CHAPTER – 5

Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security Issues
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COOPERATION IN NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

The end of the Cold War encouraged hopes of a rare era in history, when international relations would no longer be defined by great power rivalries. The hope of a more stable and peaceful world after the end of the Cold War, premised on the expectations that the geopolitical and security tensions brought on by the Cold War overlay would finally come to pass, were short-lived. Instead, the world is confronted with new security challenges emerging from a host of transnational threats. There is growing recognition that “new security challenges are proving to be more severe and more likely to inflict more harm to a greater number of people than conventional threats of interstate wars and conflicts. These newly emerging threats are referred to as non-traditional security (NTS) threats” (Anthony 2007).

Expressing similar views, India’s the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, in a speech on “India-US Relations in the Emerging Global Environment” at the Asia Society, in New York on 22 September 2003 said that

The end of the Cold War “had kindled hopes of an enduring era of security and stability. This has not happened. Instead, new political problems and security challenges have been thrust upon us. Many newly independent countries still suffer from weak political institutions, economic stagnation and a deficit of democracy and modernity. This threatens the security of their people and that of their neighbours. Globalization has promoted development and prosperity in some countries, but the uneven spread of its benefits has also created new disparities. The communications revolution has also resulted in the globalisation of crime and terror, and even of epidemics and diseases” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Speech at the Asia Society” 2003d).

In this changing world, the US and India face a series of non-traditional security challenges that go beyond the traditional dimensions of security and both the countries have been cooperating with each other in combating these new security challenges. As R. Nicholas Burns, the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in his article “America’s Strategic Opportunity with India” in Foreign Affairs stated that

45 Non-traditional security issues have direct implications on the overall security in the South Asian region and on the well being of individual states and societies. The gravity of the problem can be seen in the way NTS issues are increasingly discussed not only in academic circles but also among policy makers. These issues are now portrayed and treated by officials as posing threats to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, as well as to the well being of their respective societies. It is undeniable that the spread and impact of the non-traditional threats to security have been amplified by the accelerating effects of globalization.
“Our open societies face similar threats from terrorism and organized crime... As Washington thought about how best to contend with the greatest of globalization’s challenges – international drug and other criminal cartels, trafficking in women and children, climate change, and especially the rise of terrorism and its potential intersection with weapons of mass destruction – it became clear to most of us in the US government that we needed to combine forces with powerful emerging countries such as India... to respond to these threats. In this radically changed global landscape, the basic interests of India and the United States – the world’s largest democracy and the world’s oldest – increasingly converged” (Burns 2007: 131, 134).

Similarly, Robert G. Joseph, the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, in his prepared Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), in Washington, D.C. on 2 November 2005, pointed out that “We believe it is in our national security interest to establish a broad strategic partnership with India that encourages India’s emergence as a positive force on the world scene. Our desire to transform relations with India is founded upon a contemporary and forward-looking strategic vision. India is a rising global power and an important democratic partner for the United States” (Joseph 2005). He added that

“Today, for the first time, the United States and India are bound together by a strong congruence of interests and values. We seek to work with India to win the global War on Terrorism, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that could deliver them, to enhance peace and stability in Asia, and to advance the spread of democracy. India and the United States are on the same side of these critical strategic objectives. Our challenge is to translate our converging interests into shared goals and compatible strategies designed to achieve these aims” (Ibid.).

Since 11 September 2001, the US and India have made significant strides in responding to the non-traditional security challenges. They have been working together to address these new security challenges. As K. Subrahmanyam (2005: 557), a prominent Indian strategic analyst, wrote that “Today, the US perceives its threat differently and, therefore, looks at India differently”. Therefore, “the US and India are drawn together in an effort to deal with these new” security challenges and circumstances. As a result, the US and India have re-defined their security relationship based on “democracy, common principles, and shared interest” (MEA, Government of India, “Joint Statement by US-India Defence Policy Group”, 2003b).
Defining Non-Traditional Security Issues

The newly established Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia has defined non-traditional security issues as "challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime" (Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia: http://www.rsis-ntsasia.org). These dangers are mainly non-military in nature, transnational in scope – neither domestic nor purely interstate, come with very short notice, and are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and communication revolution. As such, national solutions are rendered inadequate and would require comprehensive (political, economic, and social) responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force (Anthony et al. 2006). In the changed global scenario, therefore, there is increased emphasis on addressing these global problems with a global-collective approach. These problems are not country specific and require collective management. Thus, the prominence of multilateralism in foreign policy is also underlining the ethos and logic of the collective management of these issues. The resolution of these issues can provide a foundation of stability within and between nations.

With this background, the present chapter analyses the US-India cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues from 1995 to 2006. As there are so many non-traditional security challenges that the two countries face today, it discusses some of them in order of their importance and urgency such as terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, climate change, environmental security, human rights and health issues (HIV-AIDS and other epidemics). This chapter discusses these non-traditional security issues in five broad sections i.e. i) Counterterrorism cooperation, ii) Cooperation in preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, iii) Cooperation on climate change, iv) cooperation on environmental security, and, finally, v) human right and health issues (HIV-AIDS and other epidemics).

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46 One, however, would note that there is yet to be a consensus definition on what non-tradition security really means since the issues that would fall under NTS are often contextually defined. For example, what may be NTS issues in one country like economic security, food security or energy security could already be part of the traditional concept of security in the other. As energy security which is now included in the rubric of NTS in Asia had long been a part of a country's (i.e. Japan) traditional security issues (Akaha 2004; Wang, Defining Non-Traditional Security: URL: http://www.neat.org.cn).
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

Counterterrorism Cooperation

Since 1995, the main area of concern for India’s intelligence agencies with regard to foreign terrorism has been violence perpetrated by Pakistani jihadi organisations such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). The first three of these organisations came into existence during the Afghan war of the 1980s in order to combat Soviet troops. The JEM emerged in 2000 as the consequence of a split in the HuM (Raman 2006: 159). Since 1997, the US concerns with international terrorism had led to a convergence of Indian and US interests, and a consequent improvement in relations between the two countries. It was India which felt the need for closer cooperation vis-à-vis terrorism in response to the bombings of US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam (India Today, 7 December 1998: 57).

According to the US Department of State 1999 annual report on terrorist nations, “Credible reports continued to indicate official Pakistani support for Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism such as the HuM. The hijackers of the Air India Flight 814 reportedly belong to one of these militant groups. One of the HuM leaders, Maulana Massod Azhar, was freed from an Indian prison in exchange for the hostages on the aircraft in the Air India hijacking in December and has since returned to Pakistan” (US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999: 8). Maulana Massod Azhar, then publicly announced the creation of yet another terrorist organisation in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir to fight India in the Kashmir Valley. The free reign given by the Pakistan government to militant Islamic outfits augmented the perception of official Pakistani complicity in terrorism

47 The beginning of US-India cooperation in counterterrorism can be traced to 1981 when some Sikh organisations – such as the Babbar Khalsa, the Dal Khalsa, and the International Sikh Youth Federation, acting in the cause of an independent Khalistan in Punjab, started engaging in terror acts, including the hijacking of aircraft. These organisations had an active clandestine presence not only in Punjab, but also in the United States, Canada, and West Europe. The fact that almost all the hijacked aircraft were forced to fly to Lahore, Pakistan, created fears in the minds of the US authorities that if such activities were not controlled, they could exacerbate the tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad. While refraining from criticising Pakistan for the activities of the Sikh terrorists from its territory, the United States started showing greater sensitivity to the problems faced by India in dealing with these terrorists (Raman 2006).

48 Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, many of the victorious mujahideen have joined with Kashmir freedom fighters in their armed struggle for independence. Three major, rebel groups, the Hizbul-Mujahideen, HuM, and LeT, have from a loose coalition to coordinate and execute terrorist’s attacks, including suicide bombings, in India from their sanctuary in Pakistan. General Pervez Musharraf gave these organisations free rein to operate within Pakistan’s borders, as did his predecessor, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (whom Musharraf overthrew in a coup in October 1999). While Musharraf condemns terrorism and maintains that Pakistan only provides “moral and political” support to its Kashmiri brothers, he nonetheless fans the flames of the separatist cause (Starr 2001: 117).
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

(Ayoob 2001: 124). Subsequently, the Prime Minister Vajpayee, in an address to a joint session of the US Congress in 14 September 2000, urged the members of the US Congress to recognise that the South Asian region had become one of the greatest sources of terrorism in the world. Prime Minister Vajpayee said that

“No country has faced as ferocious an attack of terrorist violence as India has over the past two decades: 21,000 were killed by foreign sponsored terrorists in Punjab alone, 16,000 have been killed in Jammu and Kashmir”. He added that “Distance offers no insulation. It should not cause complacence... such evil cannot succeed. But even in failing, it could inflict untold suffering... that is why the United States and India have begun to deepen their cooperation for combating terrorism... we must redouble these efforts” (MEA, Government of India, 2000f).

However, it was only after the 11 September terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon, the US came out strongly to fight against international terrorism and the post 11 September made the US realise its vulnerabilities and sensitising it to the issue of terrorism; an issue that India has been suffering from for almost two decades (Bhabani Mishra 2005: 89).

Shortly after 9/11 the government of India communicated to the American mission in New Delhi that it would extend whatever support the United States wanted, including military bases, in its global war against terrorism. India soon went public with its offer of full operational military support to the United States. Prime Minister Vajpayee in his letter to the US President written in October 2001 said that “India joined wholeheartedly with the United States in its goal for the destruction and defeat of the global terror network which you eloquently announced in your address to the Congress. With you we condemned any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism” (Embassy of India, Washington D.C., GOI, 2001; Noorani 2003). In response to India’s quick support, Colin L. Powell, the then Secretary of State said that “With the strong support we have received from the Indian government since 11 September, we are seizing the opportunity to accelerate the pace of change (Powell 2001).

Following the terrorists attack on Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee said that

“The terrorist attack on our Parliament on 13 December has shown beyond a shadow of doubt that the anti-India forces in Pakistan are prepared to wreak any havoc on our soil. It was an attack on our sovereignty, on our national self-respect, and it was a challenge to our democratic system. Although India has been a victim of cross-border terrorism for the past nearly two decades and has lost tens of thousands of innocent men and women and security
forces, the outrage of 13 December has breached the limit of the nation's endurance” (MEA, Government of India, “Prime Minister Vajpayee’s address to the nation on the eve of New Year”, 2001).

