CHAPTER 3:

Re-configuration of Power: Impact of the Indo-Pak Nuclear Tests

This chapter will take further the case of transformation of the complex in South Asia. The first major task required and which this chapter will fulfill is to map the background of India-Pakistan relations. This will involve going back to examine the entire period since de-colonisation. And in our efforts to focus on the crucial issues, we will be using Buzan’s scheme as our markers. In this process, some periods of the past will get more attention than others. The four major crises would be important markers and evidence of the durable transformation of power equations in the sub-continent. The point is to discern the shifts in pattern of hostility and distribution of power between India and Pakistan. This follows partially from the descriptive RSCT that organizes regional security in an empirical manner and more specifically tells us where to look.

In this chapter we will examine two of the four (individual-national-regional-global) levels of analysis that the RSCT postulates (Buzan 2003: 51). Therefore, the first is to analyze, domestically generated vulnerabilities (stability of domestic order and correspondence between state and nation) (Buzan 1991). The specific vulnerability of a state defines the kind of security fears it has (Waever 1989) and sometimes makes another state or group of states a structural threat even if it or they have no hostile intentions. The second level we examine is state-to-state relation(s), this constituting the region.

The Second World War brought about momentous changes in the world and set about a chain of events on the Asian landmass. The wave of decolonisation gave rise to many new states and partition of the British India Empire led to creation of Pakistan in 1947. Many of these newly independent states were truncated and moved to recover traditional areas of influence into their modern territorial incarnation. In addition some of these new divisions were colonial constructions with little
consideration to their historical, geographical, or for that matter, their cultural contexts. The colonial empire in India had held sway over the entire sub-continent (i.e. from the Khyber Pass on the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier to Burma). The fall of this erstwhile British Empire divided this natural geo-political region into two major states with a congenital conflictual relationship that hovers like a spectre on the Indian subcontinent (See Map 3.1).

At the global level, the cold war had divided global politics into two blocs, the US-led Western bloc separated from the Soviet-led communist countries in Eastern Europe by the proverbial iron curtain and in Asia, the bamboo curtain. The United States employed regional military pacts to encircle the communist countries by setting up North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Europe, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in West Asia and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Southeast Asia. Pakistan was part of two of these United States led pacts, the CENTO and SEATO. By the late 1950’s, Sino-Soviet relations were plummeting and the break finally occurred after the river Ussuri crisis in 1969.

The newly de-colonized Afro-Asian states made up a third group, over lapping with the cold war blocs, better known as the Non-Alignment Movement or the NAM led by Asian leaders, notably Nehru. The NAM was not very effective but at times this mass of newly emergent Asian and African nations managed to hold attention and carry their weight on a significant number of third world issues. The NAM states participated in Afro-Asian conferences in the early 1950’s to interact with each other and find a way to maneuver amidst the bitter cold war conflict. The PRC was an important participant at the Afro-Asian conferences and this third front was a significant part of the Chinese strategy to open up its communication lines independent of the Soviet Union. It was at the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in 1955 that the story of the Sino-Pakistan entente is usually begun. Thus, this was the larger global scenario of the times, when the cold war held sway over the new states that had their own legitimacy issues at home as well as pressures operating from without.
Source:
http://www.randmcnally.com/rmc/EdPub/action/viewLargerMapImage.do?geoEntityType=Country&geoEntityName=India
Regional Order in South Asia: India Dominant?

South Asia can be historically seen as a contiguous civilizational area, bounded on the south by the seas and in the North by the Himalayas. The eastern and the western boundaries of the region can be found in the inhospitable Karakoram and the Hindu Kush ranges in the west and the tropical forests and the Arakan Yomas in the east. The region gained unity and legitimacy over centuries through the various empires in South Asia demarcating its geographic and civilisational uniqueness. The British Colonial Empire (BCE) in India was probably the most hegemonic and successful in bringing this vast swathe of land under a single sovereign space, either directly or through other measures.

