CHAPTER IV

STRUCTURE OF RURAL ELITE DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

Against the pre-colonial historical background of changes in the structure of land, power and people relation described earlier, this Chapter attempts presenting a focussed outline of the structure of rural elite in Basti during the colonial period. We shall buttress our presentation with a body of primary historical and ethnographic data. The data relates to a small category of population, comprising of the then, locally powerful and influential persons. These persons belonged, as we shall note, predominantly to families and lineages of upper caste stratum with large land-holdings. Besides, they have had a history and a long tradition of rule over the local peasantry.

On the basis of various criteria, including those of traditional rulership and of continuing hold on peasants, the British during the post-mutiny phase of their colonialism, adopted an appeasement policy of conferring various types of honours and investitures on the landed lineage chiefs and influentials. We shall refer to these selected categories of influentials who appeared on the British records as the
recipients of Honours and Investures as the elites of the colonial period.

It would, however, be historically a false statement that these selected category of the local influentials who appeared on the British records during the post-mutiny phase as the recipients of Honours and Investures were the only elites of the colonial phase. Two points need to be made at this juncture; First refers to the tragic failure of the great uprising of 1857 which unleashed crippling consequences to those of the local Rajput rajas and traditional lineage chiefs who had taken up arms against the British. The aftermath of the revolt saw a total and complete disappearance of these chiefs from the power scene of post-mutiny history of the district. In the proceeding pages of this chapter we shall describe the story of their destruction. Second, the institution of award of Titles and Honours and the practice of holding Darbars, etc. came to exist only after the Proclamation of the Queen of her sovereignty over India in 1858 - a time by when all local resistance to the British were broken and destroyed.

We shall, therefore, use the term elite to refer to both, the local chiefs who fell to the wrath of the British colonialism in course of their struggle for freedom in 1857-58.

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1. The ground on which we treat the rebel chiefs as elite is based on the fact that they held enormous power and could mobilise the local peasantry against the superior British forces. Besides, they were generally rajas and ranis of the countryside.
as well as to those who survived the uprising either as the loyals to the British or as local neutrals and who subsequently emerged during the post-mutiny phase of the district as the recipients of Honour and Investitures. For elite status was anchored in those days generally among the Rajput chiefs alone as the remaining population was the subject population of these chiefs. It is a sad compulsion imposed on us by the vagaries of history that we have, in terms of details and time-depth, more information about the post-mutiny structure of elites of the colonial period as compared to the same of the pre-mutiny phase. Dependent as we are on the British records and eclipse as the rebel elite suffered at the hands of revengeful British from their official history and documents, our survey, while generally covering all the elites irrespective of their nature of relation with the colonial power, deals more specifically with the elites of the post-mutiny phase. Our interest lies in the analysis of the conjunction between the wider colonial interests of the British imperialism and the local interests of the upper caste chiefs. The nature of post-mutiny elites and the types of culture it gave rise to in the countryside of Uttar Pradesh is to be examined in detail.

The elites were recruited to and groomed for such awards and Acts of Recognition by the State as, those of Sanads, Certificates Titles, Seats of Honour in pageantry of Darbars and the awards of various types of Gifts. In
addition to these awards, some of the elites were invested with magisterial powers and were known as Honorary Magistrates and in that capacity, they used to exercise judicial power over people. These Honorary Magistrates had become a part of the colonial district judicial system.

It is worthwhile to examine how such State recognition of a group of persons belonging generally to upper social stratum went not only to partly strengthening and to partly transforming a status based segment of traditional elite; their sources of customary power and domination into a semi-formal system of authority and rule over people. It generated a process which changed the folklore of family and lineage traditions of power of traditional elites into a meticulously researched and documented history of their local rulership in the countryside. Colonial records such as Gazetteers, Settlement Reports, Chronicles, Memoirs of various districts and Manuals of Titles and other compilations, such as the clan history and pedigrees go to glorify and often to

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romanticise their past. This was done by the British and they had interest in doing so.

These elites in Basti and elsewhere in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, it seems, were pivotal to the maintenance and furtherance of the colonial interests of the British in India. Under the British rule, especially after the revolt of 1857, these local elites assumed a new kind of strategic position in the power structure of the district. In the overall power hierarchy, one could visualise the conjunctive position of the local elites. Above them was the British administrative bureaucratic system and at the bottom were located a heterogeneous hierarchy of unequal caste and exterior-caste peasantry and other groups. Occupying an intermediary position, the post-mutiny elites represented a system of alliance and loyalties to the colonial power of the state at the one hand and, on the other, a system of power and domination over the peasantry.

Before we focus our attention to these post-mutiny elites, we have to make a few essential explanations. In what conditions did these elites assume significance in the eyes of the British rule? Or, what were those historical factors, to post the question in another way, which led the British to

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attach importance to the local elites? Our attempt to answer this question would require a recapitulation of few points suggested earlier. Besides other, our data suggest, there have had been two main reasons:

1. The first refers to the East India Company's (1775-1857) agrarian policy in Uttar Pradesh. The Company, under the influence of liberal Benthamite Utilitarian land and revenue policies, I have discussed elsewhere adopted initially a strong anti-zamindar-talukdar agrarian policy of dispossessing the traditional landholders of their control over land and, through it, they tried to reduce zamindar-talukdars of their control over people. The Company set itself to create an independent and secure class of cultivating peasant-proprietors. These, rather radical liberal policies were to be implemented by such radical officers as Robert Martin Bird, the first Commissioner of Gorakhpur (1829) who later on became the Chief Revenue Officer (1833-41) and James Thomason both of North-West Provinces. The latter rose to become Lieutenant Governor of the Province (1843-53). Through a series of Land Settlement Regulations, such as Regulation No. VII of 1822; IX of 1832 and finally the Regulation X of 1844 the British tried to give a rude

jolt to the power of the Zamindars-Talukdars. Zamindars-Talukdars came to be contemptuously characterised as "useless drone on the soil".

A ground swell of disenchantment, (as we shall see in case of Basti district below) of the zamindar-talukdars arose against the British. One of the most dominant reasons of Mutiny of 1857 gaining strength at gross-root level was the anger of the landed class whose land was being ex-appropriated from them. And during the nightmare of that Rebellion the British found that the cultivating peasants were the beneficiaries of their land policy, instead of supporting them, were fighting the cause of their traditional masters - the zamindar-talukdars against their benefactors.

Consequently in the landed aristocracy of the Indian countryside, the British Crown which declared its sovereignty over India in 1858, found the steel frame of power to be used for the fortification of its own imperial interests. The British issued Proclamations to the restive insurgent

5. Ibid., pp.14-16.
zamindars-Talu'dars promising to restore back their land ex-appropriated by the radically liberal land policies of the erstwhile East India Company. Restoration of land led to restoration of their power, and indeed, with added glory over the peasantry. The liberal Benthamite utilitarian philosophy of land reform, carried out with earnestness by the British for the general uplift of peasantry, and their dream to create a class of peasant proprietors suffered a breakdown and, Pemble rightly remarks that the British surrendered to the very forces of feudalism (in India) that they had defeated. Thus, those who were indicated as the "useless drone on the soil" earlier, after the Mutiny, beside their recovery of land and power started receiving Sanads and Certificates as well.

The traditionally powerful local chiefs who survived the uprising by and large thus remained not only rooted unshaken in villages but they also started being appeased, pampered, celebrated and glorified by the British. Perhaps,

12. According to S.N.A. Jafari, ground on which Sanads were issued, besides other included condition of loyalty to the British Crown. See his, History and Status of Landlords and Tenants in United Provinces, Allahabad: 1931, pp.162-164.
in them the British Crown, unlike its Company counterpart searched for a buffer stratum to keep their imperialism effective over the vast majority of the Indian peasantry. The Royal Title Act of 1876 (which had come in a Bill form in 1858 in the British Parliament) was an instrument with which the British sought to establish thick relation with its chiefs and nobles - the bulk of them belonging to the zamindar-Talukdar stratum. This led to the legitimization of the power and authority of the traditional chiefs.

2. Diametrically opposed to the first, the second historical demand of the British Imperialism in the Indian countryside was to demonstrate the imperial capacity to inflict terror on unyielding traditional chiefs - the rajas and zamindar elites who mobilised their subject peasantry against the British stay in India. Thus corresponding to the policy of appeasement, there grew and was effectively utilised the policy of punishment. The policy of punishment involved, as we shall describe, such techniques of revengeful suppression as burning of home and hearth, often entire village, confiscation of estates, traditional titles and property of the rebel chiefs, their transporation to penal Islands (Andaman and Nicobar Islands), indiscriminate shooting and finally to

13. In 1876 when this Act was passed by the British Parliament, one of its members aired the sentiment that its purpose was "... to cherish India"; and her princes and people understood that their sovereign had assumed towards them a near and more personal relations", cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 219. See also, Palmer, Norman D., The Indian Political System, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961, p. 39.
hanging after a mock Court procedure a branch of the nearest available tree.

They were delegitimised Initially, both the policies were implemented almost side by side and, both of them were addressed to two sections of the same social stratum - the stratum of traditional rajas and zamindars, of the region. In the subsequent post-Mutiny period, however, the punitive policy after it rendered a total hold over people of the British, lost its meaning. Rebels were destroyed and never surfaced any rebellion of the traditional chiefs against the British throughout their stay in India. But the policy of appeasement remained, and it remained throughout the period of British stay in India. Let us have a close look at what we have suggested in the light of primary historical data from Basti district. It is essential as these traditional chiefs alone were generally the elites of the pre-Mutiny phase of Basti district.

MUTINY AND THE PUNISHMENT IN BASTI DISTRICT

The Rebels and Punishment

The fact that the policy of repression and appeasement of the traditional chiefs took birth after the Revolt of 1857 against the British, it is worth-while to give an account of

the now lost and forgotten rajas and zamindar elites who mobilised the peasants and fought against the British and suffered an eclipse and, whose history has been blocked out by the British historians and pedigree compilers. The account of their defeat is important as it generated forces compelling the British to appease and confer sanad and certificates to those who either actively supported the British or remained neutral to the ramble around during the Mutiny.

Of such Rajput lineages as Sarnets, Gautams, Surajbansis and the Kalhansas of Basti, then (in 1857) a part of Gorakhpur district and other lineages of the same caste such as Bisens, Kausiks and the Chauhans ruling families were spread over different tracts of the parent district. Each lineage, such as Kalhansas, Gautams and Chauhans had their lineage heads as, rajas of Basti, Nagar and Nicolaul raja respectively. Most of these lineages have had more than one raja. Such was the case with Sarnets having three rajas, such as the rajas of Bansi, Unaula and Satasi (Rudrapur). Similarly the Surajbansis had two rajas, such as the raja of Mahuli (Mahson) and the raja of Amorha. Bisens had their ruling rajas at Majhuli, Tamkuhi and at Nararpur (Chillupur).

15. T.H. Morgan who compiled the pedigree of the ruling families of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh did not include the pedigrees of rajas who rebelled against the British. He excludes the family pedigrees of rebel rajas of Amorha and Nagar. See his Title Holders, op. cit.

16. See, Basti Gazetteer, pp. 82-96.
The Kausiks of Dhuriapar, likewise had two rajas, such as the raja of Gopalpur and the raja of Barhiapar.

The kin of these rajas were scattered along and around the seats of their respective lineage rajas as zamindars in a settlement pattern which corresponded to the pargana and tappa tracts - a point which we have discussed in the preceding chapter.

During the Rebellion, the rajas of Nagar, Raja Udal Pratap Singh, rani of Amorha, Rani Jagat Kunwar Singh, the widow of Raja Jang Bahadur Singh, both belonging to the present Basti district, rebelled against the British.

The erstwhile rajas whose seat of the raj fell in the administrative jurisdiction of the present Gorakhpur district and who took up arms against the British were the rajas of Satasi, Narharpur - Chillupar, Barhiapar and the Chauhan Raja Randula Sen of Nichlaul. A summary of these rajas relation with the British during the Rebellion is presented on the following page.

17. See, Gorakhpur Gazetteer, pp.108-118.
Table - 14
The Rajput Rajas of undivided Gorakhpur District by their Raj (estates) and Lineage who fought for, against, or remained neutral to the British in the Rebellion of 1857

| S No. | Rajas by their Name of Lineage | Lineage of Rule | No. of Rajas | Raja of Lineage | Seat of Raj | the Raja & Raj
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<td>1</td>
<td>Raja of Amorha</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Raja of Nagar</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Raja of Satasi</td>
<td>Sarnet</td>
<td>Raja of Bansi</td>
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<td>Raja of Sarnet</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Raja of Narharpur</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Raja of Barhaipar</td>
<td>Kausik</td>
<td>Raja of Gopalpur</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Raja of Nichlaul</td>
<td>Chauhan</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Raja of Basti</td>
<td>Kalhansas</td>
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The British ruthlessly suppressed the rebellious rajas. Punitive methods against them included indiscriminate shooting, burning and raising down of their mudforts, houses and villages. Those rebels who were caught were subjected to

mock trials resulting either in hanging, transportation to penal Island (Andaman Island) or, to the forfeiture of their Titles and additional Titles (in case of the rajas) and to the confiscation of their estates (in case of both the rajas as well as their allys Rajput zamindars of different lineages mentioned above).

Of the six rebellious rajas of the then undivided Gorakhpur, of which Basti was a part, the rani of Amorha, Rani Jagat Kunwar Singh, the widow of Raja Jang Bahadur Singh who had died in 1855 lost her title of 'rani' and her landed property worth Rs.9,79 annual revenue was confiscated. Her kinsmen, such as Lal Debi Baksh Singh of Dubaulia village and number of his zamindar kin lost their lives and estates. The raja of Nagar, Raja Udai Pratap Singh, then the holder of 178 villages with his famous mudfort and

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20. About forfeiture of traditional titles of rajas by the British, see Gorakhpur Gazetteer, pp.113 and 116.


22. Ibid, p.210. According to information supplied by local respondents of our study, about 50 males of Amorha branch of Surajbansis lost their lives in the face to face fight with the British force at Amorha, Belwa and Gaighat encounters. 26 of them were caught by the British and all of them were hanged by the peepal trees which still stand on the road side of Basti- Faizabad road at a place known as Chahoni (Cantonement) where the British forces had encamped. For the detail, see S.A.A. Rizvi and S. Bhargava, compiled Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh, Vol.IV, Lucknow: Department of Information, Government of Uttar Pradesh, 1959, pp.146, 151 and 160.
sangars overawed the British with his personal bravery. The raja at the end of the rebellion fell into the hands of the occupation forces and, while awaiting the judgement of the Martial Law Court, committed suicide and escaped from the imminent hanging. The descendents of this raja now live in Pokharni village near present township of Nagar in poverty.

Raja of Satasi, beside, loosing the title and his estate suffered transportation to penal Island of the then Andman Island where he died as a convict. Raja of Narharpur-Chillupar was hanged along with his kinsmen and his title and estate and land of his kinsmen were confiscated. Raja Randula Singh of Nichlaul of Chauhan lineage lost his title and estate. Raja Tej Bahadur Chand of Kausik lineage of Barhiapar, like other rebels of the district lost his title and the estate and had to live a life of privation and suffering of twelve years as a fugitive in the tarai forest of Nepal.

23. The term Sangar refers to a defensive arrangement of bamboos which were specially sharpened and their pointed ends were piled one upon the other all around and up the outer walls of mudforts. Some of these Sangars were also used as booby trap for the enemy. Such defensive enclosure was encircled by a deep ditch with provision for a collapsable bridge. For detail on the nature of mudforts, see Sleeman in Oudh (ed.) by P.D. Reeves, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 232-239.


25. For the information on the raja of Satasi see Gorakhpur Gazetteer, pp. 116 and 132; for the raja of Narharpur, pp. 112 and 221 of the same Gazetteer.

26. Gorakhpur Gazetteer, p. 193

27. Ibid, pp. 112-114.
Rebel zamindar chiefs of these Rajput lineages suffered similar fate. Along with twenty followers, Thakur Sheo Gulam Singh of Rudhauri village was shot dead by the British near the present township of Basti. Thakur Jaggi Singh of Bakhira and Thakur Ram Pratap Singh of Mehdawal were hanged by a branch of peepal tree along with their rebel followers at Khailelabad. Har Govind Singh of the latter village lost his village. All of them belonged to the Samet lineage of present Basti district.

Similarly, the Samet Thakurs of Pandepur, Dumiri and Tighura, now in Gorakhpur district lost their estates as confiscated. The Bisen Thakurs of Paina village fought a guerilla warfare. They were killed, their women folk humiliated and their village burnt down and their property was confiscated. Their women-folk were humiliated. Humbling of their womenfolk had since then stigmatised them among the rajputs.

The suppression of the Rebellion erased these insurgent rais (estates) and destroyed the property of their supporting

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28. Details of this shooting is available in Rizvi and Bhargava, Vol.IV, op.cit., p.150.


31. About Paina Thakurs, see, Rizvi and Bhargava, Vol.IV, op.cit., p.152; see also, Gorakhpur Gazetteer, p.290.
lineage zamindars. The ruination of the rebel rajas and zamindar elites went side by side with the strengthening of loyal rajas and zamindars. Unlike the rebels, who fell as the victim of the colonial wrath, the allying rajas and zamindars to the British and, those who remained neutral to the episode emerged as the recipients of Gifts and Honours (Khilaut). They came to be known as the local Loyal. These Loyal were generally a new crop of Anglophile who rallied behind the British as "native chiefs" or "native gentlemen". The "Ferangis", as the British "from Canning to the cavalry cadet" were known during the pre-Mutiny days by the local populace, after the former's victory over the local rebel elites became Gora-Sahib (the white master). This Gora-Sahib subsequently, after the consolidation of British power during the 60s and 70s got transformed into a superior status category of Lat-Sahib (the Lord of People). And the changing referential nomenclature of the local population in relation to the British, starting initially with a scornful term "ferangi" and ending with a regalian, awesome term of "Lat-Sahib",

32. As the result of the anti-zamindar-talukdar land policies of the East India Company, the original territorial chiefs had already started suffering a decline and disappearance from the power scene of North-West Provinces. Their subsequent involvements against the British in 1857 led further to the loss of their titles and estates through confiscation by the British. And, when the British started restoring them back to the position of "Independent Gentlemen of Property and Personal Influences" - a pet phrase used by the District Collectors while recommending the name of a candidate to a Seat in Darbar - they found it difficult to identify them. This situation is echoed by Lord Canning, in his letter dated 16th November, 1859, to Charles Wood, then the Secretary of State for India (1859-1866) about the disappearance of the native nobility when he remarked, "We should be puzzled to hunt out many of them (the nobility)", cited by Metcalf, op. cit., p.162.

33. Based on an interview with an ex-raja of Basti District. contd..
symbolically dramatised the general process of a total capitulating of the countryside to the British. And, at the crushing heels of the British, if not from them, there rose a segment of loyal rajas and zamindar elites who became not only the recipients of the confiscated properties of the rebels but also the raw material with which post-Mutiny colonial rule in India was usually built. The genesis of the institution of the grounds of elite recruitment therefore ought to include the British practice of the Rewards to the loyals under the Confiscation Act X of 1858. The details about the local impact of this Act is presented below:

THE LOYALIST AND REWARDS

Limiting our focus of inquiry to the region, under the jurisdiction of present district of Basti, Mutiny data do not provide a single case of confiscation of property of any of the other castes except those of the Rajput chiefs. From among the community of Muslims the only exception is of

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33. Reference to Canning is about Lord Canning, Governor-General of India (1856-1862).

the Muslim peasants of Mahua Dadar, of Harriya tehsil.

But when it came to the receiving of the Reward for the Loyalities to the British after the rebellion of 1857, the Brahmans, mostly the early Martias (grantees) of Raihat chiefs, exceeded other castes in number.

We have two documents from the Record Office of Basti district. These documents throw ample light on the post-Mutiny background to identify the loyals of the district to and provide information about their background, types of services they rendered to the British and the nature of Reward they received from the British. When the information contained in these two documents are placed together with those contained in the District Gazetteer, we get a fair and firm empirical details about these people.

The first document is a letter, dated 19th August, 1859, from the Secretary to the Government of North-West Provinces and Oudh to the Commissioner of Gorakhpur. It mentions the names of 11 loyals and their 21 unnamed followers and supporters.

35. Muwalman villagers of Mahua Dadar - a village near Nagar had killed British fugitives and as a punishment on 10th June one Mr. Peppe, who then acted as Deputy Magistrate, Basti burnt and raised down the village killing all those villagers who came to their sight. See, Basti Gazetteer, p.158 and Rizvi and Bhargava, op.cit, p.146.

The second document contains names of twenty-three loyalists. Of these loyalists, ten were Rajputs, eleven Brahmans, and three were British settlers of the district. The Rajputs include the two rajas, namely the rajas of Bansi and the infant raja of Basti, of Samet and Kalhansa lineages respectively. Other Rajput loyalists whose names appear in records were Babu Jaikaran Singh, Raghuveer Singh and Bau Sheo Baksh Singh Samets. All of them were related to the Raja of Bansi and had fought for him to defend the...

37. List of persons who have done good services during the Mutiny, Political Department, M.S. undated and unsigned, File No. XVI - Mutiny-3, Serial No.1 of (1858-1863) E.R.O., Basti.

38. Raja Mahipat Singh and his younger brother, Lal Mahendra Singh, the former being the member of Board of Rajas on whom the administration of the Gorakhpur district was entrusted by Mr. W. Wynyord and Mr. E. Bird in the first week of August 1857. The other members were, the rajas of Majhauli, Satasi Gopalpur and Tamkuhi. These two brothers resisted the advance of the rebel Nazim, Mohammed Hasan and on 17th and 19th June, 1857 received Charles Wingfield, the fugitive Commissioner of Baharaich district with 18 of his companions and Captain Bioleau with four of his fugitive officers from Gonda district respectively and the raja brothers braving with the rebel forces all along from Gonda district to border to the township of Gorakhpur escorted them to safety. This they did spontaneously. See Basti Gazetteer, p.159; Gorakhpur Gazetteer, pp.190-191.

39. Infant raja of Basti, Mahesh Sitla Baksh Singh was represented by his mother, who incidently was the niece of the legendary rebel raja Kunwar Singh of Jagdishpur of Shahabad district in Bihar. The rani stubbornly pursued the Musalman Nazim and snatched their weapons including a brass cannon. About Kunwar Singh, see Rizvi and Hargava, op. cit., pp.153 and 197 and about the mother of Raja Mahesh Sitla Baksh Singh, see Basti Gazetteer, p.163.
Bhadauli Police Station. Babu Kishan Prasad Singh of the same lineage and 21 of his followers, according to the field report, shed blood to protect the British fugitives near the village (at present) Rudhauili. Mahipat Singh of Gautaum lineage of Nagar likewise aided the Britishers to take revenge with the villagers of Mahua-Dadar who had killed British fugitives on 10th June, 1857. Two Surajbansis, namely Jeet Narain Singh of Mahuli and Gopal Singh of Amorah are also on this list. They had held tehsil of Capt-in-ganj for the British against very heavy odds from the rebel forces.

According to the same record, the Brahman loyalists, unlike their rajput counterparts, did the spy work on the rebel rajas of the district for the British. Thus we have the names of Ram Jiwan Pandit of Amorha, Ram Lal Pandey of Jagdishpur, Nita Nand Tiwari of Khurhira (a village near Amorha) and Hardayal Misir of Basti - all from Harriya and Basti tehsils, who acted as British informers and intelligence men against the rebels.

40. See Basti Gazetteer, p.163.

41. About Mahipat Singh and Gopal Singh, see Basti Gazetteer, p.163. Mahua-Dabar episode was enacted by the Musalman villagers and this was the only case in Basti in which local Musalman population got involved in the rebellion against the Britishers. See also, Rizvi and Bhargava, op.cit., pp.146-147.

42. Basti Gazetteer, p.163.
In reward for good services done to the British, under the Act X of 1858, raja of Bansi got the confiscated land property of the Nagar raja and Bakhira estate; the ranı of Basti was given the title and ownership of the confiscated raja of Amorha. The remaining loyals, as the letter of the Secretary to Government North-West Provinces and Oudh to the Commissioner of Gorakhpur dated 19th August, 1958 suggests, received land, grants and Khiluts.

Conquest, expansion and the defence of colonial vested interests and the conservation of imperialistic power of the British, especially after the traumatic years of 1857-1858, and their discovery of a support from among the local influentials must have forced them to recognise the necessities to cultivate for a crop of men - men of local power, who could fuse their interests with the interests of the colonial system of the British. These rewards were, therefore, not only to create a smoke screen towards the concealment of an act - the act which brutalised and destroyed good number of traditional local elites who fought for their independence but there were also an effective instrument to dig a deeper root for the longer stay of their colonial system. An analysis of its sociological implications on the nature of elites who emerged under the shadow of colonial sovereignty and its effect on the power structure of countryside is presented below. For this

43. Basti Gazetteer, p.163.
44. Letter dated the 19th August, 1958, op.cit.
45. The term Khilut is perhaps of Persian origin. It refers contd....
sovereign provided a refuge, an asylum and a meeting ground of the rewardees from whom arose a new type of elites who came to be bound with a silken band of British connections. These connections empirically visible on account of being identified as the loyal, as a rewardee and as one who shed blood for the British to the lay peasantry. In addition to their traditional legitimacies which they have had received from the local population as raja-zamindar, now the British as a new sovereign emerged there to further polish and sharpen the traditional legitimacies of these rajas-zamindars with new sanction and with a more loud declarations. It was in fact re-legitimization of the traditional legitimacies of the local chiefs. Let us examine the social consequences of the marriage between the colonial and feudal interests of the British and of the local chiefs respectively.

MUTINY AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POWER STRUCTURE

The sociological implications of the survey of Mutiny data of the Basti District suggest that: (a) The range and

contd...

45. to the practice of Muslim ruler who used to ceremonially award a Robe of Honour, Swords and God Mohars (coins) etc. as a mark of recognition to their distinguished subjects and soldiers. The term literally mean Royal Gift. According to H.H. Wilson, it refers to a present given by Superior authority to the inferior one as a mark of distinction, see his "A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms", (ed) by A.C. Ganguli and N.D. Basu, Calcutta: 1940, p.448.
pattern of the confiscation and reward were limited to upper-caste segment alone. Instead of radically shaking down the upper-caste and high land and power nexus-based social hierarchy, the British went to re-install them and to formalise their existence. While the number of rajas after the Mutiny became fewer, the few upper-castes people became richer by receiving the land and power of the fallen rajas and zamindars. (b) Parallel to the above, was the process of a rather sudden ascendancy of Brahman as a new landed aristocracy in the district. Their emergence from the subject (praJa) status was already set in action by the Settlement Act of 1842, which converted their inferior bista right in land to a full-fledged zamindari right equal to those of the traditional rajput zamindars.

These ascendent Brahmans further burnt hold in the Rajput territorial domain by receiving vast chunks of the confiscated land of Rajput rebels in reward for the services done to the British. They, afterward, during the post-Mutiny period thus emerged as a second cadre men of power and influence on the land and power scene of Basti District.

And, finally in culmination, (c) the birth of the imperial institutions of Sanad, Certificate, Title and Seats in Darbar holding class of local elites as a privileged group.

of influentials sheltered beneath the umbrella of the paramount power of the British Crown, exercising power and domination over the local peasantry. Distribution of Sanads, as an imperial practice was suggested first, by Wingfield and it was implemented by Lord Canning in October 1859 at Lucknow Darbar, where he personally distributed them to the loyal ruling chiefs of Oudh. He awarded the title of Maharaja Bahadur to the Oudh Chiefs in that Darbar, even when the Royal Title's Bill, mentioned earlier in this chapter was yet to become an Act. Rajas and Zamindars-Talukdars' superiority of power and influence over the peasants who were tenaciously clinging to their tradition of servitude to their malik were accepted by the British as the necessary institution of the then social and power structure of the countryside. For, the British felt that these institutions served their colonial interest in the Indian countryside.

And thus the dream of the British liberalism to create a class of peasant proprietors freed from the bonds of a parasitical class of Rajas and Zamindars were set aside at the altar of colonial interests. Instead, in order to make the British stay in India more secured they went to develop

47. This was the first British Darbar held in North-West Provinces of Oudh. Among the recipients were Raja Digvijai Singh of Balrampur of Gonda District and Raja Man Singh of Mahadanna (Ayodhya) of Faizabad Districts respectively, See, Metcalf, op.cit., p.150.