Although India wanted the war on terrorism in Afghanistan to be extended to eliminate terrorism in Kashmir, this did not happen. However, India’s diplomatic effort combined with its strong lobby in Washington made the US publicly acknowledge “the kind of terrorism that affects India”. The US soon recognized India as “a key partner in the global coalition against terrorism” which had to be “ended everywhere” (Embassy of the US, New Delhi, “People, Progress and Partnership”, 2004).

The focus on terrorism was spelled out especially clearly in the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), issued in 2002 and again in 2006. The US NSS report 2002 proclaimed that “We share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia” (The White House, US NSS report 2002: 27). The 2006 version presented strengthening alliances, defusing regional conflicts, and the expansion of international prosperity as means to the larger end of defeating terrorism (The White House, US NSS report, 2006a). According to Patterns of Global Terrorism released by the US Department of State on 29 August 2004, India suffered more “significant terrorist incidents” than many other countries in 2003. The report also for the first time listed two Indian “Naxalite” organizations, the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre, as “other terrorist groups” (US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2004b).

Another important aspect need to be mentioned here that despite having the second largest Muslim population in the world, India has not been a base for any Al Qaeda recruitment, a situation that has drawn US (Ollapally 2005: 5).

**Joint Mechanisms on Counterterrorism:** One facet of the emerging “strategic partnership” between the United States and India is greatly increased counterterrorism cooperation. In a joint statement issued at the end of the India’s External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh and the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott meeting in London on 18-19 January 2000 “agreed to work together to ensure that the perpetrators of the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814 are brought to justice, as part of their joint efforts to combat international terrorism” (The Washington File, “Joint Statement of Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott Discussions”, 2000).
The United States and India have institutionalized their co-operation to combat international terrorism through a Joint Working Group (JWG) on counter terrorism. The first meeting of the JWG was held on 7-8 February 2000 in Washington, where the two sides unequivocally condemned all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them. Inter-agency teams from the two countries agreed on a range of measures to enhance cooperation between the two countries to combat international terrorism. The two sides also agreed to share experience, exchange information, and coordinate approaches and action (US Department of State, “Joint US-India Statement on Counterterrorism Working Group”, 8 February 2000). This joint working group is also a part of the wide ranging architecture of institutional dialogue established by the two sides during the visit of President Clinton to India in March 2000. Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Bill Clinton signed a joint statement entitled “A Vision for the 21st Century” in New Delhi on 21 March 2000 which stated that

“The two leaders consider combating international terrorism as one of the most important global challenges. They expressed satisfaction at the establishment of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and its productive first meeting in February 2000. They agree that the Joint Working Group should continue to meet regularly and become an effective mechanism for the two countries to share information and intensify their cooperation” (Embassy of India, Washington, D.C., GOI, “India-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century” 2000).

While much of the groundwork for strengthening institutional cooperation in counterterrorism had already been done before the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, the terrorist strikes of 2001 led to two important new initiatives. The first was the establishment of the US-India Cyber Security Forum, which held its first meeting in New Delhi in April 2002, and the second in Washington, D.C. in November 2004. Whereas the JWG consists exclusively of governmental experts in various aspects of counterterrorism with no involvement of non-governmental experts, the Cyber Security Forum brings together both government and industry representatives from each country to identify areas for collaboration such as combating cyber-crime, cyber security research and development, information incident management and response.

Underlying the significance of this initiative in counterterrorism cooperation, a press statement issued in November 2004, at the end of the second meeting of the Forum said that
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, in a prepared statement read to the delegates, emphasized that the US-India Cyber Security Forum “holds great promise for future cooperation.” The Indian Head of Delegation, National Security Council Secretariat Joint Secretary Arvind Gupta, delivering a statement to the Forum on behalf of J.N. Dixit, the then India’s National Security Advisor, said that “Securing cyberspace will remain one of the biggest challenges facing the international community for years to come and this Cyber Security Forum has emerged as an important bilateral mechanism to address such issues” (US Department of State, “US and India Launch New Phase of Cyber Security Cooperation”, 2004d).

The statement added that the first meeting of the US-India Cyber Security Forum was held in New Delhi in April 2002 in recognition of the increasing interdependency between India and the United States in the information technology field. US government and corporations utilize information technology companies in India at a rate of about $9 billion annually. “As this trend increases, it is crucial that our governments and private industry work together to ensure an environment for secure transactions, networks, and software development,” said Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., who headed the US delegation to the meeting (Ibid.). The two countries also reaffirmed their commitment to cooperation on securing cyberspace by establishing five joint working groups and identifying action plans for each. Future efforts will include workshops in New Delhi and Washington and scientific exchanges. Representatives of private industry similarly identified areas to strengthen cooperation (Ibid.).

The second new post-9/11 initiative was to expand the scope of the India-US Defence Policy Group (DPG), set up during the Clinton Administration to cover military-to-military cooperation in counterterrorism. A joint statement issued in December 2001, at the end of the third meeting of the DPG held in New Delhi said that

“A strengthened bilateral relationship will assist both countries to counter threats such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, narcotic trafficking and piracy. The two sides exchanged views on the global campaign against international terrorism. They emphasized that the military operation against the Taliban and the Al-Qaida network in Afghanistan is an important step in the global war against terrorism and its sponsors everywhere in the world. They expressed satisfaction at the cooperation between the two countries in the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan. Noting that both India and the United States have been targets of terrorism, the two sides agreed to add a new emphasis in their defense cooperation on counter-terrorism initiatives, including expanding mutual support in
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues


An important outcome of this initiative is cooperation between the navies of the two countries against piracy and maritime terrorism and the provision of Indian naval escorts for US ships transiting the Malacca Strait.

Following 11 September 2001, the leaders of the two countries also issued a number of policy statements, jointly and individually, on the scope of counterterrorism cooperation. A joint statement issued on 9 November 2001, following a visit by Prime Minister Vajpayee to Washington for talks with President Bush said that

“Since September 11, the people of the United States and India have been united as never before in the fight against terrorism. The two leaders noted that both countries are targets of terrorism, as seen in the barbaric attacks on 11 September in the United States and on 1 October in Kashmir. They agreed that terrorism threatens not only the security of the United States and India, but also our efforts to build freedom, democracy and international security and stability around the world. As leaders of the two largest multi-cultural democracies, they emphasized that those who equate terrorism with any religion are as wrong as those who invoke religion to commit, support or justify terrorist acts... They recognised that the international community will have to wage a long and multi-faceted struggle against terrorism, with patience, determination and unwavering focus. They emphasised that there is only one choice and only one outcome: terrorism must be fought and it shall be defeated” (The White House, “Joint Statement between US and India”, 2001).

President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee agreed that success in this endeavour would depend heavily on building international cooperation and securing the unambiguous commitment of all nations to share information and intelligence on terrorists and deny them support, sustenance and safe havens (Ibid.). Robert Blackwill, the then US ambassador to India, in November 2001 said that Washington and New Delhi were on the brink of a major relationship, and pledged the war against terrorism would not be over until terrorism ended against both countries. “A terrorist is a terrorist,” Blackwill said in reply to a question about Pakistan’s support for militants fighting in Jammu and Kashmir. “They are not freedom fighters. No country will be permitted to provide sanctuaries to terrorists” (The Times of India, 21 November 2001). In the Joint Statement on US-India Defence Policy Group Meeting issued on 23 May 2002, both sides agreed that

“Terrorism and state support for terrorism remains a major threat to the security of their two countries. In this context, they noted the success of Operation Enduring Freedom and the broader war on terrorism, and condemned the recent upsurge in terrorist attacks against India. They agreed that an end to terrorism is critical to ensuring a future of peace and stability in
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

South Asia and around the world. They also reiterated their determination to continue the task of eliminating al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations and entities... The United States and India have demonstrated progress in military cooperation aimed at enhancing mutual capabilities in combating terrorism, including joint research and development of technologies for meeting this threat. In the joint statement, the two sides agreed that in the coming weeks their representatives would address counterterrorism equipment requirements for India's special operations forces (US Department of Defense, “Joint Statement on US-India Defence Policy Group Meeting” 2002).

The fifth meeting of the US-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism was held on 11-12 July 2002. The Joint Working Group met three times in the past twelve months, reflecting the importance that the two sides attach to international cooperation in combating terrorism. The year 2001 has been a watershed for the two democracies in confronting the challenge of terrorism. During this period, the United States and India have accomplished much in their counterterrorism cooperation. They have, inter alia:

- Broadened their exchange of information and assessments on the international and regional terrorist situation;
- Strengthened intelligence and investigative cooperation;
- Qualitatively upgraded and expanded anti-terrorism training programmes for Indian law enforcement officials;
- Signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty;
- Launched a bilateral Cyber Security Forum, with a wide-ranging programme of action to address challenges of cyberterrorism and information security;
- Introduced military-to-military cooperation on counterterrorism to supplement the initiatives of the US-India Defense Policy Group in this area;
- Worked together closely on multilateral initiatives on terrorism, including on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373;
- Initiated dialogue and cooperation in homeland/internal security, terrorist financing, forensic science, transportation security and border management; and
- Taken concrete steps to detect and counter the activities of individual terrorists and terrorist organizations of concern to the two countries (US Department of State, “Joint Statement of US-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism”, 2002a).
As a result of these initiatives, there have been many qualitative changes in the counterterrorism cooperation mechanism since 2000. Therefore, the war on terrorism has greatly strengthened political dialogue between the United States and India and enhanced cooperation on sensitive issues such as Afghanistan and Pakistan (Kux 2002: 93-106). Subsequently, Prime Minster Vajpayee, addressing the Asia Society in New York on 22 September 2003, said that “Continued terrorist attacks around the world remind us that the global war against terrorism, which commenced after the tragedy of 9/11, is far from over. Our long-term strategy to combat it should have four broad elements:

i) A concert of democracies acting in cohesion. A threat against one should be seen as a threat against all;
ii) Consistency of approach in demanding from all countries, the same high standards in combating terrorism;
iii) Continuity of resolve, and clarity of purpose. We should not be drawn into the grey zone of conflicting policy objectives, which condone ambiguous positions on terrorism; and
iv) To win the war against terror, we have to win the war of ideas. We have to expand the constituency of democracy by promoting the ideals of freedom, democracy, rule of law and tolerance, which are our defining strengths” (MEA, Government of India, “India-US Relations in the Emerging Global Environment” 2003d).