The RSCT believes that India as the successor state of the Mauryas, Mughals and also the British is the dominant power in South Asia (Buzan 2003: 102). For long it was held that South Asia was expected to be India hegemonic and that the challenge from Pakistan would be swept aside with time. During the cold war years and importantly prior to the India-Pakistan nuclear tests, South Asia is called a bi-polar region and it was predicted that after the fading away of the Pakistan-resistance, India would be the preponderant power (Buzan 2003: 104). However, this thesis holds that the nuclearization of India and Pakistan has effectively frozen the distribution of power in the South Asian security complex.

India’s defense policy and strategic vision since independence, has been tied to the legacy of the British Empire in India (Kavic 1965). However, there were remarkable spatial differences in the post-partition Indian state and the BCE and for that matter in South Asia. The strategic unity that the British gave to the sub-continent was broken in the East (East Pakistan and later Bangladesh and also Myanmar) and the West (Pakistan). Secondly, the ancient Chinese empire found its feet and by the early 1950’s was knocking on the doors of Tibet. These two factors are most crucial to understanding the challenges to the defense of India in the post-WW II geo-political world. With the Chinese integration of Tibet, the strategic insulation of South Asia from China had changed forever (Nayar and Paul 2003: 144-152). Despite these differences with the BCE, India is the largest power in South Asia in terms of size, population and resources. India is also bigger than the rest of the South Asian states.
combined together. Moreover, until Afghanistan joined SAARC, the other South Asian states did not have common boundaries with each other and India borders all the states in the region. Thus, apart from the sheer size, such geographic constraint makes India the most important state in the sub-continent.

In any region, the domination by a single power while expected to give rise to balancers, is advantageous if the single state can impose its will on the rest and rein in the challenger. Thus, while not the most politically correct path, in an anarchist International system; this is the one of the most stable of all regional order, the other is a bipolar system when two contending states check and balance each other. The dominating state can impose its ideology and identity on the region and protect it from internal disturbances as well as external intervention. This controlling power can provide the ideational as well as physical infrastructure for the region to manage itself and concentrate on economic development. The exercise of control by such a power helps it provide public goods such as security, a better commercial regime and infrastructure, the region benefits from such a role and the rest of the states can free ride on the regional power. A better picture is available if we try to imagine the situation in South Asia without the bickering India-Pakistan relations, which has frozen the region into patterns of conflictual cycles and socio-economic remedies die a natural death at the SAARC summits. The importance of a regional order in an anarchic, self-help world cannot be underestimated, especially so in an era where regional forces have been ascendant since the end of the cold war (Ayoob 2001: 127; Lake and Morgan 1997).

The aspiration of great power status has been the belief of the Indian political elites since the colonial era (Cohen 2001: 34-35). The certainty drew from various national attributes, among them geo-political status, hegemonic presence in South Asia, the perception of its potential economic and military capabilities and civilizational ethos. Great power status is India’s ‘destiny’. With such aspirations, India has in the last fifty years managed to be an emerging power, though still, a minor player in the world order with substantive influence in certain sectors while lagging behind in others. But what has been remarkable is India’s efforts to protect its influence in South Asia. In the past half a century, India has been obsessed with security concerns within the region and especially so in the smaller states like Nepal,
Bhutan, Sri Lanka. Indian influence in the domestic politics as well as foreign relations of these smaller states has been crucial factors in the internal configuration of power. In the path towards the elusive great power status, it is very important that India manage the neighborhood towards its ends and secure the region for itself or alternatively secure itself in the region.

As elaborated in the previous chapter, realism tells us that Regional Order can be maintained in two ways (Ayoob 2001: 126). Either we have a single dominating power that acts as the security manager for the entire region and draws legitimacy by providing public goods for the other members of the system. This pivotal or the pre-eminent power has hegemonic or managerial aspirations and provides coherence to the system by arranging the security concern of the region around its ambition and capabilities. The second path to regional order stems from equal powers contending with each other to maintain stability by checking each other's ambition.

