CHAPTER III

DOMESTIC FACTORS IN UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY
Chapter III
DOMESTIC FACTORS IN UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY

The socio-political transformation of a state generally depends upon the modernization of the public mindset, the value system, socio-political concepts etc. and the role played by the public. Democracy and democratic institutions also develop successfully only with mass support and become stable when mass social strata master appropriate political values (Lapkin & Pantin 2006: 4). So also, in the shaping of foreign policy, determining national interests, and for proposing a country’s current and future foreign policy orientations, the public mind set and their opinion plays a vital role. Though it is generally held that the public mood usually follows rather than guides the foreign policy making process, it can exercise lot of influence on the determination of foreign policy if basic realignment in the prevailing power structure takes place and the state becomes more involved or more isolated from the world affairs (Chandra & Arora 2005:177) This has been the case of Ukraine.

When it is being caught between the West and Russia, the people of Ukraine played a vital role on the matter of Ukraine’s alignment and the determination of its foreign policy. Ukrainian public discussed on the relations of Ukraine with the West in general and NATO in particular, along with the question of its European integration. They were also for the most part, devoted to the general issue of Ukraine’s overall foreign policy. Discussions centered on Ukraine’s relations with Russia, maintenance of equidistance from both Russia and the West and the adoption of the policy of neutrality for Ukraine knowing the transitional nature of the state. The discussion in the media and among political experts indicated a definite attempt to revaluate stereotypes and an awareness of Ukraine’s place in contemporary political and economic values of European civilization. A sheer volume of official comments, analytical articles and broadcasts, representing alternative views both in the printed and electronic media also increased significantly carrying these discussions.
But a comparative analysis of Ukrainian views on foreign policy revealed a substantial gap between the official position and course of the presidential administration and government on the one hand and the spectrum of sympathies of the various political parties and movements on the other. A notable gap was also observed between the views on foreign policy of the Ukrainian political elite and those of rank and file citizens (Tolstov & Potekhin 1997: 3). The foreign policy thinking of Ukraine was best known through the numerous official statements and comments of the President and the highest staff representative of the National Security and Defense Council, the presidential administration, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But the various other concepts put forward by non-governmental and opposition groups remained in the shadow. As a result with many aspects of foreign policy Ukraine has given out confusing signals as to how it sees its role in the world politics (Wilson 1997: 173). So also it become complicated by uncertainty over how far the country in terms of foreign and security policy could/should facilitate cooperation with the West in the changing security environment of Europe and form a bridge between Russia and the West or project a form of positive neutrality for itself (Allison 1998: 219) in an unfavorable transitional domestic environment.

However, several of the most difficult and controversial issues in relations to neighbouring states, which had poisoned the perception of foreign policy held by a majority of the population, have been solved successfully during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma but this has not improved the expectations of the public regarding the security and stability of the state. Rank-and file citizens in general share a feeling that the developments and changes in foreign policy have brought Ukraine both neither substantial nor rapidly perceptible benefits of economic and security nature.

In spite of this internal discord, Ukraine has firmly established itself as an actor in the international politics and is being recognized by the international community. Therefore, influences on its foreign policy making are a valid and timely research topic both for insights into the domestic transformations of the state as well as for examining Ukraine’s foreign policy orientations. Thus, here in this chapter an attempt has been
made to analyze the internal factors that are influencing Ukrainian foreign policy. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the public opinion and views on Ukraine’s overall foreign policy and the elite’s opinion on foreign policy in the context of NATO enlargement. The second part analyzes the Domestic factors like the political institutional factors, the economic factors and the military factors. This part also discusses about the informal ones i.e. the interest groups, competing elites and the nationalists. The third part analyzes some other factors.

1. Public and Elite’s Opinion on Foreign Policy

Democracy and its institutions are vibrant only when they are based on the consent of the people. Public opinion shapes and reshapes the democratic institutions, the value systems and policies of the government as a whole. More specifically in relation to foreign policy, the increase in the standard of living and expansion of education make the public opinion a significant factor in foreign policy. The state never dares to pursue the interests contrary to the public opinion. Public opinion shapes the foreign policy provided it is clear and well shaped. On the other, elites who are the upholder of ideas, views and opinions of the mass mind and above all representatives of the people (whether governing or non governing), pursue only those interests which are not opposed to public opinion. Though public opinion could be significant factor only in developed states like America or Britain it is not less important in developing countries like Ukraine. Ukrainian public and elites are playing significant role since its independence in the matter of moulding its foreign policy in spite of the heterogeneous character of its social system. Their influence on foreign policy is now being discussed below.

1.1. Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

On first December 1991, the people of Ukraine by a free expression of their will endorsed the Act proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine, adopted by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 24 August 1991. More than 90% of the voters participating in the Referendum expressed their support for an independent Ukraine, which was testified to by observers from Parliaments of many countries of the world (Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Statement, 1991: 79). When the issue of prioritizing the national interest of
Ukraine was raised in 1993, the National Institute for Strategic Studies conducted a research under the Presidentship of Leonid Kravchuk. This research was based on opinion polls of various social groups within the population and the ruling elite. Out of a total of thirty-seven indicated priorities, the six highest were interests connected with reforms and stabilization of the social and economic life of the Ukrainian state. Creation of an effective system of power ranked eighth among the national interest’s priorities. So also people had placed active foreign policy to seventeenth position. Entry into the system of European and international security structures got twenty-fourth position and creation of a regional system of collective security was placed in the thirty-fourth position (Report of the National Institute for Strategic Studies 1993: 3-15). As it is evident from the above report, issues of foreign policy and international aspects of national security are at the peripheral areas of public awareness in Ukraine, it was considered that in the public perception the term “foreign policy” is commonly understood to mean the “for alien states” and not the republic of the former USSR and it was concluded that large part of the population does not relate the solutions of Ukraine’s most acute problems (i.e. the economic and social) to the activation of the state’s foreign policy (Kulinich 1995: 116).

During 1994-97, the attitude of the population of Ukraine on foreign policy has been continuously monitored by public opinion polls. But an extremely detailed database was presented in several reports of the 1996-97 polls conducted by SOCIS-Gallup Ukraine International, a marketing and sociological service based in Kiev. Each survey included standard interviews within a minimum 1,200 respondents, selected by social and demographic criteria (age, sex, education, place of residence, etc.) to be representative of the adult population of Ukraine. The survey covered all regions of the country, and the interviews were conducted in respondents’ homes. The result of the polls indicated that the citizen’s level of interest in politics was no higher than in the Soviet period. In May 1996, 31 percent of the respondents declared that they had no interest in politics, 60 percent reported a partial interest, and only one tenth expressed a ‘considerable’ interest. The prevailing ‘moderate’ level of interest in political processes is, to a considerable extent, due to the predominance of ‘first rank’ problems with which, the population of
Ukraine has been concerned over the years. These include the standard of living, personal security and health. The results of the 1996 poll also indicated that the Ukrainian population had only an insignificant level of confidence in the supreme institutions of state power and the politicians, who to a considerable extent determine the foreign policy of the state.

The public opinion polls, however, showed that the population of Ukraine tended to consider the President, the government and the parliament as responsible for the crisis in the country, first and foremost, because they have failed to carry out a substantial reform of the economy. At the same time, at the end of 1996, one third of the respondents considered that the real power in Ukraine was in the hands of the Mafia, while 23 per cent mentioned the corrupt state bureaucracy. Regarding the role of the ‘West’, only 2 per cent of respondents considered that ‘interference by the International Monetary Fund and other foreign organizations played a role in domestic misfortunes (SOCIS-Gallup Report 1997: 9). The result of the 1996 polls however indicated two main types of views of the citizens of Ukraine on Foreign policy, which are discussed below.

1.1(a) Pro-East

In 1996, Ukraine’s ties with the US, which were dominant in citizens’ awareness, were reflected in the general domestic situation of the country, though there was a significant divergence between regions. In particular, the inhabitants of the East and Crimea were the main supporters of integration within the CIS. A more balanced and moderate attitude was presented by respondents from the northern and southern regions, while the least support for this view was recorded in the central and Western regions and in Kiev. Conversely, the idea of reliance predominantly on Ukraine’s own resources was specific to the public opinion of the Western regions of the country, and received only minimum support in the East and in Crimea. In the 1996 opinion poll, approximately half of the respondents supported development of relations between Ukraine and the CIS as a top priority, but only 23.7 per cent did so in 1997. It should be noted that in 1996 a significant proportion of the supporters of a pro-CIS policy also supported extremely close links between Ukraine and Russia. In the 1997 poll (carried out in May and June),
24.3 per cent of the respondents favoured the idea that Ukraine should form an East Slavic bloc with Russia and Belarus (ibid: 11-15).

