Chapter 3

Multilateralism and China’s Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Concerns in the Post-Cold War Era

3.1 Introduction

Having realized the importance of non-traditional security issues without neglecting the traditional security concerns in the arena of national security and utility of multilateral security organisations, China has softened its approach towards multilateral security organisations since 1990s, and joined organisations like ARF and facilitated the creation of SCO. China has revised its security understanding according to the changed international scenario of post-Cold War period. During this period, China has analysed international situation more realistically and confidently, and has shown greater resilience in dealing with traditional and non-traditional security issues. China's entry into multilateral mechanisms, organisations and multilateral diplomacy manifests its national strength and change in its international socialization.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to examine the evolution of multilateralism in China’s foreign policy with special reference to its traditional and non-traditional security concerns. The chapter establishes strong link between multilateralism and China's traditional security and non-traditional security policy in its foreign policy. It shows how this interface has mutually redefined and shaped both the aspects of China's foreign policy. This chapter attempts to understand factors that led China to embrace multilateralism; Chinese perception of multilateralism; its participation in multilateral fora; role of its traditional and non-traditional security concerns in shaping its policies towards multilateralism; and also multilateral involvement altering its notion of security and security policy.

In the first section, factors that strengthened Chinese approach to multilateralism are discussed. In this section, multilateralism is viewed as a product of China's changing national identity and international identification. Besides, economic importance of its immediate regions on its multilateral behavior, various other factors such as US hegemony, Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, UN, multipolarity
etc. are also discussed in this section followed by an account of opportunities, risks and prospects that China considers in adapting to multilateralism, or its involvement in different multilateral fora. In the second section, China's traditional and non-traditional security concerns shaping its multilateral participation are discussed.

3.2 Multilateralism in the Post-Cold War Chinese Foreign Policy

Multilateralism, after many twists and turns, came to occupy a central place in Chinese foreign policy in the post 1991 period. Both the changes in its domestic perception and in the world politics have paved the way for the process. In Chinese understanding, multilateralism is viewed as a powerful instrument to promote peace and facilitate common development. Based on this perception, China has joined most of the treaties related to international arms control and non-proliferation. Besides, it has joined 18 human rights conventions, including the international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also considers multilateral approach as a robust tool in handling transnational problems and threats such as environmental pollution, resource scarcity, unemployment, population explosion, and spread of AIDS, narcotics and transnational crimes. In its understanding of multilateral approach, it emphasizes on resolving disputes and conflicts peacefully through consultations and not resort to the use of force (fmprc 2003/08/18). As a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, China confers a key role for the UN in existing multilateral frameworks in the world.

Multilateralism creates institutionalized regional and other forms of collective bargaining substituting multipolarity. Therefore, multilateralism is considered by the Chinese leadership closely related to multipolarity. Further, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence propagate those ideals for which multipolarity is sought. Bearing in mind the difficult path towards multipolar world, multilateralism has been accepted as sub-ideal to institutionalize the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

In Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser's view, China's policy towards multilateralism was "cautious and vague". It was so because by 1994, China was not convinced whether its participation in multilateral fora would give more opportunities or it would involve more risks. Garrett and Glaser developed their views regarding
Chinese approach to multilateralism on the basis of interviews with Chinese officials and researchers from foreign and defence policy research institutes and discussions in Beijing in June July 1993. As far as China’s apprehensions regarding its participation in multilateral fora were concerned, it feared that its military modernization would automatically become a matter of debate in multilateral regional fora; Japan and the US would try to set and dominate agenda of such fora; the US may use multilateral fora to promote its interests; some countries might attempt to resolve bilateral territorial disputes exerting multilateral pressure in favor of them, with the support of the US. In addition to these, it had also an insecurity feeling regarding potential negative impact on Taiwan issue. Despite these concerns China factored multilateralism in its foreign policy to achieve its national goals of development and peace. These fears were shared by researchers of China Institute of International Strategic Studies and Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations with Garrett and Glaser,

3.2. (a) Multilateralism: A Product of China’s Changing National Identity and its International Identification

China’s changing national identity and its international identification have constituted to its positive approach to multilateralism. The new leadership under Deng facilitated this process by focusing on economic development which in turn strengthened China's national identity leading to international identification.

According to Qin Yaqing, “National identity refers to a nation’s status relative to the international community. Specifically, it is the degree of identification of a sovereign state in the modern sense with the guiding international society” (Qin 2003: 1) He explains that there are three kinds of states on the basis of their identity, revolutionary, detached and status quo which lead to negative, zero and positive identification respectively. Negative identification means that revolutionary state in question opposes and challenges system created by international society. Detached state, having zero identification, is basically neutral towards the system. The state that has positive identification believes in status quo and recognizes and participates in the system. He further explains that positive identification has three levels of identification with the larger international community. At first instance, some outside force coerces identification when a particular state is not willing. Later when state gets involved in the process, it begins taking interests and become interest-driven. In
the longer run, this involvement creates identification at ideational level as it is very obvious that no actor comes out from the process as it entered.

As far as strategic culture is concerned, according to Qin it "refers to a whole set of society of macro-strategic concepts. State decision-makers identify the basic contents of the society, and accordingly a long-term state strategic choice orientation is set up" (Qin 2003: 4). He divides strategic culture into two broad categories: conflictual strategic culture and cooperative strategic culture which are further divided into three kinds of recognitions: recognition of war, recognition of conflict, recognition of efficacy of use of force. He puts two antagonistic ideas before every kind of recognition. They are whether war is inevitable, whether conflict is zero-sum, whether the use of force effectively controls outcomes and eliminates threats.

He establishes that national identification and its security culture together shape security concept of a state. He supposes that China's national identity has gradually drifted from being revolutionary one to being a status quo power via its state of being detached one. Thus the trajectory of Chinese national identification moves from negative to zero and finally leading to positive one.

In the pre-1971 phase, China appeared to act like a revolutionary state with a negative identification with the international system. After its entry into the Security Council, it remained a detached state for some time. During this period, it was by and large neutral towards the international system and benefited very little from it. After its reform and opening up in 1979, when it got involved in the process of economic liberalization, its identification could be marked as interest-driven. Throughout the eighties the same identification continued. Actual beginning of its ideational identification can be fixed in mid 1990s, especially after the Asian Financial Crisis.

The increasing identification can be highlighted by the fact that China joined only 34 international conventions in 30 years from 1949 to 1979. But, it joined 185 international conventions in the next twenty years. This matches also with its increased share of foreign trade in GDP from 12% in 1978 to 36% in 2000 and actually used foreign investment from less than 5% in 1978 to 46.9% in 2001. In 2001, its total volume of imports and exports was US $ 509.8 billion, the sixth largest in the world.
With this transformation of national identification its security culture has also moved from conflictual to cooperative one. Qin Yaqing considers China’s strategic culture as conflictual up to the third Plenary Session of the 11th National congress of the CPC at the end of 1978. Even in this session, inevitability of major and strengthened threat to China from both the superpowers was presumed (Qin 2003: 5). But this characterization of security scenario, in which conflict was essentially zero-sum, use of violence against China was there in all its likelihood, and great war was inevitable, was not compatible with the basic line of concentrating on economic growth and achievement of modernization set in the same Plenary Session. This characterization did not reflect true security scenario and did not contribute to serve its basic line of economic growth and modernization either.

Very soon Chinese leadership realized that this characterization was taking China nowhere. In 1982, the 12th National Congress of CPC changed the understanding of the 11th National congress of the CPC about the security scenario of the world and said “world peace was possible” (Qin 2003: 5-6). In 1985, Deng Xiaoping set the broad framework of China’s foreign policy for foreseeable future when he declared, “peace and development are two themes of the contemporary times” (Qin 2003: 6). For him, long lasting peace was possible and war could be avoided. Since then, this policy continues. At present, China has a security culture which is cooperative, in which war is seen not as inevitable, win-win situation or all are winners is possible, and large scale international violence is ruled out. Thus, China’s present security culture is inclined towards peace and stability, which serves its national goal of economic development and modernization.

These paradigmatic changes in China’s national identity and security culture have redefined its security interests. Its perceived security interests are now different. China’s definition of security interests has been broadened from pure military terms to the inclusion of non-military or non-traditional issues and concerns. There is ample space for common and cooperative security in China’s interests. Lu Benlong has examined the evolution of China’s foreign policy through the prism of its evolving international identification. For him, international identity means national status or position in the international society; while international identification means nation’s perception and assessment of its own status or position in the international society.
understanding of globalisation, ‘win-win situation’, ‘both are winners’ or ‘all are winners’ are acceptable and widely espoused ideas. ‘Zero-Sum game’ mentality is generally negated in this understanding. China considers its involvement in globalisation as a two way process. Its primary purpose, of course, is to improve its economy, while at the same time it aims to leave its impact on the international economic system.

China identifies itself with the concerns of developing countries at the 2001 ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar and similarly at the September 2003 WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico. In his speech at the 2001 ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, China’s trade minister, Shi Guangsheng, stressed the need for the “development of the world economy” and ‘trade and investment facilitation’ and “referred to the ‘obvious defects of the existing multilateral trading system’, namely its failure ‘to reflect the interests and demands of developing countries in a more adequate fashion’”. “In addition, in a declaration issued at the time of the Doha meeting, China insisted that the ‘developmental dimension’ be fully incorporated into the multilateral trading system.”

“Similarly, at the September 2003 WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico, commerce Minister Lu Fuyuan assessed the positions of developed countries against developing countries, concluding that ‘their obligations are not balanced and their gains are not equal’.” “Signaling Beijing’s concern for fairness, Lu emphasized the ‘enormous commitment’ to trade liberalization that China had made by joining the WTO’.” Indeed, he also noted that Beijing’s accession protocol requires China to reduce trade barriers “well below the level of other developing countries.”

Like several developing countries, China, too, believes that the WTO has failed to live up to the promises not only of the Doha Development Round launched in 2001 but also of the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994. But there is no sign that can turn China against WTO or globalisation. In fact, China’s opposition in Doha and Cancun was softer than that of India and Brazil. And it brokered negotiation between the developing and developed countries (Yong and Moore 2004: 124-125). China intends to use WTO, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and various UN agencies and make gains out of globalisation (Yong and Moore 2004: 125). It is using them to defend its interests against the US unilateralism.
Asian countries faced in 1997-1998. Instead, such kind of crisis was seen as a result of political mismanagement at the international level (Yong and Moore 2004: 119).

Thus economic and political-security form two interrelated and inseparable parts of China’s thinking on globalisation. China’s endorsement of globalisation points out its grand-strategy. Its unflinching support for globalisation can be construed in terms of a strategic choice “to deepen the country’s participation in the world economy as the best means available to pursue economic modernization, cope with US hegemony, and fulfill Beijing’s great-power aspirations.” Globalisation “has facilitated China’s satisfaction with, and boosted China’s confidence in peaceful status mobility within the international system” (Yong and Moore 2004: 121).

Simultaneously pursuing globalisation as a strategic choice, China needs to be unthreatening in its motives in the eyes of its neighboring regions. Therefore, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, its emphasis on the UN system, regionalism and multilateralism and new security concept, collectively, form part of its grand strategy and pursue a normative agenda of democratization of international relations beyond the economic arena.

3.2. (c) China’s Approach towards Neighboring Regions

China’s new found stress on regional cooperation is worthwhile. It not only conveys China’s current approach towards its neighboring regions in contrast to its disinclination towards getting involved in such international affairs, where its interests are not at stake, but also throws light upon China’s strategy to consolidate its position in the immediate region. Regional cooperation should be viewed less in terms of an economic opportunity which China aims to exploit and more in terms of a component of its grand strategy with regard to regional order of post-Cold War period. Multilateralism constitutes an important feature of this grand strategy. Multilateral institutions provide an institutional framework to regional cooperation. China’s contribution to the process of regional cooperation in both its western and eastern neighbouring regions through organisations like SCO and ARF confirms the importance which China accords to multilateral institutions in regional cooperation.

China, undoubtedly, intends to deepen regional cooperation because it remains mutually beneficial both for China and its neighbors. By doing so, it also knits a kind of solidarity on the basis of shared “historical experiences, with the common tasks of
preserving national independence and achieving economic development”, irrespective of their differences in social system and ideology (fmprc 2003-08/18). In fact, China realizes that without close cooperation and coordination with its neighbors, it is highly difficult to participate in formulating the “rules of the game” in international economy and to gain considerable benefits from it.

Its emphasis on cooperation among developing countries and especially among its neighbors is a call to unite, on a subtle level, to “elevate their position in the South-North dialogue”. Cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit will accelerate their own development. China, within its limited capacity, is ready to offer whatever aid and assistance it can contribute to foster this cooperation (fmprc 2003-08/18). This is elaborated more in the words of Vice President Zeng Qinghong. In the context of Asia-Pacific region, he emphasizes the maintenance of regional security and stability as a requirement of rapid development. He professes the idea of a new security concept featuring peaceful coexistence, mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, a concept that includes the principles of the UN Charter and the realities of the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

This concept aims at building political mutual trust and safeguarding peace and stability. As a modus operandi of realizing regional cooperation and fructifying new security concept, he discusses multilateralism. Multilateralism figures here in his views in the form of dialogue and consultation. He further clarifies that the development of the region and the development of the rest of the world are interrelated. What is clear in his views is that China expects to increase bargaining power in international economy by collective bargaining on the basis of regional solidarity (Zeng 2004).

Qian Qichen, the former Chinese Foreign Minister, measures regional cooperation from the point of view of interdependence. He acknowledges utility of regional and sub-regional cooperation mechanisms such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN plus China, Japan and the ROK dialogue, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Pacific Islands Forum in developing political trust and promoting common development. He highlights their efficacy especially in the fight against SARS and bird flu and emphasizes the need to strengthen their framework
with UN to resolve disputes and deal with common threats on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

Since economic development and peace are cornerstones of Chinese contemporary strategic thinking, he emphasizes the economic potential of these multilateral frameworks. He further reminds that maintenance of the diversity of civilizations to be taken care of and nurtured through regional multilateral frameworks. Besides this, he endeavors to broaden the ambit of these frameworks so as to help countries in their domestic efforts of a “coordinated development between the economy and society and harmony between man and nature” as “poverty and backwardness are important factors behind the unrest and conflicts in the region” (Qian 2004). Thus, Regionalism and multilateralism go hand in hand.

3.2. (d) American Hegemony

In the post-Cold War period, American hegemony became a new source of concern for international community. In fact, with the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 the issue of American hegemony came to occupy centre stage in Chinese strategic thinking. To address this problem, China hurriedly theorized and began declaring enthusiastically that the world was fast moving towards multipolarity. But the show of American might in the Gulf war-I made it rethink that the world was not moving towards multipolarity as fast as Chinese analysts and officials were hoping. This realization made China tone down its advocacy for multipolarity, and it then found multilateralism as an effective instrument to cope with American hegemony.

Despite some voices of dissent from France, China's rise, East Asia becoming basket of world economy, India's likely joining along with Brazil and Germany on some issues, Yugoslavian crisis of 1999, Afghan war of 2001 and Gulf War-2 of 2003, depth of American economy and military might have established that America is an unparalleled power. At the most, China has carved out some space in Southeast Asia, where its presence is being recognized and where it can stick to its own terms of negotiation and bargaining. Even in this region too, China has not acquired such a status that it can outdistance the US. China knows this reality. China has assessment of its own strength and capabilities and its relative power vis-à-vis the US. The present question before China in the existing international order is how to cope with the American hegemony without sacrificing its independent decision-making. China
weighs its opposition to hegemonism while preserving independent foreign policy. It emphatically asserts that it “never imposes its social system and ideology on others nor allows other countries to impose theirs on it” (fmprc 3-08/18). Thus, on a subtler level, China's opposition to American hegemony leads it towards multilateralism which provides developing countries' fora to bargain collectively and put a check on American hegemony.