**India-Pakistan: Power Configuration and Patterns of Relations**

Most writings on Pakistan embark with the problematisation of the nation-state. It is interesting to sample some of these opinions below:

The idea that Partition could have been avoided has led some observers to think of Pakistan as an artificial construction (Jaffrelot 2000: 2).

More than half a century after its creation, Pakistan is still searching for its identity, as if Partition, instead of solving the problem of the Muslims of the Indian sub continent, had generated new ones (Jaffrelot 2002: 7).

As late as 1988, thirty-nine years after independence, a scholar of Pakistan could entitle his book Pakistan: A Nation in the Making. A decade later, the title remains valid. As Pakistan reaches the half-century mark, it remains a nation in the making (Laporte Jr. 1999: 45)

...Pakistan’s domestic and external policies are more entwined than those of India, partly because of Pakistan’s more perilous geostrategic position and partly
because the dominant Pakistan army looks both inward and outward (Cohen 2004: vii).

Since independence, the two dominions born out of the decolonization of the British Colonial Empire in India were locked into a rivalry emanating out of their 'national' identities. While India saw itself as a secular state and its citizenry all inclusive, Pakistani identity was based on a more confessional base, with an avowed claim to be the homeland for Indian Muslims. The fissures of the future conflict, lay in the roots of the Partition, as the demand for a Muslim homeland was more vociferous in regions which fell in the territorial borders of modern India, in which the Muslim gentry were competing with the majority Hindus for resources (Cohen 2004:15-39). The areas that encompass present day Pakistan were always Muslim majority areas and the popularity of Jinnah’s two-nation theory did not cut much ice there. The raising of the Hindu-Muslim rivalry to the stage of national wars was a reflection of the self-professed national identities of the two new states and the first big hurdle in the path was Kashmir. An issue that was to fester and turn into one of the most prolonged conflicts in the world, giving rise to fears of a nuclear flash point in South Asia.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) was one of the Princely states that peppered the Indian landmass and had a Muslim majority ruled by a Hindu Prince. The absorption of the Princely states into the two dominions was the first stage of rivalry for the newly emergent countries (Menon 1956: 490). So after independence three erstwhile princely states became problematic. The first two were, the state of Junagarh in Gujarat bordering the Sindh province of Pakistan and Hyderabad in India. In both the cases Muslim rulers were ruling Hindu majority population and wanted to accede to Pakistan. But their physical location made such accession impossible being located away from easy amalgamation into Pakistan and therefore they dithered and ensuing period lead to a lot of tension and uncertainty. However, it was Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, a Hindu ruler and the progressive secular Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah that were to be arena of high politics that lead to the cauterization of the India-Pakistan conflict for future generations (Guha 2007: 59-83).
Thus, the wrestle that was to occupy South Asia and also worry the world for the next sixty years was being laid out. Two nations born out of one common destiny, historical experience, one religious the other professing modern secular ideals, a Muslim majority with a secular popular leader, a greedy King with ambitions of independence and perhaps the most crucial, abutting both India and Pakistan like a crown. Both the nations laid claims to the crown with its beautiful vales. For the Pakistanis, a Muslim majority province naturally belonged to them (Bhutto 1969), for the Indians, the syncretic secular Kashmiri culture (politically the state of Jammu and Kashmir comprised of Kashmir, Ladakh (Buddhist) and Jammu (Hindu) and so reflected the multi ethnic character of the polity) was what they saw as rightfully theirs. The conflict over Kashmir involved both territory and the national identities of India and Pakistan. The two nations went to war over Kashmir three times and the first was as early as 1948 (Ganguly 1986).

