CHAPTER – 6

Conclusion
The United States and India shared a mutual suspicious relationship during the Cold War period. The major reasons for this distant relationship were the different foreign policy goals, ambitions and perspectives of the two countries during this period. On most of the major international issues, the two country’s polices were often at variance to each other. The main areas of difference were the US policy priority to contain communism, in which India was not interested. The US’ desire to create blocs of allies to prevent the advancement of communism. India had rejected this policy of alignment from the very beginning and had remained officially non-aligned, which only strengthened US suspicion. The US and India differed on each other’s role in world politics. While the US branded India as Soviet supporter, the US was considered to be hegemonic by India. The US’ funding of Pakistan as an important frontline US ally in South Asia further alienated India from the US. Both countries differed strongly on nuclear and security issues in South Asia. India also consistently believed that the US had ulterior motives on these issues which negatively affected security relations. Consequently, the US concerns of relative gain in its relations with India were based on the fact that any transfer of dual-use technology to India could be diverted to either the Soviet Union or India’s nuclear programme. Since India could acquire far more easily most of the defence and technology items from other countries such as Soviet Union or France, the successfully concluded deals with other countries did not appear to the Indians as being costly or sacrificial for the US. This diminished any sense of obligation for future cooperation or a move toward diffuse reciprocity. Although economic and cultural spheres were considered as brighter spots in an otherwise indifferent relationship, economic relations were dependent on political relations. However, despite these differences, the US-India security relations had never been uniformly hostile during the Cold War years, mainly because India was not a party to the Cold War and to a certain extent, because of India’s strong democratic credentials in a region maintained by periodic instability. There were times when the leaders of both the countries tried sincerely to forge a kind of friendship between the two nations. During this period, the US-India security relations were marked not so much
by animosity as indifference. For the US, India had a lesser priority compared to many other states in Asia. India too, never worked hard to change this attitude and instead tilted gradually towards the Soviet Union.

With the end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new security relationship began to develop between the US and India. The US no longer appears to view its relationship with India primarily through the prism of its relations with other countries in the region. Perhaps, the most significant development in the security relationship is that it has been decoupled from the US relations with Pakistan. In the past, this had been a major hurdle preventing any significant improvement in the US-India relations. Moreover, despite its own, sometimes volatile, political relationship with China, there is no indication that it views the improvement in India-China relations with any degree of concern. In other words, the US is acknowledging the legitimacy of India’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy; while there will be close politico-strategic-military-relationship between the US and India, there will be no ‘alliance’ relationship. This development in the US policy toward the region came under the first Bush administration (1988-92). During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, India, in a significant break from the past, allowed American aircraft to refuel in Mumbai. Though this minor military gesture quickly became the subject of much controversy within India, its importance as a cooperative endeavour was not lost on the United States. In addition, the Indian economic reforms programme, launched immediately after the Cold War also brought optimism about a strengthened US-India relations. The big Indian market and the growing Indian middle class with its enhanced purchasing power attracted American business to India. Further, the emergence of the US as the only superpower in a supposedly unipolar world led to changes in foreign policy perceptions in India, which had to adjust itself to the post-Cold War reality of the existence of only one super power, and pay more attention to the US. The increasing political and economic clout of the Indian American community was also considered important for improved bilateral relations after the Cold War. Therefore, the post-Cold War world order offered best possible environment for both the US and India to forge a stronger relationship. Though problems persisted in bilateral relations relating to issues of Kashmir, human rights and non-proliferation issues, but both the countries tried to work positively to improve relations at all levels during this period. All these factors laid the ground work for creating conditions suitable for stronger US-India security relations in the
Conclusion

post-Cold War period. Therefore, the findings of Chapter 1 of the present study indicate that
the US-India security relations remained distant and full of mistrust between 1947 and 1994.
The factors such as ulterior motives, relative gains and exchange being perceived as costly or
sacrificial were worked negatively in the US-India security relations during this period.
Despite having several instances of overlapping security interests, thus, a strong security
relationship between the two countries remained unaccomplished.