3.2. (e) The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

As the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence guide China's participation in multilateral institutions, it is necessary to analyse the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Besides, they fully capture the Chinese vision of new or an alternative international order in which multilateralism plays a key role. Since late 1980s, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have re-emerged as a mainstay of its foreign policy. Even China's new security concept could be viewed as an extension of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These principles are projected as a sharp contrast to the US unilateralism. In fact, The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and spirit of multilateralism have strong interface. These principles can explain, on ideological plane, what multilateralism as a principle strives to achieve in the area of international cooperation in international politics.

The US president George Bush's vision of a new world order, derived form his speeches in the early 1990s, was construed by China as an evidence of American desire of fostering a rule-based international order under its benign leadership which would uphold American values only. This worldview was not acceptable to China as it was neither feasible nor desirable from Chinese point of view. According to Chinese understanding, American predominance in post-Cold War era would not be sustained and any attempt to impose ideological singularity would meet stiff resistance from the international community which was otherwise ideologically diversified (Pan Tongwen 1991). As an alternative, China brought forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence express scientific character, compatibility and stability. These are scientific because they successfully derive a common denominator among the nations and they are compatible to nations' natural instincts of being treated as equals. The worldview that these principles expound does not deny special role to major powers, but it visualizes them as sharing greater responsibilities rather than enjoying power. These principles
maintain that no interference, no arm twisting, no internal subversion and full respect for ideological diversity have to be ensured in international politics (Zhang Zhenhuang 1991). The precise elaboration of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence by China is that "every country has the right to choose its own social system, economic model and road", that "every country has the right to exercise effective control over its own resources and their exploitation", that "all countries are entitled to participate in the handling of international economic affairs", that "the developed countries should respect and accommodate the interests and needs of the developing countries and refrain from attaching political strings to their aid", and finally that "efforts should be made to strengthen North-South dialogue and cooperation with a view to necessary adjustment and reform in commodity, trade, fund, debt, monetary, financial and other important fields of international economy". These are the cornerstones around which China claims to establish a new international order (Qin Qichen 1991). By 1991, China was reported to have signed several important international documents with more than 90 countries. The underlying consensus of these documents was built on the basis of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Hu Sheng 1991). China claims that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have been guiding principles for resolving its problems with the overwhelming majority of neighboring countries. It projects the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as a mutual guarantee of independent foreign policy (fmprc 2003-08/18). The manner in which the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have been affirmed in the various bilateral documents signed between China and other countries, and repeatedly quoted at many important international forums and in international documents, show that they have evolved into generally recognized norms governing international relations (fmprc 2000-11/17).

How strong is the interface between the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the spirit of multilateralism becomes clear by how China visualizes the UN in its ideal-type congruent to the essence of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and its adherence to this essence as a precondition of success of the UN. "The Principle of the sovereign equality of all its members, "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state", "all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means", "nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state", "to achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms" are China's basic preconditions that the UN must live up to
(Li Luye 1991).

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence first came up in 1953. Premier
Zhou Enlai put forward those principles at the end of that year in a meeting with an
Indian government delegation. In its elaboration, this principle included mutual
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful
coeexistence. In the next year Premier Zhou and his Indian and Burmese counterparts
took a position before the international community that the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coeexistence should be the governing norms of international relations (fmprc 2000-
11/17). Since their enunciation, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have been
an inspiration for several countries. The inspiration working behind Non-Aligned
Movement was drawn from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

As long as world system based on Westphalian model continues, an essential
divide will endure among the nations on the lines of powerful and weak nations. And
weak nations will always strive to defend their sovereignty and equality. They will
stand and fight for just world order. This inevitability makes the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence ever more relevant. When it was propounded it came as a voice
of newly liberated and independent countries. It appealed to them because of the Cold
War politics. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence developed an ideological
plank from where they can unite and mobilize world opinion against any kind of
transgression from the US and the USSR.

The immediate context of the emergence of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coeexistence may have been Cold War; yet their relevance is as useful now as when
they were conceived, particularly when the divide between developed and developing
countries is ever growing. WTO regimes are not perceived to be in favor of
developing countries. Moreover, barring the Gulf war and the American war on terror
in Afghanistan, the occurrences of military invasions have been really reduced in post
second world war period, international economic order has witnessed the rise of new

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instruments like multinational companies and free and liberal trade, which are proving new methods of exploitation for many weak countries. So the principles of commitment for equality and mutual benefit are quintessential for developing countries, though other tenets of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence also play their part in many other security and political issue-areas.

In 1988, Deng Xiaoping felt the need for renewing this doctrine of 1950s. He clearly visualized that this doctrine still powerfully expresses developing countries’ concerns for a just international economic and political order and espouses China’s opposition to American hegemony. He is reported to have spoken to the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that as for a new international political order, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, initiated by China and India, are very clear and simple, and can withstand all tests. Taking them as norms for international relations and as a guide to the international community require India and China should follow them first in their relations with each other and with other neighbours. So far as India and China are concerned, the two countries should make some readjustments in relations with their neighbours (Deng 1988).

He is again reported to have spoken on the same lines in 1990. He expressed that foreign policies of India and China should oppose hegemonism, power politics; safeguard world peace; and work to establish a new international political order and a new international economic order with repeated emphases. The two countries should maintain their contacts with all other countries and increase their contacts with both the Soviet Union and the United States (Deng 1990).

Liu Hua and Yang Chengxu hope that China "will persist in developing relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, transcending social systems and ideology" (Liu and Yang 1992: 10). Qian Qichen also reiterated, "In order to attain the overall objective of peace and development, the Chinese government has on many occasions called for the establishment of a new international political and economic order of peace, stability, justice and rationality based on the Five Principles of peaceful Coexistence and on the recognition of the diversity of the world and differences among states" (Qian 1993: 8-11). Guo Jin'an, too, upholds the same principle (Guo:7-9). The spokesperson of foreign ministry of People's Republic of China pronounced the same when he stated: "We are ready to increase, on the basis of the Five
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, friendly relations and cooperation with countries in the world. In international affairs, we will continue to uphold justice, oppose hegemonism and power politics, maintain world peace and stability and promote common development of mankind” (fmrpc 2000-01/04).

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are suitable also to China’s neighbors, which have fundamentally diverse systems and different levels of development and treat every country and system all equal within its broad framework. The underlying inspiration of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence is not of civilizing mission, but of providing level-playing field for every country.

In China’s official position, the establishment of a new international order should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Firstly, because they contain the basic norms governing international relations, give full expression to the nature of new type of international relations, and are in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, being a whole set of standards governing behavior of countries, they are more comprehensive than other laws that are international or regional in nature. They are the best principles to pursue because of their being well defined, clear and concise. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should be taken as norms to handle relations among countries. Thirdly, because they completely do away with the unjust and unreasonable factors and negative influence in the old international relations and repudiate hegemony and power politics. Giving expression to the democratic spirit in the contemporary international relations and the desire of the international community and particularly the large number of developing countries, they meet the fundamental interests of the people in the world” (fmrpc 2000-11/17).

China has a painful realization with regard to its initial leaning only towards the USSR. Opposition to any attempt to form a broad ideological alliance seems to come mainly from this realization. China now views that such alliance remains ultimately futile. It seems to have arrived at an understanding that the best way to live in the world is by peaceful coexistence. And the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence strictly espouses this desire and the establishment of a new international order based on them ensuring world peace, common development and human progress.
China’s strategy is to establish its relations with as many countries as possible. It wants to knit solidarity with developing countries. Their stated foundation of these relations remains the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It wants to convince them that it aspires a new international political and economic order that is fair and rational can flow only from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the universally recognized norms governing international relations. Multilateral cooperation based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence fulfills the condition of multilateralism being non-exclusionary form of cooperation.

3.2. (f) UN

China views the UN as an effective instrument to further multilateralism. Based on perception, during post-1991 period China began appreciating the role of United Nations in a proactive manner, with some caveats against the influence of the US and the Western countries in it. China was much impressed by its role in resolving regional issues like Gulf Crisis, Cambodian problem, Namibia’s independence, the ceasefire and general elections in Nicaragua, expression of its concern for economic wellbeing of developing countries by adopting a declaration stressing the rejuvenation of the developing countries' economies as the most important task of the 1990s and its concern for environment protection and its declaration of 1990s as the decade of banning narcotics (Guo Jishí 1991). Liu Huorong highlights the UN’s role in solving regional conflicts. He positively views UN’s role in the light of its involvement in Yugoslavian crisis, its success in materializing an agreement between Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation which ended the 12 year old Cold War in the country in 1991, its success in evacuating Iraqi invaders from Kuwait, its success in Cambodian crisis in which it could bring all the factions to the table and clinch Paris Accord, in bargaining cease fire in Western Sahara and in preventing the recurrence of hostilities between the Greeks and the Turkish Cypriots (Liu Huorong 1992). Chinese Premier Li Peng (1992) stated at the Summit Meeting of the UN Security Council on January 31, 1992 that it was in the interests of China’s internal stability, modernization and development if the world ensures peace and stability. To achieve this higher end in foreign policy, China emphasizes that governing norms of international behaviour enshrined in the UN charter should form the basis of international politics. Showing its support, China for the first time sent its troops abroad under the aegis of the UN in 1991. These troops were sent to Cambodia.
following UN resolution no. 745 which decided to establish the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia after the Paris Agreement (Xiao Yu 1995).

Former Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (1991) upheld the idea behind United Nations and maintained that since its inception the international community has actively contributed to the defence of the principles in the UN Charter of promoting human rights and basic freedoms. He said that the Chinese government had consistently been committed to the UN Charter and the principles of protecting human rights in relevant international documents on human rights and actively participated in a series of UN activities in the field of human rights. He stated that China wants to safeguard and promote the universal realization of human rights and basic freedoms for humankind effectively. But at the same time, it wanted different political, economic and social systems and the characteristics of countries with different historical, religious and cultural backgrounds taken into account and given due consideration.

However, then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (1992) made it clear, in view of sanctions against Libya by the UN, that it supports only bright and positive side of UN system. It does not support the UN as policeman of the world and opposes use of force to settle international disputes, if it contradicts the spirit of UN Charter. China insists that multilateral efforts should be strengthened to achieve disarmament, prevent non-proliferation and combat terrorism and the UN should be at the heart of this multilateral international cooperation (The China Quarterly, 2004, (180): 1152). China had categorically held NATO action in Yugoslavia as grossly illegal for this action was not carried out after exploring all means of peaceful solutions, it violated principle of non-interference, and was not authorized by the UN, setting a dangerous precedent (Li Bian 1999; The China Quarterly, 1999, (159): 797). China's Deputy-Permanent Representative at the UN strongly criticized the action of "US-led NATO" in Yugoslavia, accusing it of being responsible for over a thousand deaths, ten thousand injuries and creation of almost million refugees, as well as causing huge damage to the country's physical infrastructure."

In January 2001, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited China and the extensive talks were held between him and President Jiang Zemin, Vice-Premier Qian Qichen and Foreign Minister Jiaxuan. In these talks, Chinese leaders extended their firm support to the UN. They also demanded greater role for the UN in Iraq. China's
support to the UN can be summarized in President Jiang Zemin's words, "I believe, as long as the purposes and principles of the UN Charter are observed, the UN will be able to play its due part in international affairs" (SWB, FE/4051 G/1, 23 Jan 01). Jiang Zemin assured UN Secretary-General by reaffirming China's commitment to taking an active role in UN activities (The China Quarterly, 2001, (166): 563).

China's acceptance of the UN as an ideal framework of global governance demonstrates the full circle on the issue of its approach to multilateralism. In line with the UN ideal, it has been participating in various regional and global multilateral processes.

3.2. (g) Multipolarity

The quest for multipolarity has taken place in so many corners of the world in the wake of collapse of the USSR – one of the two superpowers until 1991. China has emerged as one of the main champions of multipolarity in the post-Cold War period. Multipolarity has emerged as a grand objective of China's foreign policy. It can rightly be argued that China considers multilateralism as paving way for multipolarity in long run. Here, it is necessary to understand the importance of multipolarity in Chinese foreign policy discourse in order to understand its relation with multilateralism.

The official Chinese view on multipolarity is as follows:

"Currently, while complex and deep changes are taking place in the international situation, the trend towards world multipolarization has not changed. There are nearly 200 countries with a population of more than 6 billion in the world. A myriad of differences exists between these countries in ethnic traditions, religions and cultures, economic levels and political systems. It is hardly possible to imagine how to unify them with one model and one value or to "lead" them by one country. The basic norms governing international relations on equality of sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs between the member states as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations are absolutely not outdated. The history and culture, social systems and development models of various countries should be respected. The multipolarization process may be zigzag, protracted and full of struggles, but this is a historical trend independent of human will. It is in conformity with the common aspirations and interests of the majority of countries and conducive to world peace and security. Our efforts to promote the development of the world towards multipolarization are not targeted at any particular country, nor are they aimed at re-staging the old play of contention for hegemony in history. Rather, these efforts are made to boost the democratization of international relations, help the various forces in the world, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, enhance coordination and dialogue, refrain from confrontation and preserve jointly world peace, stability and development" (fmprc 2003-08/18)
On these lines multipolarization seems to be an emerging norm and principle flowing out of an ideological conviction. The philosophical basis of multipolarity is pluralism. As has been discussed above that conviction for inevitability of a multipolar world in Chinese vision is derived from diversity in the world, pluralism is very much celebrated in its vision for the new international order.

Initially, multipolarity was sought in terms of classical sense of balance of power, though this notion has been modified since mid-1990s onwards as China had realized that American might was unparalleled, and that creating such multipolarity could not be an immediate agenda of countries. Besides, globalisation has also modified China's official advocacy of multipolarity in world politics. At some point of time, China's advocacy for multipolarity could have been inferred as its hostile bid for balance of power. But now the new interpretation of multipolarization could be advanced in terms of a more democratic world order "that emphasizes proper management of state-to-state relations over the redistribution of power." "In other words, China is less concerned with US power per se and more concerned with the way that power is exercised." Now the sense of having balance of power has been excluded from the early notion of multipolarity. In its current form, notion of multipolarity has come close to multilateral norms or in more concrete form close to multilateral communities.

In Chinese conceptualization, now multipolarity could be considered as being equated with multilateralism. This point could be understood in the perspective given by the vice minister of foreign affairs, Wang Yi. According to this perspective, "multipolarization is antithetical to the self-help, unilateralist approach to security and development associated with the traditional great power game." It simply means that the understanding about multipolarization has moved ahead from earlier understanding in terms of balance of power. It has been broadened and has come closer to multilateralism. In late January 2004, China preferred to pledge to promote "multilateralism" in the Sino-French Joint Statement. In fact, beginning in the second half of 2003, it even toned down its explicit advocacy of multipolarity (Yong and Moore 2004: 122).

However, China realizes that the course towards multipolarity is strenuous. Multipolarity is not going to be achieved at least in near future. And China does not find itself in a situation that it can accelerate this process beyond a limit. China's
national capabilities have their own limits. It is still far away from commanding heights. China does not wish away present reality of the international order. It projects the ‘inevitability of multipolarity’; however, it accepts that the status of the US is unparalleled. China has neither the capability nor the desire to take the lead in formulating such a coalition, let alone confronting US hegemony by itself. It is quite clear from the way China dealt with the issue of Iraqi war of 2003. At that time China took the same line which France and Germany took. But it did not go to the extent of offending the Bush regime.