Though couched in seemingly global terms, all the four elements neatly fit into New Delhi’s case against the United States’ “double-standards” on Pakistan. This, in fact, has been the running theme of the prime ministerial diplomatic efforts here so far: without wanting to be seen as fixated on Pakistan, he has been trying to hammer away at Islamabad’s continued sponsorship of terrorism, aimed primarily at India (The Hindu, 24 September 2003). Since the last meeting of the DPG in May 2002, the US and Indian defence establishments have continued to expand cooperation. They discussed the success of Operation Enduring Freedom and reaffirmed the ongoing commitment of both countries to the future of Afghanistan. They agreed that a permanent end to terrorism is critical to ensuring a future of peace and stability in South Asia. The US and India have continued to work together to enhance their capabilities to combat terrorism and increase interoperability. They also agreed to continue to review counter terrorism equipment requirements for India’s special operations forces (MEA, Government of India, “Joint Statement by India-US Defence Policy Group”, 2003c).

In the JWG, there has been an effort to explore ways of intensifying exchange of information, especially regarding review of threat perceptions, early warning, cooperation of
administrative and judicial matters to prevent and suppress the commission of terrorist acts, and to facilitate action against perpetrators of such acts” (Advani 2003). Apart from the JWG and the Cyber Terrorism Forum, issues relating to the fight against terrorism figured in almost all bilateral discussions, official and nonofficial. As the former Indian Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal mentioned in his address to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) on 4 February 2003 that

“Considerable progress has been made in combating terrorism in the past two years by creating new levels of international cooperation, by crafting new multinational standards for state behaviour and responsibility, by disrupting financial networks, by interdicting terrorist and by dismantling terrorist bases in Afghanistan. But much more still needs to be done” (Sibal 2003).

The Sixth meeting of the India-US Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism was held on 31 August-1 September 2004 in New Delhi. The discussions included

“An assessment of the current international terrorism situation, a review of the US-led operations in Afghanistan and a review of the trends and concerns about the situation in South Asia, including cross border terrorism... Both sides agreed that, even as the challenge posed by international terrorism continues to mutate, it is important for the international community to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation to effectively meet this challenge... Perspectives were exchanged on multilateral efforts to counter-terrorism. Both sides agreed that the institutional mechanisms set up by the UN Security Council should continue to be strengthened” (MEA, Government of India, “Joint Statement: Sixth Meeting of the India-US Joint Working Group” 2004c).

In the 18 July Joint Statement, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh resolved to “combat terrorism relentlessly” through “vigorous counterterrorism cooperation” (The White House, US-India Joint Statement of 18 July 2005). Moreover, the 28 June defence pact called for strengthening the capabilities of the US and India militaries to “promote security and defeat terrorism” (Embassy of India, Washington, D.C., GOI, “the New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship” 2005). Subsequently, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in their Joint Statement in New Delhi on 2 March 2006 noted that

“The enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries and stressed that terrorism is a global scourge that must be fought and rooted out in every part of the world”. They also “recognized the importance of capacity building in cyber security and greater cooperation to secure their growing electronic interdependencies, including to protect electronic transactions and critical infrastructure from cyber-crime, terrorism and other malicious threats” (MEA, Government of India, “US-India Joint Statements” 2006b).
The United States and India reiterated their commitment to cooperate against terrorism in a statement issued by the US-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism on 21 April 2006. "The discussions advanced US-India cooperation in areas of common concern such as bioterrorism, aviation security, advancements in biometrics, cyber-security and terrorism, WMD-terrorism, terrorist finance and money laundering and violent extremism", according to the statement released by the US Department of State on 21 April. The two sides also discussed real-time information sharing, quick response to requests for counterterrorism assistance, collaboration on upgrading terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, and improvements to current mechanisms for extradition and legal cooperation (US Department of State, "US-India JWG on Counterterrorism, 2006e).

As India started the hunt for the terrorists responsible for the series of bomb blasts in Mumbai and Kashmir in July 2006, the US said it was with India in its war against terror. Terming it as a brutal attack on commuter rail passengers, Bush said it only "strengthens the resolve of the international community to stand united against terrorism and to declare unequivocally that there is no justification for the vicious murder of innocent people". Reflecting the new era of relationship between the two nations, the US Department of State offered to assist the Government of India in its investigations against the terrorists attack. "The United States stands with India in the war against terror. Those responsible for these terrible acts should be swiftly brought to justice," Secretary of State Rice said in a statement (The Indian Express, 13 July 2006). Moreover, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher on August 2006 said that "there are terror groups in Pakistan having "designs" on India. "We all know there is terrorism in the South Asian region. Some of the terror groups that have designs against India still have pieces in Pakistan," he said while addressing a gathering at the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) office (The Indian Express, 8 August 2006). Meanwhile, the US asked Pakistan to use its influence with terror groups to completely stop attacks on India, US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns said in October 2006. Burns said that

"We obviously wish to see no more terrorism emanating from Kashmiri militants. We have told the Pakistani government to use influence with these terrorist groups to curb and stop altogether any attacks on India", (The Indian Express, 13 October 2006).
According to the US Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, India achieved major success in 2006 in countering terrorism by effecting numerous arrests and confiscation of explosives despite challenges associated with its law enforcement and judicial systems. It said that “Terrorists staged numerous attacks in India, including a series of commuter train bomb attacks in Mumbai which killed over 200 people and injured more than 700. Despite challenges associated with its law enforcement and judicial systems, India achieved major successes this year including numerous arrests and the confiscation of explosives and firearms”. The report noted that US Government and military cooperation with India on counter-terrorism continued to expand (US Department of State 2007; The Indian Express, 2 May 2007).

**Constraints in Cooperation:** Despite the success of counterterrorism measures under a joint working group on terrorism, at least three areas of divergence remain. There are differences in defining the threat: Americans see it as a global challenge; Indians are more preoccupied by regional eruptions - in Kashmir, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and occasionally along the Indo-Burma and Indo-Bangladesh borders. There are divergent views on the roots of terrorism, with Indians seeing Pakistan as the root of the problem, not a solution, and the Americans viewing Pakistan as a key ally in their overall war against terror. And the Indians worry that the war on terror might destabilize the Persian Gulf and create wider disturbances in the region (Adhikari 2004). Pakistan’s unequivocal support, at the government level at least, for the United States’ war against terrorism was beginning to cast a shadow over recently mended India-US relations. In its avowed war against terrorism the US was not only accepting the support of a state India has been asking to be declared terrorist, but also appears to have succumbed to Islamabad’s blackmail and done a deal behind India’s back. That is making the people here quite jittery.

However, the Joint Working Groups have proved to be a useful mechanism for exchange of information, intelligence sharing, anti-terrorism training programmes, etc. and for strengthening institutional links between crime prevention agencies in the two countries. In the JWG, there is an effort to explore ways of intensifying exchange of information, especially regarding review of threat perceptions, early warning, cooperation of administrative and judicial matter to prevent and suppress the commission of terrorist acts.
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

and to facilitate action against perpetrators of such acts. While these efforts have been useful and important, this area calls out for greatly expanded cooperation between the two countries has been held at the expert level. However, the US and India have come a long way in expanding their cooperation and dialogue on terrorism. The goal of confronting terrorism has given a very strong rationale for the US foreign policy not only to secure the support of the different countries but also to expand its involvement in different parts of the world. In its war on terrorism, the US even found it possible to develop positive relationship with both India and Pakistan. Therefore, the most significant discontinuity in South Asia since 11 September has been the development of sound bilateral relations between the United States and both India and Pakistan. Since 11 September, the Bush administration has established positive relations with both New Delhi and Islamabad, engineered a productive triangular diplomatic process.

Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)\(^49\)

The proliferation of WMD is a problem facing both the US and India, and will continue to be a trenchant problem in the future. Both the countries oppose proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as other WMD. They perceive this as the greatest challenge to their national security and to the peace and stability in the international system. However, they have had divergent perceptions on nuclear non-proliferation which constrained in the development of a stronger security relationship. The US advocates horizontal non-proliferation whereas India wants to halt both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. As India is bordered with two nuclear states i.e. China and Pakistan and since independence, it has fought five wars – one with China and four with Pakistan. Therefore, India believes that real security is possible only through global disarmament and not by disarming the non-nuclear nations. Since the pursuit of global disarmament has become practically futile, India’s object of nuclear policy has been confined to the South Asia, while the US nuclear policy has been targeted globally. South

\(^{49}\) US Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, “Message of the Secretary of Defense,” refers to Weapons of Mass Destruction as those with “capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction: nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons or the means to deliver them” (US Department of Defense 2001: 4). The development and use of WMD is governed by international conventions and treaties, although not all countries have signed and ratified them: Partial Test Ban Treaty; Outer Space Treaty; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Seabed Arms Control Treaty; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC); Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), etc. (UNODA: http://disarmament.un.org/WMD)
Asia has become a major test case for the US nuclear non-proliferation policy (Perkovich 1999; Subramanyam Raju 2001: 127; Tellis 2001; 2002: 13-45). A study of the US-India nuclear cooperation and conflict reflects the successes and failures of the US nuclear non-proliferation policy.

The US and India were involved in many areas of conflict in the 1990s. The US was quite firm that India should sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and also the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and this pressure increased under the presidency of Bill Clinton. The US administration did not accept the basic argument of the Government of India that the NPT is a discriminatory treaty. The US sought to impose its Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) of 1987 over India and pressurized Russia to abrogate its contract with India for the transfer of cryogenic rocket technology. The US threatened that it would impose sanctions against India and Russia under the MTCR, if rocket technology were transferred to India. The US policy makers convinced that India has emerged as a middle level nuclear power in South Asia and its space research and missile developments are directed towards the goal of military nuclear capabilities (Cohen 2001; V. P. Dutt 1999: 396-408).

India’s conducting of nuclear tests in May 1998 at Pokhran and the subsequent announcement by India that it has become a nuclear weapon state clearly indicated that India has exercised its nuclear option. In the post-Pokhran II scenario, however, in spite of international reactions and sanctions, India has drawn attention to its desire to continue cooperation with the global community in discussing a wide range of nuclear issues. Apparently, India insisted to regard its announcement of moratorium on nuclear tests as a part of its “cooperation” and “consideration” on certain provisions of the CTBT. Prime

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50 India’s main objections to the NPT have been that it is a discriminatory treaty and there is lack of balance of obligation. While the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) which sign the treaty are obliged to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons states (NWS) assume no responsibility to disarm regarding nuclear weapons. The one-sided application of the safeguards clause to the activities of the non-nuclear weapon states while exempting the activities of nuclear weapon states from inspection, and the denial of peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) by the non-nuclear weapon states demonstrate the other area of discriminatory or unequal character of the NPT (K. Subrahmanyam 1974: 137-142; Poulose 1978: 117).