However, the 1996-97 public opinion studies showed one of the main expectations of Ukraine’s membership of the CIS, i.e. intensive economic cooperation. In particular, in spring 1996, more than one-third of the respondents supported Ukraine’s full and equal membership of the Economic Union of the CIS, and one tenth spoke in favour of an associate membership of the CIS, while one-fifth deemed it advisable for Ukraine to be ‘a member of the CIS on the basis of bilateral agreements’. The January 1997 poll showed that 52.5 per cent of respondents supported the development of relations with Russia and the CIS member-states as a priority (Tolstov & Potekhin 1997: 7). However, according to the public opinion poll conducted in June 1997 by SOCIS-Gallup, 58 per cent supported the view that Ukraine’s signing of the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Russia was equally in the interest of both countries. Fourteen per cent thought that it focused mainly on the interests of Russia, while 9 per cent took the opposite view. One fifth of respondents failed to define their attitude on this issue. There was also a certain regional divergence in attitude towards the treaty. Thus, the main proportions of those who regarded the treaty as an agreement between equal partners was found to be in the east (74 per cent). In the West, more than a quarter of respondents perceived the “Treaty” as being more beneficial to Ukraine, while more than one-third (35 per cent) thought that the national interests of both the countries were equally served. It is noteworthy that almost half of those polled in the northwestern region (45 per cent) did not reveal their attitude to the treaty.

Moreover, the public opinion of Ukraine showed a leniency of the public mind to some extent towards Russia, as they want to get out of the socio-economic hardships. Thus, determinants like job, social professional group or ethnicity of the respondents had no major influence on attitudes toward Russia, and as a whole, Ukrainians’ attitude towards development of Ukraine-Russian relations was generally remain positive.
1.1 (b) Pro-West

Since independence, Ukraine has been trying to identify itself with the West European institutional structure. Its elite have also made decisions in favour of integration into European and Trans-Atlantic structures. Ukraine's European integration process, however, intensified during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma and particularly in 1995-97, the Ukrainian government tried to establish closer contacts with the European Union and other European political and security institutions.

In 1995, the country joined the Council of Europe. As a result, the level of public support for the development of expanding links with the European Union and other intergovernmental organizations got particular importance. The general attitude of Ukrainians to the official aims and activities of the European Union were positive. However, the fact that a fairly significant portion of respondents (about 50 per cent) had no clear idea of the structure, activities or indeed the real nature of the EU, proved an obstacle to the formation of a positive image of it (ibid.: 8-9). So also opinion polls tended to provide a confusing picture of Ukrainian public attitude towards NATO membership and the enlargement process. When asked if enlargement was good or bad for Ukraine approximately the same number agreed with both propositions (25 and 22 per cent respectively. But, a staggering 53 per cent held no opinion on the matter (Kuzio 1998: 9).

Ukraine's participation in the NATO partnership for peace programme and its relations with the North Atlantic Alliance were also researched. The problem of National Security, which grew more acute after the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, became a subject of keen discussion in relation to Russia's claim to both the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the town of Sevastopol. In such circumstances in December 1996, 12 per cent of the respondent expressed general confidence in NATO, while 19 per cent took the opposite point of view and about one-third reflected a neutral standpoint. But in January 1997, approximately one third of the respondents spoke in flavor of joining NATO. Half of them supported speeding up this process. Another half considered that such a step would require a certain time. One-fifth of those polled also opposed
Ukraine's joining NATO (Tolstov & Potekhin 1997: 9). However, a three years back opinion poll of 1994 gives a quite different picture of support base in Ukraine towards NATO. It gave a 51.5 per cent public opinion in favour of NATO. In this opinion poll, the difference between Ukrainians (54.7 per cent) and Russians (45.9 per cent) was not also very large. Not surprisingly, the highest numbers of supporters were in the 14-24 years age groups, which tended to be more supportive of the post-Soviet transformation process and the lowest in the 45-54 years age groups, which tends to more supportive of the radical left (Kuzio 1998: 10).

However, the majority of public opinion polls have tended to provide support for Ukraine's NATO membership within the range 30-50 per cent. Those steadfastly opposed to NATO membership or cooperation with it account for approximately 20 per cent of respondents with the highest figure in the predominantly ethnically Russian Crimea. But the inherited view of NATO as an 'aggressive' and 'hostile' bloc from the former USSR is declining among the Ukrainian population (ibid. 10).

From the above discussion it can be concluded that the Ukrainian public opinion on the matter of security and foreign policy is almost ambivalent, but a clear reflection of the socio-economic and political environment of the state. So it can be also viewed that there is not much difference of opinion of the public in relation to Russian and the West on the matter of foreign policy orientations. Moreover, Ukraine's inconsistency in its approach to foreign policy and progress adopting the formula of 'movement in all directions' during the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk and 'multi victor' foreign policy during the period of Leonid Kuchma is nothing else more than the reflection of the internal domestic environment.

1.2. Elite's Opinion on Foreign Policy
While popular opinion is not unimportant, the staggering opinion and the political apathy, which characterized the bulk of the population, means that the division in attitude on foreign policy and NATO expansion among the political elites is of far greater significance. The Ukrainian elite have not been passive since independence, and have
continuously sought to influence and limit the actions of the players who will ultimately
determine its geopolitical fate. Though, their actions and opinions are not unipolar but a
clear reflection of the social divisions on the ground of religion, ethnic, linguistic,
regional and even political basis. Thus the opinion of the elites of the political spectrum is
essentially characterized by different perceptions. These divergences however reflect the
fact that the legislative is effectively polarized on the foreign policy orientations of the
country and their perceptions towards NATO enlargement. The pole more favoured by
the executive is in support of Ukraine’s orientations toward the West and the other pole,
which was favoured by the Communists, has a leniency toward the East. The opinion of
these two polarized elite groups of Ukraine is discussed below.

Leaning towards the right of centre, the national democrats are essentially central
and Western based Ukrainophones, with no representation in the south and east (Wilson
1997: 147). Their European credentials are demonstrated by the fact that they are
decidedly pro-reform, willingly supporting any obligation of membership of European
institutions and are intent on participating in the wide European processes. They are
however, realistic enough to recognize the need for limited economic cooperation with
the CIS. As a result, they are less open in their anti-Russian public proclamations than the
far right, but they are more explicitly pro-West while expressing their foreign policy
sympathy. They also interpret Russian foreign policy and the creation of CIS as nothing
more than Russian imperialism reasserting itself, free of Marxist Leninist baggage.
Russia’s efforts to protect its Western region by keeping Ukraine as far away as possible
from NATO enlargement even worry the national democrats more. Although to some
extent marginalized in the power games in parliament, due to their relatively narrow
Ukrainophone and Western and central power base, the national democrats exert
considerable influence on the President through their ‘support role’ in parliament.

Following Kuchma’s election as President in 1994, and his plan for economic and
constitutional reform put him on a collision course with his main supporters in parliament
primarily of the eastern and southern Ukrainian pro-reform liberals and leftist hard-liners
both of groups had initially supported Kuchma due to his non-nationalist outlook and
announced their intention to get the economy back on course (Wolczuk 1997: 17). However once he began to address the issues of constitutional and economic reform he failed to find the favour of the leftists and backing of a national power base, he came to rely more and more on the centrist-right fraction, i.e. the national democrats, who were gradually won over the President on account of his national and international policies. With their support Kuchma not only rejected the issue of dual citizenship for Russians in Ukraine but also play down his original intention to raise the status of the Russian language in Ukraine to that of an official language, and he himself switched from using Russian language to Ukrainian (ibid.: 17). Similar phenomenon also occurred regarding Kuchma’s foreign policy outlook. His original pro-Russian outlook was soon replaced in the face of parliamentary opposition, by an explicitly pro-European and pro-NATO stance, which continued and built on much of the foundations laid by Krauchuk.

In relation to NATO and its enlargement the majority of these elites never see it as a direct military threat to Ukrainian Security (Hopman in Taras Kuzio 1998: 4). President Kuchma also felt that there was nothing bad in NATO, because it was evolving from a military into a Security Structure (Ibid.: 4). The majority of Ukrainian security specialists argue that the expansion of NATO is, in itself not destabilizing or a threat to Ukraine’s security (Shkliar in Taras Kuzio 1998: 4). On the contrary, it would increase stability within the perceived security vacuum of Central and Eastern Europe while further guaranteeing Ukraine’s Western boarders with Hungary and Poland. Majority of elite opinion in Ukraine towards NATO and the enlargement process was never negative. Only 2.4 percent openly termed NATO enlargement as contrary to Ukrainian national interests compared with a full of 50 per cent who believed that it conformed to its interests, as reflected in a poll conducted by the Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Studies, where respondents could give more than one answer. A total of 58 percent believed that it expanded the zone of cooperation and stability in Europe, 46.5 percent felt that it served to halt Russian expansionism and 34.9 percent hold that it lead to greater European structures. A majority of elite always supported NATO membership, at the current time or in the near future. Only a hard-core group of the extreme left and elements of the military industrial complex remained hostile to NATO membership. In a
winter 1996 poll, only 12.2 per cent argued in favour of Ukraine never joining NATO, while a striking 85.3 per cent agreed that it was in Ukraine’s interests now, or in the immediate future, to seek NATO membership (Polekin & Parokhonska 1997: 38).

Moreover, NATO membership or close cooperation between NATO and Ukraine is popular among Ukraine’s elites for various reasons. In their view, NATO came fourth after the USA, Poland and the three Baltic states as the most important ally for Ukraine. This desire has been in their eagerness to build a ‘strategic partnership’ with NATO through the Partnership for Peace programme, the former North Atlantic Consultative (NACC) Council. The motives for the eagerness with which Ukraine’s elites wish to cooperate with NATO also include, preparing the country for NATO membership, obtaining additional ‘security guarantees’, assistance in military reform, the modernization of its armed forces, the technical standardization of military equipments and officer training. This trend among Ukraine’s elites is both of a growth in support for cooperation with and future membership of NATO as well as substantial decline in support for military political integration within the CIS.