Although China emerges as upholder of multipolarity, at the same time, its opposition to India, Japan, Germany and Brazil’s bid to expand the number of permanent members of UN Security Council questions its real commitment to multipolar world.

3.2. (b) No Inevitability of Conflicts Causing Systemic Instability

Transition from Yalta system, which covers the entire Cold War period and is marked with systemic stability and supremacy of sovereignty, has been relatively smooth unlike earlier transitions, which were caused by system level wars. No great war or any threat to the stability of the system exists today. An overall peace is prevailing. International political scenario is generally conducive for the development of nations. Though localized wars and conflicts might persist, there is no strong likelihood that they will lead to any system level war causing systemic instability. Only under such characterization of international politics in which international politics is not sharply and conflictually divided, multilateralism could have been acceptable in Chinese foreign policy which was otherwise in general habit of looking at the world from sharp and conflictual ideological demarcations. In this understanding of international stability, China remains no more uncomfortable about multilateral institutions being manipulated by superpowers, and it is confident in participating in these institutions.

3.2. (i) Relatively Fair and Just Order

China views the present international order as relatively fair and just in the sense that the states, which have good and capable governance, can benefit from global economy irrespective of what ideology they follow. Moreover, the present international order also provides institutional set up to redress grievances of the states
2.2. (j) Emergence of Non-State Actors

One of the most important trends of post-Cold War world, which China also recognizes, is the emergence of non-state actors. Their presence is fundamentally altering traditional concept of geo-politics, crossing all transnational boundaries and making international borders insignificant. Emergence of non-state actors has also become a source of non-traditional threat to security, and they operate on transnational level. Therefore, they can be dealt with only through international multilateral efforts.

In fact, emergence of non-state actors of negative shades can be explained in terms of cultural revival to a great extent. This emergence signifies unfreezing of ethnic, cultural and religious questions, which remained dormant under the pressure of Cold War politics throughout Cold War. One more point that needs clarification is that emergence of non-state actors also signifies spread of violence and technology, which erodes the importance of hard military power in the present era of globalisation. Thus emergence of non-state actors has greatly increased significance of multilateral cooperation. As far as China is concerned, it also faces transnational threats posed by non-state actors. China fully recognizes their nature, and is willing to employ multilateral frameworks to handle these threats.

3.3 Opportunities and Risks in Factoring Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy

In the post-Cold War period, China decided to enter multilateral processes only after a careful deliberation and proper risk analysis. As China was highly critical of multilateral institutions including the UN during Maoist period, it took considerable time in evolving a positive approach towards multilateralism. After analyzing all likely situations and considering benefits and risks that multilateral institutions might present, it decided to enter multilateral process. Since the end of
post-Cold War, gradualism and incrementalism have been central features of its understanding about multilateral institutions.

3.3. (a) **Opportunities**

China endeavours to use multilateral frameworks to cement East Asian collective identification. Commitment to modernization, belief in respect for order in society, societal harmony and authority and pragmatic approach towards worldly affairs are common traits in the East Asian region, which bring China and other East Asian countries together. This common identification blurs existence of the self and the other between East Asia and China. This cultural convergence led to the convergence of other interests (Yu 2003: 2-3).

In addition, Zhu Majie explains China’s involvement in the process of regionalism in terms of an attempt to increase its co-optive power. According to him, “Co-optive power is the ability of a country to attract other countries by ideas, values and ideology or the ability of a country to let other countries to think what it thinks” (Zhu 2003: 1). Following this proposition, China firmly believes that multilateralism offers an excellent opportunity in its regions to test its co-option power.

Multilateralism in China’s foreign policy and its active involvement in multilateral regional mechanisms and organisations are also part of its strategy towards its periphery where it wants to consolidate its national power and authority, where presence of the US may also be a consideration. Another prime motivation seems to be the convergence of interests, including with the US, especially on the issue of terrorism after 9/11 (Zhao 2003: 5). In fact, China’s strategy towards its periphery is a part of its vision for regional order. Therefore, some reflection should be made here from the point of view of China’s understanding of Asian regional order also. According to Amitav Acharya, regional concerns about the changing regional balance of power are taking place in the context of the rise of China with the prospects for Sino-US power rivalry; the danger of war in persisting regional flashpoints such as North Korea, Taiwan, Kashmir and the Spratly Islands dispute; the political and strategic strife in democratizing Indonesia; and the emergence of regional multilateral cooperation, with the establishment of the ARF (Acharya 2004: 1). According to him, one of the major impacts of 9/11 on Asian security order is that US has re-engaged itself in the Southeast Asian region and increased its involvement.
in the regional security alliances. US has been engaged in anti-terrorism cooperation with countries ranging from Singapore, the Philippines to Indonesia and Malaysia. This re-engagement has made up its legitimacy-deficit in the region, created by Anti-Americanism. At the same time, China’s geostrategic position in the post 9/11 scenario is that Japan’s increasing military role under the pretext of supporting the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq and international attention in the wake of War on Terror towards the status of minorities in China’s Xinjiang have made China nervous about the US presence in Central Asia. But at the same time, China is also utilizing the opportunity given by the US preoccupation with the War on Terror in expanding its influence in the region through a ‘charm offensive’ (Acharya 2004: 8).

China sees multilateralism as a strategy to adjust and hedge the US hegemonic world order. As Rosemery Foot argues, “China’s view of the global order is centered on the US and mainly related to the potential effects of US policy on its core goal of economic development and domestic stability” (Foot 2006: 83). According to her, China is following two-pronged strategy vis-à-vis the US hegemony. First, it makes necessary accommodation without building and leading any anti-US hegemony formation. Second, it intends to transform international society in such a way in which co-existence works as a norm. Its engagement in multilateral institutions serves both the purposes.

Since the emergence of regional multilateral cooperation, with the establishment of the ARF has been pointed out as one of the major developments in the region, the point that requires clarification here is whether China is willing and able to share greater burden of international responsibilities and obligations and what contribution it can make to the institutionalisation of regional order. As pointed out by a report to the Trilateral Commission in 2001, “‘China’s rapid rise is occurring in a region that lacks firmly established, integrating institutions like the European Union that help build trust. Asia has no security community in the transatlantic sense of peace in which resort to violence has become virtually unimaginable.’” In this regard, the general pattern is that China remains detached where its core interests are not involved, but at the same time it is actively engaged in regional affairs. The general criticism is that the stated principles and goals of Chinese foreign policy remain full of abstractions such as ‘establishing a new international political and economic order,’
‘promoting world peace and common development’, ‘accelerating multipolarization’ and ‘opposing hegemonism and power politics’. They do not indicate as to how to achieve these goals. But below are the issues which shape China’s regional policy that decides its engagement in multilateral fora.

China approaches multilateralism as an instrument in achieving rapid economic growth. In the early 1990s its economic development was not much supportive of regional trade arrangements because it was not confident enough to enter into any regional alliances. Moreover, China was pre-occupied with the fear of Japan’s domination in any regional formation. In addition, the US was also unsympathetic to the idea of regional integration in East Asia. Thus China did start its multilateral engagement by insisting every mechanism to be less formal, without any formal and binding structure (Wang 2004: 5). Despite these complexities, China has been quite willing to use them to further strengthen its economy. China has always appreciated and supported consultative idea of ASEAN and ARF, not of the bodies that can deliver binding judgments.

Thus, in a nut shell, opportunities that multilateralism provides for China are that multilateral dialogue and structure in Asia in general and Asia-Pacific in particular are helpful in engaging Japan and numbing any potential military threat from its side, outdistancing the US in its immediate regions, useful in correcting threat-perceptions of China’s neighbors’ vis-à-vis China and valuable in achieving a peaceful environment for economic development. 8

3.3. (b) Risks

Following are some of the risks that China sees in factoring multilateralism in its foreign policy praxis. Chinese leadership made it categorically clear that China cannot tolerate any kind of interference in its military modernization because it is very realistic for any state to upgrade its military capabilities from time to time. Furthermore, China’s military modernization was not exceptional because not only

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8 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser have cited Guo Zhenyuan, a senior CCIS analyst and formerly a close collaborator of Huan Xiang, the late CCIS director and close adviser to the Chinese leadership, who wrote in the fall of 1993 that at present “a favourable cycle of economic growth, economic contradictions and frictions among some countries will increase and may even lead to conflicts of bilateral interests, thus affecting the region’s stability”. The potentially destabilizing impact of economic changes as well as other sources of conflict, including territorial disputes and ethnic and religious states to “pay attention to the establishment of a new security system”.

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China but also virtually all states in the region are constantly modernizing their armies.

Second, China is very clear on its stand that neither will it let the US to impose ideological superiority and to ‘transform’ communist countries nor will it let the US and Japan promote their interests in the name of multilateralism. China is sceptical that countries like the Philippines can use multilateral security to internationalize the issue of Spratly Islands, as it has proposed to solve this problem multilaterally. Moreover, Taiwan can use multilateralism to advance its international recognition and to promote its influence as a sovereign state. China appears to be adverse towards the first issue and hostile towards the second possibility. China just does not accept the entry of Taiwan in any regional security mechanism on the basis of multilateral principles as it renders recognition to Taiwan by implication.

Third, in regard to the multilateral security cooperation, Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser argue that there is an inherent suspicion in China’s approach towards multilateralism, which portrays multilateralism “as largely irrelevant- or potentially damaging- to efforts aimed at solving or managing most of the key disputes in the Asia-pacific region”. Sometimes China maintains primacy of bilateral relations and the balance of power over regional multilateral cooperation and suggests development of co-operative relations between and among the major powers in the region as a precondition to the growth of regional multilateralism. This suspicion stems from China’s bitter historical experience of the Soviet Union’s collective security, which first put China under Soviet’s subordination, then after Sino-Soviet rift was used to encircle China in Asia. This suspicion is further intensified by the sense of being vulnerable in various territorial disputes. Moreover, given the ethnic, religious, social and political diversities in Southeast Asia causing several crises in the past, Chinese leadership does not endorse the idea that a region-wide security structure such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is likely to emerge and succeed. Jiang Zemin expressed the same sentiment in his statement “the establishment of a

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9 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser informs that the Chinese media raised such concerns in late 1993 that “the informal meeting following the Seattle APEC conference would be used be used by Washington to advance the US concept of a Pacific and Community of shared interests, values and goals, and to enable the United states to play a dominant role in the region.” According to them, 'Some writers predicted after the APEC meeting that “new contradictions and confrontations” could emerge as a consequence of the US “strengthening its control over the Asia-Pacific region.”
security mechanism should proceed from the actual conditions of the region which are diversified” (Garrett and Glaser 1994: 15).

3.4 China’s Participation in Various Multilateral Fora

China's participation in multilateral institutions has progressively increased in Post-Maoist era. More specifically from mid-1990s onwards it has witnessed a marked growth in new multilateral initiatives. In this period, it has moved from passive response to active participation and initiation, and multilateral diplomacy has become an important feature of Chinese foreign policy in general and regional diplomacy in particular. Besides, China's inhibition regarding multilateralism in security field also came to witness a paradigm shift in this period.

The General Agreement on Trade and Tariff were comprehensively discussed in China in the first half of 1990s. In general these agreements were considered beneficial to China. They were welcomed on two grounds that Chinese economy will benefit from the global integration of economy and most importantly, these agreements assured multilateralism in legalization of trade, which will benefit China equally as multilateralism and legalization of trade is a sort of fair system which China had been asking for (Li Ning 1993). But it was noted by Chinese side that the issue of China's accession to WTO was treated more as a political issue rather than as an economic issue as China argued that it lowered its import tariff by 36% in 1996 and promised to reduce them further to the average level of developing countries, but still not considered adequate for the accession (Li Peng 1996). Chinese concerns were that the imposition of an "excessive entry price" was blocking its entry into WTO (The China Quarterly, 1997, (149): 250). The Australian government maintained that economic changes that China offered to become a member of the WTO would not suffice unless it produces 'a realistic schedule for meeting international trade rules' (SWB, FE/1304, G/1, 18 April '98). Chinese Chief WTO negotiator Long Yongtu held that the Chinese "commitment is not aimed WTO accession alone" but as a responsible member of the international community, China "will help the establishment of a transparent, fair and predictable environment of rule of law" (SWB, FE/4082 G/4, 28 Feb. 01).
China’s financial aid and its exemplary management of its domestic economy, in stark contrast to the conditions imposed by IMF (which is perceived to be dominated by the US), during the Asian financial crisis, changed the perception of Southeast Asian countries about China noticeably. This changed perception paved the way for a series of multilateral mechanisms of regional cooperation involving China.

China adheres to Seoul Declaration which opened and strengthened multilateral cooperation mechanism as the central principle, lowering barriers to trade, investment and technology, thus making the regional economic and trade cooperation more dynamic. Qian Qichen, State Councilor and Foreign Minister of China, at the fourth Ministerial meet of the APEC, expressed China's position on this regard (Qian Qichen 1992).

Though, China had begun holding annual meetings with senior ASEAN officials in 1995, path breaking initiatives of setting up the ASEAN+3 mechanism and ‘ASEAN+1’, which is usually headed by the Chinese Premier, came only after this changed perception. In 1996, Shanghai-5 was started, which finally became Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2001. The initial purpose of the setting up of the Shanghai-5 was to resolve border disputes with the former republics of the erstwhile USSR. Now, SCO aims at fighting against terrorism, separatism and extremism.

China’s multilateral participation is not confined only to Southeast Asia and Central Asia. China was one of the founding members of the Asia-Europe Meeting, which was established in 1996 and holds biannual summits for heads of state and yearly ministerial meetings. In 1998, China established its political dialogue with the EU, which takes place on annual basis. Relations between China and European Union were formalized in 1985, when China and the EU (then European Community) signed the "EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement". In 1988, the European Commission established a resident delegation in China. The task of this delegation was to report the developments in China to the Commission. In 1995, The European Commission came up with a comprehensive policy towards China:"A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations". This policy provided a single strategic policy framework to cover all aspects of relations between China and the European Community (Beijing Review, 1998, (5-6): 10). China started engaging the European Union in mid-1990s; however, human rights issue continues to be a contentious issue (Qian Qichen 1996).
Most surprisingly, China approached even NATO in 2000. It may be a diplomatic move to exploit the differences within the Trans Atlantic alliance especially regarding NATO’s involvement in Central Asia. China also hosted the ninth leaders meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Shanghai in 2001. It was a move to deepen its participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Under the ASEAN Regional Forum, the organisational mechanism for security discussion, Chinese Foreign Minister Lizhaxin “proposed forming a conference to increase communication among Asian Militaries” (Medeiros and Fravel 2003: 25-27). In fact, forging an Asian security structure has been a common concern. To discuss this concern, Shangri-La dialogue was convened in 2006 in Singapore. China participated in this dialogue enthusiastically. More than 250 defence ministers, military officials and scholars participated in this dialogue. Possibility of specific question of building any security community was not insisted. Instead, this dialogue successfully highlighted the need for enhancing practical security cooperation in various formats (China Daily 2006-06/05).

President Jiang Zemin pledged support for Boao Forum of Asia. This forum has been conceptualised, as stated in its declaration, "as the most important forum in Asia and promote business and economic integration among Asian countries along with the speeding up of globalisation." "It is a non-official international conference body, mainly consists of Asian countries and regions and is open to other regions as well." (SWB, FE/4082 G/4, 28 Feb. 01). China established special APEC enterprises in a bid to promote economic and technological cooperation between Chinese companies and their counterparts in APEC nations (SWB, FE/3438, G/1 21 Jan. '99).