49. Robert Montgomery, the Chief Commissioner of Oudh (1858) observed that the superiority and influence of these Talukdars form a necessary element in the Social Institution of the Province, cited by Metcalf, Ibid., p.136.
norms to identify, select and recruit the local influentials in their cohort of loyals to support their structure of imperialism in India from below. The norms and rules for the selection of members for such a cohort of post-mutiny elites need to be examined.

The Rules of Elite Recruitment

The consolidation of British power and the extension of western formal bureaucratic administration in India, during the post-mutiny period in the North-West Provinces and Oudh, went hand in hand with the evolution of a system of formal guideline about the recruitment of local loyal elites to government Honours. Rewards of various types were to them, especially to the active loyals by the British Crown, just after the mutiny, was perhaps an act of instant expression of gratitude to their local saviours and supporters. It, at the same time, was also meant to work as a political design to seek alliance, accountability and obedience from the otherwise rebellious or potentially rebellious landholders of the countryside.

Besides, whereas the loyalty and good services done to the British in the times of the troubles were certainly a basis for elite selections, the colonial power desired to lure those neutral local influentials also who had during the mutiny neither fought for nor against the British, in their active fold of loyal cohort. This, they could do only by
instituting some seemingly objective rules and regulations which could accord not only authority but also some elements of impersonality to the practice.

Thus, while the late fifty's and the early sixty's of the 19th century our data suggest of the practice of the British to reward the Loyalists and Supporters, the seventy's initiated an expansion of the loyalist cohorts by inducting the neutrals of the Mutiny days into the institution of Darbars. The colonial compulsions demanded not only of the strengthening of the loyal cohort but also to expand its numerical volume by inducting the neutrals into the group of the loyals. A letter dated 30th December, 1874 from the Chief Secretary to the Government of North-West Provinces and Oudh was sent to all the Commissioners of the Province seeking information about the titles of rajas and the traditional chiefs of their Divisions with a view towards the formation of Divisions and District Darbars.

"I am directed to request that you will call upon all the Collectors of your Division to submit a Darbar list", wrote the Secretary to the Government, North-West Provinces and Oudh, through a circular from Naini Tal on 25th May, 1879 and went on to state, "I am to communicate the following

50. See the letter dated 30th December, 1874 from the Secretary to Government North-West Provinces and Oudh to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur seeking information about the local chiefs who held titles of raja and maharaja. Political Department File No. VNI: 2, Serial No. Nil of (1874-1877), E.R.O., Basti.
observations and order for information and guidance". His "observations" in fact were prescriptions for the selection of Darbars (to the Darbars) laying down rules for a specific type and its composition. According to this circular, the Darbar was to include the following classes of people:

1) "Native gentlemen of good family and local influence;

ii) Men who have rendered conspicuous services to the Government (allusion is to services done during the Mutiny) (insertion mine);

iii) Men distinguished for public spirit, enkindled by the construction of works of general utility and convenience;

iv) Men distinguished for learning and professional attainment;

v) Honourable servants of Government as City Magistrate, Members of the Municipal Committees, etc.; and

vi) Government officials".

The above six categories of people may be reduced to four sociologically relevant categories for the purpose of analysis and explanation, namely: (i) the landed local aristocracy and the territorial chiefs; (ii) social workers; (iii) men of personal excellence and attainments; and (iv) bureaucrats. The persons belonging to the first category is of the greatest relevance. In addition, it generally provided for the second and third categories as well. The Circular itself makes the reason obvious. It states:
"Of the first class, good family alone gives the right to a seat in the Darbar hereditary. As a rule, the eldest son of a Darbari of this class, on the death of his father will succeed to position in Darbar. This rule, however, is not absolute and when on the death of the father the estate has been largely reduced - or if the son does (sick) appear to warrant his taking his father's place - the case will be considered and decided on its merit". 51

It may be made clear that the use of the term "estate" is here to refer to the category of local rajas and territorial lineage chiefs who owned and exercise control over a large tract of land in the countryside. Urban and industrial estates were not existing then in Basti district or in most parts of east Uttar Pradesh districts. Secondly, retaining the power of a sovereign, in case of exceptional situations, to withdraw or to delegitimise the status of a Darbari, this class of people alone were, however, given hereditary position by the British and, finally that only among the families of these territorial chiefs the honour of Darbari status was allowed to transmit from generation to generation on the male line.

"The second class (i.e. one that includes social worker etc. insertion mine) includes many who will naturally find

51. See, Circular No. 45 of 1879 Nainital, 25th May, 1879, (Political Department, Special), from the Secretary to the Government, North-West Provinces and Oudh to all the Commissioners of Division, North-West Provinces and Oudh, Political Department, File No. XIX-VIII, Serial No.IV of (1875-1880), E.R.O. Basti.
their place in the first class... The succession of son to his father's place in the *Darbar* is not hereditary", explained the Circular of 1879 and, according to this no one else, except the rajas and the territorial chiefs could claim a hereditary seat to *Darbar* on the basis of his father's position.

The fact that hereditary claim was given to only estate owing rajas and chiefs as opposed to any other category of people, generated a situation in the agrarian scene on which the men of traditional power and economic strength again could rise and reassert their dynastic legitimacy before the peasantry. Their hereditary claims were in fact their hereditary "right". And, since these hereditary position holders predominantly came from the traditional ruling lineages of the Rajputs, the institution of the British *Darbar* at the local level of a district or a division not only gave sanction to the perpetuation of the traditional power of the chiefs over the peasants, merchants, artisans and the priests of the countryside but also provided them with a security to the fuller growth of aristocracy (feudalism) in the countryside.

I.R. Reid, the Chief Secretary to the Government, in his Circular dated the 52

52. See, Circular No. 447/IV-375 of 17th August, 1888, *(Political Department)*, from I. Reid, Chief Secretary to the Government, North-West Provinces and Oudh to all the Commissioners, North-West Provinces and Oudh, Political Department, File No. XXII, Serial No. 7, (1885-1890), E.R.O., Basti.
17th August, 1888, insists upon the order that:

"... in proposing the names of persons for entry in the list (of Darbar) and suggesting place to be allotted (in Darbar) to them, Commissioners should be guided by the following considerations. According to the custom Rajas, Nawabs and holders of similar titles should head the list and next to them should be entered Knights and Champion of Order".

Reid's Circular exalts the Rajas and Nawabs who were given top rank in the hierarchy of Darbars. It highlights a major sociological fact that even at the local level the British in India had started, after the mutiny, giving premium to traditional and ascriptive holders of power over those who acquired position through achieved excellence.

In the British hierarchy of Honours of such Crown titles as Knighthood, Champion of Order, Order of British Empire, Knight of India, etc. were generally given to Rajas or Nawabs alone. In the case of the award of a seat in Darbar also the top position was held by Rajas and Nawabs on hereditary basis. The Circular under reference assigns a lower position to the holders of such achieved Country titles (as the British use to refer) as Raja Bahadur, Shams-ul-Ulma, Maha Mohopadhya, Rai Bahadur and Khan Bahadur, etc. In the

53. Rajas of Bansi Raj alone received higher British Crown title in Basti. Raja Mahipat Singh was the first to receive the Title of Champion of the Star of India at Agra Darbar held in 1906. See Basti Gazetteer, p.91, Raja Ratan Singh, the adopted grand-son of Raja Mahipat Singh was post-humously awarded the Crown Title of the Champion of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire. The title was received by his widow in 1919. Political Department, File No.XVI-19 of (1918) and File No.III of (1919), E.R.O. Basti. It may be noted that Bansi family had been the strongest supporters of the British during the uprising of 1857. All other local influentials received only country titles.
hierarchy of Honours we get three distinct types:

1. Rajas and Nawabs, at the top
2. Holders of Crown titles, at the middle
3. Holders of country title, at the bottom

In the preparation of Darbar list collectors of the Division were asked to propose the name of the candidates with the supply of following types of background information about the candidate along with his (Collector's) own remark about the ground for such a proposal to the Commissioner of the Division.

1. Divisional number of the candidate
2. District number of the candidate
3. District number of the candidate
4. Name of the proposed Darbari
5. Name of the proposed candidate's father
6. Residence
7. Year of his birth
8. Amount of his income
9. Occupation
10. Ground of admission
11. Remarks

The Divisional and the District numbers of Darbaris used to reflect their relative ranks within the cohorts of Divisional and District Darbars. For example, in 1900, Gorakhpur Division included the districts of Gorakhpur, Basti and Azamgarh. The Division had a total strength of forty-six Darbaris of whom twenty-two belonged to the District of Gorakhpur and fourteen and ten Darbaris to the Districts of Basti and Azamgarh respectively. Raja Ram Singh of Bansi held the rank of No.1 both at the level of the Divisional cohort of forty-six Darbaris as well as at the district cohort of fourteen Darbaris. While the No.1 rank Darbari of the divisional level Darbar used to invariably hold No.1 rank (number) at the District level Darbars also, the vice-versa, however, was not in practice. Thus the No.1 rank Darbaris of Gorakhpur and Azamgarh district Darbars used to be, in the hierarchy of relative Honour below the rank of Raja of Basti, who held the No.1 rank at the Division Darbar.

The Commissioner of the Division had the right to seek more information about the candidate from the Collector, turn down the latter's proposal or to give his ascent to and extend approval of the Collector's recommendation. At the close of the 19th century, District Collectors had started echoing

55. See, Darbar List of Gorakhpur Division, (corrected up to 13th December, 1900). Issued on 2nd June, 1901, Nainital, by W.H.R. Impoy, Chief Secretary to the Government, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Political Department, File NoIVI-10 of (1901-1905), E.R.C., Basti.
the need for a communal balance among the darbars in Basti District.

J.H. Cox, Esq., I.C.S., District Magistrate, Basti, vide his letter dated the 16th February, 1903, to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur presents the following proposal:

"... Although the Basti District contains a population of 2,99,688 Mohamadans, these are entirely unrepresented in the Darbar Dist. I, therefore, suggest that the Government be moved to include Mr. Inayat Hussain among the Darbars of the Gorakhpur Division".56

That the Muslim population of the district did not have much of the power as compared to the Hindu upper castes is evident from the above document. They could not become a conspicuous section of the local population to be taken note of by the British. But it also suggests that the British at the beginning of the 20th century had started broadening the base for elite selections. Communal factors stated being 57 taken cognizance of in the Constitution of Darbars. In the

56. Letter dated 16th February, 1903 from J.H. Cox, Esq., I.C.S., District Collector and Magistrate, Basti to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur. M.S. Political Department, File No. XVI-2, Serial No.90 of (1900-1909); E.R.O., Basti.

57. We are intentionally using the phrase communal factors to highlight the emergence of two body-social theory in India. For, had the District Magistrate Basti been equally concerned with the issue of the non-representation of majority subject population of the upper castes and not merely with the specific case of Muslim population alone the British intention to carve out two distinct and different body-socials in India would have been ruled out. But the only concern expressed was about the non-representation of the Muslim population alone. The British could not think about Bahdik, etc., who need an urgent British attention. See, Letter, ibid.
same year, the Office of the Commissioner Gorakhpur, turned down the recommendation of the Collector of Basti to include the names of Lala Bhagwati and Babu Shorhrat Singh, stating that "the Commissioner finds the recommendation of the Collector - Magistrate Basti.... insufficient".

The British subsequently (in the 20th century) allowed the men of personal and professional achievements to get entry into their Darbars. But these new entrants could not raise up to the social status, power and position of men of ascribed traditional heritage of influence and domination. Further, the British Darbars were not a homogeneous institution. They used to be of various levels and consequently carried varying degrees of social prestige and honour in respect to their levels. In fact, recruitment to various levels of Darbars reflected the relative power level of Darbari at the one hand, and the perception of his estimated importance given to him by the British, on the other.

The factors that delimited the capacity of the Muslim population to emerge at par in power with the Hindu chiefs even when the Muslims belonged to the ruling community of the pre-colonial history of north India are to be examined in terms of political and ethnogeographic characteristics of the

58. Letter dated 9th April, 1903 from the Commissioner Gorakhpur Division, addressed to Collector-Magistrate Basti. Political Department, M.S., File No. XVI, - 13 of (1900-105), E.R.O., Basti.
tarai tract of Uttar Pradesh. Politically, a Hindu kingdom of Nepal borders the northern reaches of tarai tract of Uttar Pradesh, Nepal had been an easily available asylum for the local Rajputs who, at the face of a stronger law enforcing revenue collecting or a punitive army of the Muslim Nawabs and emperors, could make escape into the Nepalese territory.

Usually such an asylum enabled them to harass the Muslim power at the choice of their time and place. In addition and coeval to the above, were the factors of a specific geographical characteristics of the tract: swanpy densely forested terrain and inhabited by a largely mobile population headed by generally equally mobile chiefs who could dismantle their mud fort and reconstruct them at another place of their wish and choice. Geographical condition put limit to the permanent mobilization of a strong army settlement of the Nawabs, Nazims and Chakledars of the Muslim emperor. Under such a condition, only the son of the soil could settle and exercise hold over the scattered population of the tract in the pre-colonial phase of history. Muslim population, therefore, could not establish itself as a part of ruling aristocracy in the countryside of this part of east Uttar Pradesh. Basti district did not have a single raja from among the Musulmans.

Thus, in addition to occasions of special Darbars, such as

Prince of Wales Darbar at Agra in 1875 and the Coronation of Darbar of King George V at Delhi in December 1911, there used to be a regular and well defined hierarchy of Darbars. Darbars belonging to various levels of Darbars are presented below in the descending order of their importance:

1. State level, Viceroy's Darbar at Delhi
2. Provincial level, Lt. Governor's Darbar at Lucknow
3. Local level, Divisional and District Darbars

The vertical hierarchy of Darbars, from Viceroys down to Divisional Commissioner and District Collectors' Darbars used to be horizontally divided by the hierarchy of Darbars into unequal strata of honour, power and prestige in the countryside. Basti data show that recruitment to (1) and (2) categories of Darbars were kept generally reserved exclusively for the traditional Rajas and territorial chiefs. Zamindars of the lineage of Rajas and the emerging Brahman were placed at the District and the Divisional Darbar levels. In Basti, this has been a fact without a single exception. In the absence of Rajas from any other caste or community other than the Rajput lineages such as the Sarnets of Bansi estate, of Kalhansas and Suraibansis lineages of Basti and Mahson estates respectively were the only local "native chiefs", (as the Britishers generally referred to them) who were provided with the august Seats at Lt. Governor and Viceroy's Exalted Darbars. Presented below (Table - 15) are the details of their locally well remembered participation in at the State and Province level Darbars.
## Table - 15

**Participation of Local Rajas in Higher British Darbars**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Nature of Darbar Held at in year</th>
<th>Attended by the Seat Holding Raja</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Lord Canning's Darbar October 1859</td>
<td>Raja Mahipat Singh Somet Lineage Raja of Basni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Lt. Governor's Darbar December 1861</td>
<td>- do - was awarded with the Title of C.S.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Viceroy's Darbar December 1891</td>
<td>Ram Singh, the successor of Raja Mahipat Singh of Bansi and the Kalhansa lineage Raja Raja Pateshwari Pratap Narain Singh of Basti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Lt. Governor's Darbar February 1898</td>
<td>Raja Pateshwar Pratap Narain Singh of Basti and Raja Lal Narenda Bahadur Pal of Mahson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Prince of Wales' Agra, Darbar at the November 1909</td>
<td>Raja Ratn Sen Singh, the adopted son of Raja Ram Singh of Bansi and Raja Pateshwari Pratap Narain Singh of Basti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Coronation Darbar of King George V December 1911</td>
<td>Raja Ratn Sen Singh of Bansi was awarded with the Title of C.E.I.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60. See, Letter, dated 30th December, 1874, op.cit.

62. Ibid.

63. Circular No. 89/IV-223, dated 2nd February, 1898, Allahabad, from T. Stoker, Chief Secretary to Government, North-West Provinces and Oudh to the Commissioners, Rohilkhand, Gorakhpur, Lucknow and Faizabad Divisions, Political Department, File No. XVI-I, Serial No. 56 of (1895-1900), E.R.O., Basti.

64. Copy of the Letter, dated 20th October 1909 from the Chief Commissioner of Gorakhpur Division to the Secretary to Government, North-West Provinces and Oudh recommending the name of Raja Pateshwari Pratap Narain Singh of Basti to be included along with the name of Raja Ratn Sen Singh of Bansi for a seat at Agra Darbar (1909), Political Department, M.S. File No. XVI-4, Serial No. 10 of (1905-1910), E.R.O., Basti.

65. List of Native Gentlemen who attended His Majesty King George V Coronation Darbar at Delhi (1911), Political Department, M.S. File No. XVI-4, Serial No. 11 of (1910-1915), E.R.O., Basti.
Internal division into unequal strata of statuses, the structure of Darbari elites consisting of local influentials of various ranks and order and neatly arranged one upon another on the basis of relative power, prestige and honour etc., led to the formation of a power pyramid. Historically, the emergence of this pyramid was an unique phenomenon. It existed as a monolith of power over and above the lay peasantry. It was supported with the patting and pampering hands of the colonial sovereign - the British. The sovereign commanded the cohort of Darbaris and the colonial interests commanded the sovereign.

Under such circumstances, the uniqueness of the said pyramid lay in the fact that unlike the social data of the past of Basti chiefs, the members who made up the raw material of this pyramid were not seen in a cohort on the grounds of primordial bonds or loyalty to lineages, castes or communities, nor were they a united group to face a common foe for their liberty and freedom. They were there (in groups) in servitude to the British. This is an unique social data which characterised the character structure of the elites of post-mutiny phase of Basti district. And on this pyramid again, the traditional land holding rajas and lineage chiefs occupied the top positions. This tendency of a continuing hold of traditional power under the regime of the British colonialism in India is further highlighted by the patterns of the practice of award of Titles to native rajas and chiefs.
Award of Titles

The British instituted mainly two types of Titles. The first went to symbolised honour, power and prestige in the cultural idiom of Indian society. Titles such as Maharaja Bahadur, Raja Bahadur, Mahamohpaadhya Rai and Rai Bahadur, etc. on the Sanskritic Hindu and Shams-ul-ulma and Khan Sahib, etc. on the Persian Muslim styles are the examples of culture specific country Titles awarded by the British to Indian natives. We have pointed out earlier as to how, in India titles of Maharaja Bahadur were awarded to Rajas of Balrampur and Faizabad in 1859 by Lord Canning even when the Royal Titles Bill was yet to become an Act in 1875.

The above types of Titles were on the pattern and reflected the ethos of Indian traditional notion of country honours. In 1859, Lord Canning, the Governor General, and Sir James Outram, then the Military Member of Governor-

66. See, Metcalf, op. cit., p.137.

67. In Basti district Kalhansa territorial chief, Babu Shohrat Singh of Chandapar, after receiving the Title of Rai Bahadur in 1915 applied for the higher Title of Raja Bahadur which his son, Sheopati Singh, received in 1921. This is the only case of the Award of the Title of Raja Bahadur to an ancient lineage chief of Kshtriya caste in Basti. Field report suggests of the award of this Title also to Rai Bahadur Ashtuhuja Prasad, then known as Raja of Changera in 1921. For reference, see, Political Department, M.S.S. File No. XVI-11, Serial No. nil of (1920-1925), E.R.O., Basti.

68. Circular No. 447 of 1888, op. cit.
General's Council (1858-1860), the latter being the Chief Commissioner of Oudh (1856-1858) during the rebellion recommended the establishment of a special order of Knighthood, under the Crown of Queen Victoria. And, "Since title emanating directly from the crown were always more highly regarded than traditional Indian honour", writes Metcalf, "Canning saw in the creation of such an order a most effective way to enhancing the loyalty of the princes and of rewarding for their continued service to the Empire". The establishment of the title of Star of India was the result of these recommendations. Titles emanating from the British Crown came into being along with the institution of Seats in Darbars. Holding a Seat in the British Darbar was thus introduced as the second type of symbol of honour, power and prestige to its local holders.

Of the two types of titles, the one which emanated from the Crown, as compared to the traditional country titles were treated more prestigious. And, as was the case with the issue of Seats at higher level Darbars which were exclusively given to only traditionally powerful rajas and chiefs, same pattern of hierarchy is noted in the case of the awards of such titles also.

69. see, Metcalf, op.cit., p.223.
In Basti, while the men of personal and professional excellence were awarded relatively lower country titles of Rai Bahadur and Rai Sahib, the higher British Crown titles went in favour of the local chiefs who used to be and were the members of the Lt. Governor's and Viceroy's Darbars. Recipients of such prestigious titles such as Companion of the Star of India (C.S.I.), Champion of the Indian Empire (C.I.E.) and the Champion of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire (C.I.E.) were awarded only to the traditionally powerful loyal rajas of Bansi. The title, Companion of the Star of India (C.S.I.) was awarded to Raja Mahipat Singh in 1861, for his exemplary bravery and loyalty to the British Crown during the mutiny. Mahipat Singh adopted grandson, Raja Ratan Sen Singh, was the recipient of the title of Champion of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire (C.I.E.) in 1918. No other raja of Basti district could receive title of the Crown order. The only exception is that of Lala Prasad Ashtobhuja, who first received the title and of Rai Bahadur, in 1911 and then in 1920 was awarded the title of the "Order of British Empire" (O.B.E.) and his name in the British records changed from Lala Ashtobhuja Prasad

70. In connection with the award of the Title of C.S.I. to Raja Mahipat Singh of Bansi, see Basti Gazetteer, p.91. About the award of the titles to Raja Ratan Sen Singh, see List of Native Gentlemen who attended His Majesty, the King George V. Coronation Darbar at Delhi, 1911, op. cit.
to Hon'ble Lal Ashtbhuj Prasad Singh. The local term "Lal" is an honorific prefix used to refer to son of a raja, whereas the term "Lala" is used to refer to either the trading caste or Bania or to Kaitha caste scribes in East Uttar Pradesh. The change from the linguistic symbol of Lala to Lal was a major change in the status of a person for whom this symbol was used. The only Kshatriya lineage chief who received the title of Raja Bahadur was Babu Sheopati Singh of Chandapar (in 1920) on account of, in addition to 'public spirit', his belonging to one of the 'most influential Kshatriya lineage of Kalhansas of Gonda district and of Chawkhara' estate of Basti district. The remaining few received the traditional country title of Rai Bahadur.

Relevant records show that in all, only three persons of local influence received the traditional country title of Rai Bahadur in Basti. In each case the grounds for award, besides including such objective criteria as large land

71. **Revised List of Darbaris.** Gorakhpur Division, forwarded by the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division vide his letter No.167-76'XVI dated 16th February, 1920, to the Chief Secretary to the Government, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Political Department, Tile No. VII-5, Serial No.1 of (1920-1921), E.R.O., Basti.

72. Besides, Basti Gazetteer, p.94, see documents about Rai Bahadur Shohrat Singh and his son, Raja Bahadur Sheopati Singh, Award of the Title of Rai Bahadur to Babu Shohrat Singh of Chandapar (1920-1925), op.cit.
holding and high revenue paying capacity also included such subjective judgements as spirit of public work, "in recognition of his public spirit and liberal subscription towards the work of public utility". A lower traditional title of Rai Sahib was also awarded to two locally powerful persons. Among the Kshtriyas recipients of Rai Bahadur titles were Babu Shohrat Singh of Chandapur (in 1915) and Nageshwar Prasad Singh of Marwatia (in 1913) and among the non-Kshtriva recipients were Lala Ashtbhuj Prasad Singh, a Kayastha (in 1911). The title of Rai Sahib was awarded to Babu Sarju Prasad, L.A., L.L.B., Vakeel of Basti (in 1920). The latter two recipients were attached to families of Rajas, R.B. Ashtbhuj Prasad's family was attached to the Court of Samet Raja of Bansli in whose court Lala Bhagwati Prasad, the father of the former, used to hold managerial position. Similarly Babu Sarju Prasad Vakeel, according to our field report, was a family lawyer of Surajbansi territorial chief of Banpur in Basti district. The Vakeel earned his title by working hard for the Aman Sabha activities in the district. The aim of the

73. About Babu Rai Bahadur Najeshwar Prasad Singh of Marwatia, see, the List of Divisional Darbar, Gorakhpur Division (Corrected upto 10th February, 1913), Political Department, File No. VII-4, Serial No.6 (1900-1915), E.R.O., Basti.

74. About the title of Rai to Babu Sarju Prasad Vakeel of Basti, see Political Department, File No. 4, Serial No.2, (1920) and File No.10, Serial No.2 of (1920-1925), E.R.O., Basti.

75. About the activities of Aman Sabha in Basti District, see the document referred to in relation to Babu Sarju Prasad Vakeel above. Historians have not examined the role of Aman Sabhas, literally meaning Peace Committee in the contd.....
Sabha (Loyalty League) which also used to publish a newsletter (of which according to my field report, Babu Sarju Parsad was the editor) was to:

1. Monitor information about the anti-British and anti-zamindar activities of the National Congress;
2. Wean the peasant away from the influence of the Congress workers;
3. Unite the loyal zamindars, vakcels, mukhtiar and other educated sections of the district against the National Congress; and
4. To protect the British interest in India.

AWARD OF SAMHDS, CERTIFICATES AND REWARDS

These "select few", "the independent gentlemen of property and influence" as Lord Canning used to refer the landed nobility of India, were not only given seats at various levels of Darbars and were awarded with

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75. contd.... United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. At the face of gigantic peasant upsurge under the flag of the National Congress, the British organised a Loyalty League in each district during the late 20 and 30 of this century. It members were influentials, loyal zamindars and Talukdars. The functions of the League and its members were to monitor information about the Congress activities and peasants' participations with Congress against the British as well as against the local zamindars. The district administration used to award certificates to its active members. One such certificate is with the author given by late Thakur Jwala Parsad Singh of village Chaukara, District Basti, who was member of this Sabha. The only reference to Aman Sabha is in Report of India League Delegation in 1932, in A.R. Desai (ed) Peasant Struggle in India, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1979, p.309.

76. Based on interviews with Thakur Theo Govind Singh, Rameshwar Singh and Jwala Prasad Singh, These respondents were members of Aman Sabha of Basti Distt. and have had received Commendation Certificates for their anti-Congress and pro-British activities.

77. Cited by Metcalf, op.cit, pp.163 and 170.
various types of titles but they were also awarded with Sanads certificates and various other types of symbolic and material rewards for philanthropic work at the times of such crisis as famine or plague. For example on 24th November, 1909 at a Darbar held at Banaras, Raja Ram Singh of Bansi received certificate "in recognition of his meritorious services in the famine of 1907-1908". Similarly Babu Nageshwar Prasad Singh, Honorary Magistrate of Marwatia, was awarded certificate in 1912 in recognition of his services in Plague of 1905. The award was declared by the Secretary to the Government, United Provinces, through a Circular which stated:

"By the command of His Excellency, the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, medals were granted in the names of His Most Gracious Majesty King George V, Emperor of India, on the occasion of His Majesty's Coronation Darbar held on the 12th December 1911 to the following officials and non-official gentlemen and ladies in the United Provinces recognition, in the case of the former, of their responsible position and good work, and in the case of the latter, of their loyalty, influence, public spirit and philanthropy".

The award of Gold Medals at the Coronation Darbar of 1911, was perhaps kept in reserve for the British Gentlemen alone. From United Provinces, though the list of Medal

78. List of Basti gentlemen to whom certificates are to be given at the Benaras Darbar on 24th November, 1909, M.S. Political Department, File No. V-2, Serial No. nil, E.R.O., Basti, (1905-1910)

79. Circular No.1371-VI of 1912 dated 24th October, from the Secretary to the Government, United Provinces, to all the Commissioners of the Divisions, United Provinces, Political Department, File No. XIV-2, Serial No. nil of (1911-1912), E.R.O., Basti.
and monarchical symbols characterised the Darbar scenes in north India.

In a District Darbar held on the 16th December 1919 by G.B. Muir Esq., ICS, District Magistrate, Basti various types of Honours, Titles, Sanads, Certificates and Gifts

82. List of Recipients of Rewards for War Services at the occasion of District Darbar held by G.B. Muir, Esq., ICS, District Magistrate, Basti, on 16th December, 1919. The file contains the list of contributors to the War Fund.