Ukrainian elite is pro-NATO because they had successfully utilized the ‘NATO-Card’ to obtain the legal recognition in inter-state treaties of its borders with Russia and Romania in May and June 1997 respectively (Kuzio 1998: 7). Ukraine also deliberately used the NATO-card to reach a breakthrough in its relations with Russia. President Kuchma was elected in July 1994 on a platform, which had criticized the incumbent for not working energetically enough to normalize relations with Russia. But, upon coming to power Kuchma found it no less difficult to convince Russia to sign an inter-state treaty with Ukraine. Indeed, the more Russia refused to sign the treaty the greater seemed to be Ukraine’s drift toward the West and the more active seemed to be its involvement with NATO (ibid.: 7).

As far as the left is concerned, its strongly pro-CIS, pro-Russian, anti-capitalist and anti-Western arguments are in line with the ethnic Russian and Russophone linguistic composition of their power-base in the cities and rural areas of Southern, Eastern and
Central Ukraine. Although broken down into two conflicting fractions (the communists of Ukraine and the parliamentary Socialists and Agrarians), they are united in their desire to see a renewed union with Russia through membership of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (Wolczuk 1997: 18). The communists strongly opposed to cooperating with European and Transatlantic bodies and international financial institutions. But the socialists are less fervent in their opposition to privatization and free market economies. As far as foreign policy is concerned, in comparison with the Communists, the Socialists have by far the greater say, owing to the position of their main proponent Oleksandr Moroz, the Chairman of Parliament and leader of the Socialist Party. So far as NATO enlargement is concerned the communists held an uncompromising Cold War view, but in contrast, the socialists held a more moderate negative view. Oleksandr Moroz argued that, ‘Ukraine does not perceive NATO as an enemy, yet I have no grounds to claim that it perceives NATO as a friend’ (in Kuzio 1998: 9). Recognizing that in all probability Ukraine could have to pay the price of Russian opposition to expansion. He has also the view that ‘he would have no objections ‘if it were to include Russia along with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus’ (in Roman Wolczuk 1997: 18). Doubtful of the official line that NATO as a defensive body will evolve into an organ of collective security, and ferring that with NATO expansion Ukraine will be left high and dry in the no-man’s land of buffer zone neutrality. Fearing too, the response to expansion is likely to arose in Russia as NATO forces appear on its Western borders, Moroz expects Russian military material not only to appear on Ukraine’s eastern border but also in Belarus and Kaliningrad, there by undermining the security of the whole region (ibid.: 18).

Of particular concern is the possibility of nuclear weapons being deployed on the territories of the newly joined members of the alliance, something that NATO consistently refuses to rule out. Appealing for a ‘nuclear-free zone’ to be implemented in Central and Eastern Europe, Moroz’s proposal, builds on a core of current neutral, non-nuclear states to include the new members to NATO. Apart from this, more has also consistently come out in favour of an alternative to NATO expansion, arguing that the security of Ukraine is inextricably linked to the security of the continent. As opposed to the official policy, which puts its hopes on NATO evolving into a pan-European security
structure, Moroz sees this as a role of the OSCE. Above all he envisages a pan-European security system based on declarations, voluntary commitments, sanctions against any undermining of peace and stability, mechanisms to enforce rapid conflict control and control over multilateral forces (Ibid.: 20). Being aware of the divergences of views of elites, the government has however tried to pursue a line that could incorporate elements of both poles of the political spectrum and hence to bridge the divide. President Kuchma has thus adopted a balanced foreign policy between the CIS and the West, in which both sides of the political elites have a vested interest.

2. Domestic Factors of Foreign Policy

Like any other country, the foreign and security policy of Ukraine are also the reflections of its domestic environment where the internal factors playing influential role in shaping of foreign policy. Though there is no specific of the number of internal factors and are varies from state to state, but in the Ukrainian context the following internal factors, which are being discussed, are instrumental in the making of Ukrainian foreign policy.

2.1. The Political Structural Factor

While many factors influence the decisions under making, it all eventually rests upon the person who has power, information and resources to decide policy. It is all about the executive and of primary importance is the structure of government, its division of powers as embodied in the constitution and as it is in practice. But in case of Ukraine it is little bit deviated, as it is newly independent and passing through a transitional phase. In the first five years of independence Ukraine faced a constitutional crisis, as it had no valid constitution and was operating under a modified version of the 1978 Soviet constitution. Designed for a subordinate republic, this document had little practical applicability for independent Ukraine, as it outlined no clear division of powers in the realms of foreign policy making. With the election of Kravchuk as President in 1991, a non-presidential constitution obviously got outdated. But due to the lack of consensus around political choices and policies in post-communist countries, the adoption of a valid constitution became the most difficult task for Kravchuk administration (Kuzio 1998: 166).
Even after following the adoption of the draft version in October 1993, there had been a delay in the work on the final constitution, probably, due to the unclear distribution of power between the central and regional authorities. As a result, society's value system and orientations became distorted. The political apathy of the population also increased and the manifestation of crisis are discernible in the political system (Linder 1995: 370). In the parliament a struggle between leftist conservatives and nationalists fractions for leadership took place leading to a certain crisis. In the government, an intermediate position of the Prime Minister and the cabinet, between parliament and President as well, as an extensive incapability to act on the part of the government also became visible (ibid: 366). So also, the considerable divergences in the ideologies and foreign policy goals of the major political parties in the Rada, and the Soviet style bureaucratic structures increased the time involved in reaching decisions. These problems however necessitated numerous amendments to the constitution oftentimes contradictory changes added to the confusion and frequent incoherence of Ukrainian policy in the first few years.

But, the June 1996 new constitution, adopted by Ukraine outlined the division of powers and basic goals of foreign policy. Foreign policy decision-making is split between parliament and President, with the majority of power going to the executive. The President is the guarantor of state sovereignty and territorial indivisibility (Article 102). He represents the state in international relations, administers the foreign political activity of the state, conducts negotiations and concludes international treaties (Article 106.3), recognizes foreign states, appoints and dismisses ambassadors. The council of Ministers, a body controlled by the President through hiring and firing but openly headed by the Prime Minister implements Ukraine’s foreign policy and organizes and carries out foreign economic activity (Nordberg 1998: 73). However, Ukraine’s parliament determines the principles of domestic and foreign policy (Article 84.5) and ‘principles of foreign economic activity’ (Article 929), declares war after submission by the President, approves the presidents use of force, controls the budget, and approves the sending of Ukrainian forces abroad or accepting foreign forces in Ukraine (Article 85.23).
Parliament is essentially limited in drafting general principles of foreign policy while the executive has the right of implementation. This grants large powers to the presidency, and further to the executive through the council of Ministers. The power to draft general principles, however, means that parliament has an important role in creating standard operating procedures for the foreign ministry.

According to the above constitutional procedure the ‘conceptions of national security of Ukraine’ passed in January 1997, and the parliament sketched a rough policy outline. In the attached notes, speaker of the parliament Oleksandr Moroz phrases the document as a set of recommendations to the President and cabinet of Ministers, who are expected to utilize this in formulating policy (ibid.: 73). But the parliament sometimes also takes a direct hand in foreign policy matters. For example, Kuchma issued a decree ‘on the ‘Creation of Financial – Industrial Conglomerate’ with Russia for joint production of aircraft engines. Kuchma viewed that Russia is the only potential source of investment for many Ukrainian enterprises unattractive to the West. But the Rada vetoed this as it wanted to protect Ukraine’s economy from Russian encroachment. In a similar fashion the parliament has also barred about 6,000 enterprises from being privatized, claiming their strategic importance to the state. Similarly, the parliament blocked the transfer of energy industry assets to Gazprom in exchange for fuel debt relief. The Rada has also taken upon itself the responsibility of defending the Ukrainian state when Russia’s Duma claimed Sevastopol as a Russian city. The Rada quickly responded, calling such acts ‘Threat to European Security’ and an infringement upon Ukraine’s territorial integrity (ibid.: 74). Therefore, keeping in mind the role of parliament, the very real responsibility that some important matters would not be ratified, Kuchma has not submitted the CIS Air Defense or Black Sea Fleet agreement to parliament. Despite the new constitution, conflicts however regularly occur between executive and the legislative over division of powers. Many in parliament, particularly the communists, advocate both their own foreign policy.

In Ukraine, actual foreign policy is usually set by a narrow group of elite within the executive branch, namely the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) headed
by the presidential advisor. Member of the council includes the President, Prime Minister, the defense, interior, security service, finance, foreign, environment and justice ministers, as well as others appointed by the President (Taras Kuzio 1997: 10). The NSDC brings together lesser input from various parliamentary commissions, advice from its think tank, and the National Institute of Strategic Studies but strong input from the presidential administration and the council of ministers. The NSDC is biased toward the West; as Horbulin has stated, ‘Ukraine must become a full member of the European family of civilized nations, this is our goal and destiny’ (Horbulin 1995: 13).