A watershed decision on the US-India security relations occurred on 12 January 1995,
when the two sides signed an “Agreed Minute on Defence Relations”, a document that
provided a more substantial basis for defence cooperation, during the visit to India by the
then US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry. It was hailed as a “milestone’ and the
“beginning of a new era” in bilateral security relations. It covered service-to-service and
civilian-to-civilian cooperation, as well as cooperation in defence production and research.
At the institutional level, three separate groups were also established to foster more
interaction and facilitate discussion i.e. the Defence Policy Group (DPG), the Joint Technical
Group (JTG), and the Joint Steering Committee (JSC). In addition to this, service-to-service
contracts reached an unprecedented level of interaction. The DPG met in both September
1997, the US Department of State began an extensive series of engagements at the cabinet-
ministry level under the umbrella of the Strategic Dialogue. The present study finds that
these initial steps were indeed successful in developing mutual trust and confidence between
the two countries on defence and security issues. William Perry’s visit and consequent
meetings and negotiations had helped bring the pyramid relationship to a platform.

While the Clinton administration in its second term was about to further broaden its
ties to India, the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 dashed the prospects for a rapid upsurge in
security relationship. India, as well as Pakistan, because it followed suit, faced significant
economic and military sanctions as the US administration’s efforts became single-mindedly
focused on the rolling back of India and Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
Consequently, in the immediate aftermath of the tests all other areas of the relationship
suffered important setbacks. India’s nuclear tests were an unwelcome surprise and also seen
to be a policy failure in Washington, and they spurred then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott to launch a series of meetings with Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh in

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an effort to bring New Delhi more in line with the US arms control and non-proliferation goals. While this immediate purpose went unfulfilled, the two officials soon engaged a broader agenda on the entire scope of US-India relations, eventually meeting fourteen times in seven different countries over a two-year period. The present study finds that partial lifting of the economic sanctions by the US began within a year of their imposition, partly because of the satisfactory progress of the Talbott-Singh strategic dialogue, and partly because the sanctions also hurt US exports to India and Pakistan and, thus, impacted US economic interests. In this way, the strategic dialogue restored mutual trust and confidence in the US-India relations. This confidence, in turn, led to the US President Clinton to play a key role in defusing the 1999 Kargil crisis, in getting Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the Kargil and Drass sectors of Jammu & Kashmir and in staving off a potential full-scale nuclear conflict between the two countries. The present researcher considers that the Kargil crisis brought about a paradigm shift in the way and the United States engaged each other on Indo-Pakistani disputes, in particular on the Kashmir question. The US support to India during the Kargil war and the pressure it apparently exerted on Pakistan went a long way in creating the all-important factor of faith in the US-India relations.

The US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000, the first presidential visit in over 20 years, was the turning point in the US-India defence and security relationship. President Clinton and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee jointly signed a “Vision Statement” where both the leaders resolved “to create a closer and qualitatively new relationship between the United States and India”. The signing of the “Vision Statement” by the two leaders provided a framework for closer cooperation in the future and a guideline for subsequent governments in the US and India. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s reciprocal visit to the US in September 2000, only the second such high-level reciprocal visit in a calendar year in the US-India diplomatic history, underscored the strengthening relationship. The issuing of an India-US Joint Statement during Vajpayee’s visit took stock of the actions taken with regard to the promises made in the “Vision Statement” and paved the way for further

59 In 1978, the US President Jimmy Carter visited to India and then the Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai paid reciprocal visit to the US. The success of the 1978 reciprocal visits had soon been submerged in the Cold War politics. The situation was completely different in 2000. After nearly a decade of the end of the Cold War, the two countries showed maturity and willingness to forge a strong long-term relationship. Moreover, unlike 1978, the 2000 visit by the US president was marked by the signing of the very comprehensive and futuristic “Vision Statement”, which is already mentioned above, charted segment-wise, the political, economic, technological, security etc. course of future cooperation between the two countries.
conclusion between the two countries. Significant improvements were made in all major segments of the US-India relations such as political, economic, defence and security as well as in the science and technology sectors. These visits and signing of joint statements may be considered as confidence building measures in the US-India security relations. Through specific reciprocal actions, thus, they achieved a degree of success in overcoming the earlier suspicion and mistrust and opening new avenues of bilateral cooperation like counterterrorism, information technology, and biotechnology. This research findings support the first hypothesis of this thesis which was “US-India security relations can be developed on the basis of specific reciprocal actions”, as correct.