83. Some of the conspicuous recipients at the 1919 Darbar are identified below: The Tehsildar of Bansi, Sirajul Haq received Viceroy and Governor General's Title of Personal Distinction, Khan Saheb Badge and Sanad, Governor General's Certificate went to Pandit Bindeshwari Prasad Tiwari of Jamuni, Commander-in-Chiefs' Sanad was given to Raja Pateshwar Pratap Narain Singh of Basti and Sheopati Singh of Chandapar. Lieutenant Governor's Sanad for remission of Land Revenue to Rai Bahadur Nageshwar Pratap Singh of Narwati, Bagheshwari Pratap Narain Singh of Basti, Katara, Muna Singh of Pipra Gautam - all Rajputs and, to Pandit Ram Chitra Pandey of Belbharia. Lieutenant Governor's certificates were given to five Brahmans, such as Pandit Hima Nath Tiwari of Chetia, Serbhagila Nath Tiwari of Chetia, Ram Prasad Pandey of Narharia, Kripal Pandey of Narhira and one Tehsildar of Domaria Ganj - Babu Tarif Singh. Babu Sarju Parsad Vakeel and Attafar Vakeel received gold watches. Recruiting Ward Badges and Pistols were given to 10 Rajputs Zamindars such as, Raja Pat Shwari Pratap Narain Singh of Basti, Sheopati Singh of Chandapar, Jailal Singh, Hanuman Parsad Singh, Madho Parsad Singh of Rudhauli and to Babu Narmeshwar Prasad Singh of Chawkhara and to Ashtabhuja Pd. Singh of Bansi. See List of the Recipients of Rewards for War Services, 1919, Ind.
were awarded to the native influentials for their helping role in War Services (First World War). According to the document cited above, their role in war services consisted in making huge monetary contribution to War Fund of the Government and in providing the recruitment of labourers for road building. Quite large number of zamindars made contributions of money to the said Fund in 1918. For example, Raja of Bansí contributed ₹.25,000, Ashtbhuja Parsad Singh of Bansí, ₹.15,000; Kanahiya Parsad Mista of Bansí, ₹.15,000; Hari Nath Tiwari of Chetía, ₹.5,000; and Babu Shohrat Singh of Chandapar ₹.10,000.

In the above mentioned Darbar of 1919, there were awards from the Viceroy and the awards from the Governor General, such as the Title of Personal Distinctions as Khan Saheb Sanad and Badge, Governor General's Certificates, Commander-in-Chief's Sanad, and Sanad for remission of land revenue, certificates and gold watches from His Honour, the Lieutenant Governor of United Provinces, Agra and Oudh. Pistols, Recruiting Badges and Sands, Gold Badges and the Sanads from the District War Board Basti were also distributed. All the higher titles, Sands and gifts, especially the pistols, it may be noted went to the Rajput influentials.

84. Ibid
Sanads and certificates of lesser values were given primarily to literati, such as vakeels, Mukhtars and the kin of influential Darbars.

Our survey of historical data pertaining to the system of norms and imperatives evolved by the British to the recruitment of traditionally powerful land-owning local zamindars and Rajas and men of personal excellence to the cohort of Darbars of various levels reveal some interesting historical facts of significant sociological value.

1. Through the institution of Darbars and the practice of awarding titles, the British totally ignored the importance of peasantry in their estimation as a crucial segment of potential power. The pre-mutiny phase of radical Benthamite evangelical zeal to create a strong stratum of land-owning peasant proprietors, delinked from the paralysing nexus of Rajas and zamindars, peasantry that could raise the productivity and thereby raise the revenue for the East-India Company as the Ricardian and Benthamite rationalist used to think, were totally overlooked. Peasantry as the potential hero of Indian history, once dreamt by James Mill and radical administrators such as R.M. Bird and James Thomason were replaced under the pressure of hard political facts by traditional and historical heroes of the countryside - the Rajas and the zamindars of upper castes. Peasantry was ignored and
and neglected. In the political eye of the British, the peasantry did not exist as an independent and distinct category of population.

2. By introducing a hierarchy among various levels of Darbars and among various orders of Titles, the British initiated the formation of hierarchies within the elite groups. The elite structure was thus based upon recognized inequalities. The structure of elite did not only mirror the traditional hierarchy of Hindu dominated inequilibitarian society but went one step ahead: The British cemented the traditional structure of inequality with their rigorous system of sanctions and legitimacies. The traditional elites such as Kshetriya Rajas and lineage chiefs were accorded seats at Lt. Governors' and Viceroys' Darbars and received Crown Titles, the others were allowed to have access to only Darbars of district and Divisional levels. And their titles were generally country titles.

By introducing a system of hierarchy of Honours, the British tacitly introduced division and hierarchy within the cohort of local elites. These hierarchies helped and promoted the colonial interests of the British. introduction of hierarchy of Honour not only divided the elites into inequal groups of higher and lower ranks but it also functioned as a process of seeding the elites with the utilitarian concepts of incentive and competition. If loyalty, sincerity and faithfulness to the interests of
British Empire in India was the ground for the award of Honour and Recognition, the degree, frequency and the intensity of the same were the logical measures of the levels and and types of varying rewards by the British. The British opened up the possibilities for lower rank elites to climb up on the higher ranks by excelling in the display of their loyalty to the Empire. This is how a managerial Kavastha family of Bansi, as we have noted earlier, first received the lower country title of Raj Bahadur in 1911 and after nine years of hard work of loyalties, such as large contribution to War Fund, recruitment of labourers and suppression of peasant upsurge under the leadership of the local National Congress worker, etc. in the favour of the British helped him to earn the higher Crown Title of the Order of the British Empire (O.B.E.) in 1920. Sarju Prasad Vakeel was an other such status climber.

The award of title needs more elaboration. The British practice of conferring titles on the local influentials had a clear trend. Prestigious titles, throughout the second half of the 19th and first two decades of the 20th century were conferred only upon Kshatriya rajas of Basti District. The conferment of the title of C.I.E. upon Raja Mahipat Singh in 1861 and C.S.I. on Raja Ratan Sen Singh in 1919 are illustrations. But after 1920 we note a change. The rise of Lala Ashtbhuja
Prasad, who received the title of O.B.E. in 1920 and Sarju Prasad Vakeel, who received the country title of Rai Sahib in 1921 are examples of the above processes. It may be pointed out that Lala Bhagwati Prasad, the father of Lala (later on 'Lal') Ashtobhuja Prasad later on added a Rajput Suffix of "Singh" to his name. He was serving at the Court of Raja of Bansi. He got large area of land in reward from the Bansi Raja. His son, Lal Ashtobhuja Prasad rose from the title holding position of Rai Bahadur in 1911 to the position of O.B.E. in 1920 and then in 1921 received the title of Raja Bahadur and became locally famous as Raja of Changers. Chanera is located in the small town of Bansi in Basti District. Similarly Babu Sarju Prasad, according to the field report was educated by the Suraibansis of Banpur family of the district of Basti and served the patron family as their Vakeel (legal advisor).

Finally, a diachronic analysis of data of the 19th and the 20th centuries on the character and composition of elites who formed the cohort of Darbars and received Titles and Honours of various ranks and order reveal a clear and distinct shift in the British policy of elite recruitment. In addition to loyalty to the British, the 19th century elite recruitment policy emphasised more on such ascriptive qualification of local influentials as upper caste status, historicity and tradition of local
rulership and control over large tract of territory than on education and personal excellence for the award of Seat in Darbars and titles of Honour. Premium on ascription pre-determined the character and composition of Darbars: only land-owning territorial chiefs such as Rajput Rajas, Zamindars and priestly Brahmans could get entry into the prestigious echeleous of British Darbars. In Basti district, throughout the post-mutiny 19th century phase of the British rule, generally no one except the upper caste Rajputs and Brahmans could receive title of Honour Seat in the Darbars. Exceptions to the above have been very few.

The ascriptive elite recruitment principle of the British, however, underwent a change after the 2nd decade of the 20th century. Changes were structural in nature. The British innovation of modern education, schools, colleges, hospitals, railways bureaucracy, etc. generated a context for the emergence of not only modern secular achievement-values but also provided a frame in which these values could spread and prosper. Unlike the character and composition of 19th century Darbars, we find Vakeels, Mukhtars and managerial position holding educated Muslims and Kayasthas slowly climbing up and were inducted in the Darbars and were awarded titles of Honours. Darbars and titles which were the exclusive preserves of upper caste territorial Rajput chiefs and priestly Brahmans were
thus, in the 20th century made accessible to other castes as well. Their entry into the Darbars and into the folds of colonial power was generally by education and personal excellence. Peripheral, though, these new enterants were in their number as compared to numerical predominance of the upper castes, they did demonstrate the facts that people of other segments of society could rise to the top hierarchy of power and honour. It may be pointed out that it were perhaps these liberal values that led educated people, especially Vakeels and Mukhtars to join the anti-British movement launched by the Indian National Congress, at a time when some of the members of their profession were being glamourised by the British as loyal Darbaris.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE DARBARIS AND THE TITLE HOLDING ELITES OF BASTI - 1895-1920

Let us now describe the social background of the elites of this phase of Basti history. We have to discuss the extent and quality of changes British brought about - especially in relation to the power and domination of the traditional territorial elites. What types of power and privileges the British accorded to the elites who had enjoyed almost independent and autonomous rule over the countryside in the pre-British period. Their subordination

85. Maintenance of Darbar Lists at the District and Divisional level, came to exist during the 80's of the 19th century. I, however, could not trace any record earlier to 1895 in the Record Office of Basti District. The practice of maintaining Darbar List of the District and the Division, according to the District Official Sources came to end after 1920.
to the British, of some, by punishment: death, destruction, confiscation of estate and penal banishment; the others, by appeasement: award of Khillut, Land, Titles and Seat in the Darbars, etc. must have had introduced basic changes in the structure and functioning of the elites. These changes are to be portrayed. We shall do so by portraying the social background of the elites.

The data on elites discussed in the preceding section did reflect on the background of the Darbaris and title holders in general. The logic of the 19th century colonial policies, the aggressive anti-zamindar-talukdar agrarian postures of the Company Raj, the mutiny, the Proclamation of the British Crown as the Sovereign of India and the subsequent restoration of the rajas and zamindars, already provided a scheme which was predictively selective and these, therefore, indirectly reflected at the general background of the local elites. However,

86. The predictive scheme is based upon the assumption that there exists a causative inter-connection between the British restoration policy of the rajas and zamindars and the latter consequent rise to power and prestige during the colonial period. The positive correlation between state policy towards a segment of social structure and the existence and maturation of that segment seem to hold no empirical substance when we note that the same segment of Raja and Zamindars who were alleged to be the child of the British policy, continue to have power and prestige in the countryside even when post-independence Indian State policy has taken allegedly an opposite direction. Abolition of jagirdaris and zamindari system during the post-colonial India has not been able to abolish the existence of traditional raja and zamindars who continue to have influences and dominations over people. State policies, unless they are too radical, i.e., revolutionary in nature do not generally upset traditional structure. India did not face a revolutionary breakdown of its social and cultural structures and therefore, we can not rely on deterministic causative logic.
presentation of a direct and independent historical data on their background merits a separate and detailed discussion. It is especially important as the details of the social background of the elites of the colonial period, taken as a reference point, might help us in diachronically comparing with the data on the same of the post-independent period. In order to maintain this diachronic perspective, we find it essential to describe in details all those features of Basti elites which exist in the records about whom we have some dependable primary source materials.

Beginning from 1895 and ending in 1930, we have six sample Darbar Lists of Basti District at five-year intervals. Analysis of information contained in them yield interesting details on the background of the elites. These Lists were annually updated by the Collector of the District for the approval of the Commissioners of the Division, in our case the Commissioner of Gorakhpur Division.

Religion, Caste and the Lineage of Darbaris and Title-Holding Elites

Secluded, as the Basti-Gorakhpur tract was in the forest clad cys-Himalayan region, Muslim power-holders such as the Nawabs, Nazims, Amils, Hakims and Chakaledars could

87 For the exact usage of these terms, see, W.H. Moreland, Agrarian System of Moslem India, Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1930, especially the Appendix H (Glossary) of this book, p.271.
do little to upset the settled Hindu traditional power structure. Consequently, after the British arrival, it were the ruling caste of Kshtriya rajas and chiefs and the emerging priestly caste of the Brahman who dominated the District Darbars of Basti in number. The exceptions are of the Muslim Pindari settlers. Shaik Khadim Hussain of Ganeshpur who secured a Darbar Seat between 1895 and 1898 and Mr. Irayat Hussain, an educated landholder of little traditional background got a seat in 1903 and remained a Darbari during the subsequent years up to 1913. Between 1895 and 1920, in the District Darbar of Basti which included Darbaris ranging between 13 and 15 members, Muslim community with about 17 per cent of population in the district could provide only two Darbaris mentioned above.

Taking the Darbar List of 1895 as a base-point, we find in that year, of the 13 Hindu Darbaris, nine belonged

88. Around 1818, the East India Company launched a campaign against Afghan Pindaris who lived on brigandage and warfare. In order to combat with them the Company lured them to a settled life by offering initially revenue free estates. In Basti, among such a Pindari was Qudir Baksh. He was given the confiscated property of mutiny rebels of Pipra Gautam and was made to settle at Ganespur - a village in Nagar Pargana. See, Gazetteer, p.97; Gorakhpur Gazetteer, pp.120-121.

89. About Mr. Irayat Hussain of Sawalipur, see, M.S. Ref. No.52, Muslim Government Officers who used to be ex-officio members of the Darbars is excluded from our analysis.

90. Darbar List of Gorakhpur Division, (corrected upto 10th December, 1895). List of Darbaris of Basti District, forwarded to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, on 15th December, 1895 by the District Magistrate, Basti. Political Department, M.S. File No.XVI-I, Serial No. nil (1895), E.R.O., Basti.
to Kashtriya caste and four to the caste of Brahman.

These two castes had only 3.12 and 11.31 per cent of population respectively in the district. The usual total number of 14 Darbaris was reduced to 13 on account of exclusion of the name of Raja Ram Singh of Bansi from the List of Darbaris.

Among the Rajputs, Raja Narendra Bahadur Pal of Mahson, Thakur Lachman Singh of Gauhania, Babu Dan Bahadur Singh of Hariharpur and Babu Kanhiya Baksh Pal of Banpur - all belonged to Surajvansi lineage headed by the Raja of Mahson. Raja Pateshwari Pratap Narain Singh of Basti and Babu Dhrubraj Singh of Chakhara were from the Kalhansa lineage. The Samet lineage of which Raja Ram Singh was the head, had only one Darbari - Bhaiya Badri Prasad Singh of Rudhauli. Bhaiya Kali Prasad Singh of Marwata was from the Eisen lineage. Among all these Kashtriya Darbaris, with

91. See Basti Gazetteer, pp.70-80.

92. Raja Ram Singh of Bansi was temporarily forfeited of his title and seat to Darbar on account of his involvement in a murder case. See, File on Bansi Murder Case: Withdrawal of Title of Raja Ram Singh of Bansi, Political Department, File No.XVI, Serial No.22 (1885-92), E.R.O., Basti. It may be mentioned that Raja Ram Singh's amory was confiscated. For detail, see the Letter, dated 12th March, 1900 from the District Magistrate, Basti to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, giving details of the arms confiscated by the Government from Raja Ram Singh. Political Department, M.S. File No.XVI-I (1895-1900), E.R.O., Basti.
the exception of Babu Jagat Narain Singh of Narkhoria whose Bais Rajput lineage was relatively not as significant in the power distribution of the traditional Basti as were other pedigreed Rajput Darbaris. Pedigreed Rajput lineages had dynastic origin and were linked with the local history of lineage kingship during the phase of pre-colonial history of Basti district.

The next caste in the hierarchy of power was of the Brahmans. Brahmans had four Darbaris in the Darbar List of 1895. They were, Hamarain Pande of Jagdishpur, Pandit Jagrup Dat Pande of Kalyanpur, Pandit Uma Nath Tiwari of Sikautha and Pirthipal Pande of Gadawar.

A survey of six Darbaris lists sampled to represent a continuous picture of the social background of Basti Darbaris from 1895-1920, present following information on their caste background.

Before we proceed to examine the data (Table 16), we ought to recognise the fact that the British, during the mutiny of 1857 had liquidated a good deal of traditional

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93. By dynastic origin we mean to refer to those lineages whose pedigrees are recorded in District Gazettes, in Morgan's, Title Holders, op. cit., in or in any other records. Pedigrees of the rajas who had rebelled against the British in 1857, are found though not so much in the British records, as in the oral traditions of the countryside.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample years</th>
<th>Total No. of Darbaris</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Hindu castes</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Musalmans</td>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>Shatriyas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 1895</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1900 *</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1905</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1910</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1915</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1920</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

94. Data of the above table are based in addition to the Darbar List of 1895, upon the following documents:

a) Extract of the names of the Darbaris of Basti District from the Darbar List of Gorakhpur Division (corrected up to 30th December 1900), Issued on 2nd June, 1901, Nainital, by W.H.L. Impey, Chief Secretary to Government, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Political Department, File No. XVI, No.10 of (1901-1905), E.R.O., Basti.

b) Extract of the names of the Darbaris of Basti District from the Darbar List of Gorakhpur Division (corrected up to 15th October 1905), Issued on 3rd December, 1905, Nainital, by W.H.L. Impey, Chief Secretary to Government, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Political Department, File No. XVI-10 of (1901-1905), E.R.O., Basti.


d) Extract of the names of the Darbaris of Basti District from the Darbar List of Gorakhpur Division (corrected up to February 15, 1915), Issued on October, 1916 by the Chief Secretary to Government, United Provinces and of Agra and Oudh, Political Department, File No. XVI-15 of (1915-1920) E.R.O., Basti.

e) Extract of the names of the Darbaris of Basti District from the Darbar List of Gorakhpur Division (updated up to 17th January, 1920), Approved by the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, vide his letter No.1674-76, dated 16th February, 1920, Political Department, M.S., File No. XVI-18 (1915-1920), E.R.O., Basti.

* The total number of Darbaris in 1900 was initially 14. But Raja Ram Singh of Bansi was excluded from the Darbaris on account of his involvement in a murder case. See, Anil Chandra, File on Bansi Murder Case, op.cit.
Rajput rajas and zamindars. Victims of British colonialism were invariably the freedom loving Rajput chiefs of the district alone. Despite the fact of the chopping out of a substantial chunk of traditional Rajput power by the British, the remaining traditional Rajput rulers, generally those who were loyal to the British, with only about three per cent to the total population of the district, the data reveal, had nine members in the district Darbar. The average number of local influential in the Darbar was 14. Three per cent of Rajputs used to have more than twice number of members in the Darbars to the Brahmans who had about 11 per cent of population in the district with an average less than four members in the Darbars. The extent and enormosity of Rajput power and domination, thus surpassed all other 63 Hindu castes and Muslims of the district.

Musalmans, such as Khadim Hussain Pendara of Ganeshpur and Mr. Inayat Hussain of Sawalipur appeared on the Darbar lists only one at a time as exceptions. So was the case with the Kayestha caste Hindu, Lal Ashtabhuja Prasad, who also appeared as an exception from the non-upper caste Hindu fold on the Darbar list. Excluding these exceptions, though these were symptomatic to the show but consistent process of the rise of non-upper caste Hindus after the twenty's of the 20th century as Vakeels and Mukhtars in the district, the general picture of power by and large reflected the continuity and perpetuation of
the traditional foci of power, i.e., the power of the traditionally ruling Rajputs. The British cemented these foci of traditional powers.

**Political Background and Generational Continuity of the Darbaris**

The political system of the British allowed generally upper caste lineages of the Rajputs and few families of Brahmans to hold seat in their Darbars from generation to generation. The generational continuity of these Darbaris permitted and encouraged the ascriptive hereditary continuity of their status of power and domination over the remaining castes and communities. In fact, in the perpetuation of the traditional structure of loyal elites in the countryside after the liquidation of freedom loving Rajputs, there emerged a colascenence of two types of interest - the colonial interest of the continuation of the British rule in India and the semi-feudal interest of the traditional local influential elites to keep their traditional influence on the peasantry unbroken and undisputed.

The overlap of these two interests - one colonial and the other feudal - are highlighted by the fact that majority of the Darbaris, from 1835 to 1920 belonged in majority of the families of Loyalists and Rewardees of the British after the Mutiny of 1857. A few, especially from the
Kalhansa Rajput lineages, who had remained neutral during the mutiny were given generational continuity on account of their very high local influence and also on account of the British policy to absorb the neutral influentials in the overall fold of the British power.

Non-Rajput and non-loyalists, especially those who did not have a deep social root in local traditions and the oral history of the district could hardly get the privilege of generational Darbar seat - the way Rajput lineages - loyalists and the neutrals and the loyalist Brahmanas had. Those who did not have an illustrious past with them did not rise to positions of power on the basis of their achieved qualities. The few who did rise, held their hold to the position of power was shortlived. The upper castes had tradition and history whose power was noted and recognised by the British. Take, for example, the Darbar List of 1825 as a referent and go one generation back to trace the political antecedents of the Darbars, fathers in terms of their role towards the British during the Mutiny.

95. Despite the fact that Kalhansa lineage is generally confined to only in Gonda and Basti districts of Uttar Pradesh, they used to have more Seats in the Vice-Regal Darbars at Lucknow in the 70's of the 18th century. M.A. Shering in his, "Hindu Castes and Tribes as Represented in Benares, Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1974 (1874) p.124 records the information on rajput lineages and the number of Seats they held. These are as given below: Bais, 24; Bisens, 13; Gautamas, 1; Kalhansas, 8; and Surajbansis, 3; Seats.
of 1857. Since the rebels were crushed to the extent of disappearance, we shall divide the parental antecedence of elites in two categories - those who actively supported the British and received reward and those who had remained neutral. Our information about them is presented below (Table 17).

The data on the political background of Darbaris' fathers presented in Table 17 demonstrate the fact that more than half of the Darbaris on the District Darbar Lists were the progeny of the British loyalist of the mutiny. They had generally received rewards and titles for good service done to the British during the mutiny. If we exclude the Pindari settler of the post-mutiny period in the district we get eight Darbaris out of 15 whose parents had done conspicuous services to the British in 1857. Of the five rajas of mutiny period, two had disappeared as the victim of the British revenge; two had taken heavy risks in favour of the British and had fought the rebel forces in 1857-1858; and only Raja Lal Narendra Bahadur Pal of Mahson had remained neutral. Of the five Brahman Darbaris, three belonged to the loyalist families and only two came from families of the neutral background. But in case of the Rajputs, out of ten members from their caste, five were from the neutral families. We find that the British besides, keeping the committed loyals, also tried to include those influential elites of the district.
Table No. 17: The political antecedents of the fathers of the Darbaris of Basti district during the Mutiny of 1857 by their name, place, year of birth and caste.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and place of the Darbari of 1895-1900 (Place in Parenthesis)</th>
<th>Year of the Birth of the Darbaris</th>
<th>Name of the Darbaris fathers and their loyal or neutral role to the British during the Mutiny</th>
<th>Castes</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raja Ram Singh (Bansi)</td>
<td>1853</td>
<td>Raja Mahipat Singh</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Rajput</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raja Lal Narendra Bahadur (Bal Mahson)</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Raja Bhowani Ghulam Pal</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raja Pateshwar Pratap Narain (Basti)</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Raja Sital Baksh Singh</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhiya Badi Prasad Singh (Rudhauri)</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Bhiya Kishan Prasad Singh</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaik Khadim Hussain (Ganeshpur)</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>Shaik Amanullah Hussain</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Narain Pandey (Jagdishpur)</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Udit Narain Pandey</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhiya Kali Prasad Singh (Marwata)</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Bhiya Mahipat Singh</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Rajput</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Thakur Lachman Singh (Gauharia) | 1855 | Babu Gopal Singh | L | Rajput | Kept the Captainsgaj Tahsil protected for the British against odds; rewarded with grant or land.

9. Jagrup Dat Panday (Kalayanpur) | 1851 | Dabi Din Panday | L | Brahman | Helped rocraft operation against the rebel rewarde with grant of land.

10. Babu Jagat Singh (Narkhoria) | 1855 | Babu Udit Narain Singh | N | Rajput | N

11. Babu Dan Bahadur Singh (Haripurpur) | 1842 | Babu Jagat Bahadur Singh | N | -do- | N

12. Uma Nath Tiwari (Sikaute) | 1852 | Shambhu Nath Tiwari | N | Brahman | N

13. Babu Dhambraj Singh (Chawkara) | 1867 | Babu Sheo Mangal Singh | N | Rajput | N


15. Pandey Deskali Prasad (Gedawar) | 1868 | Pirthi Pal Pande | N | Brahman | N


96. Information contained in the above table is based on following documents:

*Darbar List of Gorakhpur Division, 1895 and 1900, op.cit.* About the Muting Loyal and Rewardee see, in addition to Basti Gazetteer, pp.162-163, Letter, dated 19th August 1859 from the Secretary to the Government, North-West Provinces and Oudh to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur, op.cit. and *List of Persons* who have done good services during the Mutiny, op.cit.

The Lists of Darber of the Basti District of 1895 and 1900 had 14 Darbaria on each list. But while two names, such as Sheik Khedim Hussein and Uma Nath Tiwari which were on the list of 1895 did not appear on 1900 list. On the other hand, Raja Ram Singh and Srinivas Pandey were not in the 1895 list, had appeared on the list of 1900. Therefore, instead of 14, Darbaria compound number increased to 16.
who had remained neutral to the political happenings of the 1857. Since, these neutrals had enormous power at their command, especially when the British had learnt the lessons from their rebel counterparts in 1857, attempt was made to absorb these neutral influentials into their fold of power. The British tried to reinforce the loyalists and did their best to win over the neutrals.

This, the British did by inter-locking the local feudal interests with their own colonial interests in and commitment to stay and rule over India.

This type of the inter-locking of two different types of interest is seen in the continuity of the privileges of Darbars which the British allowed to flow from generation to generation. For, in the generational continuity of the local elites, the British discovered the continuity of the British Empire in India. We are presenting in Table 18 a detailed account of information on the generational continuity and discontinuity of Darbars from the Darbar list of the district.

An analysis of the data in Table 18 reveal that, of the total 16 Darbars of 1895-1900 List, all the three rajas and seven landowning chiefs of Rainut caste, with the exception of Bhiya Badri Prasad Singh (replaced in the absence of son by his nearest—kin a nephew, Bhiya Jailal Singh in 1910) had direct and continuous hold on the Seats of Divisional
Table 18

The generational continuities and discontinuities of Darbarias from the referent Darbaria (self) of the years, 1895-1900 to 1920 by their castes.

(Data on the additions to Darbaras supplied)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Referent Darbaria of 1895-1900</th>
<th>Name of the subsequent-generations from the 1895-1900 Darbaria, continuities and discontinuities and additions by names, kinship relations of continuous generation in parenthesis</th>
<th>Caste</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Raja Ram Singh</td>
<td>-Self- Raja Ratan Sen Raja Pashupati Singh(adopted son) Narain Singh(Son)</td>
<td>Rajput</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Raja Lal Narendra Bahadur Pal</td>
<td>-Self- -Self- -Self- -Self-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Raja Palashwari Pratap Narain Singh</td>
<td>-Self- -Self- -Self- -Self-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Bhiya Badri Prasad Singh</td>
<td>-Self- -Self- Discontinued</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Sheik Khadim Hussain</td>
<td>Discontinued</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Harinrae Pande</td>
<td>-Self- -Self- -Self- -Self-</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Bhiya Kali Prasad Singh</td>
<td>Babu Nageshwar Prasad Singh</td>
<td>Rajput</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Thakur Lachman Singh</td>
<td>-Self- Discontinued</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Jagrup Dat Pande</td>
<td>-Self- -Self- -Self- -Self-</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Babu Jagat Singh</td>
<td>Discontinued</td>
<td>Rajput</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Babu Dan Bahadur Singh</td>
<td>-Self- Discontinued</td>
<td>Rajput</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Uma Nath Tiwari</td>
<td>Discontinued</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Babu Dhzubraj Singh</td>
<td>-Self- Babu Ramseher Singh</td>
<td>Rajput</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Babu Kehhiya Baksh</td>
<td>-Self- Lal Girjesh Bahadur</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Pande Deskali Prasad</td>
<td>-Self- Mathura Prasad Pande</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Addition to the list of 1905)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Babu Shohrat Singh (Chandapor)</td>
<td>-Self-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Addition to list of 1910)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mir Ilayat Hussain of (Sawalipur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year of Birth (1855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Babu Jailal Singh, nephew of Bhaiya Badari Parasad Singh (Rudhaul)</td>
<td>-Self-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year of Birth (1855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ashtabhuja Prasad (Bansi)</td>
<td>Self-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year of Birth (1881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lala Mangal Prasad (Mahson)</td>
<td>Discontinued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year of Birth (not mentioned in records)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nageshwar Misra (Bansi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the District Darbars. Rajput Chiefs who discontinued were, in most of the cases, did so on account of either the absence of a male issue at the time of their death or rarely on account of their sudden eclipse of power. Such was the case with Thakur Lachman Singh, Jagat Singh and Mangal Parsad Singh, the younger brother of the Raja of Mahson who appeared on the Darbar list of 1895-1900 and 1910 respectively and discontinued in the subsequent years. Of the five Brahman Darbars, in 1895-1900, three belonged to the Mutiny loyalist families of Jagdishpur, Kalyanpur and Naharia and, of the two who were neutrals, one such as Pandey of Gadawar held on to the Darbar position in a direct line of the generations.