The popular history in India informs us that Pathan tribesmen from the North West Frontier with armed support of the Pakistani military mounted an invasion of the state (Jha 1996). The pretext of the aggression was issues concerning the atrocities by the Hindu ruler against his Muslim subjects. This strategy was to be the main stay of the Pakistani tactic for another two wars and in 1948 it managed to wrest the North Western part of J&K. Under these circumstances, the Maharaja Hari Singh, who had earlier signed a Stand Still agreement with both India and Pakistan, asked for Indian intervention to stop the marauding tribesmen from taking Srinagar (Ganguly 2002: 16-17). The Maharaja wrote to the Government of India seeking help but help could only come if the state of J&K would accede to India and so together with the request for help, he signed the Instrument of Accession and joined India (Anand 2002). And the first India-Pakistan war began with the Indian army stopping the raiders a few miles outside Srinagar and regaining some areas to the Southwest of the capital. However, the matter was soon raised at the United Nations and orders for a plebiscite were issued (Korbel 1954), the problem froze at this stage and despite consistent efforts to find a way out of the box, the dispute remains frozen till our times.
Map 3.2: Kashmir

The Disputed Area of Kashmir

Source:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_disputed_2002.jpg
The Kashmir problem, which has elements of contested identity and territory become intractable due to them and more importantly the long gestation in the absence of a solution (Gupta 1966). It pushed both constituencies into a hard-line position making it a marker of the success of their respective identities. The war in 1948 was significant for three reasons. The first was the division of the J&K state between India and Pakistan (see Map 3.2), the second was the internecine struggle for its control that viles relations between the two countries till today and the third, was consistent Pakistani policy of claiming popular discontent in Indian Kashmir and using non-military personnel with crucial support from the Pakistani military to change the status quo.

The next phase of hostilities came in the summer of 1965 over territorial bickering in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch (Ganguly 2002: 41). By the time of the second conflict both India and Pakistan had been existing for close to two decades and mired in the process of state building and more crucially nation building. Regional politics in South Asia had undergone a sea of change with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the incorporation of Tibet into the communist state and this was to have a significant role in the 1965 war. However, the ‘threat from the North’ was an issue that also bothered the Pakistani establishment in the pre-1962 phase (Time 1965). It was in 1959 that Pakistan under Gen Ayub Khan proposed for a ‘joint front’ against China. By 1962, India had suffered an ignominious defeat in the short border war with China (Hoffmann 1990) and the spectre of the two front war raised its head for the first time and it also opened a new chapter in the India-Pakistan relations, with China as a new power centre (Nayar and Paul 2003: 80).

This phase remains important for the 1965 hostilities over Kashmir after the short Rann of Kutch dispute went for arbitration to a tribunal (Bhushan 2005). The first was that in the post-1962 situation, India received a significant amount of arms and other military equipment from both the United States and United Kingdom. A result of the ‘communist’ threat bogey and what was obviously a tilt in Indian NAM policy (Chopra 1973:9). The second reason why this period, after the Sino-Indian border

* Series of United States declassified documents (1949-1971) from the National Archive which shed light on various issues and development during those years on the Kashmir issue are available at http://www.icde.com/%7Epaulwolf/pakistan/pakindiawars.htm#kashmir, accessed 1st July 2008
conflict, is important was the developing warmth in Pakistan-China relations. All these came to a head over Kashmir and were remarkably orchestrated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Sinha 2007: 81-83). Operation Gibraltar, the Pakistan army code name for the 1965 plan, intended to push in armed freedom fighters into the Kashmir Valley and hoped for a popular resurrection where in discontented Kashmiris would rise against India (War History of the Indian Army)\(^1\). The second part of the plan called, Operation Grand Slam, was to be put into effect after the success of the first and Kashmir was to be cut off from India (Library of Congress Country Studies). As to the timing, popular literature says that Bhutto believed that with the western nations arming India, the strategic balance between the two countries was slowly and surely changing in India’s favor (Khan 1967: 158). The time was now or never to solve the Kashmir imbroglio in Pakistan’s favour.