The Bush Administration\textsuperscript{60}, even prior to assuming office, had signalled a willingness to pay greater heed to India as an emerging regional power. It was more than willing to advance the steps taken by the Clinton Administration\textsuperscript{61} in its second term. It also sought to downplay the two countries’ differences on the non-proliferation question. This led to a significant development in military-to-military ties. In turn, India’s restraint in light of the Bush administration’s decision to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty came as a most welcome surprise in Washington. This new willingness of both sides to pursue a non-ideological approach to bilateral relations opened the path to greater security cooperation.

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks marked a significant turning point of the US security policy and its relations with South Asia, especially with India. The war on terrorism has “transformed” US-India relations. It has greatly strengthened political dialogue between the United States and India and enhanced cooperation on sensitive issues such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. The “transformation” has been most visible in security relations, where

\textsuperscript{60} The Bush administration was more than willing to advance the steps taken by the Clinton Administration in its second term. This was evident in the announcements of the National Security Strategy (NNS) in 2002, in which India’s positive role in counterterrorism was visualised, the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in 2004, and most importantly, the successfully conclusion of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation of 18 July 2005. After the reciprocal visits in 1978, no such follow-up measures had been undertaken. The follow-up measures of cooperation taken by the two countries since President Clinton’s visit to India indicate that the Cold War political compulsions which had constrained the US-India security relations for many decades were over.

\textsuperscript{61} The Clinton administration’s preoccupation with questions of nuclear non-proliferation had inhibited any significant expansion of military-to-military cooperation or dual-use technology transfers. The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 also made such ties impossible and prompted the administration to impose economic and military sanctions on India. For all the positive developments, during the President Clinton’s historic visit to India in March 2000, the US and India continued to differ on the question of nuclear weapons in the region. Neither the Clinton Administration nor its hosts in New Delhi conceded any ground on this critical and deeply divisive issue. However, the Bush administration, for its part, took a more pragmatic and measured view of India’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
Washington and New Delhi have had few dealings for nearly four decades. This change became possible when the United States lifted nuclear sanctions in the wake of 11 September. India took the immediate and unprecedented step of offering to the US full cooperation, including the use of India's bases for counter-terrorism operation. The 11 September incident though revived Pakistan's status as a frontline state in American strategic perception for fighting terrorists in Afghanistan – the status which it had lost earlier after the collapse of the Soviet Union – yet at the same time, the 11 September deepened the US-India ties as well, because the US was forced to realize the real nature and dangers of international terrorism operating in Kashmir. The present researcher considers that the paradigm shift in the US policy towards the South Asian region since 11 September can also be seen from heightened US interest in balanced relations with India and with Pakistan, US efforts to manage the nuclear flash point in Kashmir, and the conscious US promotion of wider regional stability and economic integration. The most significant discontinuity in South Asia since 11 September has been the development of sound bilateral relations between the United States and both India and Pakistan. Since 11 September, the Bush administration has established positive relations with both New Delhi and Islamabad, engineered a productive triangular diplomatic process.

The Bush Administration, in a turnaround, accorded much greater priority to expanding military ties to India. In 2002, despite the significant distractions of ongoing India-Pakistan tensions, a series of joint US-Indian military exercises got under way. Among various others, two of considerable note were exercises involving American Special Forces and Indian Para-commandos in the historic city of Agra, and another in Alaska involving Indian mountain divisions experienced in high-altitude warfare. In addition to expanding the scope of military-to-military contacts, the Bush administration signalled a willingness to sell India various forms of weapons technology, including previously embargoed aircraft engines and artillery-locating radar, and initiated regular diplomatic consultations on such matters of common interest as terrorism, peacekeeping operations, the protection of sea lanes, and piracy. This significant development in the US-India defence cooperation has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of the present study. The findings of this chapter indicate that the US-India defence cooperation has developed substantially through specific reciprocal actions.
taken by the two sides since President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 and especially after the lifting of nuclear sanctions in the wake of 11 September.