51 India has firmly and finally refused to sign the CTBT in its present form. There was a national consensus on the issue of rejection of the CTBT cutting across the wide spectrum of political parties of all hues. On 20 June 1996, Arundhati Ghosh, India’s representative at the Geneva talks on CTBT, made it clear that the draft treaty was not acceptable to India. It was not doing anything new to end the existing five-nation nuclear monopoly, or taking any step to a comprehensive nuclear disarmament (MEA, Government of India, Statement made by Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, to UN in the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva on 20 June 1996 and also on 8 August, 1996; 1996a).
Minister Vajpayee, in his UN General Assembly speech on 24 September 1998, said that by announcing a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear tests explosions, "India has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT" (MEA, Government of India, Address of the Prime Minister Vajpayee to the 53rd UNGA, 1998). Besides offering to participate in the CTBT and in the negotiation of the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), India also started to engage in a dialogue with the United States on non-proliferation issues. The dialogue between the Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh and the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott which started after India’s nuclear tests, concluded in 2000 after more than two years discussions. During the course of these talks, much of the differences over security and non-proliferation issues were removed (Talbott 2004).

An important point needs to be mentioned here that though India went nuclear it reiterated its commitment to strive for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free world. India did not conceive nuclear weapons as something which is indispensable for all times. The Preamble to Indian Nuclear Doctrine states that "the use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the international system" (MEA, Government of India, Indian Nuclear Doctrine, 17 August 1999). Moreover, Prime Minister Vajpayee, while presenting a statement on the "evolution of India’s nuclear policy" in Parliament on 27 May 1998, said that "Our leaders reasoned that nuclear weapons were not weapons of war, these were weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear-weapon-free-world would, therefore, enhance not only India’s security but also the security of all nations. This is the principle plank of our nuclear policy" (Lok Sabha Debates 1998).

So far as India’s policy on disarmament and Arms Control is concerned, Indian Nuclear Doctrine argues that a "global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security objective. India shall continue its efforts to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon free world at an early date". Moreover, "nuclear arms control measures shall be sought as part of national security policy to reduce potential threats and to protect our own capability and its effectiveness. In view of the very high destructive potential

52 At the end of the talks, however, the US had not conceded India’s right to get access to nuclear technology for power production. Unless India signed the CTBT, the Clinton administration was unwilling to allow India any access to civilian nuclear technology (Talbott 2004)
of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures should be sought, negotiated and constituted” (MEA, Government of India, Indian Nuclear Doctrine, 17 August 1999). In this context, Lalit Mansingh, the then Indian Ambassador to the US in his address at the Sigur Centre for Asian Studies on “Accomplishments and Challenges in the New Era of Cooperation” in April 2004 said that

“Over the past several decades, maintaining strict controls on our nuclear and missile capabilities has been a vital part of our security policy. Our Government’s commitment to non-proliferation has been unwavering and our record impeccable. As our scientific and technological capabilities in the private sector have grown, we have further strengthened our controls on the export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies as a national security imperative… For India and the US, the arc of proliferation and terrorism that surrounds India is one of our biggest common challenges. In an uncertain and unpredictable world, where the existing non-proliferation regime is being increasingly challenged by strategic proliferation and the horrifying possibility of its links with terrorist organizations, India and the United States can turn their common concern on non-proliferation into a partnership against proliferation. That must be one of the aims of our strategic partnership” (Mansingh 2004).

In addition to this, the government of India has taken significant measures in controlling the proliferation of WMD. One such measure is the passing of “The Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act 2005”. The Act provides legislative basis to prohibit unlawful activities in

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53 India shares with most other nations the conviction that every effort should be made to eliminate the world’s store of nuclear weapons, and it has demonstrated its commitment to this conviction in a variety of ways. It was India that first proposed an end to nuclear testing in 1954. The principles for a NPT were first proposed by India in 1965. India eventually refused to sign the NPT when it became clear that, instead of addressing the central objective of universal and comprehensive non-proliferation, the treaty only legitimized the continuing possession and multiplication of nuclear stockpiles by those few states possessing them. It proposed in 1982 a convention to ban nuclear weapons, including a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. It put forward a comprehensive action plan for a nuclear-free world within a specific time-frame at the third United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, in 1988 (MEA, Government of India: www.indianembassy.org, 1988a).

54 Rajiv Gandhi, then India’s Prime Minister, in a speech before the UNGA in New York on 9 June 1988, argued “We cannot accept the logic that a few nations have the right to pursue their security by threatening the survival of mankind... nor is it acceptable that those who possess nuclear weapons are freed of all controls while those without nuclear weapons are policed against their production. History is full of such prejudices paraded as iron laws: That men are superior to women; that white races are superior to the coloured; that colonialism is a civilizing mission; (and) that those who possess nuclear weapons are responsible powers and those who do not are not... The essential features of the Action Plan (submitted to Special Session on Disarmament of the UNGA for elimination of all nuclear weapons) are: First, there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminating nuclear weapons in stages, by the year 2010 at the latest. Second, all nuclear weapon States must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries must also be part of the process. Third, to demonstrate good faith and build the required confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal. Fourth, changes are required in doctrines, policies and institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations should be undertaken to establish a Comprehensive Global Security System under the aegis of the United Nations” (MEA, Government of India: www.indianembassy.org, 1988a).
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

relation to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (MEA, Government of India, 2005b). This Act, which brings India into compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1540, also responded to US pressure for a unified export control law. The Act

- Criminalizes the unauthorized possession, export, re-export, transit, transshipment, and brokering of materials and technologies related to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as to missile delivery systems;
- Criminalizes intangible transfers of technology;
- Forbids Indian citizens – wherever they might be located – from taking part in a programme or project if they know or have reason to believe that their efforts will contributing to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and
- Broadens legal liability so that not only individual offenders but all owners and managers of a firm found to be in breach of the law may be held liable (MEA, Government of India, 2005b; Gahlaut 2005).

Behind Delhi’s policy of controlling nuclear and missile exports was a firm political conviction that spreading dangerous technologies in the world is morally wrong and strategically dangerous for India. The policy also arose from a strong desire to demonstrate that India was a responsible member of the international community, despite being a non-signatory to the NPT. The mechanics of how the Indian leadership was able to enforce this commitment for so long were equally straightforward: The federal government centralized all authority over the use and development of nuclear and missile technology while confining all research and development in these two areas – whether for civilian or military uses – to public-sector/government-owned enterprises. The Indian penchant for elaborate licenses, permits and bureaucratic controls helped make the policy of restraint in strategic exports a matter of routine. Select private-sector entities were tasked to manufacture items designed by government labs and to supply them exclusively to the relevant public-sector enterprises. This involved a very small number of companies that produced highly specialized items. Private-sector vendors were compelled to accept strict prohibitions on disclosure of classified information and forbidden to supply these items to anyone else, inside the country or outside (Gahlaut 2005; Gahlaut and Srivastava 2005).

The US policy toward WMD proliferation during the 1990’s gradually expanded, increasing emphasis on arms control agreements and including counter-proliferation. As a
world free of nuclear weapons is not a foreseeable prospect, impeding proliferation is an important consideration in US national security policy (Brown 2007: 20). Therefore, the National Security Strategies (NSS) published by the Clinton administrations had included stopping WMD proliferation as a major policy objective. They classify it as a threat to its national interests, on a par with transnational and regional or state-centred threats. Each NSS addressed WMD proliferation, concluding WMD “pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security” in the 1998 NSS report (The White House, NSS Report 1998: 6; NSS Report 1995: 17; NSS Report 1999: 5). Similarly, President Bush, in a statement on Domestic Preparedness against WMD, in May 2001 said that “Protecting America’s homeland and citizens from the threat of weapons of mass destruction is one of our Nation’s important national security challenges”. He added that “together with our allies, we seek to deter anyone who would contemplate their use. And… we must ensure that our Nation is prepared to defend against the harm they can inflict” (The White House, Statement by President Bush on Domestic Preparedness against WMD, 2001a).

Baker Spring, senior research fellow in national security policy at the Heritage Foundation, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on “International Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction Counter-proliferation Initiatives” in June 2004 said, “the policy of the United States for combating the proliferation of WMD has rested on four pillars. These four pillars are:

a) Deterring attacks on the US and its friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction;
b) Maintaining the ability to defend against such attacks;
c) Pre-emptive attacks against those that would threaten the US and its friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction and against whatever capabilities they may possess; and
d) Arms control, which is designed to limit the access of hostile forces to these kinds of weapons and their delivery systems (Spring 2004).

“This four-part policy” Baker Spring argues, “remains the foundation of the US effort for combating proliferation, despite the fact that those who seek to threaten the US and its
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

allies are a different cast of characters from those of the Cold War era and their capabilities differ”. Two significant differences are that

“Rogue states and terrorist organizations are now at the forefront of those that threaten the US and they support and are supported by a shadowy network of traffickers in weapons and weapons technology. The trick is to fashion these four essential tools into a coherent policy for combating proliferation that is properly suited to countering the capabilities that either are now or in the future could be in the hands of such rogue states and terrorist groups” (Ibid.).

The Bush Administration has been pursuing a number of specific initiatives to attack the proliferation threat posed by international networks that traffic in WMD and weapons technology by interdicting relevant shipments in transit. These include the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and the initiative under the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) programme. Among these, however, the PSI is the initiative most directly related to countering proliferation, as opposed to preventing attack or providing for homeland security. The PSI seeks to coordinate the actions of individual states in interdicting shipments of weapons, weapons components, and weapons production equipment. Baker said that “Experts have defined the PSI as a counter-proliferation activity. I see it more as an arms control activity, albeit an aggressive one, because it is designed to keep weapons out of the hands of hostile actors more than a means to deter, defend against or pre-empt attacks with weapons of mass destruction” (Ibid.). By spearheading PSI, the Bush Administration has taken a major step toward balancing international and national authority in controlling weapons proliferation. This approach allows each participating state to make a contribution toward interdicting relevant shipments in a way that is consistent with its national laws and policies.

So far as the US-India cooperation in preventing proliferation of WMD is concerned, both the countries have made significant progress in this regard since 2001. The US-India Defence Policy Group (DPG) met on 20-23 May 2002 in Washington, D.C. In the meeting, both sides “reaffirmed their commitment to work together to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. To this end, the two sides agreed to hold further consultations in the coming weeks on the threat such proliferation poses to their common security interests” (US Department of Defense, “Joint Statement on US-India DPG Meeting”, 2002).

