CHAPTER-III

THE WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT.

THE EARLY PHASE: (1867-1920)

Bombay, the oldest and the greatest industrial centre and a harbour through which India has communications with the most important centres of the world, is the heart of Maharashtra. With the emergence of the capitalists as a social class; the socio-economic and political activities not only in Bombay but all over Maharashtra were dominated by the bourgeoisie.

No doubt, the working class outnumbers the bourgeoisie; but because it is caste-ridden, multi-lingual, divided into numerous unions, supported by different political parties; its influence upon the course of history has been marginal. However, the foundation of the trade union movement was laid down by the working class in Bombay.

The first cotton textile mill was established in 1854. The first Railway train from Bombay to Thana was started in 1852. After 50 years the number of cotton textile mills in Bombay reached upto 86.

The number of the working class increased as shown below:

B) An article by Gagadhar Gadil in Maharashtra- a profile, pp.110-111.

Please refer:-

i) India in transition - M.N.Roy.
iii) Rise of Economic Nationalism in India - P.P.H. Publication.

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* ** Please refer:-
Number of workers -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1901</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>6,44,405</td>
<td>7,73,196</td>
<td>8,21,764</td>
<td>7,76,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>6,23009</td>
<td>6,12,307</td>
<td>6,82,305</td>
<td>8,47,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmedabad</td>
<td>1,28,505</td>
<td>1,37,041</td>
<td>1,59,366</td>
<td>1,99,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>3,97,552</td>
<td>4,05,848</td>
<td>4,52,518</td>
<td>5,09,346</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1914, there were 264 cotton mills working in India employing some 260,000 operatives. In Bengal the Jute industry also developed rapidly so that by 1912 there were more than 60 mills employing about 3,200,000 workers.

At the initial stage, the working class was new, inexperienced, disunited and unorganized. It was facing rampant exploitation and wretched conditions, but was unable to fight out because of lack of unity and solidarity.

According to S.V. Parulekar, "The industrial worker consumes less than the diet issued to the criminals in jails under the Bombay prison code. They are unprotected against risk of sickness, unemployment, old age, death. The government of India have consistently refused to devise any scheme of benefits for the unemployed. Suicides by the workers to protest themselves against unemployment are in evidence and deaths due to hunger are recorded in the municipal reports for the city of Bombay."

Another report on the conditions of the working class states-
"The habits of the Indian factory operative are determined by the fact that he is primarily an agricultural labourer or a labourer on land...... His home is in the village from which he comes and not in the city in which he labours; his wife and family ordinarily continue to live in that village. He regularly remits a portion of his wages and he returns there periodically to look after his affairs and obtain rest after the strain of factory life. There is as yet practically no factory population, such as exists in European countries, consisting of a large number of operatives trained from their youth to one particular class of work and dependent upon employment that work for livelihood."

Thus, the condition of the working class was miserable. They had to work for 13-14 hours a day without any holiday at the week-end. The wages were not fixed, and illiterate workers worked on whatever was handed to them as wages. With the introduction of electricity in 1892, the workers were forced to work up to midnight, more than 17-18 hours without any increase in the wages. No discrimination between man and woman was made as far as forced labour was concerned. Even the children used to work for 10-12 hours. In 1875 the government appointed a commission to report on their conditions...... The commission reported that the condition of the working class was satisfactory and needed no improvement (!)

Referring to the conditions of the working class, M.N.Roy observed-

"Nevertheless, considerable number of workers had been concentrated in the factory towns of Bombay and Calcutta even in the closing years of the last century."
Most of these workers were unskilled, fresh from the village to which they were still bound by family ties or by the fascination of a miserable piece of land, heavily encumbered with debt. The city worker of modern India did not come out of the ranks of the expropriated artisans; he came mostly from the peasantry. After having lost its trade, the artisan was pushed back to the land, where he had come to stay two or three generations before the call of the modern industry brought him again to the city. The normal course of industrial development was obstructed in India. Industry did not grow through the successive phases of handicraft, manufacture, small factory, mechanofacture and then mass production. So the Indian worker has not been trained in industry. He lacks the proletarian tradition."

These peculiarities of the Indian working class can be described as the general characteristics of the working class of the colonies and semi-colonies. According to a thesis of the Communist International:

"The working class in the colonies and the semi-colonies has characteristic features which are important in the formation of an independent working class movement and proletarian class ideology in these countries. The greater part of the colonial proletariat comes from the pauperised village, with which the worker retains his connection even when engaged in industry. In the majority of the colonies (with the exception of some large industrial towns - i.e. Bombay, Calcutta, Shanghai etc.) we find, as a general rule, only the first generation of a proletariat engaged in large scale production. The rest is made of ruined artisans driven from the deceiving handicrafts,
which are widespread even in the most advanced colonies. The ruined artisan the small property owner, carries with him into the working class the narrow craft-sentiments and ideology through which national reformist influence can penetrate the colonial labour movement".

Apart from these peculiarities, the working class in Bombay was facing very miserable conditions. The Indian Factories Committee (1890) furnishes the following picture of the Bombay working class.

Table No.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Monthly wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minor girl</td>
<td>Rs. 5-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boy</td>
<td>Rs. 6-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult female</td>
<td>Rs. 6-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult male (other than weavers)</td>
<td>Rs. 10-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult male (weavers)</td>
<td>Rs. 12-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to a report-

"The conditions of the working class can be described as deplorable. After making allowance for the very limited space, the houses are distinctly over-crowded, dark, damp and ill-ventilated.... the dwellings were surrounded by narrow gullies for carrying off waste water and sullage, the offensive vapour from these gullies permeating the whole of the surrounding atmosphere.... Although not identical in all respects similar conditions were observed in other large manufacturing centres."

* Please also refer to the - 'Industrial worker in India' by B. Shivarao, London, 1939, pp.113-14
The strikes during this period were the natural outcome of the situation. But they were sporadic, ill planned, unorganised, individual and sometimes in combination. And hardly there was any question of concerted action on any problem affecting workers from the side of the employers.

**1. The Butcher's Strike (1867).**

Early in 1866, the corporation of Bombay decided to remove the slaughter houses to Bandra, and to run a daily meat train, for the transport of beef and mutton to Bombay. The Butchers tried to strike in March 1867 but their strike collapsed because of stern and timely action by the corporation. The Butchers deposited a sum of Rs. 5000/- with an apology to the authorities. Following two conditions laid down by the authorities were accepted by the butchers.

i) Those who have stood by the municipality during the strike shall obtain a licence free and shall occupy a stall for one year on payment of a nominal fee of one pice only.

ii) That in the event of disobedience of orders of Municipal Commissioners or of the Health Officer, the offenders licence to slaughter shall be liable to be cancelled, and he himself ejected from the Municipal markets, forfeiting all fees or rents paid by him."

Then there was a strike of scavenging bigaris in 1889. The cause of the strike was the recruitment of new hands which, the old workers thought, would reduce their work and emoluments. The strike ended unsuccessfully.
In 1892-93 the mill owners by lowering the wage rates tried to reduce the cost of production. This resulted in strikes in individual mills, and at times even in groups of mills. Generally, the number of workers involved in strikes was not high. It affected 12000 to 14000 workers. The strikes were not successful.

During the plague epidemic (1897) the system of daily payment of wages was introduced. But soon it was discontinued by reverting to the system of monthly payment. This created discontent among workers. The Bombay workers in 1897 declared a strike in this connection. The following is the story of the strike.

It was only on the 11th of May that the Bombay mill owners association resolved that daily wages were to be discontinued from 1st of June, and liberal bonuses were to be fined. Several strikes occurred but were successfully broken by means of advance payments.

Then in the month of July strikes for bonus by the weavers occurred. A few black legs and spinners were assaulted, many were threatened and some windows broken. However, the strike proved a failure.

The Railway workers - the signalling staff, station masters, assistant station masters etc. declared a strike on the 6th May 1899 making the following demands on the Railway Board.

Change in duty hours, increase in wages, non-discrimination between the Indian and European employees etc. The strike continued for 27 days. The management warned the strikers to return to work by the 31st May 1899, failing which their services would be terminated.
Many of the strikers who had put in long service yielded to the threat and returned to work.