In the US National Security Strategy Report of 2002, the US redefined its security relations with India stating that as “India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century”, the United States would “invest time and resources for building strong bilateral relations with India”, and “work hard to transform our relationship accordingly”. Consequently, the United States and India signed General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in the year 2002, essentially guaranteeing that they would protect a classified information or technology shared between them. Singing of GSOMIA gave India greater access to US military establishments and some dual-use technologies. It also paved the way for the sale of US weapons to India.

The years 2002-03 witnessed a series of high-level meetings and substantial cooperation between Washington and New Delhi. The research findings of Chapter 3 of this thesis which dealt with “US-India Cooperation in Transfer of Dual-Use Technology” indicate that there was a degree of improvement in the US-India dual-use technology cooperation since the year 2002. As the US-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) initiative was launched in November 2002 to enhance strategic trade with the US, including through improved access to controlled “dual use” items from the US. In February 2003, both sides signed a “Statement of Principles for US-India High Technology Commerce”. The Statement of Principles is a major achievement in fulfilling the commitment made in November 2001 by President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee to qualitatively transform US-India relations. The two Governments set forth the principles to further promote and facilitate bilateral high technology commerce in its broadest sense. The transformation was accelerated in 2004 under the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), which was announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee on 12 January 2004. Committing their countries to a strategic partnership, the two leaders agreed, “to expand cooperation in three specific areas: civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, and high technology trade”, in addition to expanding their dialogue on missile defence. These areas of cooperation were designed to progress through a series of reciprocal steps that build on each other. The NSSP was seen as both a milestone in the bilateral relationship and a blueprint for its further progress.
The “Defence Framework Agreement” signed between the two countries on 28 June 2005 for a 10 year period is a landmark event in the annals of defence cooperation between the United States and India. This replaced the “Agreed Minute on Defence Relations” of January 1995. It seeks to remove mutual suspicion that has dominated the US-India relations in the past and replaces it with an active agenda for military cooperation. The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice’s visit to India in March 2005 initiated a high level energy dialogue with India to include energy security, expanding cooperation on civil nuclear energy, clean energy and nuclear safety issues. The US-India security relations, further, developed on 18 July 2005 when the two sides signed an agreement on “Civil Nuclear Cooperation” during the visit to Washington by India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The 18 July agreement set out specific actions to which the US and India must agree and by which they must abide for civil nuclear cooperation to occur. This agreement is seen as the most significant development giving implicit formal recognition to India’s nuclear weapons status and a possible opening up of opportunities for it to become a global player in the field of nuclear energy. The present study finds that the signing of the HTCG, Statement of Principles for High Technology Commerce, the NSSP, New Framework for Defence Cooperation, and US-India Nuclear Deal, further, helped build mutual trust and cooperation in the sensitive areas of bilateral cooperation on civilian nuclear technology, civil space technology, high-technology trade, and a dialogue on missile defence. Important progress has been made in each of these areas. This research findings testifies the second hypothesis of this thesis as correct, which was bilateral “security agreements signed between the two countries have occurred specifically and sequentially which addressed the problems of mutual trust and goodwill”.

