit pratyayalaksana or sthānivadbhāva in instances where sic has been elided. NBh says that the rule therefore being "astissico'prkte", Pat has resorted to its relation with both, namely asti and sic in the rule. This is by what is known as madhyamapinyāya. Just as a gem in the midst of a garland beautifies both the strings on either side, so also the s between asti and sicas in the rule refers to both the root as and the suffix sic.

46. NBh probably refers to the view of Daṇḍin here. He takes the first word of the rule to be astisicas wherein a sakāra has been elided by the rule "samyogāntasya lopah" (8-2-23) and the remaining word astisicas in combination with the word aprkte, becomes astisicopṛkte. (See Mbh with the commentary Taṅvaloka p.424.)
Establishment of *ekadesibhaṣya*

The *Mbh* of Pat seems, on its surface, to be an easy book as the discussions therein take the form of a dialogue and are full of short questions and answers of charming and short sentences possessed of simple words. But it will be bewildering and confusing when questions and answers coming from various members of a debate as it were, are alone given without specifying the person from whom the assertions come. Again in certain instances more than one solution is offered to solve a particular problem. Among them, some solutions though they establish the *siddhānta* in the particular context are contradictory to the statements of Pat elsewhere. So also on certain rules Pat makes certain assertions whereas quite an opposite idea is established elsewhere. In such instances one is at a loss to know for certain, the idea actually favoured by Pat. The elucidation of the passages of *Mbh* becomes perfect only when passages which present an ambiguity as such or otherwise, are specified on the basis of sound reasoning, to be that.

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47. Vide *Vākyapadiya Kānda II*

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\text{alabdhagāthe gāmbhiryād uttāna iva sauṣṭhavād} / \\
\text{tasminнакṛtabuddhīnāṃ naiva vāsthithi nīrṇayāḥ} //
\]
of siddhāntin or that of siddhāntyekadesin. This factor has also been given due attention by NBh, in his elucidative assertions on the text of Mbh.

1. "Athavaikayogah kariṣyate, "vrddhirādaijadeṇ gunah" tataḥ 'iko gunavrddhi' iti. na caikayoge'nuvṛttir bhavati"⁴⁸

In the bhasya under the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) the 'anuvṛttī' of the word vrddhiḥ is sought in the sutra "iko gunavrddhi" from the sutra "vrddhirādaic" (1-1-1). The purvapaksin raises the objection that in that case, invariably there shall be the anuvṛttī of the word vrddhiḥ in the intermediate sutra "aden gunah" (1-1-2) and so the term vrddhi is liable to be connected with aden also. Pat offers six solutions to avoid the connection of the term vrddhiḥ with aden and thus establishes that there is no contingency of aden being designated as vrddhiḥ. The above passage is one among these six. It means "or else it shall be made an ekayoga.

⁴⁸. Mbh p.118.
namely "vṛddhīrādaijadeṇ gūnaḥ". Next, "iko
gunavrddhi". There cannot be anuvṛtti in an ekayoga".
The import of the passage is as follows. The two
rules "vṛddhīrādain" (1-1-1) and "adēṇgunah" (1-1-2)
are to be treated as a single rule namely 'vṛddhīrāda-
jadeṇgunah'. As it is now a single rule, there
cannot be the anuvṛtti of the word vṛddhih in the part
'Adēṇgunah' of the same rule. This is because by
mentioning the word tad a second time in the rule "tad
adhīte tad veda", (4-2-59) it is made known that there
cannot be the anuvṛtti of a word from the part of a rule
in another part of the same rule. Otherwise the repeti-
tion of the word tad in the said sūtra is prone to be
to be effete. This fact has been pointed out by Pat
under the rule "tad asminnastīti dese tannāmi" (4-2-67)

But NBh points out that one has to accept the
anuvṛtti of a word in an ekayoga on the authority of
Pat's final statement on the said point under the same
rule and so the passage here is to be treated as that
of siddhāntyekadesin. There Pat has stated that

since in the rule "tadāśyāśṭyāsminniti matup" (5-294)
which enjoins the suffix matup in the sense of tad asya
asti and tad asmin asti, the word tad is mentioned only
once, it follows that there can be the anuvṛtti of a word
in an ekayoga. Pat has added that the repetition of
the word tad in the rule "tad adhīte tadveda" (4-2-59)
is only for the clear grasping of the meaning by students.
NBh therefore comes to the conclusion that the above
passage, 'athavā bhavati' is to be treated to be
that of ekadesin and not that of the siddhāntin. However
since the solution helps to establish that there will
not be the connection of the term 'vrddhīh' with adeņ
and admits the anuvṛtti of the word vrddhīh in the rule
"Iko gunavrddhī" and the same being the siddhānta, the
passage is reasonably characterised by NBh as coming
from the mouth of siddhāntyekadesin.

2. "Laksanam hi nāma dhvanati bhramati muhūrtam api

navatisthate" 51

Under the rule "Iko gunavrddhī" it is argued
that the rule must necessarily present the word ikah to

50. Vide Mbh Vol. II. p. 427. the passage under the rule
(4-2-67) "ekayoge 'nuvṛttiḥ bhavati. Katham jñayate?
Yadayam 'tadāśyāśṭyāsminniti matup' iti dviḥ tadgra-
hanam karoti. Katham 'tadadhīte tadveda' ? Pramāda-
kṛtam ācāryasya śakyamakartum. (Kṣ on 'Pramāda-
kṛtam:- siṣyānām sukhabodhāya lāghavam prati anava-
dhānalakṣaṇena kṛtamityarthah'.)

51. Mbh p. 127.
the rule "sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" (7-1-1) as otherwise a consonant at the end of an an̄ga followed by sici is liable to undergo substitution by vrddhi in instances like abhaitsit and achaitsit. The pūrvapaksin says that the rule 'vadavrajahalantasyācāh' (7-2-3) will cause i to be substituted by vrddhi and save the consonant d from being substituted by vrddhi.

Now, again it is argued that in instances like akosit where the rule 'vadavrajahalantasyācāh' is superseded by the rule "neti" (7-1-4), the rule "sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" may cause the consonant s to be substituted by vrddhi. To this the answer given is that the rule neti forbids the rule "sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" also. The reason is given in the passage "laksanam hi nāma dhvanati bhramati muhūrtamapi māvatiṣṭhate." (The rule (Nīsedha) suggests vaguely, wanders everywhere and does not stand still for a moment)

NBh states that the assertion here that the rule "neti" (7-1-4) prohibits the vrddhi enjoined by the rules

52. The aorist third person singular of the roots bhid and chid.

53. The aorist third person singular of the root kus.
"vadavrajahalantasyācaḥ" and "sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadesu"
as well, is in accordance with the view known as
'badhyasamānyacintā' i.e., the general consideration of
what must be superseded, whatever it may be. He
points out this view with regard to the rule "neti" is
that of the ekadesin and not of the siddhāntin. This
is because in the ensuing discussion that the rule
'iko gunavrddhi' ought to present the word ikah to the
rule "sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" in order to bring the
same under the scope of the prohibition enjoined by
the rule "kñiti ca" (1-1-5), instances like nyastārit
and nyadarīt.54 are cited and it is stated that if
antarāṅga kārya namely guna operated formerly than
the vrddhi caused by sic, the forms would become only
as nyastārit and nyadarīt and now the rule "sici vrddhiḥ
parasmaipadesu" cannot operate on the a before r, since
a is not the final element of the āṅga. The rule

54. Aorist third person singular of the roots str and
dr.

55. Vide Supra p. 50.
vadavrajahalantasyācaḥ cannot cause the a before r to be substituted by vrddhi since the same is prohibited by the rule "neti". If the rule "neti" were to prohibit the vrddhi enjoined by both the rules "sici vrddhih parasmaipadesu" and "vadavrajahalantasyāh", this assertion will be contradicted. Hence NBh says the view, that the said rule prohibits both on the basis of the view point known as 'badhyasāmānyacintā', is that of ekadesin.

3. "Athavā sici vrddhih parasmaipadesu iti sici vrddhih prāpnoti. Tasyā halantaralaksana vrddhir badhika tasyā āpi neti iti pratisedhah"56

This passage immediately follows the passage 'laksanam....' dealt with just above. There it is pointed out that based on the view 'bhādhyasāmānyacintā', the rule "neti" (7-1-4) is stated as preventing the vrddhi

56. Mbh p. 127.
enjoined by both the rules "sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" (7-2-1) and "vadavrajahalan tasyācaḥ" (7-2-3). In the passage based on the view i.e., bādhyaviṣeṣacintā (the consideration of what particular rule is to be superseded) a different solution is given to prevent the s of the root kuṣ from being substituted by vṛddhi. The passage means 'Or vṛddhi before sic is enjoined by the sūtra "sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadesu," it has its apavāda in the sūtra "vadavrajahalan tasyācaḥ" and it has its apavāda in "neti." The idea is that when the rule "vadavrajahalan tasyācaḥ," which is the apavāda of and hence supersedes the rule "sici vṛddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" is prohibited by the rule "neti," the general rule "sici vṛddhiḥ" is also automatically prohibited by the same rule "neti." Instances like 'sujāte ṣvasūnre' where the diphthong followed by vowel when prohibited on the strength of the rule "nāntah pādam avyapare", (6-1-115) from pūrvarūpa enjoined by the rule "enaḥ pādantād ati" (6-1-109), are prohibited from being substituted by ay which is enjoined by the rule "ecoyāyāvah" (6-1-78). NBh says that this kind of thought is according to the nyāya known as 'bhrāstāvasaro na pravartate'. But the fact that
when purvarupa is prohibited, ayadesa too is consequently prohibited, cannot be accepted. This is because Pan has made usages like 'saighoodhau', and 'tau'. In these expressions the angra ending in a is followed by the dual suffix 'au' and there the rule 'nadici' (6-1-102) which is the apavada of the rule. But however 'nadici' has not prohibited the rule 'vrddhireci' since in the said expressions vrddhi is found taking place. If the said maxim were resorted to by Pan these expressions of his cannot be explained. Hence on the authority of these expressions it is understood that the maxim bhrastavasaro na pravartate, according to which something does not take place when the occasion for the taking place of it has once gone by, is not resorted to in the science of grammar by Pan. In the instance 'sujate asvasunrte' the dipthong does not undergo the substitution by ay. This is not because of bhrastavasarayaya but because of the fact that there is the anuvrtti of the word enah in the rule "nantah padam avyapare", and the rule

57. Vide "saighoodhau gaanaprasamsayoh" (3-3-86)
58. "tau sat" (23-2-127)
means that whatever is contingent to substitute a
diphthong preceded by a, is prohibited. Hence NBh
says that this assertion is that of ekadesin.

4. The problem of sthānivadbhāva of the substitute
that replace laṅ, luṅ and lrṅ.

After the discussion of the essentiality of
the insertion of the word nimitta in the rule "kñiti ca"
(1-1-5) a contingency is brought to the attention,
that the substitute mip that replaces laṅ, liṅ, luṅ and
lrṅ attains the status of nīt by means of sthānivadbhāva
and thereby it may prevent on the strength of the
rule kñiti ca" (1-1-5) the guna on the final element of
the aṅga in the stage aci+nu + am during the process
of formation of words like acinavam and so on.
The solution given is that the nītva assigned by the

59. Vide the passage beginning with "lakārasya nītvād
ādeśeṣu sthānivadbhāvah prāprūoti" and ending with
"nītam cainam karoti, tasyaitad prāyojanam - nito
yat kāryam tad yathā syād nīti yat kāryam tan mā bhūt
(Mbh pp. 140 - 141)

60. a = adāgama ci = root, nu = the vikarāṇa
amī = parasmaipada termination first person singular.

61. Imperfect First person singular of the root ci.
rule "yāṣuṭ parasmaipadeśudāatto ūnicca" (3-4-103)
to yāṣuṭ which is the augment of the substitute of
liṅ, brings forth the remedy. The assignment of
niṭva to yāṣuṭ which is augment of the substitute of
liṅ, is futile as it cannot make the substitute
(here the āgamin) niṭ. Besides, the substitute of liṅ,
is already niṭ by way of sthānivadbhāva. Hence
the same indicates that no substitute of niṭ can,
by virtue of the niṭva obtained by sthānivadbhāva,
cause any operation on that which follows the referred
to substitute, however, the substitute niṭ can bring
forth any operation caused by niṭva itself. In the
context guna is an operation on the final element of
the aṅga and so it is unwarranted by the niṭva, derived
by sthānivadbhāva on the substitute. Anyhow in
forms like acinot and acinavam 62 the lopa of the i and s
of ti and vas (the parasmaipada terminations)
respectively are operations on the substitute itself.
The niṭva, by means of sthānivadbhāva being alert in
such cases, bring forth lopa on the strength of the rules
"itasca" (3-4-10) and "nityam niṭah" (3-4-99). NBh

62. Imperfect third person singular and first person
dual respectively of the root ci.
points out the question of the contingency pointed out above is prompted by the ekadesin (pūrvapaksyekadesin) and the answer too comes from the mouth of the siddhyantye kadesin. This is because Pat has framed the formula "pit hinna bhavati" and "nit pinna bhavati". Therefore, in instances like acinavam the substitute mii being originally pit can never be nit even if there be sthanivadbhāva and so there is no contingency of the prohibition of guna on the basis of nitva. Similarly the removal of this contingency resorting to an indication too cannot stand careful scrutiny. This is because NBh says that, there is no inefficacy of nitva to give rise to an indication. The nitva of yasut is fruitful, in spite of the nitva of the substitute. During the process of formation of words like stuyāt a stage like stu + ya + t the part yat is contingent to bring forth, on the strength of the rule "uto vrddhir luki hali" (7-3-89) vrddhi on the vowel u. This vrddhi is not iglaksana so as to be prevented by nitva on the strength of the rule "kñiti ca" (1-1-5). In such

63. Third person singular of the benefactive mood of the root 'stu'
64. stu = the root, ya = yasut, t = parasmaipada termination ti with the i in it being elided.
circumstances the assignment of nitva to yasūt which is the augment of a nit substitute serves the purpose of prohibiting the vṛddhi even though the same is not iglakṣana. The nitva of yasūt is fruitful in another respect also. It prevents the guna caused by the rule "jusi ca" (7-3-85) in forms like cinuyuh. Here the nitva derived by sthānivadbhava on the substitute cannot prevent the guna, since "jusi ca" (7-3-85) is a rule that supersedes the rule "kniti ca" (1-1-5). Therefore it can be said that to defeat the rule "jusi ca" (7-3-85) nitva is enjoined to an already nit substitute and by this reaffirmation of nitva, guna is prevented by the rule "kniti ca" and the rule "jusi ca" (7-3-85) does not supersede it. Thus no indication can be made since the basis of the same i.e., the inefficacy of the nitva of yasūt, is lacking here. Therefore the answer too based on this indication is that of the ekadesin. However it must be remembered that in the view of the siddhāntin who maintains the statement "nit pinna bhavati", the yasūt.

65. Benedicitive third person singular of the root 'ci'
being \( \ddot{\text{n}} \text{it} \) cannot be treated as \( \text{pit} \), though the substitute to which the augment is assigned is \( \text{pit} \). The rule 'uto \text{vrddhir luki hali}' (7-3-89) will not therefore operate on the \( \text{u} \) of \( \text{stu} \) since the same is followed by \( \ddot{\text{y}} \text{asut} \) which is \( \ddot{\text{n}} \text{it} \) and not \( \text{pit} \). With regard to the form cinuyuh there is no contingency of \( \text{guna} \) since the rule "\text{\ddot{j}usi ca}" (7-3-85) by the anuvṛtti of the word \( \text{aci} \) from the rule "\text{kṣyasyāci}" (7-3-72) enjoins \( \text{guna} \) only when the \( \text{ik} \) is followed by the suffix \( \text{jus} \) beginning with a vowel and in cinuyuh the suffix \( \text{jus} \) as is possessed of the augment \( \ddot{\text{y}} \text{asut} \), is devoid of \( \text{ajāditva} \) and the rule does not operate here. Thus it is clear that the conception of Pat that \( \text{\ddot{n}icca pinna, picca \ddot{n}inna} \) avoids the complication in the event of the \( \text{sthānivadbhava} \) of the substitutes of \( \text{laṅ} \) etc. The solution on the basis of indication too cannot be correct since it is pointed out above that no such indication is possible. Hence NBḥ concludes that this passage suspecting this contingency and giving the solution for the same is that of \( \text{ekadesin} \).
5. "ārdhadhātukasyed valādeḥ ityatra idītyanuvartamāne
   punaridgrahaṇasya prayojanam ideva yathā syād yad
   anyat prāpnoti tan mā bhūditi" 66

In the bhāṣya under the rule "dīdhīvevītām" (1-1-6) just after the establishment of the idea that the roots didhi and vevā need not be mentioned in the rule, there is a statement 'itascāpi grahanam sakyamakartum' which means, 'The mention of the augment it in the sutra also can be dispensed with.' To the subsequent question how the forms akānīsam, aranīsam, kanīta and ranīta wherein it is contingent to undergo guna, can be explained in the absence of the prohibition of guna to it by this rule; the answer is given, "when it is possible to take it by anuvṛtti, Pāṇini has read it in the rule "ārdhadhātukasyed valādeḥ". The motive underlying it is that it should stand as it under any circumstance and should never change into another. What can come instead? guna." The idea is that the

anuvrtti of the word it from the rule "nedvasikrti" (7-2-8) is quite possible, to the rule "ārdhadhatuka-syedvaladeh" (7-2-35), and the mention of it in the latter rule is an excess. There is no room for the apprehension that in the absence of the word it in the latter rule the word na also, from the rule "nedvasikrti" (4-2-8) along with it is due in the rule "ārdhadhatuka-syedvaladeh" (7-2-35) by way of anuvrtti. This is because on the basis of the maxim 'kvacid ekadeso'pyanuvartate', it can be taken by anuvrtti. Hence the excess mention of it in the rule specifies the fact that it will ever be retained as it and as such no change like substitution by guna occurs on it. Therefore on the basis of this niyama the mention of the word it in the rule, to serve the purpose that guna may be prohibited to it, can be dispensed with.

After thus explaining the passage NBh establishes that this view is that of ekadesin. He points out that the refutation of the mention of it in the rule "dīdhīvevitām" (1-1-6) is made on the strength of
the mention of the same in the rule अर्धहातुकायेद
tvala deve (7-2-35) whereas the mention of it in the said
rule is refuted by Pat under the rule "नेवसिक्र्ति"
(7-2-8) on the strength of the mention of it in the
rule "नेवसिक्र्ति" (7-2-8). It is quite clear that
these two refutations are independent and only one
of them can be explained. Hence the problem arises
as to which one among the refutations of the word it
in the two rules namely अर्धहातुकायेद
tvala deve and
"दिद्हिवेविताम" (1-1-6) is favoured by Pat. NBH's
keen intellect discerns lack of effort in the refutation
of the mention of the word it in the rule अर्धहातुकायेद
tvala deve (7-2-35). In order to refute the mention of
it in the rule "दिद्हिवेविताम" (1-1-6) one has to resort
to the नियामा whereas the refutation of the same in the
rule अर्धहातुकायेद
tvala deve (7-2-35) never involves
such a necessity. Again in the existence of the नियामा as
such, it is difficult to get the lengthening of it in
forms like "पिपाठि"67. To remove this difficulty
a clause has to be added in the नियामा that operations
that are अंगा i.e, taught in अंगाधिकारा alone, are
prevented to it. It is noteworthy that the word अंगा
cannot ordinarily convey the sense 'taught in अंगाधिकारा'.

67. Nominative singular of the base pipathis.
NBh continues that if in order to obtain the lengthening of it, the rule "purvatrasiddham" (8-2-1) is resorted to and hence the lengthening onjoined by the rule in tripādi becomes null and void in the point of view of the niyama which falls within the scope of sapādasaptādhyāyī, there is yet the difficulty to get the substitution by savarnadīrgha of it in instances like alavīt since savarnadīrgha that operates on it is enjoined in the sapādasaptādhyāyī and cannot be null and void in the view of the niyama. Hence to bring forth savarnadīrgha on it in the said instance at the existence of the niyama, there is yet the cumbrousness of resorting to vārttika "silopā ekādese siddho vaktavyaḥ". One has to say that savarnadīrgha will substitute it in spite of the niyama, since it is in order to secure savarnadīrgha, the vārttika declares the elision of sic as known to savarandīrgha. Thus it can be seen that refutation of the idgrahana of the rule "dīdhivevītāṁ" (1-1-6) is arduous and the refutation of the same in the rule "ārdhadhatukasyed valādeḥ" (7-2-35)

68. Aorist third person singular of the root īū
involves no effort. NBh, therefore, comes to the conclusion that the discussion and establishment of the assertion that 'itascapi grahanam śakyamakartum' is that of ekadesin.


Under the rule "adyantau takitaū" (1-1-46) there is the discussion as to whether the tit and kit that respectively occur at adi and anta, are āgamas or ādesas. To the answer that they are āgamas, the propriety of the prescription itself of āgamas to sabdas which are nitya, it is replied that the same is certainly proper since ādesas are sabdas, which are different from sabdas which are sthānāṁ and by prescribing ādesas, in instances where the sthānīsabda chances to be the object of cognition, sāṁ allows the ādesabda to the object

of cognition. The question doubting the propriety of the prescription of āgamas to sabdas that are nitya remains as such and it is answered by Pat as

'ādesastarhīme bhavisyanti anagamakanām sāgamaka ādesah'

NBh points out that this statement has already been dealt with in the bhāṣya, under the rule "dādhaṅgvaḍāp" (1-1-99). It follows that when a suffix like tavya chances to be the object of cognition, Pāṇ by the rule "ārdhadhātukasyeṇ valādeḥ" (7-2-35) allows the form itavya to be the object of cognition. Hence it is with forgetfulness that the following question 'tat katham', is raised and an answer is given to it.

NBh specifies the answer to be the assertion of ekadesin. The answer is as follows. "The sūtra is within the section where samjñās are enjoined. The expression ādyantau is mentioned first and takāra and kakāra which are it are mentioned next. Hence takāra which is it and kakāra which is it are respectively the samjñās of ādi and anta. When the sūtra "ārdhadhātukasyeṇ valādeḥ"

has to operate, it means ikaradi and hence the word which has 'i' at the commencement becomes the adesa to the same word which does not have 'i'." This assertion means that the expression it is a bahuvrihi compound and means a substitute which has 'i' as the former element. The idea is that the suffix tavya gets the substitute itavya. NBh argues that if 't' and k are the samjna of adi and anta there is no necessity of their being an it. So the word itau in the rule "adyantau takitau" becomes futile. The rule need only be adyantau takau. There 's 't' denotes the word adi and k denotes the word anta the tuk enjoined by the rule "ñnoh kuktuk sari" (8-3-28) would be defective since it possesses both t and k. There is thus the contingency of tuk being alternatively the former and final element. Thus being defective, this assertion is that of ekadesin, says NBh.

Moreover taking t to be the samjna of adi the ekadesin adds that in the rule "iunlanlīrṇsavadudattah" (6-4-71) the part ādudattah is a tripada bahuvrihi and means 'akarahḥ (adiḥ) udattah yasya'. Though in the rule "ādajādīnām" (6-4-72) such an explanation cannot be
given, there is no harm since this rule has been discarded by the vārttika 'ajādinām atā siddham'.

NBh points out that the sūtrakāra who has framed the rule 'ādayādinām' (6-4-72) would never have never dreamt of such a samjñā and that is why another answer which is in concordance with the statement anāgamakanām sagamaka ādesaḥ is given next by the siddhāntin. Hence this assertion is definitely that of ekadesin.

7. "Yadyevam ādesa'viśesito bhavati, ādesaśca viśesitah katham? dvitiyam sthānegrahanam prakṛtamuvartate. Tatraiva mabhisambandhah karisyate 'uh sthāne anā sthāne uh prasaṅge anā prasajyamāna eva raparo bhavati"71

In the rule "uran raparah" (1-1-51) Pat says that an which has a chance to replace r, is followed by r. To the question whether a statement to this effect is to be newly made, Pat points out that there is no such necessity since the idea is meant by the rule

71. Mbh p.277.
itself as there is the anuvṛtti of the word sthāne from the rule "sasthisthāneyogā" (1-1-49). Now a difficulty is pointed out "If so the adewa is devoid of the restrictive adjunct". This assertion means that the word sthāne got by anuvṛtti relates to the word uh in the rule in which case the rule will mean that the an that replaces r is followed by r and so, the idea that an which chances to replace r is followed by r, is not derived. Or if the word sthāne relates to the substitute an by way of the change of case as nominative, it is meant that an which gets a chance to replace (any letter) is followed by r and so the niyama that the an which chances to replace r alone, becomes rapara is not understood. Thus this assertion takes for granted that the paribhasha rule "sasthi- sthāneyogā" (1-1-49) does not present itself here in spite of the genitive case and this is due to the fact that 'vidhau paribhashopati⁠śhate na⁠nuvade'. A paribhaśa presents itself only when there is vidhi and in the rule "uraṇ raparaḥ" (1-1-51) since it does not enjoin any thing in the place of r, the genitive case
in uh is only anuvada and hence the maxim
sasthisthaneyogā does not operate there. Hence
by the anuvṛtti of the word sthāne, only one word
sthāne is got. This is clear from the answer
"Adesa too has the restrictive adjunct. In what
manner? There is here the anuvṛtti of another (second)
sthāne (from the rule sthānentaratamah) (1-1-50) and
the sentence is thus construed i.e, uh sthāne an
sthāne" which means the an which has a chance to
replace rvarna in the course of happening is followed
by r." NBh points out that these two assertions
are of the ekadesin since the rule "sasthisthaneyogā"
operates in anuvāda also. For example in the rule
"udattasvaritayor yanah savarito'nudattasya" (8-2-4)
the genitive case is anuvada since the word relates
to yanah and not the vidheya of the rule, namely svarita.
So also in the rule "lah parasmaipadam" (1-4-99) the
designation parasmaipadam is enjoined to the substitute
which come in the place of l. Here the word lah is
anuvada since it does not relate to vidheya namely
parasmaipadam. Yet there the rule "sasthisthaneyogā"
functions. So these assertions which takes for granted that the rule "saṣṭhīsthāneyoga" does not present itself here, are that of ekadesin. NBh has already established that the maxim 'vidhau paribhasopatiṣṭhatē nānuvāde' relates only to the rules "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) and "acascā" (1-2-28)72

8. "Naiṣa doṣah - "svaravidhau vyanjanam avidyāmānavad bhavati" iti nāsti vyavadhānam"73

In the rule 'uraṇ raparaḥ" (1-1-51) Pat discusses the question that the r enjoined by the rule, is to be considered whether purvānta or parādi or abhakta (an element which is neither related to the pūrva or pāra). Among the difficulties in case r is treated as abhakta, one is that in instances like girya (svayameva) and pūrya (svayameva) the accent ādyudatta, enjoined by the rule 'acāḥ kartryaki' (6-1-195) when ac is followed by yak in the sense of kart, cannot be accomplished;

72. Vide Supra pp.98.  
73. Mbh p.281.
since the vowel is intercepted from yak by r enjoined by the rule "uraṇ raparāṇa" (1-1-51). A solution to this difficulty is given i.e., "This objection cannot stand, since there is no interception on the basis of the dictum that consonants are considered to be non-existant in svaravidhi". The idea is that the rule acah karṭryaki" (6-1-195) is svaravidhi and so r being a consonant need not be treated as an existing interception between the vowel and yak. NBh, points out this solution is offered by ekadesīn. This is because the dictum "svaravidhau..." means that a consonant is to be treated as non-existant in instances where something is enjoined with regard to an accent (i.e., in svaroddesyakavidhi) and when a consonant is contingent to obtain an accent. The maxim "svara..." does never mean that when an accent is enjoined, the consonants need be treated as non-existant. If it were so; there is no necessity of the word acah in the rule "acah kartryaki" (6-1-195) since in that case the accent enjoined by the rule, will relate only to the vowels on account of the treatment of consonants as non-existing when an accent is enjoined. Therefore the dictum 'svaravidhau...’ means that consonants can be treated
as non-existant when something in regard to accent is prescribed. Since the rule enjoins an accent and not anything to an accent, the consonants cannot be treated as non-existant. Hence the solution offered on this basis, can rightly be characterised as that of ekadesin.

9. "Aparavidhaviti tu vaktavyam" 74

Under the rule "acaḥ parasmin pūrvavidhau" (1-1-57) the pūrvapakṣin brings the suggestion that the rule may be read as 'acaḥ parasmin aparavidhau' instead of 'acaḥ parasmin pūrvavidhau'. By this change, sthānivadbhāva can be taken recourse to in 'pūrvavidhi' as well as 'svavidhi' since both are not paravidhi. As a result of sthānivadbhāva in svavidhi adesa is admitted sthānivadbhāva if some kārya is enjoined to itself. The benefits from this can be seen in forms like āyan, āsan, dhinvanti, kṛnvanti, dadhyatra, madhvatra, cakrātuḥ and cakruḥ. The purvapakṣin

74. Mbh p.308.
says that in əyan and əsan\textsuperscript{75} where the root ı takes yanādeśa and the root as loses its a respectively, there is no chance for adāgama to be got by the rule "ādajādinām" (6-4-72) since yan and san do not commence in a vowel and it is secured through sthanivadbhāva.

With regard to dhīnvanti and kr̥nyanti\textsuperscript{76} during the stage dhi + nu + anti and kr̥ + nu + anti\textsuperscript{77} where u of nu takes yanādeśa and becomes v, there is chance for idāgama before v, but the contingency can be avoided on account of sthanivadbhāva of v which is svavidhi.

In the instances dadhyatra, madhvatra, cakratuḥ and cakruḥ also it is pointed out that the contingency of the operation of the rule "samyoğantasya lopah" (8-2-23) and the non-operation of the reduplication by the rule "liti dhātoranabhyāsatasya" (6-1-8) can be averted by admitting sthanivadbhāva in svavidhi. It is also pointed out that the necessity of the change in the rule

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{75} The imperfect third person plural of the roots 'i' and 'as'
  \item \textsuperscript{76} Present tense first person plural of the roots 'dhī' and 'kr̥v'
  \item \textsuperscript{77} dhi = the root, nu = the vikarana snu, and anti = the parasmaipada termination (plural)
  \item kr̥ = the root, nu = the vikarana snu, anti = the parasmaipada termination (plural).
\end{itemize}
as acah parasmin aparavidhau arises on account of the fact that in the wording of the rule "acah parasmin purvavidhau" (1-1-57) the word purva relates to the ādesa and the rule enjoins sthanivadbhava only when something is enjoined to that which is purva to ādesa and not when something occurs to ādesa itself which is referred to here as svavidhi. Pat refutes this suggestion of change in the wording of the rule, on the basis of the word vidhi in the rule. The word vidhi is derived by adding the kṛt suffix i in the sense of karman, to the root dhā preceded by the upasarga vi so that it means that which is enjoined. It can also be derived by adding the same suffix to the same root to denote bhava, so that it means the state of existing. Thus the word vidhi which is bhavasādhana is taken here. So the ādesa becomes sthanivad in the case of the existence of anything previous to it. Since there is the ādāgama before y and s in āyan and āsan and the absence of idāgama before y in dhinvanti and and krnvanti, sthanivadbhava is admitted by the rule "acah parasmin purvavidhau" (1-1-57). With regard to dadhyatra and cakratuh Pat offers other solutions78.

78. Mbh p.310.
NBh here points out that the suggestion is raised by the ekadesin. This is because the adāgama in āyan and āsan can be easily obtained by the non-validity of yanādesa in āyan and lopa of a in āsan on the basis of the rule "asiddhavadatrabhāt" (3-4-22) In dhinvanti and krnvanti, the y though valādi, is not an ardhadhatuka suffix. To become an ardhadhatuka suffix, it has to resort to the sthanin u by the rule "sthanivadadesa'nalvidhau" (1-1-56). Hence the suggestion of change in the rule, so as to arrive at the forms āyan, āsan, dhinvanti, krnvanti, etc., is of no avail. Hence this suggestion is that of ekadesin says NBh. Here one may doubt as to why Pat does not refute the suggestion on this basis itself and NBh gives the reason for this also. It is in order to point out that the word vidhi is treated here as bhāvasādhana also, in addition to treating it as karmasādhana that Pat does not refute on the above-said basis the suggestion of the change in the wording of the rule. Thus NBh concludes that the passage beginning with "aparavidhavi tu vaktavyam" and ending with "yāni tarhi svavidhau sthanivadbhāvasya prayojanāni" are that of ekadesin.
10. "Na kartavyah anenaiva prakâptir bhaviyati tasminniti
nirdiste pûrvasya sasthī tasmâdityuttarasya sasthī-
atīn."

Under the rule "tasminniti nirdiste pûrvasya"
(1-1-66) Pat says that the rule effects a niyama that the
locative case in sūtras can have the relationship of
pûrvatva alone and the rule "tasmâdityuttarasya" (1-1-67)
effects the niyama that ablative case can have the
relationship of paratva alone, since both these can have
equally the relationship of pûrvatva and paratva. Now
a question ensues, when both these cases are mentioned
in a sūtra whether the operation relates to that which
precedes or that which follows. The answer given is
that the rule "tasmâdityuttarasya" (1-1-67) will
operate through vipratisedha when there are both the
cases, as in sūtras like "tāsyanudāttet..." (6-1-186)
"bhu ca bahoh" (4-158)
"goto nit" (7-1-90) "rudādibhyah
sārvadhātuke" (7-2-76) "īdāsah" (7-2-83) "āmi sarvanāmnah
sūt" (8-3-32). Now it is pointed out that
vipratisedha is not proper here since the saptamī in all
these sūtras has been made use of in the previous or
later rules, while the ablative case is anavakāsa and

79. MBh p.363.
it is on that score that the operation relates
to the latter. This is followed by a suggestion
made under the vārttika 'yathārtham va saśthinirdesah
kartavyah'. To quote it, "yathārtham va saśthinirdesah
ekartavyah yatra pūrvasya kāryam isyate tatra pūrvasya
saśthi kartavyā yatra parasya kāryam isyate tatra
parasya saśthi kartavyā' which means there is need
to use saśthi after every visaya. Saśthi should be
suffixed to the former, if there is kārya to it and
saśthi should be suffixed to the latter if there is
kārya to it. NBh says that this view is that of
ekadesin since it involves cumbrousness to mention both the
words ending in genitive and locative cases, and is only
praudhivāda. To the following assertion that genitive
case is to be used as told, reply is made 'No', it need
not. It is decided by this itself. Where there is
the mention of locative case, (the same assigns)
genitive case that which precedes and when there is
the mention of ablative case, (the same assigns) genitive
case to that which follows." The idea is that the

rule "tasmin nirdste purvasya" (1-1-66) gives genitive case to that which precedes and the other gives genitive case to that which follows. This is by way of the anuvrtti of the word saṣṭhī in these rules from the rule "saṣṭhī sthāneyogā" (1-1-49) whereby the words of the rules are tasmin nirdste purvasya saṣṭhī and tasmādityuttarasya saṣṭhī. NBh says that this is also the praudhivāda of the ekadesin since in this view, also there is the cumbrousness of the anuvrtti of the word saṣṭhī. Again in instances where there are both these cases and hence there being the contingency of both cases assigning genitive case to the purva and para, one has to resort to the anavakasatva itself of the ablative cases in the sūtras cited above and paratva where there is vipratisedha in rules like "dah si dhut" (8-3-29) where both the cases are anavakasa. Hence this assertion is correctly characterised as that of ekadesin by NBh.
Anticipation of objections:

While elucidating the text of the *Mbh* NBh anticipates doubts on certain assertions of Pat and then words off the same with clear and correct solutions. A good effect that has resulted from this process is that the statements of Pat are simultaneously elucidated and established.

1. "Evam tarhi samarthyat purvena, na parena.
Yadi parena syād angrahaṇam anarthakam syād,
uraj raparāḥ ityeva brūyat" 82

Under the rule lan Pat discusses the question whether the pratyahāra an is coined with the n of the Śivasūtra 'a iu n' or with that of the rule 'lan'.

It is pointed out that with regard to the rule "urāṇ raparāḥ" (1-1-51) such a doubt exists and that if the pratyahāra an there, be with the n of the rule lan there is the contingency that the lengthened vowel

81. Such doubts are more or less based on the view entertained by scholars. Vide Infra p.233.
82. *Mbh* p.98.
which is enjoined by the rule *supɪ ca* (7-3-102) and is to substitute r, may become *rapa ra* in instances like *matrnam*. To this Pat gives the answer with in the above quoted passage, meaning "If so, by *sāmarthya*, it is with the former and not with the latter, the reading of an would be of no avail since he would have read *uraj rapar ah*". By *sāmarthya* Pat means that if the an in the said rule be with the latter n, it will comprehend all vowels and consonants h, v, r and l; but among these, i.e., vowels alone are contingent to replace r and Pāṇ would have read the rule as *uraj rapar ah*. Since he has not done so, the *pratyāhāra* can be only with former n.

NBh here cites an instance gaml + a. Here the rule "ɪko yanaci" (6-1-51) enjoins yan as the substitute of l and it is the consonant l that is to replace l which is a savarna of r and hence comprehended by r. How can there be the statement that vowels alone are contingent to replace r and hence liable to become *rapa ra*? In this instance the consonant l is also

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83. The base gaml preceded with the instrumental singular case ending.
contingent to be lapara by the rule "uran raparah" (1-1-51)\(^{84}\).

NBh clears the doubt saying that the rule "uran raparah" (1-1-51) will not operate in the instances like gam\(\bar{a}\) + a. He gives the reason. Among the consonants comprehended by an, h and y will never be liable to become rapara as they never replace r.

Now the question is concerned with r and l with regard to r, in the instance kar\(\bar{a}\)r + artham r replaces r. If it becomes rapara there will be two r as kar\(\bar{a}\)rrartham and one of them will be elided by the rule "ro ri" (8-3-14). Thus it can be seen that precedence by r of the consonant r has no standing effect, when the rule "uran raparah" operates on the consonant substitute that replace r. Therefore the rules "uran raparah" (1-1-51) will not operate on the consonant substitute of l also which is a sahacarita of r. Thus NBh establishes that vowels alone are contingent to replace r and liable to become rapara thereby and hence the above statement of Pat.

\(^{84}\) 'Ba' in the rule "uran raparah" is taken as a pratyahāra comprehending r and l.
NBh points out that some others give a different solution to this problem. They opine that even if \( \text{I} \) becomes \textit{lapara} one of them will be dropped by the rule "\( \text{ro ri} \)" (8-3-14) itself since \( \text{r} \) and \( \text{I} \) are having \textit{samānasruti}. He adds that still others give a different solution. On the authority of this bhāṣya passage that vowels alone are liable to replace \( \text{r} \) and become \textit{rapara}, instances like \( \text{gaml} + \text{a} \) which contract the same must come under the scope of \textit{anabhidhāna}, i.e., forms like \( \text{gamlā} \) are to be treated as not in vogue.

2. "Satām ādaicām samjñāyā bhavitavyam, samjñāyā cādaico bhāvyante tad etad itarērāśrayam bhavati."

Under the rule "\( \text{vṛddhirādaic} \)" (1-1-1) the purvapakṣin points out that there is interdependence in rules like "\( \text{mrjervṛddhih} \)" (7-2-114) which enjoin \textit{vṛddhi}. He says, "samjñā is to (indicate) the \( \text{a, ai} \) and \( \text{au} \) which are existant (but in rules like "\( \text{mrjervṛddhih} \)" they are made to exist by means of the samjñā. There

85. Vide Infra p.485.
86. Mbh p.110.
is thus interdependence". What he means is this: a samjña presupposes the existence of those that are designated by it and it is by the rule "mrj evrddhiḥ" (7-2-114) having the samjña vrddhi in it that we get ā in the root mrj, and this is interdependence since a samjña presupposing the existence of the samjñin, is made to bring the samjñin newly. NBh anticipating a doubt with regard to the existence of interdependence here and removing the same establishes the idea of the said passage that there is interdependence in the rule mentioned. The vrddhisabda can by virtue of samānyalaksanā, be well expressive of all the ādaic that are lost or existant or yet to come. If laksanā be not accepted of the word vrddhi it may denote only those particular ā, ai and au mentioned in the rule and not the same others in other instances, which are not present in the mind of the reader of this rule. Therefore laksanā being accepted of one word vrddhi, the word denotes all the ā, ai and au i.e, lost existant and yet to come and so the rule, "mrj evrddhiḥ" (7-2-114) can quite possibly denote the ā that is to substitute the r of the root mrj and is not originally there, and hence there is no problem of
interdependance here. Besides, even if śamānyalaksanā in the word vrddhi is not accepted, there is no interdependance here. The expressive power i.e., sakti of the word vrddhi has within its scope the genus i.e., ātva āitva and auṭva. It is a generally accepted fact that the saktigraha of a particular sabda, causes to be derived from the sabda, a sabdabodha involving the same particular characteristic. Therefore the word vrddhiḥ in the rule"mrjervrddhiḥ" (7-2-114) denotes the genus i.e, ātva on the phoneme that is to replace r of the root mrj and so also there is no interdependance here. After thus entertaining a doubt with regard to the existence of interdependance here, NBh removes the same. It is true that if there by the saktigraha of vrddhisabda on the genus, the word can denote all the letters having the genus. But with regard to the root mrj, there is no letter to be pointed out at present as having the said genus and so the word vrddhiḥ in rules like "mrjervrddhiḥ" cannot have connection with the genus of a phoneme that is yet to come. Since a phoneme which is yet to come is unknown to be possessed of any particular genus, the denotation of that unknown
genus by the word vrddhih in rules like "mrjervrddhih" (7-2-114) is also quite improbable. Therefore, the prescription of a, ai and au by the term vrddhih which presupposes their previous existence is definitely an anomaly. Moreover it is impossible to have saktigraha on those that are yet to function as the word vrddhih in "mrjervrddhih" (7-2-114) is quite satisfied by having, under the scope of its expressive power, the a, ai and au that are already in the mind of the reader. Hence letters which are enjoined by rules and yet to function can never come under the scope of the expressive power and hence the prescription of a, ai and au as substitute by the term vrddhih in rules like "mrjervrddhih" (7-2-114) is explicitly an interdependence here.

3. "Evam tarhi gamerapiyam do vaktavyah gamesca gunah ucyymanah antaryatah okarah prapnoti. Tasmad iggrahanam kartavyam" 87

Under the rule "iko gunavrddhi *(1-1-3) Pat says that the word ikah is necessary in the said rule

87. Mbh p.117.
to ward off the contingency of guna replacing consonants. The prescription of the suffix da having the anubandha d cannot be an indication to this effect. This is because the same suffix by means of anuvṛtti, is enjoined by the rule, "anyesvapidṛṣyate" (3-2-101) and hence this suffix may be added to the root gam. Consequently in the formation of the word nagah, agah, etc., if there be the absence of the word ikah in the said rule, the consonant m of the root gam is liable to be substituted by the guna o as it is antaratama to the original from the point of view of the place of articulation and thereby the forms nagah, etc. cannot be arrived at. Therefore the anubandha d of the suffix da is purposeful by bringing the elision of part am, of the root gam, known as ti on the strength of the rule "teh" (6-4-143) whereby the form nagah can be arrived at, and it cannot indicate the fact that consonants will not be replaced by guna. NBh brings an objection to the statement that there is no factor to indicate the said fact. He points out that the suffix da-a-u is enjoined by the Unādi rule "tanoter da-a-uh sanvacca" (5-730) to the root tan
This suffix has got the anubandha d. This can be an indication of the fact that consonants will not be replaced by guna. If guna can replace consonant, ditkarana will be of no use for in the formation of the word titau, ti + tan + au will become ti + ta + a + au if guna replaces the consonants n and then this will change into ti + ta + a + u by the operation of the rule "ato gune" (6-1-97) on the first two a and a then by the operation of the same rule on the remaining two a and a the form titau will result. Hence the anubandha d being futile can indicate the said fact.