However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a strong role in foreign policy making and implementing the decisions of the presidential administration, though the President has the final say in foreign policy matters and uses governmental bodies to his own ends. Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs generally follows the President’s policy. For example, Udovenko has stated that ‘the gradual and organic integration of Ukraine into the European and world communities is one of the top priorities of our foreign policy’ (Udovenko 1995:15). This tallies with Kuchma’s belief that, Ukraine’s ‘strategic objective is to become a full- fledged member of the European Union’. The Foreign Ministry also considers Ukraine to be an integral part of Central or Eastern Europe, but does not want to abandon all ties with Russia. So also, the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s policy of ‘cooperation with the CIS and integration with Europe’ is a clear tally with Kuchma’s ‘Multi-victor’ foreign policy approach. But on occasions the foreign minister has made statements seemingly contradicting Kuchma. At a meeting with NATO officials, he stated, ‘I hope that NATO will support Ukraine in achieving its strategic goal by full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic security structures including NATO’ (ibid. 16-17), which was denied by Kuchma.

In spite of the foreign policy making powers that the President holds and the foreign ministry work outs among contradictions, the structure of the foreign policy bureaucracies play a role in how decision are being made, because politicians may come and go but the staff of the governing structure retain a greater degree of performance. This provides a sort of instrumental memory, embodied often in standard operating
procedures for the organization to follow, generating foreign policy stability and coherence (Marc Nordberg 1998: 76). However, in a state in transition as Ukraine is, this can be harmful, because most of the bureaucrats retained from the Soviet era were communist party functionaries, who often uphold ideological goals counter to those of independent Ukraine. For example, when the President takes decisions in formulating policy through the NSDC and the foreign ministry, the parliament challenges the President on many issues leading to inconsistency in the matter of foreign policy formulations.

2.2. The Economic Factor

A state must have the economic strength to be able to manage unfavorable actions of other states, as well as sufficient resources to achieve its own goals. State power today is marked more by economic than military might. Thus in order to be able to conduct an assertive, or even an independent, foreign policy, a state must have adequate economic capabilities to handle the needs associated with such. But in case of Ukraine, it is not only economically weak, but it is also largely dependent upon others and particularly upon Russia for critical resources.

After independence in 1991, Ukraine had accepted and had begun to implement the process of transition from a centrally planned economic system to a market based economy, where the forces of demand and supply would largely determine the allocation of resources (Hare, Ishaq & Estrin 1998: 181). But due to the lack of support of a clearly articulated post-independence constitution, Ukraine faced the political instability, which ultimately led the country towards economic instability. Because of the lack of clear-cut distribution of power the constant conflict between different branches of the political system began around the question of economic reform. This was most evident in clashes between parliament and President, and the resulting confusion enabled the parliament to obstruct the process of privatization (ibid. 184). The Soviet Legacy also contributed to these problems as the majority of people including civil servants in Ukraine lack the skill and knowledge essential to operating under capitalism. In this regard Victoria Egorova, researching reform in the coal industry stated that, 'the new market economy an economy
completely foreign to the psyches of the general public, force them to adopt to new ideas, concepts, institutional structures and at the same time accepting total destruction of values established within the previous regime (Egorova 1996: 1). As a result, Ukraine experienced numerous economic problems such as: persistently high rates of inflation, a rapidly growing shadow economy, and a sharply rising debt burden with Russia and Turkmenistan in particular related to energy imports (Hare, Ishaq, & Estrin 1998: 182). Side by side, this economic instability also gave birth to monetary indiscipline, huge and erratic fiscal deficits, unemployment, corruption, and the dramatic downfall of people’s standard of living and finally, unwantedly Ukraine became dependent upon Russia on many aspects and faced several other economic problems. These are now discussed below.

2.2 (a) Trade Problem
When Ukraine was part of Soviet Union, its trade was overwhelmingly directed to members of COMCON (Economic Association of Communist Countries). Chief amongst these was Russia, which in 1991 accounted for 66 percent of Ukraine’s trade (Whittock 1993: 38). Because of the vast system of industrial linkage present in the former Soviet Union, Ukraine possesses complete product cycles for few goods. This means that with independence, Ukraine’s economy was strongly tied to that of the former Soviet Union, and that it produced few goods of sufficient quality to export to the West.

2.2 (b) Investment Problems
The issue of foreign direct investment in Ukraine is both an economic and a political one as there is more than 90 per cent of the economy is state controlled. Foreign investment in Ukraine is an indication of employment, access to new technology and know-how, and introduction to a new system of management. But the inflow of foreign investments into Ukraine is restricted by a number of factors, such as the attachment of the Ukrainian economy to the countries of the former USSR. These countries are also undergoing crisis and problems, such as: disruptions in economic links, a dearth of energy supplies, lopsided economies that heavily favor the defense sectors, underdeveloped infrastructures, backward banking and finance systems, non-convertible national
monetary units, inflexible taxation systems, and organizational and management forms that does not meet international standards (Kulinich 1995: 119). This has added to the apprehensions of foreign investors who already fears about Ukraine’s political and economic instability. Therefore, according to the expectations of Ukrainians, economic development could not take place and Ukraine became more and more dependent upon Russia for its economic development.

2.2 (c) Energy Dependency

What is worse for Ukraine’s foreign policy is its continuing dependence on Russia, for oil and gas. Ukraine depends upon Russia for the supply of up to 90 per cent of its oil and 60 percent of its natural gas. Such a high level of dependence on a single state for such an important commodity can greatly curtail a state’s sovereignty and that is happening with Ukraine. Russia on several occasions has created problems in the continued supply of energy because of political reasons. For instance, in summer 1993, Russia tried to get Kravchuk to give Ukraine’s share of the Black Sea Fleet in turn for a reduction in the debt, and in 1994, the Russian oil and gas company Gazprom also wanted to take over parts of the Ukrainian pipeline system in exchange for debt reduction (Bukkvoll 1997: 81). Russia has also linked energy supply with Ukrainian participation in the CIS economic and military unions. These however, created resentment in Ukraine, and to extricate itself from this awkward situation, Ukraine has launched several attempts to diversify its energy sources through developing its nuclear power capacity and through the search for few suppliers in Turkmenistan, Iran and Bulgaria (Balmaceda 1998: 258), all with limited success. Despite Ukraine’s high hopes for the development of gas resources in the Black Sea shelf, the prospects have been mixed in part because Ukraine still lacks comprehensive energy legislation and it has been unable to provide a welcoming atmosphere to Western investors in general (ibid.: 258). Thus again and again Ukraine has been forced to face the basic fact of its dependence on Russia even if for much of its minerals, timber, nuclear fuel and other raw materials, and try to manage rather than to deny it.
However, overwhelming energy dependence on Russia has posed many problems for Ukraine. In addition to the above demands on dividing the Black Sea Fleet, Russia has attempted to use Ukraine's energy debt in order to gain control of industrial assets in Ukraine. Russia is especially interested in Ukraine's refineries, pipelines and gas storage facilities. Possession of these assets has given Ukraine the ability to manage Russian pressures over energy debt. The main pipelines exporting Russian gas transit through Ukraine. Ukraine has gained much needed revenue from charging transit fees for use of these pipelines. However, unwelcome these economic ties with Russia may be, but it would be disaster to attempt to sever them. This forces Ukraine to maintain some relations with Russia but for many in Ukraine, this creates the following paradox: 'a weak economy threatens independence, but the current level of dependence on Russia threatens Ukraine's sovereignty' (Nordberg 1998: 71). Ukraine has also faced other economic problems. Widespread tax avoidance by two thirds of its enterprises costs the state $1.7 billion annually (ibid. 71). The January 1997 tax reform, designed to boost foreign investment, which was predicted by the Chairman of Ukraine's National Bank lead to a 70 per cent drop in collection of revenue (ibid.: 71). On the top of this, Ukraine's shadow economy is estimated at 60 per cent of the GDP; while the state's other economic problems have led to between $12 and $15 billion leaving the country in capital flight (Kuzio 1997: 17).

However, these economic weaknesses have led Ukraine to turn to the West for technical assistance for transformation and monetary aid, particularly to the USA, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and European Union (EU). Building relations with the West has met with some success. Ukraine has joined several European organizations, the USA considers itself to have a 'strategic partnership' with Ukraine, and Ukraine became the third largest receptionist of US foreign aid. But lack of reform made Ukraine handicaped in getting financial aid from the West and yet again Ukraine continues overwhelmingly to rely on Russia for its need. Moreover, Ukraine's weak economy means that its range of foreign policy options is constrained. As it has been evident in Ukraine's fear of political domination by Russia, caused it to avoid full membership of the CIS Economic Union. But economic reality means that Ukraine
cannot cut all ties with the CIS countries, in fact, it has an interest in retaining some of these ties. Therefore, Ukraine has created for itself an associate membership of the CIS Economic Union and continues to trade with the states to its east. Ukraine also maintains the desire to limit Russian influence, and for this, it is diversifying its trade with as many states as possible. But its vision to be part of the West continues to exist. As a result Ukraine orients its foreign policy both to the East and the West.