President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in New Delhi in March 2006 issued a Joint Statement that included an announcement of successful completion of India’s nuclear facility separation plan. In the Joint Statement, they reaffirmed their commitment to expand even further the growing ties between the two countries. On 18 December 2006, President Bush signed into law “The Henry J. Hyde US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006”. This law represents an historic achievement and a major step forward toward realising President Bush and Prime Minister Singh’s vision of a strategic partnership between the world’s strongest and largest democracies. Moreover, the US National Security Strategy
Report of 2006 states that “We have set aside decades of mistrust and put relations with India, the world’s most populous democracy, on a new and fruitful path”. Therefore, the Indo-US civil nuclear deal is a pathbreaking agreement and both the countries wanted to put this agreement in the context of a larger strategic relationship. The Indo-US nuclear deal is a mutually beneficial agreement. It is a win-win agreement for India’s energy security; it would boost investment in Indian industry and make it more technologically competitive; enhance nuclear trade with France and Russia initially, and with the US subsequently; enable the country acquire sophisticated military equipment and dual-use technologies and augment its national security preparedness; it is a welcome step for a clean environment as the growing Indian economy will emit lesser amounts of greenhouse gases than if it was relying entirely on hydrocarbons for energy; and it would aid global non-proliferation efforts by bringing a large number of the existing Indian nuclear facilities and all future (civilian designated) nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards. The research findings of Chapter 4 of the present study which dealt with “US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation” indicate that the formalisation of US-India nuclear deal, there appeared to be a lot of convergence of interests between the United States and India as never seen before anything during last six decades.

In an expanded conception of security, there was also a greater focus on peace, development and cooperative security between the two countries. Security challenges now include not only the traditional defence-related, but also the non-traditional security threats. The new security challenges to both the countries are diverse and multi-dimensional, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, security of resources such as energy and water, illegal migrations, human rights abuses, piracy, drug trafficking and gun running, climate change, and environmental degradation. The US-India cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues have been discussed in Chapter 5 of the president study. The research findings of this chapter shows that the United States and India have undertaken significant joint measures to counter these non-traditional security challenges. In many respects, therefore, the US-India security relationship is evolving in response to the changing role of India as a regional power and (potential counterweight to China), the growth of India’s economy and its attendant impact on US interests in such varied realms as energy policy planning and foreign trade, and Washington’s interests in continued stability in the
subcontinent in light of its stated objectives in the war on terrorism. Today, the relationship has reached to such a height where it never had reached in the past. Therefore, the present US-India security relations have developed through specific reciprocal actions which led from specific bilateral cooperation to other areas of cooperation. This research findings support the third hypothesis of this study which was “the pattern of security relations through such specific exchanges can deepen and evolve, leading to stronger and diffused relations based on mutual trust”, as correct.

It is in this analytical context that the present study has examined the evolving parameters of the US-India security relations. Now, coming to the overall assessment of what has led to a paradigm shift in the US-India security relationship, one could say that there are five significant developments have helped bring about the recent dramatic strengthening of US-India relations. First, the end of the Cold War removed the US-Soviet rivalry as the principal focus of US foreign relations and the rationale for India’s nonalignment policy. Second, India’s historic economic reforms of the early 1990s, led by Manmohan Singh, then finance minister and now prime minister, opened India to the global economy for the first time and catalyzed the extraordinary boom in private-sector trade and investment between the United States and India that continues today. Third, the signing of the very comprehensive and futuristic “Vision Statement”, by the President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee during the formers visit to India in March 2000, provided a framework for closer cooperation in the future and a guideline for subsequent governments in the US and India. The follow-up measures of cooperation taken by the two countries since President Clinton’s visit to India indicate that the Cold War political compulsions which had constrained the US-India security relations for many decades were over. The negative affect of the three factors such as ulterior motives, relative gains and exchange being perceived as costly or sacrificial were also reduced significantly in the US-India security relations during this period. Fourth, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent war on terrorism have “transformed” US-India relations – especially in the defence and security sectors. Finally, as the twenty-first century began, the global order started to undergo a tectonic shift, and India’s emergence as a global force was obvious for all to see. Thus, the period under study is very significant from the point of view of future relations because it laid the foundations of a new and much more engaged relationship.
The existence of consistencies in the United States and India’s policies and geopolitical interests are necessary conditions for future cooperation, however, the present study finds that there remains significant differences between the two countries. Particularly, in regard to India’s non-adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); its disinclination to support the US policies in Iraq; its desire to develop energy links with Iran; its future nuclear and ballistic missile programmes; and the US-Pakistan relations. Many other developments in the region could also be held responsible that have contributed in a significant manner in not allowing US-India defence and security relations to grow during this period. It is actions like US doing business with Pakistan under Brown amendment, its deviation from the long held position on Kashmir, failure to initiative steps to weaken the Sino-Pakistan nexus in missiles and nuclear related areas. Moreover, India’s test of five nuclear devices in May 1998 alienated the United States more, which chose to impose economic sanctions in response and some of the US sanctions on dual-use technology transfer yet to be completely removed. As the technology transfer holds key for further development of defence and security relations, the US technology transfer polices, security concerns and bureaucratic stringency inhibited in developing a strong security relationship. Therefore, the United States and India need to overcome these obstacles before they can attain a true global partnership. The two countries also need to work more effectively to counter terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, light weapons and small arms trade, drug trafficking and narcotics, climate change, environmental concerns, human rights and health issues (HIV-AIDS and other epidemics). Progress so far has shown how effectively they can work together to settle past differences and meet future challenges.