203
In this context, US-India engagement within the bilateral "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" (NSSP) framework is of particular relevance. Announced by President Bush and then-Prime Minister Vajpayee in January 2004, the NSSP envisages cooperation in the civilian nuclear and space sectors, high-technology commerce, and missile defence. The two sides concluded Phase One of this initiative in September 2004, with India agreeing to procedures for conducting end-use visits in India and to enhanced non-proliferation measures. The United States also recently posted an export control attaché at its embassy in New Delhi to conduct end-use checks and outreach to Indian government officials and industry on export controls. The two sides were also working on additional phases of the NSSP, under which India would continue to strengthen its export control regime and the United States would ease certain restrictions on exports of dual-use items to India (Gahlaut and Srivastava 2005).

Subsequently, the United States and India signed a landmark strategic agreement on 18 July 2005 to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation while at the same time strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In signing on to the joint declaration, the Bush administration agreed to reverse a decades-old US non-proliferation policy by removing obstacles to cooperation with India’s civil nuclear power programme. Specifically, President Bush referred to India’s strong commitment to preventing proliferation of WMD and stated that, “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology,” India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states”. On the other hand, India reciprocally agreed that “it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States” (The White House, US-India Joint Statement of 18 July 2005). Through the Joint Statement, India committed to a number of important non-proliferation steps. These are:

- Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes and file a declaration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its civilian facilities;
- Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;
- Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;
- Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

- Work with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) to halt production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
- Refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and support efforts to limit their spread; and
- Secure nuclear and missile materials and technologies through comprehensive export control legislation and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (Ibid.).

Moreover, in the 18 July Statement President Bush and Prime Minister Singh committed “to play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The US welcomed the adoption by India of legislation on WMD (Prevention of Unlawful Activities Bill)” (Ibid.)

The non-proliferation experts, however, argue that the potential costs of nuclear cooperation with India to US and global non-proliferation policy may far exceed the benefits. At a time when the United States called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and for tighter multilateral controls, US nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating a NSG exception. This is at odds with nearly three decades of US non-proliferation policy and practice. Some believed that the proposed agreement undercuts the basic bargain of the NPT, could undermine hard-won restrictions on nuclear supply, and could prompt some suppliers, like China, to justify supplying other states outside the NPT regime, like Pakistan. Others contend that allowing India access to the international uranium market will free up its domestic uranium sources to make more nuclear weapons.

In response to this, Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, in his prepared Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Washington, D.C. on 2 November 2005 said that the Joint Statement agreed to by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh is not – as some have argued – a triumph of power politics over non-proliferation principles. “This is not a zero-sum trade-off, whereby improvement in our bilateral strategic relationship results in non-proliferation losses. Rather, as the broadly-constituted Joint Statement is implemented, it will prove a win for our strategic relations, a win for energy security, and a win for non-proliferation” (Joseph 2005). India’s Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, in his article “Nuclear Non-Proliferation and...
International Security” also wrote that the exception for India is rooted precisely in its record on non-proliferation, even though it is not formally a member of the NPT. It is significant to note that the “Indo-US understanding in civilian nuclear cooperation is prefaced by President Bush conveying his appreciation for India’s strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation. He has acknowledged India as a responsible State with advanced nuclear technology. There is today no other State, which has this record of responsibility and is still denied non-discriminatory access to civilian nuclear technology, Secondly, our export controls are today at global standards and our policy of non-transfer of re-processing and enrichment technologies, in fact, put us in an ‘NPT plus’ category” (Saran 2005: 367).

Andrew K. Semmel, US Deputy Assistant Secretary, Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy and Negotiations, said that in June 2005, “as part of our discussions on civil nuclear cooperation, India’s parliament passed a landmark WMD export control law that significantly upgraded and improved India’s ability to counter the proliferation of materials related to weapons of mass destruction. This law makes such proliferation a crime in India, just as it is in the United States” (Semmel 2006). Moreover, R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, in his hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative”, on 2 November 2005 said that all the steps that India pledged on 18 July joint statement that would “Strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, and all align with our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. India’s September vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that found Iran in noncompliance with its nuclear obligations reflects India’s coming of age as a responsible state in the global nonproliferation mainstream” (Burns 2005a). Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, in the same hearing on 2 November 2005 said that

“As befits a major, responsible nation, and in keeping with its commitment to play a leading role in international efforts to prevent WMD proliferation, we hope that India will also take additional non-proliferation-related actions beyond those specifically outlined in the Joint Statement. We view this as a key component of the developing US-India strategic partnership and look forward to working with the Indian Government, as well as the international community more broadly, to further strengthen non-proliferation efforts globally” (Joseph 2005).

India’s Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, stated that “As a responsible nuclear weapon state, we are even more conscious of our obligations to the international community on the
control of WMD technologies and their delivery systems” (Saran 2005: 363). Foreign Secretary Saran further pointed out that

“Our own security interests have been seriously undermined by the clandestine nuclear weapons programmes in our neighbourhood aided and abetted, or at the least, selectively ignored by some NPT signatories themselves. In seeking clarity on such clandestine activities, the international community must focus not merely on recipient states but on supplier states as well; otherwise our global non-proliferation effort would be undermined by charges of motivated selectivity and discrimination” (Saran 2005: 364-365).

Earlier, in the 28 June 2005 Joint Statement on the New Framework for Defence Relationship, both the countries agreed in a common belief in “preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, data, and technologies”. In pursuit of this shared vision of an expanded and deeper US-India strategic relationship “enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (MEA, Government of India, 2005). President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in their March 2006 joint statement, expressed satisfaction with the great progress the United States and India have made in advancing strategic partnership to meet the global challenges of the 21st century. Both countries are linked by a deep commitment “to increase mutual security against the common threats posed by intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction” (MEA, Government of India, US-India Joint Statement, 2006b).

They “welcomed India’s intention to join the Container Security Initiative aimed at making global maritime trade and infrastructure more secure and reducing the risk of shipping containers being used to conceal weapons of mass destruction. They reiterated their commitment to international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (Ibid.).

Under the US-India civil nuclear deal, India will “maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing”, and put in place very strict measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials and technology. By taking these steps, “the agreement strengthens the international non-proliferation regime and plays a vital role in enhancing international security and stability. In a time when terrorists are bound and determined to gain access to weapons of mass destruction, nothing is more important than keeping weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear technology, out of the wrong hands. So India’s commitment to non-proliferation clearly serves the interest of us all” (Cheney 2006).
Therefore, India’s track record on controlling dangerous exports is the main reason why the US-India nuclear deal has received support from Britain, France, Russia, and the IAEA, among other interested parties. However, as India becomes more intertwined with global high-technology commerce, the Indian export control system will require upgrades and strengthening. Government of India is committed to bringing its export control enforcement to the strictest international standards, and its WMD Act, approved by the Parliament in May 2005, is intended to actively pursue this goal. The US government is uniquely placed to encourage further strengthening through technology cooperation (including the US-India nuclear deal) and to facilitate it through focused outreach to and dialogue with India.

Climate Change

Cooperation on climate change, energy and environment are significant components of US-India relations. The US Administration, under President Bush, expressed a long-term commitment to climate change. The US approach is based on scientific research, technology transfer and promoting market-based mechanisms. One important strategy for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions is developing and sharing climate-friendly technologies. The United States “participates in various bilateral and multilateral technology cooperation initiatives that aim to encourage the use of technologies that will reduce greenhouse gases” (USAID 2002).

The US climate change policy, as articulated by President Bush in his 11 June 2001, and 14 February 2002 climate change policy announcements, reaffirms the US commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its ultimate objective – to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at a level

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55 An increase in the levels of GHGs (greenhouse gases) could lead to greater warming, which, in turn, could have an impact on the world’s climate, leading to the phenomenon known as climate change. Indeed, scientists have observed that over the 20th century, the mean global surface temperature increased by 0.6 °C (Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, Climate Change: http://envfor.nic.in/cc/what.htm). Climate change in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) usage refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs from that in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where climate change refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods (IPCC, Climate Change Report 2007: 30).
that will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate (USEPA 2006a: www.epa.gov; Watson 2003). The policy recognizes the need to take near-term actions, while maintaining economic growth that will improve the world’s standard of living.

It is "grounded in the reality that addressing the issue of climate change will require the sustained effort by all nations over many generations. And it will require the development and deployment of new transformational technologies during this century – technologies that will allow us to produce and use energy with little or no net emissions of GHGs and technologies that will allow the use of abundant fossil fuels" (Watson 2003).

Harlan L. Watson, US Climate Negotiator and Special Representative, addressing at the “US-India Cooperation on Climate Change” in New Delhi on 11 November 2003 said that President Bush’s climate change policy has three basic components designed to address both the near-term and long-term aspects of climate change: i) Slowing the growth of GHG emissions; ii) Laying important groundwork for both current and future action; and iii) Working with other nations to an efficient and effective global response (Ibid.). However, the United States, one of the world’s largest producers of greenhouse gases, has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol mandating a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Rather than national regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, the Bush administration relies on voluntary measures to combat global warming. The success of US climate change policy, therefore, ultimately depends on corporations voluntarily reducing their greenhouse gas output. But pledging to cut carbon is bad for business, which is why so few firms take such voluntary measures. In other words, in order to be widely adopted, investments required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must increase shareholder wealth and, thus, have a positive net present value (Thorburn 2008).

So far as India’s policy on climate change is concerned, India has undertaken numerous response measures that are contributing to the objectives of the UNFCCC. India’s development plans balance economic development and environmental concerns. The planning process is guided by the principles of sustainable development. Reforms in the energy and power sector have accelerated economic growth and enhance the efficiency of energy use. These have been complemented by notable initiatives taken by the private sector. In recent years several measures relating to environmental issues have been introduced. They have targeted increasing significantly, the capacity of renewable energy installations; improving the air quality in major cities – the world’s largest fleet of vehicles fuelled by
compressed natural gas (CNG) has been introduced in New Delhi; and enhancing afforestation. Other similar measures have been implemented by committing additional resources and realigning new investments, thus, putting economic development on a climate-friendly path (MOEF, Government of India: http://envfor.nic.in).

In this context, India signed the UNFCCC on 10 June 1992 and ratified it on 1 November 1993. Under the UNFCCC, developing countries such as India do not have binding GHG mitigation commitments in recognition of their small contribution to the greenhouse problem as well as low financial and technical capacities. The Ministry of Environment and Forests is the nodal agency for climate change issues in India. It has constituted Working Groups on the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Work is also progress on India’s initial National Communication (NATCOM) to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted in 1997 and requires developed countries and economies in transition listed in Annex B of the Protocol, to reduce their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels. Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). India acceded to the Kyoto Protocol on 26 August 2002 (Ibid.).