A strike involving 7000-8000 workers from the Bombay mills took place in the later part of 1904. The cause was a dispute between the management and workmen as regards wages. The strike lasted for 11 days and was terminated only after considerable concessions were made to the operatives.

All these strikes were the outcome of the abrupt eruption of discontent and anger among individual workers or a few groups of workers. And naturally it was a sporadic attempt, hence there was neither a militant working class organization, nor any experienced, powerful trade unionist to guide them. N.M. Lokhande, a philanthropic social worker established "The Bombay Mill hand's association" in 1890 to ameliorate the conditions of the workers. He started a Marathi weekly 'Deenbandhu' to give vent to and redress the grievances of the workers. Mr. R.P. Dutt has rightly stated that Mr. Lokhande's association was in no sense a labour organization. It had no membership, no funds, no rules. It was not an organized trade union. Lokhande was a philanthropic promoter of labour legislation and of worker's welfare, not a pioneer in labour organization or of labour struggle.

We may accept Dutt's statement only with certain reservations. In the given situation a number of workers were unwilling to have any connection with any association for fear of losing their jobs. And the employers were intolerant of any such relations on the part of the workers. How could Lokhande form a militant organization of the working class in such a situation?

* For details about Mr. N.M. Lokhande and his organization please refer Sen's 'Working class of India' - pp. 73-66. Sen has rightly appreciated the efforts of Mr. Lokhande.
After 1905, the political situation in Maharashtra radically changed. There was a national upsurge against the British imperialists on account of the partition of Bengal. The working class in Bombay could not keep itself away from this national upsurge. Slowly they were politicalized. The politicalization of the working class created a sort of confidence and consciousness which enabled them to stand against the mill owners and the bourgeoisie. The working class, inspired with the feeling of nationalism, started participating in the mainstream of the national freedom struggle. The working class revealed its revolutionary potentialities by proclaiming a strike in 1908 - the first strike of its kind not only in Maharashtra but in India.

THE STRIKE (POLITICAL) 1908:

In the beginning of the 20th century Bombay had developed as the biggest industrial centre. In 1908, according to a report, the number of industries in Bombay reached 168 employing 34% of the workers in various industries. But it was not a proportionate growth. Textile manufacture became the main branch of industrial activity in the city employing about 100,000 workers out of a total industrial labour force of the city numbering between 180,000 - 200,000. Out of this, 100,000 unskilled labourers in the city worked as coolies or were engaged in similar other jobs.

In July 1908, the working class of Bombay went on a mass political strike on account of Tilak's deportation for 6 years. This was the first general strike in the history of the Indian working class.
The police resorted to Lathi charge and firing, killing a number of workers. But the workers were defiant. They too retaliated with all their strength. The strike continued for a week and succeeded in showing that the working class was a force to be reckoned with.

In this connection Lenin wrote:

"In India too, the proletariat has already developed to conscious political mass struggle and, that being the case, the British regime in India is doomed! .... There is no doubt that the age old system of plunder in India, and the present struggle of all these progressive Europeans against...... Indian democracy, will steel millions upon hundreds of millions of proletarians throughout Asia, for a struggle against their oppressors.... the class conscious European worker already has comrades in Asia and their number will grow with every passing day and hour."

The Times of India reported:-

"Since the unfortunate episode at the textile mill on Saturday morning..... the city has been in a state of comparative tranquility. But it lies entirely upon the surface. None of the mills were at work on Saturday and Sunday. The temper of the mill operatives is said to be extremely sullen..... The most distressing feature of this situation is that 9/10 of those who are now on strike do not know why they are on strike.... This dislocation is due in small part to sympathy with Mr. Tilak, in large part to the wishful misleading of the ignorant masses by artful and designing persons who are the real source of the mischief, and more to sheer coercion."
The report of Lenin and the Times of India seems to be misleading. Lenin overestimated whereas the Times of India underestimated the strength of the working class. The event was a spontaneous and elemental outburst. No doubt it shook Bombay; but it was a momentary affair. It blazed for a few days and then died without leaving a trace or memory. Workers were soon back at work as if nothing had happened.

The Indian Factory Commission observed in 1908:

"One of the main difficulties experienced at present when unrest appears among the employees is that no definite demands are formulated, no grievances are stated, no indication is given as to the cause of discontent. The operatives simply leave work in a body, or more commonly they drop off one by one without explanation, and accept employment under more congenial conditions in their factories."

After the strike (political) in 1908, there was a lull on the industrial front for 10 years. During the first world war, there was a steep rise in prices but no increase in the wages of the working class. This created great unrest among the people. The cost of living increased by 54% without any increase in the standard of living of the workers. This caused a wave of strikes in 1917. 45 strikes occurred between July and December 1917. The workers got 15% increase in their wages; but the workers remained dissatisfied. The half-starved, undernourished workers were badly infected by Influenza and other deadly diseases which proved fatal in a number of cases. The irritated workers declared a strike towards the end of 1918 which affected the entire industry in the Bombay cotton mills. But the millowners were unmoved.
So on 11 January 1919, the workers again went on strike. Nearly 1\ 1/2 Lakhs of workers remained on strike for 11 days. The mill owners at first tried to suppress it, but ultimately sanctioned 35% increase in the wages. The confidence of the working class was strengthened by this victory.

In a conference in December 1919, the workers made the following demands—

1) 10 hours day instead of 12 hours day.
2) Wages in proportion to increasing prices.
3) One month's leave with full salary.

The mill owners not only rejected these demands, but compelled the workers to work from morning to evening in accordance with the Indian Factory Act.

The workers again went on strike to press these demands. This strike which lasted one month was the greatest strike that had ever occurred in the country. The strike ended successfully with a wage increase of 35% for fined salary holders, 55% for women and 75% for daily wage earners. The working hours were reduced from 12 to 10 with one month's leave with pay or one month's bonus. This strike encouraged workers in other fields i.e. The Dock Workers, The Railway Workers, The Municipal and Tram Workers, The Workers in Oil Companies etc. They too went on strike and got considerable increase in their wages.

The following table indicates the growing discontent among the working classes.
Year | Strikes
--- | ---
1918 | 1
1917 | 47
1918 | 61
1919 | 18
1920 | 63

These strikes involved 15000-20,000 workers. Many of the strikes were short lived. A few of them lasted from 10 to 30 days.

R.P. Dutt has briefly summed up the rising strike movement of 1919-20 in the following words:

"The strike movement which began in 1918 and swept the country in 1919-20 was overwhelming in its intensity. The end of year 1918 saw the first great strike affecting an entire industry in a leading centre in the Bombay cotton mills. By January 1, 25,000 workers covering practically all the mills were out. The response to the hartal against the Rowlatt Acts in the spring of 1919 showed the political role of the workers in the forefront of the common national struggle. By the end of 1919 and the first half of the 1920 the wave reached its height."

The spontaneous strike wave was accompanied by efforts at organizing trade unions. The Madras labour union was the first organized union established by B.P. Wadia in 1918. Trade unions were formed in Bombay, Calcutta etc. on the Madras pattern. In Bombay N.M. Joshi, R.S. Nimbkar, S.A. Dange, S.S. Mirajkar, K.N. Joglekar (all Communists) were active among cotton textile workers and municipal workers. All these leaders tried to have a federation of unions.
And in 1920 the All India Trade Union Congress was established. However, the immediate cause of the establishment in 1920 of the A.I.T.U.C. was the nomination by the government of India of the Indian worker's delegate to the first International Labour Conference in Washington in 1919.

It is true that the initiative to form the AITTJG was taken by the nationalists and humanitarians, but the real driving force behind this development was the spontaneous militant mass action of the industrial workers themselves. This took a qualitatively new form in the post-war years of 1918-20. It is significant that the CPI was founded in Tashkant, and the A.I.T.U.C. in Bombay in October 1920. It is also significant that the birth of CPI at Ganpur in 1925, the influence of the Communists was on the increase in A.I.T.U.C. in Bombay and other regions of Maharashtra.

**THE WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT: PHASE-II (1920-64).**

With the establishment of the A.I.T.U.C. the strikes became more intensive and were organised showing the strength and solidarity of the working class. Mr. and Mrs. Roy not only took cognisance of these strikes but Mrs. Roy wrote a few articles in journals' like 'Imprecco'. She wrote: "If the labour organisation did not hang together, the bourgeoisie and the British imperialists would hang them separately."