The present study suggests that the contemporary security relationship between the US and India should approach their bilateral problems in a larger perspective. Having identified the areas of convergence and conflict, both the countries need to devise practical modalities to build upon the areas of convergence as well as to narrow the difference of opinion on the conflictual issues. Therefore, a sound approach to strengthening the US-India security relations would require the continuing strong and public support at the highest levels of government of enhanced bilateral cooperation to emphasize to bureaucracies and publics in both countries the need for effective and unified policymaking by those bureaucracies;
maintenance and, as possible, enhancement of official cooperation and dialogue on political, security, and intelligence areas; reinstitution of an official dialogue on bilateral and international economic policy issues; and, negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement to spur expanded economic ties; the US policy should also recognize its stake in India’s growth and select its economic reform agenda based chiefly on the broad economic impact of proposed reform measures; and, thus, provide a solid floor beneath which the security relationship can never fall.

The United States should also undertake actions to ease restrictions on cooperation in the civilian satellite sector; and, treat India as a “friendly” country with regard to the granting of export licenses of defence equipment and dual-use technologies. Adopting these two measures as policy has just become more likely as both sides have agreed to formalize a framework of action that would enable India to obtain dual-use technologies from the United States. This agreement would allow India to receive civilian nuclear, space, and other technologies. In terms of defence cooperation, for India “the ‘acid test’ for US commitment” is technology transfer. The reason for this can be found in New Delhi’s experience of defence ties with Moscow, which primarily consisted of arms purchases without joint military exercises or exchanges, and India’s perception of the United States as an unreliable source of weaponry. The United States, by contrast, conceives of a bilateral security relationship as being multifaceted and comprehensive – much more than just arms transfers – encompassing military exchanges, exercises, and strategic dialogues.

The Bush Administration said that its goal “is to help India become a major power in the 21st century”. This would require open and public support for India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, working actively with India (and other) to accomplish the goals of Security Council expansion. Even by the rules of 1945, India has a strong candidate for a seat. More than a million Indian soldiers fought with the Allies in the Second World War. In the twenty-first Century, the case for a permanent Indian place at the table is even more persuasive given India’s thriving democracy, billion-plus population, expanding economy and long-standing contributions to UN peacekeeping. Indeed, New Delhi will almost certainly take the degree of Washington’s backing in its quest for a permanent seat as a kind of litmus test of the strength of America’s commitment to the strategic partnership. For the United States, however, this is part of a much larger issue about major institutional
reform of the United Nations. Moreover, Washington has to weigh the candidacies of a number of other countries that are seeking permanent membership on the Security Council.

A prognosis that the present researcher can make based on the findings of this thesis is that this warmth security relationship between the two countries is going to continue. The factors that have helped to develop such a prognosis are the continuing improvement in defence, dual-use technology, civil nuclear cooperation, non-traditional security issues and political and economic relations between the two countries since the Kargil crisis. The initiatives taken by both countries after the Kargil crisis like joint military exercises, establishment of the US-India Joint Working Group (JWG) on counterterrorism, the HTCG, Statement of Principles on High Technology Commerce, the NSSP, the New Framework for Defence Cooperation, the Civil Nuclear Cooperation, etc. bear testimony to this improvement in bilateral relations. As the trend suggests, such initiatives are expected to increase, making the proximity sustainable in the future. A related prognosis can also be made from the present study that improvement of the US-India security relations is not going to be dependent on the incumbent government of any particular political party in either country. Security relations will continue to develop irrespective of any political party in power in both the countries, as the major political parties in both the countries are willing to forge a closer relationship.62 While defence and security relations are expected to be much closer in future US-India relations, unlike the Cold War years, economic relations will also remain dominant in the relationship.