After thus giving an objection to the assertion of Pat, NBh removes the same saying that the word titau is treated as non-derivative stem and so no indication is possible, and hence Pat's statement that the word ik is necessary to ward off the contingency of guna replacing consonants. NBh adds that there may be a further objection that the word ik is not necessary since guna, viz. अ ए ओ will never replace consonants as the same (अ ए ओ) have got a, i & u as their antraratama sthanin. This objection is baseless,
says NBh, since the vowel e which is guna has got the consonant s as antaratama sthanin in instances like the root is. Both i and s are palatals and have the effort viz. vivrta from the point of view of Pan to whom sibilants and vowels have the same effort viz. vivrta. Again the selection of an antaratama sthanin by a substitute is quite improbable since Pat has refuted the wording of the rule "sthānentaratame" (1-1-50) which gives rise to the said selection and accepted the rule with the wording "sthānentaratamah" (1-1-50).

4. "athaḥa-āhāyam "adaso māt" iti, na ca itvotve stah, nāpi makārah tata evam vijnāsyamaḥ: - mārthādīdādyarthānām iti" 89

Under the rule "adaso māt" (1-1-12) it is pointed out that in the rule the designation pragrhya is enjoined to i and u after m in adas, and there is the

88. Vide Paniniyasyaiksā - "Vivramūsmanām svarānāmca".

89. Mbh p. 171.
necessity of the prohibition of ayādesa ayādesa and ekādesa (pūrvarūpa) since the consonant m that replaces d and the vowels ī and ū that replace e and au, are non-valid by the function of the rule "pūrvarāśiddham" (8-2-1) in instances like amī + atra, amī + āśāte, amū + atra, amū + āśāte which appear to the sapādasaptādhyā: as ade + atra, ade + āśāte, adau + atra and adau + āśāte. Different solutions are given to avoid the necessity of such a prohibition. One among them, is given under the vārttika "mārthādīdāyarthānām vā". "Or the sūtrakāra has said "adaso māt". There is no ī or ū or m. Therefore we take to mean "mārthāt īdāyarthānām". The idea is that the word māt in the rule is taken to be mārthād and īdūt in the rule to be īdūdartha. The word mārtha denotes that which stands for m i.e, d, the original of the substitute m. Īdūdartha denotes that which stands for e and au i.e, the originals of the substitutes ī and ū. Thus e and au in adas are designated as prakṛtya by the rule adaso māt, whereby they get prakṛttibhāva and there is never a necessity for a prohibition of ayādesa, etc. on them.
NBh says that there is a difficulty in this interpretation. It is the forms ade and adau that get the designation pragrhyya and when they become ami and amu by the substitution by m of d and by the substitution by i and u of e o etc. the i and u would not get the designation and so there will be the contingency of other euphonic combinations here instead of prakrtibhava. The samjna cannot be derived even by sthanivadbhava since the samjna relating to e o etc., is alvidhi in which sthanivadbhava is prohibited.

After anticipating such a difficulty NBh gives the import of the passage which averts the objection. The word pragrhyya in all the rules in which it is used denotas not only e o mi and au but also the originals (Ī and ū) of these 'substitutes.' The denotation of ā and ū is by virtue of the acceptance of laksana in the word pragrhyya. So where ā and ū are to be provided with the operations relating to the term pragrhyya, the term pragrhyya in the rule enjoining that particular operation is taken to denote
them by virtue of laksana in the word pragrhyo.

Therefore there is the designation pragrhyo to the e and au as well as i and u. Therefore there is no necessity for a prohibition of ayadesa etc. in this interpretation.

5. "Tasmin kriyamane ihaiva syat-papaca papatha;
iyaya ara ityatra ma syat. vyapadesivadekasmin

karyam bhavatity atrapi siddham bhavati.90

Under the rule "adyantavadekasmin" (1-1-2d)

Pat discusses the need for remodelling the said rule as vyapadesivadekasmin, so that operations shall be made on a single unit by taking recourse to vyapadesivadhava. To the question about the purpose of this remodelling he says, "vaksyati-skaco dve

prathamasyeti bahuvrihinirdesa iti". tasmin kriyamane

ihaiva syad - papaca papatha; iyaya ara ityatra na syad.

Vyapadesivadekasmin karyam bhavatity atrapi siddham bhavati". which means "He (Varttikakara) is going to say under the sutra "ekaco dve prathamasya" (6-1-1),

the vārtika "ekāco dve prathamasyeti bahuvrīhinirdesāḥ (by which it is clear that the word ekāc is a bahuvrīhi compound and not a karmadharaya compound). According to it the pa of the root pac and pāṭh will be reduplicated, but reduplication cannot take place with reference to the roots i and r (to go). The object is achieved thereto by adopting the principle that what happens to the primary ekāc happens even when there is only one vowel. The idea is that by virtue of the rule "ādyantavadekasmin" (1-1-20), roots like ṭ and ṛ can be treated as ajadi or ajanta. To get the reduplication enjoined by the rule "liṭī dhātor anabhyāsasya" (6-1-8) where there is the anuvṛtti of the word ekācahi, the roots need be ekāc. But these roots each of which is a single vowel cannot be treated as possessed of a single ac by the rule "ādyantavadekasmin" (1-1-20). Hence reduplication relates only to roots like pac, pāṭh, etc. which are possessed of a single vowel and not to roots i and r.

NBh here brings an objection to the statement that roots like pac will get reduplication even without vyapadesivadbhāva. He says that the rule enjoins
reduplication to the ekāc which is first in a root (i.e., Prathaṁma). With regard to the roots pac and path the root itself is a single ekāc and not the first ekāc in a rule. Hence with regard to these roots also in order to treat them as the first ekāc of the root, which cannot be effected by the rule "ādyantavadekasmin" (1-1-20) there is the necessity of vyapadesīvadbhava and so the assertion of Pat may seem obscure.

But this statement of Pat, NBh says, is correct. This is because the word prathama is a synonym of the word adi and so the treatment of an ekāc as the first ekāc i.e., adi is well nigh achieved by the rule "ādyantavadekasmin" (1-1-20) and so is not a unique purpose to be served by the said remodelling of the rule.
6. "Evam tarhi acaryapraavrttir jnapayati sthanivad
ädeso bhavati yadayam 'yușmadasmador anadesе
tyadesе pratisedham āasti. Katham krtvā jnapakam?
Yușmadasmador vibhaktau kāryamucyamānam kah prasaṅgo
yad adesepi syād? Pāsyati tu acaryo sthanivadvadeso
bhavati iti.atah adesе pratisedham āasti" 91

In the rule "sthānivad adesо'nalvidhau" (1-1-56)
Pat doubts the necessity of the said rule. The argument
that adesa plays the same part as the sthanin just
according to what we find in the world, i.e., one who
comes in the place of another takes to his work, is
refuted by pointing out that this worldly example does not
apply in the science of grammar on account of the
rule "svam rūpam sabdasyasabdasmjña" (1-1-68).
According to this rule sabdas like han shall denote
han alone that is the sthanin and not vadh which is
the substitute. Pat then establishes the non-essential-
ity of the rule by citing an indication for the rule.
He says "If so Acārya Pāṇini suggests that adesa becomes
sthānivad since he has used the word anadesе in the

sūtra "yuṣmadasmador anādeṣa" (7-2-86) prohibiting the lengthening of a of yuva and āva before halādivibhakti which is anādeṣa (not being substituted by another). Under what conception does it become jānapaka? What happens to yuṣmad and asmad when case-suffix follows them, may not happen to them when an ādeṣa to the case-suffix follows. Ācārya prohibits it when ādeṣa follows them seeing that ādeṣa may play the same part as sthānīn". Thus the part anādeṣa of the rule is resorted to as an indication by Pat. NBh advances an objection here and by way of clearing it confirms the indication pointed out by Pat. He presents a contingency for the word anādeṣa. The rule "yuṣmadasmador anādeṣa" (7-2-36) prohibits the lengthening of yuva and āva when preceded by vibhakti which is not a substitute.

Vibhakti is a technical term in the science of grammar and so the rule "svam rūpam śabdasyaśabdasmajñā" (1-1-68) cannot apply here on account of the part asabdasmajñā in the same rule. Technical terms do not denote the svarūpa but the sense. The term vibhakti need not denote the svarūpa, vibhakti but the sense.
namely su au jas, etc. Hence in the absence of svarūpavidhi the substitute of su au jas etc., can play their part just as in the world one who is in the place of another takes to his work. NBh thus states that in the absence of the word anādese qualifying the word vibhaktau, the prohibition of lengthening will apply to the precedence of vibhakti which is even an ādesa. The word anādese is therefore fully satisfied in avoiding the lengthening when proceeded by suffixes which are substitutes.

NBh now establishes the superfluity of the word anādese. The technical term vibhakti indicates su, au, jas, etc., mentioned in the rule "svaṃ jasamau..." (4-1-2) and "tīptas jhi..." (3-4-78). In these rules, however there is the application of the rule "svaṃ rūpam śabdasyaśabdasmāṃjña" (1-1-68). Therefore sounds having the svarūpa namely su, au, jas, etc., can be designated as vibhakti and the substitute which have a different svarūpa can never be termed as vibhakti. Hence there is no need for the prohibition of lengthening in the in the precedence of a vibhakti which is not a substitute. Hence the superfluous word anādese is rightly taken for the indication of the sthānivadbhāva.
Vārttikakāra maintains that the rule "pratyayalore pratyayalaksanam" (1-1-62) is necessary to operate in instances where sthanivadbhāva is prohibited on the score alvidhi. He enumerates the merits and demerits of the rule. Pat shows that the merits to be accrued by the said rule can be achieved even otherwise and so there is no need for the rule (as vidhisūtra). Yet he says that there is the necessity of the sūtra. It has to effect a nīyama as follows: 'that which is enjoined with reference to pratyāya may come within the range of pratyayhlaksana and that which is enjoined with reference to a word may not come within its range.' To the further question enquiring the purpose of this nīyama, he replies that the bahuvrīhi compound sudrṣad, which becomes an adhyājunct of brāhmaṇaḥ may not take adyudātta svara enjoined by the rule "sor manasi alomōṣasi" (6-2-117).

92. Ṛṣibha p.347.
that enjoins adyudatta svara to the sound ending in au or as, but not the sounds loman and usas dis contingent to bring forth the svara on the part drsad. This is because of pratyayalaksana of the elision of as. If the rule effects the said niyama, there is no such contingency here since in the rule "sormanasi alomo fåsi" (6-2-117), the suffix jas is not referred to, but only the sound as which may comprehend both the suffix as well as the non-suffix sound.

NBh brings a doubt here. In the said rule, svara is prohibited to loman and usas by the part alomo fåsi. By the prohibition of svara to usas a similarity of this may be drawn to as which is being endowed with svara, i.e., a sound ending in as, must actually be heard as ending in as and not sounds like drsad in the cited instance which is not heard to end in as. This is by virtue of the prohibition, known as paryudasā and consequently here is no necessity to a niyama to avoid svara on drsad in sudrsad.

After expressing the doubt, NBh establishes the statement of Pat. He says that there is a difficulty in resorting to the prohibition known as paryudāsa.
Based on the similarity with usas, the sound ending in as, may be taken to be that ending in as which is a suffix itself and so in the word suvah the ending of which is though as is not a suffix, we cannot get the svara by the rule. Hence it is in order to avoid svara in drsad and to procure the same in suvah also that Pat takes the rule "pratyayalope pratyayalaksanam" (1-1-62) to give the said niyama.

Readings

While elucidating the text of the Mbh, NBh has given great attention to the readings in the same. He specifies and justifies certain readings, points out variant readings for some others and brings to our attention certain incorrect readings found in the text. Most of his assertions in this regard are supported by strong and logical reasoning based on grammar.
Specifications and justifications of the readings in the text of the Mbh

1. "atha mukhasukhārthastakāraḥ akāropi"\(^\text{93}\)

Here NBh specifies that the expression 'mukhasukhārthah' in the above reading, should be treated as a compound formed by the rule "mayūravyamsakādayaśca" (2-1-72). This is because the idea conveyed by the compound mukhasukhārthah relates to the uccāraṇakriyā which is implied but not expressed in the sentence and if the compound mukhasukhārthah is treated as regularly derived (i.e., mukhasukhāya ayam mukhasukhārthah) by the rule "eaturthi tadhārthā...." (2-1-36) then by virtue of the masculine gender in it, the compound will relate to the masculine word takāraḥ in the sentence on the strength of varttika under the same rule, 'arthena saha samāso vṛṣyanighnataēeti vaktavyam'. Therefore in order to relate the sense of the compound word with uccāraṇakriyā itself implied in the sentence, NBh specifies that mukhasukhārthah.

\(^{93}\) Mbh p.81.
should be treated as a compound formed on the strength of the rule "mayūravyaṃsakaḍayāsaṃ" (2.1-12) in which case it is not necessary that it should relate to the word takārah and hence can be taken as relating the uccaṇaṃakṛiyā implied in the sentence and which can be expressed by the masculine word upadesāh. Thereby NBh implies that, if the reading be mukhasukhārtham, it can be treated as formed by the rule "eaturthi, tadarthārtha..." (2.1-36) and also will relate to the neuter word uccaṇanam the sense of which is implied in the sentence.

2. "mātrakālo'tra gamyate, na ca māтриkam vyanjanam asti. anupadistam sat katham sakyam vijnātum?

asacca katham sakyam pratipattum"94

NBh brings to our attention the fact that in certain versions of the Mbh, the sentence 'asacca ..........pratipattum' is not seen. However it may be noted that the absence of the same does not obstruct the clarity of idea in the context.

94. Mbh p.86.
3. "katamasmimstāvad āngaṃhaṇe sandehah" 95

NBh points out that if the reading be "kataśmimstāvad....sandehah", i.e., with the word katarasmin in the place of katamasmin there is no defect since the expression katarasmin derived by the addition of the suffix datarac to the base kim is grammatically quite correct in the context. It may be pointed out here that the rule "kimyattador-
nirdhāraṇe dvayorekasya dataracca" (5-3-92) enjoins the suffix datarac to the base kim and the like, when the mention of one among two (dvayoh ekasya nirdhāraṇam) is to be made and the rule "vā jātiparipraśne datamacca" (5-3-93) enjoins the suffix datamacca to the base kim and the like, when mention of one among many (bahūnām ekasya nirdhāraṇam) is to be made.

The question 'katamasimstāvad....." follows the statement that there is a doubt in regard to the expressions an in etc., since the same letter n is made use of in the two Śivasūtras' aiun' and 'lan. Such expressions being many in number, the pūrvapakṣin

95. Mbh p. 97.
says, "tatrāngvahanesu ingvahanesu ca sandeho bhavati -
pūrvena vā syuh parena veti". Now, it is asked:

'In which angvahana does the doubt arise? Since, many expressions of an are being stated be to be doubtful previously, this question is: 'which one among these is doubtful' and so here in this question mention is to be made of one among many and so the expression 

kamasmin with the suffix datamac may appear to be more proper here. And one may feel that the reading katarasmin with the suffix datarac in the sense of the nirdharana of one among two, may apparently be not proper. But NBh justifies this reading also saying that the condition that datarac is to be used only when there is the mention of one among two, is refuted by Pat and so datarac can also be made use of when there is nirdharana, irrespective of the fact that the same is of one among two or many.

4. "yadi pāonganam kriyate, syadāḥ pravatāḥ, himavatāthā

ityāhāpi prāpnoti"96

Here NBh specifies that if the reading "yadi..... ityāhāpi prāpnoti', then, the verb prāpnoti should be

96. Mbh p.133.
supplied with the agent vrddhīḥ. If the reading be 'yadi....ityatrāpi na prāpnoti' as cited above, the agent to be supplied to the predicate 'na prāpnoti' is, 'nisedhah'.

5. "kim ca syāt yadyekasya halah samyogaḥ samjñā syāt? iyesa uvosa 'ījādesca gurumatonrccah ityām prasajyeta"  
   NBh points out that in the above reading mention of the word uvosa is made quite accidentally. But it cannot be cited as an example along with iyesa to illustrate the undesired contingency of the suffix ām to roots, since the addition of the suffix ām to the root us is desired (though optionally) by the rule "usavidājāgrbhyo nyatarasyām" (3-1-38). NBh continues that the reading may be "kim ca......syāt? iyesa uvokha. Ijādeśca......prasajyeta" i.e., the example cited may be the form uvokha. In this case it is quite appropriate to cite the same as an illustration for the contingency of the suffix ām to roots in case a single consonant is treated as possessed of the term samyoga.

97. Ṛbh p.149.
6. "rkāralkārayoh savarṇaḥ vidhiḥ, rkāralkārayoh savarṇaḥ samjñāḥ vidheyā" ⁹⁸

NBḥ specifies that in the part rkāralkārayoh in the vārttika and bhāṣya cited above, the rule "ṛtyakah" (6-1-126) which enjoins prakṛtibhāva has operated and hence the reading as such and there is no function of any rule on the a and the following 1 there.

7. "upādāstāṣya svarah śikṣāṣyeti. ātve krte "sthāghvoricca" itītvam prāpnoti" ⁹⁹

NBḥ points out that the reading is "sthāghvor-īceti kitvam prāpnoti" Even in the reading "sthāghvoricca itītvam" (as cited above) he says that "ītvam" means 'kitvasahitam itvam'. This is because the rules "sthāghvoricca" (1-2-17) enjoins kitva and itva and in the context here in the bhāṣya where it is referred to, the reference is to the kitva enjoined by the rule.

8. "naiveśvara āṇjapayati, nāpi dharmasūtrakāraḥ pathanti
   asambhave'pavaś dairutsargā bādhyantāṁ iti"100

NBh points that the word apavādaih in the
above reading has as its precedent the word 'asambhave'
and adds that in certain editions of the Mbh, as in
the above, the reading itself is "asambhave'pavādair...
........iti". This shows that there is also the
reading "naiveśvara āṇjapayati nāpi dharmasūtrakāraḥ
pathantī - apavādairutsargā bādhyantāṁ iti", in certain
editions of the Mbh.

9. "Parādau guṇavrddhyātvā dirghā nalopānusvārasī-
   bhāve nakārapratisēdhāh"101

NBh specifies that in the vārttika cited above
the reading is "śībhaṇakārapratisēdhāh" as cited above
and the non-elision of the locative suffix is ārṣa.

100. Mbh p.258.
10. "yo hi bhuktavantaṁ brūyāṁ mā bhuktaṁ āh iti, 

kimtena kṛtam syād?" ¹⁰²

Here NBh specifies that the reading of the verb "bhuktah" is devoid of the anusvāra as cited above.

11. "rāyi chāndasah" ¹⁰³

NBh specifies that the part 'rāyi' in the bāṣya quoted above, is to be separated as rā (which means raisabda) + yī (which means yakarādau) and the reading is rāyi i.e., without the visarga and thus averts the doubt that the reading rāyi is not correct since the śabda 'rai' cannot entertain both the ātva enjoined by the rule "ādeca upadesē sītī" (6-1-45) and the 'ak' which is usually added to roots. NBh points out that it is the nominative case suffix 'su' that is added to the śabda rai.

¹⁰² Mbh p.271.
¹⁰³ Mbh p.279.
Variant readings:

1. \textit{Tatra c\=asya} \textit{gamak\=alenaiv\=ayuh} krt\=san \textit{paryupayuktam} syat 104

NBh points out that there is a variant reading 'pryavasannam' as against the reading 'paryupayuktam'. But the variant reading noted by NBh does not effect any change in the idea expressed by the sentence.

2. \textit{Tatha v\=aky\=anyapi dv\=isth\=ani bhavanti, \=sveto dh\=avati alambusan\=anam yateti} 105.

NBh states there is a variant reading 'p\=ata' as against the reading 'yata' in the sentence above quoted. He specifies that the word p\=ata is derived from the root p\=a meaning to protect.

3. \textit{\=Am\=amayam \=s\=alamayam, \=vrddhilaks\=ano mayan na pr\=apnoti} 106.

NBh makes clear that the suffix mayat is enjoined by the rule "\textit{nityam vr\=ddha\=sar\=adibhya\=h}" (4-3-144) to \=base having the designation \=vr\=ddha which itself is...

104. \textit{Mbh} p.43
105. \textit{Mbh} p.62
106. \textit{Mbh} p.104
brought about by an initial vowel having the designation
vrddhi and in the quoted passage, mayat is, therefore,
spoken as being caused by vrddhi. He adds that there
is a variant reading "vrddhalaksamo mayan na prapnoti" which
means that the suffix mayat is caused by the designation
vrddha possessed by a base.

4. "sambandhamanu vartisyate - "vrddhiradaic" "a de\ngunah"
vrddhiradaic, tath\" "iko guna\vrddhi" iti. guna\vrddhi-
grahanam anuvartate, \adaijaden\grahanam nivrttam"107

NBh points out that in the passage quoted
above, the assertion "vrddhir\daic ad\ngunah" corresponds
to the rules 1-1-1. and 1-1-2. in the Ast. The next
assertion 'vrddhira\daic' denotes the anuvrtti of the
same in the rule 'ad\ngunah'. The next sentence means
that just as the word guna alone and not the word aden
is got by anuvrtti in the rule 'iko gunavrddhi', so also
'vrddhih' alone is got by anuvrtti and '\adaic' is not
got by anuvrtti in the rule 'iko gunavrddhi'. NBh adds
that there is a variant reading "\adaijgrahanam nivrttam"
as against \adaijaden\grahanam nivrttam'.

107. Mbh p.118
Incorrect readings:

1. "nanu ca bhosḍāṇḍogāṇām satyamugvirāṇāyaniyā
erdhamekārār ardhamokārām caddhiyaite - sujāte
esvasūnṛte, adhvaryo odribhiḥ sutamjukram te enyat,
rajetām te enyat - iti

Here NBh points that in the above sentence in the part sujāte esvasūnṛte", there is an incorrect reading including the letter 'a' as sujāte svasūnṛte and such a reading is caused by carelessness (pramāda).

2. "kim vaktavyam etat? naḥi kathamānucyamanam gamsyate?
ena deśe ke dvivacanaparo'yam antadi vádbhāvena"

NBh points out that the passage cited above is an incorrect reading found in the text of the Mbh. This passage occurs after the vārttika "avacanādapi tatparāvijñānam" and the bhāṣya on it, "antarenāpi vacanam āpi dvivacanaparo'yam bhaviṣyati". It is stated in the vārttika and bhāṣya that the feminine word ubhe formed

108. Mbh p.79
109. Mbh p.213
by the addition of the nominative dual suffix \textit{au} to the feminine base \textit{ubhā} which is derived by the addition of the feminine suffix \textit{ṭāp} to the prātipadika \textit{ubha}, can be treated as endowed with \textit{dvivacana} at the end, even without making a specific statement to that effect. The idea is that when the feminine suffix \textit{ṭāp} is added to \textit{ubha}, the resultant form \textit{ubhā} can be treated as \textit{ubhaśabda}, by virtue of the \textit{pūrvāntavadbhāva} of the ekādesa \textit{ā} of \textit{ā} + \textit{a}, on the strength of the rule \textit{"ādyantavadekasmin"} (1-1-20). Thus \textit{ubhā} being treated as \textit{ubhaśabda}, it goes without saying that \textit{ubha}, formed by the addition of the dual suffix \textit{au} to \textit{ubhā}, becomes \textit{dvivacanānta} and there is no necessity of making a specific statement to that effect. Hence the passage cited above, meaning "Is this to be mentioned? No. How can that which is not mentioned, be understood? This (\textit{ubha}) will be treated as being endowed with dual suffix at the end on account of \textit{antādivadbhāva} when the ekādesa is made" is not correct since a discussion of the necessity of a specific statement becomes out of place when it has been pointed just previously that the same is not necessary.

However, NBh adds that, the said reading may be treated as correct if in the said passage, the discussion
arises out of the misunderstanding that a statement as 'avacanādapi taiparvijnānam' is necessary.

3. "asti vēha kaścit puruṣārambah?"

NBh points out that the passage cited above is a question and hence the reading with ca in the place of vā, i.e., asti vēha kaścit puruṣārambah is incorrect since the use of the māyāta ca is not appropriate here in the statement which is in the form of a question.

110. Mbh p. 253
CHAPTER IV

ELUCIDATION OF THE PRADIPA
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In his work Uddyota, NBh elucidates the Pradipa, which is a gloss on the Mbh. He explains the expressions of Kt and elaborates Kt's assertions on the expressions found in the text of the Mbh. He supplements the views held by Kt on various points. The elucidative assertions of Kt on the different passages in the text of the Mbh are also dealt with by NBh. The method of elucidation by way of answering the objections and doubts raised by himself, is followed while dealing with Kt also and thus NBh helps to justify the assertions of Kt.

Expressions

While Commenting on the Prdp, NBh pays attention to the explanation given by Kt to the various expressions in the sutras and passages in the text of the Mbh. He gives additional information on them and elucidates the expressions used by Kt himself.
The word 'tāvad' used by Kt and Pat in two different places, has been explained significantly by NBh. He specifies the two distinctly-related yet different senses in which the same word is used by them. Kt uses the word in the sentence, "svavākyam vyākhyātum taddavayaṃ athasabdāṃ tāvad vyācāste". NBh says that the word 'tāvad' used by Kt here means 'first of all', "Tāvad" prathamam°. Pat in answer to the questions, "kēsām sabdānām?", says, "laukikānām vaidikānānca. Tatāra laukikāstāvadām". Here the word 'Tāvad' is used by Pat and NBh says: 'tāvacchabdo'nu krame' i.e., 'tāvad' is used in the sense of priority.

In the former instance, the sense given to the word is significant, because it is meant that Pat intends to explain all the words in the sentence 'atha sabdānusāsānām' and took first of all the word 'tāvad'°.

1. Vide Prdp p.3.
2. Vide Udy p.3.
for explanation. That may be due to the oft-quoted saying 'prathamatikramane manabhavat'. In the latter context, the sense of priority is significant.

Among the Vedic and non-Vedic words though the Vedic words are more important, Pat with a view to show his equal regard to non-Vedic words, begins to cite the examples for non-Vedic words before giving the same for Vedic words. This may be due to the fact "bahunamanugraho nyayyah". Thus the two meanings of the word i.e, 'first of all' and 'prior' (prathamya and anukrama) have only a narrow distinction between themselves, since the former relates to number and the latter relates to the sequence. This subtle difference has been clearly pointed out by NBh.

2. 'Bhuyah'

Commenting on the word 'bhuyah' used by Pat in the sentence 'imanica bhuyah sabdanusasanaprayojanami' Kṣ says "bhuya iti punarityarthah". NBh points out the significance of this explanation 3. In the sentence there is the word 'prayojanami used in the plural

number and the word bhūyah ordinarily used to denote the sense of many, may seem to be an adjective of prayojanāni. There is thus the scope for a doubt as to how can the word bhūyah, nominative singular of the neuter base bhūyas, can correspond to the word prayojanāni used in the plural number. NBh says that it is to avert this obscurity that Kt gives the meaning of the word 'bhūyah' as 'punah' which shows that the word bhūyah is an indeclinable here, meaning 'again' and hence it is not an adjective qualifying prayojanāni'. This sense suits the context. After dealing with the main purposes to be achieved by the study of Vyākaraṇa, Pat again deals with the purposes, of the study of Vyākaraṇa, which are accessory.

3. 'Pramattagītah'

Pat uses the expression 'pramattagītah' in the sentence 'pramattagīta esa tatrabhavatāh'. By the word 'esaḥ', he refers to a verse cited previously.

4. MBh p.27.
In this sentence the derivation of the word 'pramatā-
gītah' presents an ambiguity. If the suffix 'kta' in
the part 'pramatā' of the compound, is used in the
sense of agent, it will correspond to the word
'tatrabhavatah' and so cannot be compounded with the
word 'gītah'. NBh says that it is to point out the
correct derivation, that Kt splits up the compound as
'pramādene vipratipannatvena gītā ityarthah'. The
idea is that the suffix 'kta' in pramatā is in the
sense of 'bhāva' whereby pramatā means pramāda and the
compound means, 'recited by a dunce.

4. Dharmaniyamah

The compound word 'dharmaniyamah' in the
vārttika,

siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato'ṛthaprayukte śabdaprayoge /
śāstrena dharmaniyamah kriyate yatha laukikā-vaidikesu //

is given different derivations in the bhāṣya i.e.,

dharmāya niyamah dharmaniyamah, dharmartho va niyamah
dharmaniyaṁ, dharmaprayojna vā niyamah - dharmaniyaṁ.

Kṛṣṇa says that the explanation dharmayā niyamah must not lead one to the misunderstanding that 'dharmaniyaṁ' is a 'caturthi tatpurusa' compound enjoined by the rule 'caturthi tadarthartha, etc. (2-1-36). The relation between dharma and niyama is 'tadarthya' whereas 'caturthi samāsa' is restricted to those having 'prakṛtivikṛtibhāva' as their relation. The compound is an example of sasthisamāsa enjoined by the rule 'sasthi' (2-2-8) and the genitive case after dharma shows the relation between dharma and niyama and the same is explained as 'dharmayā niyamah'. NBh here says that this statement of Kṛṣṇa shows that the sense tadarthya comes under the scope of genitive case. He continues that Kṛṣṇa is quite justified when he takes the word 'dharmaniyaṁ' as an example of sasthisamāsa in spite of the explanation 'dharmayā niyamah'. He points out that the derivation of the compound as 'caturthi tatpurusa' cannot be sanctioned by the yogavibhāga of the rule "caturthi tadarthārtha"..." (2-1-36) into two, one

5. Mbh p.50.
comprising the word 'caturthi' alone, considering that such a yogavibhaga is mentioned nowhere in the text of the NBh. The splitting up of the compound as 'dharmaya niyamah' with a view to treat the same as a 'caturthi samasa' cannot be justified even by the rule 'saha supa' (2-1-4), since it is the last resort in the absence of any other explanation and hence cannot be a strong support to establish the purpose. Therefore, NBh strongly supports the view of Kt that even in the explanation dharmaya niyamah, the compound word is an example of sasthisamasā.

Kt says that in the second interpretation dharmartho vā niyamah dharmaniyamah, the expression dharmaniyamah is an example of karmadhāraya compound. Dharma and niyama are identical here. The niyama that the meaning is to be denoted by correct words alone, is to procure dharma. Thus the niyama is 'dharmanartha'. The component word 'dharma' of the compound is in the sense of 'dharmanarth' and as the words 'dharma' and 'niyama' denote identical ideas they are compounded by the rule "visesanam visesyaṇa bahulam" (2-1-56).
Kt continues saying that the third interpretation of Pat i.e., 'dharmaprayojano va niyamah dharmaniyamah' means that niyama is effected by 'dharma' known in the name of 'niyoga' which is the scope of liṅ and the like.

NBh points out that the difference which Kt wants to bring out between the second and third interpretation is that in the former dharma is treated as the consequence of niyama whereas in the latter niyama is treated as being effected by dharma. He specifies that the explanation given by Kt to the third interpretation is in accordance with the view of Mīmāṁsakas. According to them, the liṅ, i.e., 'yajeta' in the injunction 'svargakāmo yajeta' denotes apūrva. This apūrva causes man to be engaged in the same and hence is called 'niyoga'. NBh makes clear that this 'niyoga' is the one referred to as dharma by Kt here and it effects the niyama of excluding incorrect words. Hence the explanatory assertion dharmaprayojanah is an example of sāsthi samasa with the derivation dharmasya (the genitive case after dharma being in the sense of agent) prayojanah, wherein the part prayojanah has the
suffix lyut in the sense of kārma, and by this derivation the compound denotes the idea effected by niyama. Hence the compound dharmaniya used in this sense means the niyama caused by dharma. In this way NBh clarifies the difference suggested by Kt between the second and third interpretation given by Kt himself.

5. Iglaksanah

Pat and Kt use this expression as an adjunct to guna and vrddhi. In the bhasya under the rule "na dhatulopa ārdhāḍhatuke" (1-1-4) the objector asks how the forms 'upeddhah' and 'preddhah' can be arrived at, if the word 'ārdhāḍhatuke' is treated as an adjunct of lopa. What he means that in the form 'iddhah' which is derived from the root 'indh' with the addition of the suffix 'kta', there is the elision of the element 'u' of the root caused by the suffix 'kta' and so when the form is prefixed with 'upa' or 'pra', there may be the undesirable prohibition of guna from replacing

6. MBh p.131.
the 'a' of the prefix and 'i' of the form 'iddhah'.

Kt says that as the guna is aniglaksana and the rule prohibits such guna and vrddhi that are iglaksana, there is actually no difficulty like the contingency of the prohibition of guna here and yet the question is put forward to bring another solution to this problem. NBh here explains the idea conveyed by the word iglaksana and the circumstance under which such an idea is got. In the said instance, the guna as it replaces 'i' can be described as iksthānika, but it is not iglaksana. This is because the expression iglaksana means that caused by the paribhāsa rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3). The rule "iko gunavrddhi" is got by anuvṛtti in the rule "na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke" (1-1-4) and the latter means: the prohibition i.e., "na dhātulopa ārdhadhātuke" presents itself in the rules where the rule "iko gunavrddhi" presents itself. Thus the rule "na dhātulopa;" (1-1-4) too is treated as a paribhāsa. We thus find that the prohibition is only to those guna and vrddhi that are caused by the rule "iko gunavrddhi". NBh gives another interpretation of "na dhātulopa......" for arriving at the idea of the prohibition of guna and vrddhi that are iglaksana.
The rule prohibits the guna and vrddhi enjoined by rules wherein there is the function of the rule "iko gunavrddhi". NBh quotes the words of Kt under the vārttika 'ikprakaranāannumlope vrddhi'. They are "tena yatrekparibhāsā sthānyantaraniyṛttaye. yatrekparibhāsa vyāpriyate tatrāyam nisedhah". Without treating the rule "na dhātulopa............." (1-1-4) as a paribhāsā, NBh suggests another way by which the rule prohibits guna and vrddhi that are iglaksana. The word ikah in the rule "iko gunavrddhi" denotes the word ikah and with this meaning it is got by anuvṛtti in the rule "na dhātulopa...(1-1-4) and so the rule prohibits the guna and vrddhi that have their operation specified by the word ikah.

6. The word 'udāttah' in the rule "asthidadhīsakthyakṣnām anañudāttah" (7-1-75)

Pat says that the word udāttah in the rule asthidadhīsakthyakṣnām anañudāttah"(7-1-71) indicates that gunas are treated as abhedakas in the science of grammar. In case gunas were non-differentiating elements

7. Prdp p.133.
of phonemes, there is no need for the mention of the word *udāttah* in the rule. Pan could have uttered the akāra with the *udāttasvāra* and anān will ever be treated as *udātta*. Kt elucidates the jñāpaka. Gunas are non-differentiating elements and since the utterance of a letter is not without a svara, the particular svara of a phoneme can be taken into account only when there is a specific effort for its sake. That is why Pan has mentioned the word *udāttah* in the said rule. Now, Kt anticipates an objection here. As the utterance of a letter is not without a particular svara and as a svara can be taken into account only if there is a specific effort for the same, how can Pat resort to *udāttanipatana* for serving different purposes? He speaks of the *udāttanipatana* of the substitute vadha of the poot han so that the part ekācaḥ in the rule "ekāca upadesa' nudāttād" (7-2-10) can be dispensed with. Kt clears this inconsistency pointing out that the *udāttanipatana* itself is an effort in instances where by virtue of *sthānivadbhāva* another svara is contingent to be used in a letter. The han is anudātta and vadha being its substitute ought to be uttered with the anudāttasvāra and in this circumstance the *udāttanipatana*
in the substitute becomes a specific effort. So also
the nipata un is not nasalized and its substitute need be
non-nasalized and the nasalization( \( \tilde{\dot{\mathcal{u}}}_1 \)) of the same in the
rule (1-1-18) is an effort to take the vowel substitute
as nasalized.

To establish what has been stated by Kt, NBh
advances a doubt here. In the rule "asthidadhisakthyaksnām
\( \text{anānudāttah} \) (7-1-75) the a of \( \text{anān} \) need be uttered as
anudāttā since the svara of the sthānin 'i' in asthi etc.
is anudāttā and the utterance itself of a with the \( \text{udāttā} \)
svara can be treated as an effort, in the light of Kt's
explanation, to indicate that gunas are \( \text{aphedakās} \). Therefore
the doubt that the word \( \text{udāttah} \) in the rule is still
superfluous, arises. NBh continues that this doubt
cannot stand careful scrutiny. In instances like
paramāsthi, paramadadhi, etc., the sthānin 'i' is \( \text{udāttā} \)
and so in accordance with the sthānin, the 'a' of \( \text{anān} \) has
to be \( \text{udāttā} \). Thus considering that the sthānin is one
having varied svaras in varied instances, there is no
certainty that the sthānisvara, is ever \( \text{udāttā} \) in which case
the utterance itself of a with \( \text{udāttasvara} \) would have
become a specific effort. Therefore it is the mention
of the word udāttah that is, as pointed out by Kt, the
jñāpaka for the fact that gunas are abhedakas.

Here one thing may be asked, says NBh. The
substitute cataśr prescribed by the rule tricaturōḥ striyām
tisrcaṭaśr" (7-2-99) need be ādyudāttā and it cannot be
a specific effort since the sthanin, catur is ādyudāttā
by the rule "urah sanskhyañām". At the same time Pat
speaks of ādyudāttanipatana on cataśr to serve the purpose
of averting the antodāttā of cataśr in the instance
cataśraḥ that is contingent to be uttered there by the
rule "caturah sasi" (6-1-167). NBh says that it is this
discrepancy that persuaded Kt, to introduce another with
the statement anye tvāhuh. Kt says that some are of
opinion that udāttanipatana in an instance becomes a
specific effort as the rules are read in ekasruti. NBh
explains it saying that the rule (1-2-36) "vibhāṣā chandasi"
enjoins ekasruti optionally. Hence the udāttanipatana
i.e., the utterance of a syllable with a particular svara
becomes a specific effort (for taking the udāttasvara into
account) where on account of ekasruti no particular svara
need be uttered. However, the mention of the word
udāttah in the rule (7-1-75) becomes an indication to the
abheda katva of gunas in the traisvarya pakṣa according to

9. Phītsūtra 2.5.
which a syllable cannot be uttered without a svara.
Hence if the gunas were differentiating elements, Pan could have more conveniently uttered the a of anah with the accent udatta and the superfluous mention of the word udattah becomes the jnapaka to show the non-differentiating capacity of gunas.

NBh says that the view cited by Kt with the statement 'anye tu ahuh' is expressive of Kt's disagreement with the same and he brings out that point. There is no authority to point out that all the rules are read in ekaśruti. In the bhāṣya under the rule "dāndināyana......" (4-7-4) Pat says that the word aiksvāka in the said rule is read in ekaśruti. Again though students read the whole of Āst in ekaśruti, we are informed from the vyākhyāna (interpretation of the learned), of the sounds that are nasalised and the like. Hence we cannot wholly accept the view that all the rules are read in ekaśruti in which case udattanipatana can be treated as a specific effort. Again NBh, adds the udattanipatana in the rule "tricaturho striyam tiscatasr" (7-2-99) can well be treated as a specific effort in the traisvaryaapaksa. This is because
nipātana means a particular usage of the acārya where another kind of usage is contingent in the natural course. In the rule "tricaturhoh striyām tisrcatasr" (7-2-99) the accent on the a of catasr ought to be anudāta since tisrcatasr is a dvandva according to which a can be only anudāta. Thus, the udāttanipātana on the a of catasr when it ought to be anudāta is a specific effort and hence it averts anudāta contingent to be given to 'a' in the instance catasrah by the rule "caturah sasi" (6-1-67). Nībh therefore says that the mention of the word udatta as the jñāpaka to the non-differentiating capacity of gunas and the udāttanipātana incidentally resorted to by Pat is well justified by Kt.

7. Samanadhikaranya:

Pat says that "vrddhirādaic" is a rule defining the technical term vrddhi, as there is samanadhikaranyā and ekavibhaktikatva in the rule. Kt cites two different views with regard to what the expression samanadhikaranyā means. Tattva samanadhikaranyam sabdāyoreva kecid

iccahanti, dvābhyaṁ bhinnapraṇātinerit abhyāṁ ekasya-
bhidheyaṁya pratipādaṁ vīṣeṣanaviśeṣaṁ yathapratipādaṁ acca
vīṣeṣanaviśeṣyatvam. Anye tu niñamutpalam iti prārṭti-
numittayoh jātigunayor ekam adhikaranam aśraya iti sāmānādhikaraṇyam vīṣeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvam cārthayor eva manyante

NBh explains these views on sāmānādhikaranya. When two
sabdās of varied prārṭtinimittas denote one and the same
object, those sabdās can be called sāmānādhikarana. In
a sāmānābodhaśaśabda, the prārṭtinimitta is that sabdā
itself whereas in a sāmānābodhaśaśabda the prārṭtinimitta
is the quality i.e., dharma that rests on the sāmānā.

Accordingly the prārṭtinimitta of vrddhisamānā is vrddhisabda
itself and that of ādaic is ādaicāva. These two sabdās
These two sabdās of varied prārṭtinimittas thus, denote
one, by virtue of the rule "vrddhisādaic" (1-1-1). Hence
there is the sāmānādhikaranya of these two words. The
sabdabodha derived from the rule is vrddhisādavadabhinnāh
ādaicāh. The other view cited by Kt is that sāmānādhikaraṇa relates to the senses denoted by sounds, and not
to the sounds. NBh says that according to this view the
senses of words vrddhiḥ and ādaic are treated as sāmānādhikaraṇa since the prārṭtinimitta of these two, namely,

vrddhisābda and ādaica rest in one object. (Vrddhisabda rests in the samjñin and that relation is known as tādātmya).

NBh adds that this view cited by Kt with the statement anye tu āhuh is expressive of his dissent with that view and he brings out that point of disagreement. If as according to this view samanādāhikaranya relates to the sense and not to the sounds the expression pratītapadārthakayoh of Pat

in the passage "dvayor hi pratītapadārthakayor loke vīsesanavīsesyabhāvo bhavati na ca daicchabdah pratītapadār-
thakāh tasmāt samjñāsamjñināveva" cannot be explained.

In this passage the expression pratītapadārthakayoh is a bahuvrīhi compound meaning, 'of those two, which have their sense well-known'. Pat speaks of sounds alone in this passage in order to establish that the word vrddhih and ādaic are samjñā and samjñin and are samanādāhikarana. If the samanādāhikaranya relates to objects, he would not have used the bahuvrihi, but stated pratītapadārthhayoh (karmadhāraya compound). Hence the usage of the bahuvrihi compound

by which sounds are taken into consideration, does not seem to favour the idea that samanadhikaranya relates to the sense and not to the sound.

8. 'Ekayoga'

In order to secure the non-connection of the word vrddhih of the rule "vṛddhirādaic" (1-1-1) with adena of the rule "adengunah" caused by the anuvṛtti of the word vṛddhih from the rule vṛddhirādaic to the rule "ikogunavṛddhi" (1-1-3) which is immediately preceded by the rule "adengunah" (1-1-2) Pat says that "vṛddhirādaic" and "adengunah" are to be made an ekayoga i.e., vṛddhirādaicjadengunah and as there cannot be the anuvṛtti of a word within an ekayoga there is no problem of the connection of the word vṛddhih with adena. Kt maintains that ekayoga means a simple sentence. NBh points out the basis of Kt's single conception of ekayoga. Ekayoga cannot be a rule possessed of a single prediction, since vṛddhirādaicjadengunah which is the ekayoga mentioned here, conveys the predication of two samjnas namely vṛddhi and guna that are distinctly separate in as much as they relate to different samjnas.