The following table illustrates the intensity of the strikes:
## Disputes during 1921-1922

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Disputes involved</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Days lost</th>
<th>Personal Leave</th>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Partially successful</th>
<th>Unsuccess</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>154824</td>
<td>159963</td>
<td>1639946</td>
<td>763111</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>318673</td>
<td>198702</td>
<td>2946479</td>
<td>1803750</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Strikes in India - V.B.Karnik pp. 69-70
However, the Communists in Bombay started a regular drive for capturing and dominating the trade union movement from 1923. Prominent Communists like S.A. Dange, R.S. Nimbkar, K.N. Joglekar, S.S. Mirajkar, S.V. Ghat etc. enjoyed influential posts in the National Congress as well as in the Bombay provincial Congress committee. Communist influence in A.I.T.U.C. becomes noticeable from 1925 onwards. The 5th Congress of the Communist International held in 1924 had given the Indian Communists the following directives.

"The Indian Communist party must bring the trade union movement under its influence. It must recognise it on its class basis and purge it of all alien elements. In accordance with these directives the Communists in 1926-27 launched a few successful strikes. The Simon Commission was boycotted by the workers under the leadership of the Communists. Gradually, the masses were being radicalized and politicalized by the Communists. S.V. Ghat a well known CPI member was elected one of the secretaries of the Congress. The Communists wanted to make the Congress more oriented towards Moscow and the Communist International.

In 1927 the A.I.T.U.C. had its session at Delhi. S. Saklatwala, a British M.P. attended the session. The U.S.S.R. did not like the resolutions passed in the session. A Soviet commentator wrote about them as a 'step forward' but opined that they were not a 'serious advance'. His grievance was that the majority of the trade union leaders 'did not support the class struggle but still believed in class collaboration.'
The year 1928 was the year of achievements for the CPI. Out of the 203 disputes in 1928, 111 were in Bombay, 60 in Bengal, 7 in Madras. Towering over all the rest was the Bombay textile strike, the greatest strike in Indian history, in which the entire labour force of 1,50,000 workers stood united for 6 months from April to October against every form of pressure and government suppression. The workers put up a number of demands, but the strike was mainly against the reationalization scheme which the workers feared would result in large scale unemployment. The strike was the remarkable manifestation of the solidarity of the workers and of their capacity to withstand sufferings and privations. The government appointed the Fawcett Committee to examine the standardization scheme without overhauling and find out how it could be introduced without causing hardships to workers. The Fawcett committee recommended the withdrawal of the 7½ percent wage cut and conceded certain other demands of the workers.

The workers did not get any immediate benefit, but the appointment of the Fawcett committee was a moral victory for the workers. They went back to the mills as victors with greater faith in and enthusiasm for the leaders of the strike committee. The strike committee soon was transformed into the Girani Kamgar Union. Thousands upon thousand workers joined the union. Its membership swelled to 70,000. The workers from other areas i.e. the docks, the railways, the municipal councils etc. came under the banner of Communism. Moderate

* Almost all the books on Indian Working class have given a detailed account of this strike.
leaders like N.M. Joshi and others who were just onlookers were swept aside and active Communists replaced them as leaders of the workers of Bombay.

As a result of the influence of the CPI, 1928 was a year of intense industrial unrest. The number of industrial disputes in the year was 203 as against the 128 of 1926 and 129 of 1927. The number of workers involved was 506,851 as against 1,86,811 and 1,31,655 of the two earlier years. The number of man days lost 3,16,47,404 remains the highest on record.

According to K.N. Joglekar, "It was during the process of the strike that the textile workers evolved and perfected their organization, firstly, in the form of a strike committee, in which under the pressure of the rank and file the moderate and the reformist section was compelled to join. Though the experiences of this strike the workers realized the importance and significance of their class organization; and it was as a result of the experience of the strike that they raised within the space of the next month one of the mightiest unions - the Girni Kamgar Union (Lal Bavta)."

Further Joglekar stated-

"It was due to the constant vigilance of the CPI that we were able to suppress all tendencies towards weakening at their very appearance and it was due to this vigilance that we could maintain the morale of the workers and win the strike."

The victory - Lord Irwin, in his speech to the Legislative Assembly in January 1929 declared that, "The disquieting spread of Communist doctrine has been causing anxiety". So in September 1928, the public safety
bill was introduced to curb Communist activities in India. The Assembly rejected the bill. But the Viceroy issued a special ordinance in favour of the bill and brought it into effect.

The Communists were able to assume leadership of the strike because they guessed correctly the mood of the workers and put themselves forward as vigorous champions of their cause. The Communists realised and they convinced the workers that strikes in individual mills would not serve their interest. The workers, accepted as a result of their experience, the Communist proposition of the general strike. The Communists did not adopt an adventurist or sectarian attitude, and were keen on carrying the moderate, nationalist leaders with them. V.B.Karnik has rightly stated that the Communists were tireless in their work, fearless in their attitude, and steadfast in their devotion. These qualities paid them rich dividends and after the end of the strike they became the unquestioned leaders of the working class of Bombay. Their prestige throughout the country went up and workers of other centres also began to accept them as leaders.

According to Masani, the CPI had given some instructions to its members in the A.I.T.U.C.

"Take part in every day struggle, do not disregard the smallest demand; be conspicuous in all strikes and demonstrations, every strike, large or small is a lesson. Train leaders from the rank and file; inculcate discipline, expose reformists, oppose all phrases of non-violence or passive resistance, denounce capitalists. Create discontent and intensity and draw illustration from Russia."
According to V.B. Karnik, however, the strike was not a success. The workers did not gain any economic advantage. On the contrary they lost over 6 months' wages which amounted to about 2½ crores. The rationalization scheme was not abandoned but postponed. Some of the mills had already introduced the rationalization scheme and would not retrace their steps. Even the Communists have admitted that the strike was only a partial success for the workers.

However, the achievements of the workers were not negligible. The Girni Kamgar Union (Lal Bawta) was off-spring of the strike. It was founded on May 22, 1928.

At the initial stage the G.K.U. had only 324 members but it grew by leaps and bounds and the membership reached 54000 by December 1928 and 65000 by the first quarter of 1929. On the whole, it was a moral victory for the workers. At the end of the strike, the workers returned to work with a feeling of exhilaration and with a pride and consciousness of their organized strength.

According to government report:-

"In several respects the strike itself had been remarkable. It was unprecedented in length of time for which it lasted and in the discipline and cohesion of the strikers."

Subhodh Roy gives the following account of the strike and its effect:

"The Communist party capture nearly all the labour unions, and their representatives in the strike committee became virtual dictators."

* For the demands in this strike, please see the Appendix.
On 5th October a huge mass meeting more than 20,000 workers was addressed by Nimbkar and Mirajkar. The following slogans - 'Victory to the red flags', 'Victory to the Girni Kamgar Union', 'Long live the workers fight' etc., were given. Red flags were enthusiastically displayed and where they were not available, the workers used their turbans as flags.

(2) THE GENERAL STRIKE OF 1929:

The strength and the success which the Communists acquired disheartened the mill-owners as well as the government. Naturally, the millowners and the government started their anti-Communist activities. Many prominent Communist leaders were arrested and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment in the 'Meerut conspiracy case'.

In 1929, the millowners removed some Communist trade union activists without any notice. The strike of the 26th April 1929 followed in which 75000 workers in 41 mills struck work exactly at 12 noon. In a couple of days the strike spread to other mills and the textile industry was brought to a standstill.

According to the Bombay labour Gazette: "The origin of the strike is traceable to the strikes of the Wadia group mills which first originated in the spinning mills of first March with the dismissal of a worker for absence from work. The worker started that he had taken leave from the jober, who, however, denied the statement".

The Girni Kamgar Union demanded the reinstatement of the discharged workers. Early in May the government of Bombay held a joint conference of the representatives of the G.K.U. and M.O.A. in order to secure an early settlement. The conference failed as the G.K.U. insisted on the immediate reinstatement of about 6000 workers who had been
discharged from work. The M.O.A. was not prepared to concede the demand.