The 1965 war ended in a stalemate of sorts with the first part of the Pakistani operation failing as no insurrection of the Kashmiris against the Indians took place. Over time, it has been observed that Pakistan is in a superior position along the Line of Control (LOC), however, if another front like Punjab was opened as in the 1965 war, pressure could be off the Indian forces in Kashmir (Nayar and Paul 2003: 165-168). Any straight line advance of Indian troops on the non-Kashmir fronts all along India’s western frontier and along the states of Punjab and Rajasthan, could threaten to cut off Pakistan along its main North South axis. The war also marked a change in Pakistan’s alliance patterns. The Americans proved unreliable during the conflict and prohibited arms sales to both India and Pakistan but it was Pakistan who was hit hard as their military was equipped with American weapons while Indian arms were procured increasingly from the Soviet Union (Singh 1986: 212). Interestingly, the Chinese came to Pakistani rescue with arms transfers as well as by rattling India’s Northern frontier (the two front threats) with troop movements and threats and strident vocal support for Pakistan in international fora (Sinha 2007: 86-89).


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The next few decades saw a Pakistan in turmoil with first the exit of Ayub Khan after months of popular discontent, ostensibly supported by Bhutto on the ‘surrender at Tashkent’ in January 1966. Within less than half a decade, Pakistan was to undergo a crisis far worse than any before and which had its roots in Jinnah’s two-nation theory that put the Urdu language and Islam as the central points of a Pakistani identity (Sisson and Rose 1990). Adding to the problem was the failure of democratic institutions to take root and the crucial ineptitude in working out a practical federal structure so that the provinces in Pakistan could be provided the necessary space. Matters came to a head when in the 1971 elections, the East Pakistan Awami League led by Mujib-ur-Rehman, won the majority of seats. The Awami league’s agenda was to seek the correction of West Pakistan’s colonial attitude towards the distant province, the opposition to enforcement of Urdu and substantive redressal of Bengali grievances. The series of events were interpreted as a secessionist move by Gen. Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto whose Pakistan People’s Party had won the second largest number of seats saw the Awami League standing in the way of his ambition to be Prime Minister. The situation deteriorated rather quickly owing to the repression unleashed by the Pakistan army in East Pakistan and both parties were pushed to more obdurate positions. The crisis saw millions of refugees making their way to Indian territory that resulted in dramatic pressure on the Indians owing to Bengali nationalism as well as providing an opportunity to make gains from Pakistan. The East Pakistanis declared independence and set up a government in exile in Calcutta and the Indian army began training the Mukti Bahini, recruited out of the refugees and who were to be later instrumental in the swift Indian victory and surrender of the Pakistan forces.

The narrative in this section is seeking to bring out the nuances of the efforts by India to impose its will on the region and of the successful Pakistani challenge. Secondly, while delineating the interplay between the two paths to maintain regional
order, hegemony and bi-polarity, the study is also looking at power structure in South Asia and specifically between the two most important states, India and Pakistan. The regional and global aspects of the 1971 crisis were compound and need a more elaborate elucidation that will be attempted in the next chapter. In our present discussion it would suffice to mention that owing mainly to the role of Pakistan in the coming rapprochement with China, the United States of America, under Nixon and his Secretary of State Kissinger, decided to lean heavily towards Pakistan. The Indian fear of a two front war was negotiated with a defence treaty (India-Soviet Union Treaty of Peace and Friendship, August 1971, See Annexure I) with the Soviet Union and the Chinese were expected to stay off the Indian back. The fact that the Chinese role in the 1965 war was not to be repeated was further ensured by conducting the East Pakistan war in the winter months (December) when the Himalayan passes would be blocked.

The 1962 conflict had resulted in an urgent and dramatic turn about in India’s military preparedness (War in the Himalayas). The Indian war experiences of 1948, 1962, 1965, reoriented India’s post-Nehru vision away from dialogue (NAM) to defence and had huge impact on the formulation of South Asia as a region. The reorganization of the army and crucial weaponization was sourced from the United States and UK while the Soviet Union became a more durable defence partner for India. Secondly, the stalemate at Kashmir in the first two India-Pakistan wars was more a result of the delicate Indian position in Kashmir due to the command of the heights by the Pakistan army. An important marker of the superiority of the Indian position was, when in the 1965 war, the Punjab front was opened to take pressure off Kashmir. Pakistan enjoyed the propensity to war precisely due to three reasons: the first was the issue of Kashmir which put India on the back foot owing to its failure to solve it; the second was the command of the heights for the Pakistani army on the Line of Control and thirdly, it was the territorial limitation of conflict, in that it was restricted to Kashmir. The opening of the Punjab front in 1965 threatened Pakistan with a North-South cut off as well as taking the war to Pakistani heartland, Punjab, and this move surprised Pakistani generals. Therefore, after the euphoria of the Rann


**Official Indian History of the war is available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/index.html**

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of Kutch victory and the stalemate in 1965, the Pakistani bluff appeared to have been called.