Ekayoga cannot be the closest utterance of words. If it were so, even before the solution that *vṛddhirādaic* and *adeṅgunah* are to be made an ekayoga, is offered, they are uttered in close proximity and hence the future tense in *karisyate* in the passage giving this solution cannot be explained and it is prone to be regarded as superfluous.  

Again in the rule "*nerau yat karmaṇau cet sa kartā'nādhyāne*" (1-3-67) which is a single sutra, there is the anuvṛtti of the words *anau*, *yat*, *karma*, *ṇau*, *cet*. This rule is possessed of four classes namely, (1) *nehātmanepadam* (syād); (2) *anau yat karma* (tat) *ṇau cet* (3) *anau yat karma saṇau kartā cet* and (4) *anādhyāne* (cet) and among these four, the first is the principal clause. From this it is clear that ekayoga cannot also mean a single sutra. Pat has stated that there cannot be the anuvṛtti of words within an ekayoga and in the said rule there is the anuvṛtti of words within itself.

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14. *Mbh* p. 118 "*athavaikayogah karisyate - vṛddhirādaic jadeṅgunah* tatah - "*ikogunavrddhi* iti nacaikayoge' nuvṛthir bhavati".
NBh points out that it is after taking into consideration all these factors that Kt upholds the view that *ekayoga* means a simple sentence. Kt says that by supplementing a word denoting the idea of *bhavathikriyā* a simple sentence is obtained. Though this predicate namely, *bhavathikriyā* may relate separately to *guna* and *vṛddhi* in the *pratipatikāla*, the connection of *gunasamjña* with *aden* and that of *vṛddhisamjña* with ādaic is understood simultaneously and therefore, *vṛddhisamjña* cannot correlate to *aden* which is already connected with *gunasamjña*. NBh elucidates this assertion of Kt also. He points out that Kt derives a simple sentence i.e., *vṛddhirādaij adēngunbhavatī*, by means of *ekayoga*. The word *pratipatti* used by Kt means *vakyārthabodha* derived from the sentence and it is here that which is known as *samooḥālambanaajñāna* and hence there is no problem of the connection of the word *vṛddhiḥ* with *aden*. On the *vakyārthabodha* derived from the sentence may be as *vṛddhirādaic adēngunah ca bhavatah* and as such also there is no connection of the word *vṛddhiḥ* with *aden*. NBh points out that Kt is quite justified in assuming *ekayoga* to be a simple sentence and it is because of the complex nature of the rule "neranau......" (1-3-67) that the anuvṛtti of the words within itself is accepted.
9. The component word 'adi' in the rule "vānyasya
samyogādeh" (6-4-68).

In the bhāṣya under the rule "halo'mantarāh"
samyogah" (1-1-7) Pat discusses the question whether the
word saha is to be added at the end of the sūtra so that
when there are two contiguous consonants, the whole
may get the designation samyoga collectively. If otherwise
they get the designation individually, there is the
difficulty that in instances like niryayāt and nirvayāt,
the a after the first y in the former and after v in the
latter can optionally change to e by the rule "vānyasya..."
(6-4-68), as the y and v can be designated as samyoga as
there are two contiguous consonants namely, r and y in the
former and r and v in the latter. The solution given
is that this defect cannot stand careful scrutiny by virtue
of the word adi in the compound word samyogadeh of the rule.

The compound word samyogadeh is to be split up in the
dual number as samyogau adi yasya so'ya samyogādih and
not in singular number samyogah adih yasya so'ya samyogādih
tasya samyogadeh so that the optional substitution by

15. niryayāt and nirvayāt are benedictive first person
singular forms of the roots vā and vā each prefixed
with nir.
shall function on the vowel \( a \) of such \( \text{āṅga} \) alone that begins with two \( \text{samyogas} \) and not one\(^{16}\). Here Kṣ points out how the word \( \text{ādi} \) helps to arrive at this meaning. He says that if the optional replacement by \( e \) is to influence the \( a \) of an \( \text{āṅga} \) beginning with a single consonant the wording of the rule need only be as \( \text{vānyasya samyogāt} \) from which even without the word \( \text{ādi} \) by virtue of the \( \text{paribhāṣā sutra "tasmādityuttarsya"} \) (1-1-67) the idea, that the vowel \( a \) following a single \( \text{samyoga} \) undergoes the optional replacement by \( e \), can be easily arrived at. The word \( \text{ādi} \) being thus superfluous helps in splitting the compound in the dual number.

To justify Kṣ, NBh says that the word \( \text{ādi} \) is not even necessary to get the idea that, in order to get the optional substitution of \( a \) by \( e \), the single \( \text{samyoga} \) which is to precede the \( a \) should be the former element of the \( \text{āṅga} \). It may be said that if there is not specification that the single \( \text{samyoga} \) ought to be the

\(^{16}\) "naivam vijñāyate - samyoga ādiryasya so'yaṃ samyogādāh, samyogāderiti. Katham tarhi? samyogāv adi yasya so'yaṃ samyogādīḥ samyogāder iti" (\textit{Mbh} p. 145)
former element of the *ānga*, there is the contingency of the optional substitution by *e* of *ā* in the instance *khatvāyāt* where the single samyoga *v* is not the former element of the *ānga*. But this contingency can easily be avoided by the anuvṛtti of the word *upadeśa* from the rule "syasicasiyuttāsīsu bhavakarmanorupadeśe..." (6-4-62) to the rule "vānyasya samyogādeḥ" (6-4-68) so that those which are roots in the *upadeśa* itself are taken into consideration in this rule and not those which are nominal roots. Therefore, there is no problem in the instance *khatvāyāt* as the same is derived from a nominal root. Moreover, NBh says that a form like *khatvāyāt* need not be taken into consideration as it is understood from the bhāṣya under the rule "āto dhātoḥ" (6-4-140) there is the *anabhidhana* of the forms derived by the addition of *kvip* in the sense of *ācāra*, from basis like *khatvā*. Therefore, the word *ādi* in the rule is quite unnecessary to prevent the optional substitution by *e* of the vowel *ā* in the said instance. Kt is, therefore, quite correct in saying that it is by virtue of the word *ādi* that one gets the compound having the components in the dual number.

17. *khatvāyāt* - the benedictive first person singular derived from the nominal root *khatvā* added with *kvip* in the sense of *ācāra*. 
NBh however, adds that in the siddhānta that the designation *samyoga* relates to two or more contiguous consonants, the word *ādi* is necessary to get the idea that the *samyoga* by which two or more contiguous consonants are meant, must be the former element of the *aṅga* of the root for the function of the rule, so that in instances like *niryāyāt*, the *aṅga* i.e., *yāyāt* being devoid of *samyoga* at the beginning won't undergo the optional substitution of ā by ē.

10. The expressions *mahīśī rūpam iva* and *brahmanī rūpam iva* in "Samānādhi karāṇesu ghaḍiṣu ity ucyamāne iha prasajyeta mahīśī rūpam iva, brahmanī rūpam iva iti 18

Under the rule "*taraptamapau ghaḥ*" (1-1-21) Pat... says that in the rule "*gharūpakalpacia bruvagotra.....*" (6-3-43) which enjoins *hrasva* to a *pūrvapada* ending in ā when followed by an *uttarapada* like *gha* etc., the *uttarapada* must be treated as feminine in gender for the function of the rule. If on the other hand the *uttarapada* like *gha* etc., is interpreted to be *samānādhi karaṇa* with the *pūrvapada* therein is involved the difficulty

of the contingency of ḥrasva in mahiṣī rūpam iva and 
brahmāṇi rūpam iva". The exact words of Pat are 

Strīlingesu ghādisu ity evam tad. Avāṣyam ca itad evam 
vijñeyam. Samānādhikaranesu ghādisu ity ucyamāne 
iha prasjyeta mahiṣī rūpam iva, brahmāṇi rūpam iva iti. 
Meaning "It is interpreted thus, followed by ghādi which 
is feminine in gender. It must be necessarily interpreted 
so: If it is said that it takes place when followed 
by ghādi which is samānādhikarmaṇa, it will operate in 
mahiṣī rūpam iva, brahmāṇi rūpam iva also". With regard 
to the expressions 'mahiṣī rūpam iva' and brahmāṇi rūpam iva' 
Kt says that the word iva in these, is to be put after 
the words mahiṣī and brahmāṇi respectively. He points 
out that the expression means mahiṣī iva iyam 
ākṛtih and says that there is the contingency of ḥrasva 
by the rule "gharūpa....." (6-3-43) on the word mahiṣī 
when the two words mahiṣī and rūpam are compounded by the 
rule "saha supa" (2-1-4). NBh gives the significance of 
Kt's explanation. He points out that Kt is quite justified 
in considering mahiṣī rūpam iva, which is in the sense 
of mahiṣī iva iyam ākṛtih, to be the vigrahavākya of a 
compound. The words mahiṣī rūpam iva cannot be treated 
as an expression wherein separate words are used without
composition and the same cannot be a compound expression also. There cannot be the contingency of *hrasva* as pointed out by Pat in *mahisī*, if the said expression gives separate words without composition, considering that it (the word *mahisī*) is not followed by an *uttarapada* since *rūpam* is a separate word and the rule enjoins *hrasva* only when a *purvapada* ending in *ni* is followed by *uttarapada* as the rule falls within the jurisdiction of the *adhiṅkārasūtra* "*alug uttarapade*" (6-3-1). Again since the word *rūpam* means *ākṛti* and since it is in anticipation of that, the *ākṛti* of which is equal with *mahisī*, it will not even correspond to the word *mahisī*. *Mahisī rūpam iva* cannot even be a compound expression since in that case also there cannot be the contingency of *hrasva* which is pointed out by Pat. The same, if it were a compound expression, is to be accepted as the *sasthī tatpurusa* compound in which case the components will never be *samanādhiṇkarana* and what Pat has stated is that it is when the *uttarapada* is treated as *samanādhiṇkarana* with the *purvapada* that there is the contingency of *hrasva*. Thus it can be the *vigrahavakya* of a compound in which case is implied an *upamanopameyabhava*. However the compound
cannot be the one enjoined by the rule "upamānāni śāmānyvacanaih" (2-1-55) as there is not the mention of śāmānyadharma here. Again it cannot be the one enjoined by the rule "upamitam vyāgrādibhih śāmānyāprayoge" (2-1-56) since rūpa being the upamāya is to be placed before the word in the compound. If it (rūpa) is treated as upamāna it will always anticipate that, of which it is (i.e., kāṣya rūpam), and hence being related to that, it cannot undergo a vṛtti like samāsa, with mahiśī with which it does not correspond. NBh says that it is after taking into consideration all these facts that Kt says that the words mahiśī and rūpam are compounded by the rule "saha supa" (2-1-4).

Views of Kaiyāta

1. The reason for the absence of vibhakti from a ī etc. in the Śivasūtras

Kt asserts that the absence of case-endings from a ī etc. in the Śivasūtras is due to the fact that they are not after which alone case-endings are added.

Though by virtue of svarūpa and anukārya they can be treated as 'arthavat' that 'arthavatva' is not taken into consideration and hence being not arthavat they are never prātipadikas after which case-endings are added.

NBh elucidates the view of Kt. As a rule, the svarūpa of a sabda can be treated as its 'artha' since it is being cognised on hearing the sabda. The a, i etc. in the Śivasūtras give a cognition in which their svarūpa is also involved. Hence a, i etc. are well arthavat.

Or else a, i etc. are the anukarana of the a, i etc. in the worldly usages. An anukarana always denotes the anukārya and hence it is the artha of the anukarana. Therefore a, i etc., being imitative of a, i etc. are arthavat. Yet they do not come under the scope of the word arthavat to which the term prātipadika is given by the rule "arthavadhātur....." (1-2-45). This is because the word arthavat in the rule denotes a sabda having a sense i.e., artha denoted by its expressive power known as vṛtti. Svarūpa and anukārya are not this kind of artha. There is no need of the function of the expressive power of the sound in understanding its 'svarūpa'. It will be cognised simply when the sound becomes the object of hearing. So also an anukarana indicates the anukārya
not by its expressive power, but by virtue of its similarity with the anukārya, etc. being thus indicative of no sense by its expressive power cannot be characterised as arthavat and so cannot entertain case-suffixes after them. Moreover if the suffixes are added to it, its imitative power as an anukarana may be disturbed. Hence the absence of case-suffixes after each letter in the Sivāsūtras. NBh says that the same can be justified by treating the same as 'sautra' i.e., peculiarity found in sūtras alone.

The correctness of the word 'ltaka'

While enumerating the benefits of the enunciation of the letter 'l' it is pointed out in the bhāsya that the same is for the sake of yadrcchasabdās i.e., for words coined at random. These words like ltaka, lphida and lphidda are words of casual utterance and form one group among the four divisions of standard words. The vārttikakāra points out these are not correct and it is the words rtaka rphida and rphidda that are correct. They are the regularly derived forms and consequently grammatically correct forms. They are only three kinds of standard
words i.e., jātisabda, gunasabda and kriyasabda. The objector attacks this view saying that this kind of argumentation is not fair. He argues that the utility of the mention of 'l' in Siyasūtras, is shown on the strength of the view that there are yadrcchasabdas and the same is disproved by denying the existence of yadrcchasabdas. Besides a sabda formed according to rules debars the other one not so formed, only when both are used in the same sense. Here the words rtaka and ltaka do not have the same sense, the former meaning truthful and the latter being the designation of a person. The answer given to this argument is that regulations are made even on the basis of different views. This means that the view admitting the existence of three groups of standard sabdas is the one to be accepted. Thus according to vārttikakāra the regularly derived words like rtaka alone are to be used. NBh says that, one can refute the utility of the mention of 'l' for the sake of sabdas like ltaka even by admitting the existence of yadrcchasabdas. Words like ltaka are debarred from usage since they are not accepted by sistas. Correct words include those which even though not regularly derived are sanctioned by the usage of sistas. NBh
points out that this fact, though not stated orally by Pat, is noted by Kt who for the sake of average students says that "avyutpannasamjñaḥ sabdapakṣeḥ pi pāramparyagatāḥ sistaprayuktā eva samjñaḥ kartavyah".

3. The problem of substitution of 'a' by hrasva in the absence of the upadeśa of 'a' as vivṛta in the rule 'aiun'.

Under the Sivasūrta 'aiun' Pat says that the vārttika 'akārasya vivṛtopadesah ākāragṛhanārthah' points out the inclusion of ā by a as the purpose of the actual utterance of the letter a in the said rule and the vārttika does never advise the mention of a as vivṛta instead of the usual samvṛta which is actually made there. The rule "a a" (8-4-68) is an indication to this effect since it enjoins the substitute namely samvṛta 'a' in the place of 'a' which is vivṛta. To contradict this indication, the objector says that the rule 'a a' (8-4-68) is not

20. Prdp p.75.
21. Mbh p.64.
at all redundant to bring forth such an indication.

It has got the specific purpose of making the hrasva substitute namely a enjoined by the rule "gostriyor upasarjanasya" (1-2-48) in instances like atikhatvah, to be samvṛta, which otherwise is contingent to be vivṛtta on account of the similarity with the sthānin namely ā and so it cannot indicate the fact that there is vivṛtopadesa of a in 'aiun'. The words of Pat are here "naitadasti jñāpakam. asti hyanyad etasya vacane prayojanam. kim? atikhatvah atimālah ityatrāntaryato vivṛtasya vivṛtah prāpnoti, samvṛtah syād ityevamarthā pratyāpattih. Kt suspects an inconsistency in this assertion. If there is no vivṛtopadesa of the letter 'a' in the rule 'aiun', it cannot comprehend 'ā' and so 'ā' will be devoid of the designation 'ac'. Hrasva substitute can only be 'ac' since in rules like "gostriyor....." (1-2-48) enjoining a hrasva substitute, the rule 'acascā' (2-1-28) presents itself and points out 'ac' as the sthānin of the hrasva substitute. 'A' will not therefore be a substitute for ā. Thus at a stage when the substitution by hrasva
of \( \tilde{a} \), in instances like atikhatvah is impossible, how can it be said that the rule \( 'a_a' \) (8-1-68) can serve the purpose of making the hrasva \( 'a' \) substituting \( \tilde{a} \) to be vivrta? Kt clears this doubt on the strength of the rule "udicam atah sthane yakapurvayah" (7-3-46). This rule enjoins short \( 'i' \) in the place of \( a \) which has substituted \( \tilde{a} \). As the substitution of \( \tilde{a} \) by \( a \) is impossible in the above circumstance and the mention of such an \( 'a' \) in this rule indicates that \( \tilde{a} \) even if devoid of the designation \( ac' \) will be substituted by \( a \). NBh fully agrees with the view of Kt and to confirm Kt's assertion anticipates a doubt on the same and then gives the answer. It may be pointed out: The rule "aponyatarasyam" (7-4-15) prescribes hrasva to the \( \tilde{a} \) of the feminine suffix \( \tilde{c} \tilde{a}p, \tilde{d} \tilde{a}p \) and \( \tilde{t} \tilde{a}p \). In the examples of this rule we get a short \( a \) as the substitute of \( \tilde{a} \) and it is this short \( a \) that is spoken of in the rule "udicamatah...." (7-3-46). Therefore it cannot be the basis for the indication that \( a \) even if devoid of the designation \( ac' \) is substituted by \( hrasva \). Therefore, the inconsistency, that in the absence of vivrtopadesa in the rule 'aiun', hrasva i.e., short \( a \) cannot substitute \( \tilde{a} \) in instances
like atikhatvah still remains as such. Now the answer is given by NBh to justify Kt's statement. If the rule "udicām ātah........." (7-3-46) functions only in instances where the rule "āponyatarasyam" (7-4-15) has brought a in the place of ā, the rule is actually being restricted in its scope. This must be avoided. Hence it is better to accept the substitution by hrasva i.e., ā of ā even devoid of the designation 'ac'. Again it can be established that the rule "acaska" (2-1-28) does not exert its influence on the rule "gostriyor........." (1-2-48). Among the gosabda and the feminine suffix mentioned in this rule, the vowel o in 'go' will be substituted by hrasva even in the absence of the function of the rule "acaska" (2-1-28) as there is only one vowel there and so, the rule "acaska" does not present the word 'acah' with regard to 'go'. The rule does not present the word acah to the feminine suffix also. Since it is read along with 'go' in the said rule and being its sahācarita the rule "acaska" does not refer to it. Thus in the rule"gostriyor........." the feminine suffix is not presented with the word acah and so the ā of the feminine suffix even devoid of the designation 'ac' gets the hrasva substitute in instances like atikhatvah.
4. The insertion of the word 'nimitta' in the rule

"kniti ca" (1-1-5)

Under the rule "kniti ca" vārttikakāra suggests the insertion of the word nimitta in the rule. Kt is of opinion that such an insertion is necessary only if in the interpretation of the rule, the word kniti relates to the word ikah got by anuvṛtti. This is because the rule "tasminniti nirdiste pūrvasya" (1-1-66) will exert its influence on the word kniti and the rule may teach the fact that ik which is adjunctly previous to the suffix shall get the prohibition of guna and vriddhi substitutes. Hence the ik which is the last element of the anīga in instances like citam, stutam, etc. alone gets the prohibition and the penultimate ik in instances like bhinnam, cannot get this prohibition as the same cannot be adjunctly previous to the suffix and to secure the same the insertion of the word nimitta becomes an essential factor. But Kt says that if the word kniti relates to the word gunavṛddhi got by anuvṛtti, the locative case in kniti will be nimittasaptamī as the rule "tasminniti nirdiste pūrvasya" (1-1-66) will not exert
its influence and so there is no need of the insertion of the word nimitta in the rule.  

NBh elucidates this assertion of Kt. He points out that the locative case in kniti is to be interpreted as the one taught by the rule "yasya ca bhavena bhāvalaksanam" (2-3-37) by which the action of one expressed in the locative case indicates the action of another. By virtue of this locative case in the word kniti which relates to the word gunavrddhi, it is understood that the existence of kniti suffix indicates the existence of gunavrddhi. This is possible only if there is some connection between them and that relation is none other than nimittanimittibhāva, since rules like "Sarvadhatukārdhadhatukayoh" "mrjervṛddhiḥ"(1.2-144,,Etc., that enjoins guna or vrddhi, offer sarvadhatuka and ardhadhatuka suffix as the nimitta. Thus the rule kniti ca by virtue of the locative case taught by the rule "yasya ca..."(2-3-37) prohibits the guna and vrddhi that are indicated by the existence of kniti suffix on account of their nimittatva to the same. That is why, says NBh, Kt feels the non-essentiality of the insertion.

of the word "nimitta" in the rule "kniti ca".

NBh here cites a view of some scholars elucidating the assertion of Kṣ in a manner different from that of NBh. These scholars maintain that the locative case in kniti that relates to the word gunavṛddhi, is the one taught by the rule "yasya ca bhavena bhāvalaksanam" (2-3-37). But it is on the basis of the dictum siddhasādhyasamabhivyāhare siddham sādhyāya kalpate that the knīt suffix is being treated as the nimitta of gunavṛddhi in this rule. This dictum known as siddha-sādhyā sama-bhihāranyāya points out that when there is the coherence of something which is siddha (already accomplished) and some other which is sādhyā (to be accomplished) the siddha paves the way for (becomes the nimitta of) sādhyā. In the rule "kniti ca" that, which is predicated and hence sādhyā, is the prohibition of gunavṛddhi and that which is anuvādyā and hence siddha, includes the knīt suffix. Therefore, on the strength of this nyāya it can be said that the knīt suffix brings forth the absence of gunavṛddhi which results in the nimittatva of knīt suffix to guna and vrddhi. The rule therefore means "kūnnimittte gunavṛddhi na bhavatah".
5. "Yathotharam hi munitrayasya prāmānyam"

This is a remark made by Kṛ while commenting on the last statement of Pat in the bhāṣya under the rule "na bahuvṛihau" (1-1-28)\(^2\). The discussion there is concerned with the fact whether the rule is necessary to prohibit sarvanāmasamjñā to sarvādi in a bahuvṛhi compound and it is stated the rule is necessary to prohibit sarvanāmasamjñā to sarvādi in a bahuvṛhi compound and it is stated the rule is necessary to prohibit sarvanāmasamjñā to sarvādi that occur in the alaukikavigrahavākyā of bahuvṛhi i.e., the words which convey the sense of bahuvṛhi and since being for bahuvṛhi compound can be designated as bahuvṛhi\(^2\). The benefit derived from this prohibition is that in the bahuvṛhi compound formed from the two components yusmad and pitr the sarvādi namely yusmad won't entertain the suffix akac prescribed by the rule "avyaya sarvanāmnam akac prāk ṭeh" (7-3-71) and it enjoins the suffix ka.

The resultant form of this bahuvṛhi is tvakapitrkaḥ and not tvakatpitrkaḥ. Now it is stated in the bhāṣya

\(^{23}\) Prdp p.217.
\(^{24}\) Mbh p.215.
"Gonardīyastu āha:- akacṣavaṁ tu kartavyau pratyaṅgam muktasamśayaṁ tvakatpitrko, makatpitrka ityeva bhavitavyam itī.\(^2\) In the opinion of Gonardīya, the sūtra 'na bahuvrīhau' (1-1-28) is not necessary and the form tvakatpitrkaḥ and makatpitrkaḥ are treated as correct and desirable words. Kt says that with this assertion Pat is discarding the rule which is made to arrive at the forms tvatkapitrkaḥ and matkapitrkaḥ. Thus it is found that in the opinion of the sūtrakāra who frames the rule 'Na bahuvrīhau' (1-1-28) the form tvatkapitrkaḥ is desirable whereas to Pat who refutes the sūtra it is the form tvakatpitrka that is favourable. Kt says that we have to adhere to the opinion of Pat since 'yathottaram hi munitrayasya prāmaṇyam' superiority goes to the latter among the three sages, in matters of controversy:

NBh commenting on this assertion of Kt says that the reason for the acknowledgement of superiority to the latter among the three sages is that the latter is the one familiar with more forms in the progress of language. Therefore the view, that in order to make the sūtra significant the examples like tvatkapitrka given by the Vṛttikāra is to be accepted, need not be paid attention to.

\(^2\) Mbh p.217.
NBh adds that the superiority of Pat as pointed out in the statement is clear from the bhasya under the rule "dhinvikravyor a ca" (3-1-87). The rule enjoins the substitute a to the final element of the roots dhiv and krv and the suffix u to these roots when there is the possibility of the suffix sap from these. Pat discusses the purpose of prescription of the substitute a to the v instead of enjoining lopa to the same. To the argument that the rule even if it enjoins lopa to v the root will get prohibition of guna by the rule "na dhatulopa ardhadhatuke" (1-1-4) Pat says that the rule "na dhatulopa. (1-1-4) will bestow the prohibition of guna only when the lopa is caused by an ardhadhatuka and the lopa desired to be enjoined is not such an one. Pat adds that the rule "na dhatulopa" (1-1-4) is a sutra already discarded. Hence the contingency of guna can be prohibited only by the prescription of the substitute a which even when elided by the rule "a to lopa" (6-4-48), can prohibit guna by means of the thanivadbhava of lopa. The exact words of Pat are "na caisa ardhadhatukanimitto lopah api ca pratyakhyayate khalvapi sa yogah Tasmin pratyakhyate gunah syadeva tasmad atvam vaktavyam". Here NBh
says that it is clear from the above passage that the view of Pat who refutes the rule is more prominent than that of Sūtrakāra. He says that this is the source for the statement yathottaram muninām prāmāṇyam 26.

**Passages**

1. "atha gaurityatra kah 'satdah?"

After stating the fact that the science of grammar is concerned with correct words both Vedic and non-Vedic Pat puts forward the question "atha gauritratra kah sabda?" 27. Kt says that the idea of the question is as follows:-

"gauriti vijñāne pratibhāsamāneṣu vastusu kah sabda ity-arthah (what, among the concepts that appear in mind on the cognition gauḥ, is denoted by the word sabda?)

Commenting on the word pratibhāsamāneṣu NBh says that the concepts that appear in mind on the cognition gauḥ are the sound, the genus cow, the individual cow, etc.

Hence these concepts are doubted by Pat to be the \textit{sabda}. NBh says that in the light of the explanation given by Kt, it may seem that \textit{guna} and \textit{kriyā} cannot be doubted to be \textit{sabda} as these concepts do not appear in mind on the cognition \textit{gauh}, but Pat introduces questions doubting \textit{guna} and \textit{kriyā} to be the \textit{sabda}. NBh adds that it can be shown that these doubts are quite concordant with the explanation given by Kt. He points out that the relation between \textit{guna} and \textit{gunin} and the same between \textit{kriyā} and \textit{kriyavat} is \textit{abheda} and so quality and the individual cow, as well as action and the individual cow are identical with each other. It is also to be noted that the sound \textit{gauh} and the individual cow are identical as the relation between the sound and sense is \textit{abheda}. Therefore by the application of the \textit{nyāya \textit{tadabhinnabhinnasya tadabhinnatvam}} (one thing which is identical with a particular thing, is identical with another thing which is identical with the one mentioned secondly), the sound identical with the individual cow is identical with \textit{guna} and \textit{kriyā} that are identical with the individual cow and hence they are also doubted to be the \textit{sabda} by Pat.
While commenting on the rule 'hayavarat' Pat puts forward this question and Kt says that this question does not enquire the purpose of the mention of the letters य, य, र and ल in the Sivasūtras "hayavarat" and "lan". The mention of these letters is quite necessary there for including them in pratyāhāras like य. Kt hence says that the idea of the question is why the rule "anuditsavarnasya capratyayah" (1-1-69) is not read as ajuditsavarpasya capratyayah. Apparently it may seem quite far-fetched to take the question as conveying this idea. NBh with his brilliant interpretation justifies the explanation of Kt. The part 'ansūpadesah' of the question is a single compound word and not two separate words like अप्सु उपादेश. The compound is to be split as anah supadesah and means the utterance of the word अन. So the words अनस्थानाम अनसुपदेश means the utterance of an to indicate अनस्थानास. Such an utterance of the word an to indicate अनस्थानास is seen in the rule "anuditsavarnasya capratyayah" (1-1-69). The rule teaches the ability of an to comprehend its cogni-
Among the consonants denoted by an \( \text{h} \) and \( \text{r} \) does not have any cognates and it is the letters \( \text{y}, \text{v}, \text{and l} \) known as \text{anthasthas} that are given the ability to comprehend their cognates and Pat enquires in this question the purpose of the comprehension of cognates by \text{anthasthas}. Thus the question results in the sense pointed out by Kt why the rule "\text{anudit}...." (1-1-69) is not read as \text{ajudit}\text{savarnasya cāpratyayah}.

3. "\text{chandovat sūtrani bhavanti}"\text{29}

In order to explain the non-substitution by \( \text{k} \) of the letter \( \text{c} \) in the rule "\text{vrddhirādaic}" (1-1-1) Pat says that the word \( \text{ādaic} \) is endowed with \text{bhasamjñā} by the rule "\text{ayasmayādīnī chandasi}" (1-4-20). To the subsequent objection that the said rule is concerned with Vedic words alone whereas \( \text{ādaic} \) is a non-Vedic word, Pat makes the above assertion. "\text{Sūtras are to be regarded as equal to Vedas.}" Kt says that this is an \text{isti} of Pat. The status of Vedas is such that the Vedic words are not fettered by the rules of grammar. This privilege is extended to the expressions in \text{sūtras} also by this \text{isti} of Pat. Kt points out that the \text{sūtras} mentioned

\text{29. Mbh p.104.
in this isti are not those of Vaisesika system of philosophy or the like, but those of the science of grammar as it is one among the Vedāṅgas. Here NBh says that this reason given by Kṛ is significant. It points out why the sūtras of the science of grammar are treated like the Vedas. The science of grammar as it helps in understanding the Vedas by explaining the words and their meaning, is treated as an accessory to the Vedas. It is regarded as the face of the Vedas personified as a human being, Pat too has stated that the science of grammar is the principal one among the four Vedāṅgas. NBh favours the reason given by Kṛ for treating the sūtras of the science of grammar to be equal to Vedas. NBh adds that Pat has pointed out under the rule "yū strākhyau nadi" (1-4-3) that the assertion 'chandovāt kavyah kuvanti' is not an isti of his. Pat does not recognise the fact that writers can make usages, uncontrolled by the rules of grammar, like those in the Vedas which are free from the clutches of grammar. Hence NBh draws the conclusion that the basis for the isti 'Chandovāt sutrāni bhavanti'.

30. Mbh p.6 *pradhānam ca saṅsvāngesu vyākaranam
is not that the rules of the science of grammar are ūrsa but that the sutras are of the science of grammar which is the anga of the Vedas. Thus it is because of this īsti of Pat the sutras of the science of grammar get the freedom enjoined to Vedas in regard to word formation 32.

4. "kim prayojanam?" 33

Under the rule "dādāghvadāp" (1-1-20) Pat begins the discussion regarding the essentiality of the insertion of the word prakṛtayāh in the sūtra with the assertion, 'ghusamjñāyām prakṛtigrahanāṁ kartavyaṁ dādā- prakṛtayo ghusamjna bhavantiti vaktavyaṁ (Mention of

32. Here it has to be borne in mind that by this īsti of Pat’s sutras are treated as like Veda not only in respect of word formation but also in respect of the fact that the sutras of Aṣṭ have adṛṣṭaprayojana also. Hence even when Pat who is the supreme authority in grammar refutes a rule of Pāṇ or a word in them, the rule is neither removed from the text of Aṣṭ nor left unstudied. The refutation (pratyākhyāna) made by Pat, simply denotes the fact that the particular rule or the word in them, meant for getting a particular formation is not actually necessary for the same. But his rules are never devoid of the adṛṣṭaprayojana. By the refutation of the sutras Pat points out that the particular rule or word which he refutes has only the adṛṣṭaprayojana but not the ṛṣṭaprayojana of effecting a particular formation. Thus Pat gives to the sutras of Pāṇ, the status of Vedas itself, in its full scope.

the word Prakṛti is needed in the sutra enjoining ghusamjña. It needs be said that dādhāprakṛtayah gets the designation.) Now a question is raised "kim prayojanam" meaning What is the benefit (of the insertion of the word prakṛtayah)? Kṛṣṇa says that the idea behind this question is that in the reading of the rule as dādhāhvadāp itself, all the six roots desired to be benefitted by this designation namely du dān (3rd conj) dān (1st conj) do (4th conj) and den (1st conj) dudhāṅ (3rd conj) and dhe (1st conj) can get the designation and he points out how these get the said designation. The word dādhāṅ in the rule is to be regarded as a dvandva compound of the two components da and dhā each of which in its turn is the expression by ekasesa i.e., dāśca dāśca dāṅ, dhāśca dhāśca dhāṅ. One among each of these two similar groups, namely, da and dhā are the anukarana of the roots dudāṅ dan and dudhāṅ. The other ones, namely da is arrived at by the substitution by a of the final element of the anukarana do de of the roots do and den ending in ec and dhā is arrived at by the same process from the anukarana dhe of the root dhe ending in ec devoid of the anubhanda t having been elided. Elucidating the assertion of Kṛṣṇa Bhūṣāṇa says that the anukarana do and dhā of the
roots ending in \( \text{ec} \) get the substitution by \( a \) enjoined
to the originals by virtue of the maxim \( \text{prakṛtīvad anukaranaṃ} \), by which these anukaranas can be treated
as the originals. So also in the rule \( \text{"ādeca upadēśśiṣṭi"} (6-1-45) \) enjoins \( ātvā \), there is a word
namely \( āṣiṭi \), and the naṅ there is to be treated as
prasajya pratiṣṛṣṭa whereby the rules \( \text{"ādeca upadēśśiṣṭi"} \)
(6-1-45) enjoins \( ātvā \) to the roots when they are not followed by a suffix which is \( \text{sit} \). Since the anukaranas
are not followed by any suffix, they get the substitution by \( a \) of the final element. One may doubt that on
the strength of the maxim \( \text{"lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoh pratipadoktasyaiva grahanam"} \), the forms \( \text{dā} \) and \( \text{dha} \) in the rule may not comprehend the same arrived at by the substitution by \( a \) in the anukaranas as the latter are lakṣaṇikas. It may also be doubted that on the basis of the maxim \( \text{"niranubandhakagrahane na sānubandhakasya"} \), the roots \( \text{dhet} \) and \( \text{den} \) may not be comprehended as they are possessed of anubandhas whereas in the rule the form \( \text{dā} \) and \( \text{dha} \) are mentioned as without being possessed of any anubandha.
But NBh says that these doubts are quite baseless since in the said rule by virtue of ekasesa all these roots are individually taken into account. 

So also there is no need for the apprehension that the roots drñ and dhṛñ which have the form dā in instances like darayati and dhārayati as the anukarana of these roots cannot entertain ātva as they do not end in ē and it is the anukaranas that entertain the substitution by ā of the final element that are comprehended by the form dā and dhā which undergoes ekaśesa. So there is not the contingency of root drñ (5th conj) being comprehended by the rule since it does not undergo ātva by the rule "ādeca upadeśe 'siti" (6-1-45). Thus NBh elucidates the idea of Kt that by the question 'kim prayojanam?' it is meant that all the six roots get the designation ghu even if the word prakṛtyah is not inserted in the rule and indicates that the insertion is not necessary.
In the bhāṣya under the rule "halonantarāḥ samyogah" (1-1-7), we get a discussion as to whether the term samyoga relates to each two or to all in instances where there are more than two contiguous consonants. In the passage 'astu tarhi samudāye samjña' Pat concedes to the view that the term relates to all contiguous consonants. To the subsequent question reminding of the defects involved in the view, and noted previously, he rectifies one of those six doubts saying "naiśa dosah vaksyatāyetat antyāt pūrvo maśjeridanusāngaśasya samyogadilopar̥tham iti."

After that, he remarks, 'athavāviśesena samyogasamjña vijñāsyate - dvayorapi, bahunāmapi tatra dvayor yā samyogasamjña tadaśrayo lopo bhaviṣyati' wherein he admits both the views that the term relates to each two and all when there are more than two contiguous consonants.

Now follows the passage cited above. In this passage, the optional operation of the rule, "vānyasyasamyogādeh" (6-4-68) in the instances nirglāyat and nirmlāyat is
achieved by connecting the word $\text{āṅgasya}$ with the part \text{samyoga} of the compound \text{samyogadeh} in the said rule.

\text{Kt} says that in this passage, \text{Pat} is rectifying the rest defects, other than that related to the root \text{masj} (which has already been rectified), pointed out in the view that the term \text{samyoga} relates to all contiguous consonants. He continues that on the strength of the dictum, \text{"pāthakramādarthahramo balīyān"}, this passage is to be interpreted as coming just after the statement, \text{"naiśa dosah vakyāyat antyāt pūrvo masjermidanusaṅga-}
\text{samyodilōpārtham"} wherein one of the six defects in the view is rectified and this passage does not refer to the statement, just previously made, \text{"athavā.......bhaviṣyati"} to which the same may relate on the strength of \text{pāthakrama}. He then says, \text{"vyakhyaṇāntaramatra klistatvānnoktam."}

As an earnest elucidator, \text{NBh} gives the \text{vyākhyānantara} of this passage indicated by \text{Kt} and points out the effort (klesa) involved in it. He informs us that the \text{vyākhyānantara} has the purpose of adhering to the \text{pāthakrama} by which the cited passage can be interpreted as connected with the just previous passage, \text{"athavā.......bhaviṣyati"}
itself. He points out that the *nipata, iti* coming after the verb *prapmoti* in the passage is used in the sense of *yasmāt* and is related to the following clause, "'āṅgena samyogādīm viśeṣayiṣyāmaḥ'. The whole sentence is to be supplied with the words "tadapyast, yato' viśeṣena samyogasamjñocaye". The passage means, "yasmāt angena samyogādīr viśeṣyate tasmāt, "iha ca nirglāyāt nirmlāyāt, nirgleyāt - mirmleyāt "vānyasya samyogādeḥ" ityetvam na prapmotiti yadapi, tadapyasat; yato'viśeṣena samyogasamjñocaye". It is clear that in this interpretation the optional operation of the rule "vānyasya samyogādeḥ" in the cited instances is achieved.

NBh adds that the klesā involved in this interpretation is that there is the necessity of supplying many words to arrive at such an interpretation. Moreover the *nipata, iti* is more appropriately felt to be conveying the idea of the conclusion of the sense of the sentence. Again the assertion of Pat which comes after this passage, "evam tāvat sarvamānīgam pariḥrtam" does not suit this interpretation. It is quite obvious
that by connecting the word angasya to the part
samyoga of the compound samyogādeh of the rule,
"vānyasyasamyogādeh" the defects concerning the aṅga
mentioned in the rules "ṛtasca samyogādeh" (7-2-43) and
"gūnortēsamyogādyoh" (7-4-29) can be explained. All
these render the latter interpretation klūṣṭa, says NBh.
CHAPTER V

CITED VIEWS
NBh has cited a lot of views in his work Udy. They are of varied nature and are meant for elucidation and justification of the assertions of Pat and Kt. Many are critical in nature. Generally, NBh does not reveal the identity of the persons holding the particular views he cites, the instances where he mentions the name of the authors are very few. From the nature of the commentary, we are able to know that some of the assertions in Udy are the views of the author himself. For instance, there is no doubt that the views cited with the statement 'vastutah bodhyam' or with the beginning 'vastutastu' or with the ending 'iti bodhyam' are those of NBh himself. But many views are cited with other introductory or final expressions and the significance of these is examined here.

1. Vide Supra p. 54
The various expressions used to cite different views

NBh uses the expressions 'iti pare', 'pare tu ahuh', 'pare tu.... vadanti', 'pare tu .... icchanti', 'ityanye', 'anye tu ahuh', 'ityashuh', 'iti kecit', 'kecit tu ahuh', 'iti kascit', ityeke', 'atra vadanti' and 'ityapare'. We may notice them class by class.

1. The usage of the word 'pare'

While citing certain views, NBh, uses the word 'pare' in the form of 'iti pare' or 'pare tu....ahuh' or 'pare tu .... icchanti' or 'pare tu .... vadanti' and such views are generally acknowledged to be representing his individual opinion. Vaidyanatha Pâyagunđe, a disciple of NBh, says that, NBh would cite with the statement 'pare tu' the view which he follows whole heartedly. Thieme also has got the same opinion. Sîtarâma Śâstri in his introduction to the edition of Br. Šab. Šekh says

2. Vide Par Sekh with the commentary 'Gadā' p.9 - "ata evaitavadamsasyaduṣṭatvena tatrārucisūcanāya kecit ityuktam. Anyathaitadanyasya granthasya siddhântatvena paretvitvayuktam." 

3. Vide S.K. Belvalker felicitation Volume, p.127 - "His final view, his siddhânta he would introduce by 'pare tu', others (who are correct), which amounts with him, to bhāsyataṭtavidas, those who know the true meaning of the bhāsyā."
that NBh uses the word pare or vastutah to introduce his individual views. The internal evidence in his work also leads one to this conclusion. This is most obvious in Par. Sekh where the views, cited in Udy and which from the explanatory part of the commentary are undoubtedly understood to be his, are given within the statement 'pare tu...ahuh' in relation to different views on the score. For instance the passage in the bhasya under the rule "didhiveditatam" (1-1-6) "ardhadhatukasyed valadeh ity atra id ityanuvartamane punaridgrahanasya prayojanam ideva yathā syād, yad anyat prapnoti tan mā bhūd iti. Kiṇcanyat prapnoti? gunah; by which he refutes the word it in the rule "didhiveditatam" (1-1-6) is established as the assertion of siddhāntyekadesin by NBh in the Udy and this view is given within the phrase pare tu in Par. Sekh. In short, instances are many which support the conclusion that the views cited by NBh with the word pare are representative of his individual opinion.

5. Vide Par. Sekh p.33.
The careful examination of his work however, shows that there are also instances to contradict this general conclusion. We are forced to believe that rarely NBh uses the word pare to introduce views of others or views which he does not support wholeheartedly. A few examples will suffice to prove this. Under the Sivasūtra "hayavarat" Pat asks the question why the letter 'h' alone is mentioned twice, in the Sivasūtras. He enquires whether the enunciation of the same, either in the rule 'hayavarat' or in the rule 'hal' alone will suffice. His words are "sarve varnāh sakrd upadistāh, ayam hakāro dvirupadisyate. pūrvaścaiva paraśca. yadi punah pūrva evopadisyeta para eva va kascātra vīṣeṣah?" Here commenting on the portion "yadi pūrva eva upadisyeta" NBh raises an objection. If as said in this passage, the letter 'h' is mentioned in the rule "hayavarat" alone and not a second time, there is no need of the Sivasūtra 'hal' and this implies that the anubandha in it is also unnecessary. As such how can

Pat speak of *tantranirdeśa*, of the rule "halantyam" (1-3-3) by which the 'l' of the rule 'hal' gets the designation if it and thus avoid the defect of interdependence? In answer to this doubt, two different interpretations of the said passage are given at a stretch and then with the expression pare tu ..... āuhu an altogether different interpretation of the said passage is given. Here there is no reason to doubt the first two explanations are not of NBh since the question is raised by himself and the answer that follows immediately can in no way be explained as of others without any indication like 'āuhu', 'kecit', 'anye', etc. to that effect. Hence the first two assertions in answer to the question being taken to represent the view of NBh, the third explanation given within the expression 'pare tu ..... āuhu' cannot be his, but only be of others.