The government of Bombay took repressive measures to curb the strike ruthlessly. Top ranking Communist leaders—S.A. Dange, Joglekar, Mirajkar, Ghate etc. were already behind the bars. A 'black list' of the workers having relations with the Communists and the G.K.U. was prepared. All repressive measures were adopted to break the strike. The G.K.U. called off the strike on the 19th September 1929.

The G.K.U. in a resolution stated:

"The union and its members have done their best to fight for their rights which are also the rights of the working class in general, but the strain on their resources has been so heavy that it is not possible for sometime to continue the campaign of persuading the workers to remain on strike and hence it has become regretfully necessary to withdraw the union pickets from the mills from Thursday, September 19; this does not mean, however, that the union accepts the report of the 'Court of Inquiry' either partially or entirely, or that this union gives up any of its demands."

The strike which lasted 29 days ended in failure. The workers did not gain any economic benefit; on the contrary, they had to accept the rationalization scheme. The G.K.U. - the powerful and militant union of workers was smashed.

The Home Department records commented:-

"Since the collapse of the strike the G.K.U. has failed to obtain subscriptions from their members. In many cases centres which
formerly collected several hundred rupees a month can now hardly secure 10%. The clerks and office bearers are appropriating it to their own use as they have not received their pay. The leaders have fallen out among themselves having removed Mr. Dange and V.H. Joshi from the committee on the ground of 'right deviation' (but really on account of personal jealousy and recriminations regarding funds).

Behind the strike was a struggle for power, and a war of attrition between the M.O.A. and G.K.U. Since October 1928, the G.K.U. had become a powerful body. It had a big membership and a large following amongst the textile workers of Bombay. It had a committee in every mill. The mill committee were a force to be reckoned with. In some mills they were so powerful that nothing could be done without consulting them. In some places they began dictating terms to the managers. The employers did not like it. They started victimization of the working people.

The strike failed because the experienced and mature leaders were in jail. B.T. Ranadive and S.V. Deshpande who led the strike were new and inexperienced, and were unable to judge the situation properly. The failure of the strike resulted in infighting and factionalism among the Communists. Despite the failure, the G.K.U. became popular and spread to Sholapur, Dhuliya, Amalner etc.

The government report regarding the influence of the Communists upon the Bombay working class is self-explanatory. It stated -
There are no labour leaders in Bombay who have the courage to oppose the Communists openly on the platform; and to denounce their teachings as mischievous. They will gradually regain their ascendancy; the poison will gradually be instilled into the minds of the workers and other young men of the stamp of Nimbkar, Dange, Deshpande, Ranade etc. So far we have serious trouble only with the mills; but the intention of the Communists is to get control of the Railway workers, the Dock workers, and Municipal workers and to work for a general strike. And if they are allowed full freedom of movement, I do not see anything to stop them...... reaching their goal!

Another report stated:

B.T.Ranade and Deshpande are the brains of the G.K.U. At present they have been temporarily removed. They are supposed to be undergoing imprisonment but are getting very comfortably through their term of imprisonment. During their forced absence from the management of G.K.U. the union is like a ship without a rudder and nobody is able to formulate an obstructionist policy.

The failure of the strike and the repression of the government resulted in the decline of the strength of the G.K.U. The membership fell from 197,052 in March 1929, to 98,816 in December 1931 and to 97,716 in June 1935.

* This illustrates the attitude of the British government towards the Communists.
(3) THE OIL WORKERS STRIKE – BOMBAY 1929.

The oil company refused to recognise the workers union formed by the Communists. The Communists started picketing and declared a strike. The oil company and the government started breaking the strike with the help of the Police. The strike failed. A number of workers lost their jobs. And the Union was paralysed.

The strike failed because of the heterogenous nature of the work-force. It consisted of local Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Bhayyas, Pathans etc. The oil company recruited new Bhayyas and Pathans, resulting in clashes between the strikers and the new recruits. It assumed communal character.

During 1929-34, the Communists had undergone suffering, repression, infighting and factionalism. As the working class movement was weak; and the mill-owners exploited the situation by increasing the number of working hours, reducing the wages and dismissing the workers. Out of 84 mills in Bombay, 34 mills were closed; and 60,000 workers became unemployed.

The G.K.U. in its conference in 1934, called upon the workers to go on strike. Strikes occurred in Sholapur, Nagpur, Bombay etc. The textile mill workers of Sholapur went on strike against a 12.5% cut in wages. The strike lasted from February 1934 to May 1934, resulting in a loss of 460,000 working days. At Nagpur also 60,000 textile workers participated in the strike which lasted from May to July 1934.

*A confidential government report deals with this factionalism in the Communist movement. According to this report, Ranadive and Deshpande had formed two separate groups each with a good number of followers. Please refer appendix.
In Bombay, 90,000 workers were involved in the strike. This strike was conducted by a 'Council of action' consisting of both the militant Communists and the moderate reformists.

The 'Bombay Sentinel' reported thus on these occurrences: 30,000 workers joined the strike. 11 mills completely closed and 26 mills were seriously affected on 24th April 1934. The strike continued for 2 months. The mill owners sanctioned 25% D.A. and working hours were reduced from 10 to 9 and the strike was called off.

'The Times of India' reported:-

"The Communists activity in India is like the Malaria wave. After a bad Malaria epidemic over some area there follows a period of comparative freedom from the disease, because people are left for a while almost immune, similarly when Communist activities pass certain limits government round up the Communist agitators and the movement subsides until it throws up other leaders to take the places of those who were compulsorily laid by."

The CPI documents describe the Communist movement's position during this period as follows:-

"During this period our movement undoubtedly succeeded in awakening broad mass of workers to class consciousness. But our movement did not gain in depth; as it did in breadth. It failed to strike deep roots in the working class masses. It failed to create a working class cadre. It failed to create the CPI with its roots among the rank and file workers which alone would have been the guarantee of consolidating the success achieved and of weathering the storms which were ahead."
But Sen has given a different account of the situation. According to him, despite government repression, and cancellation of the registration of G.K.U. (Red flag) and a few other unions; "This was a period when the Communists made serious efforts to propagate the revolutionary ideas of Marxism and Leninism from inside the jail and from outside as well. In this very period a large number of political workers connected with terrorist movements shunned the wrong path of individual terrorism and accepted Marxian philosophy as their revolutionary creed."

In 1937, the Indian National Congress came to power in Bombay. In July the government issued its statement of labour policy. "With regard to trade disputes, government are determined to pursue an active policy with a view to maintaining industrial peace ... endeavouring all the time to see that the workers obtain a fair deal. It is the intention of the government to promote legislation aiming at prevention of strikes and lockouts as far as possible!..."

The Bombay industrial disputes act, passed in November 1938, attempted to remedy the defects in the 'Bombay trade dispute act', passed in 1934.

In 1937, when the Congress Ministry was in power, there were 5 Industrial workers' unions. Most important was the Communist led G.K.U. (red flag) with 5500 members. By June 1940 the membership of the G.K.U. rose to 32000 whereas the combined membership of the rest of the unions was only 7000. This rapid growth of the G.K.U. was due to the vigorous support which it lent to strikes in various mills, and especially to the
two general strikes of 1938 and 1939. The first in November 1938, was a token one day strike (protest) against the passage of the Bombay industrial disputes act which was accompanied by considerable violence but resulted nevertheless in the addition of new members to the G.K.U.

In 1939 more than 3000 woman workers of the winding section of the Beetiya Mill declared a strike in protest against an increase in the work-load. This strike lasted 6 months and had tremendous impact upon the Bombay working class.

Due to the World War II, the prices had soared high and the cost of living had enormously increased but the industrialists were getting huge profits and the condition of the working class was deteriorating. Naturally, the working class was in a mood to go on strike.

(4) THE BOMBAY MILLS STRIKE 1940.

In 1940 the Communists called upon the working class to go on strike to face the situation, arising out of the Second World War. The government started repression by adopting D.I.A. against the workers. 'The Communist' reports-

"This is the first great economic strike against the effects of the war; it makes the beginning of a gigantic mass upheaval on a national scale, affecting every section of the Indian proletariat. The membership of the union (G.K.U.) rose by 20,000 during the strike itself - a thing which had never taken place in the history of the Indian working class struggles. For more than a month 1,60,000 workers
of Bombay are on strike. On 17th March, in response to a call from B.P.T.U.C. workers in hundreds of factories went on a one-day strike; shops and schools in north Bombay observed hartal to condemn the repressive policy of the government. Complete unity prevails in the workers' ranks - Muslims, Marathas, Mahars - all stand united determined to fight till victory is achieved."