In the post-1965 phase, the US in its détente with USSR ceded the South Asian space to the Soviet Union, letting it organize the Tashkent Conference (Perkovich 2002a: 110; Nayar and Paul 2003: 71). The Soviet Union during the 1965-1970 phase spent considerable energies in cultivating Pakistan and this relationship involved transfers of some weaponry till India objected. So the years after 1962 saw corrective measures for India, for the unpreparedness in the time of the Chinese conflict had resulted in a scandal and by the time of the 1971 war and owing to the nature of issues involved, the Indian state was in an envious position vis-à-vis Pakistan. One can also see 1971 as a sort of reverse Kashmir in many aspects; a restive province fighting the central government and remarkable Indian superiority owing to landscape and location. Thus, like operation Grand Slam when the Pakistani forces were expected to move in and channelise the inevitable domestic rebellion, the Indian army waited for the rebellion to break out and then moved in to finish what was a lost cause for Pakistan.

These years were the hay-days of the second Indira Gandhi regime in Delhi. The speedy war in 1971 went along the textbook prescriptions of resolving a conflict. India was patient while upping the ante, the Indian Prime Minister made a quick tour around the important capitals drawing attention to the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan. India repeatedly demanded that the Pakistani government desist from its genocidal actions and behaviour before the Indian army was sent in. Indira Gandhi was seen as a decisive leader and a Prime Minister in control owing to the internal balancing of the Nehru years. The split in the Congress had removed all challenges to her leadership and she was the person in total command. While it led to a gross over-centralization of power for the central government, it also was a quieter period owing to the democratic resolution of a number of post-independence restive provincial grievances. With her conduct in the 1971 war and the clinical victory, Indira Gandhi was dubbed as Goddess Durga by a population that exulted and thrived in the first military victory of modern India. The triumph of holding 90,000 POW's and the Simla Agreement heralded the dawn of a new era as East Pakistan become Bangladesh and Pakistan reduced to half its size. It was unanimously announced that
India had settled South Asia in favour of itself by cutting down the Pakistan challenge (Guha 2007: 453-466).

The military defeat proved hard for the Pakistani army and resulted in its return to the barracks. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took oath as the President and at long last it appeared that the man, who could chart a democratic path out of the chaos, was in the right place (Wolpert 1993: 165). Post-1971, South Asian history though did look extremely optimistic. At one level it was hoped that with the weakening of Pakistan owing to loss of territory and the stark invalidation of the practicability of the two nation theory, would result in some sort of amiable future and at the domestic level, it was hoped that Pakistan had found its path out of the military morass it repeatedly found itself in. The superior Indian position was further illustrated when Indira Gandhi ordered a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. It appeared to be the last nail for Pakistani challenge and signified a prescience of an emergent India on the horizon under the astute and stable leadership of Indira Gandhi (Guha 2007: 455).

But what was not known was that in 1972 in a meeting in Multan, Bhutto in a meeting with a group of Pakistani scientists asked them to find the shortest route to a nuclear capability (Pande 1991: 49-50). It is important to mention that the Indian nuclear test was still two years away. Commentaries have it that Bhutto’s nuclear ambition had two main aims. The first was the humiliation of the division of Pakistan in 1971 and Bhutto hoped to over ride the Indian conventional superiority through nuclear weapons. The second explanation appears to be to keep the army away from the obsessive issue of national security. It was expected that with nuclear capability, the central role of the military in national security would be reduced. So while 1971 can be marked as the start of Indian superiority in South Asia, in hindsight, it appears as a false start as events later proved.