Among the subsequent entrants, only Babu Shohrat Singh, a Kalhansa kin of Babu Ramehwar Prasad Singh of Chaukhara and, an ascendent Kayastha, Lala Ashtbhuja Prasad, who belonged to a managerial family of Bansi, appeared on the list of Darbars in 1905 and 1910 respectively and held that position till 1920. Except in the case of Thakur Lachman Singh of Gauhania village who remained on the Darbar list from 1895-1905, and who belonged to the family of Mutiny loyals, all the loyalists and neutral territorial chiefs remained, for generations on the list of Darbars and, therefore, on the scene of sharing and shaping of power in the District.
Occupational and Economic Background of Darbari Elites

A survey of data in Table 19 on the occupational and economic background of Darbari elites contained in the base Darbar List of 1895-1900 and in the sampled Darbar Lists of 1910 and 1920 with a ten years' gap with one another reveals that landowning was a predominant occupation for the overwhelming majority of the elites.

Table - 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1895-1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total No. of Darbaris = 14</td>
<td>Total No. of Darbaris = 14</td>
<td>Total No. of Darbaris = 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Landowning</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a rural society as Basti district was and continues to be the sources of livelihood and income lie in land and in its produce. During the 19th century, the Darbaris came

98. In the British documents (See Darbar Lists of 1895, 1910 and 1920, op.cit.) terms such as 'landowner', 'zamindar' and 'Jagirdar' are used in an interchangeable fashion. Landowning technically cannot refer to an occupation. But in situation as it prevailed in the countryside, when and where sources of income not only remained confined to agriculture alone but also and, to a great extent, rose from the exercise of control over such means as forest, fisheries, ferries, etc. use of the term agriculture to refer to the occupation of 'rajas and landholding chief could have had been equally misleading. Perhaps, the British officers, by using the term landowner intended to refer to a broad range of sources of production as well as the Savar (cess).

99. Ibid.
only from the land owning sections of upper castes. Slowly, the British, after having dug their root deep enough to implement their western bureaucratic system, expanded roads, opened post offices, and schools. Consequently, new types of professional men, very few in number, started appearing on the Darbar scene. In 1910, Mr. Inayat Hussain, was not known as a landowner but as an educated pleader. In 1920 Mr. Hussain had disappeared from the list. Mr. Jagrup Pande of Kalyanpur, initially belonging to a family of mutiny rewardee and Nageshwar Misir of Bansi became known as village banker and Jamogdar. Emergence of pleaders and village bankers during the first decade of the 20th century on the Divisional and District Darbars were the causes as well as the consequences of British modernising impact on rural people. The composition of the majority elites, however, remained only of those of the rajas and their lineage chiefs and the landed Brahmans who owned large tract of land and ruled over the peasants of their respective tract. Landowners were thus the holders of power as well. Power arising out of the

100. With the advent of the British, local banking system gave way to cash economy. Some of the Brahmins of the district such as the Misirs of Bansi, Uska and Pandes of Kalyanpur started the system of rural bank. They loaned money to landed zamindars on the system of land mortgage. In case of default by the latter, the bankers received the land mortgaged to them. These bankers also functioned as Jamogdars. Jamogdars were the one who used to give surity on behalf of the payers of loans and revenue to the payee. Being rich bankers, their surities were accepted. About village bankers and Jamogdars, See, P.D. Reevers(ed) Sleeman in Oudh, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 77, 121 and 122. About Jagrup Pande and Nageshwar Misir as bankers of Basti district, See, Darbar List of Gorakhpur Division of 1920, op.cit.
possession of large land holdings by the elites was further strengthened by the fact of their consequent economic power. A glance at the data (Table 20 - on the following page) on the income distribution of the elites reveal their general relative economic prosperity.

The division of Darbaris into various income groups, ranging from Rs. 1000 upto Rs. 30,000 and above, by their castes who appeared on the three Darbar Lists of 1895-1900, 1910 and 1920 show the economic superiority of Rajputs. They generally belong to the top income groups. Of the 25 Rajputs presentations, nine of them alone cluster in the highest income bracket of Rs. 30,000 and above. Brahmans, on the other hand, have more clustering in the 6th income group. Remaining Rajputs and Brahmans Darbari elites tend to have a smooth spread over different income categories. Of the three non-upper-caste Darbaris, two belonged to the Muslim community and one to the Hindu Kaistha caste. The presence of these non-upper caste elites in the Darbar dominated by the upper caste Rajput and Brahmans itself is not as significant as the fact that they could attain high economic status at par with the Hindu upper-castes and could attain power and prestige parallel to the traditionally powerful high caste Hindus of the district. The data on appearance of these new elites on power scene of the district suggest that the British system silently opened the opportunities

*We select these three Darbar Lists purposely as they cover all the elites who appeared on the Darbar Lists of Basti District from 1875-1900 to 1920.
### Table 20

The economic distribution of Darbaris of Basti District
by income groups and castes.

| S.No. | Group by Annual Income in Rupees | Darbaris of 1895-1900 (Rajputs|Brahmans|Others) | Darbaris of 1910 (Rajputs|Brahmans|Others) | Darbaris of 1920 (Rajputs|Brahmans|Others) | Total |
|-------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|
| 1.    | 30000 and above                 | 2                           | 4                           | 3                           | 9                           |
| 2.    | 29999 - 25000                   | 1                           | 1                           | 1                           | 2                           |
| 3.    | 24999 - 20000                   | 2                           | 1                           | 1                           | 1                           | 4                           |
| 4.    | 19999 - 15000                   | 1                           | 1                           | 1                           | 5                           |
| 5.    | 14999 - 10000                   | 2                           | 1                           | 3                           | 1                           | 8                           |
| 6.    | 9999 - 5000                     | 2                           | 1                           | 1                           | 2                           | 10                          |
| 7.    | 4999 - 1000                     | 1                           | 1                           | 1                           | 1                           | 4                           |
| 8.    | Total                           | 10                          | 5                           | 4                           | 1                           | 42                          |

101 Data contained in the Darbar Lists of 1895-1900, 1910 and 1920 op.cit.

*Lal Mangal Prasad, the younger brother of Raja Narendra Bahadur Pal of Mahson, belonging to Rajput caste appeared on the Darbar list of 1910. The document, however does not mention his income. Consequently there is a deficit of one in the total of 43 Darbaris.
for other castes and communities to rise, at least theoretically to the high status and position of upper caste Hindus. It was the development of these opportunities that led, in part to the emergence a counter Darbar elites during the twenty's and thirty's of the 20th century.

The data contained in Table 21 (on the following page) suggest a change and fluctuation of income of the Darbaris over the years. While a good number of Darbaris of top income positions such as Rajas of Bansi, Mahson, Basti; Babus of Rudhali and Marwatia - all belonging to Rajput caste and who had an average annual income of Rs.1,26,600, 22,000, 14,71, 1,863 and 5,575 respectively in the years 1895-1900 increased by 1910 to Rs.1,28,000, 4,14,040, 28,163, 40,000, and 8,220 respectively. Some of them, however, suffered decline of the income in the same decade. Thus, among the Brahmans, Pandes of Jagdishpur, Kalayanpur, Narharia and Gadawar whose annual income in years 1895-1900 were Rs.1,822, 2,475, 2,593 and 10,509 respectively, declined in the year 1910, to Rs.8,600, 1,045, 6,593 and 6,000 respectively. With the sole exception of Chawkhari family, then facing financial decline on account of feud and division within the family, the income of the Rajputs in general was on the increase. Being the original colonizers, they were daring and warlike and as compared to others. They could give security to their labourers from outside attacks.
### Table 21

The fluctuations in the annual income (in rupees) of Darbaris of 1895-1900, 1910 and 1920 of Basti District by their name and place.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Darbaris of 1895-1900 (place in parenthesis)</th>
<th>Annual income</th>
<th>Name of the Darbaris of 1910 (Annual income)</th>
<th>Name of the Darbaris of 1920 (Annual income)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Raja Ram Singh (Bansi)</td>
<td>1,26,600</td>
<td>Raja Ratan San Singh (Bansi) 1,28,000</td>
<td>Raja Peshupati Narain 1,28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Raja Lal Narendra Bahadur Singh Pal (Mahson)</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>Raja Lal Narendra Bahadur Pal 4,14,040</td>
<td>Raja Lal Narendra Bahadur 41,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Raja Peshwari Pratap Narain Singh (Basti)</td>
<td>14,711</td>
<td>Raja Peshwari Pratap Narain Singh 20,163</td>
<td>Raja Peshwari Pratap 14,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bhiya Badri Prasad Singh (Rudhauri)</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>Bhiya Badri Prasad Singh 40,000</td>
<td>Bhiya Jailal Singh (Rudhauri) (Nephew of 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Shaik Khadiq Hussain (Ganeshpur)</td>
<td>22,791</td>
<td>Babu Shohrat Singh 45,050</td>
<td>Babu Shohrat Singh (Chandapur) 45,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Har Narain Panda (Jagdishpur)</td>
<td>18,922</td>
<td>Har Narain Panda (Jagdishpur) 8,600</td>
<td>Har Narain Panda (Jagdishpur) 18,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bhiya Kali Prasad Singh (Narwatia)</td>
<td>5,575</td>
<td>Babu Nageshwar Prasad Singh 8,200</td>
<td>Babu Nageshwar Prasad Singh (Harvatia) 8,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Thakur Lechman Singh (Ganhesia)**</td>
<td>6,698</td>
<td>Ashtbhuj Prasad Singh</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Pandit Jagrup Dat Pande (Kalayanpur)</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>Jagrup Dat Pande (Kalayanpur) 1,045</td>
<td>Jagrup Dat Pande (Kalayanpur) 1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Babu Jagat Singh (Narkhorsa)</td>
<td>12,081</td>
<td>Mir Inayat Hussain (Sawalipur) 9,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Uma Nath Tiwari (Sikoutha)**</td>
<td>8,747</td>
<td>Babu Rameshwar Singh 12,341</td>
<td>Babu Rameshwar Singh (Chawkhada) 12,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Babu Dhrubraj Singh (Chawkhada)</td>
<td>22,649</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Babu Keshu Bakh Pal</td>
<td>17,509</td>
<td>Lal Girjesh Bahadur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Pande Deokali Prasad</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>Mathura Prasad Pande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Srinivas Pande (Narhar)</td>
<td>25,901</td>
<td>Baldeo Prasad Pande</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

102. Data on Darbaris income is based on information contained in the *Darbar List* of Gorakhpur Division, 1895-1900, 1910 and 1920 op. cit.

* Derbar list of 1895 and 1900 have 14 Darbaris on each list. Each Darbari belonged to and represented a family. By treating family representation as an unit, collapsing of the two lists in one we get 16 families being represented in Darbars at various times instead of only 14.

** Four Darbaris discontinued after 1895-1900 and two after 1910.
In addition, the Rajputs were close to British settlers. Both were fond of hunting and horses and the former not only took up the British life styles in terms of costume, food and field games such as hockey, badminton and football but also their modern agricultural technology. The receptive capacity of the Rajput helped them to increase their colonizing capacity and expand their income and economy. Besides, the Rajput with a tradition of past chivalry were more apt in inculcating a strong sense of loyalty and commitment in their subject classes.

The relative decline of income of the Brahmans elites was generally on account of their failure to compete with the traditional Rajput maliks. Luring of the migrant labour force from outside and providing a security and protection to them and evolving a peculiar type of loyalty and commitment on the line of malik-praj (master-subject) nexus with them in a direction towards bringing more and more of pastures and scrubs under cultivation, exactions of more and more rent from the peasants, were some of the institutional tools they were not equipped with to handle as were the Rajputs. In addition, their traditional callings were not in line with forging a cultural nexus and establishing a close relationship with the British officers and settlers. Unlike the Rajputs, Brahmans could not provide

103. See, Note on British Settlers in Basti in Appendix at the end of this Chapter.
a context of an adventurous hunt, shikars and game shootings; they had little interest in horses and pedigreed dogs and could hardly furnish the kitchen of a Gora-Sahib's camp with a Dali (presents) of game birds as the Rajputs, it is reported used to do. The Rajput enjoyed the company of British officer and therefore, was closer to the sources of British power which he could use to enhance his prosperity.

POWER AND PRIVILEGES

The pre-colonial inter-lineage war-fares, strong preying upon the weak, swollen lineage raja enconsed in his mudfort surrounded by his kin and free-booters and playing constant game of hide and seek with the imperial power did grant to him a far greater sense of absolute power and privileges in their tract of forest or land. The usurpation of independent power of local chiefs by the British system of impersonal rules and regulations were severe and harsh for them. And if they rebelled in 1857, their rebellion was the last attempt to save their relative independence and power which emerged first from the force of a Rajput sword and then got transformed into the force of traditions. Coercion often recasts itself in customs. When the British brought their rules and regulations to bear upon these independence loving lineage chiefs, they gave a wide margin for the latter's exercise of both, the power of coercion as well as the power of customs upon the peasant.
Let us now sketch some of the concessions, privileges and power especially granted to this category of "select few" independent gentlemen of property and personal influence as the influentials were referred to the British at the wake of post-mutiny phase. In Oudh, the Oudh Proclamation of March, 1858, had already brought back the talukdar to their in-contestable right over the land and had initiated a process which allowed the talukdars to share the administrative power in a limited way with the British. The Oudh policy of administrative participation of the British with the native Zamindars was extended to North-West Provinces by Lord Cannings in 1860. Lord Cannings recommended that Zamindar be given a recognised place in local administration by investiture with magisterial power on the Oudh model. In 1862, North-West Provinces had 44 Zamindars of sufficient eminence and personal distinction to be invested with magisterial powers in the pargana or estate of their residence.

Coming closer to Basti, we find following types of privileges and power being specially given to the Darbari

104. In 1859 six prominent talukdars of Oudh were given the power of Deputy Magistrate in their estates. By 1862, their number had increased to 48. See Metcalf, op.cit., pp.147 and 154.

elites. The actual and symbolic significance of these privileges lied in generating an aura or halo of a blue-blood nobility, set apart and placed above the peasantry. These were furthered by their disproportionate economic and material strength. Ownership over the vast tract of land, forest, rivers, and ponds; lordship over all those who lived and walked on the "lords domain", of rajás and zamindars and their capacity to be close with the ruling British Officer, to play and to hunt with them and finally, their ability to receive special Honours and Titles from the British marked them as a privileged group. The symbolic impact of these social, cultural and economic distinctions of the Raja-Zamindars on the peasantry was deep.

The relative significance of the special privileges and power entertained are presented below:

**Magisterial Power**

Most Darbars of the district were given IIInd and IIIrd Class magisterial powers to deal with revenue and petty criminal cases of the pargana or tehsil of their residence. Traditionally, the Rajás and Zamindars used to arbitrate between their feuding tenants. Their oral judgements and verdicts were accepted by the subject classes. With the arrival of the British the traditional judicial power of the Rajás and Zamindars was transferred
to the British system of former Cutcherries and Courts. Though only a few of them were literate and that too in the vernacular languages, the British did not assign any pre-requisite qualification for selection of these magistrates except those of good character and of local influence. For, as late as 1923 setting up of any pre-requisite educational qualification or institution of examination system for the recruitment of Honorary Magistrates was found impractical.

In Basti, thus we find that Rajas such as Pateshwari Pratap Narain Singh and Rajput Zamindars such as Babu Nageshwar Prasad Singh of Marwatia, Lal Mangal Prasad Singh of Mahuli and Babu Rameshwar Prasad Singh of Chawkhara, Bhiya Jailal Singh of Rudhauli, Mote Singh of Atta and Brahmans such as Pandit Kanhaya Nath Misra of Bansi, Pandit Himan Nath Tiwari of Chitia, Mathura Prasad Pandey of Gedawar, Pandey Har Narain of Jagdishpur and Ram Charitra Pandey of Belbharti have acted as Honorary Magistrates in the district. These names are only illustrative. Their combined number from 1905 to 1920 and in the subsequent decades must

106. See, Circular, dated 25th May, 1923, No. 2117/VI-1682, Allahabad, from L.S. White, Esq., ICS, MLC, Deputy Secretary to Government of United Provinces to all the Commissioners of Divisions, United Provinces, Judicial and Criminal Department, File No. XVIII-2, Serial No.1 of (1920-1925), E.R.O., Basti.
be for more than those cited here.

The exercise of power in making judgement over revenue and criminal cases to their respective tehsils and parganas was in fact exercise of authority over people. And this type of authority was especially given to the landed aristocracy of the United Provinces by the British. For, only they were able to be the man of "influence" and "character" in the eyes of the British.

**Exemption from Arms Act**

While the upkeep of swords, shields, and matchlocks were the essential artifacts for the survival of the rajas and their kin during the unsettled pre-colonial period of lineage Rais of this cys-Himalyan tract, the same became symbols of royalty, status and power during the colonial periods. Among the Rajputs, swords are sacred objects and ritually celebrated. Each sword has a name, a history and, often through the history of a sword one can arrive at the history of the wielders. Deified arms are objects which bestow power on its possessor.

The British brought rifles, sports-gun and pistols. And when they carved out a segment of erstwhile princely

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107. With the exception of Babu Rameshwar Prasad Singh, all names of Hon. Magistrates are recorded on the Darbaris Lists of 1905, 1910 and 1920, op.cit. Combined List of Hon. Magistrates of Basti District could not be traced out from the E.R.O. Basti.
and priestly categories of population and inducted them into their Darbars, adorned them with Titles, furnished them with Sanads and Certificates, they also armed them with the gifts of firearms. As a matter of special privilege all the rajases and title holders were exempted from the Arms Act. According to Arms Act, holders of firearms are required to secure licence for the same from the Government.

Holders of titles, such as those of Rajas, Maharajahs and other Crown and Country Titles enabled the holders to secure exemption from the said Act. Thus, in Basti District, Rajas of Bansi, Basti, Mahson and later on the Raja of Chandapar were exempted from the bindings of arms licence. Loyal Darbaris were also granted this special privilege.

Thus Bhiya Badri Prasad Singh, son of Bhiya Kishan Prasad Singh, the latter being the recipient of Khilut for his loyal services to the British during the 1857 mutiny, was also exempted from the Arm Act. So was the case with the families of Jagdishpur and Kalayanpur.

108. Gift of pistols to six landholders of Basti Darbar held in 1919 is mentioned earlier. See, List of the Recipients and Rewards for War Services, op. cit.

109. One of the privileges of title holding Rajas were the personal exemption from the Arms Act. This fact is made evident by the Magistrate Collector, Basti, vide his letter dated 12th March, 1900 to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division. The letter refers to the Confiscation of the Title of Raja and the Armory of Raja Ram Singh of Bansi on account of his involvement in a murder of a washerman's wife in middle of the 19th century. According to the List of arms confiscated, the Raja had 227 swords, 40 pistols, 161 rifles, etc. totalling to 479 units of arms. His title was restored to him in 1897 as per Government of India notification No. 33-221/13 dated 24th September, 1897 (Home Department). The details of all the references to the Government proceedings pertaining to this case are contained in the letter dated 12th March, 1900 of the District Magistrate Basti to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, op. cit.

110. Ibid.
The symbolic and actual value of arms were so great that when a Raja was found guilty of murder, the greatest punishment was thought to be the confiscation of his Title and arms. Surrendering of arm was an insult to its master.

**Exemption from Court Appearance**

The Darbari and Title holding elites, unlike the teeming masses of the country side were not required to appear before the British Court like an ordinary subject. They were given direct access to all district officers. And the district officers were advised not to call for the landed aristocracy to appear in their court for petty cases. The landed aristocracy was thus clearly set apart as a distinct privileged group. From 1858 to 1860, number of Circulars were issued in favour of Zamindar talukdars whose dignity, prestige and honour was to be respected by the district administration.

**Exemption from Police Intervention**

Police intervention in the estate jurisdiction of any Darbari elite was treated as an insult to the Darbari. The landlord himself was, for a variety of cases, such as theft, violence, rape including marital feuds, the judge and the police of his estate. He had enormous resources to wield his

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111. About these Circulars, see Metcalf, op.cit., pp.157-158.
judgement on people with the help of his arms and the retinue of Sepoys and telengas (mercenaries). Eviction from land, from the home site, excommunication from the estate, beating, torture, public humiliation and numerous other types of punitive measures were resorted to by the Zamindars to implement their rules upon the subject classes. And in doing so, interference from outside was treated as an uncalled for act. The British generally accepted the policy of non-interference, except in the cases of serious crimes.

Direct intervention of the tehsildars, darogas (police officers) and other administrative functionaries of the district were against the dignity of the landlord. They could intervene in only after they were asked for by the local Zamindar. And in this the British administration cooperated with the Zamindars.

Such were the power and privileges of the elites of the colonial period. Belonging essentially to the traditionaly upper castes, having a history of conquest and colonization, aided and abetted by the priestly caste of Brahman, possessing large tract of land the ownership of which was confirmed by the British, this title-holding aristocracy adorned with Sanads, certificates, pistols and rifles, often occupying magisterial seats of a court were the real hallmark of British rule in India.
These "select few" of Basti district, unlike elective position holders of such bodies as City Corporation, Municipal Committee, Zila Parishad, Legislative Assembly or Parliament, etc. reached up to the distinguished Darbari and Title holder's status on account of their generally ascriptive qualification. Darbari elites did not receive any salary or honorarium from the British. For most of the upper caste Darbaris, Darbari status was hereditary and it passed from generation to generation. No specific qualification except loyalty to the British Empire, tradition and a history of local rule over land and peasantry were used to identify the influential. Cohort of the British Darbar was, therefore, an honorific system which used to reflect the power and prestige of its members.

112. We have been critical of over reliance on the blanket use of positional approach to the identification of influential in elite studies. Status of a Darbari or a Khati Title holder reflected a different type of position as compared to the position of a City Corporator or of a Legislative Assembly Member. District Board elections during the colonial phase did involve some element of electioneering in a restricted way as the voting was not based on the principle of general adult franchise. Even then, between 1922 to 1947, with five elections for the postion of the Chairmanship of the District Board Basti only one Darbari, Sheopati Singh of Chandapur contested and won the position twice. He was the Chairman of the District Board (DB) during 1932-1933 and 1944-1947. Lal Shatrujeet Bahadur Pal, Rai Sahib Ganpat Sahai and Mr. Daulat Ram Asthana were the Chairmen of the DB in 1922-26, 1927-31, and 1933-43 respectively. These Chairmen were non-Darbaris. During the post-colonial phase DB was replaced by Zila Parishad and all its Chairmen such as Udaï Shankar Dube (1948-1952), Sri Tameshwar Prasad (1953-1958), Mr. Mues Khan (1958-1963) and Mr. Dhanurjai Harid Pandey (1964-1970) were local Congress Party leaders. We, therefore, have reasons to treat Darbar position as a distinct category of Honour which was different from elective position of "office".
Under the combined weight of the British colonial revenue policy and exploitative rent exaction of the select class of landed aristocracy peasantry screeched and groaned. And ultimately the rate with which these hierarchy of exploiters increased their demands on the peasants became the rate at which yawning cracks in the rampart of colonial and feudal power in India started appearing. This was the time when, in 1920, the National Congress had started sneering at both, the British as well as their pampered rajas and zamindars. A groundswell of peasantry led by educated yakeels and mukhtars under the banner of the Congress started appearing in groups and collectivities against the continuation of both, the British as well as of the rajas and zamindars in India. New elites were appearing on the power scene of the district. The following chapter examines the nature of this new elites.

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NOTE ON BRITISH SETTLERS IN BASTI

During the first half of the 19th century, there appeared a sizeable number of British Settlers on the agrarian and power scene of Basti. Between 1832 and 1840 no less than 618,547 acres of scrub, jungle and uncultivated pasture land were leased to the Britishers for indigo and rice cultivation. The area which lay in the present district of Basti as much as 300,000 acres of land was held of British lease-holder and grantees. The lease was initially given for 50 years on progressive rental charge and was afterward converted into Zamindari tenure. These tracts of land held by the Britishers expanded further when confiscates land were awarded to them for their services to the raj during the Mutiny. Inspite of the hostile attitudes of the local traditional Zamindars towards these Britishers they flourished for more than a half century in the district initiating cultural, technological and agricultural modernizational. Local elites not only tried to take up the life style of the British neighbours but also technology.

The Britishers, with few exception could not retain the land. Thus in 1883-84 when Mr. V.A. Smith, then the Commissioner of Gorakhpur Division started the operation of 7th Land and Revenue Settlement, the total holdings of the British on over 300,000 acres in 1832-40 had declined to 60,793 acres in Bansi, 11,017 in remaining tehsils of Basti district. Majority of these grants were sold to local influential such as to R.B. Shohrat Singh of Chandapar who purchased Kathel grant of 3,156 acres from Mr. C. Wallace in 1905. Some of the established grants have been those of Birdpur and Dulha of Mr. W.C. Peppe; Neora grant of Mr. J.H. Bridgman, estates of Alidapur and Sarauli owned respectively by Mr. Peppe and Mr. Bridgman and finally Mr. William Cooks grant in Basti and Harriya tehsils.

These Britishers did hard work in converting forest land into cultivable field; introduced improved seeds plants, flowers and for the purpose of agriculture, embankment, canals drainage, bridges, water reservoirs with mansanory gates and created fairs and market for the flow of money and raw materials. Towns such as Bridgman Ganj, complierganj, Peppeganj in the present Gorakhpur districts and villages like Cookenagar and Birdpur (after Mr. R.M. Bird) in the present Basti district are testimony to their names and popularity. And, when they left, they left behind not only the land they cultivated but also the British cultural ethos, the life style and the technological spirit as legacy for the local Zamindars, who started introducing similar life styles and cultural practices including modernizing of their farms with the help of modern system of technology. These Britishers are affectionately, and respectfully remembered by the local peasantry whose families inherit the memory of their Angrez Maliks orally from generation to generation. See, Basti Gazetteer, pp.97-101 and 120 and Gorakhpur Gazetteer, pp.123-25.
CHAPTER V

STRUCTURE OF RURAL ELITES IN CONTEMPORARY BASTI
(1920-1970)

INTRODUCTION

The rise of the Indian National Congress as a rural force, the gigantic peasant upsurge and revolts in North India and elsewhere, the emergence of a politicized nationalist anti-zamindar and of an anti-British literati in the countryside and finally the eventual withdrawal of the British from India in 1947 constitute one set of major historical and socio-political data. The other set consists of the torrent of consequences unleashed by the first set: mass political participation in the process of government making at the state and Centre levels and participation in the formation of Panchayats and Zila Parishads, abolition of landlordism and the fixation of ceiling on land holdings. These processes in the State of Uttar Pradesh are of major historical importance. The contextual importance of these two sets of data lie in their contributions to the process of persistence and of the change in rural elites and agrarian power structure. The processes of change and resistance to change are conflicting data that still characterise the contemporary rural scene of North India.