The red A.I.T.U.C., the All India press workers federation, the G.I.P.Railway labour union, the Lal Bavta press Kamgar union and other organizations celebrated the following days:-

Lenin day, Karl Marx day, Paris commune day, textile workers week, Meerut day, general strike day, May day etc. and made propaganda of Communist principles during 1936-40.

The central body of the A.I.T.U.C. at its session in Bombay in 1939 stated:-

"As the present war between great Britain on one side and the fascist powers on the other, is claimed by Britain to be waged for the vindication of the principles of freedom and democracy and not for any imperialistic purposes. India, without any sympathy for imperialism or fascism, naturally claims for herself freedom and democratic government; before she can be expected to take part in the war. Participation in the war, which will not result in the establishment of freedom and democracy in India, will not benefit India, much less will it benefit the working class."
But with the involvement of Russia in the Second World War in 1942 the CPI and the A.I.T.U.C. switched over from this position to cooperation with the British government; overnight the imperialist war became the 'peoples war'. And the A.I.T.U.C. asked the workers not to go on strike. On the contrary, it was their pious duty to boost up the production in the national interest! This position of the CPI adversely affected the growth of its membership - the CPI and the A.I.T.U.C. were cut off from the mainstream of the national freedom struggle. Being isolated, they suffered irreparable losses, the effects of which are perceptible even today. Though the membership of G.K.U. declined from 36500 - 26000 in 1942-45, the G.K.U. was the only force to be reckoned with.


* In 1949 March, a Railway strike was declared by the A.I.T.U.C. and A.I.R.F. It was an attempt to jeopardize the government machinery. The government ruthlessly curbed this strike by using the P.D.A. The membership of the CPI declined from 90,000 to 20,000; and the A.I.T.U.C. membership declined from 700,000 to 100,000.

Because of this violent strike, (led by B.T. Randive) serious infighting and factionalism started within the CPI. There was mutual recrimination between Dange, P.C. Joshi, B.T. Randive and others. In 1948 and 1950, S.A. Dange issued statements describing Randive's policy as 'Trotsciate' and charged that party membership had dropped from nearly 100,000 to 20,000. Communist trade unions were in a state

of "complete paralysis and stagnation". The peasant organizations were 'practically wiped out'. And the party itself was in a condition of 'paralysis and disintegration'.

But B.T.Randive bitterly criticised these views as 'reformism'. Further he stated... In its most naked and gross form (it is) shameless theory of class-collaboration. The rich peasantry is an enemy and the Andhra party leaders failed to acknowledge this because they were themselves predominantly "rural intellectuals, sons of rich and middle peasants."

But B.T.Randive's policies were condemned even by Russia. The Cominform declared "The Indian situation was far from revolutionary. It was "Peoples deep disappointment" with the new government instead of revolutionary upsurge as B.T. had described."

Even the British Communists also advised B.T.Randive to disassociate from such sectarian and adventurist policies. (B.E.Reindive, in an interview, confessed that he had committed a gross mistake in adopting such sectarian and adventurist policies in 1949).

After Independence, new working class organizations - I.N.T.U.G. H.M.S., U.T.U.C. etc. emerged. The INTUC from its inception has been dominated by the Indian National Congress; and naturally the state government (being a Congress government) adopted a sympathetic attitude towards the INTUC. The H.M.S. is patronised by the Socialists. There is competition and rivalry between these organizations. The
AIITUC had to launch movements in collaboration with H.M.S. or UTUC. The AIITUC, because of its sectarian outlook and tarnished image on the one hand, and the hostile attitude of the Congress and the government on the other, has been slowly swept aside by the INTUC. Many a time the H.M.S. too, under dashing leaders like George Fernandes etc. has wrested control from the AIITUC in many industries. But from 1951 onwards the CPI and the AIITUC adopted a moderate attitude towards the Nehru government.

(6) THE STRIKE IN 1950.

In 1950, the textile workers of Bombay declared a general strike. This strike was called by H.M.S. and the CPI led G.K.U supported it. The following demands were made.

i) Payment of bonus for 3 months.

ii) The recognition to the union must be based upon the secret voting of the workers etc.

This strike lasted for two months; but could not succeed. However, the G.K.U. and the H.M.S. by exposing the INTUC could develop the strength and the solidarity of the working class.

From 1950 to 1960 the CPI led G.K.U. failed to launch mass movements - on a large scale. No doubt there were strikes, but these strikes were either in individual establishments or groups of mills. These strikes could not become general, nor influence either the government or the mill owners; they could not also solve the problems

* This might have happened because of the improvement in the relations between Russia and India. The General Election (1951) and the set-backs of the CPI, may explain the shift to moderate policies.
faced by the working class. The Congress government in alliance with the mill owners tried to curb the activities of the CPI led G.K.U. and A.I.T.U.C. by giving a free hand to the INTUC - Congress dominated working class organization. In 1962 the Chinese aggression added fuel to this hostility towards the CPI and its allied working class organizations all over the country. Naturally the CPI had to face a very odd situation during this period. Its membership, influence and popularity declined as a result.

The membership of the R.M.M.S. - (controlled by INTUC) between 1951-56 rose from 31,000 to 84,000. While the membership of G.K.U. and H.M.S. varied between 10,000 - 20,000 respectively.

Thus for five years the R.M.M.S. occupied as almost unchallenged position in the Bombay textile industry. The Communist led G.K.U. and A.I.T.U.C. being weak and unable to rebuild its strength, the RMMMS exploited the situation to its maximum benefit.

**THE GRAND DELHI MORCHA 1963.**

However, the CPI could recover its position to a certain extent in 1963. When the CPI began to demand nationalization of Banks, oil companies, export and import trade etc., so that the government could utilize the funds for the defence of the country. In support of this demand the Bombay working class led by the CPI refused to attend to their work on leave days. The gold control policy of the government added to the sufferings of the working class.

* According to Harold Gouch the G.K.U. in the 1960's was the second most influential if not the most influential trade union organization in India.
So strikes and hartals became a common feature in Bombay. 'Bombay Bandh' was declared on 20th August 1963. 10,00,000 workers participated in the Bombay Bandh. From Bombay to Kalyan - the offices, the shops and stores closed down and buses, trams etc. were off the roads.

On 1st September 1963, the CPI collected 7,00,000 signatures in Maharashtra in support of their demand for the nationalization of foreign industries. A huge Morcha consisting two Laks of workers, peasants, middle class etc. reached Delhi on the 13th September, 1963. 3000 people from Maharashtra participated in this historic Morcha.

THE OPINIONS OF THE PRESS:

The press commented on this event as follows-

1. 'The capital has gone red' - 'Times of India'.
2. "It was beyond imagination. It was an eye opener for those who were under the illusion that the CPI is finished!" - 'Nava Kal'.
3. "The Delhi people had never seen such a huge, organized, disciplined, peaceful Morcha in their life". - 'Maratha'.
4. "The CPI could regain its old prestige which it had lost due to Chinese aggression by adopting a new three-fold policy - support to Central government - specially to Mr. Nehru, opposition to Mao's China and leadership of the people on the economic front - the CPI has achieved a lot within one year. The Morcha gave a tremendous shock to the anti-Communists." - The 'Kesari'.

On 12 August 1964, 3 million people stopped work in response to the call of a general strike cum Hartal given separately by H.M.P., H.M.S. and the A.I.T.U.G. The Morchas, meetings, demonstrations too were held separately. Dange said the slogan of the day was... 'March separately, but strike together'. The Bandh was a success.

Harold Gouch describes the situation in 1964 as follows-

'The trade union situation in Bombay textile mills in particular and in Maharashtra ing general, seems to have developed into one kind of stability. The RMMS with nearly 88000 members in 1964, has by far the larger membership but does not have a complete hold on the loyalties of the workers. In normal times when no major issue is in the air there is no reason why the workers should not go to the RMMS with their complaints and receive the benefits of membership of a union, privileged under the law. However, at times of crisis, whether economic, like the bonus, or political like the State's Reorganization, the workers respond to the call of the opposition. The G.K.U. seems to replace the RMMS in normal times. Nevertheless, it performs an important agitational function.'