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently launched the “National Action Plan on Climate Change” which categorically states that India’s per capita greenhouse gas emissions will “at no point exceed that of developed countries.” The National Action Plan encompasses a broad and extensive range of measures, and focusses on eight missions, which will be pursued as key components of the strategy for sustainable development. These include missions on solar energy, enhanced energy efficiency, sustainable habitat, conserving water, sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem, creating a “Green India,” sustainable agriculture and, finally, establishing a strategic knowledge platform for climate change (Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India, National Action Plan on Climate Change, 2008).

The document underlines that “India will engage actively in multilateral negotiations in the UNFCC in a positive, constructive and forward-looking manner”. “Our objective will be to establish an effective, cooperative and equitable global approach based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and relative capabilities enshrined in the UNFCC”, the plan document said (Ibid.).
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

For several years, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and India have collaborated with public and private partners to address global climate change. Activities have focused on energy efficiency and conservation in power plants, industry, the transport sector, and end use. USAID promoted technical cooperation while recognizing the critical link between environmental protection and sustainable development. The major activities included the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Prevention Project (GEP), the Clean Technologies Initiative (CTI), the Energy Conservation and Commercialization Project (ECO), the South Asia Regional Initiative for Energy (SARI/Energy), and the Water-Energy Nexus in Agriculture Activity (WENEXA). Successful US-India joint ventures resulted in India's first commercial electric car, Reva, and important progress in development of electric two and three-wheelers. The US Asia Environmental Partnership has brought hundreds of environmental experts together from both countries to tackle common environmental challenges and promote trade in environmental goods and services. The SARI/Energy, encourages trade in both hydro-power and natural gas within the South Asia region (USAID 2002). In October 1999 US-India Joint Statement on “Cooperation in Energy and Related Environmental Aspects”, the two countries resolved,

“To work closely together and with other countries, in keeping with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, to advance the goal of protecting the people of the world from the threat of climate change, while promoting economic growth... As the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the United States recognizes its responsibilities to help lead international efforts to address the challenges of climate change. The Kyoto Protocol sets forth a binding emissions target for the United States, which would result in a reduction of roughly 30 per cent from the projected levels in 2008-2012. The Government of India recognizes the need for voluntary ‘no-regrets measures’ at the national level, which will have the additional benefits of dealing with air and water pollution, urban transportation and other important sectors of the domestic economy” (MEA, Government of India, “Joint Statement on Cooperation in Energy and Related Environmental Aspects,” 1999a).

In the Joint statement, moreover, both sides agreed to cooperate and to work together in appropriate forums for advancing the goals of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in accordance with the decisions of the Conference of the Parties to the UN in its various sessions... And to take appropriate measures to foster private sector energy ventures, cooperation in research and development, and greater utilization of environment enhancing and climate friendly energy sources and technology for balanced and sustainable economic development.
Harlan Watson, US Climate Change Negotiator and Special Representative, visited New Delhi on 29-30 April 2002. Watson explained the climate change policy announced by President Bush on 14 February, the steps that the United States is taking to achieve its national goals for mitigating projected greenhouse gas emissions over the next decade and its approach towards international cooperation on climate change issues. The Government of India reiterated its commitment to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of Parties in addressing climate change (US Department of State, “US-India Joint Statement on Climate Change” 2002). In May 2002 US-India Bilateral Cooperation on Climate Change, both sides agreed that

“They would continue to work together in the spirit of cooperation and partnership under the UNFCCC. In this context, the two sides announced their intention to enhance ongoing collaborative projects in clean and renewable sources of energy, energy efficiency and energy conservation. India also suggested acceleration of support in fuel cells, photovoltaic technology, weather early warning systems and climate modeling, and research and technology development. They recognized that these projects would supplement the existing cooperation between the two countries in energy and environment. The two sides agreed to continue their bilateral dialogue (US Department of State, “US-India Bilateral Cooperation on Climate Change” 2002).

Harlan L. Watson in New Delhi in 2003 said that “Our bilateral partnership with India is particularly important because it allows us to share experiences and knowledge to advance climate change science and technology. We are working with India on 18 initiatives” that fall into two broad categories:

1. “Energy and Technology, which is addressing areas such as energy efficiency, clean energy and distributed energy technologies, and improved electricity distribution and transmission efficiency”; and
2. “Science and Environment, which is addressing topics such as forest carbon assessment, climate and environmental observations, economic and environmental modeling, and integrated environmental strategies. And to further explore adaptation issues, the US is providing funding for the UNFCCC adaptation workshop” (Watson 2003).

In addition to this, the US and India were also jointly participating in several US-led international science and technology initiatives. These included the Earth Observation Summit in Washington in 2003 that was attended by over 50 nations and international organizations. “The goal of the Summit and follow-on activities is to design and implement...
over the next 10 years a new international, integrated, sustained, and comprehensive Earth observation system that will greatly advance our understanding of climate change” (Ibid.).

R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in his article “America’s Strategic Opportunity with India” in Foreign Affairs stated that “If global climate change will be the most significant challenge of the future, India and the United States must face it together… As the United States invests in alternative energy sources, it can partner with India, home to some of the world’s most innovative initiatives: the production of biofuels, the expanded use of compressed natural gas in public transport, and the world’s most profitable wind energy company. Indian and American business leaders, scientists, and engineers must become a major part of the solution to the challenge of global climate change” (Burns 2007: 143).

President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in the March 2006 statement welcomed the creation of the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, which will enable India and the US to work together with other countries in the region to pursue sustainable development and meet increased energy needs while addressing concerns of energy security and climate change. The Partnership will collaborate to promote the development, diffusion, deployment and transfer of cleaner, cost-effective and more efficient technologies and practices (MEA, Government of India, US-India Joint Statement, 2006b). With the successful completion of the US-India civil nuclear deal will also help meet India’s energy needs and reduce GHGs. “It will have a profound positive impact on global energy security and international efforts to combat climate change” (MEA, Government of India 2008a). As External Affairs Minister Mukherjee said that by reinforcing and increasing the nuclear element in the country’s energy mix, which is vital to sustain India’s growth rate, nuclear power will directly boost industrial growth, rural development and help expand every vital sector of the country’s economy. “It enables India to respond with her global partners to the challenges of climate change and global warming by strengthening her own economic growth and sustainable development” (The Indian Express, 11 October 2008).

Environmental Security

Asia, as a densely populated and fast growing economic region, wrestles with numerous environmental problems. Instances of Climate Change, as mentioned above, water pollution
and increasingly human-induced natural disasters, for example, have been on the rise and pose major threats to the security of individuals, especially those in less developed countries. The lack of state capacity to address these catastrophies only serves to perpetuate a vicious cycle of poverty and other non-traditional security threats (Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia: http://www.rsis-ntsasia.org). Some of these environmental threats require institutionalized mechanisms for managing them, including the possibility of bilateral or multilateral security cooperation. In this regard, the US-India cooperation on environment is an outstanding representation of how the bilateral relationship is being transformed. The changing role of the Department of State (DOS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) over the past 50 years in addressing environmental issues and the emergence of new US players in India, such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), show the importance of the environment and the depth and breadth of the US-India partnership to address environmental issues of common concern (Embassy of the US, New Delhi, “People, Progress and Partnership”, 2004: 74).

The United States and India, the two largest democracies in the world and endowed with abundant natural, scientific and skilled human resources, have a long history of mutually beneficial cooperation in the fields of science and technology, industry and trade, health and environment and culture and education. They recognize that future development of energy sector must take into account the growing demand for energy, the importance of judicious utilization of limited resources of the planet in the most efficient and equitable manner and the need to protect environment.

During the March 2000 visit of President Bill Clinton to India, Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Clinton outlined their vision for a new relationship in the new century. Cooperation between the two countries in promoting energy and protecting the environment was an important part of their vision for the future. In the March 2000 joint statement the two countries agreed that meeting energy needs in a sustainable manner is one of the most important challenges of the 21st century. They underscored the central role energy plays in economic development, as well as the human health and environmental risks associated with unsustainable energy use. They noted that the development of cleaner and
more efficient energy technologies will contribute significantly to improving the air quality and protecting the global environment. As leaders in the forefront of the new high technology economy, they recognized that countries can achieve robust economic growth while protecting the environment and taking action to combat climate change (MEA, Government of India, US-India Joint Statement on Cooperation in Energy and Environment, 2000a). In Joint Statement, the two leaders further noted that their common desire to promote clean energy and protect the environment has guided past cooperation and joint initiatives. They accord high importance to this aspect of their bilateral energy cooperation. They intend to activate related mechanisms established in the past, including ministerial meetings under the Indo-US Bilateral Energy Consultations, and to intensify further their cooperation in the fields of clean energy and environmental protection, including the impacts of air and water pollution on human health (Ibid.).

The Environment Track of the US-India Economic Dialogue was established as a result of the Joint Statement issued by the White House following the meeting between the US President Bush and India’s the then Prime Minister Vajpayee on 9 November 2001. This prompted the visit to India by the Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in January 2002, where a “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States of America and The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) of the Government of India Concerning Cooperation in Environmental Protection” was signed. This MOU established a framework for policy and technical cooperation between MoEF and EPA (with support from the US Agency for International Development) in four major areas: air quality management, water quality management, management of toxic chemicals and hazardous waste, and environmental governance. In 2005, EPA also entered into a Cooperative Agreement with the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute in India to support activities under the MOU and Environment Track (USEPA, Fact Sheet: Environment Track of the US - India Economic Dialogue, 2006).