2.3. The Military Factor
After having lived under Russian domination for over three hundred years, Ukraine, the second most powerful Slav nation in CIS has not only emerged as an independent sovereign state but much more by the stroke of destiny, in a unique manner of inheriting its 176 ICBMs, 30 bombers and a vast infrastructure of nuclear facilities and fissile materials. This makes Ukraine the third largest nuclear-armed country in the world and second in Europe (Singh 1995: 1308). As military resources available to a state, allows it to project influence abroad or resist pressure at home, Ukraine’s military resources make the West and Russia more cautious. But Ukraine turns to be a ‘snake without teeth’ as the capabilities of its nuclear force are extremely limited due to lack of high-tech and precision guided weaponry, increasing lack of officers etc. For all these Ukraine became dependent upon Russia.

2.3 (a) Industrial Military Dependence
Despite hosting a significant share of former Soviet defense production, Ukraine’s industry produces few weapon systems entirely. This has been evident from the case of the T-80 tank, of which Ukraine contracted to sell to Pakistan. Produced mostly in Kharkiv, they still rely on Russia for production of the main guns, engines and communication gears. Russia has halted delivery of these parts, most likely because Russia is seeking to sell its own tanks abroad. This severely hurts Ukraine’s arms industry, which looked to make $650 million on the deal, as well as interstate relations (Nordberg 1998: 67). For these Ukraine has sought closer ties with Slovakia, which also produces some of these tank parts. In the air defense Ukraine is also dependent upon Russia. Strategic air defense facilities were situated along the former Soviet boarders
when the USSR collapsed, and these were inherited by a multitude of states, a division of which rendered the unified system ineffectual. Ukraine's air defense system had collapsed due to this division and its inability to produce these parts. Even though Ukraine has tried to keep it's military as independent as possible from Russia, its inability to maintain its air defense structure forced Ukraine to join the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) Joint Air Defense Agreement in 1995, agreeing to share two early warning strategic radars with Russia. Such dependence exists for all major weapon systems, vital materials such as petroleum products and in other areas.

The Ukrainian military at the time of independence had also a large share of non-Ukrainian officers mostly Russians, that is 50 per cent of all officers and 90 per cent of generals (ibid. 68). Although many of these subsequently took the oath of loyalty to Ukraine, there remains a fear that the military training facilities, which are spread throughout the new countries, may create problems for Ukrainian officers' training. Thus, Ukraine is limited in adopting strong policies against Russia, and it lacks a credible use of force.

2.3 (b) The Issue of Black Sea Fleet

The division of former Soviet military assets between Ukraine and Russia took place without great controversy. But the Black Sea Fleet and its shore-based assets have been under contention since 1991 and influencing Ukraine’s policies toward Russia. This is primarily because the fleet issue is more about the recognition of Ukraine’s independence and Russia’s desire to get a strategic foothold in the Crimea (Kiniklioglu 1996: 83-84), and thus, both parties have been very sensitive towards compromising on the issue. Both sides have emphasized the necessity of reaching an agreement but documents signed in June 1992, September 1993, April 1994 and June 1995 have not solved the controversy, since they were for the most part statements of intent. Distrust by both parties has negatively influenced Ukraine’s attitude toward the CIS Military Union, energy debt to Russia and demarcation of the border with Russia. This situation, at times has become a very limiting factor in Ukraine’s Russia policy.
But fortunately on 28 May 1997 the BSF agreement was signed, after it had been originally rejected by Russia in October 1996. On this agreement two political breakthroughs have been achieved. Firstly, Crimea, Sevastopol and the BSF have been recognized by Russia as de-jure Ukrainian territory. Secondly, Russia officially declared that the impediments to fuel supplies, such as tariffs and energy cuts hitherto imposed on Ukraine were ‘artificial’ and in effect, admitted that they had been applied for political reasons (Moroney 1998: 25). Yet one specific issue was deliberately avoided i.e. Ukraine’s defence and foreign policy orientations. However, under the terms of the agreement, the part of Sevastopol will be leased by Russia for twenty years, with the option of renewal for another five years. During this time, Russia is expected to move its part of the fleet to its naval base at Novorossiysk. The principal concession was Ukraine’s right to refer to Sevastopol as the headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy and base its own ships there in future. Russia has agreed to pay a rent of $97.7 million, per year, for the facilities, which over twenty years will cover $1.95 billion of Ukraine’s outstanding $3 billion debt for energy supplies. The negotiations however, greatly in Russia’s favour, since the original demand from Ukraine was for $423 million per annum, while Russia only offered $72 million per annum (Sherr 1997: 43).

On the surface, it appears that Ukraine has achieved much by this agreement. But the treaty contains provisions, which, if implemented, could move Ukraine’s economy and defense industry nearer to Russia rather than towards the West’s market economies, which would complicate closer integration into Western security structures. So, many in Ukraine, remain watchful of Russia and also oppose the lease of the port, or fear that a Russian presence will make Ukraine ineligible for NATO membership at some future date.

In the light of the Russian Army’s failure to subdue Chechnya, it is probable that Ukraine has sufficient might to limit Russian military pressure. However, in Chechnya Russia proved that its military retains impressive destructive capabilities. Russia also maintains a nuclear force that Ukraine no longer possesses. This means that while Ukraine has sufficient power to resist Russian pressures to join a CIS military treaty,
Ukraine is still watchful of Russia, and lacks the strength to pursue an aggressive foreign policy in relation to Russia. As a result, Ukraine has turned to the West in search of ensured security. By the way adopting a policy of neutrality Ukraine avoided Russia with fear of its imperial actions and try to develop greater cooperation with the West. Ukraine secured security assurances from the United States and the United Kingdom and joins the Partnership for Peace, under NATO. However, this is partially a reaction to Ukraine's internal weakness causing a military wariness of Russia, a fact which influences Ukraine's Foreign Policy.

2.3 (c) The Nuclear Issue

The issue of the status, subordinations and decision of the ultimate fate of nuclear arms installed on the Ukrainian territory in the times of the former Soviet Union has acquired an exceptional significance in the shaping of the foreign policy of Ukraine since independence. Nuclear weapons have become beyond any doubt, the most complicated problem of the foreign policy and security of the state (Tolstov 1994:5).

Initially, Ukraine's position on nuclear disarmament was influenced by the idealistic perception of the non-nuclear world, the moral-psychological factor of the Chernobyl tragedy, strong pressure from the West and Russia, and the expectation of favorable international conditions for achieving Ukraine's independence and international recognition (Kulinich 1995:124). These factors were reflected in the Supreme Rada's Proclamation of Non-nuclear Status (24 October 1991), which oriented the legislative and executive bodies of power towards unilateral nuclear disarmament but without actual clauses, conditions and guarantees. However, the year 1993, showed a gradual increase of the role of the nuclear arms problem in the civic-political life of Ukraine. Although the idea of unilateral nuclear disarmament of the state had been proclaimed long before the declarations of independence, the political aspects of this strategic intention were not properly grounded and thought through, in particular, as regards the cost of disarmament and conversion.
Therefore, the paradox is that, the parliament and government of Ukraine, which had proclaimed their intention of achieving a non-nuclear status, ended up and became unable to realize this goal by their own efforts due to a lack of the funds required to finance the disarmament process (Tolstov 1994:6). In addition, failures in foreign policy led to the emergence of opposition within Ukraine to the non-nuclear policy. Influential circles of the political elite, including members of parliament and some representatives of the military, began to envisage the nuclear weapons as perhaps the most effective guarantee of independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine (ibid.:6).

As a result, decision-making on the future of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons was slowed down, and led to complications in relations between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the U.S.A. and the countries of Western Europe, on the other, and to the creation of a negative image of Ukraine in the eyes of public opinion abroad. At the same time, talks on political concessions, including Ukraine’s possible renunciation of control over these nuclear devices or the handing over of war heads to Russia without the proper resolution of issues related to the value of the nuclear materials and the financial arrangements for the destruction of the missiles, led to the consolidation of pro-nuclear sentiments among the majority of the factions in the Ukrainian parliament and a part of the military leadership (ibid.:7). Side by side, Leonid Kravchuk being influenced by the nationalists also expressed his reluctance to relinquish the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its soil. But his efforts to use these weapons as a bargaining counter for increased Western economic support backfired. Western institutions made it clear to Ukraine that denuclearisation were a pre-requisite for further economic and political support (Moroney 1997:26). America also leads the international community in isolating Ukraine as a pariah nation. Aid, assistance, trade and political support with Ukraine ceased. Tension increased between Russian commanders and custodians of the nuclear missiles and weapon storage bunkers on Ukrainian soil, leading eventually to armed conflict (Tolstov 1994:11).

However, in order to normalize its relations with the West and with Russia, on 18 November 1993, the Supreme Rada of Ukraine voted in favour of the ratification of the
START-I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol in spite of internal political strife, between those in favour of and those against the nuclear status of Ukraine. But the ratification of the START-I Treaty by Ukraine with the thirteen stipulations evoked highly negative reactions in the international community though the stipulations are in general fair and justified in character and reflective of the national interests of Ukraine (Kulinich 1995:25). Nevertheless, the situation after the ratification of the START-I Treaty by the supreme Rada of Ukraine proved to be critical. There emerged the urgent need to search for some compromise. The meeting of the presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine on 14 January 1994 in Moscow and the signing of the Tripartite documents regulating the transfer and removal of nuclear arms from the territory of Ukraine were a breakthrough in this direction, marking a genuine success for American, Russian and Ukrainian diplomacy (ibid: 125).