S.A. Dange has categorically state that -

'We shall launch the struggle and will gladly allow the RMMS to sign the agreements representing the fruits of our struggle.'

* 'Mews Age' dated 26 October 1975 gives a detailed account of this 'Band'.
Table No. L
Trade Unions affiliated and sympathetic to A.I.T.U.C.
in 1920.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>No. of affiliated Unions.</th>
<th>No. of sympathetic Unions.</th>
<th>Membership.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table No. 2
Sessions V to X of AITUC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>VIII</th>
<th>IX</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table No. 3

Number of Unions and their membership in
Maharashtra - 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INTUC</th>
<th>ATTUC</th>
<th>H.M.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claimed</td>
<td>178/3,38,729</td>
<td>128/202,851</td>
<td>95/2,10,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>94/1,54,242</td>
<td>69/41,154</td>
<td>50/1,37,286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BOMBAY INDUSTRY HAS A LONG AND BITTER TRADITION OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT. THERE HAVE BEEN MORE LABOUR DISPUTES IN THE BOMBAY COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY AND THEY HAVE BEEN OF GREATER INTENSITY THAN ANY OTHER PLACE OR INDUSTRY IN THE COUNTRY. THE CPI LED AITUC AND G.K.U. WHICH EMERGED IN 1920 AND XM 28 RESPECTIVELY HAD A COMPLICATED, TUMULTUOUS AND UNSTABLE CAREER. ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN CALLING MASSES OF WORKERS OUT ON STRIKE.

WHILE IN NORMAL TIMES THE REFORMIST UNIONS I.E. THE INTUC, THE B.M.S., H.M.S. ETC., SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT HAVE SUCCEEDED IN MAINTAINING THEIR POSITIONS AS REPRESENTATIVE UNIONS.

THE AITUC HAS ADOPTED A MORE POSITIVE APPROACH TO THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. AT VARIOUS AITUC SESSIONS RESOLUTIONS WERE PASSED TO DEMAND THE UNCONDITIONAL TRANSFER OF ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE, ABOLITION OF INDIAN STATES, AND PARASITIC LANDLORDISM, FREEDOM OF PEASANTRY FROM ALL EXPLOITATION AND EXACTIONS; NATIONALIZATION OF LAND, PUBLIC UTILITIES, MINERAL RESOURCES; CONTROL OF ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE COUNTRY BY WORKERS AND PEASANTS SO THAT THE FRUITS OF NATIONAL FREEDOM MAY NOT BE GRABBED BY THE CAPITALISTS.

KEEPING THESE OBJECTIVES IN VIEW, THE COMMUNISTS SUCCEEDED TO A CERTAIN EXTENT IN CHANGING THE NATURE OF THE WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT IN MAHARASHTRA. BEFORE THE EMERGENCE OF THE COMMUNISTS THE WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT WAS SPORADIC AND SPONTANEOUS AND DOMINATED BY ECONOMIC MOTIVES AND POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS WERE NEGLIGIBLE. THE COMMUNISTS

*FOR OBJECTIVES OF THE AITUC PLEASE REFER APPENDIX.
brought a qualitative and quantitative change in the movement. As the masses were politicalized, the Communists could succeed in giving a political orientation even to the economic strikes.

The working class movement had reached its height in the 1930's when the Communists were the unquestioned leaders of Indian labour. They had captured almost every important union not only in Maharashtra, but in India except the textile union of Ahmedabad, led by Gandhi. They had succeeded in securing a membership of over 50,000 textile workers in Bombay city for G.K.U. Although the G.K.U. membership fluctuated widely over the years, its peak in 1929-30 far outdid the B.T.L.U.'s 9800 or the 26,732 of the Gandhian Ahmedabad textile association.

However, the success achieved by the Communists in Maharashtra was short-lived. With the emergence of bourgeois nationalist trade unions- INTUC, H.M.S. etc., the Communists were swept aside because of their failure to strike deep roots among the people. The failure of the Communists can be attributed to a number of complicated factors.

P.C. Joshi has correctly pointed out the nature of the Indian working class:

"The working class in India is outnumbered by the peasantry. And the vast masses of the urban and rural poor are pauperised but not proletarianised. The working class is to a greater extent of peasant origin and has not broken its umbilical cords with the peasantry and the village. The new working class suffers from the

* It does not imply that non-Communist working class organisations have struck deep roots either. The only thing is that they are having better position than the Communist. This is because of number of factors - discussed elsewhere in this chapter."
narrow horizons and backward orientations of the peasants at one end and the anarchic moods of the lumpen proletariat at the other. On the basis of the former it is extremely susceptible to the aspects of communalism, casteism, militant regionalism and other forms of fanaticism. On the basis of the latter, it creates the base for socialism in India."

The Maharashtrian working class is not an exception. That is why the Shiv Sena could successfully exploit the working class along with other sections of the society; and command tremendous influence during 1966-68 in Maharashtra. So long as the Communists do not strive hard to educate and re-educate the working class, and bring out psychological changes; they will never produce a revolutionary class.

The labour investigation committee had concluded in 1946 that only the engineering industry could claim an industrial proletariat. The Communists and other radical organizations have suffered due to this undifferentiated class character of the workers not only in Maharashtra, but all over the nation.

ii) In Maharashtra, the skilled and unskilled class of workers are separated not only on the basis of superior or inferior technical skill, but they are separated on the basis of caste as well as community and sex. The lower caste Hindus (the untouchables) were totally excluded from the weaving department. In the reeling department too they were separated from other high caste people. The Kokani Marathas were in demand where skill and intelligence was required. While Kokani Maratha women worked in the reeling and winding department. The Muslims worked in the weaving department.
According to Morris—

'The Hindu untouchable caste members were excluded from weaving department not because they belonged to the low caste. On the contrary, the weaving section was a comparatively highly paid section; so the high caste Hindus and the Muslims too wanted to capture the highly paid jobs and create a sort of monopoly.'

It would seem that Morris has not sufficiently recognized the stereotype, caste-ridden structure of Indian society. In India for centuries together, the low caste Hindus have been given low paid jobs. The low caste Hindus were kept out of the higher posts because of their obsession with pollution. Admission of the lower castes on terms of equality with the superior ones would undermine the very basis of the caste system of which presentation of purity is regarded as the essence.

The Bombay work-force has a multi-national composite character. The bulk of the workers come from the Konkan and the Deccan districts of Bombay. About 90% of them workers in the textile industry and not less than 80% in other industries are Marathas. In general, 75% are Hindus but the Muslims, the Mahars, the Matangs etc. also account for a considerable share.

On the language basis, the Bombay work-force can be divided as follows—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marathi speaking</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati speaking</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu speaking</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English speaking</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other languages</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because of this multi-lingual and cosmopolitan character of the work-force, the Communists in Maharashtra have been faced with a very difficult problem and have not found it easy to unify the variegated working class.

According to Dange:-

"The Caste, nation and the tribe in the Marathi worker, must be harnessed in the service of building the class outlook. The nationalism of the worker must not be allowed to destroy his internationalism as a class. It is the task of our trade unions to see that while supporting the demand for linguistic provinces, the workers of one language and nationality do not trail behind the bourgeoisie of their language and nationality and break with their working class brothers of another nationality or be unfriendly or hostile to them."

But the party’s Maharashtrain leadership (including Dange) could not achieve this feat. They consistently concentrated on the Marathi speaking majority. In 1955, two of the most prominent CPI leaders in Bombay, A.S.R. Chari and G. Sundaram, both South Indian Brahmins, were denied seats in the newly created Maharashtra Communist committee that was formed following merger of the Bombay and the Maharashtra units. Naturally they complained that Bombay Communists leadership was dominated by Dange and the Maharashtra clique.

In multi-lingual Bombay the 'Bhayya' has been touched least of all by Marathi oriented Communist organization. In a report in 1953 the party accepted "Special attention must be paid to this erstwhile neglected section of the Bombay working class. The dangerous attitude that
the Bhayya will always remain a stranger to our movement must be banished forever from our mind."

The caste composition of the Maharashtrian trade union leaders belonging to different organisations throws sufficient light on its social base.