While the US Environment Protection Agency (EPA) activities in India date to the early 1980s, EPA’s concerted programme of environmental collaboration with India largely emerged since 2000, with a Presidential visit to India that year that included commitments to enhancing US-India environmental cooperation, including specific engagement of EPA. In November 2001, a Joint Statement was issued on the occasion of the India’s Prime Minister’s meeting with the President at the White House that established an Environment Track as a new component of the US-India Economic Dialogue (US Environment Protection Agency, “Overview of EPA Environmental Cooperation with India”: http://www.rsis-ntsasia.org, 2006a).
The leadership of the US-India Economic Dialogue is promoting greater integration of the US and Indian private sector into the efforts of the Economic Dialogue. The Environment Track is similarly seeking avenues to promote increased private sector engagement, to supplement the emphasis to date of government to government cooperation. To accomplish this, the Environment Track has identified several focused government-industry environmental partnerships that it will champion. These partnerships address shared environmental priorities and promote activities with both local and global environmental benefits. They will provide a platform to engage the private sector in bilateral environmental cooperation activities, and will also seek to promote cross-Ministerial/Agency cooperation (Ibid.). They also demonstrate the sorts of collaboration envisioned for the new Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate Change. The three government-industry environmental partnerships to be promoted include:

1. “India and the US are founding country partners of the Methane to Markets Partnership to reduce global methane emissions to enhance economic growth, improve the environment, promote energy security, and reduce greenhouse gases. Other benefits include improving mine safety, reducing waste, and improving local air quality”;  
2. The US-India partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles - this would “bring together relevant government, industry, research organizations and other stakeholders to better characterize emissions from in-use vehicles, demonstrate technology options for reducing diesel emissions from heavy-duty vehicles, and share US expertise and tools to encourage improved fuel quality, consistent with goals outlined in India’s Auto Fuel Policy”; and  
3. Mercury Partnerships - under this initiative the US and India would seek “to promote best management practices to reduce environmental releases through training, demonstration, and technology transfer activities working with relevant US and Indian private sector partners. Key areas being pursued include improving monitoring and inventory of mercury emissions, exploring opportunities for reducing mercury in products where cost-effective alternatives exist, and encouraging efforts to reduce releases of mercury from key sector sources, such as those outlined in MoEF’s Charter for Corporate Responsibility for Environmental Protection (USEPA, Fact Sheet: Environment Track of the US-India Economic Dialogue, 2006).

The US-India Environmental Cooperation would be further developed under the four core activity areas of the EPA-MoEF Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation in Environmental Protection: Air Quality Management; Water Quality Management (focus on urban drinking water quality); Management of Toxic Chemicals and Hazardous Waste; and Environmental Governance. Numerous additional US-India bilateral climate change related activities are also being advanced under the auspices of a multi-agency US-India Bilateral Dialogue on Climate Change. The US-India Defence Policy Group
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

(DPG) also plays an important role in the management of humanitarian relief and environment security. The DPG which met on 20-23 May 2002 in Washington, D.C., emphasized the importance of the DPG and other bilateral exchanges in coordinating approaches to security issues in Asia and beyond. The DPG has set a course for cooperation in areas, including consequence management in response to humanitarian relief and environmental security (US Department of Defense, Joint Statement, 2002).

A meeting between the Minister for Environment and Forests, T.R. Baalu and the US EPA Administrator, Governor Christine Todd Whitman took place in Washington, D.C. on 1 May 2003. They expressed satisfactions with the progress made during the last one year under the MoU signed on 16 January 2002. The programmes undertaken during the last one year include:

“A training programme on environmental compliance and enforcement; a workshop to evolve an urban air pollution control strategy using the USEPA vehicular emission model; study tours to the US and participation of US experts in the Conference on Environmental Health held at New Delhi. The environmental projects which have been posed to the USEPA and are in the pipeline are: Inventorization of Emissions and Source Apportionment Studies, Management of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals including Bio-medical waste, and Environmental Health and Risk Assessment” (MEA, Government of India, Bilateral cooperation for environmental protection between the MEF & USEPA, 2003a).

India emphasized the need for undertaking new programmes and activities for protection of environment and sustainable development that include the following:

- Cleaning of major rivers including monitoring of water quality;
- Environmental health and risk assessment with focus on children’s health specially covering exposure due to indoor air pollution, urban and industrial pollution, heavy metals including arsenic, chromium and pesticides;
- Colour removal from the industrial effluent, particularly waste water emanating from distilleries, pulp and paper mills;
- Mercury emissions from coal-based thermal power plants;
- Environmental Technology Verification Programme;
- Estimation of respirable particulates in the ambient air (PM2.5);
- Development and review of health based environmental standards; and
• Human Resource Development of scientists and technocrats (MEA, Government of India, Bilateral cooperation for environmental protection between the MEF & USEPA, 2003a).

The USEPA Administrator assured of full cooperation by USA in undertaking the above new programmes and activities. Consequently, in the 18 July 2005 Joint Statement, both the countries agreed to “Strengthen energy security and promote the development of stable and efficient energy markets in India with a view to ensuring adequate, affordable energy supplies and conscious of the need for sustainable development. These issues will be addressed through the US-India Energy Dialogue”. They also agreed “on the need to promote the imperatives of development and safeguarding the environment, commit to developing and deploying cleaner, more efficient, affordable, and diversified energy technologies” (The White House, Joint Statement, 2005).

The United States and India also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) renewing their commitment to work cooperatively on environmental issues. The agreement was signed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Stephen L. Johnson and the Indian Minister of Environment and Forests A. Raja. Administrator Stephen L. Johnson said that

“The United States and India share in the commitment of being good global neighbours. Renewing this MOU strengthens EPA’s vital collaborations with our Indian partners in order to continue to accelerate the pace of environmental progress in both our nations.” The memorandum of understanding focused on four priorities i.e. air quality, water quality, toxic chemicals and waste and the management of environmental agencies (Embassy of the US, New Delhi, “US, India Renew Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,” 2007).

The United States and India are strengthening their cooperation on environmental protection, public health, and economic development. US Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Stephen Johnson said in April 2007, the memorandum of understanding he recently renewed with Indian Minister of Environment and Forests Andimuthu Raja would improve India’s air and water quality and deal with hazardous waste (Voice of America Online News, 11 April 2007).

In recent years, therefore, the US and India have worked together on a number of environmental measures that also have positive health and economic benefits. In
collaboration with the California Air Resources Board, the Indian city of Pune developed an air-quality management plan. The plan has been so successful that six other Indian cities are now implementing similar plans. In addition, the US Environmental Protection Agency is working with Pune and the Indian state of Maharashtra, through the Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles, to demonstrate technology that reduces air pollution from diesel buses and auto-rickshaws. The US is also working with the World Health Organization and Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewage Board on methods to prevent drinking water contamination (Ibid.).

The Methane to Markets Partnership, of which India is a charter member, focuses on reducing global methane emissions by promoting its cost-effective recovery. The US-India Partnership is working with governments, civil society, International Financial Institutions, and the private sector to capture methane emissions from landfills, agricultural waste, and coal mines, and turn this potentially dangerous and environmentally harmful waste into sources of energy and wealth. India is one of the seven largest emitters of methane in the world. “Much of this methane can be economically recovered and sold as a clean, reliable, and inexpensive source of energy,” said Johnson. Methane, he said, can provide an environmentally friendly alternative to coal, which now generates over half of India’s electrical power. Working with India’s national and state governments and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce, the US, Johnson said, looks forward to developing “projects that reduce methane emissions while bringing more clean energy to markets” (Ibid.).

**Human Security\(^\text{57}\)** and Health Issues (AIDS/HIV)

Non-traditional security issues move beyond inter-state conflicts and geo-political concerns. They focus on non-military security concerns and incorporate both state and non-state actors. Beyond challenging state security, non-traditional security issues are particularly relevant to human security. Indeed, these threats endanger both the stability of the states and the security of other actors in international relations, including the individuals. The broadest definition of

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219

According to the US State Department’s “India: Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2005”, the Indian government “generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, numerous serious problems remained”. These included extensive societal violence against women; extrajudicial killings, including faked encounter killings; excessive use of force by security forces, arbitrary arrests, and incommunicado detentions in Kashmir and several northeastern states; torture and rape by agents of the government; poor prison conditions and lengthy pretrial detentions without charge; forced prostitution; child prostitution and female infanticide; human trafficking; and caste-based discrimination and violence, among others. Terrorist attacks and kidnapings also remained grievous problems, especially in Kashmir and the northeastern states (US Department of State, “India: Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2005” 2006c).

Similarly, New York-based Human Rights Watch’s annual report 2006 noted “important positive steps” by the Indian government in 2005 with respect to human rights, but also reviewed the persistence of problems such as abuses by security forces and a failure to contain violent religious extremism (Human Rights Watch, 2006: 262-269). The State Department’s June 2006 report on trafficking in persons said that New Delhi “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so” and it placed India on the “Tier 2 Watch List” for the third consecutive year “due to its failure to show evidence of increasing efforts to address trafficking in persons”. New Delhi later downplayed the claims and said the report was “not helpful”. The trafficking of women and children is identified as a serious problem in India (US Department of State, Report on Trafficking in Persons, 2006a).

58 One has to take the holistic view of the security. Both military and non-military threats have to be addressed by the state. One cannot be sacrificed for the other. National security, therefore, requires politico, economic, and military capabilities complemented by societal, technological and environmental strands. Barry Buzan calls to incorporate political, economic, environmental, societal, and, of course, military issue on the security agenda. International relations should be concerned with more broadly defined threats to security of human collectivities (Barry Buzan 1991).
The State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour has claimed that India's human right abuses "are generated by a traditionally hierarchical social structure, deeply rooted tensions among the country's many ethnic and religious communities, violent secessionist movements and the authorities' attempts to repress them, and deficient police methods and training." India's 1958 Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which gives security forces wide leeway to act with impunity in conflict zones, has been called a facilitator of "grave human rights abuses" in several Indian states. India generally denies international human rights groups official access to Kashmir and other sensitive areas (US Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2003” 2004). The US Department of State 2005-2006 report on Supporting Human Rights and Democracy calls India "a vibrant democracy with strong constitutional human rights protections," but also asserts that "poor enforcement of laws, widespread corruption, a lack of accountability, and the severely overburdened court system weakened the delivery of justice" (US Department of State, Supporting Human Rights and Democracy, 2006d).

In addition to these reports, the United Nations estimates that 5.7 million Indians are infected with HIV/AIDS, giving India the largest such population worldwide (India overtook South Africa in this category in 2006). Due to the country's large population, prevalence rates among adults remain below 1 per cent. India's AIDS epidemic has become generalized in four states in the country's south (Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Maharashtra) and two in the northeast (Manipur and Nagaland). According to USAID, these six states account for 80 per cent of the country's reported AIDS cases. India first launched its AIDS control programme in 1992; New Delhi boosted related funding to about $120 million in the most recent fiscal year (Kronstadt 2007: CRS Report RL33529). As part of its foreign assistance programme in India, the US government supports integrated HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and support services in high prevalence states.