Under the rule "adyantavadekasmin" (1-1-20) NBh cites a view explaining the passage in the *Mbh* beginning with the lines 'atrapyarthena yukto vyapadesah padam nāmārthaḥ rū nāmārthaḥ yathā tarhi ....." and

ending with the line "ādyantavadbhāvaśca śakyo'vaktum". This view cited with the expression pare tu āhuḥ refutes the explanation given by Kṛ to the said passage and can be treated as his individual opinion, since he repeats the same in Par.Śekh to refute the view of Kṛ. Then he gives with the statement vastutastu iti tatvam, an explanation to the passage 'yathā tarhi ... avaktum', in a particular manner by which the explanation formerly given with the wording pare tu āhuḥ is refuted. Hence it can be said that though there are ample instances to draw the conclusion that the views cited with the introductory or final word pare represent his opinion, there are also certain rare instances which contradict the above conclusion. In his commentary on Rasagāndhāra while commenting on the words of Jagannātha, on the distinction between the figures of speech, parināma and rūpaka, NBh gives a view with the beginning vayam tu brūmaḥ and then gives a slightly different view.

9. Vide Par Sekh p.52.
10. Mbh p.128.
within the wording pare tu āhuh. Here it is clear that the word pare does not represent his view. However, as it is clear that in almost all instances he uses the word pare to cite his individual opinion, the views in Udy cited as such are treated here to be his own and dealt with in the following chapter since here we are mainly concerned with the views of others, cited by NBh.

2. The usage of the word 'anye'

NBh's usage of the word anye in the form ityanye or anye tu āhuh is quite interesting and at the same time confusing. It is said interesting in the sense that the usage of the word anye carries a significance. It is baffling in the sense that one cannot arrive at a definite conclusion as to the identity of the author of the view, whether he refers to himself or others. It can be said that he uses the word 'anye' to cite the views of others. Under the Śivasūtra 'lān' dealing with the bhasya passage "evam tarhi sāmarthyat pūrvena na pareṇa", NBh raises an objection and answers the same.

After that he gives two different views on this point, each with the final wording ityanye. Here there is no doubt that the word anye refers to others. Again under the rule ityanye NBh indicates his disagreement with the assertion of Kt and then cites a view with the expression ityanye which supports the view of Kt. Besides, while commenting on Kt, in instances where a view is given in Prdp with the statement anye tu ahuh NBh points out that Kt uses the word anye to point out that he entertains difference of opinion or disagreement with the view cited as such and NBh makes clear that point of disagreement. Hence the word anye used by a person who explains the usage of the word anye as expressive of some dissent with the view cited as such can ordinarily be taken in the same sense and hence that view cannot be taken as that of NBh. Again in certain instances he explains Kt and then gives a different opinion, with the ending ityanye. All those facts lead one to the conclusion that the views cited with the word anye to be not of NBh. But in certain instances NBh uses the word anye to cite a view which it is hardly acceptable as the view of others.

14. Udy pp. 5 & 19
For example in the first āhnikā of NBh, under the passage "nanu coktam śūtre vyākākarane saṣṭhyartho'nu-pabanna iti. naisa dosah vyapadesivadbhāvenāpyetad siddham," NBh cites a view with regard to vyapadesi-vadbhāva with the wording ityanye. The same view is given in Udy while explaining the passage "ādyanta-vadbhāvaśca sākyo'vaktum", under the rule "ādyantavadekasmin" (1-1-20). The noteworthy factor is that here the view is stated as 'vastutah .... iti tattvam' which is characteristic of the citation of the view of NBh himself. Thus the word anye used in the first āhnikā, referred to just previously cannot be treated as that of others. Again in the first āhnikā, under the passage "atha gaurityatra kaśśabdah" a view is given in accordance with the Yogasūtrabhāṣya of Pat and NBh designates the same as the view of anye and then says that he has dealt with this view in another work of his namely Mañjūśā and in that work this view is seen as the one favoured by NBh. Thus it is seen that the usage of the word anye by NBh is confusing in the sense that it does not clearly indicate whether views cited are of himself or of others.

It may also be noted that the expression anye tu āhuḥ is significant when NBh uses the same in certain instances. He uses this expression to cite views which though not his original, are favoured by him in regard to the view of Kt. He uses the expression when he differs with Kt and implies by this usage that it cuts both ends. Probably that is why he does not designate such views as that of pare. Under the Sivasūtra 'hayavaṛat' while discussing the reason for the non-inclusion of anubandhas in pratyāhāras Pat says 'lopaḥ khalvapi tāvat bhavati'. Under this passage, NBh points out as his own view the fact that the vowel 'a' in the rule lan is not an anubandha. The same view is given with the statement anye tu āhuḥ under the passage 'lakārasya laparatvam vakṣyāmi'. Here he points out that as there are arguments to consider that a is an anubandha, so also there are arguments to negate the same. Again, in the first āhṇika under the passage 'sakyam cānena svamāṁśādibhirapi ksut pratiḥantum'
NBh refutes the explanation given by Kt with regard to the usage 'śakyam ksut pratihantum'. He says that the view entertained by Kt here is refuted by him in the Udy, under the rule "svādumi ṇamul" (3-4-26).

When we turn our attention to this assertion under the said rule we find that the view is given within the frame 'anye tu āhuh'. Hence it seems that NBh uses the word anye to cite views which though they are not his original views, are preferred by him to that of Kt.

3. The usage of the expression 'ityāhuh' 

According to the traditional interpretation the usage of the word āhuh after stating a fact or view is treated as indicative of some dissent with the person with regard to the assertion used with the word āhuh.

The usage of the word āhuh by NBh also is interpreted as conveying his aruci. Commenting on the word 'gonikāputrah' used by Pat while dealing with the rule "akathitam ca" (1-4-51) NBh says, gonikāputra ākara ityāhuh 19a.

18. Vide Udy p.31
Yudhishthira Mimamsaka says that the usage of āhuh here by NBh shows that he does not favour that view.20 Again it can be seen that many views cited as such are expressive of his dissent, which is made clear on the foregoing pages.21 Hence it can be accepted that the views, cited as such cannot be of NBh's individual opinion, but of others. But it is to be noted that all the views cited with āhuh are not expressive of his dissent. There we have to find a reason why NBh, uses the word āhuh there. Probably it is because of the fact that they are not merely his individual view but are accepted by certain others also. Hence the verb āhuh in such instances can be supplied with the agent bhasyata tvavidah. Rudradharajha Sarma supplies this word to āhuh used by NBh in certain instances.22 All these are dealt with in the following passages.23

4. The usage of the word 'kecit'

Thieme is of opinion that the word 'kecit' used by NBh always refers to certain scholars whose

20. op. cit, p.165.
21. Vide Infra pp.234-276
22. Vide Mbh (with the commentary Tattvāloka) p.
23. Vide Infra pp.234-276
opinion NBh does not accept because it contains assumptions that are without the support of or even against the bhasya\textsuperscript{24}. The internal examination of Udy presents instances to support this view. In the rule 'na dhatulopa ārdhadhātuke' (1-1-4), under the passage in the bhasya "athāpi kathañcid anavakāsō luk syād. Evam api na doṣaḥ", NBh gives a view with the ending ity āhuh and the same view is elaborated under the rule "sthānivad ādeśo'nalvidhau" (1-1-56) by himself with the statement iti kecit\textsuperscript{25}. Here it is clear that kecit does not refer to NBh himself.

Pāyagunde notes that there is a difference of opinion with regard to the usage of the word kecit by NBh. In his commentary on the paribhāsā sannipātalaksano vidhī-animittam tadvighātasya" in Par.Śekh, Pāyagunde says that some take the word kecit used by NBh while explaining the said maxim, to be of the views of others with which NBh, entertains difference of opinion-while others take the word as amounting to bhaṣyatātvavidāh\textsuperscript{26}.

\textsuperscript{24} Vide S.K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume, p.127.
\textsuperscript{25} Udy pp. 135 & 291.
\textsuperscript{26} Vide Par.Śekh with the commentary gadā' p.179.
But it is noteworthy that the word kecit that occurs first in Par. Sekh though explained as bhasyaatvatvavidah by Pāyagunde, he himself says that NBh indicates his dissent with the view by citing the same with the word kecit instead of the word pare.27

5. The usage of the words 'eke', 'kaścit', 'apare', etc.

There can be no difference of opinion with regard to the usage of the words eke and kaścit as referring to the views of others and this is made clear in the following pages.28 The usage of the word apare seem to represent the expression pare. The expression atra vadanti can be treated as referring to the view of others.29

27. Vide Par. Sekh with the commentary 'gadā', pp. 477.
29. The expressions 'na ca........vācyam' 'namu....itiōem' etc. used by NBh for anticipating objections on the assertions of Pat and Kt is taken by some scholars to indicate the citation of the view of others. For instance T. Chandraśekharan in his introduction to the Mbh edited with the commentary Mahabhāṣyapradipoddyotana of Annambhatta points out that in the statement in Udy (p. 13) 'na ca vanamiti samoohabhiprayam tat', NBh is referring to the view of Annambhatta which he refutes subsequently.
Cited views

On the passages in the bhasya

1. "śabdānusāsanaṁ nāma śastraṁ adhikrtam veditavyam"

Elucidating the idea of his sentence 'atha śabdānusāsanaṁ' Pat says śabdānusāsanaṁ nāma śastraṁ adhikrtam veditavyam." Here NBh finds the necessity for the supply of a word to the part adhikrtam and hence inserts the word kartavyatvena in the sentence which thereby means, the science, by name śabdānusāsana, on account of its being to be composed, has been begun. Thus after expressing his opinion he cites another view on the same point as 'vivaranaṅkaṅratvād vyākhyatavyatveneti sesa ucita ity anye'. The word inserted between śastraṁ and adhikrtam is vyākhyatavyatvena meaning 'to be interpreted.' The sentence means, the science by name śabdānusāsana being to be interpreted, has been begun. This seems to be more acceptable since Pat is beginning his work, which is descriptive in nature, with the
The injunction 'brahmāṇena nīśkarāṇo dharmo sadaṅgo 
vedo'dhyeyo jñeyaśca.'

Pat quotes the said Vedic passage as the authority ordaining the study of Vyākaraṇa. Kṣ says that this points out the fact that the study of Vyākaraṇa, which is the important one among the six Vedāṅgas is a nityakarman. NBh says that the study of Vyākaraṇa is a nityakarman as well as a kāmyakarman since the same involves benefit. Then he cites a view with the ending iti kascit. Since there is the word brahmāṇena in this sentence, it is to be understood that to the Kṣatriyas and Vaisyas the study of Vyākaraṇa is only a kāmyakarman and it is a nityakarman only in regard to

30. Mbh p. 16.
to Brahmins. Vaidyanātha Payagunde says that this view cited by NBh, as iti kascit, is that of one Ratnakṛt. This person seems to be the author of a commentary or work by name Ratna. Rudradhārajahā Sarma says that by citing this view with ending iti kascit NBh expresses the fact he does not favour this view. Again in the said passage Veda is spoken of as dharma and to this assertion he gives an explanation with the ending ityāhuh. Vedas are the object of a study which, being to be secured by man by means of effort, is treated as dharma and hence the word dharma is used in a secondary sense to denote the Vedas. This explanation given with the ending ityāhuh shows that NBh uses the word āhuh to cite view which he favours though they are not his original views.


31. Vide Chāyā p. 18.
32. Vide Mbh with Tatvāloka, p. 15
33. Mbh pp. 63-64.
in the above passage a question in regard to the idea of the vārttika. "Is here mentioned the inclusion of \( \tilde{a} \) by \( a \) as the purpose of the actual utterance of the letter \( a \) as vivrta or is it here advised the mention of \( a \) as vivrta instead of the usual samvrta mention which is actually made there (in the rule 'aiun')?"

Elucidating the idea of this passage Kt says that the doubt is with regard to whether sūtrakāra has already taught the \( a \) in the rule as vivrta and Kāt is pointing its purpose the comprehension of \( \tilde{a} \) by \( a \), or whether Kāt is stressing the necessity of the vivrtopadesa of \( a \) which is taught as samvrta in the rule. Here commenting on the word sūtrakāra used by Kt, NBh, says there is a view, which he quotes with the ending ityahuh that the word sūtrakāra refers to Siva or Vedapurusa.

At the end of the discussion on the idea of the said vārttika Pat says that it makes no difference in saying that Kāt is stressing the necessity of the vivrtopadesa of \( a \), in the rule, read as samvrta, or is pointing out the benefit of the vivrtopadesa of \( a \) in 'aiun' instead of samvrta, since in both cases the purpose to be served is the comprehension of \( \tilde{a} \) by \( a \), and the
former statement arises out of imprudence. Here NBh remarks with the expression ityāhuḥ that of these two views, the view admitting the mention of the purpose of Vivṛtopadesa is more favourable and acceptable since to question or order anything in regard to fourteen rules which are treated as non-made by human beings, shows imprudence on one's part. Thus in the said two instances NBh points that there is the view assigning the authorship of the fourteen rules to Śiva or Vedapurusa. This idea he states with the expression ityāhuḥ. However he repeats the same idea without the statement ityāhuḥ at the end of the bhāṣya under the Śivasūtra. "Iān" Pat says "tajñāpayatyācāryah bhavatyesā paribhāṣa..." Here NBh points out that the word ācārya refers to Śiva. In these instances the rules referred to are the fourteen Śivasūtras. Hence it can be seen that NBh uses the word ityāhuḥ to cite views which he favours. In such instances it may be pointed out that the full fledged expression of ityāhuḥ may be 'iti siddhāntavidād āhuḥ'.

34. Udy p.100.
4. "yad ayam kṣubhnādiṣu nrnamanaśabdam pathati"

In this passage in the bhasya under the Śivasūtras "eōn" and "ailauc", Pat says that the grouping of the word nrnamana among those headed by kṣubhna, indicates the fact that the letter n following r will be substituted by n. NBh supplies the word samjñābhūtam as an adjective to the word nrnamanaśabdam in the sentence.

According to him, it is the grouping of the samjñāsabda nrnamana, under kṣubhnādi that indicates the said fact. It is as follows. The effort to ensure the prohibition of natva in the word nrnamana shows the contingency of the same otherwise. That contingency cannot be on the strength of the rule "ātkupvānumvyavāyepi" (6-4-2) since nrnamana is not a samānapada i.e, a word that is not split. Hence to point out the contingency one has to resort to the rule "pūrvapadātāmsamjñāayām agah" (8-4-3) which alone prescribes natva to n in a sakhandapada i.e, split word. However the rule will operate only when the sakhanda śabda is a samjñāsabda. Hence NBh says

35. Mbh p.85.
that there is the contingency of natva by the said rule on the n of nṛnāmanā which is a samjñāsabda, but for the factor that there is no nīmitta namely r or s in it. Even then the effort namely grouping of the samjñāsabda nṛnāmanā under ksūbhānādi is made to ensure the prohibition of natva. This shows that the letter r also is a nīmitta for natva. Hence all other conditions being perfect the rule "purvapadāt samjñāyam agah" (8-4-3) may change the n in nṛnāmanā to n and to avoid the same, nṛnāmanā which is a samjñāsabda is grouped under ksūbhānādi. NBh here cites a view which tries to explain the indication pointed out in the bhasya, by saying that there is no contingency of natva in nṛnāmanā even by the rule "cchandasyrdavagrahat" (8-4-26) which enjoins the substitution by n of n followed by r.

This is because there is no avagraha in the word nṛnāmanā and the rule provides natva to n followed by r only in instances where there is avagraha. Thus at a stage when there is no contingency of the substitution by n of n in nṛnāmanā, the effort of Pan to ensure its prohibition indicates that n followed by r is substituted by n.

It seems however that NBh does not favour this view. The point of disagreement is that the rule
"cchandasayrdavagrahat" (8-4-26) deals with Vedic words alone and so irrespective of the perfection of other conditions, the rule cannot apply in nrnamana which is a non-vedic word. So an indication with regard to an operation in non-Vedic words on the strength of the non-contingency of a rule which does not bring under its scope non-Vedic words does not appear quite satisfactory. Probably it is to point this sense of dissent that NBh uses the word ityāhuh after citing this view.

5. "Evaṁ tarhi sāmarthyat pūrvena, na pareṇa yadi pareṇa syād angrahanam anarthakam syād, uraj rapara ityeva bruṭṭat.

Under the Sivasūtra "ian" Pat discusses the question whether the pratyāhāra an in the rule "uran raparah" (1-1-51), which enjoins raparatva to an that replace r is coined with the n of the rule aiun or with the n of the rule "ian". After certain queries and answers on the point, Pat concludes in the quoted passage that an in the said rule is joined with n of the Sivasūtra "aiun". His words are "If so, by sāmarthya, it is with..."
the former and not with the latter (n). Had it been with the latter, the reading of an would be of no avail since he would have read uraj raparah. Pat's argument is that, if Pan intended to give raparatva to other letters also in addition to a \( \grave{a} \) and u that replace r, he would have read the rule as uraj raparah, since vowels alone and not the consonants v, r, and l, additionally comprehended by the pratyahāra an coined with the latter n, are to replace r or l in instance like mātrnám.

Here NBh cites an instance gaml+ā and raises the objection that here there is the consonant l (comprehended by the pratyahāra an) that replace l on the strength of the rule "iko yanaci" (6-1-77) and how can Pat speak of vowels alone as letters that replace r or l? NBh himself gives the solution that the rule "uran raparah" will not operate in the instance gaml+ā. This is because it can be shown that the raparatva ordained to the consonant r that replaces r has no standing effect. For example in the instance karthr+artham the consonant r, that replaces r by the rule "iko yanaci" were to
become rapara, there will develop two r sounds as karthrr artham and one of them will be elided, permanently, by the rule "ro ri" (8-3-14). Thus the raparatva taught to a consonant r comprehended by the pratyahāra an formed with the latter n being futile, the rule does not accord raparatva to the consonant that replace l which is a sahacarita of r.

NBh here points out that some others give a different solution to this problem. They opine that even if l becomes lapara one of them will be dropped by the rule "ro ri" (8-3-14) itself since r and l are having samanāsruti. Here it is to be noted that NBh does never accept the pratyahāra ra in which case only rapara can be interpreted as lapara also. Hence this view cited with the ending ity anye is definitely a view held by other scholars.

Again NBh cites a view with the ending ity anye, which gives another solution to their problem. On the authority of the bhāṣya that ac alone is contingent to replace r where by the rule need be only "uraj raprah"; we must accept, the anabhidhana of instances
like gamlā where 1 is substituted by 1 by virtue of the
rule "iko yanaci" (6-1-77).

6. "tad etad atyantam samdīghdam vartate acaryanām
vibhāsanuvartate naveti \textsuperscript{37}

Under the Sivasūtra "hayavarat" Pat discusses
the question whether the rule "halo yamām yami lopah"
(8-4-64) that prescribes elision, is optional or
uniformal. When it is pointed out that the prohibition
of doubling by the rule "śaro'ci" (8-4-49) is an
indication to the fact that there is the anuvṛtti of
the word vibhāsa in the said rule, Pat explains that
it can be equally shown that the prohibition of doubling
is an indication that the rules "halo yamām yami lopah"\textsuperscript{(8-4-64)}
and "jharo jhari savarne" (8-4-65) enjoin elision uniformly
and not optionally. He therefore concludes "tad etad...
naveti" meaning, "In short it remains extremely
doubtful whether according to the sūtrakāra the word
vibhāsa is got by anuvṛtti (in the said two rules i.e,
8-4-64 & 65)." Commenting on this Kt says that this
assertion of Pat shows that the optional operation of
the rules by the anuvṛtti of the word vibhāsa cannot be

\textsuperscript{37} Mbh p.97.
accepted on the basis of any indication i.e., jñāpaka.
But the optional operation of the rules are accepted
on the basis of the assertion of acārya Patañjali under
the rule "nājjhalau" (1-1-10) where he says "vibhasā sa
lopah" which means that elision (enjoined by the rule
"jharo jhari savarne") is optional.

Here NBh says that a certain scholar (kascit)
maintains that the optional function of the said rules
is accepted also on the basis of an indication namely
the word an in the rule "anudit savarnasya capratyayah"
(1-1-69). In the instance of combination of sam+yantā
the m is replaced by nasal y which is a cognate form
of y, on the strength of the rule "anusvarasya yayi
parasavarnah" (8-4-58). In the resultant form sayyantā
the nasal y gets doubling since it is treated as yar
considering that it is comprehended by y which is an an
and to which the power of comprehending cognates is
given by the word an in the rule "anudit savarnasya capra-
tyayah" (1-1-69). If the rule "jharo jhari savarpe"
enjoins elision uniformly, the doubling of the nasal
y being treated as becomes futile since one of them
will be elided and correspondingly the word an, in the rule "anudit savarnasya capratyayah" (1-1-69) which gave the power of comprehending cognates, to \( y \) by which the nasal \( y \) is treated as \( yar \), becomes superfluous. Hence it is indicated that the rule "jharo jhari savarne" (8-4-65) enjoins elision optionally and the doubling survives optionally and to achieve the same, the word an in the rule "anudit savarnasya capratyayah" (1-1-69) becomes significant.

Thus NBh says that a certain scholar maintains that the word an of the rule "anudit savarnasya capratyayah" (1-1-69) is an indication to the optional function of the rules 8-4-64 & 65.

NBh however adds that Kt does not resort to this indication by the word an of the rule "anudit savarnasya capratyayah" (1-1-69) since the word an by there has been dispensed with Kat38.

38. Mbh p.373.
7. "yam vidhim pratyupades'o'arthakah sa vidhir
bāḍhyate yasya tu vidher nīmittameva nāsau bāḍhyate"

One among the three purposes cited by Kāt of the word ikāh in the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) is the prevention of the substitution by guna of the dipthongs in instances like glāyati here the ai of the root glai is, otherwise, contingent to be replaced by guna on the strength of the rule "sārvadhātukārdhā-
dhātukayoh" (7-3-84). Pat refutes this purpose by resorting to the upadesasāmarthya of ai in glai. If the root glai were to become gle by the substitution by guna, Pan could have read the root as gle itself. The objector resorts that if upadesasāmarthya be resorted to, nothing can replace the ai of glai on the said score. Hence it would not undergo substitution by āy in the instance. To this Pat gives the above reply, "This objection cannot stand, for the vrddhi in respect of which upadesa is of no use, is warded off, and that in respect of which it is only nīmitta, is not warded off. In respect of āy etc. it (the ai of glai) is only nīmitta". Pat means that the

substitute ay has got ai only as its sthanin. That is why it replaces the ai of the root glai. But guna however can be warded off by the ekaroccaranasāmarthya in the root glai.

Here NBh cites a view (with the ending ityāhuh) which raises an objection to the assertion of Pat and wards off the same. The objection is thus:- There is the pmatipadika rai. If this be added with the suffix kvip taught in the sense ācara, it will become a root by the rule "sanādyantā dhātavah" (3.1.32). In the instance rayati derived from this root, there is the contingency of the ai of root rai, being replaced by guna. Here the ekaroccaraṇasāmarthya cannot be resorted to since the ai in rai has got other purposes to serve, when the same is treated as a base. Hence the word ikah is necessary to avoid the dipthong from being substituted by guna. Thus the objection is as to how can the ekaroccaraṇasāmarthya be resorted to. The answer is that though the argument is correct, Pat's statement stands unrefuted. This is because on the authority of the statement that iggrahana is not necessary to ward off the substitution by guna of dipthongs, and the aikāropadesa is of no use with regard to glai if the
diphthong were to be substituted by guna, the usages of forms derived by the addition of kvip taught in the sense of acara to bases ending in diphthongs are not to be accepted on the score namely anabhidhana. And in the absence of an instance like rayati the word ikah is not necessary in the rule "iko gunavrddhi" to ward off guna replacing ai in rai. This view given with the ending ityahuh cannot be interpreted as showing any dissent from the point of view of NBh since NBh himself in many instance resorts to anabhidhana to justify Pat. Hence it seems that this ahuh may be supplied the agent bhasyatatvavidah.

8. "ksipraksudrayor api yanadiparam guna itiyata siddham so'yam evam siddhe yat purvagraham karoti tasyaitad prayojanam, iko yathā syād aniko ma bhūditi.\textsuperscript{40}

Under the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) Pat discusses the question whether this rule and the rule "alo'ntasya" (1-1-52) have the relationship of

\textsuperscript{40} Mbh p.124.
I sesasesitva. In this case, guna and vrddhi shall replace only the final letter of the anga and Kāt says that there is the necessity of the insertion of the word ikah in six rules among which the rule "sthuladūra-yuvahrasvakṣipraksudrānam yanadiparam pūrvasya ca gunah" (6-4-156) is the one so that the bases ksipra and ksudra shall be benefitted by way of the nonfinal i and u in them being substituted by guna. In the above quoted passage Pat says that there is no necessity of the insertion of the word ikah here. He says that in regard to ksipra and ksudra, since though the desired object is won by reading the word gunah after the word yanadiparam (i.e., sthūla......nām yanadiparam gunah), he reads the word pūrva, it has the prayojana that guna replaces ik and does not replace anik. The argument is that if only the final letter i.e., p is to be replaced by guna, Pan could have read the rule as "sthūla......nām yanadiparam gunah" so that the part ra (in ksipra and ksudra) which is yanādi can get elided and guna can replace the final letters p and d of that part ksip and ksud that survive. Here NBh cites a view with the ending ityāhuh that there is no room to doubt that if the rule

41. Mbh p.120:- "fṛddhigunāvaḥlontyasyeti cet midimṛjipu-gantalahūpadharccikṣipraksudresviggrahanam"
is read as pointed out above, in regard to the base hrasva mentioned in the rule, the part rasva which is which is yanadi is contingent to be elided. This is because in regard to the bases sthula dura etc. along with which hrasva is also mentioned, yan denotes the penultimate letter and hence it in the base hrasva also, we take by the word yan the penultimate v and so va alone being treated as yanadi, gets elided. Thus this view supports the assertion of Pat that the word pūrvasya is unnecessary and hence results in the bringing about the purpose of yanadiparam being treated as a pañnasamitapurusa compound where the part yanadi treated as a bahuvrihi compound denotes p and d so that the part beginning with the g same gets elided and the i and u previous to them gets substitution by guna. It seems here that NBh has here used the statement ahuh in the sense 'bhasyatātvavidah ahuh'.

9. "The scope of the maxim "yadāgamaś tadgunībhutās tadgrahanena grhyante"\]

Pat speaks, first, of the maxim 'yadāgamaś-tadgunībhutās tadgrahanena grhyante' under the rule "dadhāghvadāp" (1-1-20). NBh points out that this
maxim cannot be applied universally\(^{42}\). In certain circumstances, this maxim does not apply. This is because by prescribing the augment \(m\) (\(muk\)) to the letter \(a\), the component of the \(āṅga\), by the rule "\(āne muk\)"\(^{43}\), Pan shows that the \(m\) augmented with \(a\) shall not be treated as \(a\) on the basis of the maxim as otherwise the prescription of the augment \(m\) to \(a\) will be of no avail, since the same taken along with \(a\) will be coalesced into \(ā\) on account of being followed by the suffix \(āna\). Thus it can be seen that the application of maxim is not universal. Hence, NBh says, we get the form \(didiye\)\(^{43}\). There the maxim does not apply so that there is no contingency of \(ye\) (the augment \(y\) the suffix \(e\)) being treated as \(e\) which is an \(ac\), and thereby causing \(yan\) to replace the previous \(i\) by the rule "\(iko yanaci\)" (6-1-77).

NBh says that there is a view according to which, the fact that the maxim does not apply in all instances where letters are taken into consideration, is

\(^{42}\) Udy p.183.

\(^{43}\) \(didiye\) - Perfect first person singular of the root \(dīn\) with ātmanepada termination.
implied by the word *arthavad* used by Pat while citing the maxim, *arthavata āgamāstādgunībhuḥōrthavadgraḥanena grhyate*. This view cited by NBh with the remark *ityahuh* is expressive of his dissent with the same. It may be pointed out here that NBh does not admit the fact that the maxim does not apply in all instances where letters are taken into consideration. He accepts this much that on the basis of the prescription of the augment muk to *a* the maxim need be only universally non-applicable i.e., *anitya*. Hence the above view is cited by NBh with the statement *ahuh* which shows his dissent with the same.

10. "Tadvisēbhyastarhi prāpnoti"  

Under the rule "bahuganavatudati samkhyā" (1-1-23) Pat speaks of the maxim *krtrimākrtrimayoḥ krtrime karyasam-pratyayah*. He points out that if this maxim be accepted and thereby rules operate on *krtrima* alone among *krtrima* and *akrtrima*, the rule "nadīpaurnāmasyāgrahayānībhyyah" (5-4-110) will operate on *krtrima* *nadī* which is described

45. Mbh p. 193.
in the rule "yūstrākhyau nadi" (1-4-3) and not on the word nadi which means a river. When it is answered that it does not happen since the word nadi is read along with the words Paurnamāsi and āgrahāyanī it is pointed out "tadvīseṣebhyas tarhi prapnoti". The idea is that if the operation of the maxim krtrimākrtrimayoh krtrimocāryasampratayayah be not accepted, the word nadi may refer to the individual rivers like Ganga etc. and not to the word nadi. Here with the ending ityāhuh NBh says that the instances referred to by the word "tadvīseṣebhyah" in the passage, are parigāngam and pariyamunam which are avyayībhava compounds. Here the samāsānta suffix tac optionally operates on the strength of the rule "nadīpaurnamāsyāgrahāyanībhaya" (5-4-110) and these forms become antodātta by virtue of the suffix tac. In the absence of the operation of the suffix tac these forms are endowed with purvapadaprakṛtisvara by the rule "paripratyupāpā varjyamānāhoratrāvayavesu" (6-2-33). NBh does not seem to entertain any difference of opinion with this view and hence this āhuh may be supplied the word bhāsyatāttvavidah.
9. "lrántasya ityatra vakáropi nirdisyate, kim vakáro na śrūyate? luptanirdiṣto vakárah"

Under the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) the siddhāntyekadeśin says that in the process of formation of the word alavit during the stage a+lū+is+īt, the guna by the rule "sārvadhatukārdhadhatukayoh" shall operate on the u. The rule "sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" (1-2-1) shall not substitute u by vrddhi since guna that depends on sic alone is antarāṅga whereas vrddhi depending on sic and the parasmaipada termination is bahiraṅga and that antarāṅga rules prevail over bahiraṅga rules. As a result of the substitution of u by guna the form becomes a+lo+is+īt wherein o undergoes substitution by av and in the resultant stage a+lav+is+īt, the rule "ato lrántasya" (7-2-2) will provide substitution by vrddhi i.e., ṛ of a. This is because he says that in the rule "ato lrántasya" (7-2-2), ṛ is added before 1 and it is not heard owing to

46. Mbh p. 128.

47. alavit - Aorist third person singular of the root lū a+lū+is+īt;
     a = adāgama, lū = the root, is = sic prefixed with idāgama, ēt = the parasmaipada termination with idāgama.
its elision caused by rule "lopo vyor vali" (6-1-66).
Thus he is opinion that the rule "ato lāntasya" (7-2-2)
provides the substitution by vrddhi to āṅgas ending
in l r and v.

NBh here introduces a doubt. The rule
"ato lāntasya" by the addition of the letter v to it,
shall teach that the āṅgas ending in r or l or v that
are in the vicinity of ā is substituted by vrddhi.
In this case the root sav also, during the process of
formation of the aorist form asavīt from it, i.e., in
the stage asav+is+īt the vowel a of the root sav is liable
to undergo substitution by vrddhi permanently whereas
the optional substitution by vrddhi on the strength of
the rule "ato halāder laghoh" (7-2-7) is desirable on a.

Here an answer to this doubt is given by
NBh with the ending ityahuh. The assertion, that the
rule "sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" (7-2-1) does not
operate first as it is bahiranga whereas guna is antaraṅga
is that of ekadeśīn. Hence the statement of vakāraprasleśa
in the rule "ato lāntasya" coming from his mouth, can
be treated as one that does not pay heed to the root
sav.
NBh continues that others (anye) give a different answer to this question. On the authority of the bhāṣya passage which speaks of vakārapraslesa in the rule, it is to be accepted that the root sāv originally possessed the form sāp. Since p and v are having samanāsruti the root is being heard as sāv in its usages. The root, hence, can be seen as not ending in v and so there is no problem of substitution by vrddhi in the view that there is the vakārapraslesa in the rule "ato lāntasya".

10. "Naiva saṃdhyāksaram antyam asti" 48

Under the rule "iko guna vrddhi" (1-1-3) Pat says that, though the rule "sici vrddhiḥ parasmaipadesu" (7-2-1) in the absence of the supply of the word ikah by the rule "iko guna vrddhi", enjoin vrddhi as the substitute of any letter located at the end of an āṅga followed by sic, a dipthong is never contingent to be replaced by vrddhi since there is no instance having a dipthong

at the end of the aṅga, ("naiva sandhyaksaram antyam asi").

Kt cites an instance agāvit the aorist first person singular of the root 'go' and anticipates the contingency of the dipthong o being substituted by vrddhi. The prātipadika 'go' when added with the suffix kvip in the sense of acara on the strength of the vārttika 'sarvapra- tipadikebyāh kvib vā vaktavyah' becomes a root by the rule "sanādyanta dhatavah" (3-1-32). During the process of formation of the aorist third person singular form from this root, we arrive at a stage a+go+is+it and here the aṅga a+go can be seen as ending in the dipthong o being followed by sic and that dipthong is contingent to be replaced by vrddhi.49. In answer to this doubt, Kt says that this contingency can be warded off by the anuvṛtti of the word dhatoh with the rule "sici vrddhih parasmaipadesu" (7-2-1). In the rule the word dhatoh can already be got by means of the suffix which can be added to a root alone. And so, the anuvṛtti of the same in this rule, from the rule "ṛta id dhatoh" (7-1-100) serves the purpose of conveying the idea that sic is to be followed by an aṅga which is an original root and not a nominal root (like go which being originally a base attain the status of root by the rule "sanādyanta dhatavah" (3-1-32). At the stage a+go+is+it go being thus not an

49. a+go+is+it a * adāgama, go = the root, is = sic prefixed with idāgama, it = the parasmaipada termination prefixed with idāgama.
aupadesikadhatu the diphthong o at its and is not liable to undergo vrddhi. So also in the aorist first person singular of the root kavi arrived at by the addition of kvip to the base kavi the rule "sici vrddhih parasmaipadesu" (7-2-1) does not operate on i in the stage a+kavi+i+s+it and so the resultant form is akavāyīt and not akavāyīt.

NBh here cites the view of Mādhava. Here he is of opinion that in the rule "sici vrddhih parasmaipadesu" there is the anuvṛtti of the word bahulam and by virtue of the same it can be said that the rule enjoins vrddhi to the last letter of all the roots accept the nominal roots ending in diphthongs. Thus according to him, the nominal root kavi, as it does not end in a diphthong can well undergo the substitution by vrddhi in the aorist form and the first person singular form is akavāyīt. However when kvip is added to bases like go, se etc., these nominal roots, when followed by sic shall not undergo the vrddhi enjoined by the rule "sici vrddhih parasmaipadesu" (7-1-1).

Refuting these views of Kt and Mādhava, NBh cites a view with the ending ityāhuh. As Pat gives stress on
the fact, that there is no dipthong which is the final
of an an̄ga and at the same time is liable to undergo vṛddhi
by the rule "sici vṛddhiḥ pāmasmaipadesu" (7-2-1), by
virtue of using the word eva in the statement "naiva
sandhyaksaram vyaṁjanam asti", it is better to accept
the anabhidhāna of the addition of kvip, in the sense of
ācāra, to bases ending with dipthongs whereby the assertion
of Pat becomes alright. Here it is to be noted that
though Kt and Madhava invent devices to point out that
vṛddhi won't operate on a dipthong at the end of a root,
they do not negate the existence of a root, ending with
dipthong and is followed by sic. What Pat says is
"naiva sandhyaksaram vyaṁjanam asti". It seems that
though NBh cites the last view with the ending ityāhuḥ he
prefers the same to the view of Kt and Madhava. Moreover
the non-addition of kvip in the sense of ācāra to bases
ending with dipthongs, is favoured by him on the authority
of Pat.

50. Vide Infra p. 485
On certain expressions

1. The word 'mantra'

While elucidating the verse 'dustah sadbah svarato varnato va...' quoted by Pat Kt narrates the story of Indra killing Vrtra. In order to procure a son who would kill Indra, the father of Vrtra performed a sacrifice and Kt says that the priests coined a mantra is the form of "Indrasatrur vardhasva". NBh points out that since the inferred words (uhita) cannot be called mantra, the word mantra used by Kt in opposition with 'Indrasatrur vardhasva' is to be understood in the sense of bodhaka. NBh quotes the sutra of Jaimini, namely "anamnatesvamantatvam" to support the fact that construed (uhita) words cannot be called mantra. Kt says that the expression 'Indrasatrur vardhasva' did not convey the desired sense on account of the adyudatta accent erroneously used in the place of antodatta accent. He says that however in the said expression there is no contingency of ekaśruti by the rule "yajñakarmaṇyajapanyun-khasāmasu" (1-2-34) as the expression is not originally

51. Prdp p.23
52. Udy p.24
a mantra but an inferred one.

NBh raises a doubt that if an inferred expression (ūhitasabda) cannot be called mantra, how can a sacrifice in which laukika sabdas are used can be fruitful and then gives the answer with the ending ityāhuh. On the strength of the statement 'prakṛtivad vikṛtih kartavyā' which sanctions uha in mantras, suryāya tvā justam nirvapāmi is inferred on the model of the mantra, agnīre tvā justam nirvapāmi' and the sacrifice performed with the utterance of this having the laukika sabda suryāya in it is considered as bringing the desired effect. Hence though uhitasabda are not mantras, yet they are fruitful on the strength of the very sanction of uha in mantras.

2. The verse by name bhrāja mentioned by Pat

While dealing with the accessory benefits accrued from the study of grammar, Pat refers to a certain verse, by name bhrāja which deprecate the value of the soma sacrifice. NBh points out that there is a view ascribing the authority of this verse to Kāt. He cites

53. Mbh p.27
this view with the ending ityāhuh. Yudhisthira Mīmāṃsakāṇa says that from this āhuh, it is understood that NBh does not favour this view.

3. The expression 'ayamaham vadet' in the verse

"avidvāmsah ...... vadet"

While dealing with the accessory benefits of the study of grammar, Pat quotes a stanza beginning with the word avidvāmsah. In that verse it is stated that a person who is ignorant of using the protraction of the vowel in the name of the pupil to whose salute he responds, is to be saluted by the pupil saying 'ayamaham' as in the case of saluting women. Here with the ending ityāhuh NBh gives a view with regard to the absence of gamāsa in the expression 'ayamaham vadet'. There is a rule "anukaranam cānītiparam" (1-4-62) which provides the designation gati to an anukarana when it is semantically connected with a kriyā and not followed by the word iti.

54. op. cit, p.382.

55. Mbh p.28.
Here the part ayamaham is the anukarana of the actual salutation in regard to women. Though not followed by itisabda it does not get the gatisanjna since the same is not connected with a kriya. The part ayamaham is semantically connected with verb vadet, but it cannot be compounded with vadet since vadet is a tinanta and the rule "kugatipradayah" (2-2-18) prescribes the samasa of a gati with a semantically connected sabda which however must not be a tinanta.

4. The word aksara in the Vedic passage 'yo va imam...

While dealing with the accessory benefits of the study of Vyakarana Pat refers to the Vedic passage "yo va imam padaah svarasah aksaraasaasca vacamividhati sa artvijino bhavati". Here commenting on the word aksaraaah Kt says that this word aksara means a vowel along with consonants. Thus the expression yeyajamahe can be described as possessed of five aksaras. NBh

56. MBh p. 30
says that in the opinion of others aksara denotes a single letter. The basis of this view is that in the varūttika 'varnam vāhuh pūrvasūtre' quoted by Pat at the end of the second āhnika it is stated that according to the grammatical rules of ancients, aksara means a varna i.e., a letter.

5. The expression "ucchrityānucchritya in the bhasya sakyaṃ cānena yatkiṃcideva kāstham uucchrityānucchritya va pasuranubandhum"\(^57\)

NBh gives the meaning of these two words as 'after chopping or without chopping'. He then says that according to certain others (anye), the said expression means after making it upright (in the earth) or otherwise. Of these two views, Amarnath favours the latter and establishes the same by giving quotations from Rg Veda, Rāmāyaṇa and Śrautaśūtra.\(^58\) P.S. Śāstrī also favours the latter view\(^59\). But K.V. Abhyankar resorts to the former.\(^60\)

57. Mbh p.52
60. Vide The Mahabhasya of Patanjali, edited by K.V. Abhyankar, Fasciculus I, p.33
6. The expression dharmaniyamah in the vārttika "siddhe śabdārthasambandhe..."

The compound word dharmaniyamah occurs in the first vārttika 'siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstrena dharmaniyamah kriyate wāthā laukikavaidikesu'. It is given three explanations by Pat as dharmāya niyamaḥ dharmaniyamah, dharmārtho va niyamaḥ dharmaniyamah, and dharmaprayojano va niyamaḥ dharmaniyamah.

After elucidating the explanation of Kt to this bhāṣya, NBh cites a different explanation given by certain scholars (Kecit ....... āhuh). According to them, the word dharma in the first explanation dharmāya niyamaḥ, denotes pratyavayaparīhārarūpadharma. The niyama or restriction that meaning is to be denoted by correct words alone, wards off pratyavāya that may occur otherwise i.e., when ideas are denoted by incorrect words. Thus dharmāya niyamaḥ means the said niyama is for dharma which is in the form of the removal of pratyavāya. In the second explanation dharmārtho va niyamaḥ dharmaniyamah, dharma means yajña. The said niyama is necessary for the performance of a yāga since an incorrect word used in the sense of the correct word can be designated as anrta and
the same has been prohibited in a yaga by the Vedic passage 'nanrtam vadet'. In the third explanation dharmaprayojano va niyamah dharmaniyanam, the word dharma means adrsta.

This is because in the Vedic passage 'ekah sabdah samyak jñatah susthu prayuktah svarge loke kāmadhuk bhavati'. it is pointed out that the usage of correct words bring forth merit. Therefore the interpretation dharmaprayojano va niyamah dharmaniyanam shows that the said niyama results in merit. Kt however takes the word dharma to denote adrsta in three interpretations uniformly.

7. The word 'eka' in the bhasya etadakam ācāryasya maṅgalārthanā mṛsyatam''

While discussing the criticism by which the samjñā and samjnīn in a sūtra can be specified, Pat says, "athavā purvoccaritah samjñī paroccarita samjñā which means 'Or else that which is mentioned formerly is samjnīn, the one mentioned subsequently (to the samjnīn) is the samjñā.

The rules "adēn guṇah" (1-1-2), halōnantarah samyogah (1-1-7) exemplify this assertion. But in the rule "vrddhirādaic" (1-1-1) which is a samjñāsūtra, the samjnīn namely ādaic is not given the former mention, but is mentioned

63. Nbh p.110.
in the contrary, as subsequent to the samjña. Therefore there arises the question "kañtham vrddhirādaic?" and Pat answers 'etad ekam ācāryasya maṅgalārtham mṛṣyatām' and concludes that "sarvatra vyākaraṇe pūrvo cāritā h samjñāparo cāritā samjña". Pat means that the former mention of the samjña namely vrddhi in the rule instead of its mention subsequently to the samjñin, serves the purpose of maṅgalācaraṇa for his work. In all the other samjñāsūtras samjñin is the one mentioned formerly.