The present researcher considers that for the future development of this security relationship, the United States will seek to build a robust, multi-faceted relationship with the principal power in the South Asian region, India. It will attempt to forge such a relationship for a number of compelling reasons. These are

- With the waning of the Cold War India’s foreign-policy-making elites have dispensed with much of their visceral anti-American fervour and now are seeking a more viable relationship with the United States.

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62 For instance, while the Bush Administration led by Republican Party continued the upward trend in bilateral relations initiated by the Clinton Administration led by Democratic Party, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh led the UPA government also continued the warmth in bilateral relations initiated by Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee led NDA government.
Despite the slothful pace of India’s efforts at economic reform, its sustained GDP growth rate of about 7 to 8 per cent over the last one decade and the potential Indian market remains attractive to American business and commercial interests.

The United States recognizes India as an emerging world power and a possible role that it can play in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia.

The “likely emergence of China and India as new major global players” will “transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries”. The emergence of China and India as new global economic powerhouses “will be the most challenging of all” Washington’s regional relationships. In the competition with Asia over technological advances, the United States “may lose its edge” in some sectors. India is an important “swing state” in the sense that a strengthened US-India relationship would be a major gain for the US; conversely, an indifferent relationship would be a major loss.

A closer relationship with India will also enable the United States to prosecute some of its more immediate-term interests in the region, namely the continuation of its efforts in fighting terrorism. India’s decision-makers, who have long had to cope with the depredations of the allies of these organizations in Kashmir, remain eager to cooperate with the United States in this common anti-terrorist enterprise.

The US administration also has a global approach to the US-India relations, consistent with the rise of India as a world power. India’s rising power provided the foundation for a changing relationship with the United States, but sustaining new Indo-US ties will, therefore, depend on India’s evolution during the next 10 years.

India is the most populous credible democracy in the world, and democracy is being advanced and exported as an essential national value by the US Administration. For these reasons, the Bush administration promised that the United States is intent on making India a major world power.

India is now poised to enter a new phase in its foreign policy. It aspires to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is demonstrating a growing capability to shoulder regional and global responsibilities. The US recognises India’s this potential role, as the 2006 National Security Strategy report states that, “India
now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power”.

New Delhi also has a direct and vital role in ensuring regional stability vis-à-vis Pakistan and in promoting the development of China as a responsible partner. Although the United States does not “have a policy that would build up a relationship with India to contain China”, Washington and New Delhi are watching Beijing carefully and pursuing policies that will induce China to move in a positive direction. India has made clear that it will not be a pawn against China, and like the United States, it is increasingly engaging in political, diplomatic, and military exchanges with China. Given the commonality of US and Indian concerns and hopes about China, this is an issue on which they can closely collaborate. Therefore, the United States is not working to contain China. Rather, the US policymakers are employing a radically different strategy; to preserve Washington’s strategic position in the region by facilitating the ascent of friendly Asian centres of power that will both constrain any Chinese bid for hegemony and allow the United States to retain its position as Asia’s decisive strategic actor. In the face of the China challenge, the United States is encouraging the emergence of new centres of strength that will not erode US power but protect the US position in a new Asian balance featuring emerging world powers in China, Japan, and India. Thus, its strategy vis-à-vis China is one of engagement and not of containment. It wants to create an environment in which China is more likely to play a positive role than a negative role.