Table No. 44

Caste distribution of Bombay Trade Union Leaders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>INTUC</th>
<th>AITUC</th>
<th>H.M.S.</th>
<th>H.M.P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Brahmins</td>
<td>67 (58.7)</td>
<td>45 (67.0)</td>
<td>21 (64.5)</td>
<td>7 (50.0)</td>
<td>1 (33.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmins</td>
<td>37 (32.4)</td>
<td>23 (31.9)</td>
<td>8 (25.8)</td>
<td>7 (50.0)</td>
<td>2 (66.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled Castes</td>
<td>10 (8.9)</td>
<td>4 (1.1 )</td>
<td>2 (9.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 114 72 31 14 3

(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)

Note: Figures in bracket show percentage.

**Table No. 5**

Distribution according to religion and central organization with percentage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>INTUC</th>
<th>AITUC</th>
<th>H.M.S.</th>
<th>H.M.P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>114 (68.2)</td>
<td>72 (48.8)</td>
<td>31 (75.6)</td>
<td>14 (66.7)</td>
<td>3 (42.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>16 (9.6)</td>
<td>4 (3.6)</td>
<td>3 (7.3)</td>
<td>1 (4.7)</td>
<td>2 (28.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>11 (6.7)</td>
<td>9 (8.1)</td>
<td>1 (2.4)</td>
<td>1 (4.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jains</td>
<td>3 (1.8)</td>
<td>4 (3.6)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1 (0.6)</td>
<td>1 (0.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (1.47)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsee</td>
<td>1 (0.6)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (0.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>21 (12.5)</td>
<td>20 (18.1)</td>
<td>6 (14.7)</td>
<td>4 (19.2)</td>
<td>2 (28.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in bracket show percentage.

These two tables illustrate the domination of the Hindus and specially of Brahmans when compared to the Scheduled Castes. That is why normally the Scheduled Caste workers follow the RPI and other similar organizations espousing the cause of the Scheduled Caste communities. Whenever problems of monetary gain arise, the Scheduled Caste worker follows the radical trade unions like the G.K.U. (Red flag).

The following statement of Dinakarrao Javalkar is a comment on the mood of the non-Brahmins and their attitude towards the Brahmin leaders:

"The red flag union must endure, the red flag union must grow, but the union should be in the hands of the workers and there should be no room for Bhatjis" - (Brahmins).

Because of Dr. Ambedkar's anti-Communist stance, the Scheduled Castes - specially the Nax Buddhism are anti-Communist. The Congress has struck strong and deep roots among the non-Brahmin section in the rural areas. After 1950, the Brahmans, to a greater extent, came under the influence of right reactionary parties like the Jan Sangh. Thus the base of the Communist party was progressively eroded and its strength declined inevitably in Maharashtra.

"Had the Communists in Maharashtra not over estimated the economic aspects of the problem of untouchability and completely neglected the social, cultural and psychological aspects of the problem; had they been able to win over some of the emerging radicalized leadership from the non-Brahmins (as happened in Kerala and Andhra), a strong working class movement might have been securely founded in Maharashtra.

* At the initial stage, the leadership of the Brahmans was the natural outcome of the education they received. Today the situation is changing but with a snails pace.
Electoral strategy and caste appeal drew the overwhelming majority of the Marathas into the Congress fold; the Bahujana Samaj and the Peasants and Workers Party similarly continued to exercise strong influence in certain areas in Maharashtra, by appealing to non-Brahmin sentiment though, of late the P.W.P. has broadened the base of the leadership by inducting into its fold elements from higher castes.

The Communist party felt itself restricted by its ideology and could not make appeals in the name of caste like other parties or societies. Naturally, they represent a very limited section of the society - the working class in the textile industries in Bombay, Sholapur etc.

According to one opinion the Communists in Maharashtra suffer from lack of co-ordination among the members, bureaucratic tendencies and other organizational weaknesses. Though they are dedicated to their cause.

At present the party has measurably failed in giving any definite motivation and direction to the trade unions. Instead of discussing the policies, problems and prospects of the party; the members generally discuss certain trivial matters. They did not feel it necessary to have experienced, mature, enthusiastic comrades to guide the rank and file on different levels. Individualistic tendencies and not the collective responsibility has become/is becoming the rule of the day."

Because of this unhealthy tradition there is, no recruitment to the party. The top ranking leaders, without consulting the concerned person in the field, give their directives. This leads towards bureaucratization and bossism."

* S.G.Sardesai in an interview commented that right from 1920, the Communists concentrated upon the workers in the textile industries only. That is why they are a power to be reckoned with in textile industries; but almost negligible in other industries.
One of the prominent Communist leaders from Marathwada also complained that the top ranking leaders are least interested about the political education of the party members. Many of the members from the rank and file do not know the significance of the Marxist ideology and other related matters.

According to Marx:-

"The trade unions must learn how to act consciously as focal points for organizing the working class in the greater interests of its complete emancipation. They must support every social and political movement directed towards this aim. The trade unions must succeed in rallying round themselves all workers still outside their ranks. They must carefully safeguard the interests of the workers in the poorest paid traders - i.e. the farm labourers, who due to especially unfavourable circumstances have been deprived of their power of resistance. They must convince the whole world that their efforts are far from egoistic and narrow, but on the contrary, are directed towards the emancipation of the down trodden masses."

But the Communists turned a blind eye and a deaf ear even to Marx; their concentration on organising textile workers was at the cost of the emancipation of the down trodden and unorganised masses. This negligence on the part of the Communists was to have serious consequences. Instead of overthrowing the 'establishment', the working class, because of its petty-bourgeois mentality, has tried to become - knowingly or unknowingly part and parcel of the 'establishment'.

*S. A. Dange, in an interview, accepted this fact. But opined that education through movement is the real education. The available Marxist literature is mainly in English. This is also a great hurdle in educating the people. The party should provide serious attention to this problem.
P.C. Joshi has rightly pointed out that "the post-Independence working class struggle is mostly of the defensive type; their main demand has been to defend their existing living standards, the gains registered get gradually wiped out by the growing price rise. The struggle should be planned in such a manner that they go over from the defensive to the offensive, from struggles to defend their living standards to struggles to improve the same."

The bourgeoisie is the most powerful section, having complete control over the government as well as over the means of communications. The press in Maharashtra, controlled by the bourgeoisie has been busy with anti-Communist propaganda. By giving distorted and fabricated news of the Communist activities, it has bred ill-will towards the Communists. It does not mean that the press is favourable in other provinces. But Bombay being the heart of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie to safeguard its interests, utilizes every means (specially press) to counteract the Communist propaganda.

* About bourgeoisie press, please refer Chapter-I p.
** Please refer Appendix p.
### Causes of Weakness of the Working Class Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Illiteracy of Workers</th>
<th>Poor of Finances</th>
<th>Apathy of the Rank &amp; Machinery</th>
<th>Reliance on Judicial Politics</th>
<th>Influence of Management</th>
<th>Outsider Union Causes</th>
<th>Inter-Union Causes</th>
<th>Other Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122 respondents</td>
<td>(87.7)</td>
<td>(86.9)</td>
<td>(81.1)</td>
<td>(77.9)</td>
<td>(74.6)</td>
<td>(74.6)</td>
<td>(71.3)</td>
<td>(69.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109 respondents</td>
<td>(63.0)</td>
<td>(77.0)</td>
<td>(55.0)</td>
<td>(51.4)</td>
<td>(65.1)</td>
<td>(90.8)</td>
<td>(38.5)</td>
<td>(72.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:— Trade Union leadership in India: S. M. D. Puneker and S. Madhuri.

This shows that the Communist party has an urban base. One every point Bombay scores over Maharashtra as a whole.
Along with these general causes, (shown in the table) the following factors also have hampered the growth of the Communist movement in Maharashtra.

The Communists failed to understand the heterogeneous, though in some respects composite, class character of the working class in Maharashtra. The working class can easily be divided on the ground of caste, community, language, religion etc. Middle class tendencies are on the increase among these classes. Because of these middle class tendencies, the working class is not in a mood to follow the Communists.

Moreover, the Communists failed to judge the psychology and potentialities of the working class - i.e. what stuff the working class is made ? How far is it law abiding ? And under what circumstances does it break the law ? What are the grounds which it can be well mobilized; and to what extent ? Such questions were neglected. That is why very often they launched movements when the working class was unprepared. Moreover the Communists failed to assimilate the Muslims and the backward classes within its fold. Naturally, these classes follow their own organisations.