With the ending ityāhuh NBh cites a view with regard to the significance of the word ekam in the said passage. The word ekam means first. Therefore the idea is this: The exception or change that we find for the first time in the rule "vrddhirādaic" in regard to the usual order of the mention of samjña and samjñin is to bring the benefit of maṅgalācaraṇa. This implies that in other samjñāsūtras too, if there be any change of usual order of the samjña and samjñin must have some purpose. For example in the rule "ārdhadhatukam sesah" (3-4-114) which is a rule defining the samjña ārdhadhatuka, the order of the mention of samjña and samjñin is reverted and this change of order has got a purpose to serve.
According to the usual conception, to secure the connection of two ideas as *uddesya* and *vidheya* (subject and predicate) in a sentence, the word denoting *uddesya* ought to be mentioned formerly and the word denoting the *vidheya* deserves to be mentioned latter. It is in order to point out the fact that, to secure the *anvaya* in *uddesya*/*vidheya* one need not necessarily mention the *uddesya* formerly and the *vidheya* later, that Pan has changed the order of *samjña* and *samjñaṁ* in rules like "*ardhadhatukam sesah*" (3-4-114) and *aprktā ekāl pratyayah* (1-2-41). In these rules the *uddesya* namely *sesah* and *ekāl pratyayah* are deliberately mentioned later to point out the above fact. However in the *śabdabodha* derived from these, *sesah* and *ekāl pratyayah* are *uddesya*. These rules mean *sesah* *ardhadhatukam* and *ekāl pratyayah* *aprktam*.

It is noteworthy here that to explain the exception to the usual order of *samjña* and *samjin* Kt resorts to treating the rule "*aprktā ekāl pratyayah*" (1-2-41) as a *paribhāṣāsūtra*. He does not say anything
with regard to the rule "ārdhadhatukam sesah". NBh however refutes this view of Kt and points out that this discrepancy cannot be accounted for by what has been stated by Kt. The view cited above, however explains the change of order in the said two sūtras and so this view, cited by NBh with the ending āuhu seems to be favoured by NBh. Most probably what NBh, means by āuhu may be siddhantavidah āuhu.

8. The form '(he) picavya' doubted by Kt as being contingent to undergo substitution by guna in regard to the i that follows p in it.

Kat says that if the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) enjoins guna to all the ik whether it be the final element of the āṅga or not, the guna enjoined by the rules "jasi ca" (7-3-85) "sārvadhatukārdhadhatukayoh" (7-3-84) "hrasvasya gunah" (7-3-108) "jasi ca" (7-3-109) "rto nisarvanamasthānayoh" (7-3-110) "gheckiti" (7-3-111) and "orgunah" (6-4-146)

66. Vide Mbh p. 122, "evamapayam jasi guno'niyatah so'nantya- syāpi prāpnoti".
ought to be prohibited from replacing the ik that is not final. Pat points out that though by resorting to niyama in a two-fold manner i.e., 'pugantalaghūpadhasyaiva sārvadhatukārdhadhatukayoh gunah; sārvadhatukārdhadhatukayor eva pugantalaghūpadhasya gunah', the contingency of guna by the rules "sārvadhatukārdhadhatukayoh", "harasvasya gunah", etc., can be averted from replacing the ik that is not final, the guna by the rule "jusi ca" is contingent to replace the non-final ik in instances like anenijuh paryavevisuh. Here Kt adds that there is the contingency of guna in spite of the two-fold niyama also in instances like (he) picavya buddhe and buddhayah where the rules "orgunah", "hrasvasya gunah", "jasi ca" \(^{7-3-109}\) that enjoin guna, may operate on the non-final ik in the bases picu and buddhi. The niyama relating to laghūpadha āṅgas in both ways cannot restrict guna here since picu and buddhi are non-laghūpadha āṅgas. NBh explains this statement of Kt. (He) picavya is the vocative case of the base picavya which is derived by the addition of the suffix yat to the stem picu by the rule "ugavādibhyo yat" \(^{5-1-2}\). Here the contingency of guna pointed out by Kt can be explained only when the rule is treated as enjoining guna to the ik which is a component of the āṅga...
ending with \(u\). After thus elucidating the view of Kt, NBh points out that there is a view (ityahuh) which doubts the contingency of the operation of the rule "orgunah" (6-4-146) narrated by Kt in the instance (he)picavya. Before speaking of the niyama Pat has stated that "orgunah" (6-4-146) is contingent on the non-final \(i\)k in the instance sausrutah. Here it may be noted that the \(anga\) in sausrutah is sausrut that ends in \(t\) and not in \(u\) and since Pat stated there is the contingency of the operation of the rule "orgunah" here, the rule cannot be interpreted as enjoining \(guna\) of an \(anga\) ending with \(u\). But to suit the said bhasya the rule is to be interpreted as enjoining \(guna\) to the \(ik\) namely \(u\) of the \(anga\). As such, there is no contingency of \(guna\) on the \(i\) of the instance picavya. The statement of Kt in regard to picavya, therefore requires reconsideration.

NBh however rescues Kt, pointing out that in certain copies of Kt's work, the instance (he) picavya is not mentioned and so Kt has not made this assertion.

9. The word pradhanani used by Kt in the sentence "pradhānānāi atmasamśkārāya sannidhiyamanāni guṇabhedam prayuñjate\(^{67}\).

Under the rule 'kñiti ca' (1-1-5) Pat offers many suggestions to refute the view that the word nimitta is

to be inserted in the rule so as to bring the penultimate *ik* under the prohibition of *guna*, prescribed by the rule. One among them is "*athavā yad ētasmin yogā kūnidgrahānāṃ kriyate tad anavakāsam. Tāsyānavakāsatvād guno na bhaviṣyati." Kt says that this passage offers a solution to bring the penultimate *ik* under the prohibition of *guna*, in accordance with the maxim 'yathoddēṣam samjñāparibhāsām' and points out 'yathoddeśe pradhānāni ātmasamskārāyā sannidhiyānānāni gunabhedam prayunjate'.

Here NBh says that there is a view (ityāhuh) that by using here the word *pradhāna* to refer to the *vidhisūtras*, Kt is implying the reason to account the fact that the rule enjoining prohibition get attached to each and every *vidhisūtra* that enjoin *guna*.

10. The forms (he) *asukā* and *asuka* derived from the base *adas*.

Under the rule "*adaso māt*" (1-1-12) Pat refutes the view that the rule is framed to produce the single benefit namely the prohibition of *nasalaization of ā* and *u* in the instance *ami* and *amū* by means of providing the same with the designation *pragrhyā* and establishes that

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68. Udy p.139.
the rule has more purposes to serve. He says

"naikam prayojanam yogārāmbham prayojayati. yadyetāva:
prayojanam syāt tatraiva yam bruyāt 'anopragṛhasyānunāsiko' 
daso na' " which means "a sutra is not read with reference
to only one benefit. Had the sutrakāra meant that
this sutra operates only with reference to the sutra "ano'
pragrṛhasyānunāsikah' he would have read this sutra
after it thus adaso na".

Kū here points out that in this reading 'adaso na'
after ano'pragrṛhasyānunāsikah', there is no necessity of the
insertion of the words idut and māt which are in the
existing rule adaso māt. There is no room for the doubt
that in case of the absence of these words in the reading
adaso na, the an, e and ā in the forms asau amuke and
amukābhyaṃ respectively, derived from the base adas, shall
be prohibited nasalization. Thus is because Kū says
even in the existence of the rule "adaso māt", these do
not get nasalization since an and ē in asau and amuke,
are not comprehended by the word an of the rule
"ano'pragrṛhasyānunāsikah", which is coined with the n
of the rule aiun. The ā in amukābhyaṃ also does not
become nasalised since it is not the final element.

Here NBh says that there is a view which takes into consideration the forms (he) asuka and asuka in this connection. (he)asuka is the vocative case of the base adas added with suffix akac and asuka is the nominative case of the feminine base derived from adas added with the suffix aakac. The final vowel in these undergo nazalization, since they are not provided with the term pragrhyya. Hence in the wording 'adaso na' the part adasah is interpreted in such a way as to avoid the contingency of the prohibition of nazalization to vowels in these derived from adas caused by the rule 'adaso na'. The part adaso is repeated. One of them is derived in the following matter. "na vidyate dasya sthāne sah yasya tasya" meaning that which does not have the letter d being replaced by s and the other one conveys the usual sense "of the word adas". Thus the idea that nasalization is prohibited to the adas that does not have the d in it being replaced by s and hence in the instance asuka and asuka the final vowels do not come under the scope of the prohibition of nasalization since the d of adas there, is being replaced by s, and so they get nasalization.

After giving this view, NBh points out that others (anye) hold a different opinion. According to
this latter view the forms (he)asuka and asukā are not to be accepted on the basis of anabhidhana. This is because in the existence of such forms, it comes out that the rule "adaso māt" has two purposes, namely, the prohibition of nasalization of ɨ and ū in the instance amī and amū by giving them the designation pragrhyya and thereby endowing the a and ā in asuka and asukā with nasalization. This contradicts Pat's assertion that the rule serves a single purpose of the prohibition of nasalization and to procure such a benefit a rule in the form need not be framed, ("naikam prayojanam ...... na").

Hence the former view cited with ending ahun is expressive of NBh's dissent with the view. There is no valid authority for the repetition of the word adasah and the peculiar derivation accepted in the word adasah and also it involves comprousness. It seems that NBh favours the latter view cited with the ending 'ity anye'. 
Refutation of cited views

In addition to citing views, that are elucidative, justificatory or critical in nature, on the assertions of Pat and Kt, NBh has introduced in his work certain other views for purpose of refuting the same. He shows clearly that those views entertained by other scholars are erroneous. He elucidates the text of Mbh and Prdp in such a way that critical views on them are related and the assertions of Pat and Kt are reestablished. However, he does not generally reveal the identity of the personality whose view he is refuting. We may examine such views.

1. Criticism on Kt who resorts to the vārttika

“ḥṛgrahor bhaśchandasi hasyeti vaktavyam” to explain the substitution of h by bh in Vedic words.

To point out change of letters, seen exclusively in Vedas, Kt cites two instances udgrābham and nigrābham and says that these words are derived from the root grah
prefixed with the *upasarga ud* and *ni*, respectively, by the addition of the suffix ghan. The suffix ghan here is not enjoined to the said roots by any rule, but is understood to be so by the nipatana of these words in the vṛttika udgrābhānigrābhāc ca cchandasi.

Kṛṣṇaṇanda says that this vṛttika allows the usage of the words like udgrābha and nigrābha derived by the addition of the suffix ghan and in the sense of srugudyamana and srugnipatana. Kṛṣṇaṇanda continues that the substitution of h by bh in these instances is sanctioned by the vṛttika 'hrgrahor brahachandasi hasyeti vaktavyam'. Here some express a disagreement. They point out that the former vṛttika is however necessary as an authority for the addition of the suffix ghan to the root grah and that vṛttika itself can be resorted to explain the replacement of h by bh. Therefore there is no necessity of the vṛttika, cited secondly to explain the substitution by bh of h and they are of opinion that Kṛṣṇaṇanda has in vain resorted to the second vṛttika.

Refuting this assertion, Nṛsiṃhaṇa makes the position of Kṛṣṇaṇanda unquestionable. He points out that there is another usage grbhṛṇi in the Veda. This form is derived

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70. Prdp p.15.
from the root *grah*. Here there is the substitution of *h* by the letter *bh* and the *vārttika* is necessary for explaining the substitution of *h* by *bh* here, so also the same in the form *jagrabha* derived from the root *grah*. The *vārttika* cited formerly does not enjoin the substitution by *bh* because it simply allows the usage of the word *udgrābha* and *nigrābha* in a particular sense. Therefore, NBh points out, Kt has quite correctly resorted to the second *vārttika* as an authority for the change of *h* into *bh* in the root *grah*.

2. The optional correctness of the word *ltaka*

In the *vārttika* lkaropadesa yadrcchāsaktijānukarana-plutyādyarthah, it is pointed that one among the purposes served by the enunciation of the letter *l* in the Śivasūtras is to procure vowel-operation on *l* that is seen in yadrcchāśabdas like *ltaka* (words coined at random)\(^7^1\). Pat refutes this saying that there are only three kinds of standard śabdas and no fourth variety formed by yadrcchāśabdas. Hence words like *ltaka* being an incorrect word, lkaropadesa is not necessary for its sake\(^7^2\). To

\(^7^1\) *Mbh* p.72.

\(^7^2\) *Mbh* p.73.
this the objector remarks that this kind of argumentation is not fair. He argues that as the utility of the mention of ı in the Śivasūtras is given by admitting the existence of yadrcchāśabdas, the negation of the same on the strength of the view that there are no yadrcchāśabdas, is not logical. Pat gives the reply "naisa dosah. Pakśantarairapi parāhārā bhavanti", which means 'The difficulty pointed out does not arise. Refutations are made even on the basis of different views". NBh points out that there is an erroneous interpretation of this passage in the following manner73. This bhāṣya treats the word ltaka as correct in the view that there are four divisions of standard words and as an incorrect one in the view that there are only three groups of standard sounds and it is in this letter view that the utility of the mention of the letter ı is refuted. Hence it comes out that words like ltaka like the words ti, ghu etc. coined by Pāṇ are fit for grammatical operations in the view that there are four groups of sounds among which one group is that of yadrcchāśabdas. NBh strongly argues against this interpretation. The foremost point of objection is this. The acceptance

73. Udy p. 74.
of the fact that a particular word can be treated as
correct and incorrect on the basis of two different
views is contradictory to the statement of Pat in the
rule "naveti vibhasa" (1-1-44). There a word become
correct only partially is pointed out as a defect.74.
Hence words like ķataka are ever unfit for grammatical
operations. They are unlike the words ti ghu etc.
Since the latter are coined by sistas like Pan. There
is no such authentic usage by sistas, in regard to the
words like ķataka. Hence they are unfit for grammatical
operations. Moreover if we accept these as partially
correct words and fit for grammatical operations partially,
it will be contradictory to the reference made by Pat
to this science of grammar as sadhvanusasana. Besides,
there is a doubt as to whether these words like ķataka
are to be accepted as whether fit for grammatical
and even fit for grammatical operations are not correct words. Hence it is wise to
accept that ķataka as incorrect word and the idea of
the passage is that, the utility of the mention of 1
admitting the existence of yadṛčchāśabdas is refuted
since Pat favours the view that there are only three
groups of standard sounds.

74. Mbh p.141. sadhvanusāsane'śmin sastre yasya vibhāsā
kriyate sa vibhāsā sadhuh syāt".
3. Sabdaparavipratisedha

Under the Śivasūtras "eon" and "aiauc" NBh points out that vivaranakāra is of opinion that the letters ai and au get i and u as the hrasva substitutes on the basis of śabdapravipratisedha (vipratisedha based on the positions of the letters in a sound). The dipthong ai is constituted of a and i whereas au is constituted of a and u. When hrasva is enjoined as a substitute to ai and au for instance in words like rai, sudyau and as these letters do not have the (hrasva) short variety there is the contingency of ai being substituted either by a or i since both these are antaratama to a and i that are the components of the letter ai. Thus there results a vipratisedha between the substitutes a and i, and i will substitute, on the strength of the rule "vipratisedhe param kāryam" (1-4-2) since it is antaratama to the one namely i which is para among the components a and i when looked at from the point of view of sound position. Similarly u will substitute au which has the components a and u.

75. Udy p.79.
NBh does not agree to this view. He points out that in the circumstance narrated by Vivaranakāra the probability is the substitution by a of ai and au on the basis of antaraṅga which is given prominence over bahiraṅga by the maxim ‘asidham bahiraṅgam antaraṅge’. This is because a is antaraṅga since it is concerned with the pūrva viz. a where as i and u are concerned with para viz. i and u in ai and au. This is quite clear, NBh says, from the bhaṣya under the rule “acaḥ parasmin pūrvavidhau” (1-1-57) where in the instance kartr+i+a the yanādesa caused by i which is pūrva to a, supersedes the yanādesa caused by a which is para to i, on the basis of antaraṅga. Thus looking from the point of view of sound position the kārya concerning the pūrva has been given prominence. But Pat says ‘asiddham bahiraṅgalaksanam antaraṅgalaksana ityanena siddhyati’. Here Pat makes clear that the rule “vipratisedhe paramkāryam” (1-4-2) does not operate where one of the operation is para, simply from the point of view of sound position.

76. Udy p.79.
3. Acceptance of laksāṇā in the sentence "pañca pañcanaṅkā bhaksyaḥ".

To the question as to how the exposition of sābdas has to be given whether by expounding all correct words or by expounding all incorrect words or in both ways, the answer given by Pat is that the exposition of science is to be achieved by either of the two methods i.e., by the exposition of correct words alone or by the exposition of incorrect words alone.

Pat then illustrates his assertion "tad yathā bhaksya-niyamenaḥbhaksyapratisedho gamyate. pañca pañcanaṅkā bhaksyaḥ ityukte gamyate etad-ato'nye'bhaksya īti" 77.

NBh here points out that there is a view that the assertion pañca pañcanaṅkā bhaksyaḥ denotes the idea that those other than the five five-nailed animals are not to be eaten. This idea is derived by accepting laksāṇā by which the word pañca denote those other than the five and the word bhaksya indicate abhaksya.

77. Mbh p.41.
NBh refutes this view totally. The first point of objection is that the acceptance of laksana in these words involve ambiguity, NBh cites many a reason to refute the above view. The most important one among them is the statement of Pat himself "bhakṣyaniyamena bhakṣyapratisedho gamyate" wherein it is made clear that the restriction in this statement of a few as edible implies the prohibition of others as non-edibles.

If the sentence stands for abhakṣyakathana how can Pat speak of bhakṣyaniyama? Again it cannot be agreed to that on the strength of the word bhakṣyaniyamabodhakena and by virtue of laksana in the part niyama in it, the sentence can be stated as prohibiting one from tasting the flesh of others other than the stipulated five.

This is because there lurks the defect of ambiguity if laksana is accepted. This the view cannot be accepted when one takes into consideration the words of Pat. Kt too has stated that 'niyamyamanam laksanam śamartyad anveto bhyo nivarte, and that too will be contradicted. Again the subject of this illustration is sabdopadesah i.e., upadesa of śabdas like gauḥ whereby others like gāvī gonī are understood as incorrect ones. Hence this example so as to be coherent with the subject of illustration ought to be treated as conveying the idea of the specification of those that are edible by which other than
these can be understood as non-edibles. Moreover learned men have stated that an assertion which comes under the group of parīsāmkhyāvidhi only implies the avoidance of others and never directly states the same. Since according to Mīmāṃsakas this is a parīsāmkhyāvidhi which is here treated as niyama by Pat, this must therefore directly mean the injunction of those which are edible. The sentence directly means "eat the five five-clawed animals". Since even without this injunction the possibility of the consumption of those five animals are natural, the statement points out that the consumption must be restricted to these five animals alone. The sentence therefore never mean by laksanā the fact that those other than the five five-nailed animals are not to be eaten, but only results by means of the restriction above-mentioned in the prohibition of the tasting of the flesh of others which involves prayascitta.

4. A view with regard to the meaning of the rule vrddhirādaic in the kāryakālapakṣa.

Under the rule vrddhirādaic (1-1-1) NBh cites a view according to which the meaning of the rule in the
kāryakālapakṣa is "where there be vrddhi there the
word ādaīc presents itself and the rule has the status
of a samjnāsūtra simply on basis of the fact that
in sūtras like mrjervrddhiḥ the word vrddhi which
attracts the word ādaīc denotes ā ai and āu, just as
only in the śruti 'jyotistomena yajeta' enjoining
jyotistomayāga the word jyotistoma is understood
as a samjnā since it is samāndhikaraṇa with yāga. 

NBh refutes this view. He points out that
if the rule were to mean in kāryakālapakṣa the idea that, 
where there be the word vrddhi, there the word ādaīc
presents itself, Pat's statement under the rule "syanah
samprasāranam putrapatyoh" (6-1-13) 'kāryakālaṁ
samjnāparibhāsāmaṁ bhasyetypasthitam idam bhavati yaci
bham iti' and another statement under the rule
"idudevdvicanam pragrhyam" (1-1-11) 'kāryakālaṁ samjnā-
paribhāsāmaṁ. Pragrhyah prakṛtyeyypasthitam idam
bhavati idūdet dvivacanam pragrhyam iti" cannot be
coherent. He ought to have asserted as kāryakālaṁ

78a Udy pp. 114-115.
samjñāparibhāṣam upasthitam idam bhavati yaciṣṭu. Since he does not state like that the above view is not tenable. Again the fact that even in kāryakālapakṣa it is an independant samjñāsūtra is clear by the arguments of vārttikakāra for the formation of an adhikāra sūtra like atha samjñā before the rule vrddhirādaic. Pat refutes this attempt pointing out that in spite of an adhikarasūtra it can be understood as a samjñāsūtra.

There are also other defects involved in this view. The paribhāṣāsūtra, "iko gunavrddhi" presents the word ikh to the rule "mrjervrddhih" since the rule enjoins ā ai and au by the term vrddhi. If it is accepted that the word ādaic presents itself where there be the word vrddhi, the rule "mrjervrddhih" directly enjoins ādaic and so ā ai and au won't have the status of being prescribed by the term vrddhi and hence there is the difficulty, that the rule "iko gunavrddhi" (1-1-3) will never presenting the word ikh to that rule. Though however the word vrddhi will have relation with the rule mrjervrddhih since they relate to ādaic enjoined by the rule it can never have the status of a samjñā. But
with regard to the rule "jyotistomena yajeta" the word jyotistoma is treated as a namadheya since here the case is different. In this sruti the idea of yaga is denoted by the part yaj of yajeta and hence jyotistoma can but be a namadheya on account of its being samanadhikarana with yaga. Moreover there will arise a doubt as to whether the rule vrddhiradaic be treated as a paribhasa sutra since the word vrddhi in the rule attracts the word adaic, or a samjna sutra since it expresses adaic attracted by it. Above all it is difficult to accept that a word attracts another word by the expressive power of sabdas known as vrtti. Last of all, NBh points out that in the sense of the rule as suggested the rule is contingent to present the word adaic only where there be the word vrddhi as vidheya. But Pat has accepted the function of the rule vrddhiradaic even in sutras like vrddhir yasyacam adis tad vrddham (1-1-74) where vrddhi is an anuvadnya. All the above arguments completely disprove the idea delineated in the view. According to NBh in the karyakalapaksa, the rule vrddhiradaic becomes a sub-clause of the rule mrjervrddhih and from that sub-clause it is understood that vrddhi is the term for a, ai and au and it is that vrddhi which is enjoined by the main clause mrjervrddhih.
5. The treatment of samjnasutras as niyamasutras.

Haradatta is of opinion that the rule "vrddhiradaic" is a niyamasutra. The word vrddhi is derived from the root vrdh by the addition of the suffix ktin taught in the sense of bhāva and hence means increment. The letters ā, ai and au are possessed of increment itself and hence by abhedopacāra they can be treated as increment itself i.e., as vrddhi. Thus the word vrddhi, can even in the absence of a rule like 'vrddhiradaic' can denote by laksana ā, ai and au and so the rule vrddhiradaic pointing out the same is restricting the term vrddhi to ā, ai and au alone and thereby prevents the term from being applied to the prolate ā the lengthened ī etc. which also possess increment. Haradatta thus opines that samjnasutras are niyama sutras. NBh refutes this view pointing out that this kind of explanation cannot be given to the rule "adēn gunah" (1-1-2) which enjoins the term guna to the letters ā, e and o and this view is quite negligible.

79. Mbh p. 103.
6. The maxim 'samjñāpūrvako vidhiranityah'

Bhaṭṭojidiksita is of opinion that there is a maxim that a rule is not universally valid, when, that which is taught in it, is denoted by a technical term. He says that the rule "uto vrddhir luki hali" (7-3-89) that enjoins au as the substitute of u therefore functions optionally alone i.e., it does not function in certain instances. Otherwise Paṇḍ have read the rule as 'utāu luki hali'. Therefore the contingency of the substitution by vrddhi, on the strength of this rule, of the u in stuyat and the like is avoided, NBh refutes this, pointing out that such a maxim is nowhere mentioned or indicated by Pat. Moreover he says that if such a maxim were to exist, Pat won't have resorted to the indication of a maxim 'angavṛtte punarvṛttav-avidhih by virtue of lengthening in the substitute jā taught in the rule "jñājanor jā" (7-3-79). In this rule the substitute jā is enjoined to the roots jñā and jan whereby forms like jānāti and jāvate are arrived at. During the process of formation

80. Udy p.141 and Mbh with the commentary Tattvāleka, p.183
of the word jānāti at the stage jā+na+ti, if the substitute be hrasva i.e., ja, the resultant form will be jānāti and the a in ja cannot be lengthened by the rule "ato dirgho yani" (7-3-101) since it enjoins lengthening by using the term dirghah and hence does not operate universally. Therefore in order to arrive at a form, when there is the maxim 'samjñāpurvako vidhir anityah' the mention of the substitute as being lengthened i.e., ja is quite necessary and being satisfied for the same, it cannot indicate a maxim 'angavṛtte..........

Since Pat indicates the above maxim by virtue of the lengthened substitute of this rule, one cannot, the maxim "samjñā- purvako vidhir anityah" which makes this indication impossible. So also the contingency of the substitution by vrddhi by the rule "uto vrddhir luki hali" (7-3-89) on the u of stuyāt cannot be warded off on the basis of this maxim. It is to avoid this vrddhi that Pat accepts the formula pit hinna bhavati ŋit ca pinena bhavati. This idea is arrived at by splitting the rule "sārvadhātukamapit" (1-2-4) as sārvadhātukam and apit. The split rule by virtue of the ŋan in the sense of prasajyapratisedha and the anuvṛtti of the word ŋit means 'pit hinna bhavati'. Therefore in the
instance stuya, the yasut being nit (yasut parasmai-
-padesūdatto nicca), 3-4-103) cannot be treated as pit
even though the substitute ti to which it is the
augment, is pit and in the absence of precedence of a non-pit
suffix, vrddhi enjoined on the precedence of a pit
suffix by the rule "uto vrddhir luki hali" (1-3-89)
cannot substitute the u of stu which is immediately
followed by yasut which is nit. Thus the view held by
Bhattojidakṣita is refuted by NBh.
CHAPTER VI
CRITICISM OF THE PRADIPA-
I DIFFERENCE OF OPINION
CHAPTER VI

CRITICISM ON THE PRADĪPA

I. DIFFERENCE OF OPINION

NBh's gloss on Prdp can be characterised as a critical study of the observations of Kt. Though as a commentator he has elaborated Prdp by way of elucidations and justification of the statements found in it, he has subjected the work to criticism also. His observations in Udy show his difference of opinion with Kt on many points. In many instances he expresses his disagreement with the view of Kt. He points out that several assertions of Kt requires reconsideration.

Interpretation of passages

1. Kesām sabdānām? laukikānām vaidikānām ca

After stating the fact that the science by name sabdānuśāsana has been begun, Pat employs the above question and answer, "Of which śabdas? Of these current

in the world and the Vedas. Kt and NBh differ in their opinion in regard to the purpose of this question and answer. The former is of opinion that since the word 'sabda' denotes not only words of human speech but also the sounds produced by birds, animals, etc. Pat wishes to inform the readers clearly that it denotes only words of human speech here. NBh on the other hand feels that since the word 'śabdānusāsana' is a significant name for grammar, it goes without saying that incorrect expressions and sounds produced by animals or birds are not to be dealt with in this science. Hence, the possibility is that one may entertain a doubt as to whether the science, just like the Śākatāyana Vyākaraṇa deals with words of the spoken language alone or just like the treatises like the prātiśākhya deals with words of vedic literature alone and hence the question, kāśām śabdānām (anuśāsanam)? The answer tells the reader that Pāṇḍu deals with both of them in his work.

1 Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka says that NBh has gone wrong in considering that Śākatāyana Vyākaraṇa is concerned with words alone and points that the same is concerned with Vedic words also. Op. cit., p.112.
To the question 'kāni punah sabdānuśāsanasya prayojanāni?', Pat enumerates five main benefits and thirteen subsidiary benefits as accruing from the study of grammar. This is followed by the above question which means "why the benefits accrued from the study of grammar alone are enumerated and not those of Vedas also?" Kt feels an inconsistency in this question raised by one who has just before enquired about the benefits of the study of grammar and got the answer for it. He therefore takes this question to imply that Pat is about to specify the need of the enumeration of benefits, to be only in the case of the study of subjects other than the Vedas. But, with the conclusory remark ityanye NBh removes this inconsistency in another way. The question is taken to be raised by a third person different from those two who enquired about and enumerated respectively, the benefits of the study of grammar.
3. asty anyad garga dibidipatha prayojanam kim?

samudayananam sadhutvam yatha syad iti

In the first āhnikā of the Mbh to the question concerning the purpose to be derived from the fourteen Śivasūtras, the ekadeśin replies that the said sutras are for the understanding of correct pronunciation and in this case, the necessity of uttering correct vowels like those that are grave, acute, etc., no longer arises, as there is the authoritative utterance of their general forms i.e., ākṛtyupadesa in the Śivasūtras. Now an objection is raised that if ākṛtyupadesa be accepted there arises the necessity of prohibition of such letters that are possessed of the faults such as samvrta, kala and the like. To the answer that the vowels possessed of faults will not be included on account of their faultless pronunciation by Sūtrakāra himself in words which are put in groups beginning with garga bida and the like, an objection is again raised in the above quoted passage which means: "There is another purpose served by reading of the collection of words headed by garga and bida.

What? so that the samudāya may be taken to be correct. According to Kṛ the word samudāyanāṁ in the said passage refers to words like garga, bida, etc. The reason for putting groups of words headed by garga and bida is that the whole words like garga etc. (which are a collection (samudāya) of certain letters in a particular order) may be taken as correct. NBh on the other hand, refers by the word samudāyanāṁ to the words like gārgya, baida, etc. (which are the collection (samudāya) of the base garga and the like and suffix yan an and the like. The reason for grouping words headed by garga etc. is that words like gārgya etc. could be looked upon as correct ones. NBh says that this interpretation is more befitting when one considers the further assertion of the siddhāntin'ubhayam anena kriyate, pāthascaiva viśesyate, kalādayaśca nivartyante'. Here the part pāthascaiva viśesyate means "by the groups like gargādi words like garga are instructed to be possessed of the suffix yan enjoined by the rule "gargādibhyoyanāṁ" (1-1-105)

It may be pointed out here that Kṛ does not say anything on this assertion of Pat.
4. 'na hi dyayor ākṣarasamāṁnāyikayo' yugapat samavasthānastātī,4

Under the Śivasūtra 'aiun' Kāt says that the vowel a which is samvrta in roots bases etc. is to be mentioned as vivrta so that it may be comprehended by the a in the Śivasūtra 'aiun' where it is mentioned as vivrta, otherwise the a in roots bases etc. shall not be comprehended by the a of the rule 'aiun'. Pat says that this difficulty does not arise since the comprehension of a by a is indicated by Pāṇ through the word akah in the rule "akah savarne dirghah" (6-1-101). His words are "ācāryapraavrīttir jñāpayati - bhavatāyākṣara- samāṁnāyikena dhātvādisthasya grahaṇam iti-yadayam akah savarne dirghah iti pratyāhāre'ko grahaṇam karoti-katham krtvā jñāpakam? na hi dvayor ākṣarasamāṁnāyikayor yugapat samavasthānastātī". The idea is that in the absence of the comprehension of the vowel a that is in the roots bases etc. at no places can the letter a (vivrta) belonging to the list of alphabet be found together with another letter a of the same kind so as

to be coalesced into $a$ by the rule "akhir savarne dirghah" (6-1-101). Hence the word aakhir in the rule serves no purpose with regard to the vowel $a$ and therefore could be taken to indicate the inclusion of its cognate $a$ occurring in roots bases etc. by the $vivrta$ $a$ of aiun although the cognate $a$ be samvrta.

Here commenting on the word dvayoh in the passage Kt points out that the vowel $a$ which is $vivrta'$ is found in the Sivasūtras alone and in other instances one can never find even a single $a$ which is $vivrta$. Yet Pat has made the remark that at no places can two āksarasamānāyika ($vivrta$) $a$ vowels can be seen. This assertion of Pat, is therefore, to be understood in the sense that, as the savarnadīrgha enjoined by the rule "akhir savarne dirghah" is an ekadesa i.e., substitute of two sthanin viz. purva and para, the sthanin viz. $vivrta$ $a$ is mentioned here in dual number in the expression dvayoh says Kt.

NBh on the other hand gives a different opinion as the view of other scholars. He says that in the sentence 'devadatta ajasti' the initial $a$ in the
word \( \text{ac} \) (\( \text{ac+asti} = \text{ajasti} \)) can be understood as \( \text{vivrta} \) since the \( \text{pratyahara ac} \) wherein it occurs, one can understand that it belongs to the \( \text{'Sivasutra 'aiun'} \). Thus in this instance viz. \( \text{ac} \), it is possible to find a \( \text{vivrta a} \) along a \( \text{samvrta a} \) which is at the end of the word \( \text{devadatta} \), to be coalesced into \( \ddot{a} \). Therefore the presence of one \( \text{vivrta a} \) being feasible and there being the absence of two \( \text{vivrta a} \) vowels, Pat has rightly said "\( \text{na hi dvayeY ak\text{\`a}}\text{\`arasama\`mn\text{\`ayikayor yugapat samvasth\`anam asti.} \)"

5. \( \text{D\text{\`irghaplutau punar naiva loke na ca vede samvrtau stah}^5} \)

Under the \( \text{'Sivasutra 'aiun'} \) Pat says that there are no \( \ddot{a} \) and prolate \( \ddot{a} \) that are \( \text{samvrta} \). \( \text{Kt} \) opines that their non-existence is due to the fact that it is not possible to utter the \( \ddot{a} \) and prolate \( \ddot{a} \) as \( \text{samvrta} \). \( \text{NBh} \) points out that there is a different opinion held by certain scholars with regard to the reason for the non-existence of \( \text{samvrta d\text{\`irgha and pluta.} \)

5. \( \text{Mbh p.67} \)
are admitted by sistas i.e., by the learned. That is why they are treated as existant. But, the **samvrita dirgha and pluta.** The **vivrta dirgha and vivrta pluta** are admitted by sistas i.e., by the learned. That is why they are treated as existant. But, the **samvrita dirgha and pluta** are treated as non-existant since they are not acknowledged by sistas.

6. "na cāpāśabdāḥ prakṛtīḥ na hyapāśabdāḥ upadīśyante na ca nupadīṣṭā prakṛtirasti"

Pat says that words like *ltaka*, mispronounced due to the disability to utter properly as *rtaka* are apasabdas but the imitatory words like *ltaka* as in the sentence 'brahmani *ltaka* ityāha' are not apasabdas. He says that one cannot superimpose apasabdatva on a correct word i.e., sādhusabda, even on the basis of the maxim 'prakṛtivad anukaranaṁ'. This is because apasabda cannot be characterised as the prakṛti mentioned in this maxim, since prakṛti is that which is enunciated and apasabdas are never enunciated. Hence they being non-enunciated cannot be called prakṛti. His words

6. *Mbh* p.76
are "na cāpaśabdāḥ prakṛtiḥ na hyapaśabdāḥ upaḍīśyante
nacānupadistā śraddhāṇā prakṛtir asti". Kṛṣṇaṇa says that the maxim
that the maxim allows the superimposition of only
technical factors and operations. Apaśabdā is not a
technical factor. Moreover, adds, it is not reasonable
to superimpose asadhyātva on sadhusādhu. Hence NBh points
out that a certain scholar feels that this assertion
of Kṛṣṇaṇa requires reconsideration. Apaśabdātva can well
be superimposed on a sadhusādhu, just as abrahmanatva can
be superimposed on a brahmin. Any attribute can be
superimposed on another. There is no question that of
being reasonable or not, in it. The reason for Pat's
assertion that the imitative word ṛtaka of the mispronounced
word ṛtaka due to disability, cannot be treated as
apaśabdā by the maxim "Prakṛtivad anukaranam" is that
apaśabdā being not enunciated is not a prakṛti, the
quality of which alone can be superimposed on its
anukarana by the said maxim.
7. Samghātasyaikatvam arthan tena varṇāt subutpattir

na bhaviṣyati

To establish the fact that letters are possessed of sense individually, several arguments are advanced under the Śivasūtra 'hayavarat'. To this the objector points out that if letters are accepted as individually possessed of sense, there shall be the contingency of case-suffix after each letter in bases like dhana, vana, etc. This difficulty is warded off by Pat in this passage 'Samghātasyaikatvam .... bhaviṣyati'.

Kṛ takes the sentence samghātasyaikatvam arthan to mean samghātasyāpi ekatvam arthan. (The samudāya too has got the sense of oneness). This takes for granted that the components have got the sense of oneness. Kṛ says that just as many people see a particular object with the help of a single lamp, a single case suffix namely, su is enough to convey the sense of oneness of the components and the whole. It will come as a precedent (para) to the whole (samudāya) so that it can be the precedent of the component letters as well as the samudāya.

7. Mbh p.93.
Kt says that this is just like \textit{samudāyadivrācana} by which the components as well as the \textit{samudāya} gets reduplicated. However, the \textit{samudāya} alone will be designated as \textit{pada}, since the same alone can be treated as \textit{subanta} to which the rule "\textit{suptināntam padam}" (1-4-14), wherein there is the \textit{anuvṛtti} of the part "\textit{yasmat pratyayavidhiḥ}" prescribes \textit{padasamjñā}.

NBh, here offers a different interpretation of the Bhāṣya, maintained by certain scholars (\textit{Kecit tu \ldots āhuh}). They say that \textit{samghatasyaikatvam arthah} means oneness is the sense of \textit{samudāya}. This is because the transposition or disappearance of letters in the base does not cause any corresponding effect in the sense of number. Hence the sense of number conveyed by the suffix is to be treated as relating to the base or \textit{samudāya} as a whole and not to the components individually. Thus the sense of number being related to the \textit{samudāya} there is no contingency of case suffix that indicates the sense of number, from each component letter. However one may doubt that there is the contingency of the case suffix from each letter since the case suffix is added to
the avyayas in the sense of which there is no
distinction involving the sense of number. Hence
the case suffix su being a general suffix that can be
added to any base having a sense irrespective of whether
this sense is distinguished by number or not, is contingent
to be added after each letter in a word. NBh
continues that such a doubt is not correct. It is
because even though there is the addition of case suffix
after avyaya which denote a sense distinguished by
number the addition of case suffixes to the letters in
a base (samudāya) wherein the sense distinguished by
number is conveyed by the samudāya is not justifiable.
Therefore case-suffix can be added to the samudāya and
not to the component letters. Strictly speaking the
letters in vrksa are not even prakṛti and so they do not
fall under the scope of the statement "na kevalā prakṛtih
prayoktavyā nāpi pratyayah". Thus it is pointed out
that letters being not the base for a suffix there is no
contingency of case suffix after each letter in the
bases like dhanam, vanam, etc.

8. "Aśnute ity-aksaram"8

While discussing the denotation of the word
aksara Pat quotes the vārttika asnoterā saro'ksaram and

says aśnute ityaksaram. Kṛ explains it saying that
artham aśnute vyāpnoti iti aksaram padaṃ vākyam vā i.e.,
that which involves a sense is aksara and it is pada
or vākyam. NBh does not favour this interpretation.
The disagreement lies in the point that the word aksara
cannot in this interpretation of Kṛ refer to a letter
as there are letters having no sense. He then cites
a view, of others (anye) according to which aksara means
that which pervades. Since sphota is exhibited in
different places at one time, the same can be described
as one that pervades and hence it is quite apt to refer
to it by the term aksara. This view seems to be more
acceptable. Since sphota is exhibited by varṇa pada or
vākyam, aksara can well refer to vāṇa also that exhibits
sphota.

9. “atha pi kathancid anavakas'o luk syād evam api na dosah”

Under the rule "na dhatulopā ardhadhatuke"
(1-1-4) Kṛ says that this rule which prohibits guna can
be dispensed with if in the formation of words like
loluvaḥ and popuvah derived by the addition of the suffix

9. MBh p.135.
yan to roots lu and pu, the elision caused by the rule
"ato lopah" (6-4-48) operates on the strength of
paratva on the a of the suffix yan, before the operation
of luk enjoined by the rule "yanoci ca" (2-4-74) operates
on the suffix ya as a whole. In this case there is
the benefit that the elision caused by lopa can enjoin
sthānivadbhāva so as to prohibit guna to the vowel u
in loluvah.

Supporting this view of Kāt it is stated
in the bhāṣya that the rule "ato lopah" (6-4-48) shall
operate first since "yanoci ca" (2-4-74) is satisfied
(i.e., sāvakāsa) by bringing the elision of the remaining
part y of the suffix yan. Though the rule "yanoci ca"
prescribes the elision of the suffix yan, it can very
well operate on the part y since the same can be treated
as yan on the strength of the maxim ekadeśavikrātmananyavad.
Pat then proceeds to give an alternative suggestion to
bring about the former operation of the rule "ato lopah"
with the introductory remark quoted above. It means
"If it is said that somehow luk will have no room to
operate, there is no harm". This statement does not
seem to be harmonious with the statement, just previously
made, that luk is sāvakāsa.

To avoid this discrepancy, Kt interprets the idea of this as follows. The rule "yañoci ca" prescribes luk to that which is designated as yañ. The designation of y that remains after the elision of a in ya, on the strength of the maxim 'ekadesavikrtam ananyavad' is only secondary and such a secondary designation does not help in any way for the operation to be brought about by the principal designation (mukhyavyapadesa). The rule "yañoci ca" that prescribed luk to yañ cannot therefore operate on y. Thus if it be "ato lopah" that operates formerly, luk will have no room to operate and so cannot be superseded by the rule "ato lopah" on the strength of paratva. Hence Pat gives another suggestion to bring the operation of "ato lopah" with the said remark, says Kt.

NBh does never admit the fact that the designation attained by atidesas like 'ekadesavikrtam ananyavad, sthanivad adesonalvidhau, etc. are secondary. If it were so, the super-imposition itself is prone to be effect since the designations thus arrived at fail to serve any purpose. The assumption of y as yañ is therefore quite correct. The discrepancy caused by
the reference to the rule "yañoci ca" as anavakāśa just after the illustration of the fact that it is savakāśa (having a scope for operation) is explained by NBh as follows. A rule can, supersede another even when the scope of their operation is different. For instance in regard to the formation of the imperative form vivyātha of the root vyath the rule "vyatho liti" (7-4-68) that enjoin samprasārana and can well have the letter y of the root as the scope of operation operates on the letter y of the root superseding the rule "halādiśsesah" (7-4-60) that enjoin elision and has the part beginning with y of the root as its scope of operation. Pat too states that unlike other suffixes, the suffix śnam does not precede the root to which it is enjoined, since the rule "mid acoṭyāt parah" (1-1-47) which has mit as its scope of operation supersede the rule "paraśca" (4-1-2) which has suffixes as its scope of operation. Similarly here also Pat points out that though the rule "yañoci ca" becomes savakāśa by the operation on the part y which remains after the lopa of a in ya, caused by the rule "ato lopah", it can be considered anavakāśa, since its operation on ya is prohibited by the rule "ato lopah" on the strength of paratva.
10. evam hi kaścid kaścid prechati anantare ete
brāhmaṇakule iti sa āha nānantare, vṛṣṭakulam
anayor antarāḥ iti

Under the rule "halo'nantarāḥ samyogah"

(1-1-7) Pat points out that by virtue of the word anantarāḥ in the rule, consonants intercepted by vowel will never be designated as samyoga. When it is argued that the word anantarā is also used with reference to objects which are intervened by dissimilar ones as for example two villages that are intercepted by dissimilar objects like rivers and mountains, are referred to as anantarāvimau grāmāv, Pat asserts that unlike ones always form an interception between similar ones. To illustrate the same, he makes the assertion quoted above. It means "Someone asks another. Are these two Brahman houses adjoining (anantarā-without having any antara - interception)? He replies, "No They are not adjoining, a house of śūdra is between them".

11. Mbh p.149.
Here Kt makes the remark that a brahman house can be treated as intercepting them and the house of südra is stated to intervene the Brahman houses, with a view to refute the argument that dissimilar ones are not interceptory to similar ones. Thus Kt upholds the view that interception of objects can be by dissimilar or similar one.