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A heuristic portrayal of some of the events and of relevant data about them is essential. We wish to construct the structure of rural elites with some degree of reliability on a continuing historical canvass of the district. For, the leap from historico-political context of 1920s of Basti district to its 60s and 70s, may not in terms of time span appear a great one, but the same when examined in terms of the quality of events and the impact they have made on the society would prove to be epochal and of historic importance. We shall, therefore, focus on details of the social and political background of Basti to portray the sequence of factors and forces as they occurred. Our aim is to illuminate the structure of rural elites as well as the structure of power in the district during the crucial periods of late 1920s to mid 50s. It was in the late 30s when the National Congress emerged as a formal political party with an active organizational set up and:

1) Started mobilizing the peasant and subject classes, against the rajas and zamindars at the local level and against the British at the national level.

2) The emergence of peasant revolts and Nijai-Bol movement and large scale confrontation between the peasants and the raja-zamindars at the instance of the Congress.


Further, subsequent to independence, there emerged statutory democratic elective bodies in the countryside. Thus,
while the first General Elections of 1952 accorded to the villagers, for the first time, an opportunity to elect their representatives to the State Assembly and the National Parliament, they also began to participate in the elections for the Gram Sabhas (GS), Gram Panchayats (GP) and indirectly in the elections of Zila Parishads (ZP) at the village and district levels respectively. Based on the concept of democratic decentralization of power, these elections are meant to evolve a type of power apparatus at all the levels of Indian society and which is basically opposed to that of the colonial period, at least theoretically. How far have constitutional and legal revolutions in India been able to snap the colonial nexus of power based on traditions is a question to be answered by this study. These questions will emerge in course of our discussion on the structure of elites and on the data related to them.

**The Indian National Congress (INC) in Basti**

The history of the INC in Basti began with the first visit of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawahar Lal Nehru in 1919. Gandhi again paid a visit to Basti district in 1921. According to Kazi Addil Abbasi, one of the senior local Congress local leaders, Gandhi was a fire brand who infected the peasant and the educated youth of the district with a fire for reform and change. Between 1919 and 1930, the INC in Basti district was under the leadership of Ram Daman Singh of Harriya tehsil. It was in an embryonic stage and had not been able to develop a formal organisational structure.
Though Congress workers and leaders, such as Baba Raghav Das of Gorakhpur, Babu Mahadeo Singh, Rajkumar Singh, Pandit Dalshrinagar Shama, Vishunath Mukerjee, Ram Anugrah Lal of Basti were the first generation active local NC workers who had courted arrest in the movements of Non-Cooperation, Civil Disobedience and in the Boy-Cott to the visit of Prince of Wales (on 17th November, 1921) in 1921-22, a formal unit of the INC did not emerge till the 1930s. Congress workers, it may be noted, in those days were treated by the British and the local raja - zamindars as rebels and either used to work in the remote countryside, where, as it used to happen, they were haunted by the British loyal local zamindars - the latter usually being the members of British sponsored Loyalty League locally known as Aman Sabha (discussed in the preceding chapter) or else where out of the district agitating against the British and the pro-British rajas, zamindars and talukdars. In 1935, when the Mahatma again paid a visit to this district, the District Congress Committee came into being.

1. Based on autobiographical book by Ved Tirtha Nar-Deo Shastri, Karvas Ki Ram Kahani - 1921-22 (Hindi), Calcutta, Ratuakar Press, pp.9-13 and 174 (year of publication not mentioned). Nar-Deo Shastri was freedom fighter and was arrested during 1921-22. He gives chronological records of persons arrested, place of their confinement and also the inside story of Congress politics of the time. His list of NC workers of various districts of United Provinces who were arrested in 1921-22 is a reliable primary source.

2. Based on interview with senior most living Congress leaders such as Uda Shankar Dube and Kazi Adil Abbasse.
We need to emphasize here the fact that the 1930s were years when a group of young and educated and inspired mukhtars and vakeels, with a few exceptions belonging generally to managerial families of Kavasthas and Brahman castes, appeared as new elites (or rather as counter elites) on the political scene. Their parents served the rajas and zamindars as managers, munshis or as ziledars. Most of them held, either the degree of Bachelor of Laws, such as the Abbasi brothers, or the Diploma of Mukhtars, such as Uday Shankar Dube, Kripa Shankar, Daya Shankar, Ram Shankar and Ram Lakhan Misra, or held the Shastri degree awarded by the then Congress Party-run institution, Kashi Vidyapith of Banaras, as is the case with the local literati like Raja Ram Shama and Ram Kumar Shastri. These were the second generation Congress men who provided the initial organisational infrastructure to the INC as a district political organisation during the colonial period of the 1930s.

Most of them belonged to Kavastha and Brahman castes. They initially came from the lower middle class economic background. Generally, their parents lived in subservience to

3. Such as Kazi Adil Abbasi and his younger brother, Kazi Jalil Abbasi who came from ex-Zamindar family of the district.

4. The term 'Ziledar' refers to an administrator who is an employee of a Raja - Zamindar. He looks after the rent collection and agricultural operations of the latter's estate.
one of the upper caste landed Darbaris of the locality and had got liberal modern education with the latter's financial aid. Liberal modern education designed by the British fired these young men with revulsion towards both, the benefactor zamindars as well as the British system which, paradoxically, had made educational facilities available to them. Most of the avenues for a decent employment being relatively closed for them, they, on account of circumstances, went for self-employment as practitioners of law in the district and tehsil courts, which reportedly during the 30s was not very remunerative. The rajas and the zamindars as Hon. Magistrates still used to settle most of the legal disputes of their respective localities. And as I have noted elsewhere, these advocates, Mukhtars and Shastris, being equal to the Darbari-Maliks in ritual status in general, their modern education was a highly sensitizing factor leading to the development of conscious feeling of relative deprivation. In fact, education and politics were the only weapons in the armory of the disenchanted group of emerging elites to fight for and raise themselves to a status equivalent to the Maliks. And they used this weapon of education and politics effectively. The ascendancy of this group unleashed large scale peasant uprisings against the local Zamindars.

Peasant Uprising the Revolt

The politicization of peasantry and their subsequent general uprisings and revolts in north India is seen as closely allied to the Independence Movement initiated by the Indian National Congress. In Bihar, the revolts of the peasant against the indigo planters (1917-18), the Kheda (1919) and the Bardoli (1929) uprisings in Gujarat, the revolt of Chauri-Chaura Bazzar in Gorakhpur district (1920), and the general Oudh peasants uprising against the talukdars at Faizabad, Hardoi, Rai Bareily and Pratapgarh districts during the 1920s and 1930s were the outcome of two leading factors: first, the socialisation of peasants in the use of agitational politics; and second, their mobilization against the British and the local zamindars-talukdars. During this period, the political parties such as Kisan Sabha and C.P.I. worked in unison with the Congress - especially in the talukdari region of Oudh.

In fact, the history of INC during the 1920s and 1930s has been the history of Satyagraha (passive-resistance), Civil-Disobedience, Non-cooperation, Boycotts, Pickettings, Hartals (strikes) and of populist Marches.

6. About these peasant revolts and uprisings see the following articles contained in A.R. Desai (ed.), Indian Peasant Struggles, Bombay: O.U.P., 1979:
   a) "Agrarian Revolts", by N.C. Ranga and Swami Sahanand and "Indian Peasant Struggle" by N.C. Ranga, pp. 47-66.

See also, The History of Indian National Congress, by Sitaramarayya, Bombay, Padma Publications Ltd., 1946, pp. 211, 216, 221 and 235; and Agrarian Unrest in North India by M.H. Siddiqui, Delhi, Vikas, 1978, pp. 184-192.
The millenarian Utopia of Ram Rajya, the slogans, such as "land for the man behind the plough" and "land to the tiller" were thrown persistently as a futurist value-paradigm by the local congress worker to the peasants. In the district of Basti, the Mukhtars, Shastris and the advocates transformed the village bazaars, fairs and weekly markets into an active School of Democracy and socialism for the peasantry. And in doing so, they incited the peasants against the local zamindars. The megaphone in their hands used to pour fire against the zamindars. These local congress men used to hold the zamindars and the British responsible for the miseries of the peasants. The proverbial passive peasant was thus transformed into an agitated political man. While the district congress leaders were fanning up the discontents among the peasants against the zamindars, the state and national level leaders were exerting pressure upon the British to institute pro-peasant agrarian laws in the 1930s. The Congress instituted several Enquiry Committees to find out and record the grievances and discontents of peasantry against the zamindars and talukdars of United Provinces. Special Agrarian Enquiry Committee, known as Pandit Committee, headed by Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, submitted its Report in 1931. The Report called for radical agrarian reforms in the Province of Agra and Oudh.

From 1930s and to mid-1940s, the Congress continued to work against the Zamindars in the district. Its state and national leaders took the support of sister political organizations such as Kisan Sabha and CPI and convened a meeting, known as All Parties' Congress at Lucknow in 1938. The Lucknow meeting emphatically underlined the common concern of all the leaders of the Congress and the sister organizations and parties (such as the Kisan Sabha and CPI) with the issues of the peasants.

The Congress workers of Basti district were often radicals and, in their zeal for land reforms as compared to the workers of Kisan Sabha and CPI of the adjoining districts of Faizabad, Hardoi and Rai Bareilly where the peasants were equally restive it seems were more aggressive in attacking the rajas and zamindars. From among the Basti district Congress workers, Mr. Ram Lakhan Misra, a Brahman and other Kayastha Mukhtars were openly exhorting the peasants to revolt against the Zamindars. Rajas of Shohratgarh, Basti and Mahson, Babus of Radhanli, etc., were becoming targets of the violent peasant revolts in the late 1930s and early 1940s. And these were, it may be noted, solely inspired by the radical local

8. Kisan Sabha and CPI during the period under study remained active in talukdari districts of Oudh. Basti being a ceded district and located at the North - most part of the State continued to remain under the influences of the Congress alone.

Congress since Kisan Sabha and CPI had remained confined to Oudh districts.

The general peasant ground-swell and increasing confrontations between the landlord and the tenants in the district resulted into large scale organised killings. Zamindars, such as Babu Bankey Singh of Norkhoria, Ram Kripal Pandey of Narharia, Lakhan Singh and Chanden Singh of Bhanpur and Lakshmi Niwas Pandey of Gadawar villages, were killed by peasants in 1935, 1939 and 1946 in open encounters respectively. The only peasant caste, a Kurni Zamindar of the district, Mr. Ram Nath Chaudhary of village Kathautia was killed in 1950. Numerous attempts in the part of the peasants to kill Zamindars resulted in the loss of lives of many peasants. Thus, for example, the peasants' attempt to kill Thakur Raghu Nath Singh of Itahiya fam (near Kamaihiya), Thakur Jagdambika Singh of Kamaihiya, both cases occurring in 1949, attack on Dwarika Parsad Pandey of Gadawar in 1945 and on Major Ranjit Singh of Radhauli villages, were events of confrontation in which tenants suffered loss of life at the hands of the 10 Zamindars in the district.

However, the general impact of the Congress-led peasant insurgencies and revolts against the rajas and the zamindars during the pre-independence period, and of the subsequent abolition of the right of the intermediaries during the

post-independence phase has to be examined with some caution. For, the cultural and socio-political basis of the position of the traditional elites in the agrarian social structure have been and continue to be more complex than they appear at their face value. A few compelling points are to be taken into account.

It was during this period of intense class polarization and confrontation between peasant as a class and the zamindar at their enemy, that Nijat-Bol movement began. Seven years after the independence, the Congress Government abolished the Zamindari system from Uttar Pradesh with effect from July, 1952.

We have to recognise the fact that historically, the upper caste, Title, Sanad and Certificate holding aristocracy was not a sudden creation of the British utilitarian pragmatism. Our data suggest that rajas and privileged land-holders in one or in other forms, already existed in the Indian countryside before the British arrived on the scene. The existence of such an aristocracy, prior to the arrival of the British, is therefore, to be explained in terms of the general scheme of the traditional Indian social structure. The concept of social hierarchy, especially, the inequalitarian system of normative order which upholds and feeds an elaborate system of relative power and economic positions of castes in India, is basically elitist in nature. Elitism is, and has been, the basic ethos of caste based agrarian social structure. What the British did, therefore, was to politically
recognise this feudal ethos and utilize the same in their own colonial interests. The ascriptive character of the traditionally particularized society, thus remained unshaken and the rajas and the zamindars continued to preside over their principalities till the 1920s and the 1930s when they and their British protectors started falling under attack.

The Congress did succeed in throwing the British colonialism out of India. But to what extent it succeeded in throwing away the basic normative paradigm of caste hierarchy and its elitist ethos is not as clear as the case of British withdrawal from India. It is a historical fact that the Congress, right from the 1930s up to the year of Zamindari abolition in 1952 in U.P. did its best to awaken the peasant from their slumber of passivity, apathy and tolerance. They enthused the peasants with radical slogans such as "Land to the tiller", "land for the man behind the plough", etc. and helped them in identifying their "enemies". Large scale resentments, rebellions and revolts against the oppressions of Zamindari system disturbed the countryside.

But the questions remain: Has the Congress, even after it abolished the system of Zamindari, driven the traditional upper caste land owning elites outside from the ramparts of their power? How far has the heat and dust of peasants mobilizations of 1930s and 1940s and of the subsequent Government's enactments, such as the Zamindari Abolition and Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holding Acts of 1952 and 1954
respectively succeeded in flattering the rather sharply conical traditional agrarian social pyramid of the North Indian countryside?

These, and many other questions, especially in the light of reforms, such as adult franchise, grant of special privileges to scheduled castes and tribes, etc., are to be kept in the background of our study.

Our field data on the structure of rural elites and their relations with the changing structure of agrarian power in the countryside, tend to have direct or indirect bearing on these questions. The concrete empirical consequences of the populist protests of peasants in 1930s and 1940s and of the seemingly legal revolutions in the field of agrarian legislations in the 1950s, are to be examined in terms of their successes in altering the distributive system of power, prestige and honour in the countryside. Has the agrarian legal deluge of post-independent India washed away the socio-cultural and economic moorings of the traditional upper caste landed elites? The data presented and analysed below give answer to some of these questions. We divide our data in two parts: First part attempts to sketch the social profile of the contemporary rural elites and the second part examines the sources of their power in the countryside.
PART I: SOCIAL PROFILE OF THE CONTEMPORARY ELITES

AGE, COMMUNITY, CASTE AND FAMILY STRUCTURE

To begin with, we note that rural society in north India continues to be a male-dominated social world. The fact that our sample of rural elite does not include a single woman suggests their traditional confinement to home and hearth. They have not yet emerged, it appears on the scene of rural power structure. Power, thus continues to be a game to be played by the males alone.

Age

While elite-status tends to be linked with male status, the ascriptive character of rural society is highlighted by its attempt to link power with age. The data reveals some important social facts with regard to age composition of rural elites. Of the 227 elites, 10.6 per cent and 67.4 per cent of elites belong to the age-groups of 30-45 and 46-60 respectively. The age-group of 61 and above years of age contains 22 per cent of the elites. More than two-third of the elites belong to the second category of age-groups. The category of the aged elites contains more than the double percentage of the elites to the youthful category of the first age-group. Among the aged elites there are six whose age is 70+. Here two facts are to be underlined. These are,

11. On the selection of sample, See, Chapter II.
two extreme age-groups, i.e. the younger and the aged are pre-dominantly ex-rajás, ex-darbarís and their descendents. There is some kind of ascriptive influence and fame traditionally attached to these elites. The same is not true with the majority of the middle age-group. The middle age-group is a mixed category consisting of elites of all the castes and community bases, including the upper castes. Unlike the traditional ascriptive inheritance of the history of power, as is the case with the ex-rajás and ex-darbarís, these people have had to sweat their way up hard to get "known" in the district. Understandably they "arrive" late on the elite scene and retire early from there, as compared to the elites with traditional advantages.

Community

Historically, Hindus have had their stronghold over the swampy forest clad Tarai tract. We have discussed earlier (Chapter III) the way sheer geographical factors helped the rajputs ruling families to establish their relatively undisturbed rule over the colonised lineage principalities. Wider political vicissitudes, such as the fall of Mughals at Delhi, emergence of Nawabs as sovereign at Lucknow and their subsequent decline, and the arrival of British raj, did little to disturb the power and the demographic supremacy of the Hindus in this region. As compared to the 17.39 per cent of Muslims (or Musalmans), Hindus form 82.55 per cent of the
population in Basti district. The remaining fraction represents Christians, Buddhists and Sikhs.

Indeed, it was the numerical strength of the Hindus that allowed their upper castes to emerge on the power scene of district during the colonial period. Shaik Kadir Hussain, a pindari settler alone, as an exception was included among the Divisional Darbar for a period of three years, i.e., from 1895 to 1898. And it was the total non-representation of Muslims in the Darbars that was used as a ground by the District Magistrate of Basti, Mr. J.H. Cox, ICS, in his recommendation for the inclusion of the name of Mr. Inayat Hussain of Swalipur to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division in 1903. Initially the recommendation being based only on communal ground was turned down by the Commissioner. Point that we intend to make is that demographically and politically Muslims have had relatively been far behind the Hindus in power and domination. The representation of this community in the sample of 227 elites is only 12.8 per cent where as they form 17.4 per cent of the total district population.


13. Letter, dated 16th February 1903, from J.H. Cox, Esq., ICS, the District Collector and Magistrate of Basti to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur, Political Department, M.S. File No.XVI-2, Serial No.90 of (1900-1909), E.R.O., Basti.

14. Ibid.
Ca.stes

Keeping aside, for the time being, the Muslim elites, let us examine the comparative data (Table 22) on the division of Hindu population in terms of caste-ranks and their respective percentage to the total Hindu population on the one hand, and the division of Hindu elites into the same categories and the percentage of each such category in relation to the total sample of Hindu elites on the other. If our sample of elites represents, in any way, men of power and domination in the countryside, the data on Hindu castes and elites is disturbing. While totally equalitarian social systems are sociologically impossible the power and prestige distribution among various segments of Hindu population in contemporary rural India unfold the severity and harshness of the inequiditarian system which has been allowed to persist.

The data speak of the poor state efforts to bring about a socialist-democratic republic in India. More than 35 years of legal and constitutional reform towards establishing equilitarian social order, has done little to break the crust of the custom of caste feudalism in the countryside. Two upper castes, Brahmans and Rajputs with only 14.4% per cent of strength in the total Hindu population in the district, make for as much as 76.2 per cent of the Hindu elites. The power of these two castes thus, is an unbroken extension from the past to the present.
Table - 22

A comparative picture of castes, ranks and their percentage/Hindu population and the castes, ranks of elites and their percentage to the total Hindu elites sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Caste ranks</th>
<th>Castes and their percentage to the total Hindu population</th>
<th>Elites, castes ranks, castes and their percentage to the total Hindu elites of the sample</th>
<th>Name of elites</th>
<th>No. of elites</th>
<th>Percentage to the total elite in the population</th>
<th>No. of total Hindu elites</th>
<th>Total Hindu elites of the sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>2 14.46</td>
<td>1. Brahman 75</td>
<td>2. Rajput</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2 151</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>8 7.16</td>
<td>1. Kayastha 11</td>
<td>2. Vaish</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20 10.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>38 57.36</td>
<td>1. Ahir 2</td>
<td>2. Kurmi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 10.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Hindu Sadhus (Saints)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Sadhus (Hindu Saints)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 58 100.0 | 11 198 | 100.0 |

15. Comparative data of this Table is based on the integration of information contained in Table 6 and Table 8 of Chapter II of this dissertation.

16. Sadhus (Hindu Saints) belong to Hindu category of population and their social status ranks at par with upper castes yet, their religious calling demands from them to abandon their caste roots. Sadhus are socially beyond castes. While they exercise considerable influences on Hindu population, they are a category set apart from caste population.
Kavastha and Vaishva, the former from the category of the clerical and the latter from the category of trade and business, along with the cultivating caste of the Bhumihaars belong to the eight castes of the middle caste ranks. This rank provides for 10.1 per cent of the Hindu elites. The lower caste group consisting of as much as 38 internally divided peasant castes and forming 57.36 per cent of the entire Hindu population, is just represented by five castes with only ten elites. Though Abirs and Kurmis, as cultivating castes, have emerged at par with the upper castes in agricultural farming, they continue to yield to their ex-masters, the upper castes erstwhile ex-landlords. The demographic dominance of the lower caste groups does hardly help them in seeking dominance over upper caste groups of minority population. The category of ex-untouchable castes, ten in numbers, make for more than 20 per cent of population to the Hindu groups. The provision for the Reserved Seats in the Parliament and in State Assembly for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes helps the exterior castes to get "picked up" by the upper caste political leaders. Left to themselves, they have so far failed to produce their own leader from their own caste. Hence the five Chamars are but M.P. and MLAs from this caste.

Sadhus are in the sample of 227 elites and forms 6.1 per cent to the total. They wield considerable power over all the ranks of Hindu population. Most of these Sadhus
are Brahmans. And directly or indirectly, they reinforce classical Brahmanic and Rajput social conservatism. It is interesting to note that lower caste Sadhus serve as disciple (Chela) or as servant (Sevak) of upper caste Sadhus. The world of the Sadhu has its own hierarchy in the district and their internal divisions are much more rigorous than among the conventional castes. The tragedy of their situation is that while they declare to be beyond the caste, they are the most ferocious watchdogs of a discriminatory caste system of the Hindus in the countryside.

Proceeding further, let us now glance over the data in Table 23 on caste ranks and the relation of each rank to the categories of entrenched and emerging elites. These two types of elites have been introduced in Chapter I and have been identified in Chapter II. Here we propose to describe their qualitative social attributes and social background.

As the data in Table 23 reveal upper caste Hindus and the Muslims tend to be more represented in the entrenched elite category as compared to the lower ex-untouchable and Sadhu rank/categories. As we move down from middle caste ranks to the category of Sadhus, we note a decline in the number of entrenched elites and a consequent increase in the emerging elite category.
The caste ranks and the community background of elites by their types (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Caste ranks</th>
<th>Entrenched elites</th>
<th>Emerging elites</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>71.55</td>
<td>61.85</td>
<td>66.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>9.15</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>8.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ex-untouchable</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Sadhus</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td>11.01</td>
<td>12.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=109)</td>
<td>(N=118)</td>
<td>(N=227)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our data on caste and community background of the elite show that there is a strong tendency among the upper castes to tenaciously hold and retain their traditional power and prestige. And in this, they are largely successful. However, despite the grossly inequalitarian distributive system of power and domination among various castes, which more than 35 years of exercise of democracy and socialism could not abolish, it did open up a narrow passage for the lower and ex-untouchable castes to come up: A possibility which was unimaginable during the colonial period.

Muslims

Secondly, our data reveal that/who have historically been relatively insignificant group have attained, as compared
to all non-upper caste Hindus population, more entrenched Elite statuses. This reflects their social ascendancy in the countryside.

**Family**

Most of the rural elites, it is interesting to note, come from large joint families. Such a family consists of, in addition to one's wife and children, parents, uncles, brothers, their wives and children and married sons, and grand-sons. In the countryside, large sized families are treated as an index of power and symbol of prosperity. It grants to the head of the family a numerical strength and the physical power of coercion like a primordial father. The head of family allots responsibilities to its members such as looking after the farm and agriculture, looking after the litigation at the district headquarter, developing contact with government officers, etc. The same family spares a few of the younger ones to go for higher education and seek jobs outside the village and the district. Thus, in Basti, one can identify within the same family, various types of experts; one in agricultural operations, another in litigation and civil and criminal laws, and the third in the politics. Again, it is not uncommon to find within the same family an expert on Homeopathic or Ayurvedic medicines, though sometimes, these indigenous doctors do try and have crude knowledge about allopathic medicines. The elite in our sample is generally the head of this large family who tends
to incorporate within himself all the qualifications of these "experts" of his family. The data contained in the Table 24 highlights the family size of these elites. The average size of family in Basti is 5.2 members.

**Table 24**

**The average size of family of elites by their types in Basti District**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Types of elites</th>
<th>Upper castes</th>
<th>Average family size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Entrenched elites</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rajput</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Emerging elites</td>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rajput</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A large number of elites, numbering as much as 147, belong to families with more than ten members. Often four generations are seen clustered in the single large Bukharis or Havelis (bricks and cement pukka houses). The family consists of collaterals as well as the agnates. Below the large sized-families are the medium and small sized-families. Medium sized-families consisting of 5 to 10 members are found in the case of 51 elites. The small-sized families consisting of four members or less was found in the case of 29 elites.

In an agrarian setting, the numerical strength of the family attains great significance. Since a majority of elites depend upon land produce, political nexus for benefits like water and electricity for irrigation, loans
for improved seeds, fertilisers, machinery, etc., becomes essential. Economic prosperity and local power, to a great extent, is subject to a strong numerical strength of the family. In addition, families in the countryside require sufficient members to look after specialised needs of the modern agrarian living. And those who possess this, tend to have greater economic prosperity. The traditional joint family structure is now being effectively used in the countryside to enhance not only the economic interests of the family but also its power.

**EDUCATION, OCCUPATION AND INCOME**

We are going to present and analyse information pertaining to the educational attainments, occupations and income of the elites under study. Education being a source of power tends to mould occupations of elites. And these when reinforced by other factors, generally determine the income structure of people. We shall, therefore, examine each of these factors with the help of a body of field data from the district under study.

**Education**

The data on the educational background of elites (Table 25) do not reveal any significant variations by their types. A majority of the elites (134) hold only Matric (Xth Class) and Intermediate (XIth Class) examination certificates.
Table 25
Educational background of the elites by their types (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level and type of education</th>
<th>Type of elite</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entrenched</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. University Education,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-professional graduate,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-graduate and higher degrees</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Professional education,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers, Mukhtiar and Medical Degrees</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Middle, High and Intermediate School Education</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Classical Esoteric Educational attainments</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Literate with or without Primary School Education</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=109 N=118 N=227

These elites, however, do not hesitate to pass strictures against the current schooling system and hold an opinion that they can surpass a post-graduate degree holder of today in writing English and in mathematical exercises. Ex-rajas, such as those of Bansi, Basti, Chandapar and of Mahson, and ex-zamindars such as Babu Rameshwar Prasad Singh of Chowkara, Sheo Govind Singh of Bhanwapur and Ram Charitra Pandey of Belbharla are indeed sensitive, well-informed and highly articulate persons even though they do not hold
University degrees. Only 28 elites, most of whom belong to ex-zamindar families hold University degrees. Names of Dr. Sant Bahadur Singh, a Cambridge University trained botanist and the retired Director of Agriculture, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Babu Bhanu Pratap Singh, holder of M.Sc. degree in Mathematics and an ex-Cabinet Minister of Rural Development, Government of India during the Janta Government regime (1977-79) are few illustrations to highlight the nature of University educated elites.

The category of professionals, consist of such legal practitioners as Kazi Adil and Jalil Abbasi, Suleman Adhame, Madho Prasad Tripathi and Babu Ansman Singh and others. Among the Mukhtars, the names of Uda Shankar Dube, Ram Shankar, Kripa Shankar, Daya Shankar and Ram Lakhan Misra are good examples. Dr. Kamala Datta Tripathi, and an eminent social worker and medical practitioner of Basti also belong to this category. These lawyers, Mukhtars and other professionals were and continue to be a counter-elite to the traditional upper caste rajas and zamindars.

Classical esoteric education refers to the case of Hindu Sanskritic tradition to train Brahman students in Sanskrit language and to educate them in Hindu classics. In the case of Muslims, the same is done through Muktab

17. We may also make mention of a number of scholars of high academic attainment and influence who have their homes in the district and permanently belong to it. There are two fulfledged professors, one of natural sciences and the other of social sciences at the Jawahar Lal Nehru University. There are three Readers, two of
system of education to impart training in Persian language and in the Koran. Maulvis, Kazis, etc. are teachers in such schools in the case of Muslims, and Acharya, Veda-Charva in the case of Hindus. Seven persons in our sample have had education of this type.

The fact that the educational attainment of 30 elites is only primary education is not crucial. But it is important to note the fact that most of them with only certificates of VIth class or without even this, are capable of reading and writing not only vernacular languages efficiently, but also English. Thus the absence of educational degrees and certificates hardly prevented them from becoming a Zila Parishad Chairman of Basti as is the case of Mr. Dhanus Dhari Pandey in 1964 or in becoming a manager or a 18 president of academic institutions, including higher secondary schools as is the case of Babu Shoo Govind of Bhanwapur and Babu Rudra Pratap Singh of Latera villages.