“In 2004 Beijing joined the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and applied for membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime” (Foot 2006: 86). China hosted a Security Policy Conference with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2004. Defence officials from twenty-four Asian countries attended it (Percival 2005: 7).

Another impressive multilateral activity in which China is making remarkable contribution is the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) economic cooperation involving China, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia. “The GMS had moved beyond initial discussion stage with China investing US $5 million in improving the waterways of the upper reaches of the Mekong River. In addition,
scenario, China increasingly regards multilateralism as an effective instrument to ensure common security and promotes it. While promoting it, China does not insist on any particular kind of multilateralism to be promoted. It adopts a flexible approach in this regard. It supports all relatively strong multilateral security mechanisms, multilateral security dialogues, confidence-building measures and nongovernmental dialogue. China adopting multilateralism in security arena shows its material strength that it has acquired by reforms and opening up and its further integration with the international society. China by upholding multilateralism in security field emerges more mature and confident in its foreign policy (Jianwei Wang 2005: 160-163).

In the post-Cold War period, China visualized that power politics was still prevailing in the larger world scenario. The United States Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Herman Kane's statement demanding Africa to democratize and introduce multi-party system and Manual Marlin, a European Community official demanding democracy and human rights were considered as interventionist agenda, which sought to make democracy, human rights and multi-party system as a pre-condition for the support of development programmes. This was sufficient to make China uneasy because, from Chinese point of view, dozens of Asian, African, Latin American and east European countries were already facing social strife and instability in the name of demand for democracy and multi-party system in early 1990s. China was apprehensive because it had yet to recover from the trauma of Tiananmen square episode. These democratic movements in outside world could have again become source of inspiration for Chinese dissenters. Besides this, developed countries' policies of raising non-tariff barriers, declining Official Development Assistance, restricting flow of goods from, and capital to, developing countries made China rethink its approach. By the end of 1990, the combined debt of third world countries was US$ 1,336 billion. Population explosion, destruction of ecology, drug smuggling, international terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation are the issues which threaten the existence of mankind. In this context, China has decided to highlight the brighter side of UN system as representative of its own conviction to strengthen multilateralism (Sa Ren 1992). Chinese leadership highlighted shifting base of tranquility and stability from Europe to Southeast Asia as well as 'deepening contradiction between US and Europe'. They cited disintegration of the USSR, thereby lessening importance of the US in European affairs and uneven economic development in European countries as main reasons behind emerging contradictions.
between the US and Europe. US and Europe could reach an agreement on agriculture in GATT negotiations with great difficulty. There was also difference of opinion on the issue of European integration, Maastricht Treaty and relationship with Germany in the post-Cold War era. As Xin Hua reported, whole Europe was swept by the post-Cold War syndrome. It means, European leadership and public wanted to be independent from the US. In fact, in mid 1990s, Chinese strategic community was hoping an inevitable emergence of multi-polarization in international politics. Chenxi in his article, "peace and development: sign of the times" pointed out that Japan and Germany on the basis of their economic development, France on the basis of its security or autonomy and Russia's re-emergence as a big power together with China's political stability and continuous economic development are bound to make international politics multipolar one (SWB FE/2498 G/2 01 January 1996). Chen Xiaogong (1992) characterized the Cold-War as 'strained stability' and post-USSR phase as "détente amidst turbulence". He also contrasts the relative stability of the Asia-Pacific with East European and African and West Asian stability.

3.5. (a) Multilateralism and China's Traditional Security

China has broadened its approach to security during its phase of 'reform and opening up'. This process was not without twists and turns. However, its understanding of security culture and interests has radically departed from Mao's period. During that phase, China treated every multilateral activity, including the UN, as a hegemonic ploy, and opposed them. It perceived security interests mainly in narrow military terms and relied on bilateral relations. After 1978, it has given up its earlier policy of characterizing and then exploiting world situation on the basis of balance of power. It has come out of persecution complex.

Though it started exhibiting new approach and confidence in economic domain after 1979 only, it could not demonstrate same confidence in political and security realm till the end of Cold War. Transformation of its security understanding lagged behind transformation of its economic understanding during this period. But since 1990s, multilateralism came to occupy a pivotal place in its policy of peace and development requiring new orientation in its security policy.

According to President Jiang Zemin, "as countries increase their interdependency and common ground on security, it has become difficult for any
single country to realize its security objectives on its own. Only by strengthening international cooperation we can effectively deal with the security challenge world wide and realize universal and sustained security” (Deng and Moore 2004: 121). Following the proposition, China’s security is dependent on other countries. Thus, concepts like “common security” and “globalized cooperation” are central to China’s foreign policy discourse.

Based on this understanding, China has theorized that overall peace will persist in the world. It is not going to face any systemic catastrophe. A military solution to the problems is not desirable and its role has even diminished. In this theorization, multilateral frameworks are viewed as essential components in redressing security issues as they can deal with threats of transnational nature successfully, build mutual trust required for peace and development and provide an alternative to the American foreign policy agenda. In fact, the neutral response that China received from the Southeast Asian countries and later even from Japan towards the Tiananmen has led China to view that the world is not intrinsically hostile towards it and that the countries can coexist.

The immediate and long term security architecture that China visualizes is to protect its economic interests in the international economic order and in the neighboring regions, to consolidate its power and authority in its periphery, to project its positive and friendly image, to quarantine the regime of the Taiwan, to prevent Japan’s remilitarization and to balance American presence in the neighboring regions.

Since 2000 a clear change is seen in China's security understanding in which multipolarity is not much emphasized. China's general understanding about security in the first decade of 21st century emphasised that security depends on economic growth in Asia and particularly East Asia. Overall global economic scenario also influences China's security. China's security analysis had changed once again as it revised its understanding about US relations with Europe and Japan. China compelled to do so seeing the strengthening of NATO and US security relations with Japan. In addition, national separatism that arose in the wake of the end of the Cold War continued into the of 21st century. Kosovo crisis and Aceh provinces of Indonesia are examples of this. In China, pro-independence voices in Taiwan were being considered as directly influenced by this international situation. Given these changes, military might was still considered an important element in international security. Initial decline in
military budgets of the nations in early 1990s began increasing again by the end of the decade. In this scenario, China considered the UN as relevant and a forum where it could show its big nation status (Li Bin 2000). At the same time, since Gulf-War I, China concentrated on active-defence military strategy.

Si Chu (1991) delineated a general approach for confidence-building, security and disarmament arrangements consistent with China's assessment of security in which China does not rely on probability of emerging contradictions between the US, Europe and Japan but supports establishing bilateral relations gradually evolving in the direction towards multilateral arrangements on larger level; and creating confidence building measures first instead of formalized security arrangements and initiating informal talks before official talks. The emphasis of approach is on gradual evolution of confidence building measures into formal security arrangements. In the light of this general approach, Si Chu considers non-military confidence building measures more realistic and practicable in their implementation. He finds that political diplomatic relations on the basis of 'mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries', economic relations on the basis of mutual benefit can be established and developed; and diversity can be accepted as a principle along with speeding up the process of political solutions to the regional hot spots to start with. Also, he identifies China renouncing aggression and accepting negotiation and consultation as the most effective means to settle disputes. On military level confidence building measures, his basic thrust is on nuclear disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region, making it a nuclear-free-zone and assuring non-nuclear states that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in any case. But he is not very definitive about making formal arrangements for consultation, as in his views heavy military presence of US and USSR is a hindrance in this direction. Vice-premier Qian Qichen said in a speech at Asia Society"

"We stand for the establishment of a new type of security concept. Only by conducting equal consultation and dialogue, strengthening mutual trust and pursuing common security, will we (sic) be able to preserve peace and stability. In our opinion, strengthening military alliances, intensifying the arms race and unilaterally pursuing absolute security do not correspond with the trend of the era, nor will these bring about genuine security" (SWB, FE/4101 G/2, 22 Mar. 01).
China treats bilateral and multilateral talks in a way that these are upheld as a matter of norm in which nations enjoy equal footing (Li Peng 1997). In addition to this, the leadership introduced a new security concept, which is mainly an extension of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, represents many of its concerns. This concept includes the following:

- Conducting cooperation on the basis of the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other widely recognized norms governing international relations, and give full play to the leading role of the United Nations;
- Peacefully resolving territorial and border disputes and other controversial issues through negotiations;
- Reform and improve the existing international economic and financial organizations and promote common prosperity in line with the principle of reciprocity and mutual benefit and common development;
- Putting emphasis on non-traditional security areas such as combating terrorism and transnational crimes, in addition to the traditional security areas like preventing foreign invasion and safeguarding territorial integrity;
- Conducting effective disarmament and arms control with broad participation in line with the principle of justice, comprehensiveness, rationality and balance, prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, uphold the current international arms control and disarmament regime and refrain from arms race.” (Fmprc 2002).

This concept provides a normative direction and practical course for its multilateral security engagement.

China's traditional security concerns could be categorized mainly into three: geo-strategic, regional and domestic. Some issues fall in more than one category. Issues like Taiwan and China's military modernization transcend regional and domestic dimensions. China may claim them to be domestic; however, their implications are felt region wide. China's traditional security concerns in these categories are discussed below.

3.5. (a). (I) Geo-strategic Scenario: US and Japan

Larger geo-political scenario has been shaping China's traditional security concerns. This scenario includes America's perceived encirclement of China, re-militarization and nuclearization of Japan, and India's growing prosperity and international stature especially after nuclear tests of 1998 and its growing relations with the US. In addition, a soft grouping of the US, Japan, India and Australia on maritime security, proposed in recently held ARF meeting also, is a major security concern for China.
In the post-Cold War era, Sino-US relations have witnessed mixed trends. On the one hand, the bilateral trade has been surging steadily. On the other, Sino-US relations touched its lowest point during Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. Apart from that the US has been putting pressure on China on the human rights issue. U-2 plane episode and alleged illegal nuclear and missile technology transfer by China to North Korea, Pakistan and Iran have also added to acrimony and developed distrust. Even bilateral trade between the two was not without problems. For instance, trade dispute between the US and China that emerged in mid-1990s when China and the US went into a trade war. The US Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor accused China of not being willing to take proper measures to protect American intellectual property rights and was blocking market access for American videos, films and sound recordings. He gave a unilateral deadline to meet the US demand or it would introduce 100 per cent tariffs-on listed Chinese exports to the United States with a total value of US$2.8 billion (The China Quarterly, 1995, (142): 663). China promised that it will try its best to join Universal Copyright Convention in 1992 which was one of the core demands to join the proposed WTO (SWB FE/1288 A1/4 27 Jan 92). But in 1994, Sino-US negotiations on intellectual property rights broke down following "US trade representative Mickey Kantor published a list of Chinese products which were considered targets for trade sanctions". In fact this intellectual property rights issue involved many labour issues. The basic US argument was that China was not fulfilling its duties towards international conventions. China considered these demands as "flagrant interventions" in China's internal affairs (SWB FE/2194G/1, 6 Jan 95). China's understanding was that the US was behaving recklessly on trade disputes; however this issue could have been settled through dialogue and negotiation (SWB FE/2193G/1, 5 Jan 95). During this period (from late 1994 to the opening months of 1995) trade dispute between China and the US was a major bone of contention. This issue was continuously under discussion in media and at governmental levels. China's position was that, issue was to be resolved only through dialogue not by any retaliatory measures. In the same period Chinese authorities cracked down on piracy one after another. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Chen Jian announced that the "Chinese government has all along paid great importance to the protection of intellectual rights" and "in the future, it will take further measures to enhance law enforcement to further protect IPR" (SWB FE/2501 G/1 5 January 1996). Finally China and the US signed the agreement on intellectual property rights (SWB
These irritants underscore that there exists an intense and real economic-business competition between the two countries, which is bound to cast its shadow on political relations. It may not be a coincidence that the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis started building up few months after this trade acrimony.

Despite these problems, instances of cooperation can also be observed in Sino-US relations. Thomas Christensen, the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, has accepted China's cooperation on Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq and global health (China Daily, 2006-08/04). Military to Military cooperation between the US and China, a recent phenomenon, has been carried out to remove mutual apprehensions. However, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other senior officials have demanded more openness in China's defence budget and modernization (China Daily, 2006-06/13). China and the US set up a hotline in 2007. It was intended to reduce mistrust when the US was wary of China's military modernization (China Daily, 2007-06/04). Henry Kissinger, who played an important role in drafting the Shanghai Communiqué, urged US to "eliminate differences through serious dialogue". Echoing this sentiment, Bill Clinton pointed out, "An isolated China does not serve US interests" (SWB FE/2851 G/1 24 Feb 97). Despite this, bigger picture of Sino-US relations remains ambivalent. US relations with Japan, its proposal of including Taiwan in Theatre Missile Defence System and nuclear deal with India speak louder than instances of cooperation. In January 2001, the US was warned against including Taiwan in its proposed Theatre Missile Defence System (The China Quarterly, 2001, (166): 562). Colin Powell admitted in a press conference in Australia that there was an idea of creating 'mini-NATO' containing the US, Japan, Australia and Republic of Korea (Xiao Zan 2001: 10).

Apart from purely emotive issues, there are some other security apprehensions. In the post Cold-War period, Japan, anticipating ultimate eventuality of the US withdrawal from the region, wanted to build its own political and military capabilities. Japan's assured economic clout to sustain this bid and its 'militaristic past' caused considerable worry in China (Yang Yi, China Daily, 2007-09/01). The issue of overseas dispatch of the Self Defence Forces has been a provocative and a matter of serious concern not only in China but also in Asia-pacific. This was enough to remind Japan's expansionism in 1930s and 1940s. Despite strong opposition from within the domestic political constituencies and outside world, the Japanese House of Representatives passed a government bill on June 15, 1992, authorizing for the first time since World War II the overseas dispatch of the Self Defence Forces (Jing Yaping 1992). China also took careful notice of Japan-Australia defence pact signed in 2007 (China Daily, 2007-03/13). On the other hand, Japan is also equally anxious seeing China's growing economic and military might. Besides, North Korean nuclear and missile programmes directly concern Japan. (China Daily, 2006-08/01). Japan is also concerned about China's military exports. Keeping this in mind, Japan pointed out that China did not lend its support to a resolution to establish a register of conventional weapons exports (The China Quarterly, 1992, (129): 280). Japan's Foreign Minister and Deputy-Prime Minister stressed that 'greater transparency' was required in China's military exports (The China Quarterly, 1994, (138): 586). On Taiwanese front too, there are serious problems between the two. "Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama declared publicly that the "surrounding areas" covered by Japan-US security collaboration should "naturally include the Taiwan Straits"(Beijing Review, 1997, (36):7). The Chinese Defence Minister, Chi Haotian, categorically conveyed back that 'China would not accept the inclusion of the Taiwan Straits within the scope of the Japan-US Defence Co-operation guidelines.' And it would be a definite violation of Chinese sovereignty (Chi Haotian 1998).

Despite these irritants in their bilateral relations, there are examples of cooperation too. Japan's Foreign Minister and Deputy-Prime Minister acknowledged China's importance in the resolution of North Korean nuclear crisis (The China Quarterly, 1994, (138): 586). "The Chinese foreign minister also promised to cooperate with Japan in its efforts to remove references to Japan as an "enemy state" in the UN Charter. For his part, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama gave an
undertaking that Japan would pursue only "unofficial regional" exchanges with Taiwan (The China Quarterly, 1991, (127): 674).