NBh on the other hand maintains that interception of two objects cannot be formed by a dissimilar ones. This is, according to him, implied by this statement itself wherein he uses the genitive case of idam("vrsalakulam anayor antarā"). The usage of the genitive case here in spite of the proximity of the word antarā that brings about accusative case by the rule "antarānthareṇa yukte" (3-3-4) shows that the two brahman houses are not exactly the limit (niyatāvadhi) relating to the interception. By the usage of the genitive case, Pat points out that two Brahman houses are not taken individually for the enquiry whether there is any interception. The interception enquired is with reference to two brahman houses that are situated along with other brahman houses and Pat suggests that a brahmin house is not an interception.
between brahman houses. Therefore interception cannot be by a similar one in the opinion of NBh.

11. "ubhayato niyamo vijnāsayate ksijyorevaicah tayośca śakyārtha eveti"\textsuperscript{12}

Under the rule "sthānentaratamah" (1-1-50) Pat, resorts to a two-fold niyama in the sūtra "ksayyajayyau śakyārthe" (6-1-81) so as to avoid the substitution by ay, contingent in case of the non-utterance of the word vāntah in the rule "vānto yi pratyaye"\textsuperscript{14}, of the letter e in the instance ceyam and in instances like kseyam and jeyam where the suffix yat is in the sense yogyam (ksetum yogyam and jetum yogyam).

The two-fold niyama drawn from the rule "ksayyajayyau śakyārthe" which gives the forms ksayya and jayya in the sense ksetum śakyam and jetum sākkyam is that the change of e to ay is only with reference to the roots ksi and ji and that too only in śakyārtha.

Here Kt says that this niyama in both ways is got by the splitting up of the rule "ksayyajayyau śakyārthe" into two rules one as ksayyajayyau and the other as śakyārthe. Here NBh gives a different

\textsuperscript{12} Mbh p.279.
opinion as that of others 'anye'. He says that in the rule "brahmabhrūṇavrtresu kvip" (3-2-87) a two-fold niyama is accepted and there it is not stated by Pat that the same is got by the splitting up of the rule. Similarly too, there being no decisive proof for the splitting up of the rule, it is better to accept the niyama in two ways since it is told by Pat.

12. "yadi punar 'alantyasya ityucyeta tatrāyamaparthaḥ ane-kālāit sarvasya ityetanne vaktavyam bhavati jidam niyamārtham bhaviṣyati alevantyasya bhavati nānya iti" 14

Under the rule "alontyasya" (1-1-52) Pat discusses the question whether the word alah as the genitive singular of the word al, be treated as an adjunct to the word antyasya, or as the nominative plural be treated as an adjunct to the substitute. In regard to the latter

13. Rudradhara-jhā śarma says that this is the view held by the author of the work "Ratna' Vide Mbh edited with the commentary 'Tattavāloka' p.375.

view he makes the above assertion. There he refers to the rule as *alantyasya* so as to make it clear that the word *alah* is to qualify the word *ādesah*. He points out that in the latter view there is no necessity of the rule "*anekālsit sarvasya*" (1-1-53) since the rule means that the substitute which are *al* replace the final letter of the *sthanin* whereby it comes out that a substitute that is not *al* replace the *sthanin* wholly. Thus the rule results in a *niyama* that only the substitute that are *al* replace the final element whereby other substitutes get the status of *sarvadesa*.

Here *Kt* points out a defect in this view. The rule "*arurmanścaksuṣcetorahorajasām lopasca*" (5-4-51) enjoins the elision as a substitute to bases like *arus*, etc. This substitute is desired to replace the final element of the bases like *arus*, *manas*, *cetas*, *rahas* and *rajas*. But in the said view according to which only the substitutes that are *al* can replace the final element, the substitute elision which is not *al* can hardly replace the final element of *arus* *manas*, etc. and so forms like *arūkaroti*, *virahīkaroti* *virajīkaroti*, etc. cannot be arrived at.
With the ending "ityanye" NBh cites a view according to which there is never the said defect pointed out by Kt. The word alah in the rule when treated as an adjunct to the ādesā, is said to effect a niyama that only substitutes that are al replace the final element, whereby the substitutes other than al become sarvādesa. Here the substitutes other than al can be taken as the substitutes that are anekāl and not the substitute which is in the form of elision and such a substitute replaces the final element alone. There is an indication to this effect.

In the rule "luk vā duhadihalihaguhām ātmanepade dantye" (7-3-73) enjoins luk as the substitute of the suffix ksa. When the word lopah can be got by anuvrtti since both the words luk and lopa ultimately denote the adarsana, Pan could have avoided the mention of the work luk in the rule. The mention of the word luk which denotes the adarsana of a suffix, can therefore be treated as serving the purpose of the elision of the suffix as a whole. If lopa also were to bring the elision of ksa wholly the mention of the word luk becomes superfluous. Hence it indicates lopa shall replace the final element of the sthānina and lest the final element should be substituted by elision, Pan mentions
the word *luk* in the rule. Thus the mention of the word *luk* in the said rule indicates that *lopa* substitutes the final alone and so there is no defect of *lopa* substituting the whole base like *arus* and the like.

13. "*sthānīvad analvidhau iti* *yatyucyamanē ka idañīm sthānīvat syāt*"\(^{15}\)

Under the rule "*sthānīvad ādesā'nalvidhau*" (1-1-56) Pat discusses the purpose of the mention of the word *ādesa* in the rule. To the question "atha*ādesāgraḥanam kimartham?* a counterquestion quoted above is raised. "If the *sūtra* is read *sthānīvad analvidhau* without the word *ādesa*, which will act like *sthānīn?*" Kt gives an explanation to this counterquestion to which NBh cites a different explanation as the view of certain scholars. Kt is of opinion that as there are two varieties of substitutes one *pratyakṣa* and the other *ānumāṇika*, i.e., direct and indirect, the rule without the word *ādesa* can comprehend only the substitutes like *ē* that are directly mentioned in the

rules like "eruh" (3-4-86) and so the inferred substitutes like tu seldom act like sthanin. NBh on the other hand says that according to certain scholars, the question does not have this motive behind it. It is simply a question raised by one who is ignorant of the idea of the previous question athadesagrahamam kimartham? which means that even in the absence of the word adesa, it shall be comprehended in the rule since, the only one word related to sthanin i.e, sambandhisabda, is the same. The answer to this counter-question is "yah sthane bhavati" and this comes from the person who knows the fact that the word adesa is the sambandhisabda of the word sthanin.

This is followed by the question and answer "kaśca sthane bhavati? adesah." Now follows the passage "idam tarhi prayojanam adesamātram sthanivad yathā syāt ekadesavikrtasyopasamkhyānam codayisyati tanna vaktavyam bhavati" which means all the substitutes both direct and indirect are to act like sthanin. NBh says that the answer "yah sthane bhavati kasca sthane bhavati? adesah" is to be treated as given by a person who is ignorant of the context, so as to suit the explanation given by Kt to the last passage.
Here it may be pointed out that the idea pointed as the view held by certain scholars and the latter idea cited with the ending ityahuḥ is held by the same group of scholars whom he designated as kecit which Rudradhara-Jha Sarma takes to amount to bhasyatatātvavidāḥ.

14. "tālādayāḥ prāk pāṣapāḥ, sasprabhrtayaḥ prāk samāsāntebhyah, māntaḥ, tasivati, kṛtvor'ṛthāḥ nānānau iti" 16

Under the vārttika 'siddham tu pāthāt' in the rule "taddhitaḥcasarvavibhaktih" (1.1.38) Pat enumerates the suffixes that are to be designated as avyaya. They are the suffixes beginning with tasi upto the suffix enjoined just before the rule that enjoin the suffix pāṣap, the suffixes beginning with sas upto the suffix enjoined just before the rule enjoining samāśanta suffixes, the two suffixes tasi and vati, the suffix ending in m, the suffix having the meaning of the suffix kṛtvāsuc and the two suffixes nā and mān. Here Kt says that the tasi referred to in the passage as

tasivati is the suffixes enjoined by the rule "pratiyoge pañcamyāstasih" (5-4-44) and the rule "tasīśca" (4-3-113).

NBh maintains that the part tasi in tasivati points out the suffix tasi enjoined by the rule tasica alone and not the same enjoined by the rule "pratiyoge pañcamyāstasih" (5-4-14) the reason being the fact that the suffixes referred to as sasprabhṛtayah prāk samāntebhyah include the tasi enjoined by the rule "pratiyoge pañcamyāstasih". NBh therefore opines that the assertion of Kt requires reconsideration.

Neverthless, NBh cites a view in support of Kt. Others maintain that Kt has merely illustrated the rules that enjoin the suffix tasi.

14. "atha dvitiyam pratyayāharagrahanam kimartham? pratyayalaksanam yathā syād varnalaksanam mā bhūd iti. gave hitam gohitam rāyah kulam raikulam"17

After discussing the purpose served by the part pratyaya in the expression pratyayalope of the
rule "pratyayalope pratyayalaksanam" (1-1-62) Pat puts forward the question 'what for is, then, the pratyayagrahāna a second time' and answers the same, that the kārya depending upon pratyaya may set in and not that depending upon a letter.

Kt and NBh differ in the interpretation of the idea of this question. According to Kt the question means that the part pratyaya in the word pratyayalaksanam is superfluous since it can be referred to by a pronoun tad considering that pratyaya is already mentioned in the rule in the expression pratyayalope. The question enquires the purpose of the wording pratyayalope pratyayalaksanam instead of pratyayalope tallaksanam. The answer is that if the pronoun is used instead of the word pratyaya, the pronoun is liable to refer to the pratyaya as well as the letters in it, since pronouns refer to the object and not to any particular characteristic of the object unless otherwise mentioned. To avert this, Pan uses the word pratyaya itself and thereby disallows pratyayalaksana in instances where an affix by virtue of the letter comprised in it arranges the ground for an operation.

N7. NBh p.340.
NBh points out that according to some scholars, the question expresses the superfluous nature of the mention of the whole expression pratyayalaksana whereby the word pratyaya occurs a second time in the rule "pratyayalope pratyayalaksanam". The question does not imply the enquiry of the purpose of the mention of the word pratyaya alone instead of using the pronoun tad. This is because in the said rule the usage of tad or pratyaya in the part pratyayalaksanam makes no difference as they are synonymous in the said context. The question therefore implies the fact that the rule need only be as pratyayalope api which can well convey the idea that an operation that occurs at the time of the existence of a pratyaya, may take place even when the pratyaya has elided. Or a rule with the wording as pratyayalope which can by virtue of the anuvrtti of the word sthānivad from the previous rule, can convey the idea that a pratyaya obtains stānivadbhāva, when the elision of the same take place. To the question with this idea is given the answer 'pratyayalaksanam yathā syād varnalaksanam ma bhuditi'. This is the interpretation given by certain scholars to the question quoted, says NBh.
Interpretation of sutras

1. Absence of euphonic combination in the Sivasūtras

In the rules 'aiuṅ', 'rlk', 'eōṅ', 'aiauc' we do not find the euphonic combination of vowels which can occur on the strength of the rules "ādgunaḥ" (6-1-87) "eco'ya�ayāvah" (6-1-78) and "iko yanaci" (6-1-77).

Kt's justification for the same is that technical terms like ae ik etc. which are the basis for the operation of the said rules have not come into being at the time of the recital of the alphabets in the form of Sivasūtras and euphonic combination does not occur here.

NBh points out that reasoning is not logical.

The rules like "iko yaṇaci" (6-1-77) which come into being after the accomplishment of the Sivasūtras, technical terms like it and the subsequent formation of pratyahāras, can well operate in the Sivasūtras just

as they operate in instances like suddhyupāsyaḥ since a, i, u, etc. are the ones comprehended by the word ac, ik, etc. Otherwise, we can't justify the euphonic combination namely cognate lengthening in the body of the rule "tulyāṣyaprayatnam savarnam" (1-1-9) (tulyā+asyaprayatnam = tulyāṣyaprayatnam). Since there also it can be argued that only after the accomplishment of this sutra, the term savarna is understood and so in the body of the said rule the operation namely savarna- dirgha effected by the term savarna would become questionable. Hence NBh disagrees with the reason pointed by Kt to account for the absence of euphonic combination in the Śivasūtras. According to him the same may be treated as sautra i.e., peculiarity relating to sutras alone. Or it can be said that samhitā which is the basic factor for the combination is not intended here. It may be noted that here NBh agrees with Bhattotjīdikṣita.

2. The remodelling of the rule "guroranṛto'nantyaśya- pyekaikasya prācām"

In the bhaṣya under the rule "rīk" Pat speaks of the remodelling of the rule "guroranṛto'nantyaśya- pyekaikasya prācām" (3-2-86)19. The rule with the

word anrtah prohibits the prolation of the letter r

and here there arises the difficulty of the prohibition

of prolation of l in the instance klptasikah since

on the strength of the maxim 'ekadesavikrtam ananyavad bhavati,

the l which is a changed form of r by the rule 'krpo ro

lah" (7-2- ) can be regarded as r. By the change

of the word anrtah to aravatah the letter possessing r

sound is forbidden from being prolated. Thereby,

the letter r which is ravat i.e., possessed of the r sound

gets the prohibition and l being not possessed of the r

sound is not forbidden from being prolated.

Here Kt says that the suffix matup in the word

ravat is to be understood in the sense 'permanently

possessed of' and not merely 'possessed of'. This

is because in the word vartaka the letter a that follows

r is possessed of the sound r as adjacent to it and hence

a here being ravat, its prolation will also be prohibited.

If the matup is understood in the sense of permanently

possessed of, the a here cannot be pointed as ravat.

Since a is not possessed of r wherever it occurs in words,

the a in vartaka will be not prohibited from being

prolated.
According to NBh it is in vain to resort to the sense, 'permanently possessed of' instead of 'possessed of'. The sense 'possessed of' assigned to the suffix matup by the rule "tad asyāstyasminniti matup" (5-2-94) relates to the possession of something as an organ and not as an adjacent one. The letter a in vartaka does not possess the sound r as an organ of it but possesses the same only as an adjacent one. Hence it can never be treated as ravat i.e., possessed of r as a part. Thus even without resorting to the sense of permanent possession of the sound r, the purpose is achieved here and hence he differs with Kt here.

3. The rule "arthavad adhaturapratyayah prātipadikam" (1-2-45) as the basis for the existence of non-derivative stems coined at random.

Kt observes that the rule "arthavad adhaturapratyayah prātipadikam" (1-2-45) presumes the existence of stems which are not derived from roots with addition of some suffix 20. If all stems are formed from roots, they can well be grouped as krdanta i.e., those having

a kṛt suffix at their end and they will get the designation prātipadika by the rule "kṛttadhitasamāsāśca" (1-2-46) itself, which entitles kṛdanta stems to the title of prātipadika. Hence in the absence of non-derivative stems the rule "arthavad adhāturapratyayah prātipadikam" (1-2-45) will become redundant and hence it implies the existence of said stems, to endow which with the designation, the rule becomes necessary.

NBh does not agree with Kt here. He cites stems like bahupatu where the taddhita suffix bahuc is added before the word patu by the rule " Vibhāṣa supo bahuc purastāt tu" (5-3-65). These words are taddhitapūrva and hence the rule "kṛttadhitasamāsāśca" cannot provide them with the said designation and to serve that purpose the rule "arthavad adhāturapratyayah prātipadikam" (1-2-45) is necessary and hence is no longer redundant to indicate the existence of non-derivative stems.

NBh however cites a view in support of Kt's presumption. Others hold that the part taddhita in the rule "kṛttadhitasamāsāśca" (1-2-46) is to be
understood not as taddhitānta but as taddhitavisista i.e., having taddhita suffix (either in the beginning middle or end). Hence instances like bahupatu which has a taddhita suffix at the beginning can be designated as prātipadika by the rule "kṛttaddhitasaṃśāsca" (1-2-46). The rule therefore is redundant and that is why Kṛt says that the rule implies the existence of the non-derivative stems. There is no scope for the doubt, that the rule "arthavat adhāturapratyayāḥ prātipadikam" (1-2-45) may endow prātipadikasamjña to the word pacataki which is tiṇanta and possessed of taddhita suffix akac, since it is arthavat. This is because the part apratyayah of the rule shall bring the prohibition of prātipadikasamjña to pacataki which has got the tiṇ suffix at the end. So also there is no need for another doubt that if the rule "kṛttaddhitasaṃśāsca" (1-2-46) endows to a sabda possessed of a taddhita suffix, the prātipadikasamjña, there is the contingency of the samjña on the sabda bahupatavastisthanti. This is because the taddhita suffix can ever be possessed by subanta words like patu alone and not by tiṇanta words like tisthanti and so bahupatu alone will be designated as prātipadika. Thus others justify the view of Kṛt.
4. The śābdabodha of the rule "vrddhirādaic".

Pat establishes that the rule "vrddhirādaic" (1-1-1) is a samjñāsūtra defining the technical term vrddhi since there is sāmānādhi karanya and ekavibhaktikatva in the said rule. Kt here says that 'tattu sāmānādhi karanyam śabdārthayor eva kecīt icchānti, dvābhyaṁ śabdābhyaṁ bhinnapravṛthinimittābhyām ekasya adhikarānasya abhidheyaṁya pratipādanāt'.

According to this view of Kt, the śābdabodha derived from the rule is given by NBh. In a samjñābodhakasabda the pravṛttinimitta is that sabda itself whereas in a samjñābodhakasabda the pravṛttinimitta is the quality that rests in the samjñin. Accordingly the pravṛttinimitta of vrddhiḥ is vrddhiśabda itself and that of ādaic is ādaictvā. The śābdabodha of the rule therefore is as follows. That which has got vrddhiśabda as the motive force of denotation is identical with ā, ai and au (vrddhiśabdavadbhīnāḥ ādaicah). The contention of Kt is only that in this way the sāmānādhi karanya of the word vrddhiḥ and ādaic can be explained. NBh

now cites a view of certain scholars in which the sabdabodha of the rule is pointed in a different manner. According to them, the word vrddhih denotes vrddhisabda itself and not vrddhisabdavat that which has got vrddhisabda as the pravrttinimitta i.e., the motive force of denotation. Accordingly the sabdabodha derived from the rule is vrddhisabdābhinnah ādaicah i.e., vrddhisabda is identical with ā ai and au. The verse of Bhar is quoted here by NBh.

"vrddhyādayo yathā sabdāḥ svarūpanibandhanāḥ ādaicpratyayitāśśabdaissambandham yānti samjñībibhīn̄"

NBh says that the holders of this view maintain that samānadikaranya of two words is the denotation of ideas within which one shall be the principal element in regard to the other. They find no necessity of considering pravrttinimitta as a determining factor of samānadikaranya.

5. The word 'taparah' in the rule "taparastatkālasya" (1-1-76).

Under the Śivasūtra "eōṅkāiauc" Pat observes that the compound word taparah in the rule "taparastatkālasya" (1-1-70) denotes both viz. that
which has \( t \) as its predecessor and that which precedes \( t \). How can the single expression taparah convey these two ideas? Kt's explanation is that taparah is an expression by tantra and NBh agrees to it. Kt then gives an alternative explanation taparah is an expression by ekaśesa. Among the two similar words taparah (one in the sense of the bahuvrihi compound and the other in the sense of the tatpurusa compound) one alone is retained by the rule "sarupanam ekasesa ekavibhaktau" (1-2-64) and thereby the expression taparah which conveys the sense of both, is accomplished.

NBh does not give his consent to this explanation. He says that if it were ekasesa, the retained word ought to have the dual number as taparau. If we accept taparah to be a samāhara dvandva compound, so that the singular number in it can be explained, yet there is the difficulty of the non-achievement of ekasesa, since ekasesa is not enjoined in samāhāradvandva. NBh therefore finds the view of Kt here to be reconsiderable.

6. The significance of the technical term 'samyoga' defined by the rule "halo'nantarâh samyogah".

Kt considers the term 'samyoga' defined by the rule "halo'nantarâh samyogah" (1-1-6) to be significant one. The term, in accordance with its derivative sense (samyujyante asmin varnâ iti samudâyah samyogah) the term relates to the contiguous consonants as a whole and not to each of them individually. Hence, he says that, there is no need of the insertion of the word saha in the body of the rule so that the term may relate to the whole alone.

NBh does not support this view of Kt. He points out that the derivative sense of the word is over-extensible since a word like vrksah or a sentence like râmah gacchati is contingent to get this samjña, in as much as both of them are equally samudâyahs in which contiguous letters viz. ks and cch are combined. The presence of other letters in them do not contradict this status. NBh, therefore, does not favour the

acceptance of the application of the derivative sense of the term in regard to those that are designated by the term.

7. The purpose served by the word 'eka' of the compound ekāc in the rule "nipāta ekājanāṁ" (1-1-14).

Under the rule "nipāta ekājanāṁ" (1-1-14)
Pat says that the part eka of the compound ekāc in the rule indicates the maxim 'varṇagrahane jātigrahanam'24.
NEbh does not agree with the explanation given by Kt, as to how the word eka indicates the paribhāsa. Kt observes that the expression ekāc in the rule being a tatpurusa compound means a single vowel and this idea can be obtained even if the expression be ac.
He gives the reason. It is the term pragrhyā that is predicated here and hence is the important (prađhāna) one in the rule. Ac is the samjñin and since it helps the samjñā, is guna i.e., subordinate to the samjñā.
Kt maintains that the number in the word denoting the apradhāna can be intended. He cites the vedic

24. Vide NbŚ p.174:-
"yadi tatpuruso'yam samanadhiñhāro naṁ nārthā ekagrañhārena-evaṁ tarhi siddhe sati yadajgrañhāne
kriyamāne ekagrañhāna karoti tajñāpayācāryah
anyatra varṇagrahane jātigrañhānam bhavaĩ ac"
injunction 'pasunāyajati' wherein the singular number
in the word pasunā which denotes the animal is intenced.
Considering that pasu is unimportant in as much the
animal is meant for sacrifice and not vice-versa. Hence
even if the rule need be "ac nipātaḥ", a single vowel
is provided with the term and the part eka becomes
superfluous to indicate the maxim.

NBh on the other hand, points out that in
fact it is the samjñā that exists for the samjñin. Hence
samjñin cannot be treated as apradāna but is anuvādyā
since a samjñā is predicated in regard to it. The
sense of ekatva standing as adjacent to the samjñin by
virtue of the singular number in the word ac cannot be
intended. NBh quotes the dictum of Mimāmsakas,
'vidheya vīṣeṣanam vivakṣitam anuvādyavīṣeṣanam avivakṣitam'
Hence ac cannot be taken to convey the idea of a single
vowel in the manner described by Kt. According to NBh
the word eka becomes superfluous in the following manner.
The word ac denotes that which is possessed of the
quality 'actva' and a group consisting of more than one
vowel cannot be treated as possessed of the quality
actva just as there is not the quality namely svāṅgatva,
in svāṅgasamudāya (a group of organs). Hence by the expression as ac in the said rule, the term shall relate only to a single vowel (that which is possessed of actva) and not to the acsamudāya which is not possessed of actva. Hence the word eka in the rule becomes superfluous. Hence NBh differs with Kt here.

After pointing out that the word eka in ekac is superfluous, Kt and NBh agree in pointing out that the same indicates the maxim 'varṇagrahane jātigrahaṇam', meaning "Genus is referred to in instances when letters are referred to". In the existence of such a maxim if the wording of the rule be as nipāta ajanān, the term pragrhyā may shoot to the group of vowels in each of which there is the genus actva, otherwise the reference to genus cannot be effective since the even with reference to genus a single vowel can be referred to. Thus the word eka is used to here to avokd the group of vowels being designated as pragrhyā.
8. The technical term 'sampras̄aranā' defined by the rule "ig yanah sampras̄aranam" (1-1-45).

While interpreting the rule "ig yanah sampras̄aranam" (1-1-45) Pat says that the term 'sampras̄aranā' is applicable to both i.e., to the letter namely the ik that replaces yan and to the sentence 'yanah ig bhavati' that conveys the sense that yan replaces ik.

Kt here points out that the rule can provide the term to the above mentioned two in case the sūtra is repeated twice as igyanah sampras̄aranam and igyanah sampras̄aranam. This can be secured by treating the rule as "tantranirdesa āvrttinirdesa or ekasesanirdesa".25

NBh on the other hand does not feel the necessity of repetition here. A sentence is to be repeated in case the predication made, by the sentences that are got by repetition are different. In the

context, in both the sentences got by repetition, the predication made is of the same namely the term *samprasarana* and hence it is quite possible to predicate in one sentence a single *samjña* though it relates to more than one. The basis of NBh's view seems to be 'vidheyabhedād vākyabhedā'. Again Kt maintains that in the view that the term relates to the letter *ik* that substitutes *yan*, there shall be accepted the influence of the rule "yathāsaṅkhyaṃ anudesah samānām" (1-3-10) so that the term may relate to *i*, *u*, *r* and *l* that replace *y*, *v*, *r* and *l* respectively. Otherwise the term may relate to *i*, *u*, *r* and *l* that replace *y*, *v*, *r* and *l* and as such there is contingency of this designation to each one of *ik* that replaces among *yan*. Thereby the letter *i* which replaces *l* in the formation of the word *aduhi* (Aorist First person singular of the root *duḥ*) is contingent to derive this designation and it may result in the undesirable lengthening of *i* by the rule "halah" (6-4-2).

Here also NBh disagrees with Kt. He points out that if the respective order be accepted in relation to *ik* and *yan*, *ik* has to comprehend the four
letters verily in the order i, u, r and l and to secure this order the enunciation of l after r in the Śivasūtras is essential. Otherwise the pratyāhāra śik shall comprehend only the three letter i, u and r. The substitutes being four in number, it can be seen that the respective replacement of three by four is improbable. Thus the enunciation of the letter l in the rule can be treated as serving the purpose i.e., the term 'samprasārana' relates to i, u, r and l only when they replace y, v, r and l respectively. Thus the enunciation of l in the Śivasūtras being purposeful the questioning of the same by Pat is contradicted 26. NBh therefore does not favour the adoption of the rule "yathāsāṅghya-manudeśaḥ samānām" (1-3-10). The purpose he says can be achieved by taking recourse to the tadbhāvita-pakṣa in words like samprasāranaśya in rules 6.4.2. "halāḥ" (6-4-2).

9. The number of letters comprehended by the pratyāhāras ik and yan and the substitution by l of the vowel l.

Under the rule "sthānantaratamah" (1-1-50) Pat discusses the instances which form the scope for the operation of the rule "sthānantaramah". In the passage "ikō yanaci-dadhyatra madhvatra tālustomānasya tālustomānah, oṣṭāsthamānasya oṣṭaṣṭhamānah yatha syād iti" it is pointed out that the rule "sthānantaramah" (1-1-50) has its play in the function of the rule "ikō yan aci" (6-1-77) so that the palatal ṭ among ik get the palatal ṭ among yan and the labial ṭ gets the labial ṭ among yan as substitutes, and dadhyatra and madhvatra form the instances for the same. Here Kt makes the remark that the criterion, for determining the substitutes and their sthanin, cannot be the rule "yathāsāṅkhyaṃ anudesah samānāṃ" (1-3-10) since the number of the sthanin and the substitutes are not equal. The letters i u r and l denoted by the word ik comprehends totally sixty six varieties of letters i.e., 18 varieties of each of the vowels, i u and r and 12 varieties

27. Mbh p.166
of l which is devoid of the six varieties of dirgha.

Yan comprehends seven letters namely r and the nasalised and non-nasalised letters of y v and l. Thus sthanin number sixty six and substitutes amount to seven.

Mbh maintains that though theoretically it can be said that r possesses eighteen varieties and l twelve, it is to be remembered that the nasalised varieties of lengthened r and those of prolate r and l are nowhere seen in usages and so the statement of Kt that ik comprehends 66 varieties, requires reconsideration.

The same is the case with the statement that yan comprehends seven letters. The nasalized varieties and non-nasalized varieties of y v and l are not identical, and are cognates and cannot be comprehended by yan which on the strength of the negation apratyayah made in the rule "anuditsavarvasya capratyayah" (1-1-69) denotes only y v r and l and does not comprehend the nasalized varieties which are cognates.

In the following passage "naitad asti samkhyatanudesenapyetad siddham, Pat establishes that the criterion for determining the respective sthanin and substitutes is the rule "yathasaṅkhyaamanudesah saṁānāṁ" (1-3-10). Here Kt says that the letters denoted by
the pratyāhāras īk and yan, being four are equal though
the number of letters comprehended by these four i.e.,
ī u r and ī which form īk and y v r and ī
that form yan vary. Kt then anticipates a doubt.
Is there an instance where the ī is found substituted
by ī? And in the absence of such an instance how
can one resort to the rule "yathāsaṅkhyamanudeśah samānām"
(1-3-10), for determining the sthānin of yan. He
feels answered by citing an instance like ghaslādesah
where ī has been substituted by ī considering that
there is the precedance by ac for ī.

NBh points out that a doubt as such is quite
out of place. The rule "yathāsaṅkhyamanudeśah samānām"
(1-3-10) depends, for its operation, on the equality of
number of the denotary words of two groups connected to
each other in a rule. The rule does not care for the
number of those comprehended by these denotary words.
This fact has been made clear by Pat in the pratyāhāra
ahnika. Hence without paying heed to the existence or non-
existence of an instance where ī is found substituted by
ī the rule "yathāsaṅkhyamanudeśah samānām" (1-3-10) can

28. Udy p. 101
operate here since the denotary words of the sthanin and adesas are four in number. NBh therefore feels that the doubt entertained by Kt and the consequent justification given by him is quite unnecessary.

10. The nature of the nimitta of dhatulopa in the function of the rule "na dhatulopa arthadhatuke" (1-1-4)

Under the rule "pratyayalope pratyayalaksanam" (1-1-62) Pat clarifies that the rule operates in cases of the elision of suffixes which are the nimitta of an operation, for its nature as suffix and not by virtue of a letter comprised in it. This specific function of the rule is brought about by the mention of the word pratyaya a second time in the said rule.

Here Kt makes the remark that the function of the rule "na dhatulopa arthadhatuke", (1-1-4) which disallows guna and vrddhi to ik when, the arthadhatuka suffix that stands as the nimitta of guna or vrddhi, is the cause of the elision of the part of the root; is also likewise. The arthadhatuka suffix brings about the prohibition of guna and vrddhi only when the said suffix brings the elision of the part of the roots.

29. Vide NBh p.340. "atha dvitiyam pratyayagrahanam kimartham? pratyayalaksanam yathā syād varnalaksanam ma bhūd iti".
on the basis of its nature as an ārdhadhatukā suffix. As a result, forms like sudheḥ and sukēḥ the nominative singular of the bases sudhīn and sukrn are obtained. These bases are derived by the addition of the suffix vic, respectively to the roots dhīnv and krnv prefixed with su. In the resultant stage su+dhīnv+vic and su+krnv+vic, the letter ṣ of the suffix vic in accordance with the rule "lopghvyorvalī" (6-1-66). Thus it can be seen that suffix vic does not bring the elision on the basis of its nature ārdhadhatuka suffix and so vic does not bring the prohibition of guna in the nominative singular form. The forms like sudhiḥ and sukīḥ wherein guna has been prohibited are thus avoided.

NBh expresses his strong disagreement in regard to the function of the rule "na dhatulopā ārdhadhatuke" (1-4-4) in a way similar to the operation of the rule "pratyayalope pratyayalaksanam" (1-1-62). He points out that it is by virtue of the second pratyayagrahana that the function of the rule 'pratyayalope pratyayalaksanam' in the specified manner is accepted. The second
pratyayagrahaṇa is an excess so long as there is the word pratyaya in the expression pratyayalopē pratyayalaksanam.

But in regard to the rule "na dhatulopa ārdhadhatuke" the state of affairs is different. There is no guiding factor in the rule, so as to accept the function of the rule in the said manner. NBh establishes his standpoint by pointing out that the word ārdhadhatuke in the rule cannot achieve this purpose. Kt himself has stated that the word ārdhadhatuke is necessary for arriving at forms like totorti. Pat has stated that the word ārdhadhatuke in the rule is necessary to arrive at the form roravīti; otherwise the guna shall operate. Hence to resort to the idea that by the word ārdhadhatuke the suffix is to be nimitta of dhatulopa for its nature as an ārdhadhatuka, cannot be in harmony with the said with the said assertion of Pat in the rule 'kniti ca' (1-1-5). Again, there is no authority too for the acceptance of the repetition of the word ārdhadhatuke so as to comprehend the purpose of arriving at the form roravīti and of making ārdhadhatuka, the nimitta of dhatulopa for its nature as an ārdhadhatuka suffix. All the more, the function of the rule as told by Kt does not agree with the part valopa of the varttika 'na yañyakkyavalopa' in the present sūtra and the Pat's illustration of the same by citing the instance jīradānuh.
Kāt and Pat unanimously opine that in the instance jiradānun, guna contingent by the ārdhadhātuka suffix radānu is prohibited since there is elision of the part v of the root jiv caused by the letter r of the suffix radānu by the rule "lopo vyārvali" (6-1-66). If the prohibition of guna functions only when the ārdhadhātuka is the cause of elision for its nature as ārdhadhātuka, the prohibition cannot apply here since the elision of v does not depend upon the suffix radānu for its nature as an ārdhadhātuka suffix but depends only on a letter comprised in it. Therefore NBh can't but disagree with Kt here.

Explanation of certain words

1. The meaning of the word āmrabuddhyā in the sentence 'sa tatrāmrabuddhyā nyagrodhabuddhim pratipadyate'.

Under the rule "sthānivad ādeso'nalvidhau" (1-1-56) while explaining the idea behind sthānivādhbhāva in relation to the conception of sounds as eternal Pat makes use of a sentence 'sa tatrāmrabuddhyā nyagrodhabuddhim pratipadyate'. Kt gives meaning of the word

30. NBh p.297.
amrabuddhyah of this sentence as "tasyāh anantaram". Thus according to him the sentence means, 'In that case, after the cognition of them as mangotrees, he has the cognition of them as nyagrodha trees'. Here NBh offers a different sense to this word pointed out by certain scholars. They take the word to mean "amrabuddhim vihāya", according to which the sentence means 'In that case, discarding the cognition of them as mango trees, he cognizes them to be nyagrodha trees'.

2. Jāngamah

At the end of his gloss on the bhasya under the rule "na dhatulopa ārdhadhatuke" (1-1-4) Kt deals with the above word31. According to him the formation of the word is as follows. The root gam takes the suffix yan after and gets itself reduplicated. From the resultant form gam+gam+ya wherein all operations pertaining to abhyāsa take effect, a stage like jāngam+ya is arrived at. This yanata root takes the suffix ac after it and leads to the stage jāngam+ya+a. Here Kt says that the letter a of the suffix yan is dropped on the strength of the rule "yasya halah" (6-4-49).

The y is dropped by the function of the rule "yañoci ca" (2-4-74) and thereby the complete form jaṅgamanah by the addition of the nominative singular suffix.

Assuming the formation of the word as pointed out above, Kt raises an objection here and gives the solution to which NBh disagrees totally. He doubts that there is the contingency of the elision of the letter a of yañ whereby, there is the contingency of the elision of the letter a of yañ whereby there is the threat of the elision of the upadhā i.e., a of jaṅgam by the rule "gamahanajanakhanaghasam lopah knityanani" (6-4-98). He clears the doubt giving the solution that a of yañ can be treated as an whereby the prohibition of upadhālopa is is brought by the part anāni of the said rule. Here an objection may be raised. The an in yañ is meaningless whereas there is the suffix an (substitute of the suffix cli) which is meaningful and therefore the an mentioned in the rule cannot refer to the meaningless an of the suffix yañ and so how can the elision of the penultimate be prohibited by the part anāni? Kt's retort to this argument is that the rule "gamahana...." (6-4-98) enjoin the elision of the penultimate when gam is followed by a suffix beginning with a vowel and the a of yañ cannot be treated
as a suffix since it is meaningless considering that suffix referred to is possessed of meaning. So it cannot bring the elision of the penultimate and so the previous doubt regarding the contingency of the elision of the penultimate is baseless.

NBh does not agree with the view that a of yan cannot be treated as an ajādisprayya. He points out that the acceptance of the same as such is necessitated by the part vare in the rule "na padāntadvirvacanavareyalopa...." (1-1-58). This rule prohibits the sthanivadbhava of the substitutes of a vowel, when the nimitta of the substitute for replacing the vowel be the suffix vara(c) which the yanata roots take after them. With reference to the formation of words like yayavarah formed by the addition of the suffix vara(c) to the yananta root yayaya, the substitute namely elision of the vowel a in the suffix yaṅ can be treated as a suffix by virtue of sthanivadbhava. Fearing the sthanivadbhava of elision in which case there is the contingency of the elision of the vowel a at the end of yayā by the rule "āto lopa iti ca" (6-4-64) which enjoins the fact that the vowel a elides when followed by an ajādisuffix; the rule "na dhatulopa ārdhadhatuke" (1-1-4) prohibits the same. Here it is to be noted
that if the vowel a of yan can no longer be treated as an ajadi suffix, its substitute namely elision, too cannot be the same by sthanivadbhāva in which case only the a is contingent to be dropped. Hence the prohibition of sthanivadbhāva to that effect implies the contingency of the elision of a here which confirms that the sthanivadbhāva brings an ajadi suffix and thus in turn points out that the sthanin i.e., a of yan is an ajadi suffix.

Again forms like yatih can be obtained only if a of yan is treated as an ajadi suffix. The yananta root i.e., yayaya takes the suffix kti after it. In the resultant form yayā+ya+ti the a of yan is dropped by the rule "ato lopah" (6-4-48) and y is dropped by the rule "lopo vyor vali" (6-1-66). Now the a at the end of yayā has to be dropped by the rule "āto lopa iti ca" (6-4-64). It is possible only if the elision is treated as an ajadi suffix by sthanivadbhāva which necessitates the acceptance of a as an ajadiprayaya and when the preceding y of a is also dropped the form yatih is arrived.

Thus NBh establishes the fact that a of yan has to be treated as ajadi suffix. Therefore there
always lurks the contingency of the elision of penultimate of gam in jaṅgamah by means of the sthāñivadbhāva of the elision of the a of yañ. To prevent this contingency NBh suggests the process of formation of the word in a manner different from the one described by Kt. During the stage jangam+ya+ac wherein the yañanta root is followed by the suffix ac, the suffix ya(n) is dropped wholly by the rule "yañoci ca" (2-4-74) instead of the individual elision of a by the split rule "yasya" and that of y by the rule "yañoci ca" (2-4-74). The result is that the elision of yañ is never an ajādesa since it has replaced a and y and so here there is no contingency of sthāñivadbhāva which is enjoined to the substitute of a vowel alone by the rule "acāh parasmin pūrvavidhau" (1-1-57).

3. The expression anyathājātīyaka in the bhaṣya passage "anyathājātīyakena nirdesāh kriyate, anyathājātīyaka udāhriyate."[^32]

Under the rule "tasminniti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya" (1-1-66) Pat uses the base anyathājātīyaka with two different case-endings in the sentence "anyathājātīyakena nirdesāh kriyate, anyathājātīyaka udāhriyate". The

[^32]: NBh p.359.
base anyathajátiyaka is formed by the addition one by one of the two taddhita suffixes thāl and jātiyar to the word anya. These suffixes are ordained by the rules "prakāravacane thāl" (5-3-23) and "prakāravacane jātiyar" (5-3-69), from which it is clear that they convey the same idea. Since the addition to a base of two suffixes denoting the same meaning may appear to be in vain, such usages require explanation.

With the above view in mind Kt makes a distinction in the sense conveyed by these two suffixes. Though both these are enjoined in the same sense "prakāravacana" there is a natural distinction in their sense. The suffix thāl denotes prakāra alone whereas the suffix jātiyar denotes prakaravat. Anyathā shall accordingly mean anyasādṛśya and anyajātiyā may mean anyasādṛśa. In the context if the suffix thāl alone is added to the base, the expression anyathā shall convey the idea anyapraṅkāra and with a view the convey the idea anyapraṅkāravat there is the addition of the suffix jātiyar to anyathā and thereby the expression anyathajātiyakena. Kt continues that in fact jātiyar alone is capable of conveying the sense of anyapraṅkāravat and the suffix thāl is here superfluous. He remarks that hence the
usage of the same in addition to jātiyar is to show that with regard to usages in language (lankikaprayoga) as opposed to that in grammar brevity or parsimony in expression much cared for.

NBh is quite in conformity with Kt in regard to the above implication. But he does not feel the necessity of a distinction, in the sense, conveyed by these suffixes enjoined with the same wording prakāravacane, to indicate the above fact. His contention is that this implication is possible even when these two suffixes are treated as conveying the sense prakāravat. It is quite correct to say that the usage of the two suffixes conveying the one and the same idea, imply that one need not pay heed to brevity in regard to the usages in language. Again both rules have the same wording prakāravacane and therefore one cannot contradict the denotation of the idea of prakāravat by the suffix thāl when the suffix jātiyar conveys the idea of prakāravat by the suffix thāl when the suffix jātiyar conveys the idea of prakāravat. Moreover Pat has used the suffix ka also here the same being a svārthika suffix that which does not convey a sense in addition to that conveyed by the base to which it is added, the same can also indicate the above fact. Thus NBh points out that
a distinction in the sense of these two suffixes is hardly justifiable for the implication of the above fact.

4. The expression taparopadesaḥ in the bhasya

"sandhyaksaresu taparopadesaścet taparoccāranam kartavyam"33

Under the Śivasūtra hayavarat Pat discusses the question whether the dipthongs are to be enumerated in Śivasūtras just as they are read, or along with t as "et otn" and "ait autc". He inaugurates the discussion saying that "sandhyaksaresu taparopadesaścet taparoccāranam kartavyam". In this sentence if the expression taparopadesaḥ means the utterance of t as a precedent, the sentence may convey a non-sensical idea "If there is the utterance t as a precedent to the dipthongs, the utterance of t is to be effected". Hence Kt opines that the part upadesaḥ in the said expression should mean the purpose of utterance. What Kt means is that, NBh says, the suffix ghan in the part upadesa is in the sense of sampradāna. The sentence can now be shown as conveying logically correct idea i.e., if there is any purpose served by the utterance of t as precedent to dipthongs, the utterance of the same (t) is to be made.

33. NBh p.78.
NBh points out that others hold a different opinion. The suffix \textit{ghan} in \textit{upadesa} in the said expression is in the sense of \textit{karana} i.e., instrument of an action. The purpose of an action can be treated as the \textit{karana} of that action. Hence the word \textit{upadesa} by virtue of the suffix \textit{ghan} being in the sense of \textit{karana}, means the \textit{karana} of utterance in otherwords the purpose of the action. Hence the sentence "sandhyaksaresu taparopadesasacat." signifies that 'if there is the instrument namely the purpose of utterance, of t as a precedent to the dipthongs, the utterance of the same as a precedent, is to be made'.

5. The process of formation of the word 'vrksav'

According to Kt the form \textit{vrksav} is to be formed from the root \textit{vrskavrsc} by the addition of the \textit{krt} suffix \textit{vic} and not by that of \textit{kvip}. The original root \textit{vrasc} takes \textit{kvip} after that, when there is the \textit{upapada} namely \textit{vrksa}. The resultant form with \textit{sampasara} \textit{vrksavrsc+kvip} is a \textit{pratipadika} by the rule "\textit{krtadhitasaamasasca}" (1-2-44). When on the strength of the \textit{varttika}, '\textit{pratipadikad dhavatvarthe bahulam isthayacca}'

\textit{34. Prdp p.98.}
the suffix nic is added to it the same becomes
vrksavrśc+i and the part rśc which is the ti is
substituted by lopa on the strength of the said vārttika.
The subsequent form vrksav is now a root by the rule
"sanādyantā dhatavah" (3-1-32). This root takes the
suffix vic after it. Lopa replaces i by the rule
"neraniti" (6-4-51) and then follows the elision of
vic by the rule "veraprktasya" (6-1-67). Thus the form
vrksav is arrived it

Kt argues that if the termination added to
the root vrksav be kvip, as stage like vrksav may be
arrived at, but the process of formation may not end with
it. By the application of the maxim "ekadesāvikrtam
ananyavad bhavati", the v in vrksav can be treated
as vrśc in spite of the lopa of rśc and hence the same
is prone to samprasārana enjoined to vrśc by the rule
"grahijyāvayiyathi vāstivātivṛscati..." (6-1-16).
The accomplished form will therefore never be vrksav
and hence the necessity of the addition of vic alone to
the root.