Moreover, the US-China trade hit $387 billion in 2007, making China the second largest US trading partner. Such a large trade relationship does not lend itself to practicing a containment strategy as was done in respect of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the US strategy is to help develop a balance of power in Asia so that China would not emerge as the sole superpower in the continent. While Russia and Japan are already major established powers in the international system, India is an incipient power. Hence, the US decision announced in

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63 US-China trade rose rapidly after the two nations established diplomatic relations in January 1979, signed a bilateral trade agreement in July 1979, and provided mutual most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment beginning in 1980. In 1978, before China's reforms began, total US-China trade (exports plus imports) was $1 billion; China ranked as the 32nd largest export market and the 57th largest source of US imports. The US-China bilateral trade hit $343 billion and $387 billion in 2006 and 2007 respectively, making China the 2nd largest US trading partner after Canada (Morrison 2008: CRS Report RL33536; USCBC: http://www.uschina.org).
March 2005 that its goal “is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century”. Therefore, the present US offer to help India in its moves to become a major power in the twenty-first century is based on US calculations of its own interests in respect of Asian and world developments. The US initiative on extending civil nuclear energy to India is rooted in the strongly held views of President Bush that revival of nuclear energy was essential to solve the energy problem and to ensure that major industrial powers are not held hostage to oil exporting countries.

Regarding China, India, therefore, finds itself on a more positive trajectory. India’s growing economic, military, and diplomatic strength, combined with China’s desire to concentrate on internal political-economic development, induces Beijing to improve relations with New Delhi. India’s rather astute cultivation of better ties with the United States and China has encouraged Beijing to seek better relations with India so that India should not align closely with the United States against China. New Delhi and Beijing, thus, augment their national military capabilities while simultaneously engaging in mutual diplomatic reassurance.

In the Indian case, it accepts that the United States occupies the apex of world power in its several dimensions – military, technological, economic, political and even popular culture. It hopes to gain access to high technology, particularly defence technology, but also to nuclear technology, materials and equipment for its atomic energy programme as well as enriched and natural uranium. India also needs the US to face any eventualities that might arise from the tensions among its neighbours. The contours of the Indo-US nuclear deal might be seen in this perspective as well. However, three issues will largely determine the future of its relations with the US. First and foremost, India’s ability to sustain moderately high levels of economic growth and open its markets to foreign and especially American investment will have a profound impact on the relationship. Its failure to do so will retard the deepening of the relationship. Second, India’s continuing interest in and willingness to expand military contacts with United States and broaden the range of military-to-military cooperation will also play a vitally important role. Third, India’s ability to maintain social peace will also affect the US-India relations. If elements of the Indian state remain complicit in the ethnic and religious violence, US-India ties will almost inevitably suffer. The US executive branch will inevitably face pressure from the Congress and nongovernmental...
organizations to scrutinize and upbraid India. Until recently, Indian political elites across the political spectrum have been hypersensitive to such criticism. Nevertheless, in the emerging global normative climate, their ability to ignore such criticism will be increasingly difficult.

The US-Indian security relationship, therefore, has developed on the basis of specific reciprocity and that through such specific exchanges the pattern of security relations may deepen and evolve, leading to stronger relations based on mutual trust as a result of recurrent and gradually expanding political and socio-economic exchanges. Hence, trust must be built in the coming years through more interaction and exchange for a strong and diffused security relationship to flourish. The US-Indian civilian nuclear deal is a good start, but only a start. For its part, in time India will need to assume more burden-sharing responsibilities globally if it wants the United States to recognize its membership in the top tier of the international community. In time, India's reticence will likely diminish. The civilian nuclear agreement finally removes the concrete barrier that has long kept India out of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also removes the more intangible intellectual barrier that has stopped Indian governments and its people from playing a more assertive role in the international community. Even now, however, the United States should not overlook that India is already acting as a responsible stakeholder, setting the norms and pursuing the values that are such an important part of what the United States represents. Like the United States, India is synonymous with democracy, development, equality, freedom, liberty, and other such fundamental beliefs. The US-India strategic partnership would help shape global norms and institutions that are universally accepted and democratic. Washington and New Delhi, however, need to study and absorb the lessons of the past and should cooperate with each other on political, economic, defence and security grounds if the United States and India are to forge a more constructive security relationship in the years ahead.