However, situation remains problematic as the mutual deficit of trust between them lies mainly in the strategic arena. Yingfan is apprehensive about the success of China-Japan cooperation in political and military arena (Wang Yingfan, China Daily, 2007-08/30).

3.5. (a). (II) Regional Security

China's move towards regional security shows its interest in shaping new regional order. In the world of increasing interdependence and especially when faultlines pertaining to culture and civilization are undermining the ideology of nationalism and challenging borders of nation-states, a large number of security threats are being collectively felt at regional levels by existing states; therefore necessitating tackling these threats at the regional level. China mainly shares its security concerns with Central, South and Southeast Asia. These concerns are security as well as developmental. China has moved a number of initiatives regarding regional security. Multilateral cooperation has figured in these moves prominently. Creation of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and joining of ASEAN Regional Forum are such initiatives.

China's strategy towards regional security is two-pronged. On the one hand it intends to stabilize its peripheries, and on the other hand it aims away to create a new regional order on its terms in which its major goal is to keep US at bay in its neighboring regions.

3.5. (a). (III) Xinjiang

Xinjiang, an autonomous region on the north-western part of China, has acquired an international dimension due to its historical legacy of being part of Central Asia. In addition, Xinjiang has abundance of gold deposits. Large gold mines have been discovered in Junggar Basin, Ili District and the Altay mountain area. There are more than 100 salt lakes with reserves estimated at 41.39 billion tons, more than enough to meet China's needs for 200 years. Some 1.6 billion tons of salt deposits are located near railways and highways. Grasslands in Xinjiang stretch over 50 million hectares, accounting for 23 percent of the country's total and capable of sustaining more than 60 million livestock. Xinjiang now has 3.4 million hectares of
arable land. This is 0.25 hectare per capita, two times higher than the amount of arable land per capita nationwide. Apart from this, Xinjiang is famous for its fruit production. It has over 900 varieties of fruits on 100,000 hectares." Apart from this account, Xinjiang has an impressive record of small scale and cottage industries like weaving. Cotton produced by these industries is considered to be very fine quality. The Tarim Basin with an area of 560,000 square km, located in the south of the Xinjiang (of which 330,000 square km is covered by the Taklimakan Desert), The Turpan-Hami basin located east of Xinjiang with an area of 48,000 square km and the Junggar Basin located north of Xinjiang with an area of 130,000 square km contain enormous oil and gas reserves (Kou Zhengling 1991).

Xinjiang is home for 47 nationalities. The largest population is of Uighur who constitute around 7.2 million. The second largest population is of the Hans who constitute around 5.8 million. Other noteworthy ethnic groups are Kazaks and Hui. In fact, other minority ethnic groups make 62 percent of the total population. Xinjiang shares borders with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Because of geographical remoteness, Xinjiang has lagged behind in the race of economic development during reform era (She Duanzhi 1994). Uighur minority is Muslim by faith and not Han by race. It shares racial stock and affinity with other fellow Central Asian regions. Many Uighur minority groups have been fighting for independence for centuries as they consider Chinese authority as Han expansionism. Of late Uighur separatist problem has been linked with international Islamic terrorism threatening China's sovereignty. The Xinjiang Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China released a handout on Xinjiang in 2003. In this handout, China highlighted two facts from its perspective. First, Xinjiang has historically been part of China. Second, Xinjiang is multi-ethnic region. It implies that no particular ethnicity, here Uighur in question, has no special right over Xinjiang.

According to China, Xinjiang problem has a mix of religious extremism and racial chauvinism. This problem is ideologically inspired by pan-Islamism with the undercurrent of Turkic or Uighur supremacy. China's position is that Eastern Turkistan as such never existed in history. This term was arbitrarily coined by Russian imperialist administration when they annexed three Khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Khokand in Central Asia in 19th century. They gave appellation of Turkistan to whole
Central Asian up to Tarim basin of Chinese Xinjiang and wishfully identified and publicized a distinction between so-called Western Turkistan or Russian Turkistan and Eastern Turkistan, what the Chinese call Xinjiang. (Xinhuanet 2003-06/12)

There was a violent riot on 5th-6th February 1997 in Yining City, claimed to be largest of its kind since 1949. In this riot, at least 10 people were reported to have died and more than 100 injured. Apart from this incident a number of bombings and other forms of violence were regularly reported. Russian media also recorded that there was surge in "anti-China terror" for an Islamic state in Xinjiang (SWB FE/2840 G/1 11 Feb 97: SWB FE/2854 G/3 27 Feb 97: SWB FE/2854 G/4 27 Feb 97). Widespread and numerous incidents of violence in Xinjiang were reported in the opening months of 1998. Security situation was considered grim. These reports were duly collected and compiled by Summary of World Broadcast in its volumes of that period. Chinese authorities carried out a 100-day "strike hard" campaign against the separatist elements throughout the city of Urumqi (SWB, FE/3428, G/3, 9 Jan. 1999). Xinjiang region has been major transit point for smuggling routes. The major smuggling articles range from arms and explosives to narcotics and pharmaceuticals (SWB, FE/3431, G/7 13 Jan 1999). Concerted efforts have been made to curb not only guns and explosives related crimes but especially abduction of women and children by Xinjiang security agencies (SWB, FE/3750 G/10 29 Jan 2000). In 1999, China launched major political and security offensive against separatism and other crimes in Xinjiang. These are widely reported in Chinese media. Separatist violence in Xinjiang is quite frequent unlike Tibet. Violence was reported to have surged mainly in the second half of 1990s.

Wang Le Quan, secretary of the Xinjiang autonomous regional party committee, and Zhou Shengtao, deputy secretary of the regional party committee and leaders of the Ili Kazakh autonomous prefecture and Ili prefecture stressed economic development, social, political stability and prevention of major incidents in the preceding years of 2000 (SWB FE/3730 G/13 06 Jan, '00). Zhou Shengtao called for a two-pronged strategy, immediate and long term (SWB, FE/3744 G/10). In fact, economic development in Chinese western regions has been a main strategy to contain and eradicate splitism there. The policy of promoting reform and opening up drive on the one hand and cracking down on crimes on the other is only way out of Xinjiang separatist problem (SWB, FE/3778 G/10 2 March 00). Mou Binley. Vice-
Minister of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, announced that China would pursue highest possible level of economic development in minority ethnic areas. This commission was created to look after the development of China's western region. According to him, GDP in these areas in 1999 was 7.8 per cent higher than that of 1998. He also informed about improvement in the living standards in these regions. He stated that five million people were lifted out of poverty in 1999 through the specific efforts of Chinese state (SWB, FE/3772 G/9, 24 Feb 2000).

Xinjiang autonomous region problem has also a Turkish dimension. A number of people who have migrated from Xinjiang to Turkey formed associations and carry separatist activities from there making the relations between China and Turkey complex (SWB, FE/3455, G/2, 10th Feb. 99). Xinjiang dissidents, generally under the banner of the "East Turkistan National Centre" staged demonstrations in front of Consulate-General of China in Istanbul on the eve of Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem's scheduled visit to Beijing (SWB, FE/3148 G/3 11 Feb. 98).

This region, besides being strategically important for China, is also rich in natural resources. For instance, "Xinjiang houses 122 minerals out of China's known 162 minerals, found in more than 4,000 locations. The total estimated coal reserves in Xinjiang is 1,600 billion tons, one-third of China's total and the nation's largest. Possible reserves of oil and gas is 28 billion tons, one-fourth of the country's total.

Thus, Xinjiang region has great geo-strategic and economic importance. China's opposition to NATO was inspired by its concern for Tibet and Xinjiang (SWB, FE/3500, G/1, 5 April 99). It has large oil reserves and provides connectivity to Central Asia, Russia, and Caucasian region and West Asia. Thus, this region holds a crucial geo-strategic importance for China. As for multilateralism, China aims to securitize Xinjiang region through SCO.

3.5. (a). (IV) Taiwan

Taiwan is another issue of the Cold War legacy that has been shaping China's approach to multilateralism. Re-unification of Taiwan with the rest of China remains its high priority agenda. But at the same time, Taiwan is committed to status quo while enjoying US protection. Any disproportionate assertion from the mainland may escalate tensions between China and US. But integration of Taiwan is a question of national aspiration and it has become a reference point of patriotic claims of Chinese
regime. In August 1993, Information Office of the state Council of the People's Republic of China released a handout on its position on Taiwan. In it, China reiterated its claim over Taiwan as its inalienable part. It highlighted Cold-War origin of this problem and maintained that China has been supporting "peaceful reunification; one country, two systems" policy since 1970s. According to this policy, only one China exists in which two systems-capitalist and socialist- can coexist and after reunification, Taiwan will enjoy greater autonomy as it will be granted status of special administrative region. Till the reunification is achieved, China categorically opposes any kind of relationship between Taiwan and the rest of the members of international community or international organisations, which recognizes Taiwan as a sovereign country. Taiwan is a member of Asian Development Bank and APEC but only under the capacity of China's region and nomenclature of Taipei. China considers arms sale to Taiwan and unqualified civil aviation terms with Taiwan also against its national unity and integrity (Xinhuanet 2006-02/28).

China's policy is to prevent Taiwan from acquiring high international profile. In engaging with the Southeast Asian countries, China makes it amply clear to them that it does not welcome any kind of closeness with Taiwan. And, it is clear that they have taken care of China's sentiments as China has virtually quarantined Taiwan in the region. In fact, China's tough stance against Taiwan has shaped its relations with ASEAN and its entry in ARF. Issue of Taiwan is a non-negotiable for China in these forums.

Much symbolism is attached with the issue of Taiwan. China insists support for its 'One China' policy a precondition for normalization and establishment of relations with other countries (Zhou Qingchang 1991). Relations even with distant and politically insignificant countries are established with the precondition of recognizing 'one China' policy. For the Chinese Olympic committee clearly refused to support Taiwan's bid to host the 2002 Asian Games (SWB FE/2248/G/3 10th Mar 1995). China drew consent from Spain for its "One-China" policy (SWB, FE/3145 G/2, 7 Feb 98). Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang tersely conveyed to Vatican that their relations can be normalized only when Vatican cuts off its 'so-called' diplomatic relations with Taiwan and stop Taiwanese official visits to Vatican under the pretext of "vacationing" and "stopover" and receiving honorary titles. These activities are aimed to create "Two Chinas" internationally (SWB FE/2818 G/3 16 Jan
97). By 1995, China had established relations with 159 countries. All these countries recognized 'One China' policy (Bai Liang 1995). Qian Qichen categorically conveyed that China will accept Taiwan in WTO as a separate customs territory of China, only then China acceded to the WTO as a signatory state. Qian Qichen strongly conveyed China's reservation against the sale of Mirage-2000 by France to Taiwan. Taiwan's "practical diplomacy" and "southward policy" aiming at the Southeast Asian countries may disturb China's calculations and relations in the Southeast Asian region. China, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Malaysia and Brunei agreed in the joint statement of 1997 that they would sideline their differences and solve disputes in peaceful ways. However, the problem persists.

Status quo is maintained in the cross-strait relations because of the US commitment for Taiwan's security. It should not be a coincidence that ever since the United Nations adopted Resolution no. 275 in 1971 categorically accepted China as fifth-permanent member of the Security Council replacing Taiwan, only in 1995 Taiwanese government published a pamphlet which described China only as a historical, cultural and geographical connotation and neutralized the word China politically and demanded to divide China into two parts. China accused Taiwan for attempting to purchase the UN membership with US $ 1 billion. In mid-1995, the US allowed long-deferred visit of Taiwanese leader Lee Teng Hui, terming as private visit. It has been a US-Taiwan policy that it does not allow visits by Taiwanese leaders. It simply permits them to stop over or transit to other countries. Therefore, this visit created outrage, rumpus and a sense of betrayal in China. In fact this visit was accompanied by US decision of selling F16 to Taiwan. They described it as a breach of commitment by the US commitment which the US accepted in three different communiqués (Shen Guofang 1995). China declared these acts as totally in disregard of three communiqués including Shanghai communiqué on which Sino-US relations were based and which clearly set limits of US-Taiwan relations. This whole episode mounted tension in Taiwan. China defiantly tested missiles in the strait and in response US moved its Seventh fleet from its Japanese bases. The US decision of sending an aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Straits from its naval base in Japan was taken as highly hostile and an affront to China's sovereignty (Qian Qichen 1996). Jiang Zemin clearly conveyed that Taiwan is at the centre of the Sino-Us relations and as per understanding arrived at three different communiqués; the US can have only
informal relations with Taiwan (Jiang Zemin 1995). This was the lowest point in Sino-Us relations since the rapprochement. In the same period the US passed Taiwan Relations Act which, in Chinese understanding, was running counter to the obligations undertaken by the US government in the three communiqués (SWB FE/2532 G/2 10 Feb. '96).

Nicaragua approaching the UN General Assembly through a letter asking Taiwan's representation in the UN came as an irritant for China in 1998 (Qin Huasun 1998). Since 2004, tensions across Taiwan Strait escalated with China passing anti-secession law, China's opposition to Taiwan's entry into the WTO and in the UN as a member state and the decision of Taiwan authorities to cease the function of "National Unification Council" and the application of its guidelines.

3.5. (a). (V) Tibet

Though Tibet is a settled and non-negotiable issue from Chinese perspective, it still remains a cause of anxiety because there are quite vocal powers in international community beyond its control, which question China's authority over Tibet. Practically, this questioning hardly makes any difference to China's control over Tibet. However, any discussion on Tibet in any legitimate international fora amounts to questioning Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and China's nationhood. Therefore, China always remains vigilant so as to prevent Tibet from figuring in the proceedings of any such fora.

The problem of Tibet emanates from Chinese history. According to Chinese point of view, Tibet went out of Chinese control after the weakening of central government in post-1911 nationalist period. Therefore, Chinese troops moved into Tibet in early 1950s and accomplished national unification. From Tibetan perspective, this is highly contested. However since early 1950s China has effective control over Tibet. Despite this ground reality China's position does not remain unchallenged. Though there has been no major upheaval in Tibet in the recent past, it remains a vulnerable point raising questions about Chinese nationhood. The Dalai Lama, who heads government-in-exile, has been a big irritant for China for the last five decades. Perhaps, the Dalai Lama is the most hated figure among Chinese ruling elite after Chiang Kai Shek. Hate against the Dalai Lama is severely and representatively reflected in Tibetan leader Raidi's speech on ideological battle against separatism.
Chinese authorities have been highly contemptuous and have showed utter disregard for the 14th Dalai Lama. Whenever they find any opportunity they simply characterize him a trouble maker, 'saboteur' and agent and leader of feudal remnants and collaborator of anti-China hostile western forces whose only job is to obstruct peace, tranquility and development in Tibet (SWB, FE/1793, G/3, 20 March '00). Much of their energy is spent on keeping watch over where the Dalai Lama is traveling and whom he is talking with. Distrust and nervousness regarding the Dalai Lama is so high that his visit to Taiwan was considered as a conspiracy. China took cognizance of the Dalai Lama's visit to Japan and termed it "Interference In China's Internal Affairs" on the ground that "The Dalai Lama is not an ordinary religious person but a politician in exile who has long been engaged in activities intended to split the motherland and sabotage national unity under the pretext of religion" (SWB FE/2261 G/1 25th Mar 95). Likewise, the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan in 1997 created outrage and furore in China. This visit was considered as a meeting of two arch-conspirators against China's unity and territorial integrity and widely condemned.