NBh deems that this view of Kt requires reconsidera-
tion. The v in vrksav cannot be regarded as vrśc by the
maxim 'ekadesāvikrtam ananyavad bhavati'. There are two
reasons for the same. The one is that the sthāna of
tilopa is the prātipadika vrksavṛśc and not vrśc. Hence
there being no change of rśc in the status as the ti
of vrśc, v is the ekadesavikṛta of vrksavṛśc, and not of vrśc alone in which case the same would have been considered as vrśc by the said maxim. Even if tilopa be however treated as connected with vrśc, one cannot apply the maxim on v because the major portion of vrśc has undergone change and in instances where half or more than half of the portion of a sabda has undergone a change, the maxim cannot be applied there. This is the second reason.

NBh adds that if vrśc is taken as the sthānīna of tilopa, the same being an ekāc there is the contingency of the operation of prakṛtibhava to vrśc by the sūtra "prakṛtyaikāc" (6-4-163) and that will supersede the tilopa. Therefore the sthānīna of tilopa need necessarily be the pratipadika vrksavṛśc so that it may not to be superseded by prakṛtibhava. Thus v cannot in no way be considered as vrśc and hence there is no contingency on v of the samprāsārana originally enjoined to the root vrśc. NBh thus points out that the assertion of Kṛ that in case of the addition of kvip to the root vrksavṛśc the form vrksav cannot be arrived at, requires reconsideration.
CHAPTER VII

CRITICISM OF THE PRADĪPA (CONTD.)

II REFUTATIONS
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The criticism of the Prdp by NBh is not limited to the mere expression of his dissent with the assertions of Kt. With precise and decisive arguments he refutes certain assertions of Kt in regard to the interpretations of sutras and varttikas and the explanation of the expressions and passages in the bhasya.

Interpretation of Sutras

1. The necessity of enunciation of the letter l in the Sivasutras.

The letter l is looked upon as an ac as it is enunciated in the sutra rlk. Kt brings to our attention the varttika rlvarnayoh mithah savarnyam vacyam and says
that this vārttika is competent to serve the above purpose. The letter r is an ac. The letter 1 also which according to this vārttika is a cognate of r, can be looked upon as an ac on the basis of the fact itself that it is comprehended by an ac namely r.

Kt points out that one is thus naturally prone to doubt the necessity of the enumeration of the letter 1. But he says that the fact is that Pan does not pay heed to the said vārttika. From the point of view of Pan, 1 is never a cognate of r so as to comprehend 1 whereby 1 will be designated as an ac. Therefore the enunciation of 1 in the Śivasūtras. Refuting this view of Kt, NBh points out that if 1 were not taught as one among the letters enunciated in the form of the fourteen Śivasūtras, the authenticity of 1 itself will be doubted.

At this juncture, the assertion too, of cognateness between r and 1 cannot be sustained. As a matter of fact, it is the enunciation of 1 that facilitated the assertion of cognateness by Kt. The justification of the enunciation of 1 in the Śivasūtras cannot therefore be made on the basis of the fact that Pan is negligent or ignorant of the vārttika.

NBh's refutation of the view of Kt becomes all the more effective when he quotes the words of Pan.
at the end of the bhāṣya under the Śivasūtras

[[1]](1-1-9) "Anupadistam sat katham śakyaṁ vijnātum? which means "How can one accept the existence of a letter that is not enumerated". Pat makes this assertion to show that the existence of a consonant having one matra cannot be accepted. This passage supports the view that in the absence of the enunciation of \( \text{ल} \) even the existence of the same cannot be accepted and so the assertion too of cognateness of \( \text{ल} \) with \( \text{र} \) is not feasible. The existence of the letters like \( \text{अ} \), \( \text{इ} \) etc. can be accepted in spite of the absence of their enumeration. This is because, NBh says that they are comprehended by the letters \( \text{आ} \), \( \text{इ} \) etc. that are enumerated in the sūtras. But with regard to the letter \( \text{ल} \), the guiding principle of cognateness, namely the rule "tulyasyaprayatnam savarnam" (1-1-9) cannot apply on \( \text{र} \) and \( \text{ल} \) as they are not 'tulyasyaprayatna' with each other. \( \text{ल} \) will not therefore be comprehended by \( \text{र} \) and that is why \( \text{ल} \) is enumerated in the Śivasūtras.

1. *Mbh* p.86.
The meaning of the word 'sthāna' in the sutra

"sasthī sthāneyogā" (1-1-49).

Pat points out that in the sūtras of Panādesas are enjoined to those that are uttered in the sūtras with the sixth case at the ending. Since there is no sasthīnirdesa in the sūtra in vrddhirādaic (1-1-1), he refutes the view that the sūtra prescribes ādaic as the substitutes of the word vrddhi. However in contrary to the said assertion it is found that sūtras like "nabhi nabham ca" and "parastri parasu ca" teach the substitutes nabha and parasu in the place of the sthānin namely nabhi and parastri which are not sasthīnirdista in the said rule.

In order to justify this sthānyadesabhāva in spite of the absence of sasthīnirdesa of the sthānin Kṛ resorts to the double meaning, prasaṅga and artha, conveyed by the word sthāna in the sūtra 'sasthīsthāneyogā' (1-1-49). The word 'sthāna' there is a tantranirdesa. The rule is interpreted to be

3. "nabhi nabham ca" and "parastri parasu ca" are two gānasūtras which come respectively in the gānas headed by the words, śarat and bida, referred to in the rules "avyayībhāve śaratprabhritibhyah" (5-4-107) and 'anrsyānantaraye bidūdibhyoh " (1-1-104)
conveying two ideas. One is that in grammar the sixth case denotes the sense of scope (i.e., prasāṅga).

The idea got by taking the word sthāna to mean artha is that the sthānin gets as its substitute the one which is competent to denote the sense of the original.

Accordingly, the rule points out sasthīnirdesa and artha-sadbhāva as the deciding factors of sthānyadesabhāva.

It is owing to the presence of the same artha that nabha is understood as the substitute of nabhi and paraśurī as the substitute of paraśū. That is why, Kṛṣṇadeva says that there is no sasthīnirdesa in the rules nabhi nabham ca and paraśū paraśū ca.

According to NBh it is in vain to take the word sthāna to mean artha. The word conveys the idea of prasāṅga alone. The prasāṅga of a sabda itself means the same of the sabda possessed of artha, since one employs a sabda to convey an artha. Thus the sense namely prasāṅga conveyed by sasthīnirdesa in a rule points out that the connection of sthānin and adesa is brought about by artha. Thus it comes out that the sthānin gets as its substitute the one which conveys the sense of the sthanin. Thus in sutras like nabhi nabham ca,
nabha is understood as the substitute of nabhi in spite of the absence of sasthīnirdesa in the rule and thus NBh refutes Kt's interpretation of the word sthāna, in the rule "sasthīsthāneyogā" to mean artha also in addition to prasaṅga.

3. The necessity of the insertion of the word nimitta in the rule "kniti ca" (1-1-5).

In the vārttika "knitipratisedhe tannimittagrahamam", it is pointed out that the rule "kniti ca" (1-1-5) ought to be read as "knīnnimitte ca". Kt says that in the said rule, the words ikah and gunavrddhi are got by anuvṛtti and tannimittagrahaṇa is necessary only if in the interpretation of the rule, the word kniti is taken to be the vīsesana of ikah and not that of gunavrddhi. The prohibition of gunavrddhi by this rule is desired on the last (as in citam) as well as the penultimate of the anāga in the instances of bhinnam and chinnam respectively. By the application of the paribhāṣā rule "tasminnitinirdiṣṭe pūrvasya" (1-1-66) on the word kniti, the rule shall mean that the ik which is adjunctly

4. NBh p.136.

5. The roots bhid and chid added with the suffix kta produce the forms bhinnam and chinnam.
previous to the \textit{knit} suffix shall get the prohibition. Though the \textit{ik} which is the last element of the \textit{niga} in \textit{citam stutam} etc. gets the prohibition thereby, the penultimate in \textit{bhinnam} and \textit{chinnam} cannot be benefitted as the same cannot be adjunctly previous to the \textit{knit} suffix. The insertion of the word \textit{nimitta}, thereby becomes a necessity. Kt says that if the word \textit{kniti} relates to \textit{gunavrddhi}, the paribhasa rule \textit{tasminniti nirdiste purvasya} won't apply on the word \textit{kniti}. One can achieve the prohibition of anything which is get to take effect and not that of an operation which has already taken effect. The \textit{guna} and \textit{vrddhi}, being not taken effect if to be probibited, cannot be designated as previous or subsequent to a suffix. Hence the absence of the influence of the rule \textit{tasminniti nirdiste purvasya} on the word \textit{kniti}. The locative case in \textit{kniti} can only be in the sense of \textit{nimitta} by the rule \textit{"vasya ca bhāvena bhāvalaksanam" (2-3-37)} in which case there is no need of the insertion of the word \textit{nimitta} in the rule.

The arguments advanced by NBh completely upset the standpoint of Kt. NBh establishes that the word \textit{kniti} is necessarily to be treated as an adjunct to the
word gunavrddhi and the insertion of the word nimitta is indispensable in this case. He points out that during the discussion of the topic, Kat and Pat have nowhere mentioned the anuvrtti of the word ikah and so there is no question of the word kniti relating to ikah. NBh continues that even if the anuvrtti of the word ikah be accepted, it is to be treated as sabdadhihika i.e., anuvrtti of the word ikah devoid of the meaning denoted by it in the previous rule and the word kniti cannot relate, the sabdasvarupa ikah pointed out by the word ikah. Among the other words gunavrddhi na bhavatah, the word kniti cannot relate to na or bhavatah since bhavatikriya or absence cannot be followed or preceded by a suffix since they have got no form. The word kniti cannot therefore but be the viresana of gunavrddhi. The locative case in kniti makes the word liable to the influence of the rule "tasminniti mirdiste purvasya" (1-1-66). Though there is nimittasaptami enjoined by the rule "yasya ca bhavena bhavalaksanam" (2-3-37) the parasaaptami will supersede it on the authority of the statement 'upapadavibhakto kārakavibhaktir baliyasi'. Nor can one doubt it again to be nimittasaptami by the siddhasadhya samabhihāranyāya, as a rule possesses greater force than a nyaya. Besides the application of the
paribhasā cannot be doubted by the maxim 'viddhau
paribhasopatisthate nānuvade' since such a statement
is seen nowhere in the MBh. Even in case of its
acceptance, it has been established that this maxim
relates to the two rules "iko guṇavṛddhi" (1-1-3) and
"acāśca" (1-2-28).

Thus by the operation of the paribhasā, the
rule means 'kniti pare purvasya avyayahītasya guṇavṛddhi
na bhavatah'. The rule therefore shall accord the
prohibition to those guṇavṛddhi alone that substitute
an ik which is adjunctly previous to the kniti suffix.
This necessitates the tannimittagrahana in the rule.

NBh says that the application of the rule "tasminniti
nirdiste purvasya" (1-1-66) on the word kniti and
the absence of the anuvṛtti of the word ikah is
sanctioned by Pat when he states 'yatā knityanantaraḥ guṇa-
bhavyastītatra syād'. In this statement the
absence of the word ikah has got a significant bearing
to the argument of NBh. The fact is again borne
out by the citation of the instance hatah by Pat as
the prayojana of the insertion of the word nimitta.

6. MBh p.137.
If, as according to Kt, the word ikah is got by anuvratti, the instance h3t~ can never be the exclusive benefit of tannimittagrahana as the absence itself of ik in the word can bring the prohibition of guna feared to operate there.

4. The technical term 'samyoga' prescribed by the rule "halonantarãh samyogah" (1-1-7).

Kat considers that the word saha is to be added to the rule "halonantarãh samyogah" (1-1-7) so that the designation samyoga shall relate to contiguous consonants collectively and to each of them individually. Pat considers the same to be unnecessary. This is because there are instances where the predicate relates to the subject individually as in 'devadattavyajñadattavisnumitrã bhojyantãm and where the predicate relates to the subject collectively as in Gargãh satam dandyantãm. In the former sentence the word pratyãekam is not found, nor is the word saha found in the latter. Since Pan has followed the practice current in the world in not using the word pratyãekam

in the sutra "vrddhirādaic" (1-1-1) and "adeṇ gunah" (1-1-2) he does not mention the word saha in this sutra and it is quite correct says Pat.

Here Kt opines that the word samyoga is a technical term functioning in accordance with its derivative sense. He says samyujyante varnāh asmin iti samudāyāh samyogah. In accordance with its derivative sense, "wherein letters are combined" the term shall relate to contiguous consonants as a whole and not individually. Hence there is no need of the insertion of the word saha in the rule.

NBh refutes this view of Kt. However before attacking his view he makes the point of view of Kt clear. Kt's opinion is that though there are instances of the predicate relating to the subject in a sentence individually, that process does not apply in this sutra, since it contradicts the action of the term according to its derivative sense. Moreover to accept the term as relating to contiguous consonants individually results in treating the word anantarāh as upalaksana whereas when the term relates to the consonants collectively the word has the function of
viśeṣana, adjective in the sense and it is always preferable to the former. Again favourites of the view that term relates individually seeks to explain rules like "vānyasya samyogādeh" (6.4-68) by resorting to the splitting of the word samyogādeh as samyogau ādī yasya tasya, so as to avoid the over applicability of the rule in instance like nīrāyāt. These people may have to face this objection that samyogādeh may be split as samyogah ādayah yasya, as there is no guiding factor as to the number of the components used while splitting a compound and this will prevent the function of the rule in instances like gleyat. Thus after explaining Kt's standpoint NBh adds the word ahuh communicating that he does not factor this view.

To refute the view of Kt NBh points out that the derivative sense of the term is misleading as it may lead the designation to a word or to a sentence wherein also letters are combined. Just as in a statement ghatapatau samyujyante yatra we conceive of a thing which is different from ghata and pata and wherein there is the samyoga of these two, so also a word or a sentence too, wherein we get contiguous letters,
shall also be prone to the designation _samyoga_.
Therefore the designation _samyoga_ need not be accepted as _anvarthasamjña_, though the same be a _mahāsamjña_.
Perhaps Pāṇḍu used the term not for its derivative sense, but in accordance with his ancestors who used this term. This is evident from another point, also, says NBh. Pat while refuting the view that the word _saha_ need be added to the rule, resorts to the instance _gargah satam dandyantām_ wherein even in the absence of the word _saha_ the predicate relates to the subject collectively. Pat does never resort to the _anvartha_ of the term. With this strong support at his command NBh refutes the view of Kt.

5. The expression 'halāḥ' in the rule "halo'nantarāḥ samyogah" (1-1-7).

Under the rule "halo'nantarāḥ samyogah" (1-1-7) Pat discusses the question that where there are more than two contiguous consonants, every two gets the designation or the whole alone. In this context, Kt makes an observation that the plural number in the expression halāḥ in the rule is according to the rule "jātyakhyāyāmekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām" (1-2-58).

8. NBh p.146.
Thereby the word halah denotes the genus haltva and not three or more consonants. Therefore, Kt says that, the term sāmyoga shall relate to two contiguous consonants also, as there is the genus haltva in those two.

Refuting this assertion of Kt, NBh says that the word halah is an expression by ekasesa of the words halau and halah. Halau ca halasca become halah. This is because under the rule "svaritāt samhitāyām anudattānām" (1-2-39), Pat in answer to the problem that the word anudattānām in the plural number fails to comprehend single and double anudatta letters, says that anudattānām is an expression by ekasesa of the words 'anudattasya cānudattayoscānudattānām. There Pat does not say that anudattānām is an expression in plural number according to the said rule "jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām" (1-2-58)².

6. The splitting (1) of the compound expression samyogādeh in the rule "vānyasya samyogādeh", as samyogau ādī yasya so'yam samyogādih samyogādeh and (2) of the compound expressions kumāryagāram and vadhvagāram as kumāryor āgāram and vadhvor āgāram.

Under the rule "halōnantarāḥ samyogah"

(1-1-7) Kāt argues for the addition of the word saha to the rules so that contiguous consonants shall get the term collectively and not individually. It is pointed that if each of them gets the term individually there is the contingency of the over-applicability of the rule "vānyasya samyogādeh" (6-4-68) in instances like nirvāyāt where r of the prefix nir and y of the root yā, being contiguous consonants are liable to be designated as samyoga whereby the root being samyogādi, the optional substitution by e of a of the root yā is liable to take place. To refute this contingency it is said in the bhāsya "naisa dosah yat tāvad ucyate iha tāvannirvāyāt, nirvāyāt vānyasya samyogādeh ity- etvam prasajyeteti. Naivam vijnāyate-samyoga ādir yasya so'yam samyogādih, somyogāder iti". The

idea is that the aforesaid contingency can be avoided by splitting the compounds into components of dual number so that the root, in order to get the optional substitution by \( e \) ought to have at its beginning two consonants which are termed as \textit{samyoga} and the root \( \text{va} \) being devoid of the same there is no contingency as suspected before.

Here \( \text{Kt} \) raises an objection; how can the compound \( \text{samyogadēha} \) be split with components in dual number? His doubt relates to the fact as to how the sense of duality in the idea conveyed by the components in a \textit{vṛtti} (like \textit{samāsa} and so on) can be understood. \( \text{Kt} \) himself clears the doubt saying that it is the presence of the word \( \text{ādi} \) that helps in splitting the compound with components in the dual number. The idea derived by splitting the compound \( \text{samyogadī} \) with components in singular number i.e., \( \text{samyogah ādih yasya} \) can be got even without the word \( \text{ādi} \). The rule need only be \( \text{vānyasya samyogāt} \). By the help of the maxim \( \text{"tasmād ityuttarasya"} \) (1-1-67) which operate on the word \( \text{samyogāt} \), the letter which follows a \( \text{samyoga} \) and is at the beginning of the root
shall get the optional substitution by ā and hence the ā of the root ya in niryaṭāṭ shall get the substitution by ā and the presence of the word ādi is of no avail. Hence its presence makes the compound to be split up by components in dual number and hence no contingency of substitution by ā of ā. Thus the word ādi of the compounds helps to have the idea of duality in the sense conveyed by the compound samyogādeḥ.

Here it is interesting to note that NBh refutes the manner in which the doubt is raised here. He points out that the term samyoga of course implies the sense of union of more than one but it does not indicate the union of two specifically. Therefore the doubt here ought to be "how the idea of more than one can be conveyed in the sense of the components of a compound?" Pat has never denied that the idea of more than one in the sense of the components of a compound can be expressed. What Pat has stated is that the idea of a specific number is not conveyed in the sense of the components of a vṛtti like compounds. NBh therefore argues the question,
to be more correct, ought to be as how the sense of more than one, as expressed in the splitting samyogau adi yasya be conveyed from the vrtti, samyogadeh.

NBh however agrees with the solution as giving the circumstances under which the compound is split into components of dual number.

(2) Under the rule "iddeddvivacanam pragrhyam"

(1-1-11) Pat has discussed the four ways in which the rule can be interpreted. If it is interpreted as idadyantam yad dvivacanantam tat pragrhyam i.e., that which has a dual suffix at its end and ends either in i or a or e gets the designation pragrhyya, prohibition of the application of the designation in regard to instances where there is luk is to be made. To illustrate, when the two pairs kumāryor agāram and vadhvor agāram are compounded, they arrive at a stage kumāri+agāra which leads to the final compounded form kumāryanagāram and vadhyanagāram. Since the former member of these compounds are kumāri and vadhū that end in i and ū respectively and are dvivacananta by virtue of the pratyayalaksana of the suffix os that has elided, are liable to be designated pragrhyya in the aforesaid interpretation of
the rule. Here also Kt raises the doubt as to how the components in dual number can go to make the compounds kumāryagāram and vadhvagāram considering that the specific number in the sense of the components is not conveyed by the vṛtti like samasa. He clears the doubt saying that just as in the expression tavakīnāh which comes under taddhitavṛtti and formed by the addition of the suffix khaṇ to the base yuṣmd the sense of ekatva is conveyed by the substitute tavakā of yuṣmd by the rule tavakamamakāvekavacane, Pat'ā points out in the said passage that if the term pragrhya relates the part kumārī of the compound, the term shall procure prakṛtibhava and imply the sense of duality since as otherwise the prakṛtibhava cannot be explained.

Refuting Kt, NBh points out that in the compounds kumāryagāram and vadhvagāram the former part is never endowed with the term pragrhya and the interpretation of the rule in the afore-said manner is not accepted at the end of the discussion. And as such the expression kumāryagāram in the sense of kumāryor agāram

12. Udy pp. 166-167
is liable to be treated as erroneous since the part kumārī of the expression is devoid of the term pragrhyā which is described by Kṛ as implying the sense of duality and Pat would have to be accused of carelessness by making such an erroneous usage. As it cannot be so, it is to be accepted that, NBh suggests, the explanation given by Kṛ stands untenable. In a compound NBh points out that the sense of number is conveyed only to distinguish the sense of the former member of the compound and the sense of the component words is never conveyed with specific number. This however allows the fact that though a specific number in the sense conveyed by the component, is not conveyed by a compound, there can be the expression of the idea of more than one and as such the compound kumārya-gāram in the sense of kumāryor a-gāram stands correct and rightly explained.

7. The idea conveyed by the word 'anaci' in the rule "anaci ca" (8-4-47).

Kṛ upholds that ac is not a determining factor of the operation of dvirvacana enjoined by the rule "anaci ca" (8-4-47) 13. If the word anaci be explained as aci na, the rule shall mean yarah aci dve na and so...

dvirvacana shall operate on that yar alone which is not followed by ac and thus ac has to be treated as one determining factor of reduplication. Kt therefore takes the word anaci to mean hali. The expression anaci is a nañ compound and the nañ according to him used in the technical sense of paryudāsa. Anac denotes that which is non-identical with and similar to ac and such a letter is hal i.e., consonant. Now that the rule means, yar gets reduplicated when followed by hal, ac or vowel never becomes a determining factor of the prohibition of reduplication. NBh is of opinion that ac need not be taken into consideration for the operation of reduplication. But he does agree to the explanation given to the word anaci by which it means hal. This is because one cannot justify the reduplication of the letter of k of the word vak since it is not followed by hal. Besides, if hal were to be meant by the word anac, Pāñ could have more precisely stated the rule as 'hali ca' instead of Anaci ca. Hence NBh finds it difficult to agree with Kt.

In the opinion of NBh the word anac means \_aживина i.e., something different from ac. The rule anaci ca means yar gets reduplicated when followed
by something different from \textit{ac}. In this explanation \textit{ac} does not appear directly as a determining factor of \textit{dvirvacana} and in instances like \textit{vāk} the consonant \textit{k} will get reduplicated since the absence of letters that follows \textit{k} is something different from \textit{ac}.

The fact that the status of \textit{ac} as a determining factor of reduplication is necessary for the \textit{sthanivadbhāva} of the substitute \textit{r} of \textit{ḥ} in the operation of reduplication in instances like \textit{suddhyupāsyah} where Pat says the rule "\textit{acah parasmin purvavidhau}" (1-1-57) allows \textit{sthanivadbhāva} of a substitute even when \textit{ac}, the \textit{sthanin} of the substitute, does not stand as a \textit{nimitta} of the operation concerned.

5. Complication involved in the absence of the word \textit{an} in the rule "\textit{uran raparah}" (1-1-51).

Pat says that if in the rule "\textit{uran raparah}" (1-1-51) the word \textit{an} is not mentioned, the \textit{sūtra} may mean that any substitute that replaces \textit{r} shall become \textit{rapara} and hence the elision taught by the rule \textit{dhaki lopah} (4-1-13) may become \textit{rapara} as it has to replace the vowel \textit{r} in the base \textit{pitrsvasr} and consequently the
form paitrśvasreyeh is hardly obtained. Therefore in the absence of the word an in the rule, raparatva will have to be prohibited with reference to elision.

Kt examines the contingency caused by elision being rapara. He points out that if the elision becomes rapara, the resultant form will be paitrśvasreyeh. Since such a form is easily obtainable by the function of the rule "iko yanaci" (6-1-77) the prescription itself of elision by the rule "dhaki lopah" (4-1-133) which leads to the said form will be of no avail. To avert the same, it is to be noted that the complication in the event of non-utterance of the word an in the rule "uran raparah" (1-1-51) is that, the elision taught by the rule "dhaki lopah" (4-1-133) becomes rapara and is contingent to replace the whole base paitrśvasṛ.

14. Mbh pp.177-178. The form paitrśvasreyah is derivable by the addition of the taddhita suffix dhak to the base paitrśvasṛ. R is dropped by the rule "dhaki lopah" (4-1-133). In the resultant form pitarśvas+dhak is substituted by vrddhi and dha by eya on the strength of the rules "kiti ca" (7-2-118) and āyaneyīniyīyaḥ phadhakhkhaḥhakghām pratyādīnām" (7-1-2).

15. In the stage pitarśvasṛ+dha, elision replaces r and r becomes absent and since elision is rapara, r comes there and thus we get the form paitrśvasreyah. The same form is also possible if r replaces r by the rule "iko yanaci" (6-1-77).
NBh refutes this remark of KT. He points out that the elision, must have the status i.e., the substitute of \( r \), so that it can be \( \text{rapara} \) and hence it cannot be the substitute of the whole base \( \text{pitṛsvaṃ} \). In which case it cannot be stated as the substitute exclusively of \( r \). Therefore \( r \) alone is to be replaced by the elision which is \( \text{rapara} \) and there is the consequent bareness of the prescription of elision, since the form thus got can as pointed out earlier be obtained by the rule "iko yanaci" (6-1-77). That itself is the defect caused by the non-utterance of the word \( a n \) in the rule "uran raparah" (1-1-51).

Elucidation of vārttikas

1. The remodelling of the vārttika 'varṇānupalabdhaḥ cañartha-gateh' as varṇānupalabdhaḥ caṭadara-tha-gateh

Under the Śivasūtras "eon" and "aiauc", while discussing the question whether letters are individually possessed of sense or not, Pat suggests the vārttika varṇānupalabdhaḥ caṭadara-tha-gateh as an amendment to the
vārttika varnāṃupalabdhaū cānarthagatēḥ which answer the question in the affirmative on the basis of the fact that on the disappearance of a letter in a word, the sense is not understood. To the objection that in words like vrksa, a sense is understood even on the disappearance of the letter r there, Pat gives the amendment atadārthagatēḥ to the part anarthagatēḥ in the vārttika. He then gives two different interpretations of the part atadārthagatēḥ. "Tasyārthah tadārthah. tadārthasya gatiṣṭadārthagatiḥ. na tadārthagatiratadārthagatiḥ atadārthagater iti. Athāvā so'ṛthastadārthasaḥ tadārthasya gatiḥ tadārthagatiḥ. na tadārthagatiratadārthagatiḥ. atadārthagater iti." Kt says that in the former interpretation i.e., "tasya arthah...." the word tad refers to a letter. The amended vārttika therefore means that on the disappearance of a letter in a word, the sense conveyed by the letter is not understood. Kt continues that now there may arise an objection i.e., the inference being at a stage when it is not established that the letters are individually possessed of sense, an argument based on the same is baseless. It is therefore that,

Kt opines, Pat resorts to an alternate interpretation of the word as "so'rtastadarthah..." wherein the part tadartha is treated as a karmadhāraya compound instead of the sasthitatpurusa compound. The word tad refers to the sense which is understood from vrksa at the time of the presence of the letter v (sah = prakṛto'ṛthah).

It is quite correct to say that since that sense (which is understood at the time of the presence of a letter) is not understood on the disappearance of the letter in the word, letters can be inferred to be possessed of sense individually itself.

NBh differs with Kt here. In his opinion the word tad in the former interpretation as tasya arthasya gatih does not refer to the letter v in vrksa, but to vrksa namely, that which has the letter v as its component. There is no impropriety in saying that the sense namely vrksa is not understood on the disappearance of the letter v in it. In the latter interpretation "so'ṛthah..." the sense, understood when v is there in the word, is, as told by Kt, referred to by the word tad. Thus NBh says that the interpretation of tadartha as sasthitatpurusa compound is quite
in harmony with the context. It is only to secure ease of effort that Pat resorts to kārmadārāya compound. NBh says that the further statements of Pat during the discussions, "sakakārena kāścidartho garmyate", favour his interpretation of word tad as referring to the collection of letters namely vrksa,kupa etc.

2. The vārttika "samprayogo va nastāsvadagdharathavad".

Under the rule "sthānentaratamaḥ" (1-1-50)

Kāṭ points out that where r is to be replaced by guna or vrddhi, all the letters designated as guna or vrddhi are contingent to replace r since none of these substitutes designated as guna or vrddhi is antaratama to the sthānin, so as to be selected as the specific substitute of r. Kāṭ himself offers the solution to this doubt and then Pat gives his own explanation. He states that in instances where guna is enjoined to r,  a shall replace r since a and r are respectively antaratama adesa and sthānin in as much as one is devoid of antaratama sthānin and the other of antaratama substitute. Pat then proceeds to introduce the vārttika 'samprayogo va nastāsvadagdharathavad' and elaborates on it as
follows:— "Or they are in close association like two men, one being nastasva and the other being dagdharatha. It is explained as follows. Your horse is dead and my chariot too is burnt and let us make use of both we have, and associate them. Similar is the case here. You do not have a sthanin similar to you and I do not have an adesa similar to me and let us both be associated together" 17.

Apparently the former solution given by Pat and the ensuing varttika cited above seem to convey the same idea. Lest the varttika should be understood as a repetition and so as to consider these two as alternative assertions, Kt gives an explanation. The former statement of Pat is made on the basis of the rule "sthanentaratamah" (1-1-50) according to which closest similarity is the deciding factor of sthanesabha between the substitutes and sthanin. The varttika is based on the refutation of this rule. Even if there is no rule as "sthanentaratamah" (1-1-50) it will get a as the guna substitute just as two strangers one devoid of the horse and the other of the chariot, are associated in one action.

17. Mbh p.274.
NBh differs with Kt here. The basis described by Kt viz. the existence of the sutra and the refutation of the sutra, to explain the statement of Pat and Kt does not hold good because both of them imply one and the same deciding factor of sthānyadesabhāva. The rule at its existence proclaims antaratamya as the deciding factor and the rule is discarded on the same ground that even without a plain statement like 'sthanentaratamah' closest similarity shall be the deciding factor of sthānyadesabhāva. Thus these explanations still leaves the vārttika to be a repetition of the previous statement of Pat. NBh therefore gives a different introduction to the vārttika.

The statement of Pat is based on the fact that closest similarity is the deciding factor of sthānyadesabhāva. Kt gets a as the substitute, since both of them are similar to each other in as much as both of them have the common characteristics viz. devoid of similar sthanin and adesa. The absence of similar sthanin and adesa is treated as a similarity of the sthanin and substitute. To those who do not view non-similarity as a similarity Kt offers the solution. Just like two strangers associate in one action, r and a that are entirely dissimilar are incorporated in sthānyadesabhāva.
3. The vārttikas 'nirvrttapratipattau nirvrttih' 
'anarthakam ca' and 'uktam vā'.

Under the rule "sthanentarata amah" (1-1-50)
Pat discusses the question whether the rule is an
independent rule by which antaratama substitutes are
enjoined or the same is a discriminatory rule
(wisesapratipādaka rule) which adds the characteristic
namely antaratamatva to the substitutes that are
enjoined by other rule. To point out an objection
in the latter view according to which the rule decides
correctly what is enjoined by another sutra, the vārttika
'nirvrttapratipattau nirvrttih' is cited and Pat says
'nirvrttapratipattau nirvrttih na siddhyatiti sarve
sarvatra prapnuyanti'. This is followed by the
question 'kim tarhyucyate, nirvrttir na siddhyatiti,
na sādhiyo nirvrtthi siddhā bhavati? The answer
clearly pointing out the objection is given 'na brūno
nirvrttir na siddhyatīti, kim tarhi? istā vyavasthā
na prakalpyeta, na sarve sarvatra iṣyante. A counter-
question is raised now, 'idam idānīm kimartham syād'

18. Ṛgveda p.170. "Kim punar idam nirvartakam antaratama
anena nirvartyante, āhosvīd pratipādakam anyena
nirvṛttānām anena pratipattih?"
and the objector points out the consequence with the vārttika 'anarthakam ca', 'anarthakam etad syād'.

Yo hi bhuktavantam brūyān mā bhūktahāh, iti kim tena kṛtam syād?" Answering the objection, Pat cites the vārttika 'uktam vā' and says 'kim uktam siddham tu saṣṭhyadhiṅkāre vacanāt' iti saṣṭhyadhiṅkāre ayam yogāh kartavyāḥ, sthāṇentarataṃḥ saṣṭhīnirdiṣṭasya iti'.

Kṛṣṇa says that the initial assertion 'nirvṛttapratipattau...... prāpnuvanti", pointing out the objection in the view of treating the rule as pratipadaka, is that since rules are ever an authority and considering that in this view the vidhisūtras enjoin substitutes which may be antarataṃ or anantarataṃ to the sthānin and the rule "sthāṇentarataṃḥ" selects only the antarataṃ substitutes, both the forms wherein antarataṃ substitutes have replaced the sthānin and anantarataṃ substitutes have replaced the sthānin would have to be treated as optionally correct. The latter assertion clearly pointing out the objection, 'na brūmo....sarvatresyante' is that since the vidhisūtras have enjoined substitutes, they operate in the respective forms irrespective of the fact that they are antarataṃ or not, and hence such forms are to be
uniformly treated as correct and their correctness cannot be removed by the rule "sthāṇentarata-mah", since forms derived by an authoritative rule does not have the samānyavisesabhava in between them so as to be totally superseded by a few of them on the basis of another rule, though it be authoritative. This results in the barrenness of the rule "sthāṇentarata-mah" which is pointed out in the vārttika 'anarthaka- ma'. Kt says that by the vārttika'uktam va' and the bhasya passage accompanying the same we are told of the difference of treating the rule 'sthāṇentarata-mah' from the latter view treating sthāṇentarata-mah as pratipādaka. The rule "sthāṇentarata-mah" unites itself with the viddhisūtras that deal with the substitutes of sthanin and by means of this ekavākyata the viddhisūtras enjoin antaratama substitutes alone to replace the sthanin.

NBh offers a different explanation. He says that the initial assertion under the vārttika 'nirvṛtta-pratipattau nirvṛttih', nirvṛttapratipattau nirvṛttir na siddhyati sarve sarvatra prāpnuvanti" means that if the rule "sthāṇentarata-mah" be treated as deciding
antaratama substitutes, it has to be accepted that the forms wherein antaratama substitutes have replaced the sthānin on the strength of the rule, are averted by the rule "sthānentaratamah", just as luk averts the suffixes that operates by virtue of the rules enjoining them. Hence the vidhisūtras cannot retain all the forms sanctioned by them. The next assertion "na brūmo nirvṛttih.... sarvatresyante" is made by one who does understand the said idea. He says that the forms sanctioned by the vidhi rules are contingent to be treated as correct uniformly. However the rule "sthānentaratamah" becomes futile. This is conveyed by the vārttika 'anarthakam ca'. In the vārttika 'uktam vā' by which Pat solves the difficulty, Pat refers to the vārttika "siddham tu sasthyadhikāre vacanāt" and here NBh agrees to the interpretation given by Kt. However, in the interpretation of Kt, the significance of the word vā is not brought out and NBh gives the same. It means that even if there be no ekavātkyata of the vidhi rules and the rule "sthānentaratamah", and they stand aloof the latter as a discriminatory rule, and one has to accept necessarily the exclusion of forms having
anantaratama substitutes formed by virtue of the vidhi rule. This is because though it is true that he, who asks one not to eat after one has eaten, accomplishes nothing, the rule \"sthanentaratamah\" cannot be treated as futile on the authority of the statement of Pat under the rule \"vrddhirad\"a\"atvarnenapyanarthakena na bhavitavyam kim punar iyata sutrena\". So in order to secure the purposefulness of the rule sthanentaratamah, the forms with antaratama substitutes are to be averted by the said rule.

4. The interpretation of the varttika visayena tu nanuliingakaranat siddham.

In order to meet the objection that the existence of the rule \"sthanivad adeso'nalvidhau\" (1-1-56) paves the way for the contingency of the shooting of the kārya concerning a general rule to the exception by means of sthanivadbhava whereby nitkārya may shoot to the suffix ka which is the apavāda of the suffix an, Pat refers to the varttika 'visayena tu nanuliingakaranat siddham' which he has dealt with previously under the Śivasūtra 'aiun' 19.

19. Mbh p.298. \"apavādaprasāṅgastu sthānivatvād. apavāde tu utsargakṛtam ca prāpnoti. Karmanyaḥ āto 'nupasarge kaḥ' iti kēpi anīkṛtam prāpnoti kim kāraṇam? sthānivatvād.\"
The suffix ka taught by the rule "āto'nupasarge kah" (3-2-3) is endowed with the anubandha k. The word tu in the said vārttika means 'again' (the sense conveyed by the indelible punah) and Kt says that the vārttika means that, since Pāṇ uses the symbol k again in the suffix tak which is the apavāda of the suffix ka and which can by virtue of sthānivadbhāva be treated as kīt, the kārya of the general rule will not shoot to the exception by virtue of sthānivadbhāva.

NBh refutes this interpretation of Kt. He argues that if the purpose of the vārttika be as such, the alternate solution given subsequently by Pat cannot be explained as having any difference with this solution. The alternate suggestion given by Pat is that since Pāṇ reads syan, snam, sna, śa, snu, with the symbol s as anubandha in the apavāda rules even when in the utsarga rule "kartari sap" (4-1-68) sap has the anubandha s it is understood that the kārya of the general does not shoot to the exception. The explanation given by Kt of the said vārttika is identical with this statement of Kt and this contingency is not desirable. Moreover the idea given by Kt cannot be got literally from the words in the vārttika. Again even in the interpretation of the word tu as conveying the sense 'again' the
significance of the word \textit{nana} in the \textit{varttika} is not brought out and it remains as not related to the idea of the \textit{varttika}. In support of his refutation of the interpretation given by \textit{Kt}, \textit{NBh} adds that under the rule 'aiun' \textit{Pat} has cited the \textit{varttika} 'visayena tu \textit{nalanlingakaranat siddham}' as a remodeled version of the \textit{varttika} 'visayena tu \textit{nalanlingakaranat siddham}'. In this remodelling, the word \textit{punah} is used whereas \textit{tu} is retained and it shows definitively that the word \textit{tu} is not used in the sense of the word \textit{punah}. \textit{NBh} therefore says that \textit{varttika} conveys the ideas that, since \textit{Pan} provides various symbols like \textit{k}, \textit{n}, etc. in different places like \textit{ka}, \textit{an}, etc., it is to be understood that every suffix or sound procures that operation alone caused by the \textit{anubandha} with which it is endowed in the rule and hence no overlapping of the operations caused by \textit{anubandha} in any way.
The explanation of certain expressions

1. The expression 'sāmānyabhūtam' in the sentence

"yat tarhi tad bhinnēṣu abhinnam cchinnēṣvaccchinnam
sāmānyabhūtam sa śabdah, 20.

In the above sentence Pat expresses the doubt, whether the genus cow which becomes the object of cognition when one utters gauh to be, the śabda. Kṛśna commenting on this, takes the word bhūta in the expression sāmānyabhūtam to be conveying the sense of similarity as in expressions like pitṛbhūtaḥ (meaning one who is like a father). Sāmānya means the general sum-total of qualities, sattā and the word sāmānyabhūta means that which is like sāmānya which according to Kṛśna is sattā. The sentence "yat tarhi tad bhinnēṣu abhinnam cchinnēṣvaccchinnam sāmānyabhūtam saśabdah" is interpreted as conveying the sense, 'Is śabda then that (i.e., the sum-total of qualities like gotva) which like sattā ever exists when the individuals are broken or destroyed. Kṛśna says that here gotva the sum-total of qualities is compared to sattā the general sum-total of qualities. Bhar also has got the same opinion. 21.

[References]
20. Mbh p.11
21. Vide Mahābhaṣyapradīpikā, p.16.
NBh refutes this explanation and we cannot but agree with him. He says that the comparison between gotva and sattā i.e., between vyapyañjati and vyapakajñati is not admissible as they are the general and the particular. If a comparison involves between the general and the particular, there is the contingency of the expression vrksavad āmrah meaning a mango tree is a like a tree. Again the word sāmānya can denote gotva as well as sattā since both are sāmānya i.e., sum-total of qualities. Therefore there is no reason in restricting the sense of the word sāmānya, does not singularly contribute anything in the context. There is also the comprousness of supplying a word like gotva as a particular sum-total of qualities in order to make the comparison perfect.

NBh's attack on Kt here is vehement. He says that the expression pramāñabhūtaḥ made by Pat in the second āhnika has been explained by Kt without resorting to the sense of similarity. So here too Kt could have more wisely adopted a that kind of interpretation. There the word bhūta is interpreted to convey the idea

of the word prāpta. The word bhūta is derived by the addition of the suffix kta to the root bhū meaning to attain (prāpti). Here too sāmānyabhūta derived similarly can well suit the context in as much as it will mean, 'that which has attained the status of sāmānyā' in other words, sāmānyā itself. Again NBh says that the illustration of Kt's interpretation by the word pitrbhūta is not sound. There the word bhūta does not denote the idea of the word sādṛṣṭa. However the whole word means one who is like a father and this idea is got on the basis of the nyāya 'antyatra anyāśabdapravayogō sadṛṣyaparāḥ' (The usage of a word to denote a thing which it does usually denote, shows the similarity on the thing, of the exact thing conveyed by that sound.) According to NBh it is therefore better to take the word bhūta in the sense of the word svarūpa. Sāmānyabhūta means sāmānyasvarūpa 'that which is sāmānyā in nature'.

2. The reason for the operation and non-operation of pumvadhāvā enjoined by the rule "pumvatkarmadhārayajati-yadesiyesu (6-3-42) in the forms gomatībhūtā and mahadbhūtā respectively.

Under the rule "pratyayaloṣṭe pratyayalaksanam" (1-1-62) while discussing the purpose to be served by the
rule, Pat refers to the word *gomatibhūta* used in the sense of *agomati gomati sampanna gomatibhūta*. By virtue of the rule "krbhvastiyo gomati sampadyakartari cvih" (5-4-50) the word *gomati* when in association with the word *bhūta*, gets the suffix *cvi* which elides wholly and the two words are compounded by the rule "kugatipradayah" (2-2-18) and the form *gomatibhūta* is got. Here Kṛṣṇa says that the *pumvadbhava* taught to a feminine base by the rule "pumvatkarmanjatiyadiyadesiyesu" (6-3-42) does not operate on the part *gomatibhūta*. But the rule operates on the part *mahatī* of the compound *mahadbhūta*, formed similarly and the form *mahadbhūta* is obtained.

Kṛṣṇa tries to explain this discrepancy on the basis of the meaning conveyed by the suffix *cvi*, namely *abhūtatadbhāva*, "the change of a thing (prakṛti) to an nature which it does not possess previously (vikṛti). The compound forms *gomatibhūta* and *mahadbhūta* mean *agomati gomatibhūta* and *amahati mahatibhūta*. Here it can be seen that *amahati* and *agomati* are the originals i.e., prakṛti and gomati and mahati are vikṛti. The word *bhūta* denotes bhavanakṛthī or janikarṭī and if the prakṛti is treated as janikarṭī, the word *gomati*.