17. contd.....

literatures at the University of Delhi and one at the A.N. Sinha Institute at Ranchi, Bihar. The latter one is the student of Ramyond Aron and is a Sociologist. There are four Lecturers in Sociology and Geography at the Universities of Delhi, Lucknow and Gorakhpur who belong to this district. All of them, with the exception of two Lecturers hold the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in their respective disciplines. In addition to the above scholars, there are University educated IAS and IPS officers and engineers who are in Government services.

18. Currently there are four degree colleges affiliated to the University of Gorakhpur which impart education leading to the degree of B.A., B.Sc. and B.Ed. in Basti. Two colleges are in the township of Basti and the third is at Banshi and the fourth at Chandapar. Latter two colleges are managed by the ex-rajjas.
Most graduates, in fact, depend on these men for their employment and promotions. These elites send their children to colleges and universities outside the district to Lucknow, Banaras, Allahabad and Delhi. Such children do not generally suffer from communication gaps which is normally the case with the illiterate peasantry.

**Occupation**

Agriculture and farming is and has been the main occupation of the people of Basti. Almost 80 per cent of population directly or indirectly live on land and land produce. In the predominantly rural economy of the district, while agriculture remains the traditional occupation for the majority of the population, one also finds a gradual appearance of various types of professions. Professions such as the practice of law, of medicine and the vocation of politics are becoming the mainstay of livelihood for a significant number of educated people. Traditional occupations and modern professions exist side by side in contemporary rural India.

The occupational profile of these 227 elites as reflected by the data highlight the predominance of agriculture as an occupation for the 77.53 per cent to the total sample. We recall that most of the titles, *Sandys* and certificate holding *Darbari* elites of the colonial period, with few exceptions, such as Babu Sarju Prasad Vakeel
nd Mr. Inayat Ahmed Khan were mainly from the landowning, agricultural families. Agriculture has obviously been the traditional occupation of the rural elites.

Businessmen form 4.40 per cent. In addition, there are as many as 41 elites making about 18 per cent of the total sample who belong to modern non-agricultural occupations, who practice law as lawyers, pleaders and mukhtars (8.81 per cent), medicine as doctors (3.52 per cent) and the full-time politicians and political workers (4.40 per cent). Remaining 1.32 per cent account for unspecified profession. Acquired or achieved occupations point to the changes that are taking place in the countryside. The emergence of politics, law and medicine as full-time occupations is a response to the needs of changes operating in the rural areas. Agriculture, however, remains the occupation of most of the elites and is the main source of subsistence for a majority of the population.

Data contained in Table 26 give further detail on the distribution of elites in various occupations and professions by their types (Table 26).
The occupational and professional distribution of the elites by their types (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type of elites</th>
<th>Traditional occupations</th>
<th>Modern professions</th>
<th>Total in percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Medico</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Entrenched elites</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Emerging elites</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=176</td>
<td>N=10</td>
<td>N=20</td>
<td>N=8</td>
<td>N=10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income Structure of Elites

The per capita income of the state of Uttar Pradesh in general remained three hundred rupees. But the income of the sample elites of Basti is disproportionately higher than the average. Income data contained in the Table show types of elites by income groups. The range of monthly income has been divided into two broad groups, i.e., the low and the high income groups. The lowest monthly income of the elites recorded was Rs. 1000/- per month. Taking Rs. 1000/- per month

19. Data on income of the elites are as sensitive as about the land. Rural elites being non-salaried generally do not maintain record of income and expenditure. Sources of income, such as mango orchard, vegetable crop, bamboo, timber, fishery, etc. are so variegated that their computation into neat categories of regular income groups show more of approximation rather than exact figures of income. Often some members of the joint family, it seems are in employment outside the districts and they send their earnings back to the villages and sometimes on the other hand the income of the village is transferred to the city and vice-versa. Hence the data on income are close approximation to the exact-figures.

20. See Uttar Pradesh Annual - 1978, Director of Information, Lucknow; Uttar Pradesh, 1979, p.76.
as a base, from Rs.1000/- to Rs.2000/- p.m. make low income group. The high income group includes cases of income ranging from Rs.2001/- to Rs.3000/- and above.

**Table - 27**

**Types of elites per month income group**

*in rupees*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Types of elites</th>
<th>High income</th>
<th>Low income</th>
<th>Total of elites in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Entrenched elites</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Emerging elites</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0 (N=227)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data on income reveals the economic superiority of the entrenched elites over the other the emerging elites. Out of the total 109 (48 per cent) top elites, as many as 93 (75.6 per cent) belong to high income group. It may be mentioned that seven of the entrenched elites, which includes all the ex-rajas and a few traditional land holders, have income of becoming exceeding Rs.10,000/- per month. But they have been rich for generations. As compared to the relative economic superiority of these entrenched elites the majority of the emerging elites belong to low income group status. Out of 118 (52.0 per cent) elites from this category, 88 (84.6 per cent) belong to the low income group. It appears that there is a correlation between position of elites in terms of their scale of power and prestige with their economic status.
Entrenched elites retain greater economic power as compared to the emerging elites in the countryside.

The relationship between the types of elites and their correspondence to high and low income groups parallels with a similar correspondence between upper caste Brahman and Rajput elites, on the one hand, and non-upper caste and Musalman (or Muslim) elites, on the other. Caste and income data presented below in Table 28 support our observation. The traditionally ruling castes of Rajputs who form 33.5 per cent of the sample of elites have 68 persons (55.3 per cent) in the high income group. Brahman elites, on the other hand, belong more to lower income group as compared to Rajput elites. But the elites coming from non-upper caste social background tend to cluster clearly at the low income group side.

Table - 28

The nexus between the caste status of Basti elites (in percentage) with income grouping (in rupees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Caste status of elites</th>
<th>High Income group</th>
<th>Lower Income group</th>
<th>Total of elites in percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Brahmans</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Rajputs</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=123
N=104
N=227
There is a close correlation between economic power and upper caste status in the countryside. We can recall that 71.5 per cent of the 109 persons belonging to the category of entrenched elites have an upper caste background.

Our presentation and analysis of data pertaining to education, occupation and income unfold basic information on the sample of elites. This enables us to have a closer view of their cultural values and political ideologies. We, therefore, intend to present an outline of value and ideological characteristics of the elites. Our aim is to highlight various value aspects of elite and his social, cultural and political attributes. This section thus deals with the cognitive character-structure of rural elites.

CULTURAL VALUES AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES OF ELITES

Structure of Values

We are presenting below data on cultural values of the rural elites. Our study being primarily on an examination of the relationship of rural elites with land and power structure of agrarian society, the focus on the study of values and ideologies is only secondary and tangential. We sought the responses of the elites to three statements, namely, that Indian society could not progress unless it rejects all its customary practices in favour of totally new one's; that it should reject part of its customary practices
in favour of some new ones; and finally, that it should hold fast to all its customary practices and reject all that are new. With the help of these statements we tried to elicit responses from the elites with regard to values which are radically innovative, adaptive and those that are basically conservative. Each respondent was asked to exercise the choice of a positive response to the one statement which was closest to his preference of values.

The pattern of responses show that 71.80 per cent of the respondents cherish adaptive values and 18.94 per cent hold basically conservative values. A minority response of 9.25 per cent is for the radical and innovative values.

The response patterns suggest the prevalence of values which are in tune with the general political, legal and economic changes taking place in the rural society. An overwhelming majority of elites cherish values which are a synthesis of the traditional and modern practices. The role of modern education, benefits of science, technology and medicine and the emergence of general awakening towards egalitarian image of society to be established, speak neither of a revolutionary overthrow of the traditional systems such as caste, land and power hierarchies nor do they support the perpetuation of total non-change. Radical innovations and conservatism are extreme values which are preferred by a very few elites. But these extremes values do have adherents in the rural India and that 18.94 per cent conservatives is
double to 9.25 per cent radical innovatives. Politically, technologically, socially and culturally it seems that the potential of values for peaceful gradual changes among the majority of elites as compared to the supporters for the radical and sudden changes is stronger.

### Table - 29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Types of elites</th>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>Adaptive</th>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Entrenched elites (109)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>42.33</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Emerging elites (118)</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=21</td>
<td>N=163</td>
<td>N=43</td>
<td>N=227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the distribution of the responses by types of elites as presented in Table 29 reveal some interesting trends. While the general adaptive value pattern reflects the values of the majority of elites irrespective of their types, the two extreme values of innovation and conservatism are seen polarised around entrenched and emerging elites. The entrenched elites constitute a potential group which contains greater leaning towards conservatism as compared to innovation. The emerging elite, on the other hand, are a type of group who harbour more potential for innovation.
as compared to conservative values. These two extreme
value tendencies, being projected by a minority of
respondents, however, reflect a symptomatic value pattern:
one for the traditional social order and the other for
its change and overthrow.

Sociologically, it appears that interest-frame of
elites vary by their types. Customary practices, traditional
ways of inter-personal and inter-group relationship; the
system of economy and power, appear to be considered as
social and cultural instruments which yield bounties to
one type of elites than to the other. And the overthrow
of these are seen as a way to gain similar bounties by
the other types of elites who foresee realization of their
interest only after the hold of the past is totally
broken.

These symptomatic value polarizations around the
entrenched and the emerging elites also suggest the suppressed
anxieties of the few as against the reconciled majority of
the rural elites. A further probing into these by relating
the responses with the caste and community bases of the
elite narrow down the implications of the data on value
pattern more decisively. Data presented in Table 30 give the
caste and community-wise responses to the value choices of
the rural elites.
The relationship between the types of values projected by the elites by their caste and community background, corresponds closely to one we noted earlier (Table 29) between the types of elites and the projected types of values.

The data in Table H reveal that Brahmans are, coming as they do from the priestly background of Hindu population comparatively more conservative. Elites coming from non-upper caste and from the Muslim community are comparatively more radically innovative. The Rajput elites fall between the Brahmans and other castes and communities. However, in terms of adaptive values the Rajputs emerge as the single most important category in their frequency of responses for values which stand for synthesis and assimilation of traditional with the modern values.
The overall picture pertaining to the values reflected by the elites suggests that rural elites are overwhelmingly receptive to modern values and yet, at the same time, they do not disown their traditional customary practices. They visualise a middle way approach to the progress of the Indian society. There are, however, seemingly a suppressed minority number of elites. A few entrenched elites, particularly Brahmins and the others from the category of emerging elites coming generally from non-upper castes and communities, reflect opposite values of conservatism and radicalism respectively. The holders of these two extreme values interestingly are polarised by their traditional social bases, highlighting the differential play of contemporary social structure which accrues benefits to one and deprives the other. Perhaps it is because of this that the deprived of the contemporary society, especially some of the emerging elites, nurse aspiration for the total rejection of the past practices. And, perhaps also because of the perceived consciousness of the possible erosion of the contemporary social structure that the entrenched upper caste elite, though a minority reflect radically conservative values.

Value-Orientiation of Elites

In continuation to our investigation on the nature of values cherished by rural elites, we tried to elicit
their responses highlighting the mode of their value orientations. Following Talcott Parsons' pattern-variable paradigm, we operationalised his first pattern variable, namely, universalism vs particularism in terms of concrete rural situations in such a way as to reflect the value orientation of the elites. Three situations were posed to the elites and these range from such value dilemmas as those in which the respondent is visualised in a situation involving his own son, his nearest cousin and the uncle. In relation to each situation of value dilemma the respondent had to give responses in 'yes' or 'no' form.


22. Value-dilemma situations

S-1 Suppose you are a Sarpanch and your son has committed a punishable offence against the complainant who brought the case before you and your Panchs for the punishment of your offender son. Your colleague, the Panchas, council you not to award punishment as the offender is your own son. Will you punish him?

S-2 Suppose you are a key witness to a land dispute litigation case in the District Court between your nearest cousin with a small cultivating peasant. The disputed land, according to your knowledge, is actually possessed and cultivated by the peasant. But if you tell a lie before the court stating that the same is tilled and possessed by your cousin, your cousin will get the land from the peasant. Will you tell a lie for the sake of your cousin?

S-3 Suppose you have a sizable number of voters under your influence who would cast their vote at your approval to any candidate irrespective of his political affiliation. Despite your hatred for the Congress Party, will you ask your supporting voter to vote for your uncle who is seeking election on the Congress Party ticket?
Table - 31

Universalistic - particularistic - value - orientation of the rural elites (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elites</th>
<th>S-1</th>
<th></th>
<th>S-2</th>
<th></th>
<th>S-3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=227</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>227</td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>84.14</td>
<td>15.58</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>33.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: "S" refers to situations indicated in the footnote No. 22 on p. 370)

The three rural situations around which we tried to elicit responses of the elites on their value dilemma and choices were part of a general social context of the contemporary countryside of Uttar Pradesh. These situations are not alien to the elites and to the leaders. They, therefore, provide a natural stimulus to elite and being native situations, they promise to yield natural and authentic responses.

The data contained in the Table 31 suggest that (i) there is no clear-cut empirical boundary separating elites holding an universalistic world view from those who hold to opposite (ii) that value orientation patterns vary in the same person or group from situation to situation. Thus, an elite who holds a strictly universalistic values in the cases (84.14 per cent) in regard to the application of punitive measure against his son at the complaint of the victim of the latter is strictly particularistic in 66.5 per cent of cases in relation to issue involving agricultural land etc. In relation to land, he does not mind telling lies of the most blatant nature before the court in favour
of his kin against the non-kin. The first situation (S-1) as compared to the second (S-2) entails comparatively lesser long-term consequence and violates emotive symbol of lesser intensity. Given the extent of punitive power of a Sarpanch of the statutory village Panchayat in Uttar Pradesh, he can simply impose a fine not exceeding Rs. 500/- on the offender and generally the latter course is taken. A token fine or a public reprimand can hardly inflict harm to the wrong-doer. And an elite who decides to do so against his son, without undergoing any serious sufferance, derives a moral face-lift from the villagers who see him as an honest and upright person who sees everyone with the "same eye". But when it came to inflicting permanent damage of a loss of land and that too by one who is a kin, a majority of elites become aggressively pragmatic, they choose to hide the fact that consequently deprives a rightful owner of his land in favour of one who is a kin but who is making a dishonest claim.

Again, when we move from S-1 and S-2 to the third situation, elites are found regaining their universalistic orientation. They would respect the political party they like, rather than the election fortune of their kin. As much as 79.29 per cent of elites express the sentiment of

23. In case of serious offences the victim usually approaches the police and higher sub-divisional or divisional courts. Only minor offences are brought to the notice of village panchayats. However, for offences, which fall outside the jurisdiction of the Panchayat, it has power to forward the case to higher courts.
holding the value of the nature of political parties above the value of the nature of candidates seeking elective positions through political party platforms. Again, we find that the line of explanation we have taken in relation to S-1 and S-2 seems to apply to this situation also. Election to positions, affiliations to political parties, etc., are temporary issues. In the minds of rural elites, these situations do not alter the basic structures of social, economic and power relations.

Before we conclude our analysis of data on value orientations, let us briefly examine the relationships between the said orientation and the type of elites and by their caste and community backgrounds. The data presented in Table 32 show the relationship between types of elites and their value orientations. The data suggest that there exists little variation in the nature of response to S-1 by the types of elites. That the emerging elites tend to show particularistic orientation in case of 72.2 per cent of response, as opposed to only 27.8 per cent responses of the entrenched elites, support this assumption. However, the variation of data by types of elites in regard to S-1 not distinct enough to warrant a substantive conclusion.

Probing into the relationship between the types of elites and the nature of their value orientation, as we move from rather unstriking and diffuse pattern of responses we noted in relation to S-1 to S-2, we find a clear
Table - 32
Universalistic particularistic value orientation and the types of Rural Elites (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No</th>
<th>Types of Elites</th>
<th>S-1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>S-2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>S-3</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Entrenched</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N=91</td>
<td>N=36</td>
<td>N=227</td>
<td>N=151</td>
<td>N=76</td>
<td>N=227</td>
<td>N=47</td>
<td>N=180</td>
<td>N=227</td>
<td>N=227</td>
<td>N=227</td>
<td>N=227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and specific tendency towards an overlap of particularistic responses among the emerging elites. It may be noted that the majority responses of both types of elites are, in S-2 context, particularistic, but the frequency of the same is found to be more in case of emerging elites as compared to the entrenched group. If spoken responses are to be taken as an authentic reflection of personality structure, we have to conclude that emerging elites of Basti are more particularistic than the entrenched elites. My field experience, however, suggest that such conclusions are to be accepted with caution. For, I have noted that respondents try to create an impression before others in their own favour, but in actual conduct and behaviour, they flout the value they orally allege to cherish.

24. It requires another independent research enterprise to prove the gap between spoken values and the values that are actually practiced by the respondents.
Responses of the elites to the third situation (S-3) again takes a somersault and we find our respondents echoing universalistic types of values: the echo is more in the case from the entrenched elites as compared to the emerging ones. While some of the reservations expressed earlier in relation to S-2 may hold equally true in the case of S-3, we find that entrenched elites who, by virtue of their higher reputation have a better chance in vote-mobilization in the district during elections, show more freedom in the exercise of universalistic values. Since such a periodic assertion of autonomy of ideology, political party, etc., does not entail relatively permanent consequences. We can conclude that modern political innovations of democratic exercises such as electioneering as compared to other situations operate relatively more on universalistic principles. The above conclusion requires explanation. If the competing candidates in the elections arena come more from a single caste, lineage or community than the other, there would logically be little relevance of casting of votes on caste and community line.

Particularistic need stands self-satisfied by the very structure of competing candidates. What generally remains to make a choice for, is the alternative political ideology of the candidates. Hence universalistic values, my field experience suggest, is generally exercised in the wider frame of particularistic structure of politics. This explanation is closer to the reality as not only the majority of sample
elites come from upper castes but also, especially in Basti, the majority of competing candidates demand votes during the elections.

| Table - 33 |
| Universalistic-particularistic value orientation by the Caste Community Backgrounds of Rural Elites (in percentage) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Caste and Community Background</th>
<th>S-1</th>
<th>S-2</th>
<th>S-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Brahmins</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rajputs</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Both castes and communities</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=191 N=36 N=227 N=151 N=76 N=227 N=47 N=181 N=227

Our attempt to examine the constitution of responses in terms of the caste background of elites and their value orientations gives us some interesting relations (Table 33). Non-upper castes, i.e., non-Brahman and non-Rajput respondents tend to show, in the case of S-1 a conspicuous particularistic orientation. Of 36 total particularistic responses as opposed to 191 universalistic one, as much as 66.7 per cent of them are from this category of respondents. In the case of S-2 context, we do not note any clear-cut variation in the nature of responses by the respondents' caste and community background. Land is, apparently, a type of emotive economic category which tends to carry premium over all
other considerations. Pertaining to the context of S-3, we find Brahmans and Rajputs are more inclined towards universalistic considerations as compared to the non-upper caste elites.

Emerging elites, especially the non-upper caste elites, as compared to entrenched upper caste elites, tend to show a comparatively higher frequency and intensity of particularism in an overall review of our data. And their value orientations vary by context and situations.

Political Ideology and the Rural Elites

In the study of "Politics, as a Vocation" reference has been made to political games in terms of "ethics of responsibility" and the "ethics of conscience". The former involves a pragmatic world view in relation to sharing and shaping of power through reconciliation as a goal. The latter pertains to unattainable absolute social goals and its practice ends in creating a group of "true believers" and of faith. It is in the former sense that David Apter provides an operational meaning of the terms political. According to him, it refers to activities "essentially devoted to the recruitment of followers who attempt to modify the (social) systems either by the participation in the government or by

directing their actions against it. The latter (activities) will be regarded as political. We are using the term political to signify collective attempts towards sharing and shaping of power in society. Thus, the term "political act" will involve an organised attempt to search for, to retain, and to replace or overthrow power.

The term "ideology" refers to a set of alternative ideas, beliefs and values which provide a paradigm for the interpretation of the empirical situations of a society. It not only involves judgement on the empirical nature of social realities but also the way those realities ought to be. And the nature of beliefs and values pertaining to the "ought" vary from group (parties) to group. It is in this context that Eric Hoffer reflects upon the instrumental aspect of ideology as "ceaseless barrage of propaganda" to exercise control over people. This instrumental characteristic of ideology is best highlighted by Karl Mannheim who treats ideology as a projective defence mechanism and as a protective tool evolved by the ruling class to ensure retention of its power in the face of adversaries (the opposition parties) even if it involves outright misrepresentation and distortion of the objective realities. He states


that, "... ideology consists of the beliefs and the values of a ruling group which obscures the real conditions of society..." Ruling class ideology is a separate category of conceptions which stand opposite to adversary groups. Eric Erikson offers a definition of ideology which closely corresponds to the sociological conception. Ideology is, according to him, an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific as well as political thought: The tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to ideas and ideas to facts in order to create a world image of convincing change to support the collective and individual sense of identity. Ideology is usually a challenge and it offers an alternative value structure to societies in search of equilibrium. According to Parsons, ideologies combine an evaluative and an empirical element in the diagnosis of social situation. Because of the evaluative pressure, they tend towards selectivity and sometime outright distortion, both, in stating the case of the proponent and in attacking that of the opponent. But in all cases, to recall Geertz's observation "ideology is response to strains..."

We shall use the term 'ideology' as an alternative model of values - especially political values pertaining to the society entertained and projected by the political groups and parties. We shall also use it as an alternative model carrying some element of what Johnson calls "Imminence" with regard to the establishment of a society better than what is being perceived by the contending parties.

In the light of the preceding discussion, let us examine the ideological character of rural elites. On account of the facts that political parties with a distinct ideology in contemporary India are numerous; their spread areas vary enormously. And also because of their tendency towards fusion with and fission from each other, they pose difficulties in their categorization and analysis. We are, under this circumstance, resorting to develop a heuristic device to typify them in terms of value-themes among such types as the right-wing parties, the left-wing parties and finally the centralist parties. Through the study of these political party types we intend to highlight the ideological value-themes to which the rural elites belong.


33. The above typology is heuristically formulated as political parties have often been changing their names and, through fusion and fission, have been splitting and forming new parties. In Basti, right-wing parties have been represented contd...
In the course of our investigation, we found that out of the sample of 227 elites only 20.0 per cent had formal education by such parties as Hindu Maha Sabha (HMS), the Jan Sangh (JS) and the Swatantra Party (SP). Left-wing parties are: the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP). Centrist parties include the Congress Party which underwent a split in 1969 at the instance of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Basti Congress represents the one led by Mrs. Gandhi, other centrist parties have been the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and the Bhartiya Kisan Dal (BKD). Of all the above parties, only the Congress and the CPI have had roots in the colonial period. The contemporary Congress Party is the inheritor of the Indian National Congress (INC). The remaining parties arrived on the political scene at different phases of the post-independence political scene of India. In March, 1977 the hitherto ruling Congress Party suffered a total defeat in the elections, and fell both at Centre as well as at the State, even of Uttar Pradesh. An amalgamation of most of the parties, except the left-wing parties, and the defeated Congress Party (which again underwent a split in January 1978) gave birth to Janta Party (JP). The political mosaic of Janta Party which had come into being in 1977 continued to function as the ruling party till the Lok Sabha Election of January 1980, when it fell and the Congress(I) under the Presidentship of Mrs. Indira Gandhi became again the ruling party of India.

The Janta Party mosaic broke into its original chips after the defeat. These political chips assumed new names: Jan Sangh took the name of Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), BKD of Lok Dal (LD), remaining splinters are continuing as Janta Party and the Congress component as United Congress (U), Congress (S) and Congress (J), etc. This maize-way history of names and political parties are thus ironed out into three typologies on the basis of their political value-emphasis. It may be of crucial importance to note that the splinter parties of the broken JP after 1980, even when they have taken up new names, are locally operating with an identity which is of pre-Janta Party phase of their history. Thus, BJP is locally known as Jan Sangh. Therefore, while rechecking the responses in 1978 in the field, I was struck by the fact that respondents, instead of referring to JP used to refer to its components, i.e., the Jan Sangh and Swatantara etc. In addition, the Congress, the CPI and the Jan Sangh have been powerful political parties before 1977 and they continue to be the only active party in the district of Basti. In our analysis, therefore, we have used to old names of these political parties.
membership in political parties, such as in the ruling Congress (10 per cent), Bhartiya Janta Party (6 per cent) BJP, (earlier known as the Jan Sangh Party), Janta Party (2 per cent) (JP) and the Communist Party of India (2 per cent) (CPI). The Congress, under the control of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, is the strongest party in the district. Other political parties, such as Hindu Maha Sabha (HMS) and Bhartiya Kisan Dal (BKD), have their formal organisation in Basti but none of the elites in this sample reported that they belong to them.

The rather poor percentage of political membership of the elites, however, in no way reflects a poverty of political consciousness. Invariably, all the elites are found to be politically aware and keenly sensitive to their relative ideological conceptions. Most of them have a wide knowledge about the political careers of not only state level but also of national level, political leaders.

Two Rajput elites, one an ex-Zamindar Thakur of village Athadama near Rudhanli of Bansi tehsil and the other, an ex-raja of Chandapar at present in Naugarhi tehsil, boasted of having played host to national leaders of no less importance than Mahatma Gandhi and Jawahar Lal Nehru during the pre-independence period. These leaders stayed at their residence during mid 1930s and 1940s. A good number of them (about 63 per cent) have had access to various State and Central
Government Ministers at various times in the post-independence period. It may also be noted that almost all of them know the conceptual meaning of such political terminology as those we are using, i.e., left-wing, right-wing and thecentrist-parties. At our probing, they provided correct illustrations by grouping the various parties in these three ideological types.

In order to find out the general ideological anchorages of the rural elites, we introduced a simple and straightforward question to them eliciting the name of a single political party from each respondent which he liked most or hated most from among the contemporary political parties of India. The list of liked and disliked parties were subsequently categorised into the ideological types of parties.

Before we examine the responses to the above question, we need to highlight a few issues of more theoretical nature. These issues emerged in the course of data collection. The first issue refers to the ethno-construction of political parties and their respective ideologies. If political parties reflect ideologies and the ideologies refer to a cognitive paradigm of alternative values and conceptions, the question arises as to what sort of content do the elites

34. We, however, did not use conceptual terms such as left-wing or right-wing parties in the schedule. Our questions focussed on the exact political party, irrespective of their place in the ideological types of political parties we later evolved in the course of patterning and processing of data for analytical purposes.
assign to those paradigms? The empirical notion of ideologies held and understood by the respondents may or may not correspond to the theoretical clarity of academic categorization of parties and ideologies. Hence, there is a need to notice this anamoly and recognise the limitation of such a study.

The second point to be made explicit is that in course of the field investigation, it appeared that unlike the ideal-typical concept of Lipset's "political man", East Uttar Pradesh rural elites show a tendency to fuse ideology with men. Preference over or likes and dislikes of parties, it appeared, are not essentially determined by ideological foundations of political parties. They are liked or disliked also because of the sort of men who "people that party". Thus, if a locally esteemed person fights election, chances are that he would get the vote despite his political backing from a less esteemed party.

In Basti, it was noted that elites often refer to the ideological position of the parties more on the position of the men who lead and control the party and less on the content of the ideology of that party. The cognitive understanding of the ideological contents of the political parties and the cognitive construction of the social image of the men who belong to those parties, are both crucial in the evaluation of the data we are going to examine below.
Basti elites have generally used harsh and figurative expression to refer to the left parties. Some of them called the leftist leaders as "lal-frengi". Ethno-construction of the left-wing parties reveals that they are against caste, religion and private property, and their rule would amount to a Sudra-raj (rule of the inferior classes of people).

With the demise of property and religion, all other values and norms pertaining to marriage and family, would also disappear in the sudra-raj. They fear men would be reduced to "rats and rabbits". Based on such type of negative values, it is no surprise that out of the sample of 227 only a small minority of 10.57 per cent respondents approved left-wing parties. Majority responses of 49.77 per cent was in favour of right-wing parties and 39.47 per cent in favour of the centrist parties.

Right-wing parties project an extension and, indeed, an elaboration of the traditional ascriptive Hindu society. And since the majority of elites belonging to upper castes, and also because they have suffered a relative loss of land and power during the post-independence period, their reliance on utopian ideologies and hope from right-wing parties is

35. The import of the term "lal-frengi" is to be understood against the historical background of the mutiny of 1857 in course of which Britishers were referred to as frengi (locally meaning foreigner) by the rebels. Lal-frengi is used to refer to red-foreigner. The implicit connotation is to the non-Indian origin of left ideologies.