China was concerned about India granting refugee status to Tibetan Karmapa (SWB, FE/4073 G/3, 17 Feb. 01). Some US Congressman opposed China's bid to host Olympic Games on the ground of 'bad condition of human rights' in Tibet, which was criticized by the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao maintaining that they were biased against China (SWB, FE/4095 G/3, 15 Mar. 01). A French-Chinese expedition to Tibet was postponed, in 1997, by France, seemingly in support of 'Tibetan cause'. Chinese ambassador Yan Peng protested against the proposed flag hoisting of Tibetan flag by Kladno town council (SWB FE/2859 G/10 5 March, 97; SWB FE/2859/10 5 March, 97). China strongly condemned US appointment of a special coordinator for Tibet Affairs (SWB, FE/3439, G/1 22 Jan. '99). Chinese authorities issued a White-Paper on Tibet refuting the charges from varied international sections.

Chinese government vehemently rejected the demand for self determination in Tibet, backed by some sections in the US and termed this demand as an attempt to dilute Chinese sovereignty (SWB FE/2238 G/2 27th Feb 95).

On 4 March, 1991, China, with the help of third world countries, successfully blocked a resolution from being tabled and voted in the UN. This resolution was
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the issue of human rights, advised the US to "respect facts, observe the principles of the international law, and stop interfering in the internal affairs of another country under the pretext of the so-called human rights issue" (SWB, FE/3141 G/1 3 Feb 98).

Jin Yongjian (Ambassador, head of the Chinese delegation, at the Asian Regional Preparatory Meeting for the World conference on Human Rights in Bangkok on March 30, 1993) put forward alternative understanding of Human Rights: Priority should be ensuring human rights having affected by massive violence resulting from racism, racial segregation, colonialism, foreign aggression and occupation. State sovereignty should be respected at every cost. Ideological, political, cultural and civilizational diversity should be accorded due recognition. Development should be considered as inalienable human rights. Enforcement of rights should be universal, objective and impartial. There should be no ideological provocation. Mutual respect and exchange of views should be taken care about. As far as development is concerned, China treats 'right to subsistence' as the most fundamental right. Chinese definition of human rights is much broader in its scope (Yu Quangyu 1992). Thus, China considers political and civil rights secondary to social and economic rights.

3.5. (a). (VII) North Korea's Nuclear Problem

North Korean nuclearization is one area in which Chinese approach to multilateralism has been quite useful and effective. Nuclear issue in Korean peninsula has been one of the problems which emerged in international politics in the post-Cold War period. Around end of the first Gulf War, the US and South Korea accused North Korea of developing nuclear weapons and demanded inspection. North Korea took a position that it would not allow any unilateral inspection and held that if at all there are any inspections; inspection should be carried out in both North and South Korea simultaneously. Tension grew up. South Korea indicated that it was not against the idea of destroying alleged nuclear facilities with force even. On 31 December, 1991, both the sides signed a draft declaration for denuclearization. China's sympathy lied with North Korea (Liu Nengging 1992). Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992. But again, it declared in 1993 that it would withdraw from the treaty. Since then, situation has been critical. In fact, the US satellites sent images of DPRK developing nuclear weapons at a site 100 km north of
Pyongyang. The issue is that International Atomic Energy Agency has been demanding inspection of military facilities, but DPRK has been defying to cooperate with the Agency. The US and the Republic of Korea have been at the forefront to demand inspections and halting of nuclear weapon programme.

China has been playing an active role in Six-Party talk regarding North Korea's nuclear programme. These six parties are North Korea, South Korea, Japan, US, China and Russia. China's role and sincerity in resolving this issue has been widely appreciated. China facilitated talks between US and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and has shown desire in the success of these talks. China believes the nuclear problem of Korean peninsula is not irresolvable. The need of the hour is to take a positive approach. In China's view, nuclear problem in the Korean peninsula, however complicated, can be resolved through consensus and dialogue. Every party has to show sagacity to solve the problem step by step (People's Daily 2003-08/21). Even after North Korea's nuclear test, China has not lost hope for peaceful solution. It feels this test will not bring the talks to an end and not even undermine it to any significant level (China View 2006-10/10). North Korea particularly has acknowledged China's efforts to resolve this problem peacefully.

3.5. (a). (VIII) China and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

China has a nuanced policy on non-proliferation. Ideally, it stands for total non-proliferation. But at the same time, it cites so many ground realities that need to be taken into account.

Chinese Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Hou Zhitong (1992), in a statement at the First Committee of the 47th Session of the United nations General Assembly, made China's position clear that China's non-proliferation policy stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction. Given the existing reality, China continues to possess nuclear stockpile while being committed to no-first-use, no use against non-nuclear power.

On its Seventy-fifth anniversary the PLA issued a statement which says that:

- Nuclear powers should give up any nuclear threat policy, and the countries with largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons should make sharp reductions.
- All countries with nuclear weapons must refrain from using nuclear weapons as a first strike and from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against those countries that do not possess a nuclear capability, and this should be included in international treaties as soon as possible.
Those countries that have deployed nuclear weapons abroad should withdraw these weapons and should support the establishment of nuclear-free zones, bearing related duties.

All countries should refrain from developing or deploying satellite-based weapons systems and missile defence systems that impair security and stability.


Qian Qichen (1995) head of the Chinese at the UN's Review and Extension Conference on the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons supported extension of NPT and emphasized the need for reaching an early agreement on a CTBT and a negotiated convention on banning production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Chinese Disarmament ambassador Li Changhe (1998) appealed to all countries that they should refrain from using space for military purpose. He said "space belonged to the whole of mankind and should be used solely for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind". He reiterated that the Chinese government supported complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weaponry. Sha Zukang, head of the Chinese delegation at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, criticized without naming any country but certainly alluding to the US that some countries have not only deviated from the principled non-proliferation but they are advertising themselves as the sole crusaders of non-proliferation to further their own foreign policy objectives (*SWB*, FE/3213, G/1 29 April '98).

To keep the record straight, we should see China's non-proliferation and other arms control related initiatives. China has signed and ratified the relevant additional protocols to the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and it supports the protocols for establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Korean peninsula.

China's accession to various non-proliferation treaties and conventions is given below:

- China acceded to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons in 1992, and contributed positively to its indefinite extension in 1995. China actively participated in the negotiations of the chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), signed and ratified the convention in 1993 and 1997, and has fully implemented its legal obligations.

- China became a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1984, and is now actively participating in the negotiations of a protocol to strengthen the effectiveness of the convention.

- China was one of the first to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test ban Treaty (CTBT), and has played a positive role in the work of the CTBT Prepcom.

- As a member state of the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA), China has put its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards on a voluntary basis.

- It joined the Zangger Committee in October 1997, and signed the "93+2" protocol aimed at strengthening the IAEA safeguards system at the end of 1998.

- Moreover, China has signed and ratified relevant protocols to the treaties of Tlateloco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. It has also undertaken to sign the amended protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Apart from participating in multilateral non-proliferation efforts, China has improved its export control systems on sensitive items and technologies, and has promulgated a series of laws and regulations.

- In December 1995, China published the regulations on the supervision and control of chemicals, and subsequently issued a list of chemicals subject to supervision and control and the bylaws for the Implementation of the regulations in June 1996.


- In June 1998, China published the Regulations on the Control of the Export of Dual-Use Nuclear Materials and Related Technology." Non-Proliferation bids can succeed only through the efforts of whole international community without maintaining any double-standards (Sha Zukang 2000).

Apart from nuclear non-proliferation, China supported the Programme on Guaranteeing the Effectiveness of a Supervision System (the 93+2) adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In January 1993 China signed the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, and their Destruction. It was ratified in December 1996. On 25 April 1997 the Chinese government filed the instruments of ratification, becoming the first signatory state to treaty. In December 1994 China attended the consultation on suspending the exportation of anti-personnel mines held by the UN General Assembly. In April 1996, the Chinese government followed the newly revised protocol of Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects to declare the suspension of anti-personnel mine exports. As a
signatory to NPT, China claims to be committed to have control of exports of sensitive materials and military equipments (Giri Deshingkar 1996). The White Paper issued by China in November 1995 was basically on arms control and disarmament, which is otherwise known as defence White Paper. According to Giri Deshingkar, the importance of these White Papers should not be overrated as they hardly convince other concerned countries. Giri Deshingkar points out an interesting contradiction in this defence paper when China claims that it not only opposes nuclear blackmail but also 'the nuclear deterrent policy itself. Then, what are its nuclear weapons all about! Interestingly China which has claimed very loudly its standing support for nuclear free zones did not support that the geographical scope of the nuclear free zones cover continental shelves, exclusive economic zones "areas of dispute between the state parties" to the nuclear weapon free zone treaties and the neighbouring states over the territorial sovereignty and maritime interest (SWB, FE/3505, G/4-5 15 April '99).

3.5. (a). (IX) China's Military Modernization, Military Transparency and China Threat Theories

China's military modernization has generated a major debate in strategic community in China's immediate regions and across the globe. The crux of the debate is centered on the intentions and motivation behind China's military modernization. According to critics, China's military modernization demonstrates its great power ambition and thus pursues hegemonic agenda. David Shambaugh states that China's military modernization remains highly unilateral in its approach for it does not take the concerns of its neighbors into account (Shambaugh 2004/05: 85).

But a sympathetic view could be that China's military has outdated hardware which needs to be updated and its modernization is aiming at making its military more capable of sustaining China's enhanced national strength and needs. However, China's reluctance in discussing issue of its military modernization in multilateral fora like ARF and lacking transparency in it endanger mistrust about its military modernization.

China's growing defence expenditure is a matter of concern for many countries including the US. The notable issue about China's defence budget is that the amount of defence expenditure in China is highly contested. The widely accepted perception is that Chinese government figures are understated. Considering the difference of accounting and rerouting of funds these could be as much higher as three times more
than what is generally admitted. In fact, China's defence spending has been maintaining the double digit expenditure for more than 15 years. The annual report from the US Department of Defence maintained that China's defence expenditure is two or three times the officially disclosed figures. China rebutted that its military spending is only 1/10th that of the United States (China Daily, 2006-05/24). Chinese official argument justifying this constant increase is that it is consistent with China's overall economic growth and most part of this increase is spent on salaries and other personnel related expenditure. China's standard defence of its military modernization is that it pursues military modernization to sustain its economic development (China Daily, 2006-07/20). Most interesting note about China's military build-up came from Australia. Within the span of five days, Australia's position moved full circle from Prime Minister John Howard's "China defence build-up risky" to visiting Australian Defence minister Brendan Nelson's "PLA strength justified" and "China's military buildup understandable" (China Daily, 2007-07/09).

From 1980 to 1993, military spending increased by 116%, whereas prices went up by 130%(Qian Qichen 1993). China's defence budget increased by 16.7% in 1993 over 1992. The inflation rate also increased at the rate of 16.7%. In 1994, this increase was by 20% in both the areas. Military expenditure accounted for 1.7% of gross national product in 1991, 1.5% in 1992 and 1.3% in 1993. China's per capita military spending was US$ 5 in 1994 where as US per capita military spending was US$ 1000, British and France's per capita military spending was US$ 600, Japan's per capita military spending was US$ 360 and India's per capita military spending was US$ 8. In 1993, China's defence budget was 2.5% of the US and 20% of Japan's defence budget (Hu Ping 1994).

"From 1979 to 1994 defence spending increased by 6.22 per cent annually in absolute terms, which represented in real terms a negative growth of 1.08 per cent compared to the 7.3 per cent annual increase of the country's general price index of commodities in the same period." (The China Quarterly, 1998, (56):1115).
### Table 3.1: China's Annual Defence Budget, 2000-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget (US $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000 i</td>
<td>14.6 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 ii</td>
<td>17 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 iii</td>
<td>20 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 iv</td>
<td>22.43 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 v</td>
<td>27.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 vi</td>
<td>30.64 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 vii</td>
<td>35 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 viii</td>
<td>44.94 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 ix</td>
<td>58.8 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3.2 Defence Budget and Per Capita Defence Budget in Select Countries, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Defense Budget (US $)</th>
<th>Per Capita Defence Budget (US $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>532.8 billion</td>
<td>383,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>62.38 billion</td>
<td>324,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50.78 billion</td>
<td>146,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>44.94 billion</td>
<td>19,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>42.00 billion</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>37.5 billion</td>
<td>148,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3.3 Percentage of Military Expenditure in GDP, and Proportion of Military Spending in Fiscal Expenditure, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Expenditure Percentage of GDP</th>
<th>Proportion of Military Spending in Fiscal Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>n.a.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* not available

Table 3.4 Percentage of China's Annual Defense Expenditure in GDP (1995-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995 i.</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 ii.</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 iii.</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.5 Percentage of Defence Expenditure in GDP and Financial Expenditure in Select Countries, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage of Defense Expenditure in GDP</th>
<th>Percentage of Defense Expenditure in Financial Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>16.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>18.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>11.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>9.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>7.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the Chinese *White Paper on Defence, 2006*:

"Both the total amount and per-serviceman share of China's defence expenditure is low compared with those of some other countries, particularly major powers. In 2005, China's defence expenditure equaled 6.19 percent of that of the United States, 52.95 percent of that of the United Kingdom, 71.45 percent of that of France and 67.52 percent of that of Japan. China's defence expenses per serviceman averaged RMB107, 607, amounting to 3.74 percent of that of the United States and 7.07 percent of that of Japan. China's GDP in 2004 and 2005 was RMB15, 987.8 billion and RMB18, 308.5 billion, respectively, with a growth rate of 10.1 percent in 2004 and of 10.2 percent in 2005. The state financial expenditure was RMB2, 848.689 billion in 2004 and RMB3, 939.028 billion in 2005, up 15.57 percent and 19.11 percent respectively over the previous year. China's defence expenditure in 2004 and 2005 was RMB220.001 billion and RMB247.496 billion, respectively, with growth rates of 15.31 percent and 12.50 percent. In the past two years, the share of China's annual defence expenditure in its GDP and in the state financial expenditure in the same period has decreased, being 1.40 percent and 7.74 percent respectively in 2003, 1.38
percent and 7.72 percent in 2004, and 1.35 percent and 7.29 percent in 2005. Its defence budget for 2006 is RMB283.829 billion."

Considering the above-mentioned statistics and giving some credence to the US concern regarding this issue, nothing can be said conclusively. Increase in China's defence budget should be seen in global context. It was observed that after the end of Cold-War, there was a dip in major countries' defence budget. But very soon, defence budgets began to increase. Military interferences promoted by superpower, efforts to seize the commanding heights in the military realm, the intensification of contradictions in trouble spots like Afghanistan and Iraq, developed countries' interest in weapons market are cited main reasons of increase in defence budget (Wang Hucheng 2001). In Chinese case, tracing roots of this increase in Gulf-War I in 1991, it is accepted that this war showed unchallenged technological superiority of US military and left an impact on Chinese military thinking. It was realized that China would have to generate its own military capability in the post-Cold War era in the wake of disintegration of USSR to meet with any eventuality. China has at least some valid ground to increase its defence budget. Besides military expenditure, level of military transparency and military-to-military interaction need to be taken into account.

From 1978 to 1998, China had established inter-armed forces relations with more than 100 countries, set up military attaches offices in more than 90 Chinese embassies abroad and some 60 countries have the same in China. During the same period, more than 1,300 Chinese military delegations, of which some 180 were, headed by senior officers, visited over 80 countries and 2,100- foreign military delegations visited China. During 1996 and 1997, more than 100 Chinese military delegations visited to most of its neighbouring countries. In the same period it hosted over 130 military delegations from its neighbouring countries. China offered assistance in personnel training, equipment and health care to over 70 countries. Since 1973, China had given training to around 10,000 officers of developing countries. It also sent over 8,000 experts to these countries. Since the beginning of the 1990s, China's navel vessels have visited many countries.