23. Ṛṣabha p.342.
which is vikrti cannot be treated as samanadhikarana with the word bhuta and so it does not entertain the pumvadbhava prescribed to a feminine base when followed by an uttarapada which is samanadhikarana, by the rule "pumvatkarmadharaayatiyadesyesu". In the compounded form mahatibhuta the vikrti namely mahati is treated as janikarthri and hence being samanadhikarana with the latter part bhuta of the compound it undergoes pumvadbhava and the form mahadbhuta is arrived at. Kt adds that this alternative treatment of prakrti and vikrti as janikarthri in these instances is due to the fact that sounds are eternal and cannot be discarded of one's own accord.

NBh refutes this explanation totally. He points out that it is the prakrti which is always the janikarthri where there is abhutatadbhava i.e., in the compound and in the vigrahavakya. In the compound, the words gomati and mahati which are vikrti denote the prakrti by the expressive power of sabdas, known as gauni. Thus mahati and gomati being the prakrti though of course in a secondary sense, are samanadhikarana with bhuta and hence mahati gets pumvadbhava. But the absence of the same in the word gomati of the form gomatibhuta, is because
that it is not bhāsitapumska (that which can be used in masculine gender without change of meaning), to which alone subject to the satisfaction of other conditions also, pumvadbhāva is enjoined by the said rule. In the sentence agomati gomatibhūtā, the part gomati of agomati, denotes the river by name gomati and the sentence means a river which was not the river by name gomati, becomes the river by name gomati. Here the word gomati denoting the river, cannot be used in masculine gender and hence is not bhāsitapumska. He adduces another argument in support of his statement that in the compound the word mahat though vikrti is gauna in as much as it is used in the sense of prakrti.

The absence here of lengthening of the final element of the word mahat enjoined by the rule "ānmaḥataḥsaṃāṇādhi-karana jātīyayoḥ" (6-3-46) shows that the word mahat is gauna here, otherwise, it would have undergone the lengthening. NBh thus points out that absence of pumvadbhāva in gomatibhūtā is not based on the fact that gomati is not saṃāṇadhikarana with bhūtā.

3. The expression 'avyapavrktam'.

Under the Śivasūtras "eōn", "aiauc" Pat makes an assertion, "yathā tarhi tailam na vikretavyam māmsam
na vikretavyam iti vyapavrktam ca na vikriyate, avya-
pavrktam gāvah sarsapāsca vikriyante", wherein occurs
the expression avyapavrktam. The passage means
that if so when it is said that oil should not be sold
and that meat should not be sold, they are not sold
when they are separated from the whole, but the cows
and mustards wherein they are not separated are sold.
Kt takes this expression as an avyayibhāwa compound in
the sense of arthābhāva prescribed by the rule "avyayam
vibhaktisamāsāmārdhivyrddhyarthābhāva....." (2-1-6).
Refuting this view of Kt NBh says that avyapavrktam is
a tatpurusa compound according to which the splitting
of the compound be as na vyapavrktam avyapavrktam.
Quite reasonably NBh finds that one may entertain a
doubt as to how the word avyapavrktam in singular number
can correspond to gavah and sarsapah which are plural
in number and with which it seems to have semantic
relation. NBh points out that the word avyapavrktam
relates to tailam and māmsam which relates to gavah
and sarsapah and the former group and the latter group
relate to each other in accordance with the context.
NBh adds that the nipāta nān does not make the avyayi-
bhāva compound and this is made clear by Pat under the rule
"nān" (2-2-6).

24. NBh p.83.
4. The component compound 'dasamyuttaram' in the whole word dasamyuttarakālam.

While dealing with the accessory benefits accrued from the study of grammar Pat quote a sentence from smṛti wherein occurs the compound dasamyuttaram in the whole word 'dasamyuttarakālam'. Kt splits the compound as dasamyah uttaram saying that this compound comes under the split rule "pañcamī" from the rule "pañcamī bhayena" (2-1-37). The authority cited for this compound, namely the split rule "pañcamī", means, "a pañcamyantā word compounds with any subanta having semantic relation with it." Then follows the other rule "bhayena" wherein the word pañcamī is got by the process of anuvrtti and it has got the usual meaning ascribed to the rule. The compound dasamyuttaram gets the bahuvrīhi compound with the word kālam as dasamyuttaram kālam yasmin tat dasamyuttarakālam.

Refuting the view of Kt, NBh says the part dasamyuttaram in dasamyuttarakālam is compounded by the authority of the rule "saha supā" (2-1-4) which means that a subanta is compounded with another semantically

25. NBh p.37.
related subanta. Generally the justification for a compound by resorting to yogavibhāga is not favoured by grammarians as it implies the absence of any other regular resort for justification. Such a justification is treated as agatikagati. That is why, it seems, NBh resorts to the rule "saha supā" to justify the compound and that is a regular resort.

5. The compound "parāśatāni".

Under the rule 'nājjhalau' (1-1-10) Pat cites the word parassatāni. Kt splits the compound as satat parāni and says that the two words are compounded on the authority of the word bahulam in the rule "kartrkarane krtā bahulam" (2-1-32)\(^2\). Refuting this opinion of Kt NBh says the compound can well be justified by the rule "mayūryamsakādayasca" (2-1-72) or by the rule "saha supā" (2-1-4). Here also NBh's effort to justify a compound on the authority of a definite rule as against resorting to the yogavibhāga or a word which explains the context vaguely, is evident.

\(^2\) Prdp p.160.
6. The component compound 'padādi' in the rule "sātpadādyoh" (8-4-111). The component compound 'padādi' in the rule "sātpadādyoh" (8-4-111). 

Under the rule "na lumatāngasya" (1-1-63) while refuting the vārttika "uttarapadatve capadādividhau" Pat gives the derivation of the compound padādi in sātpadādyoh (8-4-111) as padat adh padādih instead of padasya adih. As a result of this kind of derivation the part padādi means the initial letter which follows the pada (padat parah adih). Here Kt tries to justify the compound padat adih padādih by means of the yogavibhāga of the rule "pancamī bhayena" (2-1-37) into pacamī and bhayena and says that the split rule pacamī means a word in the ablative case gets compounded with a semantically related subanta.

NBh finds fault with Kt here. He says that in the derivation of the compound padādih as padat adih the word padat is not semantically related with the word adi since padat relates to the sense of word para and so padat and adih not being semantically related words, they must not get compounded. The compound here is therefore to be treated as sautra that is, a peculiarity found in the rules of Pan alone.

27. NBh p.352.
7. The word 'prasāṇ'.

Under the rule "krnmejantaḥ" (1-1-39) Pat makes an assertion 'acāryapraavruttir jñāpayati na pratyayalakṣanā vyayyasamjñā bhavati iti' yadayam prasāṇsabdam svaradisu pathati" 28. In this passage there occurs the word prasāṇ. It is formed by the addition of the suffix kvip to the root śam prefixed with the upasarga pra. It gets the designation avyaya by the rule "svaradinipātamavyayam" (1-1-37). Kt points out that the same form can be obtained by adding the suffix kvip to the root śan (śāna tejane) prefixed by pra. This is also prone to get the avyayasamjñā since in the svarādi list the form prasāṇ is not mentioned. But this contingency does not occur, Kt points out, because, the usage of the root śan being added with the suffix kvip is seen nowhere in usage and so there is no question of its being designated as avyaya.

Refuting Kt, NBh says that in the svarādi list, the actual form read is prasāṁ and not prasāṇ.

The svarādi word prasām becomes prasān by the rule "ma no dhatoh" (8-2-64) only in the usage. Thus the svarādi form being prasām, there is no question of the form prasān formed from the root san being designated as avyaya. NBh supports his argument by pointing out that in the svarādi list, the initial one is also read as svar and only in the usage we get the form svah by the function of the rule "kharavasanayor visarjaniyah" (8-3-15). Therefore NBh concludes that even if the form prasān from the root san with the suffix kvip and prefix pra be accepted it does not get avyayasamjña since in the svarādi list the form included is prasām and it can only be from the root sam.

Explanation of the passages in the bhasya

1. 'sūtra vyākarane saṣṭhyartho nopapadyate - vyākaranaśya

   sūtram iti kim hi tad anyad sūtraṃ vyākaranaṃ

   yasyādah sūtram syad?"29

   Beginning the discussion on the meaning of the word vyākarana, Bṛhat says that if it denotes sūtra

29. NBh p.57.
the meaning of the sixth case in the expression \textbf{vyākaraṇamsya śūtram won't suit.} He asks, "Is it then that \textbf{vyākaraṇa} is different from śūtra, so that it may be said that this śūtra is of that?" Commenting on this passage, Kṛṣṇaṇa says that the unsuitability of the meaning of the sixth case implying difference arises since both the words śūtra and vyākaraṇa are used to denote the Ast. He then makes a remark that if the two words śūtra and vyākaraṇa as used in a general and particular sense respectively i.e., the word śūtra denotes aphorisms of any science and vyākaraṇa denote aphorisms of the science of grammar, the expression \textbf{vyākaraṇam śūtram} just as puruṣo manuṣyah is possible. He then adds that if the word vyākaraṇa denotes the Ast and the word śūtra is taken as denoting a part of the Ast, the meaning of the genitive case suffix is quite befitting in the expression \textbf{vyākaraṇasya śūtram}. Nīdiśaṇa says that Kṛṣṇaṇa takes the word śūtra to denote the part of the Ast on the basis of assertion of Pat, "śūtrani cāpyadhiyāṇah isyate vyākaraṇa iti", where the word śūtrani refers to the parts of the Ast as otherwise (If it denotes the Ast), the plural number in śūtrani cannot be explained. Kṛṣṇaṇa is
therefore of opinion that though Pat has stated the
meaning of the sixth case suffix does not suit in the
expression \textit{vyākaranasya sūtram} when the word \textit{vyākaraṇa}
denotes sūtra, the same is quite suitable in the said
expression if the word \textit{vyākaraṇa} denotes the Ast and
sūtra denotes a part of it.

\textit{NBh} refutes this view of \textit{Kt}. He says that
the part of the Ast too can be directly designated as
\textit{vyākaraṇa}. Even indirectly at least it shall be treated
as \textit{vyākaraṇa} since it is the part of the Ast which
is \textit{vyākaraṇa}. Thus both the words sūtra and \textit{vyākaraṇa}
being indicative of the same sense, the meaning of the
sixth case suffix implying difference between sūtra and
\textit{vyākaraṇa} is quite unsuitable. Hence the assertion of
Pat with regard to the impropriety of the meaning of the
sixth case suffix in the expression \textit{vyākaranasya sūtram}
is justified in every respect.
2. "anusvāra - anusvārasca na siddhyati dvisantapah
parantapah mo'nusvāro hali ityanusvāro na prāpnoti" 30

Under the rule "midaco'ntyat parah" (1-1-47)
Pat discusses the question whether mit (that possessed
of m as an anubandha) is pūrvānta, parādī or abhakta,
in relation to that to which the mit is enjoined. In
the quoted passage, Pat points out a difficulty in
the view which holds mit as abhakta i.e., neither the
the final or an initial element, but as standing
individually in relation to that to which it is enjoined
The passage means that m cannot be replaced in the
words dvisantapah and parantapah (where mum i.e., mit is
enjoined by the rule "dvisatparayostāpeh" (3-2-39) on
the strength of the rule "mo'nusvārah" (8-3-23) where
there is the anuvṛtti of the word hali from the sutra
"hali sarvesām" (8-3-22). This is because the
rule, "mo'nusvārah" (8-3-23) prescribes anusvāra as a
substitute of m when followed by a consonant and is
the final element of the pada and in the cited instances
m taught by the rule "dvisatparayostāpeh" cannot be
designated as the final element of pada, if it stands as abhakta.

Here Kt makes the remark that in the said passage the citation of the instance dvīšatrāpah by Pat is only accidental and Pat does never intend to convey that there is difficulty in getting anusvāra in the said instance when m stands as abhakta. This is because, Kt says, in the word dvīśat the m comes after the vowel a by the rule "mādaco'ñīyatparah" (1-1-47) and since it, though be abhakta, thus falls within the word dvīśat the resultant form dvīśamt can be treated as dvīśat by the maxim tanmadhyapatitastadgrahanena grhyate. So the padāsajñā with which the form dvīśat is endowed, relates to the form dvīśamt also. In this stage the final t elides by the rule "sāmyogāntasya lopah" (3-2-23) and the remaining form dvīśam is treated as pada by the maxim "ekadesavikṛtam ananyavad". Now that m is the final element of the pada, it gets itself replaced by the anusvāra by the rule "mo'nuṇsvārah" (3-3-23). The object namely substitution of m by anusvāra, even if m be abhakta is thus achieved by the maxim "tanmadhyapatitastadgrahanena grhyate".

NBh refutes this assertion of Kt. He points out that the maxim "tanmadhyapatitastadgrahanena grhyate"
is unknown when this is explained and the citation of the instance dvisantapah may be on the presupposed absence of this maxim. What NBh points out, seems to be that the interpretation of a passage in the text of Mbh is to be made on the strength of maxims that are already referred to by Pat and not on the basis of those that are to be mentioned later on. Pat has not mentioned the said maxim anywhere before making this assertion. Hence the citation of this instance cannot be refuted as pointed out by Kt, on the basis of this maxim. NBh therefore supports the statement of Pat that if mit be held as abhakta there shall be difficulty in getting the substitute of m by anusvara in the instance like dvisamtapah. NBh adds that the absence of the achievement of anusvara is definitely due to the treatment of mit as abhakta and not to any other maxim say for example 'asiddham bahiraṅgam antaraṅge" by which it can be said when the letter m is to be substituted by anusvara the bahiraṅga rule "samyogantasya lopah" (8-2-23) becomes invalid and thus t remaining as the final element, m cannot be designated as the final element of the pada. This
maxim is not responsible for the non-achievement of anusvara, since according to him, the same does not function in regard to rules that fall within the scope of tripädi.

3. "na hi ke pare'nah santi"\textsuperscript{31}

Under the Śivasūtra "lan" Pat says that in the rule "kenah" (7-4-13) the letter n in the pratyāhāra relates to the mute letter of the sūtra 'lan' and not with that of the sūtra 'aiun'. This is because the suffix ka is never, in any instance, preceded by letters like r 1 etc. that are additionally included if the pratyāhāra be with n of the rule "lan".

Kt here adduces words like alpopānatka and giska as instances of the same negated by Pat. In these, the 1 and 2 that precedes ka are the substitutes of gh and visarga that have replaced h and r by the rules "naho ghah" (8-2-34) and "kharavasānayorvisarjanīyah" (5-3-15) respectively. The rule "pùrvatrēsiddham"

makes the substitution by gh and visarga of h and r

\textsuperscript{31} Mbh p.98.
respectively, invalid. Thus from the point of the view of the sūtra "kenah" which is in sapādasaptādhyāyī h and r are the ones, in the instances cited, that precede the suffix and they come under the letters comprehended additionally n by the pratyahāra formed with n of the Sivasūtra 'lān'. In the passage quoted there is the negation of such instances by Pat. In order to justify the same, Kt resorts a yogavibhāga in the rule "na mu ne", (8-2-2) which is preceded by the rule "purvatrāśiddham" (8-2-1). The rule is split as na and mu ne. The former one na prohibits the invalidity enjoined by the rule "purvatrāśiddham". On the strength of this prohibition of invalidity, we treat the substitution by gh and visarga of h and r as valid from the point of the view of the rule "kenah". Now the letters that precede the suffix ka in alpopānatka and gīska are gh and visarga and they do not come among r l etc.

Hence the statement of Pat that nowhere the suffix ka is preceded by letters from r upto l in the Sivasūtras.

NBh refutes the justification of Kt on the basis of yogavibhāga. He points out that the yogavibhāga suggested by Kt is nowhere mentioned or referred to by
The justification of a statement of Pat on the basis of a principle about which he has not made even any indication does not hold good. It is better to accept the anabhidhana of such forms to justify the statement of Pat. NBh points out that the subsequent passage "namu cāyam asti distanthāh goka naukā iti" shows that such words are to be treated as not in vogue. If they were accepted in usage, they could also have been included in the said passage side by side with goka and nauka because this passage cites, instances where letters like r l etc. precede the suffix ka, in order to refute the former statement "na hi ke pareṇah santi". Moreover the statement "na hi ........... santi" with the word pare used in plural number points out three or more letters among r l etc. additionally comprehended by the pratyāhara an. Hence the refutation of this statement by the passage citing the instances alpopānātkā, gīkā etc. in addition to goka and nauka would have been more effective, as the same cites instances where many letters namely h r o and au are noticed to be preceding, the suffix ka. Even-then they are not mentioned by Pat. Hence both these
passage lead one to the conclusion that such forms are treated to be not in vogue and the statement of Pat "na hi ke pare'nah santi" is fully justified.

4. "yadi tarhi rkaragrahe 1kāragrahamam sannihitam bhavati, urān rapah 1kārasya raparatvam prāpnoti 1kārasya laparatvam vaksyāmi"32.

In this bhāṣya passage under the rule "tulyāsyaprayatnam savarṇam" (1-1-9) Nāh refutes the explanation, of the sense of the word 'vaksyāmi', given by Kt. The vārttika 'rīlvarnayoh mithah sāvarṇyam vācyam' treats r and l as cognates. Hence it is argued in the cited passage that just like r, l also will be replaced by ar on the strength of the rule "urān rapah". Pat gives the answer "1kārasya laparatvam vaksyāmi". Kt takes the word vaksyāmi to mean 'I shall interpret. In the rule "urān rapah" (1-1-31) it can be interpreted that l is enjoined to be replaced by al. The interpretation is as follows. In the expression rapah the part ra is a pratyāhāra by the rule "ādirantyena saheta" (1-1-71). The letter r in the Sivasutra hayavarat is used with the anubandha a in the sutra "lan" (The a in the sutra 'lan' is anunasika and is therefore an it by the rule "upadesē janunasika it" (1-3-2). Hence the pratyāhāra ra

32. Mbh p.152.
indicates r and 1. Thus the expression raparanh
means raparanh and laparah. On account of antaratamya
r derives ar and l derives al as their substitutes.

NBh does not admit that the a in the sutra
'lan' is anunasika in which case it would have been an it.
If it were anunasika and consequently an it, Pat would
have mentioned the rule "ato lrantasya" (7-1-3) as
'ato rantasya'. The non-usage of the rapratyahāra
in the instance cited, shows that a in lan is not an
it which implies its being devoid of nasalization.
Therefore NBh points out that it is not possible to
arrive at a pratyahāra as ra. Hence one cannot
interpret the laparatva of l. The statement of Pat
lkarasya laparātvam vakṣyāmi means, says NBh, 'I make
a fresh statement that l will be replaced by al. Thus
Thus NBh treats the laparatva of l, the result of a
statement made by Pat.

5. "Nipāta iti kimartham? cakārātra jahārātra"33.

At the outset of the rule "nipāta ekājanaṇaḥ"
(1-1-1 4) we get a question and answer, "What is the need
for the word nipāta? cakārātra jahārātra". According

33. Mbh p. 172.
to Kt this question arises thus. The word nipāta
here should exclude pratyaya but, since one-vowelled
nipāta alone has meaning, since pratyaya cannot be
used independently, since it has no meaning, since it
has its existence only through the creation of
grammarians and since they are not unanimous in form,
pratyaya will never have the designation
pragrhyya even if the wording be 'eka janān'. Hence
there is no need of the word nipāta to bring the exclusion
of the suffixes from the range of the pragrhyasamjñā.
And the answer cakāratra and jahāratra means:- If
the word nipāta is not mentioned in the rule, pratyaya
(suffixes) also will come within the range of the term
pragrhyya. This is because in the instances cited
there is a one-vowelled pratyaya namely, a that has got
meaning by anvayavyatireka (inference both in affirmative
agreement and logical discontinuance) in accordance with
the grammar of Pan. Consequently the a at the end
of cakāra and jahāra which is one vowelled and which is
one vowelled and which is not āṅ, will get the designation
of pragrhyya and consequently there will be no dirghasandhi
between cakāra and atra and between jahāra and atra.
Refuting this interpretation of Kt, NBh states that it is clear from the bhasya under the rule *ot* (1-1-15) that nipata here refers to even those which have no meaning. Hence it cannot be said that this rule refers to only those which are arthavat. The question arises since the expression anān, by the technical sense of paryudāsa of the nañ in it, may suggest nipata. The answer is that by virtue of the mention of the word nipata one can say that there is no authority in taking recourse to paryudāsa here. The word nipata excludes pratyayas but not the imitation of pratyayas which are nipatas by the rule "anukaranam canitiḥparam" (1-4-62). Thus the answer shows that the word nipata excludes pratyas alone and not their anukaranas even though on the strength of the maxim prakṛtivada-anukaranam, they can be treated as pratyayas. These anukaranas when followed by iti get the nipatasamjña by the above mentioned rule.

NBh further refutes the instances āgaccha (a+āgaccha) cited by Kt along with cakārātra and jaharātra. Kt means that the a in the instance is a suffix one vowelled
and having a meaning. So the absence of the word nipāta may cause the samjñā to operate on this a also.

A is the vocative singular of the base a formed by the addition of the suffix da to the root at. NDh points out that it is difficult to agree with Kṭ. The a in the instances cited by Kṭ deserves pluta and hence there shall be prakrtibhāva. The sandhi kārya can be justified only if the non-operation of pluta is optional. So āgaccha becomes pratyudāharāna only when the pluta is treated as not operating here.

6. "Athava pratisiddhārthāyam ārambhāh o'ṣu yātām marutāḥ"\(^{34}\)

Pat declares that the sutra "ot" (1-1-15) is intended to give pragrhyasamnja denied to o by the part anān of the rule "nipāta ekāj anān" (1-1-74).

O is the ekadesa of the two nipātas anān and u.

Kṭ says that o is deprived of the pragrhyasamnja only if the nan in anān is accepted in the technical sense of prasajyapratisedha. If the sense of nan is paryudāsa, o, on account of the very same fact that it is anān, gets the samjñā by the rule "nipāta ekāj anān" (1-1-14). Kṭ explains that the letter o

\(^{34}\) Nībh p.175.
by virtue of the rule, "ādguṇah" (6-1-47) is an ekādesa of the nipātas a and u, the two sthānin, which are pūrva and para respectively. The rule "ādyantavadekasmin" (1-1-20) provides the ekādesa with a status by which it derives the benefit enjoyed by the pūrvasthānin and parasthānin respectively known known as purvāntavadbhāva and parādivadbhāva.

The state of affairs being much, one has to clarify the meaning of the word anān in the rule "nipāta ekāj anān". If nañ is used in the sense of prasajyapratisedha the sūtra denies the samjñā to ān "ān pragrivasamjñam na". In the sense of paryudāsa, the part anān means ānbhinna which is ānśadṛśa as well and the rule provides the samjñā directly to ānbhinna nipāta. It follows therefore that if we treat the ekādesa as ān by pūrvantavadbhāva, the prohibition enjoined to ān, applies on o. The sūtra 'ot' is therefore necessary to provide the same with the samjñā. On the otherhand, the ekādesa o can be ānbhinna by virtue of the parādivadbhāva and the sūtra in the sense of paryudāsa as pointed out previously, provides the samjñā to o. Therefore the rule "ot" need not confer the same on it.
NBh refutes Kt's interpretation of the passage resorting to the prasajyapratisedha and establishes that the statement of bhāṣya well applies on 0 even when the sense of paryudāsa is taken into consideration. He makes clear that the sūtra ādyantavadekasmin, either by pūrvantavadbhāva or parādīvadbhāva provides the ekādesa the sāstriyakārya in as much as the rule, by providing the samjñā to ānbhinna in the sense of paryudāsa implies the pragrhyatvābhava to ān. In the sense of prasajyapratisedha, the rule directly enjoins the pragrhyatvābhava to ān. Therefore in order to provide the sāstriyakārya viz. pragrhyatvābhava, the rule "ādyantavadekasmin" (1-1-20) operates on 0 and makes it ān by pūrvantavadbhāva. Here it is to be noted that though 0 is ānbhinna by its own nature, the ānītva got by the rule "ādyantavadekasmin,"makes it ineffective or removes it. Thus the ekādesa 0 is denied of the pragrhyasamjñā by the rule "nipāta ekājanān" irrespective of the sense of naṃ being paryudāsa or prasajyapratisedha and hence the statement, of Pat that the rule 'ot' provides 0 with the same,
need not be interpreted as based on the sense of prasajyapraṭisēḍha alone of the naṁ in anāṁ of the rule "nipāta ekājanāṁ".

7. "katham punar jñāyate sa pūrvaḥ pāṭahaḥ ayam punaḥ pāṭahaḥ iti? tāni hi pūrvādini, imānyavarādini imānyapi pūrvādini."

In the rule "pūrvaparāvaradaksinottarāparādhārāṇi vyavasthāyāmasamjñāyām" (1-1-33), the necessity for giving the complete list of pūra para etc. in the rule is doubted by the pūrvapakṣin as they are being read in the ganāpāthā. Thereupon the question arises, 'how is it, then understood the fact that ganāpāthā is anterior and the pāṭha in the said sūtra is repetition?' The answer is given "tāni hi pūrvādini" (They are pūrvādini), imānyavarādini (These are avarādini). Again a doubt arises imānyapi pūrvādini.'

Kṛ takes the answer 'tāni hi pūrvādini' to mean that those (the bases mentioned in ganāpāthā) begin with sarva (pūrva in pūrvādini denotes sarva since the same being uttered formerly than pūrva proceeds the same), and imānyavarādini means these begin (the bases mentioned in the rule) begin with

35. Bh P.119.
pūrva (avara in avarādīnī denotes pūrva since the same being uttered later than sarva follows the same). Thus the idea of Kṛt is that the statement sarvādīnī in the rule "sarvādīnī sarvanāmānī" (1-1-27) itself is a proof that ganapātha existed earlier. Otherwise how can Pāṇini mention a list as sarvādi? After interpreting the answer in this manner Kṛt explains the further doubt "imānyapi pūrvadīnī" (these too are purvādīnī) as follows. Without stating a particular reason one cannot accept the fact that ganapātha is anterior to sutrapātha.

NBh clearly points out the defect involved in the explanation given by Kṛt to the said passage. The statement 'tāni hi pūrvadīnī' in the sense of 'tāni hi sarvādīnī' is of course a clear proof for the anteriority of ganapātha. But the statement 'imānyavarādīnī' in the sense that these are pūrvadīnī does in any way help to establish the repetition of the sutrapātha and this part becomes superfluous. Again according to Kṛt the statement sarvādīnī derived from the above explanation, itself, is a sound
argument for the acceptance of the said fact.
Hence the further explanation "that without stating a specific reason one cannot accept the said fact does not seem to corroborate with his previous statement. All these lead one to the conclusion that the explanation of Kt is not agreeable.

After refuting Kt thus, NBh gives the meaning of the statement "tani hi purvadini." It simply means those (the bases in the ganapatha) are anterior and these (the bases sutrapatha) are posterior. In purvadini andavaradini, the word adi is used in the sense of asraya just as in the statement bhismadiśca suyodhananah where by the word adi in the said sense, we get the meaning bhismāśrayah suyodhanah. Purvadini means purvakālaśrayāni and avaradini means avarakālāśrayāni. To the question how can the fact that ganapatha is the former one and sutrapatha a repetition the answer is simply given as ganapatha is posterior and sutrapatha is anterior. Hence the doubt arises "these (too) are anterior" meaning that without giving a specific reason one cannot understand that they (bases mentioned in ganas) are purvapatha and these mentioned in sūtra are punahpātha suits well and this interpretation suits well.
8. "prayojanam hrasvatram tugvidhah grāmanikulam.

gramanikulam senānikulam ityatra hravatve krute
hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk iti tuk prāpnoti.
sannipātalaksano vidhiranimittam tadvighātasya
iti na doso bhavati.36

This passage occurring under the rule
"krṇmejantah" (1-1-39) means, "benefit is that
hrasvatva is (animitta) to tugvidhi as in grāmanikulam

When i in grāmanī and senāmanī is shortened in the
words grāmanikulam and senānikulam (by the sutra
"iko hrasvōnyo galavasya" (6.3.61) tuk has a chance
to set in by the sutra "hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk"
(6-1-71), but it does not do so by the dictum
'sannipātalaksano vidhiranimittam tadvighātasya".

In this passage Pat states that the forms
grāmanikulam and senānikulam owes their existence
to the dictum 'sannipāta...". Otherwise there
is the contingency of tuk after i in both instances.
Kṛ remarks that the sannipāta-paribhāsa can avert
tuk only if tuk comes as a part of i and not of
senāni or grāmanī and on the conception that the part
of an organ is not regarded as the part of the whole comprising the organ. By the arrival of tuk as the āgama of hrasva, the proximity of pūrvapada and uttarapada which was responsible for hrasva there will be removed. Thus owing to sannipatavirodha in case tuk arrives as the part of i, the paribhasa "sannipatālaksano ......." can avert tuk.

NBh completely refutes Kt here. On the arrival itself of tuk as the organ whether of i or of senani, the pūrvapada ending in i will be disconnected with the uttarapada so also the pūrvapada will be devoid of its designation as ajanta. This much itself is the sannipatavirodha involved in the arrival of tuk and based on this, the prabhasa "sannipatālaksano......" can very well avert tuk. Hence there is no necessity of stressing the point that tuk must be the augment to i only, for averting the same by the said paribhasā. NBh presupposes an objection that the tuk as a part of i can be treated as i itself on the strength of the maxim 'yadāgamas tadgunībhutah tadgrahanena grhyate' and clears the same saying that the paribhasā won't operate here on
account of the ānepaka 'ānemuk' which points out that the paribhasa does not apply universally\textsuperscript{37}. Therefore tuk always makes the purvapada devoid of the connection with the designation as ajanta.

Moreover the conception that the part of an organ is not the part of the avayavin cannot be accepted. The fingers which are the parts of the hand are treated the organ of the arm and of the body. Again the prohibition of guna to it which is an avayava of the āṅga bhavitas and it is to the ik which is the avayava of āṅga that guna is enjoined. Hence i devoid of the status of the avayava of the āṅga will never be eligible for guna. Hence the conception referred to above cannot be accepted. Thus the explanation of sannipatavirodha given by Kt is well refuted by NBh.

Missellaneous

In addition to the expression of his difference of opinion with Kt and refutations of the assertions of Kt, NBh has occasionally pointed 37. Supra. p.253.
out that there are certain statements in Prdp
which are contradictory to the statements of Pat and
to his own statements elsewhere. Moreover his
critical mind has also dared to attempt a slight
criticism even on Pan and Pat. We are now
concerned with such statements in the Udy.

Under the rule "anudit savarnasya cāpratyayayah"
(1-1-69), while discussing the purpose to be derived
by the word an of the rule, Pat incidentally says
that only the sabda which is pronounced can comprehend
another and the sabda which is comprehended, cannot
comprehend another. As an illustration he points
out that if one mentions rk only the text is understood
and not its meaning. His words are "(hṛnasvāsaṃpratya-
ayād iti cet tanna kim kāraṇam?) uccāryamānah sabdah
sampratyaṇyako bhavati na pratiyamānah. Tadyathāgī-
tyukte sampāthamātram gamyate nāsyā artho gamyate"38
NBh points out that Kt has made assertions which are
contradictory to this statement.

Under the rule "igyanah samprasāraṇam" (1-1-45), Pat begins the discussion as to which term samprasāraṇa relates i.e., whether to the vakya or to the varna. He says "kimiyaṁ vākyasya samprasāraṇasamjñāṁ, igyanah ityetadvākyam samprasāraṇasamjñāṁ bhavati ti āhosvid varṇasya...... iti". Here commenting on this Kt says that here the word vakya means vākyārtha and the doubt is as to whether the term relates to the vākyārtha, yanah igbhavati. Kt continues to give an alternate explanation. The doubt is as to whether the term samprasāraṇa relates to the vakya itself.

Accordingly in rules like "syānaḥ samprasāraṇam....." (6-1-13) the term 'samprasāraṇa' shall denote the sentence 'igyanah' which in its turn conveys the idea 'yanah ig bhavati'.

NBh informs us that this latter explanation given by Kt is contradictory to the statement of Pat referred to above. It is clear that the sentence igyanah is comprehended, in rules like "syānaḥ....." (6-1-13), by the word samprasarana and hence being not

pronounced it cannot convey its sense. By making such a statement, Kt contradicts the assertion of Pat

'uccāryamānah śabdah sampratyāyako bhavati na pratiyamānah''

Again under the rule "sasthi-sthāneyoga" (1-1-49) commenting on the bhasya passage, "sampratyaya-
mātram etad bhavati nahyanuccārya śabdam liṅgam śakyamāsāṅkīum" Kt remarks that by virtue of svarita-
tvapratijñāna a sabda uttered in a rule can be inferred to be included in the latter rules also, but the liṅgāsaṅga (attaching a symbol) is possible only to a sabda which is pronounced in a rule and not to that which is inferred to be included in a rule 40. NBh brings to our attention the fact that here also Kt contradicts the statement of Pat. If a word is inferred to be included in a rule it comes nut that it is not pronounced there and as such it must not convey any sense. But Kt says that by virtue of svaritavapratijñāna a sabda is inferred in latter rules to convey the desired idea. Hence this statement

40. Frdp p. 265.
is also contradictory to the assertion of Pat that only a *sabda* which is pronounced can comprehend another and not that which is comprehended.

NBh adds that by virtue of *svaritavapratijñāna* the reader infers a *sabda* in the latter rule and he himself by pronouncing that *sabda* derives the idea from it. This explanation of NBh is in consistence with the assertion of Pat.

Under the Śivasūtra 'hṛyavarat Pat states that if letters are treated as arthavat, each component letter in a base shall consequently get the *prātipadikasamjñā*, *suppratyaya* and *padasanjñā* and so in regard to bases like *dhanam, vanam*, etc., *lopa* of the letter *n* and the like are contingent to take effect.

Kṛ here makes the remark that though in *dhanam, vanam*, etc. each letter gets *suppratyaya* as stated above it won't be heard there since the *luk* enjoined by the rule, "*supo dhāturātipadikayoh*" (2-4-71) operates on it. The component letters *dh, a*, etc. and the *samudāya*, dhana *vana*, etc. simultaneously get the *prātipadikasamjñā* by the rule "arthavadadhāturapratypayāḥ prātipadikam" (1-2-15). The *sup* of each
component letter has fallen within the samudāyaprātipadika and is comprised in it. This is because of the paribhāṣā, 'tanmādyapatiitaḥ tadgraṇanena gṛhyate'. Thus in this context Kṛt treats the sup as the avayava of the samudāyaprātipadika and admits the operation of luk on it by the rule "supo dhātuprātipadikayoh" (1-2-45).

NBh draws our attention to the Kṛt's statement on the opening passage of bhasya on the rule "itthambhūtalaksāne" (2-3-21) where he says the trtiyā (sup) that is contingent (this contingency is brought about in the absence of the addition of the word atatstha in the rule "itthambhūtalaksāne) to come after the part kamandalu of the samsaprātipadika kamandalupānai, is not the avayava of the samsaprātipadika kamandalupānai and so it won't elide by the rule, "supo dhātuprātipadikayoh". The sup is not the avayava of the prātipadika which is samāsa, since only after the operation of samāsa, has the sup come into being. Hence Kṛt's statement in this context "na ca trtiyāyāh luk prāpnoti, samsaprātipadikānavaivyavatvāt tasyāḥ, krte samāse utpādanāt", is contradictory to the statement "yadaiva avayavānām prātipadikasamjñā tadaiva samudāyasyāpi. Tatra tadantargatavāt."
vibhakterlukā bhavitavyam made under the rule 'lan'.

In spite of the paribhasa "tanmādhyya..............

t he does not accept the sup as the avayava of the

samāsaprātipadika kamandalupāni, which is a

samudāyaprātipadika, whereas he accepts the same in

the context cited above under the sūtra lan. The con-

tradiction is therefore clearly evident.

However as an earnest elucidator tries to

justify the luk contingent to occur in dhana vana and

the absence of the same in kamandalupāni and this

tries to rectify the contradiction. He corroborates

the luk of the sup of the samudāyaprātipadika excluding

that in the samāsaprātipadika as follows. In dhana

vana, etc. each letter gets the prātipadikasamjña which

is antaraṅga by the rule "arthavadadhāturapratyayah

prātipadikam" and consequently a sup comes after each

letter. After that, the prātipadikasamjña, which is

bought about by virtue of krdantatva enjoined by the

rule "kṛttaddhitasamāsāsca" (1-2-46) operates on the

samudāya which is comprised of the sup also and thus

the sup after each component letter in dhanam vanam etc.
being the avayava of the samudāvaprātipadika is liable to the operation of luk. However, in words like dhinvanti etc., each letter even on the assumption that letters are arthavat individually, does not get prātipadikasamjñā by the prohibition adhātuḥ and apratyayah denoting the exclusion of dhatu, dhatvayava, pratyaya and pratyāyāvayava. Hence there is no contingency of suppratyaya after each component letter of the dhatu and pratyaya nor does the question of their luk arise. In samasa of course the sup i.e., tritiya in the context does not get the luk since after its coming we can't give the prātipadikasamjñā to the samasa comprised of them on any basis. Thus in dhanavana etc. the sup that comes after each component letter gets the luk, but in kamandalupāni the sup i.e., tritiyā does not get the luk.

Under the rule "pūrvaparāvaramadaksinottararāpādharāṇi vyavasthāyasamjñāyām, Pat cites the vārttika "avarādinam punah sūtrapāthe grahaṇānarthaḥ khyatam gane. pathitavād" with which the discussion as to the necessity of giving the complete list of the seven words viz. pūrva para avara etc. in the said rule, begins. In this
vārttika the seven bases beginning with pūrva and mentioned in the said rule, are referred to by the term avarādi. Since the first one in this list of seven words, is pūrva, there may naturally arise the doubt as to why these are referred to as avarādi instead of being referred to as pūrvādi.

Kāt gives an answer to this doubt. He points out that the word ādi in the expression avarādinām is in the sense of prakāra, i.e., similarity and so avarādi means those that are similar to avara and not those beginning with avara. Since, just like the word avara, pūrva and para are mentioned in the rule all these are referred to by the expression avarādinām.

NBh on the other hand says that the reference to the words pūrva para etc. as avarādinām has got a significance. He says that Kāt has purposefully placed these words, mentioned in the order of pūrva para avara etc. as avarādinām. This is to show that in the expression pūrvaparāvara ......... dharāṇi which is

a dvandva compound, avara deserves pūrvanipāta since since the same is ajādi, beginning with a vowel and ending in a and also is laghvaksara possessed of vowels termed laghu. The rule "ajādyadantam" (2-2-33) and the varttika laghvaksaram pūrvam lay down that the component of a dvandva compound, if be ajādi and adanta or be laghvaksara, deserves pūrvanipāta. It is clear that among the components of the dvandva in the said rule, avara being ajādyadanta and laghvaksara, deserves pūrvanipāta and pūrva and para are to be mentioned only after the same, whereby the seven bases ought to have been referred to as avara adaksino-
ttarāparadharapūrvaparāni. But Pāṇ has referred to them as pūrva dharāni. Hence, NBh says that Kāt is criticising Pāṇ for his deviation from grammatical rules. Though NBh says that by the expression avarādīnām Kāt is criticising Pāṇ, it is well evident that he himself is attempting criticism on Pāṇ here.

Even though as a rule, NBh uses the method, of anticipation of objections and consequent clarification of the same, with a view to order elucidate the text
of the Nbh, he at times adopts the method to indicate his criticism on the relevant passage which he is elucidating. For example, an instance may be noted here. In order to refute the view that word nimitta is to be inserted into the rule 'kniti ca' (1-1-2) so that the ik which is the upadha (penultimate), shall come under the scope of the prohibition of guna, Pat offers four solutions. One among is the ānāpaka for the prohibition of guna, i.e., the prescription of kitva to the suffix san, by the rule "halantācca" (1-2-10). His words are "āthavācāryapraṇīttirējāpayati - bhavatu padhalaksanasya pratiṣedha - iti. yadayamtrasigṛdhi ghrsiksipeh knuh "iko jhat, halantācca" iti knusanaṃ kitaū karoti". To the question "katham kṛtvā jnāpakaṃ?" he gives the answer "kitkarane etat prayojanam - gunah katham na syāditi.yadi cātra gunapratiṣedho na syāt, kitkaranaṃ narthakam syād pāsyati tvaçāryah bhavatu-padhālaksanasya pratiṣedha iti. tataḥ knusanaṃ kitaū karoti". The idea is that if the penultimate ik is not to be prohibited guna, by the rule "kniti ca", the prescription of kitva to the suffix san, added to halanta roots wherein ik can only be the penultimate and never the final, becomes superfluous and thereby become the ānāpaka for the said fact 42.

42. Nbh p.139
NBh anticipates an objection to considering the kitva enjoined by the rule "halantacca" (1-2-10) as the ānapaka. He points out that the rule is never superfluous in ascribing kitva to san. It is beneficial in the case of the roots srj, drs and dabh.

The roots srj and drs, can by virtue of the kitva enjoined to san, get the prohibition of the augment am by the part 'akiti' of the rule "srjdrśor jhalyam akiti" (6-1-58) so that the forms didrksati and sisrksati are obtained. So also the root dabh can enjoy the elision of the letter n (enjoined by the rule "aniditam----" (6.4.24) in forms like 'dhipsati' on the basis of the kitva assigned to san by the rule "halantācca" (1-2-10).

The kitva assigned to san by the rule "iko jhal" (1-2-9) can never be the ānapaka, since the scope of the rule "iko jhal" does not comprehend the ik which is upadha since in the instances which are to be benefitted by the rule ik shall always be immediately preceded by san. Thus NBh objects to considering kitva assigned to san by the rule "halantācca".

Now, follows the statement of NBh to establish the kitva assigned to san as the ānapaka. If, as pointed out in the above objection srj drs and dabh
only were the roots to be benefitted by the kitva enjoinement to san, Pan could have omitted the rule "halantācca" which now comes after the rule "iko jhal" (1-2-9) and have framed the other rules in the form, "srjidrśorjhalyamakitsani" iko jhal, and dambehācça which is more simple than reading them as "srjidrśor- jhalyamakiti" "iko jhal", "halantacca" and "dambhā jeca". But Pan has framed a rule in the form halantācca whereby he assigns kitva to san which is added to all the roots ending in hal (consonant) and wherein ik can only be the penultimate (upadhā). This results in the jnapaka that prohibition of guna by the rule "kniti ca" (1-1-5) extends to the ik which is the penultimate of an āṅga.

NBh then adds that the prescription of kitva to san and kitva added to the roots rud vid muṣ and the prescription of kitva to kitva added to the roots mrd mrd, gudh, kus and klś, by the rules "ruda vidamusagrahisvapipracchaḥ samśca" (1-2-8) and "mrdamrdagudhadhusakīsavadavasām kitvā (1-2-7) as the jnapaka for the said fact. This apparently it may seem that NBh reaffirms the jnapaka noted by Pat and supplements him, when we analyse the facts mentioned by him, it is
quite clear that he is criticising Pat here. Whereas Pat establishes that the \textit{kitva} enjoined \textit{san} is the \textit{jnåpaka}, since it is enjoined by the rule "halantåcca" NBh considers that it is the framing of the rule in the form of halantåcca instead of omitting the same along with making a simple change in the wording of the rule "srjidrsva........" (6-1-58) that becomes the \textit{jnapaka}. Probably NBh is hinting that Pat has not given true attention in establishing the \textit{jnapaka} and that is why he adds that the \textit{kitva} enjoined \textit{kitva} and \textit{san} by the rules referred to above as the \textit{jnapaka} for the prohibition of to the penultimate \textit{ik} of an anga, by the rule "kñiti ca" (1-1-5).