36. Following Karl Mannheim, by 'Utopian ideology' we mean a vision of an ideal society which are in fact wishful images of a future social order. See Ideology and Utopia, op cit, p 61.
understandable. However, between the two extremes of positive and negative ideologies, generally functioning as utopian ideologies, there are as we mentioned above 39.47 per cent of responses in favour of the centrist parties. While this category of political parties includes more than the contemporary ruling Congress Party, yet references are essentially to this party alone. Less than 50 per cent of responses (in proportion to the entire elite sample) favouring the centrist parties hold key to the entire fluctuations of the responses. This category, being in the middle of the ideological continuum tends to receive strength from both the right as well as the left-wing party men. It imposes a strain on the traditional values of caste and land, but does not challenge or abolish them.

The validation of the data with reference to the ideologies and parties liked, emerges from the data in Table 34 on ideologies and parties disliked by the elites by their types. As much as 131 (48.89 per cent) elites disliked the left, and 37 (16.29 per cent), the right, and the middle group of 79 (34.80 per cent) responses the centrist party ideologies.

Right-wing parties are disliked by a minority of elites; the majority of elites dislike the left parties. The pattern of responses referring to ideology/party liked and
disliked validates each other. A further insight is gained when we re-arrange the above data in the light of and along with the categories of the types elites.

**Table - 34**

Political parties as ideological types as liked and disliked by the elites by types (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. elites</th>
<th>Types of elites</th>
<th>Types of political parties liked and disliked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entrenched elite</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emerging elite</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total: %</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above data suggest that the majority of the entrenched elites like the right-wing parties. After the right-wing parties, the second preference goes to centrlist party-ideology. Left-wing parties are liked by only three (12.5 per cent) respondents of this group. In contrast, the majority of 65.5 per cent of the emerging elites prefer centrlist, 33.6 per cent of them prefer right wing and 81.5 per cent the left-wing parties. As compared to the entrenched elites, a moderate percentage of these emerging elites have a liking for the left-wing parties.
On the negative side, of the 109 entrenched elites as many as 72.7 per cent of them disliked the left. But in emerging elite group 73.4 per cent from among their total of 118 disliked the centrist parties. Their dislike for the right and left parties, however, was almost equal.

A clear picture of parties liked and disliked is obtained by relating the positive and the negative responses of the elites with their caste position (Table 35).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste and community</th>
<th>Political parties liked</th>
<th>Political parties disliked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caste and community</td>
<td>Right-wing parties</td>
<td>Centrist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmans</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajputs</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other castes and communities</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data on political ideology of the elites point to a rather strong rejection of leftism and left-oriented parties and ideologies. Upper castes and entrenched elites express preference for right-wing parties as compared to centrist parties.
Strong liking for the right-wing ideologies, it appears, reflects an utopian wish for the restoration of the traditional ascriptive allocation of land power and status, which have been slowly getting out of their hands under the rule of the centrist party, of the Congress during the contemporary period. The strong dislike for the left is an extension of the same psychology of disenchantment which visualises a total eclipse of their existence, should the left come in power. The revival of the ascriptive paradigm of the traditional Indian society, it seems, is the mooring for the upper-caste entrenched elites. The emerging elites on the other hand visualise a trap in the traditions. They are more for the new paradigm of Indian society. This cognitive split, is seen, according to distinctive position to the entrenched and the emerging elites as two different groups of men of power and domination in the countryside. This basic information on social and value profile of elites enables us to place them on the social and power map of the district for a closer study of their sources of power and domination.

37. See, Mannheim, ibid, pp.61-65
PART II - SOURCES OF POWER AND DOMINATION

Actual and potential sources of the elites' power and domination, our data suggest, do not lie in isolated and exclusive categories of agrarian social structure. In addition, there is also historicity of power which is supported by cultural continuities. Thus, upper caste segments, on account of their high social ranks, possession of large land-holdings and on account of their correspondingly higher economic superiority, have historically been the only segment which was capable of providing the elites. Data on elites of the colonial period in the preceding chapters attest to this fact. The change from the colonial to the post-colonial period, however, tended to alter and expand the base of elite recruitments. Such an alteration reflects shift and change in the source of power and domination as well. The exclusive monopoly of a few social segments has started crumbling and several others of the same social structure have started surfacing on the scene of elite recruitment.

Our elite nomination data suggest that those who are nominated as elites are not necessarily or always upper caste people. They tend to come from other castes as well including ex-untouchable castes and other communities. All of them are not big landholders and some of them are economically poorer compared to many relatively rich who did not achieve
reputational score to be taken in the sample of elites. Furthermore, all those office holders of elective positions on statutory and semi-statutory bodies were also not necessarily elected to our elite pool. Against these observations, we may also place the fact that the top ten entrenched elites of the district, all ex-rains and zamindars of upper-caste segment, neither hold statutory positions nor are they holders of university degrees.

In addition, as we shall see, there is a fair number of elites whose family and close kin had been at the fore-front of power as Darbaris or Honorary Magistrates in the colonial period. These cases refer to the elites who are sons, brothers or cousins of ex-Darbari elites of the pre-independent period. However, there is a significant number of elites who emerged from the political transitions and hage, as we have mentioned earlier, for the last 40 years, been exercising parallel power and dominations on people as counter elites or new elites of the countryside.

In order to highlight the issue of identifying the sources of elite power, we have to address ourselves to the issue of the pre-requisites of power. By pre-requisite of power, we refer to those basic social conditions which, when favourable, accord power, prestige and domination to persons in proportion to the possession of the basic social conditions. And, when such conditions disappear, the capacity
to exercise power also disappears. Thus, there must be a certain set of basic conditions consistently present in case of those entrenched elites who or whose families have consistently been holding a continuing stable tenure of power and domination as opposed to the other especially the emerging elites who emerged from the basic conditions different from the former one. A number of respectable names of emerging elites, such as Raja Ram Sharma, Ram Kumar Shastri, Uday Shankar Dube, Ram Shankar, Kripa Shankar, Ram Lakhan Misra, etc. who went out of the office of, say MLA and MP, were seen abruptly undergoing a sharp and steep decline in not only their power and domination but also in their living conditions. For the emerging elites to be out of elective positions, meant being out of power. Their tenure of power being office-bound is short and transitory. But the same is not true with most of the traditional entrenched elites, such as ex-rajás and zamindars. They continue, despite political odds, to have large land-holdings, orchard, to own and manage educational institutions as their family property and retain enough influence to exercise command over the process of political decision making, right from the choice of a candidate to his election to the final process of casting and counting of votes. They have a long history of power behind them which help them in the exercise of the same today even when political context of society has changed.
If we are able to discern the two foci of the basic social conditions, one which accords longer tenure of power and the other a shorter tenure, we would be approaching with some certainty, the sources of power. We have to keep in our mind that the two foci of power holding belong to two sets of historical and political situations of society. In one situation, we find 'traditional' social conditions operating. Its continuing operation in the countryside accords continuing basic conditions of power to those who have been and are its beneficiaries. The contemporary situations, on the other hand, create 'modern' social conditions. Achievement oriented nonascriptive sources of power are the product of modern social condition. In the modern political milieu, positions of power are to be achieved through success in election. The traditional situation in which control over land, historicity of rule and domination and the hereditary upper caste status, etc. had been valued, was the product of feudal-colonial political structure. The change in the political structure has brought about the modern social conditions. The continuity and change of these two social conditions, one traditional from which continuing, longer and stable sources of power emanate, and the other, modern, giving rise to sources of power which are transitory and unstable, is to be explored and analysed in terms of the two foci.
The foci of these basic conditions are examined below in terms of such analytically separate but empirically overlapping dimensions of sources of power as its historicity, power and positional structure of elites, power and the structure of land control and finally, cultural and symbolic aspects of the bases of power. In addition, we also present data on the self-perception of elites about their sources of power. Our contention is that power is the result of the interplay between the factors which are embedded in these social bases of power. Contingent factors, such as ideologies, legal policies of the State and other related political factors, are important aspects of power acquisition, but these are to be examined against the broad historical, social and cultural background of the community. We shall also present and analyse data on the perception of elites about the perceived sources of their own power. Our aim is to supplement one type of data with the other.

**Historicity of Power and Domination**

In a society, like the Indian, which did not undergo any radical breakdown of its social and cultural traditions, the history of rulership of a few rajput lineages and families and of the priestly power of the Brahmans on the peasantry themselves in past became in itself a justification for their continuation in the present situation. The past weighs heavily on rural societies and
is one of the most important handles in the hands of the traditional elites to clutch and retain their control over people.

In the preceding chapters on pre-colonial and colonial phases, we surveyed the process of colonization by the conquering Rajputs and the emergence of lineage and clan principalities, the heads of which became rajas. We have also hinted at the proselytizing role of the Brahmans, who as the priests of Rajputs, converted the indigenous tribals into faithful Hindu subjects of the raja. Indeed, it is an irony of history that subjugation of one community or of one society by the other, has generally been carried out with the help of priestly powers.

These independent and semi-independent princely rajas and their brahmanic priests, barring those who rebelled against the company-raj of the British, emerged as the Title, Sanad and Certificate holding class of local rulers after 1857. This glittering class of Darbaris of the British courts often held magisterial powers and received concessions for the possession of arms, etc. The raja (ruler) and the praja (subject) division of the pre-colonial phase, even as it persisted later, also assumed a new division between landlords and the tenants. The nexus of the ruler and the ruled, the master and the subject, landlords and the peasants was the nexus essentially of power and domination.
The continuing bondage of generations of peasants to the upper caste ruling lineages and families of landlords - the Maliks (masters), Sarkar (authority), the Deo-Bhagwan (God incarnate) and Mai-Baap (parents) as they still are honorifically referred to by the peasantry continues to persist. Politically, culturally, socially and economically majority of the rural population is under the domination of upper caste elites. This total moral and emotional grip of the traditional elites on the peasant generated a rationality which conceptualised the concept of social order as an order of sharply differentiated segments of population - the tiny top segment holding the maximum power and dominating the majority population below.

Abolition of the class of rajas and zamindars during the post-colonial period abolished the legal nexus between the zamindars and the tenants. But like many headed hydra with the loss of the legal nexus of power - the rajas and the zamindars did not lose other nexuses of power. An erosion of their power over the peasantry is tangible and is felt. But they still have relatively more power than any other social segment or any other type of new elite. The historicity of their rulership, command and control over people continues to enable them to wield more power on people with less effort as opposed to the new elites who wield comparatively less power with more efforts.

38. For details, see my article, "Culture of Inequality", in Seminar No.255, November 1980, pp.15-17.
Past Tenurial Status

In order to highlight the significance of the contribution made by history to the contemporary elites, let us first examine the past tenurial status of our elites presented in Table 36.

Table - 36
The past tenurial status of elites by types (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Type of Elite</th>
<th>Ex-raja-zamindar</th>
<th>Ex-tenant</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Entrenched elites</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Emerging elites</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=150</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=65</td>
<td>N=12</td>
<td>N=227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the total sample of 227 elites, 66.07 per cent of elites come from the families of erstwhile rajas and zamindars. The persistence of the historically powerful segment of social structure even after the legal abolition of their special privileges reflect the continuity of their power from past to the present. Only 33.92 per cent of elites come from the ex-tenant tenurial background.

39. After the Z.A. Act of 1952 of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the distinction between the Zamindar status and the tenant status disappeared.
Keeping in view the enormous disparity that existed between the population ratio of *ex-zamindars* and the *ex-tenants* (Chapter II), the representation of the elites from the latter, especially in the context of post-independence equalization policies of the State is only symptomatic. That the ruling segments of the colonial period continue to rule over the people in the post-independence Basti is an undisputed fact. But, feeble as it is, the tendency among the *ex-tenants* to rise from their historical phase of powerlessness, on the part of the peasant and the *ex-subject* classes, which could have been impossible in the past colonial context, is also an undisputed fact.

**Honorific Past**

In addition to the tradition of power being more favourable to the traditional elites, it is crucial to note that a good number of them, alive at the time of the field study such as *ex-raja* of Bansi, Mahson, Basti and Chandapar (Shohratgarh) and territorial *raiputs* and *brahman ex-zamindars* such as Thakur, Ramshwar Prasad Singh of Chawkhara, Baleshwari Prasad Singh of Rudhanli, Pandey of Jagdishpur and Babu Ram Charitra Pandey of Belbhana, etc., to cite only a few names have themselves been holders of seats in British *Darbars*, recipients of *Sanyais* and Certificates and held the Honorary position of Class II Magistrates during the colonial phase.
A good number of relatively younger elites are the sons or nephews of similar influentials who are dead.

While the Title holders generally belonged to the list of the Darbaris of the district, the number of the latter hardly exceeded 15 on any specific point of time. The recipients of certificates, sanads and gifts, especially the position of Honorary Magistrates, used to be more in number than the number of regular Darbaris. The combined number of these regular Darbaris and sanad and certificate recipients and the Honorary Magistrates in 1919 was 65. Of these 65 colonial elites, 29 elites were alive at the time of our field study and are in our elite sample; and the sons or nephews of those who are dead are nominated to our sample. Both categories of elites are presented in Table 37.

40. Information on the Honorable background of elites are from the List of the Recipients of Rewards for War Services, at the occasion of District Darbar held by G.B. Muir, Esq., I.C.S., District Magistrate, Basti on 16th December, 1919, Political Department, M.S. File No. XVI-5 of 1919, E.R.O., Basti. This file contains list of district contributors to the War Fund.

41. A. Category 'A' includes those contemporary elites who himself received Titles, Seats in British Darbars, Sanads, Certificates and held the position of Honorary Magistrates during pre-independent period.

B. This category includes those elites whose parents (now dead) belonged to A category.
It is important to note that generally all the families that were influential during the colonial period, with a few exceptions, continue to be equally influential during the post-independence period. The continuity of their power, prestige and domination has a historical dimension. A history of power become a source of power in the present. Sanctions, legitimacies and approvals of such powers become the cake of custom and suffer little from change and erosion.

**Positional Structure and Source of Power**

There has been a tendency among social scientists, first, to treat statutory positions as synonyms of actual power and then, to treat the holders of such positions as the holders of actual power. Such an assumption persists among
42 scholars, who have conducted their research on leaders and elites in India. We have questioned it earlier (Chapters I and II) and we shall presently support our criticism with a body of empirical facts.

We intend to describe various types of positions of power and influence held by some of the elites and then we shall examine the issue of elective position and power. Positions generally belong to organizations. Organisations can broadly be divided into two major types: The first is governmental organisations such as the Parliament at the national level, Legislative Assembly at the State, Zila Parishad at the district and the Gram Sabhas at the village levels. It is generally assumed that positions at national and State level bodies yield more power to their occupiers as compared to those at the lower levels. It may also be pointed out that while acquisition of position to the district, state and national level organizations involve participation in elections on the lines of political parties, especially with reference to the membership in Parliament.

and State Assemblies, such politicality of positions thins down in the case of village elections. Village elections are generally more of the function of caste and land alliances within the village rather than of political parties and ideologies.

The second type of organisations are semi-governmental in the sense that they are registered bodies. Organisation such as Managing Committees of Government recognized Primary and Secondary Schools and Colleges, Pathshalas (traditional schools), District Cane Development Federation, Weavers' Cooperatives, etc., are chiefly of this type. While in principle, acquisition of positions in these bodies is through election, but actually allocations of positions are generally decided behind the scene. Competition for positions in these bodies does not involve political contest as in case of the elections to the Parliament and Assembly. Political parties do not involve themselves in the selection of position holders for these bodies. Key positions of such Registered Organisations, though essentially honorary in nature, often yields a good deal of economic power to its holders. State grants of money for the benefit of sugar-cane growing peasant, or for a lay cloth weaver, or for getting teaching job in a school, etc., are various types of power which yield to its holders enormous local influence.
We present data below on elites who hold elective statutory position and on elites who hold positions in semi-statutory, non-political and non-elective bodies. Such an information is crucial since generally, elite studies in India, as we have hinted earlier, have remained confined to the study of elective formal position holders alone.

The number of elected candidates in the district to the seats of Legislative Assembly have been fluctuating between 15 to 16. Two of these 16 seats are kept reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates. Three candidates go to Parliament from the district and one of the three is reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate. Data contained in Table 39 show the case of elites who occupy statutory elective positions in organisations such as the Parliament, the State Assembly, Zila Parishad and as Pradhan in village Panchavats.

43. Such as Sirsikar, op.cit.

44. Number of Legislative Assembly Constituendes and therefore seats have varied between 15 in 1952 to 16 in 1962 and subsequent General Elections.

45. Zila Parishad consists of 32 elected Block Pramukhs, 32 Chetra Samiti Members, 1 Chairman of the Municipality, Basti township and other ex-officio members such as all the members of Legislative Assembly and of the Parliament from Basti district, Director of Cooperative Society, Chairman, District Cooperative Federation, Chairman Cane Society, Basti, Government nominated member of Cooperative Society and two Government nominated members to Zila Parishad Basti.
Occupancy of statutory elective positions of elites by their types (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Types of elites</th>
<th>Elites not holding elective positions by categories</th>
<th>Elective positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Holding</td>
<td>$x$</td>
<td>$y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Entrenched elites (109)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Emerging elites (118)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$N=184$</td>
<td>$N=43$</td>
<td>$N=13$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The information contained in Table 38 suggests that of the usual total of 19 members (three of Parliament and 16 of State Assembly) in category $X$, only 13 have appeared on the reputational-pool of our sample of elites, 11 (84.6 per cent) in the entrenched and the two (15.4 per cent) in the lower elite groups. Similar pattern is noted in the case of members belonging to the $Y$ category. Out of the total 32 Block Pramukhs as many as 25 belong to our elite sample. But there is one significant difference. The majority in the

* Categories of Elective Positions are:

1) $X$ Consists of members elected to Parliament and Legislative Assembly.

2) $Y$ Consists of members elected to Zila Parishad of the district.

3) $Z$ Consists of village Pradhan, Panch and Sarpanch and junior Block Pramukhs who do not belong to Zila Parishad.
X category, 11 as opposed to two belong to the group of entrenched elites whereas the majority of the Y category elites, 20 (80.0 per cent) as opposed to five (20 per cent) belong to the lower category of the elites.

We note an abrupt decline of number of position holders of Z category in our sample. Out of 2,423 village Pradhans and more than one and a half of this figure consisting of village Panchas, Sarpanchas and Junior Block Pramukhs - in all, about more than 7,000 elected position holders, just five of them could make to the elite nomination pool of our sample.

Now, placing the total of 43 (33.5 per cent in the entrenched and 60.5 per cent in the emerging category) elites holding statutory positions in perspective, let us examine their comparative relation to the 184 elites (50.0 per cent of each category) who do not hold any such elective statutory except position, although they hold positions in semi-statutory or registered bodies, such as the schools, colleges, cooperatives, etc.

In the district, the positions of Manager and President, etc., in the Managing Committees of Government recognised schools and colleges are powerful positions.

46. See the Inventory of the Village Pradhans, Kisan Marg (Hindi), District Information Office, Basti, 1961.
Government sanctions financial grants to these institutions to subsidise the payment of teachers' salary, to meet the cost of building construction and repair and to purchase furniture, etc. Government also gives special grants for the support of Scheduled Caste students, who are supposed to get free books, clothing, scholarships, etc.

The holder of managerial position of such a school exercises influence upon both those who seek jobs in the school and those who seek admissions to study in such a school. The bleak employment situation in the country and the increasing number of villagers holding graduate degrees with a desire to seek employment near their own farm and family forces the educated rural youth to negotiate for employment. Generally, grounds other than the academic qualification of the candidate, decide the selection of a teacher in the village schools. The selected candidate, it is an open practice, signs for a salary which is usually for more than what he actually receives. Besides, he has to do a lot of household chores for the manager to keep him happy and in good humour, which is crucial to keep the job secure. The legal concept of job confirmation, tenure of job and salary scales are fictions among such institutions and do not apply to them.

Similarly, the seekers of education, the students, his parents and often his relatives too, have to remain under the general over-lordship of the local educational potentate.
Grants of freeships and scholarships to the students and awards of examination marks are generally the reflection of the wish of the potentate who exercises command over the teachers. It is not a rare spectacle in the Basti countryside to find a group of college teachers, holding Master's Degree in various disciplines to stand at attendance to a semi-educated, uncouth and arrogant President or Manager of a college.

By controlling the resources of education, one not only controls the teachers, the students and their families but also controls the government sanctioned cash grants. Most of these managers get money from both sides - from the teachers and students and from government grants. In addition, the local status of a person is generally estimated in terms of the number of schools managed by him in the district. Based on our field observations, we propose to highlight the manner in which the local elites resort to gain power by capturing and monopolising the educated system of the district.

*Basti district has three Degree Colleges, one at the District headquarters, owned by an ex-MLA, Mr. Sheo Harakha Upadhaya and the remaining two, one at Bansi and the other at Chandapar are managed and owned by the ex-rajas of Bansi and Shohratgarha. According to the data provided by the office of the District Inspector of Schools, Basti District has 24 Intermediate Colleges and 130 Junior Higher Secondary Schools. Number of such schools are on the increase.
The cases of elites occupying key positions* in the schools and other** registered bodies of the district by their types (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of elites</th>
<th>Types of Registered Bodies</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrenched elites (109)</td>
<td>68.14</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging elites (118)</td>
<td>31.85</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=135</td>
<td>N=6</td>
<td>N=141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison of the data contained in Table 17 with the data in Table 39 reveals that while some of the entrenched elites, 88.07 per cent out of their total of 109 of the district are members in the Parliament and State Assembly, they also, at the district level, tend to capture and retain their monopoly over the educational institutions. Lower elites, however, as compared to the higher ones, though stronger in numerical strength, have much fewer (only 30.3 per cent to their total of 118) similar positions under their control. The details about the relationship between various categories of position-holding elites who

*By "Key" position we mean to refer to the position of President, Manager or Secretary of the organisation.

**Other registered semi-statutory organisations six in all are Weavers' Cooperative at Maghar, Cane-Society and the Cooperative Federations of Basti town, etc. These organisations do not wield as far and wide influence on people as the educational institutions do.
occupy or do not occupy elective and non-elective positions are presented in Table 40.

Table - 40

Elective and non-elective position-holding elites by types (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of elites</th>
<th>Occupying elective</th>
<th>Only non-elective</th>
<th>Elective no position</th>
<th>Elective and non-elective</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. No.</td>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Entrenched elites (109)</td>
<td>73.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>48.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Emerging elites (118)</td>
<td>26.08</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>52.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in Table 40 highlight the general picture of the distribution of entrenched and emerging elites in various categories. Compared to the entrenched elites, the data suggest that a high percentage of emerging elites either occupy no position or occupy only elective position. Entrenched elites on the other hand occupy both categories of positions. Now if we compare the data of this table with those of the Table 38, we find that entrenched elites have captured almost all types of positional sources of power. Since high elective positions (X category) are limited and
since they could create positions for themselves they control
the key positions of non-elective nature of semi-statutory
bodies and organisations.

The general picture that emerges from the data is
that, generally elites do not involve themselves with
elective statutory positions such as village Pradhans,
Panchas, Sarpanchais, etc. Instead, they prefer to occupy
top district positions such as the chairmanship of the
Zila Parishad or occupy Assembly or Parliamentary seats.
The number of these positions, being limited (only 16 for
Assembly and three for the Parliament) and also on account
of their relative detachment from active politics, most of the
top elites prefer to consolidate their power by monopolising
the semi-statutory non-elective position. Such a detachment
from the active politics may also be their strategic
withdrawal from a situation in which they visualise little
success. The ethos and the style of the elites are
generally not in tune with the demands of modern politics.
They, therefore, prefer to expand their own local resources
of power at home in the district, rather than entering
into the election fray. It may be noted here that the top
most 15 elites who secured the maximum of reputational score -
generally the ex-rajais and the zamindars - do not hold any
elective position. They, by and large, manage and preside
over their own institutions and indirectly evolve a domain
of power in which they have autonomy and independence. Such
men of independence and power are a force to reckon with by political parties for their local success in the elections. These men of power continue to patronise the politicians, educated intelligentsia, religious saints and priests in the countryside.

Our data cast doubt on the substantive nature of elite studies which confine themselves to elected positions to the Panchayats, Zila Parishads, Municipal Corporations, etc. The attempt to link power with only elective formal positions and to disdainfully leave out all other types of positions in the society is a futile attempt towards the construction and presentation of social reality. For, the Basti data reveal that the powerful and the influential men of the countryside are not so frequently found around office-bound formal elective position as in semi-formal setting.

**Land Control as a Source of Power**

In east Uttar Pradesh, there is a popular folk-saying among the upper castes, especially among the Rajputs, that "Land belong to brave and powerful". The saying perhaps faithfully reflects the archaic stage of the Rajput colonizations of the region in the past. In the contemporary scene the situation is reverse bravery and power come from possession and ownership over large landholdings.
Neale faithfully echoes this reversion of the older folk-saying sets its meaning in tune with the current land and power relationship in the countryside.

Field data from Basti indicative of the changing structure of relationship between land and power and has also provided information on the exploitative agrarian practices perpetrated by the land-owning castes on the peasants and landless labourers. We have shown how control over land helps its owners to exercise control over people. Here, after making a few general observations on land as the source of power, we shall present and examine the data on their relationship.

In an agrarian community where the majority of population lives on agriculture and agricultural products, land assumes a singular importance. It determines the chemistry of power and domination: one who has largest land holding and the consequent source of produce exercises control over people who live on that produce. And when a


large number of people, in dire need for basic goods and services need a part of that produce or need to share in its source, there is no other equation of relationship in society. The only permissible equation is to get that part or share in the produce from the monopoliser by accepting his monopolisation. By manipulating produce and the sources of the produce, thus the monopoliser manipulates the people. Land, in its distributive system imbalance generates inevitably an inequitarian power structure in which the exercise of power by a few over many becomes the characteristic of social conditions.

Before we present the data pertaining to land, it is worthwhile to briefly describe the agrarian scene of Basti district as it existed during the first decade of the 20th century. For, this would broaden the context in which the data on elite and land relationship assumes significance. In doing so, we make some passing references to the agrarian situation of the colonial period. It will be done to illuminate the significance of the contemporary data on the subject under discussion.

During the beginning of the 20th century, the upper caste rajas and zamindars with just 14.4 per cent of population held almost two-thirds of the agricultural land in Basti.

It was this anomalous land structure which gave birth to various types of exploitative practices resorted to by the zamindars against the tenants. The latter mutely tolerated the oppression without resentment. In addition to the threats of eviction from land, excommunication from the village, forced free labour known as begar, there used to be an unending series of exploitative usages such as an Gorahi (exaction from the tenants for the purchase of horse), Hathiahu (for elephant), Pujabi (exaction from the tenants for religious rituals), Biahu (exaction for financing marriage), Bhalmaanahat (exaction for good conduct), etc. These exactions used to drain out the last drop of agricultural surplus that the tenant could save after paying the regular rent to the zamindar. The tenants used to be under the total grip of the zamindars. It was during the 1930's that the local leaders of the Indian National Congress identified their common enemies - the zamindars - and explained to them the reasons for their miserable conditions. And it was these anti-raj, anti-zamindar-talukdar and anti-British forces which led the peasant upsurge which resulted in murders of the zamindars and the movement of the Nijai-Bol we mentioned earlier. The abolition of zamindari system in 1952 and the fixation of ceilings on land holding in 1954, epitomised the 'peasant-revolution' of the National Congress in Uttar Pradesh. But there hardly existed any surplus land and therefore the promise to give land to 'the man behind the plough' or 'land to the tiller of the land' could not be
fulfilled. The land situation obtaining in 1948, prior to the abolition of zamindari was such that only 3 per cent of big land holders could release some marginal land for the redistribution. The released land was 1,07,453 acres. Land required to convert uneconomic land holdings into economic one was 46,46,593 acres. There was, therefore, no logical relation between the avowed aims of the Abolition of Zamindari and the Fixation of Ceiling on land-holding, especially if its aim was to release the surplus land in favour of the cultivating peasants and the landless from its monopolisers.

A glance at the data presented in Table 41 gives the comparative picture of the land holdings as they existed just before the implementation of Zamindari Abolition Act in 1952, Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holding Act in 1954 and their impact on land distribution in 1961.