During 1999-2001, China sent more than seventy high-level military delegations to over sixty countries and hosted some 160 high-level foreign military delegations. It dispatched more than 150 technical or other specialized delegations abroad, while over 180 foreign military delegations of the similar nature visited
China. During the same period, more than 200 Chinese military personnel went to study in Russia, Germany, France, Britain, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand and Kuwait, and at the same time around 1000 military personnel from Africa, Latin America and Europe, and other Asian countries came to study in China. China has registered its participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum, Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, North-East Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Academic Symposium of China, the United States and Japan, and other activities for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation.

Till 2000, China sent 522 military observers, liaison officers or advisers and 800 men in two batches from engineering units to the UN peace-keeping operations, including the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, United Nations Operation in Mozambique, United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone and United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. "In January 2000, at the request of the United Nations, the Chinese government dispatched fifteen civilian policemen to the United Nations Transitional Authority in east Timor, the first time for China to send civilian policemen to UN peace-keeping operations. In addition, the Chinese government continued to take part in the UN's standby arrangements." China supported the UN General Assembly resolution on the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space that was supported by an overwhelming majority. After participating in the UN Register of Conventional Arms from 1992 to 1997, China suspended this participation over the issue of Arms sale to Taiwan (White Paper: China's National Defence, 2000 in China Report, 2001, 37: 1). 16 joint military exercises between China and 11 countries have been held and China has established military ties with more than 150 countries since 2002 (China Daily 2006-12/30).

China's arm export is also cited in China threat theories. But China's defence is that though it is world's fifth ranking arms exporter, its share in total arms export is 5%. Moreover, China cites a policy that it exports arms on three basic principles: arms are exported to help countries in raising their defence capability, arms must not be used to destabilize regional peace, and arms should not be used in making
interferences in other countries (Su Huimin 1993). The US took a position that China
would be the most important strategic challenge to the US security arguing that the
Asia-pacific region as the most potential victim of China's ascendancy (Zhang Zeyu
1995). Wen Ming in his article, entitled "Misguidance in Vain" pointed out how US
media is deeply biased and prejudices against China (SWB FE/ 2824 G/1 23 Jan 97).
However, on the other hand, charges of missile and nuclear technology transfer by
China to North Korea, Pakistan and Iran have also been widely reported in
international media. And, they are not without credence. American position regarding
China being a threat may be exaggerated, but such technology transfer by China is of
destabilizing nature, which could have region wide repercussions. This act of China
puts a question mark over genuineness of its policy statements.

3.5. (a) (X) Border and Maritime Disputes

At present, China has border problem only with India. Considering that in both
the countries this issue is linked with national aspirations, it becomes difficult to
negotiate. Besides, bitter memory of 1962 conflict in both the countries still lingers. A
sense of being injured is more prevalent in India. Nevertheless, much progress, at the
level of dialogue and discussion, has been made. The nature of border-dialogue
between both the countries is bilateral, not any sort of multilateral. Disputes in South
China Sea are maritime requiring multilateral negotiations. China is a major disputant
with every other country in the region. Presence of oil and gas in the sea makes
disputes difficult to resolve. Among issues that are related to sovereignty, only South
China Sea disputes are part of multilateral discussions in ARF.

3.5. (b) Multilateralism and China's Non-Traditional Security

Before proceeding to study China's approach towards non-traditional security
and multilateralism, one must bear in mind that concept of non-traditional security
itself is of recent vintage. The emergence of Non-Traditional Security has acquired
significant space within security studies. However, one can attempt to define non-
traditional security, unlike traditional security which is understood to be flown from
'hard security' issues and 'high politics' and generally concerned with the threat from
external armed conflicts, as not originating from conventional sources, but
unconventional which are generally not state entity.
According to Li Dongyan, in Chinese view, there are three approaches to non-traditional security concerns, namely realist, dual-security and human security. Of these three, realist and dual-security approaches come to be part of Technical School, while human security is part of Systemic School of non-traditional security. The Systemic School does system level analysis and questions the relationship between state and society and emphasizes that non-traditional security issues come from larger social and political issues and suggest that to reform this relation is the key to solve the issues of non-traditional security issues. Thus, this school comes very close to human security and outlines that human security issues should be addressed at a governmental level. Whereas Technical school takes a relativist approach and rejects singularity of ideology, values, and social politics. Technical school is called 'technical' because it does not deal with fundamentals of society, nation and state, but confines itself within the domain of problems that are physical and immediate to government and it seeks solution from governmental conventional and commonsensical means. He informs that mainstream Chinese IR circle and official position mainly endorse technical school. It does not accept human security based on primacy of security of individual the way US and West Europe accept. China views separate existence of non-traditional issues like poverty, employment security, gender security, food security, unsafe food, water shortages, social justice, and weak group security, AIDS, drug abuse, SARS, natural disasters and global warming that cut across countries. Human security also contains these issues. But, in contrast to Western world, strong individualist political and philosophical meanings and motives are not attached with these issues in China. These issues are considered basically part of overall national security and proposition that individual security as an end in itself is not accepted. On the contrary, Chinese conception of non-traditional security submits individual interests to national interest and upholds "a traditional belief that the security of the nation-state is always consistent with human security and individual security". Li Dongyan explains that the fundamental difference between Western conception and Chinese conception of non-traditional security is because of lack of supra-national culture in Asia (ieas.berkeley 2007.03.08).

Wang Yong (2005) has considered three events in post-Cold War period as watershed events that forced the world to think beyond traditional mode of security. These events were Asian Financial Crisis, 9/11 attack and sudden spread of SARS
epidemic. All the three incidents highlighted diminished role of national boundaries in their own way. He sees opportunity in the new found importance of non-traditional security issues as he thinks that these issues can provide new direction to consolidate East Asia community. He has also made an attempt to define and categorize non-traditional security issues. His categorization is as follow:

- Security issues related to sustainable development, including environment protection, resource development, global ecology, and control and prevention of epidemics;
- Security threats to regional and international stability, caused by loss of control or disruption of order, including economic security, social security, human rights, and refugees;
- Transnational crimes, including human trafficking and drug trafficking;
- Non-state organisations challenging the international order, best represented by international terrorism;
- Security problems caused by development of technology and globalisation, including network security, information security and genetic engineering security.

He further argues that community sense can be knit on these issues in East Asia. He elaborates this in the following manner.

Wang Yong contemplates that because of the Asian financial crisis, the September 11 terror attacks and the SARS epidemic, China has paid greater attention to non-traditional security. It finally carries forward a new national security strategy, emphasizing the equal importance of non-traditional security issues and traditional military security issues.

This shift of emphasis is clearly reflected in China’s National Defence *White Paper* of 2002 and 2004*. This shift is seen as: First of all, in its White Paper China considers non-traditional security threats taking centre-stage without rejecting threats of traditional security. Second, China recognizes that in order to deal with nontraditional security threats, international efforts are definitely required (Wang Yong 2005). Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and China’s gradual and active engagement in the cause of East Asia community building are example of this process. Third, "China has made efforts in creating and promoting the "New Security Concept" since the end of the Cold War. This New Security Concept comprises the principles of "mutual benefit, mutual trust, equality and cooperation". In May 2002, China submitted Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of Nontraditional Security Issues at ASEAN’s regional senior official meeting. In July
2002, China submitted the Official Document Regarding New Security Concept at the ARF ministerial meeting. Then China and ASEAN also released a joint statement regarding cooperation in the field of non-traditional Security. To some extent, substantial attention given to non-traditional security can be perceived as a logical development of China (Wang Yong 2005).

In January 2004, a meeting was initiated by China on striking against transnational crimes. The purpose of this meeting was to enforce the China-ASEAN agreement on non-traditional security. In this meeting, the representative from the Chinese Ministry of Public Security proposed four principles regarding the cooperation in the field of non-traditional security which included equal consultation, mutual respect, gradual progress, and flexible and pragmatic approach. Besides, China further put forward some concrete suggestion, such as building and improving the regional cooperative mechanism of combating transnational crimes, specifying focused fields and leading countries, opening hotlines among heads of related government agency, making action plan of collective strike, and dispatching police liaison officials to each other. Moreover, China and ASEAN signed the MOU on cooperation in non-traditional security affairs. They decided to focus on anti-terrorism, drug and international economic crimes. They decides also to strengthen the cooperation in terms of information exchange, personnel training and exchange, law enforcement, and joint research"(Wang Yong 2005).

China has taken the linkage between domestic and international factors and traditional and non-traditional factors very seriously, making its foreign policy 'a more challenging task' (Chen 2007).

Following is China's official position on non-traditional security,

"Non-traditional security threats present greater danger, and local turmoil caused by war is on and off, and some hotspots cannot be removed in a short time. The impact of economic globalisation is spreading into the political, security and social fields. Global economic development is uneven, and the gap between the North and the South is widening. Security issues related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping routes are mounting. International terrorist forces remain active, shocking terrorist acts keep occurring. Natural disasters, serious communicable diseases, environmental degradation, international crime and other transnational problems are becoming more damaging in nature." In addressing these non-traditional security concerns China favours international and multilateral cooperation, "More dialogues are being conducted on traditional security issues, and cooperation in non-traditional
security fields is developing in depth. To address development and security issues through coordination, cooperation and multilateral mechanism is the preferred approach of the international community. The United Nations' status and role in world affairs are being upheld and strengthened. World wars or all-out confrontation between major countries are avoidable for the foreseeable future" (bjreview 2007-01/17).

3.5. (b). (i) Economic and Financial Security

Wang Yong has identified two sources of economic and financial security: business cycles of the global economy caused by volatility of big economies and unexpected impact of the flow of speculative capital to local economy. In his view a region wide monetary cooperation or coordination could have avoided the 1997 crisis. He informs that following the 1997-1998 crisis, so many initiatives were taken like the currency swap agreement, called the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000 and the launching of the Asian bond market. However, he thinks that pace of monetary cooperation is not satisfactory. He makes some suggestions in this regard. He proposes that East Asia should think holistically integrating the concept of economic and financial security into regional security planning, while pursuing the goal of East Asia economic community. He opines that East Asian governments should enlarge the size of currency swap and establish the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). The purpose of this proposed enlargement was to stabilize currencies. It is proper to found an East Asia monetary institute to prepare the program. He considers European Monetary System as a model and suggests that East Asia could take the experience of European Monetary System into their account. He is of the view that currencies need to be pegged to each other to reduce volatility and inflation. Lastly, he proposes that East Asia should think seriously about creation of a single currency for the region, or Asia dollar (Wang Yong 2005).

3.5. (b). (ii) International Terrorism

International terrorism has more or less hit almost every country of the Central and Southeast Asian region including China. Like anywhere in the world, this problem is more highlighted in post-9/11 scenario. It has come in the agenda of every major official meeting. However, nature of terrorist problems is such that it is always difficult for states to arrive at a consensus on any given terrorist problem. States
3.5. (b). (IV) Pirate and Transportation Security

Incidents of the cases of pirate attacks in Southeast Asia have increased in recent years. Malacca is one of the busiest strait in the world lanes. After the English Strait, it is the second busiest strait. It is strategically located on vital trade route that links Europe, Asia, Oceania and Africa. According to reports, pirates cause loss of ten of billions of dollars a year to international trade. They have become a serious threat to international trade (Wang Yong 2005).

This situation demands joint efforts from all East Asian countries to safeguard Malacca and other strategic places. On behalf of participating states, ARF issued a statement on 17 June 2003, on cooperation against piracy and other threats. This statement recognized the gravity of the problem of piracy and accepted security of sea transportation as a serious issue, which requires collective efforts (aseansec.org). In the recent past, maritime security has attracted wide international attention. International Maritime Organisation (IMO), a specialized agency of the UN, looks after the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. In January 2006, Ministerial Conference on International Transport Security was organized in Tokyo. In this meeting, transport ministers and officials from 14 countries participated. They endorsed measures adopted by IMO in order to strengthen maritime security. This conference sought greater compliance with the relevant conventions and protocols. China also attended this conference. In fact, with ASEAN, China has a proper mechanism of ASEAN-China Transport Ministers Meetings, dedicated to the purpose of transport security (aseansec.org). Pirates infested Gulf of Aden is a serious headache for China also. In December, 2008, Chinese vice-foreign minister He Yafei informed the UNSC that the Chinese government was seriously thinking to send its navy to the Gulf of Aden (China View 2008-12-17)

3.5. (b). (V) Public Health Crisis

The 2003 SARS epidemic and the 2004 bird flu have highlighted how borders are meaningless when any epidemic strikes. It had a negative impact on economic development and human security in China and the ASEAN countries. Besides SARS and bird flu, AIDS has emerged as a serious human security concern in East Asia. According to the survey of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS) and WHO, "the total number of HIV affected people has reached several millions. China is facing a grave situation with rapidly increasing number of the affected. Because of population density, East Asia is likely to replace Africa as the central place of AIDS epidemic" (Wang Yong 2005).

An institutionalized multilateral framework is needed to meet with the danger of any epidemic, because such epidemic has potential of turning into a human disaster and tragedy destabilizing the whole region.

Senior World Bank health advisor Richard Feachem, informed that epicenter of AIDS was shifting from Africa to Asia. The gravity of this shift can be understood by the fact that this shifting was taking place when global presence of affected people was already between 13 million and 15 million adults in 1994 (Beijing Review, 1995, 38 (52): 6). In 1995, 50,000 to 100,000 people, in China, were estimated to be HIV-positive by experts (BR, 1995, 38(50): 6). Xinjiang autonomous region has been reported as containing fourth largest population of HIV-infected population in mainland China. In fact, drug-addiction and HIV infection are twin entwined problems in Xinjiang as common use of needles in consuming drugs spreading HIV infection.

3.5. (b). (VI) Drug Trafficking

Regional efforts to check drug trafficking is highly required as Golden Triangle of drug trafficking is located in the south of China. The drug produced in the region is about the half of the total world production (Wang Yong 2005). Drug trafficking is such a well organized transnational crime, production, distribution and trafficking of which cannot be curbed without a multilateral cooperation framework.

Almost 6, 80,000 drug addicts were registered in China in 1999. This was 14.3% more than in 1998 figure. According to official statistics 27,000 people were new drug users. Of this, 80% of the registered addicts were male and 78% were between the ages of 17 and 35. More than 4, 90,000 or the 72% of the total had consumed heroine. Vice minister of public security Bai Jingtu, informed that narcotics control offices handled 64,000 cases of drug trafficking and producing in 1999, 2.4% higher than 1998, among which 60 cases involved over 10,000 grains of heroine. Some 57,000 criminal suspects or 7.9% more than 1998 were arrested. Total 5.3 tonnes of heroine and 16 tonnes of 'ice' were seized and 33,000 criminals were
Bai informed that 214 cases of drug related smuggling were cracked, over 300 suspects arrested and 272 tonnes of chemicals for producing drugs were seized. The vice-minister also informed that 2, 20,000 drug users were admitted in state built rehabilitation facilities. According to him 2081 counties of China have come under the spread of drugs 48 more than in 1998. 72% people who were infected with HIV viruses due to these drugs as reported by 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (SWB FE/ 3780 G/7, 4 March 00). Xinjiang is major recipient of drug supply flooding from 'golden crescent' of drug producers, formed by mountainous valleys of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The "Golden Triangle" at Myanmar border still remains a major source of drug supply (China View, 2007-09-01).