Moreover, it is important to note that the majority of the stipulations made by the Supreme Rada of Ukraine concerning the START-I Treaty were taken into account in the tripartite documents. Finally, in February 1994, the Supreme Rada ratified the START-I Treaty in its final form.

However, the signing of the Trilateral Declaration though was an undoubted success of Ukrainian Foreign policy, it can be said that it was not the independent expression of the will of the Ukrainians but an imposition and a compulsion for Ukraine to do so in order to bring a change in the attitude of Western states towards Ukraine.

2.4. Interest Groups
Interest groups are generally active in democracy. These are formed by individuals to seek to advance a particular sectional interest or cause, while not seeking to form a government or part of a government. The term is often used interchangeably with pressure groups and is being supplemented by non-governmental organizations. Interests groups may occasionally contest elections as a tactic to influence political parties, but they usually rely on a variety of campaigning and lobbying methods to influence government policy that may be domestic or foreign (Melean & McMillan 2006: 266).
These interest groups are more active and influential in a well-organized developed civil society as it provides them enough opportunity to do so. In this regard Richter says that the industrialized state has become so effective in capturing the identity of its citizens because it represents a network of interlocking institutions with enormous resources available to survey, reward and discipline the behaviour of citizen (Richer in Celeste A Wallander 1996: 71). This refers to the presence of an effective civil society, something that Ukraine lacks. Yet there are several groups in Ukraine that have been effective in influencing foreign policy or have the power to do so. This includes the military, national and regional groups.

2.4 (a) Military Group

Although there is no evidence that Ukraine’s military has moved to usurp any policy-making role, elements within the military do try to exert influence. The Ukrainian Law or Defense entrusts Ukraine’s military with the charges to define threats to the state, but in practice this role has been taken by the presidential administration and parliament. Still the most active military group lobbying for certain policies has been the Union of Ukrainian Officers (SOU). This organization has taken an interest in defending the Ukrainian state, and has taken part in political debate. After the Black Sea Fleet deal at Massandra in 1993 and after Ukraine joined the CIS Air Defense Agreement in 1995, the SOU accused the government of betraying Ukraine. The SOU has also been active in working to Ukrainianise Ukraine’s armed forces, largely as a counter to the perceived untrustworthiness of ethnic Russian officers (Nordberg 1998: 77). The Ukrainian Socio-Psychological Service that arose to replace the Soviet Main Political Administration has also taken a political role for itself. It advocates decreasing the number of Russian officers serving in the Ukrainian army. It has also resisted Ukraine joining any CIS unified military bodies and has effectively lobbied for the view that Russia is the main external threat to Ukraine (ibid: 77).

Despite these groups, a few high ranking individuals also expressed their concern on political issues. Former Defense Minister Morozov, who worked, as a general in the air force and representative to NATO, is one, having spoken strongly against the CIS Air
Defense Agreement. Vice Admiral Borys Kozhyn, commander of the Ukrainian Navy, has stated that Russia is the main threat to Ukraine and has plans to absorb Ukraine (ibid. 78). However, these politicized officers are the exception, and their views have marginal influence in foreign policy making.

2.4 (b) Nationalist Group

Nationalism can be an influential factor in a state's foreign policy. But in case of Ukraine the influence of the nationalist are widely felt in the matter of foreign policy. According to Charles Furtado, nationalism always and every where narrows the parameters of foreign policy discourse, drawing into question the seriousness or patriotism of those who would stray beyond the bounds of consensus (Furtado 1994: 86). This has been particularly felt in the making of Ukrainian foreign policy as Ukraine has a strong level of feeling of national identity in the Western part of the country.

As Ukraine had almost no history of an independent state, a key goal for Ukrainian nationalists was to provide justification for an independent Ukraine. To do this, they believed that they had to demonstrate to themselves and to the world that Ukraine was a nation separate from Russia. For this, Ukrainian nationalists, gaining most of their support from Western Ukraine and Kiev have succeeded in influencing the policies of the state despite their relatively small representation in parliament. Ukrainian nationalists are strongly anti-Russian, as they believe that Russia is the only state capable of threatening the Ukrainian nation. Therefore, when the state's military doctrine was being discussed in 1992; nationalists in parliament rejected the first draft largely based upon the clause that 'Ukraine does not regard any people as its enemy'. When the document was adopted in 1993, this phrase had been changed to read that 'Ukraine will regard any state as a possible enemy whose policy consistently constitutes a threat to Ukrainian military security, which interferes in Ukraine's internal affairs or aspires to control its territory or to infringe its national interests' (Dick 1993: 6). This was obviously aimed at Russia. So also the nationalists voted in June 1996 against allowing foreign bases in Ukraine, countering former Defense Minister Shmarov's willingness to allow Russian bases in Sevastopol. The refusal to allow Russian bases reflects the fear of Russian domination,
stemming from the perceived insecurity of national identity. Most likely because of this opposition, Kuchma has not submitted the agreement leasing parts of Sevastopol to Russia to parliament.

In the electoral sphere the impact of the nationalists is also being felt. In 1994 Kuchma was elected with the overwhelming support of eastern and southern Ukraine, while Kravchuk won in the West and Kiev. But Kiev is important for Kuchma, as it is the capital city and centre of power. So, to wield actual power and have the freedom to implement policy, Kuchma tried to earn the support of these regions and for this he had to show that he did not support too close ties with Russia.

2.4 (c) Regional groups
The different regions of Ukraine have different attitudes towards the direction of Ukrainian foreign policy. In general, the more ethnically Ukrainian and nationally conscious Western oblasts prefer integration with Europe, while the more ethnically and linguistically Russian east and south prefer greater ties with the CIS. The population of eastern and southern Ukraine as a whole is more open to closer ties with Russia than those in the West of the country. A large number of these people are ethnic Russians, speak Russian, or have close family and cultural ties across the border. This fact has been interpreted by many to mean that eastern and southern Ukraine will be strongly pro-Russian. But this is an over simplification because, though these people desire stronger ties with the CIS, they do not want to rejoin Russia. These regions are not anti-Ukrainian, but they are also not anti-Russian.

However, due to this mixed identity eastern Ukraine is marked by a lesser degree of political activism. While the Western oblasts worked for an independent Ukraine, those in the east and south supported it largely as a response to the poor economic situation in the USSR and the desire for democracy and greater local self determination (Pirie 1996: 1094). But, many in the east and south did not expect that independence meant separation from Russia. Moreover, though they are not supporters of nationalism,
they do not desire a separation from the rest of Ukraine and so; these regions are home to the majority of support for continuing ties with Russia and the CIS.

2. (d) The Crimean Separatist Group

Ever since Ukraine became independent Crimea has been considered to be potentially the most dangerous trouble spot in the country. This region is known for its predominant pro-Russian sentiments, where the majority of the population is ethnically and linguistically Russian and has received much support from Moscow. As up to 70 percent of the population is composed of ethnic Russians, their nationalist element for reunification or at least a close relationship with Russia and sometimes demand for independence, thus threatened the territorial integrity of Ukraine (Fediw 2000: 76).

Demand for a separate status for Crimea started to appear immediately after the Ukrainian declaration of independence on 24 August 1991. The next day the Republican Movement of Crimea (RMC) was formed, with the task of promoting Crimean secession from Ukraine. But on 4 September 1991, the local legislature, the Crimean Supreme Soviet, declared the state sovereignty of Crimea as a constituent part of Ukraine. Then the RMC started to campaign for a referendum on January 20, 1991, to acquire the status of an autonomous republic, independent of the Ukrainian SSR. Over 93 per cent of the electorate voted in favour of autonomy. Thus the Ukrainian central government having negotiations with the political leadership of Crimea drafted a law on the ‘Delineation of power between Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea’.

However, these separatist tendencies continue to exist primarily dominated by the Russophone parties, the Communist Party and the Business parties. The Russophone parties comprise a group of small parties advocate some form of union with Russia and the dominant Crimean Republican Party wants Crimea to be an independent state. The Communist Party of Crimea which was established in June 1992, initially opposed to reform, and being in favour of restoration of Soviet Union, eventually dropped its pro-USSR position but remained anti reform and still advocates close cooperation among the former Soviet republics. The Business parties such as, the Union for the Support of the
Republic of Crimea (USRC) and the Party for Economic Renaissance of Crimea (PERC) always remain skeptical about Ukrainian independence, as they are largely dependent on the flow of subsidies from Kiev. But they advocated economic but not political independence for Ukraine (Bukkvoll 1997:47).

Among the three, the most active is the “Rossiya”, political coalition formed by the Russophone parties. In January 1994, when this coalition won both the presidential and parliamentary elections created a seemingly united drive for greater independence. President Meshkov turned the clocks in Crimea to Moscow time, stated that Crimea should serve their military service only in Crimea, demanded the removal of all Ukrainian troops and military installation from Crimea and reactivated the strongly pro-independence 1992 Crimean constitution (ibid.: 48). So also, the Crimean parliamentary speaker, Sergey Tsekov, stated that, we are not ignoring Kiev, and we are not threatening Ukraine’s territorial integrity, we are only realizing the programme of Crimean and Russian reunion (ibid.: 48).