Recognizing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic constitutes one of the greatest challenges facing humankind in the 21st century, the United States and India declared their shared commitment to strengthening cooperation to combat the disease at the global level. Prime Minister Singh and President Bush vowed to upgrade the prevention and control initiatives in India and extend these efforts, where appropriate, to other vulnerable countries. Expedited the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) Review of Anti-Retroviral Drugs (ARVs) Under the
President’s Emergency Plan and Ongoing Collaboration in the Sciences, under this partnership, the US will continue to expedite the review of applications for approval or tentative approval by the FDA of generic antiretrovirals (ARVs) received from Indian pharmaceutical companies under the President’s Emergency Plan. Eight of ten generic antiretrovirals approved so far are Indian products (US Department of State, Fact Sheet: The United States and India: Partners in the Fight against HIV/AIDS, 2005e).

Following on India’s recent scale up of resources and renewed political commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, President Bush announced an additional US contribution of $7 million to expand resources available to fight HIV/AIDS in India. These new resources will catalyze an innovative partnership, the HIV/AIDS Private-Sector Corporate Initiative. This initiative will build alliances between US and Indian companies and the governments of India and the United States in the fight against HIV/AIDS, and could be expanded to other countries. It has three components: Establishment of a Private-Sector HIV/AIDS Capital Fund that will accept donations from both Indian and US companies; Expansion of HIV/AIDS Workplace Programmes; and Increased access to safe, effective, quality anti-retroviral drugs, particularly for pediatric treatment (US Department of State 2005).

The US and India are cooperating to expand their efforts to combat and prevent HIV/AIDS by harnessing resources, knowledge and expertise. The following steps have been taken in this regard since then:

- The United States increased funding in the Financial Year 2005-06 for HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment programme to $29.3 million.
- An Indo-US Corporate Sector Fund for HIV/AIDS has been established. This is a partnership among US and Indian Businesses to fight AIDS. Six companies have already pledged a total of $1.2 million to the Fund.
- The US Food and Drug Administration (USFDA) has given approval to 13 genetic antiretroviral drugs produced by Indian pharmaceutical companies. These drugs can now be purchased as part of Bush’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS for use around the world (K.R. Gupta: 175-176).

On 2 March 2006 US-India Joint Statement, both sides expressed satisfaction at the expedited USFDA drug approval processes that strengthen the combat against HIV/AIDS at
Cooperation in Non-traditional Security Issues

the global level and encourage greater corporate participation to meet this challenge, including the establishment of the Indo-US Corporate Fund for HIV/AIDS (MEA, Government of India, 2006b). R. Nicholas Burns, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said that India and the United States are actively involved in fighting HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. "We are working together to eradicate polio and to promote maternal and child health" (Burns 2007: 140).

The US-India Global Issues Forum was held in May 2005. Within this forum, the United States and India discussed issues relating to protection of the environment, sustainable development, protection of the vulnerable, combating transnational organized crime, and promotion of democratic values and human rights (US Department of State 2005b). Moreover, a new US-India Global Democracy Initiative and US-India Disaster Relief Initiative were established under the 18 July joint statement. The Joint Statement also calls for strengthening cooperation in efforts to combat HIV/AIDS (The White House, US-India Joint Statement, 2005).

The United States also has a close and cooperative relationship with the Government of India on counternarcotics issues. In September 2003, the United States and India signed Letter of Agreement (LOA) amendments to provide State Department drug assistance funding worth $2.184 million for counternarcotics law enforcement. In 2004, another $40,000 was added to the LOA. In 2004 a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement was signed (US Department of State, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report", Vol. 1, 2007a: 243). Robert D. Blackwill, the then ambassador to India, addressing at the Confederation of Indian Industry in New Delhi on 17 July 2003, said that the American Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is in constant contact with the Indian Narcotics Control Bureau and the Central Bureau of Narcotics to exchange information and develop drug cases. "In concert with the Central Bureau of Narcotics, we are developing a methodology for predicting the size of legitimate opium yields to help control diversion of opium from legal to illicit uses. And we are stepping up our joint efforts to deal with the problem of Trafficking in Persons, a serious problem in both the United States and in India" (Blackwill 2003a).

The NCB's move to the Ministry of Home Affairs has enhanced the US relationship with the Ministry and NCB. DEA gave more courses to more law enforcement officials from a wider variety of state and central government law enforcement agencies in 2004 and 2005.
than ever before. Other training included standard and advanced boarding officer training by the USCG. “Our joint LOA (Assistance Agreement) Monitoring Committee Meetings with the GOI ensure that funds achieve desired results, or are otherwise reprogrammed to higher priority projects. The LOA project to enhance and improve NCB’s intelligence gathering and information sharing will enable it to better target drug traffickers and improve its cooperation with DEA” (US Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report”, Vol. 1, 2007a: 243).

The annual report of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has noted increased trafficking and abuse of cannabis and heroin in South Asia. The West African traffickers have targeted countries in South Asia, particularly India for cocaine trafficking. The report released in March 2008 said that South American cocaine is trafficked to India in small quantities where it is exchanged for South-West Asian heroin bound for Europe and North America. India is increasingly being used as a major transit country and also as a destination country for drug trafficking. Cross-border smuggling is relatively easy due to the porous borders between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. Illicit cultivation and abuse of cannabis continue to be a problem in most of the countries in South Asia (UNODC, INCB Report 2007; The Financial Express, 5 March 2008).

The report said that licitly manufactured pharmaceutical preparations such as codeine-based syrup, benzodiazepines and buprenorphine were smuggled from India into Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In India, organized criminal groups traffic in amphetamine-type stimulants. In South Asia, injections of heroin and pharmaceeutical preparations were contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS. “In India, the areas with highest incidences of drug-related HIV/AIDS continue to be the north-eastern border with Myanmar and large urban areas. Of those who abuse drugs in Maldives, 20 per cent to 25 per cent inject them. Drug abuse by injection rose from 8 per cent in 2003 to 29 per cent in 2006 and three-quarters of imprisoned drug offenders were drug abusers” (Ibid.; The Financial Express, 5 March 2008).

There are undesirable activities in terms of the transport of illegal arms, drugs and fissile material through the Indian Ocean. Interdiction of such cargo is necessary for peace and security in the region, where India can play a very significant role. India’s cooperation with the US in patrolling the Malacca Straits during Operation Enduring Freedom has been
an important step forward in raising India’s regional naval profile. Such cooperation with other regional countries needs to be explored. Hindering illegal trafficking in arms and drugs through the sea-lanes of communication will also help in curbing terrorism, insurgencies and internal conflicts in a number of South and Southeast Asian countries. Such a cooperation would also involve securing access rights, joint exercises and regular interaction between Indian and regional navies (Muni and Mohan 2004: 323-324). The United States has an interest in limiting the trafficking of drugs from or through South Asia, in part because drug networks are often the source of terrorism as well. A strong policy, focusing on the full range of approaches to narcotics trafficking, can help combat its growth, which may otherwise tend to overwhelm national governments.

Summary
The foregoing analysis brings out the fact clear that in an expanded conception of security, there was a greater focus on peace, development and cooperative security between the two countries. Security challenges to both the countries now include not only the traditional defence-related, but also the non-traditional security threats. The new security challenges to both the countries are diverse and multi-dimensional, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, security of resources such as energy and water, illegal migrations, human rights abuses, piracy, drug trafficking and gun running, climate change, and environmental degradation.

The convergence of interests between the United States and India in meeting global challenges has strengthened their bilateral relations. The US and India have come a long way in expanding their cooperation and dialogue on terrorism. In the aftermath of 11 September, the focus of global challenges was on combating terrorism. India was clearly a beneficiary of the US policy to remove Taliban from power in Afghanistan. The goal of confronting terrorism has also given a very strong rationale for the US foreign policy not only to secure the support of the different countries but also to expand its involvement in different parts of the world. In its war on terrorism, the US even found it possible to develop positive relationship with both India and Pakistan. The Joint Working Groups established between the two countries proved to be a useful mechanism for exchange of information, intelligence sharing, anti-terrorism training programmes, etc. and for strengthening institutional links
between crime prevention agencies in the two countries. However, there remain a lot to do in fighting against the international terrorism. In Indian public perception at least, the expectations of relief from more immediate cross-border terrorism have not been fully met. Counterterrorism remains an active facet of US-India security relations.

However, global issues go well beyond and the key challenges identified by the US National Security Strategy of March 2006 correspond to many of India's own priorities such as championing aspirations of human dignity, defeating global terrorism, defusing regional conflicts, combating WMD threats, supporting global growth through free markets and trade, and confronting the challenges of globalisation. This has allowed the two nations to develop an active agenda of global issues where their ability to work together advances their respective national interests. The US and India are today engaged in addressing security and humanitarian issues through joint and coordinated efforts. This extends to combating a range of translational challenges from marine pollution and natural disasters, to piracy and trafficking in persons. In the health sector, expedited USFDA approval processes have added to the Indian capability to contribute in the struggle against HIV/AIDS at a global level.

In 18 July joint declaration, the United States and India resolved to establish a global strategic partnership. The joint declaration was a bold and radical move that was clearly motivated by and reflects the mutual interests of both states in addressing the problems of energy security as well as the nuclear proliferation. It also promises other potential security benefits, notably enhancing US-Indian counterterrorism cooperation. In these respects, the joint declaration has laid the foundation for promoting the long-term strategic interests of the United States. In signing on to the joint declaration, the Bush administration reversed a decades-old US non-proliferation policy by removing obstacles to cooperation with India's civil nuclear power programme. Specifically, President Bush referred to India's strong commitment to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and stated that, "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology", India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. In addition, the administration is seeking to include India in global efforts to develop advanced nuclear energy systems. In return, India agreed to take a number of specific steps to expand its non-proliferation commitments. With the successful completion of the US-India civil nuclear deal will also help meet India's energy needs and
reduce GHGs. It will have a profound positive impact on global energy security and international efforts to combat climate change.

Therefore, the US-India relations have been transformed since the 11 September. Most importantly, a fundamental change has taken place in the US perceptions of India. India is now seen as a strategic partner in countering the non-traditional security challenges. The US-India relations are now based on an increasing convergence of their interests. Stronger US-India relations are an inescapable imperative for the future. As both the countries have many common interests: stabilizing the Asia-pacific region; countering terrorism, religious extremism and narcotics trafficking; dealing with the possibility of failures of states in the region; ensuring access to energy resources and reserves in Asia, maintaining freedom and security to sea-lanes in the region; preventing and countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, which has acquired new meaning in view of the possibility of their acquisition by the terrorist groups; and advancing economic stability and prosperity in these uncertain times. As the two largest democracies in the world, India and the United States have a special responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and stability. To achieve this goal a greater vision and political will is required.

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