The number of drug users documented officially by Chinese public security departments increased from 70,000 in 1990 to 1.14 million by 2004 while the estimated number is 3.5 million. According to a report of the National Narcotic Control Commission (NNCC), 87.6% of drug users abused heroin in 2002. The abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) and methylenedioxy methamphetamine or ecstasy (MDMA) has become popular in the night clubs in recent years. In the 1980s, consumption of illegal narcotic substance was more prevalent among farmers, especially living in rural bordering areas in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, whereas since the early 1990s, it has shifted to urban areas. The majority of drug users are youth with a low education level and limited job skills; although for some urban people using drugs is an indicator of "high social class". NNCC data showed that 74% drug users were aged between 17–35 years in 2002. According to National behavioral surveillance data, the median prevalence of injection drug use (IDU) among drug users reached 35% in April 1995 from 49% in April 2004, and median prevalence of needle sharing among IDUs also went up from 26% to 43% during this period. (Han-Zhu Qian, Joseph E Schumacher, Huey T Chen, and Yu-Hua Ruan 2006).

The report of the US Department of Justice, authored by Ko-lin China and Sheldon X, Zhang, cited official Chinese statistics that in 1991, there were 148,000 officially registered drug addicts in China. After a decade, their number was more than 900,000. According to it, heroin was the main drug used by addicts. Its regular-use rate was from 83.7 percent to 87.5 percent, depending on the study. It quoted a senior official in the Ministry of Public Security as reporting that in 2005, 1.1 million officially registered drug users were there in China. He informed that the proportion
of heroin users was shrinking while the ATS users were increasing. The report claims, with the reference to Chinese drug enforcement officials that the number of ATS drug users increases about two percent of the total registered users each year (Ko-lin Chin and Sheldon X. Zhang 2007: 9-20).

As far as China entering international multilateral cooperation against drugs is concerned, China has been very positive and the overall state of this cooperation is highly encouraging. In June 1985, China became a signatory of the UN 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances which was revised by the 1972 Protocol. In fact, this was considered beginning of China's cooperation on Drugs with the UN. In September 1989, China became a signatory of the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Since 1984, China has been participating in international drug control meetings held by the United Nations, the International Criminal Police Organisation, the World Customs Organisations and the World Health Organisation. In October 1989, China also held the Asian Region Anti-Drug Seminar in Beijing and again in November 1996, hosted the International Stimulant Specialists meeting in Shanghai. The Chinese delegations took part in the 17th and 20th UNs special General Assembly sessions on drug control in February 1990 and June 1998 in which China declared its determined anti-drug: stand, policies and measures to the international community. China actively supports and promotes cooperation in drug control in the regions and sub-region, as initiated by the UN. In May 1991, China hosted the first meeting of senior officials of China, Thailand, Myanmar and the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) in Beijing in which it discussed the proposal on multilateral cooperation against drug abuse in the Sub-region. In June 1992, China, Myanmar and the UNCDP signed the China/Myanmar/UNDCP Joint Cooperation Project on Drug Control in Rangoon, Myanmar. In October 1993, China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and the UNDCP signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Drugs Control, which stressed need of keeping contacts between high officials to further the cooperation in drug control in the sub-region. In May 1995, China, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia and the UNDCP convened the first minister-level meeting on cooperation in sub-region drug control in Beijing which adopted the Beijing Declaration and in this meeting the Sub-region Drug Control Program of Action was signed. In 1999, the Chinese delegations participated
in the sub-region minister-level meetings in Japan and Laos. The purpose of this meeting was to promote cooperation in drug control in the sub-region. (Li Rongxia 1995)

Apart from this, China has strengthened bilateral cooperation on curbing narcotics with the US, Russia and neighbouring countries. In 1987 China and the US signed the Sino-US memorandum of Cooperation in Narcotic Drugs Control. In 1997, the head of the two states signed the Sino-US Joint statement on cooperation in drug control. Following this, the government of China and the United states mutually accredited anti-drug liaison officers. In April 1996, China and Russia signed the agreement on cooperation against drug trafficking and narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. In 1998, the heads of state of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Russia and Tajikistan signed a joint statement which aims at cracking down narcotic crimes and marks this cooperation as a major field of cooperation among the five countries. Apart from this, China has signed bilateral cooperation agreements and treaties relating to drug control with Mexico, India, Pakistan, Colombia and Tajikistan. China has developed cooperation at many levels with United States, Canada, Japan, France, Australia, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Colombia like anti-drug information exchange, training and law-enforcement. Since 1996, China has successively entered a liaison officer system of anti-drug law enforcement cooperation with Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Russia in border areas. Apart from political executive level, the police authorities of China have cooperated with the United States, Canada, Japan and the Republic of Korea by jointly cracking cases of narco-trafficking through international anti-drug information exchange and facilitating judicial cooperation.

China has focused on anti-drug cooperation with bordering countries. Beginning in 1990, China has helped the northern parts of Myanmar and Laos, where poppies were traditionally planted by promoting alternative lucrative development avenues and providing technological and agricultural support and developing tourism resources. These efforts to some degree have been fruitful in promoting the economic and social development in that region and helped to reduce the threat level coming from the "Golden triangle" to China and international community. At the same time, China-UNDCP cooperation has been mutually appreciated (Xinhuanet 2002-11/18).
3.5. (b). (VII) Problem of Spread of Small Arms

Small arms caused the death of three million people during the 1990s across the world. About 80 percent of total deaths were of women and children. Gu Zhenqiu quotes former UN Secretary-General as saying, "When you look at the history of the last 20 years or so, most of the deaths in the world, apart from the AIDS epidemic, are caused by small arms". According to the United Nations, small arms are defined as weapons which can be used, carried and maintained by one person. These include weapons such as pistols, assault rifles and sub-machine guns, light weapons, operated by crew, include grenade launchers, shoulder-fired anti-tank guns and portable missile launchers. Gu Zhenqiu informs that, according to an estimate, "more than 500 million small arms and light weapons are in circulation around the world, one for about every 12 people." He further informs that "they were the weapons of choice in 46 of 49 major conflicts since 1990s, causing four million deaths- about 90 percent of them civilian and 80 percent, women and children. Two million firearms are circulating in Central America, seven million in West Africa and ten million in Afghanistan" (Gu Zhenqiu 2001). Since the mid-1990s when the United Nations became increasingly involved in post-conflict settlements and peacekeeping forces found a high circulation of small arms among combatants, ex-combatants and civilians. The UN has destroyed small arms on so many occasions and suggested control over manufacturing and brokering (Gu Zhenqiu 2001). The UN general Assembly adopted a resolution urging all countries to understand seriousness of the problem of small arms and organized a conference in 2001 on the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons. The Special Committee of the UN Convention on Suppressing transnational and Organized Crimes began negotiating a firearms protocol in 1999 that aims to strengthen the means to curb the illegal production and trafficking of firearms (Sha Zukang 2001).

China is vulnerable to the spread of small arms because it is contiguous to the Central Asian states, one of the biggest hubs of small arms. China considers proliferation of small arms as a very serious issue. Chinese representative Wang Guangya expressed concern that the illicit trade and accumulation of small arms remains uncurbed, despite 2001 Programme of Action of the UN. He pointed out that there is a need to harmonize domestic laws to meet this end. Besides, he insisted international cooperation needs to be intensified and there should be a greater degree of coordination and cooperation among law enforcement agencies like police and
customs. At the same time, he reminded of the fact that poverty and social instability are the major causes behind the spread of small arms. Therefore, eradication of poverty also figures in the strategies that aim at curbing illegal trade and accumulation of small arms. He stated that China was committed to put a check on the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons. He was speaking on the occasion of Two-Week Session on Aims to Assess Progress against Illegal Small Arms Trade since Adoption of 2001 Action Programme (un.org 2006). China is a party to Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects adopted in the United Nations Conference in 2001.

3.5. (b). (VIII) Crime against Women

Crimes against women has increased because complex socio-economic reasons. Among these, crime of abduction of women with a regional dimension as trafficking of women from Central Asian states has become a matter of grave concern. In China, so far, crime of abduction of women has been reported mainly within domestic realm. This crime was first recorded in 1970s. But at the beginning of 1990s, in Sichuan, an average of 10,000 women and children were annually abducted and sold (SWB FE/0969 B2/8 14 Jan 91). Shanxi police launched a one day special 'massive, coordinated and province wide' operation to crack down on organized gangs involved in abducting women and young girls. These abductions were being conducted in other provinces and these women were to be sold "as "Wives" to local peasants in mountainous areas of Shanxi provision for a sum ranging from 2000 to 5000 Yuan" (SWB FE/2217G/11, 2 Feb 95).

Same crimes have been seen taking place in the Central Asia. There cases of women trafficking by exploiting their poverty have been reported. In Chinese border areas adjoining Central Asia also, this crime has a potential to further aggravate. The elements, involved in this crime, have transnational networks. Therefore, a transnational level surveillance and cooperation is required to burst such networks.

3.5. (b). (IX) Natural Disaster Relief and Environmental Protection

Like epidemics, natural disasters go beyond borders. "The Tsunami disaster of 2004 in Indian Ocean caused the death toll of almost 300,000 people, and several millions of people lost their homes. The economic cost was as high as tens of billions US dollars...Environmental protection is another field, which requires regional efforts
to deal with...The current concerns include sandstorms, water power development and its impact on downstream area, coal burning effects, ocean pollution and of course, the implementation of climate change agreement commitments" (Wang Yong 2005). Vice-Minister of China's State Planning Commission and head of the Chinese delegation at the First Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on climate Change Chen Yaobang stated, "China has called on developed countries to provide new and additional financial resources and transfer of eco-friendly sound technology to developing countries. And developed countries should act on their commitment in accordance with the provisions of the convention" (Xi Mi 1995: 23)

China has shown its concern towards environmental degradation. It organized an international conference on environment in Beijing in 1991. Beijing Declaration on Environment and Development, an outcome of that conference, was concerned about how to coordinate environmental protection with economic development and promote international co-operation (Beijing Review, 1991, 34 (27): 10-13). China shares its position with developing countries. In China's view the economic development of developing countries cannot be ignored and both developmental and environmental demands need to be accommodated simultaneously. In this adjustment, greater responsibilities lie on developed countries. Environment protection should not become a pretext to breach states' sovereignty. As has been seen, the developed countries tend to mix trade and environment related issues to their advantage. In fact, environmental protection and economic development cannot be attained without world peace and stability. While handling this issue consideration should be given to both immediate and long term interests i.e. development and environment (Li Peng 1992). Dr. Song Jian (1992), State Councillor and Minister in charge of the State Science and Technology Commission, expressed this views at "A New Global Partnership" called for by the Rio Conference. He insisted that the "New Global Partnership" should accommodate both environment and development and should not intrude in nations' sovereignty. The "New Global Partnership" must be fair and just and developed countries should help developing countries. Finally, a universal participation should be ensured in the "New Global Partnership", otherwise, this whole exercise will bear no fruit.
China set up a coordination committee comprising well-known Chinese and foreign experts who offer advice in these two areas of development and environment (Li Peng 1992). South and North Korea, China and Mongolia participated in the first regional UN environmental projects on air pollution control and renewable energy technology (SWB FE/1283 A3/3 21 Jan 92). China set up the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment. Persons of ministerial and vice-ministerial ranks from the key ministries and agencies concerned with environment and economic development and environment scientists were to be members of this council (SWB FE/1288 A1/4 27 Jan 92).

3.5. (b). (X) Food Security

China's food policy is to achieve sufficiency in food. Agriculture is central to this policy. In this regard, China has contemplated this issue together with international community. Since the 1974 World Food Conference, international community has been engaging this issue. China declared that it wanted to safeguard world food security by:

- Striving to maintain world peace and stability so as to provide a reliable guarantee for world food security;
- Taking vigorous agricultural development as the fundamental way toward solving domestic food problems;
- Providing financial and technical assistance to food production in developing countries as the developed countries have an unthinkable responsibility;
- Enhancing international cooperation in the field of food and agriculture with a view to achieving mutual benefit, mutual complementarity and common development;
- Protecting resources and environment in the interest of sustainable development of food and agriculture (Li Peng 1996).

Thus, China understands that food crisis of present times also needs multilateral efforts as neither its origin nor its impact is confined to a country alone. The worldwide unprecedented hike in commodity prices in the first half of 2008 has further underscored the need for multilateral efforts to address the issue of food security.

3.5. (b). (XI) Poverty Reduction and Development

According to Wang Yong (2005), poverty reduction and development is a fundamental question to this region. He traces almost all non-traditional security
issues to poverty. Since, the countries in the region have rich experience as to how to reduce poverty and create economic and social development, they can share these among themselves. Lin Zhengan (1995) evaluated UN and the World Bank positively in the fight against poverty. China's total integration with world economy is development driven.

3.6 Summary

Multilateralism emerges as a clearly recognizable feature in China's own idea of world order. In fact, China's quest for multipolarity can be negotiated for multilateralism which may be taken as the basis of the new world order that China wants to establish. China's understanding of multilateralism is deeply embedded with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. The big idea that China offers to the international community in the post Cold-war era is of multilateralism based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which increases its acceptability manifold. The UN is a central feature of its understanding about multilateralism. The Five principles of Peaceful Co-existence and multilateralism are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Multilateralism based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence can play a crucial role in the event of any systemic change as multilateralism based on Wilsonian liberalism played in the post-First World War era.

The success that China has gained through its multilateral engagement is that it has wooed the Southeast Asian countries and convinced them that China is not a threat, but an opportunity, that it has reduced the possibility of the US meddling in its bilateral disputes, that it has integrated its backward frontier regions with the course of development, that it has mobilized opinion against the remilitarization of Japan and engaged the US innovatively as it knows that the countries from its neighbouring regions are not going to give it a free hand in the regional affairs and they want the US to stay in the regions, that it has quarantined the Taiwan and that it has visualized and conveyed about indivisible nature of non-traditional security issues.

China is increasingly reducing strategic gap between it and the US, partially because of its geographical and cultural proximity with Southeast Asia, and mainly because of higher level of comfort in the relations between both the sides. China negotiates the countries of the region on the level of ASEAN, whereas the US,
primarily, insists on bilateral relations. With China, they do not have to enter into strict bilateral commitments or strict multilateral framework either (Wesley 2005). Mainly because of this higher level of comfort, even countries like Thailand, recently designated a 'non-NATO ally' of the United States, Singapore that is highly alarmist about China provides a logistics hub for the US armed forces and the Philippines, a US treaty ally have come closer to China and are exploring economic ventures with it (Percival 2005: 2).

As far as Central Asia is concerned, China has positioned itself as a key player there. In the energy market of Central Asia, China has emerged as a key stakeholder. Central Asian security calculus invariably includes China. Here also, China successfully down plays apprehensions about its rise. China's participation in SCO plays an instrumental role to this end.

China's international identification towards becoming a confident player in the field of multilateralism has traverssed a long way. Ever-increasing space of multilateralism in its foreign policy and gradual acknowledgement of traditional and non-traditional security issues in the ambit of multilateralism throw light upon evolution of its international identification thereby its international socialization apart from its growing power and confidence in handling with other major powers. However, China still remains essentially a staunch upholder of Westphalian model of sovereignty and state system in which sovereign states are absolutely equal and sovereignty is paramount.

In the next two chapters, China's approach and commitment towards multilateralism will be examined in its two neighboring regions, namely Central Asia and Southeast Asia by examining its participation in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and ASEAN Regional Forum as case studies.