However with the pass off time, when the Crimean situation grew more acrimonious and the threat of the separation of the peninsula became increasingly real, the Ukrainian Rada amended the Ukrainian constitution, designed to curb Crimean autonomy. Consequently, the Rada appropriated to itself the power to cancel and automatically invalidate any Crimean legislation whenever the latter would conflict with Ukrainian constitution (Fedew 2000: 83). And indeed, in the spring of 1995, the Ukrainian legislature did annul the Crimean constitution since it led towards the separation of Crimea from Ukraine. The parliament also abolished the Crimean presidency and declared Sevastopil to be outside Crimean jurisdiction.

Crimean leaders protested against the decisions handed down from Kiev. Parliamentary speaker Tsekov with anger said that ‘Crimea is turned not just into an ordinary province of Ukraine, but also into a colony’. This decision proves that, Ukraine is an authoritarian state with a police regime (Bukkvoll 1997: 51). Moreover for the champions of Crimean independence, the events of March 1995 probably represent more
of a temporary defeat than a resignation to the fate of being forever part of independent Ukraine. In this context the deputy speaker of Crimean parliament, Victor Mezhak stated that ‘we are for the time being forced to hide our pro-Russian principles and wait for more favorable conditions’ (ibid. 59).

For Ukraine while these separatists were very problematic in the early years of independence, the problems have lost much of the importance after 1995. But when Ukraine hosted a joint naval exercise with several NATO and Black Sea countries in August 1997, despite bringing several million dollars into the local economy, the Crimean leaders came out against this exercise. The sentiment, as expressed: ‘If Ukraine goes with NATO, Crimea will go with Russia’ was widespread (Nordberg 1998: 81). But this has not provoked a heated response from Kiev as every decision of Crimean Parliament is subject to veto by Kiev. After the constitution was adopted in 1996, all Crimean parties had to register either as all Ukrainian, or as a local branch of a wider Ukrainian party. This move has served to disenfranchise the most vehement supporters of Crimean separatism. More importantly Crimea has also lost its Russian support after the May 1997 agreement between Russia and Ukraine, where Russia has implicitly acknowledged Crimea as part of Ukraine.

2.5. Competing Elites
Competing Elites are an important source of foreign policy determination. Elites build a policy acceptable to the constituents who put them into office, then compete against the policies formulated by others attempting to apply them to the real world (Anderson 1993: 59). In a state where the distribution of powers and ability to govern is completely developed, the elites are performing more efficiently, but where the distribution of power and ability to govern is not well developed, there often exist a narrow band of elites possessing most of the benefits and burden of the statehood, and the state lacks institutions capable of constraining these individuals (Jackson 1993: 21-22), leading to inefficiency, indecisiveness and development of authoritarian tendencies. Though Ukraine does not exhibit the level of authoritarianism but it does possess the above attributes.
When Ukraine gained independence in 1991, the former communists had no readymade concepts in the creation of Ukrainian foreign policies, since all their political activity had taken place within the framework of a different regime and in a different country. The choice facing them was therefore whether to accept and adopt what was presented to them by the opposition or to develop their own new concepts or to cling to nostalgia for the old system. The result was that from 1990 to 1994 Ukraine was ruled by representatives of the Ukrainian nomenklatura and the Communist Party, in cooperation with Western and central Ukrainian moderate nationalists from the former opposition (Bukkvoll 1997: 4). But as Ukraine’s political parties are in an embryonic stage and the party system is weak, the regional elite compete for the state’s resources instead of cooperation for constructive policy formulations. However, the policies and programmes of various political parties exercised profound influence in the making of Ukrainian foreign policy. These political parties of Ukraine are broadly divided into three groups, the left, the right and the centre.

2.5 (a) The leftist (Communists, Agrarians and Socialists)
The 1990 Ukrainian parliament was elected at a time when the Communist Party was still able to secure a majority. Of the seats of the 450 seats, the communists gained 239, and the parliament thus had a communist majority when Ukraine become independent in 1991 (ibid: 4). Therefore, for the first three years of independence, former communists dominated Ukraine’s parliament. The parties of the left called for closer ties with Russia, advocating dual citizenship and open boarders to the East, while a minority on the far left designed a renewed USSR, but most supported Ukraine’s independence. Even among communists there exists a strong desire not to see Ukraine subsumed by a domineering Russia. Closer ties were strongly supported, but not at the expense of Ukraine’s sovereignty. New parliamentary elections were held in 1994, and the Communists are again the largest political fraction in Ukraine with 95 seats and commanded a powerful leftist bloc (about 130 seats). The Communist Party also retained the most extensive political machine, having inherited much of the legacy and institutions of the Soviet Communist Party. The speaker of Parliament, Oleksandr Moroz, is leader of the Socialist
Party, while the first deputy speaker is Oleksandr Tkachenko, leader of the peasant party of Ukraine. These positions reflect the power of the left in parliament.

However, the left is far from unified. The Communist Party is divided into pro-Russian and the nationalist communist branches, while the Peasant Party split on the issue of economic reform. Slightly less than half of the Communists are hard liners opposed to Ukrainian independence. These individuals either hope for a restoration of the Soviet Union or desire a pan-Slavic state with Russia and Belarus. The other leftist fractions (Socialists and Peasants) support an independent Ukraine simultaneously maintaining ties with Russia and the CIS. The fractions of the left have most of their support in eastern and southern Ukraine and so far as the West is concerned they held an uncompromising Cold War view of NATO and its enlargement. They opposed Ukraine’s domestic transformation process and held similar views to the anti-reformist Belarusian leadership with an agenda for restoration of Soviet power, both domestically and externally (Kuzio 1998: 8).

2.5 (b) The Rightist [The National Democrats, the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU) and the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA)]

Despite the leftward orientation of Parliament, parties on the right had influence in the Rada. Nationalists led by Rukh and far right parties, though a definite minority, played an important role by helping to define the agenda for debate in parliament. In 1992, Rukh leaders joined by supporters in the foreign and defense ministries, pushed for membership of the ‘Vise-grad group’. In 1993, over the nuclear issue the rightist’s influence was also seen. The pro-nuclear sentiments grew in Ukraine was largely driven by the nationalist forces. On the Crimean issue the role of nationalists also felt very well in order to stop the separatist movement.

Parliamentary deputies on the right, predominantly nationalist democrats are opposed to CIS membership and hope of severe ties with Russia. They backed a foreign policy orientation that was in favour of Ukraine coming closer to Europe. They tended to
support Ukraine’s immediate membership into NATO. Europe to these groups, signifies democracy, civilization and a modern nation state (ibid: 8). However, though the rightists strongly support increasing ties with Europe and USA, they split in their level of dislike for Russia. The majority of nationalist democrats take a pragmatic view that some ties with Russia are inevitable. Parties on the right and centre-right tend to see the United States and Germany as models for Ukraine (Nordberg 1998: 84). But some extreme right groups, particularly the Ukrainian-National Assembly (UNA) adopt a strongly militant policy toward Russia. UNA receives its support from Western Ukraine and the Donbas region. This party has its own parliamentary arm, ‘Ukrainian Peoples Self Defense Force’ (UNSO) and has sent volunteers to fight against Russia in Abkhazia, Chechnya and Trans-Dniestria (ibid: 84). Likewise the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalist (KUN) sent members of parliament to Chechnya to support separatist President Dudayev against Russia. Moreover, the rightists of Ukraine overall work for a Western style democracy and market economy, and put special emphasis on the question of Ukrainian rebirth i.e. consolidation of independence, strengthening of Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture etc. (Bukkvoll 1997: 10). They also advocate closer ties with the West, and proposed that Ukraine should leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and retain its nuclear weapons to guarantee its security. For all these, they are getting support from the Western Ukraine, Kiev city, and Donbas region and from the Oblast.

2.5 (c) The Centrist

The center fractions have little ideological motivation, being neither socialist nor nationalist. They represent various regional, governmental and industrial concerns, as well as non-affiliated independents. Therefore, they vote with either the left or the right depending upon the issue, having no specific agenda of their own. They are predominantly supporters of state independence and economic reform, and are less interested in foreign policy orientations. Centrist parties called for limited cooperation with the CIS in order to extract every advantage from the relationship for Ukraine, while at the same time retaining the independence of Ukraine. This was seen as necessary given the vast number of economic ties between Ukraine and the other CIS states, particularly Russia. The centrists also fear that isolating Russia from Europe would result in increased
belligerence. Despite the size of the leftist bloc, the policies of the centrists were to some extent adopted by the President. Military union was rejected outright, while economic union was tentatively accepted based on the reality of an economy heavily dependent upon Russia.