The census data of 1961 suggest a general decline in the number of cultivators with ten or more acres of land. What the census data does not reveal is the fact of the actual release of surplus land from the holders of excess


land in terms of the ceiling limit; or is that the decline in the size of land holdings as shown by the Census figures exist only on papers and documents? Large land-holdings exists under such categories as orchards, pasture land for dairies, cooperative farms or in the name of trusts and institutions but actually owned and controlled by individual landlords. Besides, there was large scale sale of excess land carried out by large land holders.

Table - 41

The changes in the number of cultivators having different sizes of landholdings between 1951 and 1961 in Basti Distt.

<p>| Size of land- | No.of No.of | Changes in the number |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>holdings</th>
<th>cultivators</th>
<th>cultivators</th>
<th>of cultivators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Above 100 acres</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 50 to 100 acres</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 25 to 50 acres</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>-160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 20 to 25 acres</td>
<td>10177</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>-9383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 15 to 20 acres</td>
<td>2447</td>
<td>1797</td>
<td>-650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 10 to 15 acres</td>
<td>5741</td>
<td>4891</td>
<td>-850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 5 to 10 acres</td>
<td>12458</td>
<td>17039</td>
<td>+4581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 1 to 5 acres</td>
<td>45227</td>
<td>65690</td>
<td>+21393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Below 1 acre</td>
<td>64947</td>
<td>54258</td>
<td>-10689</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. Often resort to legal partition among the members of Hindu joint family, donation of land in the name of schools, temples etc. legally reduces the size of holding. But actually, it does not. In case of donation to institutions, the donator appoints himself as the Chief of the institution. Methods used by the holders of large holdings to conceal their size are discussed in Rajendra Singh, 1974, op.cit., p.54.

53. Ibid, p.54.
But we also note a decline in the number of cultivators with one or less acre of land. The decline of this category of cultivators along with those with ten acres or more of land is generally related to the process of the rise of a conservative rich caste peasantry in the countryside. Castes such as Ahirs, Kurmis and Muraos, etc. who had obtained secure land tenure during the colonial period developed potential to purchase the excess land sold by large land holders under the threat of Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holding Act of 1954. On ground of various cultural considerations, the upper caste ex-zamindars preferred these caste peasants to other groups and sold their land to them at even nominal price. The result was the general rise of the caste peasant as a rural segment. These rich Ahirs and Kurmis are respectfully referred to as Chowdharys and Mahtons in the countryside.

These Kurmis and Ahirs who used to be exploited by the ex-zamindar upper castes during the colonial and pre-zamindari abolition period are now surpassing their erstwhile masters in the exploitation of landless and marginal cultivators, who have small land holdings of an

54. About the purchasing potential of the caste peasant, see, Rajendra Singh, 1974, p.55.

55. For these considerations, see Rajendra Singh, 1982, op. cit., pp.76-77.
acre or less and live generally on wage earning. They belong more frequently to the category of ex-untouchable castes and are driven to sell their land to the chowdharys and mahons by the sheer harshness of their continuing abject-life-situations. The decline of their number is, therefore, an index of the persistence of contradictions in the structure of the contemporary agrarian society.

In view of the persistence of agrarian contradictions in Uttar Pradesh, the Government of Uttar Pradesh appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Mangal Deo Visharad in 1972. The Committee members visited various districts of Uttar Pradesh, including Basti to secure on-the-spot information on the existence of large land holdings beyond the ceiling limits in Uttar Pradesh. The members spent just two days, i.e., 26th and 28th December, 1972 in the Basti township and sought information from the town informers about the existence of large land holders. It is no wonder that the members of the Committee could identify just names of two ex-rajais as the holders of land beyond the ceiling limits. By pointing out the names of two ex-rajais as the only holders of surplus land in the district, the Committee legitimised the concealment of large land holdings by other ex-zamindars.


57. Ibid, pp.105-113.

58. Ibid, p.133.
and ex-rajas of the district. Incidentally, the Chairman of the Committee was a scheduled caste member of the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh.

Now coming to the sample elites, we find, without any exception, all of them own land either in the form of agricultural land or orchards or both. A majority of them have traditionally been landowners; others including the professionals such as medical practitioners, lawyers and full-time political workers, have acquired land in course of their ascendancy to power in the district. In fact, acquisition of more and more land is the ultimate measure of stable economic prosperity of a person. Data on land about the types of elites and the size of their landholdings is shown in Table 42.

Table - 42

Size of land-holdings (in acres) by types of elites (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of elites (in percentage)</th>
<th>Large land holdings (in acres)</th>
<th>Small land holdings (in acres)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entrenched elites (109)</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging elites (118)</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=38</td>
<td>N=37</td>
<td>N=52</td>
<td>N=22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=46</td>
<td>N=46</td>
<td>N=227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Field experiences suggest that there was a tendency among the respondents, for obvious reasons, to conceal the actual size of the landholdings. And it does not take much time to convert orchard into a farm and vice versa. But these conversions materially affect the legal concept of the size of landholding and its tenure. Despite all the legal complications involved in the fixation of landholding size, the data contained in Table 21 suggest the existence of large land holdings in cases of entrenched elites and small landholdings in cases of the emerging elites.* The sub-division of the two major categories of holdings, namely, the large and small sized holdings by the two types of elites not only reveal the continuing territorial power of rural elites in the countryside but also reflect on the failure of government appointed land system inquiry committees such as Bhumi Yavostha Janch Samiti of 1972-74 of Uttar Pradesh which could not identify more than two ex-rajias as the holders of excess land beyond ceiling limits.

* In addition, at least 51 elites of Basti district own large areas of land in the territory of Nepal whose borders run contiguously in Basti district with India. Border between the two countries being open and culturally, socially and linguistically population of Basti and Tarai Nepal being homogeneous to the extent that there are cross country marriages, elites of Basti not only exercise influence on the Indian (Basti) peasantry, but also dominate over the Nepalese peasantry. Our data on land and elite, excludes land owned in Nepal by the elites of Basti.

The nexus between the caste status of elites and the sizes of their landholding yields crucial insight: that there exists an overlap of caste hierarchy with economic hierarchy as reflected in the size of landholdings is clear. The information contained in the Table 43 highlights the said overlap. While Rajputs and Brahmans continue to own large holdings, there are a few new-rich Kumis and Ahirs Chowdharis who also have emerged as big farmers. Influential families of Muslims, some of them, are enjoying the offices of political officers and/or professionals too and hold large farms. But none excels the Rajputs in the district with regard to landholding. However, the emergence of ex-tenant

Table - 43

The nexus between caste status of the elites and the sizes of landholdings (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Caste status of elites</th>
<th>Large landholdings</th>
<th>Small landholdings</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Brahmans</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Rajputs</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=127</td>
<td>N=100</td>
<td>N=227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as a landowning influential category is indicative of changes in the economic structure of Basti. The data contained in the Table 44 suggests these changes.
The past tenurial status of the elite, as the data in Table 44 indicate by large, corresponds to the caste status of the elites. With one exception, all the Rajputs and Brahmins landowners are also ex-zamindars. And all others belong to the ex-tenant positions. One of the elites in the extenant category also had zamindari tenure. But with a few exceptions, such as the case with Kazi Addil Abbasi from the Muslim community, all the non-upper caste usually belong to the ex-tenant category.

The relationship between landholding sizes with the caste status, and post tenurial positions highlight two major

* In some of the cases elites held land under both the tenencies, i.e. ex-zamindari as well as ex-tenancy. His tenurial status is here determined by the larger area held under the specific tenure.

** This category includes 12 cases of Sadhus and Mahants who own land under ex-tenant tenure.
points: first, upper-caste elites own and exercise control over larger landholdings. Conversely elites from lower caste including the Muslims, although owned land, usually had small landholdings. Thus, elite status and the ownership of land seems to have a direct correlation with each other. Second, land being the major source of subsistence, it enables its owner to dominate over those who have none or little of land.

CULTURAL AND SYMBOLIC SOURCES OF POWER AND DOMINATION

Possession, control and manipulation of information, like any other scarce commodity has always been a source of power in human society. In the modern rural setting of east Uttar Pradesh, like other parts of rural India, for the last three decades there has been drastic changes in the legal structure pertaining to property, especially land, to family and to the rules of inheritance. And of late there has been (and is) greater emphasis on the introduction of not only new agricultural technology, improved varieties of seeds, manures, machines and new markets for sale and purchase but also the innovation of votes and elections from below, for the positions of village Pradhans to Parliament. It is very clear that in this situation one who has the information exercises influences upon those who lack it.
While radios and transistors are used by the rural folk for entertainment, the same is used for information by the rural elites. Basti elites have a habit of cross-checking information by listening both, to the information given by the All India Radio (AIR) as well as by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). As much as 95 per cent of the elites subscribe to and read Hindi (75 per cent) and English (25 per cent) dailies. *Times of India, Hindustan Times, Statesman, National Herald* and *Pioneer* are the English dailies subscribed by the elites. *Aaj*, a Hindi daily from Banaras, is also read by the elites. Besides, they also subscribe to various Hindi periodicals.

Most of the entrenched elites (81 per cent) have knowledge about agrarian laws, such as, those pertaining to landholdings, ceilings, land transfers, sales, etc. They also know the methods and techniques of circumventing these laws. Emerging elites to a lesser degree (63 per cent) also have information about the said matters. Laws relating to inheritance of property, marriage, divorce, adoptions, etc., are generally known to all the elites.

Similarly, all of them know the laws and statutes pertaining to various levels of elections. As much as 91 per cent of the elites are aware of the *Fundamental Rights* of Indian citizens guaranteed by the *Constitution*. Their capacity to get more information, as compared to the layman,
is result of (a) their education, (b) high social and economic status, and (c) broad based social contacts.

It is not unusual to find Basti elite knowing not only the district officers by their names, caste, state of domicile, etc., but also their previous records. Visits by the elites to district headquarters were too frequent to be estimated. However, their visits to Lucknow, the capital city of the State of Uttar Pradesh and Delhi, the Union Capital, have varied by the types of elites. Entrenched elites visit Delhi at least once in a year. But their visit to Lucknow and Banaras, especially the former, is frequent. Emerging elites, at least 85 per cent of them, have visited Delhi twice in their lifetime and have frequently gone to Lucknow. Some of the entrenched elites have purchased flats at Delhi and Lucknow and their children study in these cities.

Being big land owners, and also on account of their being in touch with the urban centres, they keep on introducing improved techniques of farming. Most of these elites visited Delhi and Lucknow not only for domestic purposes such as buying modern gadgets for their household, but also to get political favours and to procure modern agricultural inputs from Agricultural Research Institutes located at Delhi and Lucknow.
These influentials being repositories of varieties of information attract large number of peasants who seek their advice and who obey their orders.

**Rural Culture and the Symbols of Elite Power**

Information drawn from the interview of the elites and from the close observation of the peasants and their inter-relations suggest the existence of a specific form of culture in the countryside of east Uttar Pradesh. We refer to it as *Agrarian culture*. By agrarian culture we mean an organised system of core and general values centring around the axis of land and agriculture. Historically, agrarian culture overlapped with the historicity of agrarian social structure and these two conceptual categories (of analysis) stand in determinate relationship with each other. We assume their historical existence and recognise their mutual overlap with each other. Agrarian culture, as conceptualized here, is used as east Uttar Pradesh region specific concept of the general pan-Indian culture. Agrarian culture, as a working concept, is used here as a specific tool to describe not so much the culture of the peasant as an autonomous category, instead, we intend to describe the culture of lords and hope that with the analysis of this culture we would be able to understand the culture of the peasants. The relation between the two reflect the nexus of power and domination.
Historically, during the pre-colonial period and to a great extent in the colonial period rajas and zamindars in Uttar Pradesh in general and in Basti district in particular used to be known and were generally referred to by the tracts of the land, locally known as raja (estate). The raja was raised above the raja and the subject population used to treat such a raja as an objective emotive category. The raja was anthropomorphised. Each one lived, worked, toiled, fought and suffered for the name of such raja, as Samet raja, Suraj Bansi raja, Gautam raja and Kalhansa raja. The sub-divisions in each raja tract divided the population into clearly demarcated pockets of distinctive usages, myths*, legends and cultural practices. This in turn not only strengthened the objective concept of various rajas as feudal domains by differentiating one raja from the other, but also fused the heterogeneous population into a single body-social of the raja of which the raja was the top watchdog and also the symbol of power, prestige, and honour.

* I am recording here for illustration, two myths, one pertaining to the loyalty of a lower caste- Kurmi towards the Samet Raja of Bansi and, the other of anger of a Brahman towards the Kalhansa raja of Khurasa in Gonda district, the fugitive family of which ruled over a tract of land in Basti district. Kalhansa lineage of Basti district belong to the main family of Khurasa.

Myth No.1
Once upon a time the raja of Bansi, went out on his horse for a hunt in the summer month strayed into a dense jungle of Tarai region of his raja. He was thirsty and was in dire need of water. The raja started realising his imminent

contd.
If the *raja* victimised, exploited, tortured and humiliated the peasants, he did so in the name of the *raja*. And if the peasant remained quiescent, passive, silent and unorganised and accepted the sufferings and exploitations at the hands of the *raja*, he did so to raise up the *savak* (countenance) of the *raja*. The *raja* thus was not just a tract.

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Myth No.1 contd. . . .

Death. He felt that the search of water was futile and that he was going to die. He noticed a peasant sleeping in the open field under the summer sun at noon and a cobra standing with a spread hood providing a shadow on his face against the scorching sun. The *raja* witnessed the unusual spectacle and approached the sleeping peasant for help. The snake silently slithered away. The peasant woke up and took the *raja* to his nearby hut and served him with water, milk and bread. In turn the *raja* bestowed upon the peasant 60 villages as *Birt* (grant) and the recipient is the only *Kurmi* caste *Zamindar* - known as *Chowdhary of Dekahari* in Basti district.

Myth No.2

Achal Singh, the founder of Kalhana*sa* raj of Khurasa in Gonda district, forcibly married the daughter of Ratan Pandey - a Brahman-priest. The Brahman resisted the marriage and tried to get back the daughter. The *Raja* refused. The Brahman sat on *dharma* (passive resistance by refusing intake of food and water) and subsequently died. The night of his death was followed by the flooding by Sarju river leading to a deluge of the capital of the *Raja*. Khurasa sank into a lake from which only few could escape. A pregnant wife of the *Raja* escaped and gave birth to a son from whom the subsequent progeny, the Kalhana*sa* raj emerged in Gonda and Basti districts. Ratan Pandey, since then has become a family deity of Kalhanas and is worshipped for fear of his wrath. An angry Brahman even today threatens a Kalhana by making reference to the name of Ratan Pandey.
of forest, fields and farms but a "being", a menacingly despotic "being", which played a partisan trick on the one hand favouring the rajas and zamindars and on the other hand disfavouring the cultivating peasants. In the name of honour of the rai, the rajas and zamindars drew themselves tremendous power to inflict various types of exploitative exactions upon the peasants. And the peasants, in the name of the same symbol and honour, suffered the power of the former. Such a concept of rai was the reservoir of power for the raja. The rai offered real, tangible and objective power to the landlord. But in the case of peasants, it offered only subjective justifications for and rationalization of concrete, real and objective bodily tribulations and sufferings. Marx hinted at the autonomy of land in the feudal system. What Marx could not visualise was the fact that the autonomous conception of land is linked with a simultaneous birth of corresponding pattern of culture, in our case, the rural culture, which not only provides a plank for this autonomy of land to stand on but also furnishes the constant of nourishments by producing usages, folklore, myths and symbol which reinforce the existence of land as "being".

60. Karl Marx writes, "The domination of land as an alien power over men is already inherent in the feudal landed property. The serf is the adjunct of the lord. Likewise, the lord of an entailed estate, the first born son belongs to the land. It inherits him." He further writes, "The estate is individualised with its lord; it has his rank, is baronial or ducal with him, has his privileges, his jurisdictions, his political positions, etc. It appears as the inorganic body of its lord." See, his Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p.61.
The power which emerges from this agrarian culture, I have detailed elsewhere around the theme, culture of inequality. The culture of inequality, in our scheme of analysis, is a specific expression of the agrarian culture in general and it is embedded in its social structure. Before we try to show the way these two categories of social realities join each other in heaping power and authority on one, that is the minority section and, depriving the majority of the countryside, let us briefly describe the outline of this social structure.

Agrarian Social Structure

Traditionally, the agrarian social structure corresponded to the structure of land relationship. The allocation of individuals and groups into the status hierarchy of caste tended to overlap upon the economic aspects of class hierarchy. Being essentially based upon the concept of inherited inequalities, caste as an institution not only gave rise to great inequalities of power and privileges, purity and pollution, but went one step ahead in giving rise to a greater inequality in the distribution of material resources. Upper, middle, lower and exterior caste groups continue to parallel to high, middle, lower economic groups with almost no access to control over land and water resources.

The overlap of status-based caste hierarchy upon the hierarchy of distribution of land continues to characterise the current agrarian social structure. Such a structure of relationship resulted in various types of agrarian exploitative practices in varying frequency and intensity which we discussed earlier in (Chapter II) which the contemporary rural elites continue to resort to in their interests. The basic sources of power of elites, thus tend to lie in their capacity to manoeuvre the traditional hierarchy and to keep inequalitarian structure intact effectively in their favour. It is their ability that even at the face of legal odds* and local sporadic peasant mobilizations and resentments, they have been able to successfully retain their ownership and control over relatively larger chunks of land. Our data suggest that these larger landholdings belong to upper castes who are most numerous in our elite sample. Seemingly radical agrarian reforms and democratization of power by such institutional innovations as the institutions of statutory Panchayats and Zila Parishads, tend to stand annulled in their fundamental objectives: to establish and strengthen equalitarian social structure. Instead, these are becoming new weapons in the hands of the powerful to guard their traditional sources of power and pelf. There is a

*My reference is to Abolition of Zamindari land and the fixations of ceiling on land holdings.

tragic coalescence between traditions of power arising out of caste hierarchy and the hierarchy of land distribution. The elite is the convergent point, manipulating the overlap of both the hierarchies to keep themselves up and above the lay rural peasant.

Elites Self-Perceptions of the Sources of their Power

Before we summarise the main points about our data on the nature and sources of elite power, let us analyse their own perception in this regard. The information presented in Table 49 suggest both, the continuities of the traditional foci of power as well as the emerging strains and tensions within the contemporary social structure. Traditionally, social and cultural structures have been yielding disproportionate benefits to the elite groups. Ascriptive determinants of power, such as the phenomenon of birth in upper caste and the consequent bestowal of privileges, such as the Savak (countenance) of a noble blood, ritual purity, alleged moral excellence, physical and intellectual prowess, etc. and above all, the land and the material prosperity, seem to persist tenaciously in the north Indian countryside.

The data suggest that elites of the three caste categories excluding Brahmans find possession of large landed property as the main source of their power. Exclusiveness, as the chief attribute of property which separates things "mine"
Table - 45

The self-perception* of elites about the sources of their power by caste statuses in contemporary context (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Castes and groups</th>
<th>Upper caste status</th>
<th>Large landed property</th>
<th>Use of force and coercion</th>
<th>Total elites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Brahmans</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Rajputs</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Other castes and groups</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=52 N=113 N=22 N=40 N=227

from the things *thine* tends to assume the crudest type of utilitarian/material power, controlling the very source of the supply of subsistence to the dependent population. Particularly since land as the mean of subsistence in the countryside is scarce. And the one who commands this scarce commodity, commands the population living upon it. Brahmans rely for their source of power, the data indicate, more on their top ritual status and less on economic and other sources, Rajputs seek power more from their possession of land, and from the exercise of muscle power over others than from holding positions of power. It was indeed the Rajput's muscle power which had in past led

*Single choice by single respondent.*
led to the colonization of this region, then only a forest clad swampy tract. Conquest over land and people, as we have noted earlier, used to constitute the cultural ethos of the Rajput castes. Their lust for land and power and use of coercion even in the contemporary phase of history reflects the tardy pace of social change in north India.

While social changes have not been radical, they have, however, been effective enough to initiate an opening in the agrarian social structure for the arrival of Hindu castes peasantry on the power scene of the countryside. A large number of them have now secured land almost at par with the upper castes and have started wielding power and coercion upon the majority of the poorer section of their own ex-tenant segments and strata. Next to the Rajputs, it is these people who matter in the possession of land and in the exercise of force. The traditionally powerful caste retain their land and power and the ascendent caste is gradually capturing power. Loci of power for both is land.

Data on the perceived sources of power by the types of elites reflect almost similar pattern of responses as those we described above. Possession of large landholding is the predominant source of power for entrenched as well as for the emerging elites. Information on the use of force and coercion as the source of power is only indicative of a tendency.
This tendency is only suggestive and not its affirmation at a large scale. What is being affirmed is the persistence of power in the hands of a few, who used to conserve and accumulate it in the name of upper caste status in the hierarchical structure of the traditional society, and are now doing the same with the help of material resources, such as large holding of land which provides means of subsistence for the majority of the rural population. This persistence as noted above, seems to be precariously maintained.

The symptomatic tendency for the use of coercion and force is either to protect and insure the persistence of the past power or is used rarely for the purpose of chopping it down in the favour of a new social order in the countryside.

A couple of interesting conclusions can be summarised from the above analysis of our data which reveal the persistence and change of sources of power in the countryside. Some conceptual points are made below:

**Power and Permanence**

An enduring social and cultural structure of an agrarian society without a revolutionary past or without a breakdown of its continuing traditions, as is the case with East Uttar Pradesh countryside, tends to ensure the perpetuation of the sources of power. Relative permanence of social structure and the persistence of its cultural traditions accord similar
endurance and permanance to the traditional sources of power. The historicity of the monopolization of power and of the capacity to exercise influence and domination of one over the others, generally determine the contemporary sources of power.

In addition, the upper caste people were elevated to the top of the traditional Hindu social order by the religious sanctions of Hindu cultural traditions. This was primarily because they were the first to conquer these tracts of East Uttar Pradesh region and enslaved the primitive population to establish Rajput principalities and domions of power. Furthermore, they were also the ones who came to be celebrated as Darbaris, occupied judicial positions, were raised up as a special class of people with special privileges by the British during the colonial period. The continuing historicity of the upper caste people as the local luminaries, influentials and dominants, indeed accorded them (differential) requisite opportunity to transform their power into the systems of authority. Thus, the power drawn from the historically generalised sources tends to have a longer tenure.

Conversely, power drawn from such exclusive modern democratic sources, such as from contemporary elective positions of the Membership to the Parliament, to State Assemblies and to other local bodies, on account of the very nature of the national-legal norms governing them, tend to be fluctuating, temporary and less enduring sources of power. They are, therefore, less
capable of instilling acceptability among the rural folk. Their temporality and unpredictability in the light of the fact that positions are subject to the mandate of the voters which are, again fluctuating and temporary, go a great length to reduce their possibility of being transformed into a system of stable authority. Constant fear of eclipse of power at the next election, of compulsions to humour up the voters to seek their mandates, reduce such power to dependent status of conditional nature. They lack autonomy and, there are instances wherein some of the holders of the positions of power are now mere shadows of traditional elites with independent source of power anchored on land and caste.

Persistence of Land Control Structure and the Persistence of Power

The fact of relative permanence of power is maintained by the persistence of land control structure. In Uttar Pradesh agrarian social structure, which has traditional continuity, the sources of power tend to lie more in the normative structure of society and in the structure of its system of land control. These two crucial foci of power, our preceding data suggest, have been, and still are, an extending chain and their historical nexus of overlaps are yet to be broken. Major agrarian reforms, democratic decentralization of power, etc. did bring about significant changes in the countryside. But for the few, the powerful traditional rural elites who already had
a long history of their rulership over the majority: the ex-subjects population of the rajas and zamindars, continue to exist, basically unaltered. The legal and political innovations of Independent India could not change radically the socio-cultural and land ownership structures of the countryside. The system of caste hierarchy and the corresponding and overlapping system of land ownership hierarchy continue to persist. And the past maliks of that system continue to master the system even at present.

Highlighting the importance of land ownership as one of the most dependable and enduring source of power in the countryside, one of the respondents said, "Like the transient youthful charm of a harlot who suffers a total erosion of her physical attraction at the hand of age, the MP's, the MLA's etc. have only seasonal power which fades out unrecognisably after the person concerned looses the election."

He went on to state that the power of a politician and the power of a prostitute, everybody (hinting at the people sitting beside us) knows, is like a flood, it covers and jolts people for a few days and then disappears. Land on the other hand is immovable, unstealable and always yielding power to its owners.

And perhaps on account of these considerations, the politicians, professionals (Mukhtars, Vakeels, doctors and teachers) and even men of trade, as soon as they attain
positions of power or have an accumulation of economic capital, tend to purchase agricultural farms. In Basti, a number of MPs and MLAs who emerged as political leaders and who had no or little land during the colonial period, have after their political fall become farm holders which they purchased from the traditional zamindars through fair or foul means.

It is essentially a constant dread that they will suffer an erosion of power at the next election which prompt the politician to transform transient sources of power into relatively permanent one. This dread prompt them to use their political power to procure large agricultural farms. And when a politician who used to pour fire against the zamindars before the mid-fifties mind retires to his farm he becomes the closest ally of the ex-zamindars. And by this process these local politicians enhance the traditional prestige and power of the traditional zamindars. If the ownership of land in a society becomes the ultimate mainstay for a respectful living, then those who have most of it secure maximum of respect from the peasants and people. And this is the present situation in Basti. People like Vakeels, Mukhtars and other committed Congress Party workers who rose to become MPs and MLAs and who had initiated the process leading to the Abolition of Zamindari system in Uttar Pradesh in 1952, instead of becoming the vanguard of a new agrarian society, fell down as second class zamindars of the
locality. Thus a force which could have been a formidable agent of agrarian change went to lend a formidable support to the age-old traditional agrarian practices of the East Uttar Pradesh countryside.

The data on the social profile of elites and on the sources of their power suggest that the foci of the traditional sources of power were located around large landholdings, upper caste status, historicity of rulership and domination. These were products of the basic social conditions of feudal-colonial situations of north Indian countryside. A considerable number of contemporary entrenched elites, as our data reveal, still draw their status, power and prestige from the above feudal-colonial sources. Whereas the emerging elites generally lacking in one or another traditional attributes of power perceive their power as transitory and ephemeral, derived as it is through electoral and competitive process. Consequently, they seek to transform their transient power positions into stable and enduring ones by attempts to acquire traditional sources of power in the form of wealth, land and prestige. There is a tendency among most emerging elites to purchase large farms and properties in order to identify themselves with entrenched elites and also in order to consolidate their positions.

At a conceptual level, this clearly reflects that traditional, particularised and ascriptive sources of power
such as upper-caste status, historicity of rulership, economic prosperity and large land-holdings persist to constitute significant sources of power for the contemporary elites. This foci, as we have suggested earlier, emanated from the feudal-colonial social situations of the past.

On the other hand, a large number of emerging contemporary elites derive their power from such modern foci of the sources of power, as electoral successes and holding of powerful positions or offices. These are achievement-oriented non-ascriptive sources of accrual of statuses. The emerging elite category, it may be recalled, is constituted of significant number of non-upper caste rural influentials who arrived on the power scene especially during the post-independence period. The analysis of Basti data suggests that the traditional foci of power still persists as a long-term, stable and enduring sources of power. Entrenched elites being anchored on the traditional sources of power are, therefore, more stable and are historically perpetuative category of rural power holders.

The emerging elites, instead of attacking at the traditional foci of the sources of power favourable to shaping an equalitarian society, suffer miserably from an urge to convert their power derived from modern sources with secure traditional forms. At a social structural level, what we find is that modern bases of power, instead of eroding and displacing
the traditional structures are in essence and in practice re-inforcing them. But the worst outcome of this atavistic social process is that the basic feudal-colonial set of social situation continues to persist. Its persistence in the contemporary rural context of East Uttar Pradesh is being vigourated and energised by the forces of Indian modernity.

It is irony of the history that the British who tried initially in 1840 to create a class of peasant proprietors at the cost of the age-old ruling chiefs, ultimately after the revolt of 1857 became themselves the protectors of the chiefs. And similarly the National Congress leaders, who mobilised the peasants against the British and the rajas and zamindars, have ultimately become an appendage of the local zamindar chiefs and are seen emulating their style.