The socialist party sponsored I.M.P. was the only organization to devote more than 25% of its expenditure to support workers who were on strike, to provide unemployment benefits and to meet legal costs. The A.I.T.U.C. devoted less than 10% of its expenditure for these purposes. Inability to provide for such tentingencies affects expansion and retention of membership and encourages workers to move at will from one union to another.

* Please refer the composition of the working class given in this chapter p.
** A free talk with S.Y. Kolhatkar, the prominent trade unionist from Bombay.
Anyhow, the Communists in Maharashtra have succeeded in inculcating class consciousness in the working men and they launched a few massive struggles. But in general the struggles were neither politically motivated, nor directed towards radical social transformation. "Economism" and other bourgeois considerations outweighed the urgency of social revolution. The Communists seem to have taken for granted that the working class was born with a revolutionary consciousness. They failed to create a genuine revolutionary consciousness among the working class and using it successfully against the forces of exploitation.
Appendix - I

THE OBJECTIVES OF A.I.T.U.C.

The objectives of the A.I.T.U.C. are defined in its constitution as follows-

i) To establish a socialist state.

ii) To socialize and nationalize the means of production, distribution, exchange as far as possible.

iii) To ameliorate the economic and social conditions of the working class.

iv) To watch, promote, safeguard and further the interests, rights and privileges of the workers in all matters relating to their employment, etc.
### APPENDIX-IT

**MEMBERSHIP OF MAJOR WORKING CLASS ORGANIZATION.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>INTUC</th>
<th>AITUC</th>
<th>H.M.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>412193</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1033614</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>1028117</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>1438878</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>1548498</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>1268605</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>1374720</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>1353321</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>1429621</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1169</td>
<td>13896634</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>1447205</td>
<td>1409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1270</td>
<td>1503811</td>
<td>1453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>1503400</td>
<td>1636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>1663893</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1414</td>
<td>1645668</td>
<td>1595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX-III A

THE ATTITUDE OF THE PRESS.

"The CPI is the complete and sterile tool of Soviet Russia (a section of it now of Communist China). It is without independence of any kind, it wholly lacks any genuine indigenous roots. It does what it is told and changes course as its master tells it. It is a lackey without even a lackey's right to an occasional day off".

Source: S. Natarajan: in an article on CPI in 'Opinion'
March 29, 1966 p.10

APPENDIX-III B.

ANTI-COMMUNIST PRESS

"There is one political party fighting the general elections in this country which has at its disposal the radio for its election propaganda. The party is the CPI and the radio is the Communist radio in a neighbouring Tashkent in Central Asia. These programmes are specially directed and exclusively devoted to the elections in India. They comprise sustained and systematic attacks on all parties, except the Communists."

Source: Time of India 1952 January
## List of affiliated Union M and Membership

in Maharashtra 1962-63.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>No. of Union</th>
<th>Membership claimed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Textile (Cotton)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>61579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Textile (Woollen)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Textile (Silk)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Transport (Railways)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Transport (Roadways)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Mines Other Than Coal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Food and Drink</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Printing and paper</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Municipal &amp; Local Bodies</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Glass and Pottery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Salaried Employees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Personal Services</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Port &amp; Dock</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
<td><strong>138293</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER-III : NOTES AND REFERENCES:

1. Trade Unions and Politics in India - Harold Crouch, Manak Talas, Bombay 1966, p.13


3. Ibid., pp.7-8.


9. Quoted by Sukomal Sen - Working class in of India, p.43


11. V.B.Karnik - The Strikes in India, Manaktala Publication 1967, p.10

12. Ibid., p.252.


15a The Annual Factory Report 1904, Bombay, p.2


20. 'Times of India', 25th July, 1908.

Sen has given a detailed account (day to day) of this struggle
and opined that this attempt was modelled upon the 'Fari's Commune'
Sen seems to be exaggerating the strength and class consciousness
(which was never created at that time) of the working class.

22 Indian Factory Labour Commissioners report 1908 p.18


24 Ibid., p.

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27 Labour and Housing in Bombay - Burnett Hurt, P.S.King & Son
London 1925, p.146


29 Documents of the history of CPI- Vol. I edited Gangadhar

30 Ibid., p.206.

31 Ibid., p.206

31a Ibid., p.215.

32 Quoted by G. Adhikari in documents of the history of

33 Windmiller and Overstreet - Communism in India, p.70.

34 Cecil Kaya - Communism in India, p. 371.

35 V.B.Karnik - Indian Trade Unions- A survey, p. 38.

36 Ibid., p.


38 Ibid., p.

39 Ibid., p.40


41 Ibid., p.1990.
43 Ibid., p.
44 M. Masani - Communist party of India, p. 37
46 Meerut Conspiracy Case record Vol. 3 (6) Defence statement of Mr S.A.Dange.
48 Quoted by Musaffar Ahmed in 'Myself and the Communist Party of India' - Vol. II p.53.
But Dr. Ambedkar had opposed this strike vehemently on the ground that the union has not done anything to remove the barriers on the untouchables against working in weaving section. This increased the isolation of the Depressed classes and weakened the trade union movement - Pandalal Surana: Op.Cit. p.505.
50 Sen - Working class of India, p. 263.
51 Bombay Labour Gazette - May 29, 1929.
53 Ibid., p. 264.
54 Ibid., p.264-65.
56 V.B.Karnik - Op.Cit., p. 198
57 Home Department (Political, special) File No. 543 (10) E.P1.D.1929.
58 Home Department (Political) R.No. 4579 dated 13-8-1929.
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61 Ibid., p.
64 Ibid., p.333
65 Ibid., p. 333.
66 Bombay Sentinel, 30 June, 1934.
67 Times of India, 13th January, 1936.
69 Who these revolutionaries were is not made clear by Sen. As far as Maharashtra is concerned, no terrorist seems to be attracted towards Marxism. Sen - Working Class of India pp. 340-41.
70 Quoted by Morris in 'The emergence of an industrial labour force in India', Oxford University Press, 1965, p.188.
71 Ibid., p.190.
72 Ibid., p.
73 The detailed account (day to day) of this strike is given by Lalji Pendse in ('Bitiya: Girai Kamagarcha Ek Tejaswi Ladha' - in Marathi), Abhinav Prakashan, Bombay, 1940, p.
74 'The Communist' - Vol. 2 No.8 April 1940.
75 Ibid., p.
76 A.I.T.U.C. resolution at its session held in Bombay in 1939.
77 The Party (CPI) resolution 1942.
80 Ibid., p.
81 S.A. Dange: 'Some notes on the roots of our mistakes' after Calcutta'; p. 43.
84 The situation in India' - New Times' - June 2, 1948, pp.14-17.
85 R.P.Dutta - Situation in India, Smm Crossed Publication, Bombay pp.2-6.
87 Yugantar (in Marathi) September 21, 1963.

88 All these reports have been published in the above mentioned papers dated 15-17 September, 1963.

88a Yugantar (in Marathi) dated August 1964.
Trade Union reports - 20 August, 1964, p.4.


92 Ibid., p. 28.

93 Quoted by Pannalal Surana - 'Leftist movement in Maharashtra' in 'Maharashtra: a Profile' p. 531.


95 The Indian Annual Register 1946, Vol. I. p.546. Also refer to the strikes in 1928 and 1929 dealt with in this chapter pp

96 P.C.Joshi - an article in 'Seminar' - 178, June 1974, pp.47-49.


98 Ibid., p.


100 Ibid., p.

101 Dange's address to A.I.T.U.C. Working Committee, August 17, 1953. Dange's statement is self-contradictory.

102 India - The most dangerous decades - Selig Harrison, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 266.

103 CPI C.P.I., Bombay Committee, Political report 1953.

104 'Kaivari' January 26, 1929.
In Maharashtra, Brahmins are humiliated as 'Bhatjis' by the Non-Brahmins. Also at the initial stage, the leadership of the Brahmins was the natural outcome of the education they received. Today, the situation is changing, but with a snails pace.

105 Please refer Chapter I. pp.

106 Trade Union Report - Maharashtra Committee, 1956. pp. 20-21