2.5 (d) Regional Elites

Apart from the above political parties, a system of regional elite has developed in Ukraine since independence. The main elite base is the Eastern Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk. Their influence in government is pervasive as they control about 160 of the estimated 200 ruling positions within the Ukrainian government, including the President (Garnett 1996: 3-4). This concentration also continues to increase. In April 1997 Kuchma appointed a politician from Dnipropetrovsk, Serhi Tihipko, as first Deputy Prime Minister, and in July 1997 Valeriy Pustovoytenko, the former mayor of this region become Prime Minister. Thus the nomenklatura of this region possesses their own political fraction, unity or have been also accused of forming a ‘Dnipropetrovsk Mafia’ within the government (ibid: 5). But the elite of this region are not firmly united. They only stand together only when challenges comes from other regions. This has been reflected when the fraction between supporters of Kuchma and Lazarenko took place and the former succeeded in getting Kuchma to force Lazarenko’s regination. However, such strong regionalism means that much of Ukraine’s politics is a struggle between groups for position or assets to gain control over. This conflict from time to time thus weakened the state by inhibiting coherent policy, by increasing corruption, and by lessening the number of state assets available to implement foreign policy.

3. Other Factors

In spite of the domestic factors discussed above there are two other factors, which have a substantial influence in the making of Ukrainian foreign policy. Though the two factors such as ‘dual loyalty’ and ‘split consciousness’ of the Ukrainian mind is altogether a reflection of the factors discussed above, still there are some uniqueness in these, which project the vulnerability of the people and policy makers in the matter of their orientations.
3.1. Split Consciousness

The fundamental divisions of the values that are developed since independence really characterize the mass mind in Ukraine and primarily reflect the profound socio-cultural crisis and society’s loss of strategic reference points. Among these divisions the crucial one that is to be discussed here is the mental split. In terms of the formation of a sound foreign policy, the most meaningful and problematic division is caused by the fundamental heterogeneity of the geo-cultural and geo-strategic priorities in the Ukrainian mass mind. To analyze the priorities of Ukrainian mass mind one must consider the conflicting processes of public divisions those are operational in Ukrainian state (which has been already discussed in the domestic factors). As the centre of Ukrainian state, Kiev, in essence, connects three “Ukraine’s” which are visibly different in their origins, ethno-cultural composition and social and political priorities (Lapkin & Pantin 2006: 9). When modeled, the resulting structural differentiation of Ukrainian society can be presented as a space with four “poles” such as Kiev, the East, the South, and the West and several transitional zones in which the “polar” tendencies manifest themselves in a weakened form. Here are given a brief description of each of the four “poles”.

3.1 (a) Kiev: The Northern Region

Residents of Kiev-city and Oblast region are characterized, on the one hand, by their striving for unification and single national identity and, on the other, by an inclination to distance themselves from their real neighbours Russia and Belorussia. In politics, residents of this region are largely oriented toward the central government and its political projects, are not only toward those formally in power but also to groups close to the authorities that intend to compete for power in the near future. In terms of strategic positioning and self-determination, residents of Kiev-city and Oblast region are noticeably more likely demonstrate pro-Western sentiments, while their lack of enthusiasm with respect to Russia resembles the position found in Western Ukraine.
3.1 (b) The Eastern Region (Primarily the Donbass)

In this region, a kind of Soviet industrial enclave inside independent Ukraine, has proved to be the least prepared for life under liberal market conditions without paternalistic attention from the centre (ibid.: 9). The systemic incompatibility between the Soviet industrial complex and the new states’ economic policy and priorities has predetermined the region’s economic, social, political and ethno-cultural troubles. A major contradiction in socio-political attitudes prevails here is the profound dissatisfaction with the current situation, combined with intense engagement in national politics as the main source of political opposition to the course of building a nation state. In politics, the East is the domain of the left wing, whether nationalist or liberal, democratic politicians are unpopular here. In terms of strategic positioning and self-determination, the East demonstrates features traditional of the “Soviet mind set” anti Westernism, paternalism and prefers reintegration with Russia.

3.1 (c) The Southern Region (Odessa, Mykolavi & Kherson)

This is fundamentally different from the East version of “Russian speaking” Ukraine. The absence of a distinctive ‘industrial factor’ makes southerners’ pro-Russian sympathies more consistent and largely free from the temptation to “look over their shoulders” at the interest of Ukrainian statehood. Here paternalism is less in demand, while people give more confident assessments of their own adaptation to change and changes in life. In politics, the residents of the South favour groups that seek a liberal cosmopolitan democracy. Thus, Southern Ukraine symbolizes a search for a liberal democratic alternative to the nationalism of the Ukrainian West. In terms of strategic positioning and self-determination, the south is characterized by compromise and the absence of conflict between the pro-Russian and the pro-Western orientations. Apparently, a constructive solution to the problems of the Russian-Speaking south’s inclusion in a unified Ukraine would be to modernize Ukrainian politics by among other things, bringing its institutional structure closer to European standards and expanding its relationship with Europe, which is developing supranational integrative mechanisms (ibid.: 10).
3.1 (d) The Western Region (Volhynia, Galicia, Chernivtsi & Transcarpathia)

Despite the heterogeneity of the Western region i.e. a diverse conglomerate of ethnocultural geopolitical social segments and strata, the minds of its residents exhibit quite a few common features. The most important of these are profound rejection of the unified Soviet system, the Soviet mindset, and paternalism, as well as a distinctly expressed nationalism. In politics, Western Ukraine favours nationalist leaders and movements, from moderate centrists to national democrats. In terms of strategic positioning and self-determination, an orientation toward the West and Europe prevails among citizens of this region. As Western Ukraine, unlike Kiev, regards nationalism as lacking any paternalistic components, people here see the state primarily as a guarantor of independence, rather than a public guardian. Toward Russia, Western Ukraine demonstrates “Chilly neutrality”. Its acknowledgement of ethnic and in part, cultural kinship between Ukrainian and the Russian people is combined with a clear resistance to build closer ties at the state level (ibid.: 11). On the whole, the depth and breadth of the divisions among the Ukrainian regions hinder the prospects of a constructive development on various fronts. As they open up widespread opportunities for political maneuvering and for creating situational political coalitions aimed at achieving specific political goals, the Ukrainian state as a whole lacked a sincere, competent policy making elite to act with determination in the matters of foreign and security policy making.

From the above analysis of the various factors that has been influencing the foreign policy of Ukraine, it is evident that Ukraine is more vulnerable domestically than externally. It continues to suffer internally associated with the various factors leading to lack of consistency in its external relations. This also indicates that Ukraine is in no position to take full advantage of its independence or to provide much needed goods to its citizens. On the structural ground, Ukrainian political structure shows a clash of the executive and the legislative. Though the constitution gives the majority of policy making powers to the President (who uses organizations of the executive branch to formulate and implement policy) and the parliament is left with the task of developing basic directions and guidelines for policy, the legislature continues to seek greater powers at the expense of the executive. On the economic and military front Ukraine also shows its weakness in
relations to the pressures from Russia and limited its ability to have independent policy. Interest groups also play a very smaller role in policy making. The public opinion has little impact due to lack of a direct voice of the citizens in the matter of foreign policy. The role of the competing elite also seems too strange as their policy goals and strategies are made of on regional and ideological basis. Moreover, altogether Ukrainian state project the lack of cohesiveness in each and every front and the result is that Ukraine has adopted a multi-vector foreign policy aimed at both Europe and Eurasia, which is the true reflection of its domestic environment.

3.2. Dual Loyalty
Dual loyalty is also another factor, which created hindrance in the way of making independent foreign policy decisions. According to Gerhard Simon, many people in Ukraine have dual loyalty and feel that they belong both to Ukraine and Russia nations in terms of language, culture and awareness (Simon 1994:66). Though this dual loyalty is positive in so far as it acts as a retarder against nationalist exclusiveness, it can, have a negative impact in so far as many people see no sense in emphatically investing effort in the sustainment of an independent Ukrainian state (ibid.:66). Likewise, as there is a large Russian minority in Ukraine, which tends to view itself as a majority in many regions of the east and south, there is risk that the ties between the regions in the south and east of Ukraine to an independent state may turn out to be too weak and that a new division of Ukraine might result.

As already pointed out, this dual loyalty also created problems in determination of foreign policy choices. The nationalistic foreign policy agenda of President Kravchuk was opposed by the left-wing and anti-nationalist more moderate politicians, by a strong counter-lobby which argued that it was more natural for Ukraine to make its way in the world in alliance with Russia than in opposition to its influence (Wilson 1997:19). Simultaneously, the left-wing politicians supported the regional lobbies for the proposals for economic and even political reunion, usually between the Slavic triad of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, although sometimes with the addition of Kazakhstan, in essence echoing Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s vision of the post-Soviet future (Solzhenitsyn 1995:
90-91). Many left-wingers have also argued for Ukraine and Russia to coordinate or simply to merge their military efforts as the only way to restore the old Soviet military industrial complex to its former glory. The more moderate anti-nationalist position may be more properly labeled ‘Little Russianism’ (Wilson 1997:192). Its adherents also remain firmly in favour of an independent Ukraine, but either have no desire to leave the Russian cultural and historical space or argue that East European political realities are such that Russia must remain Ukraine’s main diplomatic, military and trading partner for the foreseeable future (ibid.:193). Therefore, it would be said that this dual loyalty in many ways obstructed the independent foreign policy decisions of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma from time to time, though the latter handled this problem in a pragmatic manner than his predecessor.