Within the first five years of the 1970’s, the promising era for India, had degenerated into another chaotic domestic period in both India and Pakistan. The Indira regime faced innumerable pressure on domestic fronts and the Jai Prakash Narayan (JP) led movement among other developments resulted in the imposition of a state of emergency. At about similar time Zulfikar Bhutto, was on his path to doom
with a particularly repressive police state and the calling back of the Pakistani army to bring peace to the restive province of Balochistan.

The Indira Gandhi regime was trounced in the elections after the emergency. The fate of Indira Gandhi in the post-1971 victory and the post-1974 nuclear test proved that foreign policy triumphs never prove fungible in domestic politics as was again proved by the voting out of the BJP lead NDA government despite the extremely popular 1998 nuclear tests. This period was far more harmful for Zulkiifar Ali Bhutto as owing to the opposition to his regime and the disturbances sweeping across Pakistan, his hand picked and supposedly pliable general Zia Ul Haq arrested Bhutto and took over power. Bhutto in his later years and with increasing opposition to his regime injected few initial elements of Islamism into the Pakistani state that was to be taken further by Gen Zia ul Haq.

The next two decades was to see a dramatic turn about in the power equations in the sub continent with the presence of superpowers and the development of proxy war/low intensity conflict as a state policy of Pakistan (Prabha 2000: 78). In 1979, to bolster the communist regime in Afghanistan, Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan. The United States saw the opportunity as an opening to stretch Soviet over-reach precisely as the Soviet's had done using the Vietnam War. Pakistan once again came to the attention of the United States and for the first time brought the two superpowers in competition in South Asia, dominating politics in Pakistan and Afghanistan for the next decade. The Americans used the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) as a conduit for transfer of arms and finances to the mujahideen battling the Soviet forces. The Military regime under Gen. Zia by this time had hung Bhutto and the nuclear program passed completely into the hands of the military. The war in Afghanistan introduced a few virulent strains in Pakistani domestic politics. Firstly, owing to the American aid, the ISI was able to create its own faithful mercenaries and control them. Secondly, it resulted in the flow of refugees into Pakistan and owing to the proxy war and state policy; the Islamic content in Pakistan's domestic polity kept rising.

There were three issues that moved to the centre of South Asian regional politics for the next two decades. The first was the incipient nuclearisation of Pakistan and by
The mid-1980's this was turning into a dyadic rivalry with India. The second was the Pakistan state policy of low intensity conflict that started with the Punjab troubles in the early 1980's and was later trumped by the Kashmir insurgency, which continues to rock India-Pakistan relations to the current times. The third and perhaps, the most virulent issue being the increasing radicalization of Pakistani society and the growth of a remarkably efficient jehadi indoctrination and training center.

The struggle in Afghanistan raged on for almost a decade till its military retreat on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Meanwhile the quiescent period that began in the post-1971 period in India-Pakistan relations was reaching an end. Punjab was on a boil owing to domestic mishandling. The demand for a separate Sikh state was raised and militants were trained and armed in Pakistan. In Pakistan as well as owing to the problems between the muhajir's and locals in Karachi, the province in Sindh was in ferment. This period in the 1980's was marked by repeated crises and India-Pakistan relations moved in a cyclical manner. The next few years will be better analyzed by looking at the various crises that stand out from the normal pattern of India-Pakistan relations.

1987-2002: The Crises Years

Strategic literature in the subcontinent dates the role of the nuclear deterrent in avoiding a conventional conflict to the Brasstacks crisis in 1987. This is generally taken as the beginning of the operation of deterrence in India-Pakistan relations. It is difficult though to actually substantiate the first threat from Pakistan to deter India by its nuclear capability may have been made during the Brasstacks crisis (Bajpai et al 1995: 6). It would also be important to point out that this section is not merely an examination of the India-Pakistan crisis in the 1990's, instead it is illustrative of Pakistan's successful challenge to Indian hegemony and the first marker of the changed power configuration in South Asia. It was in the 1980's that Pakistan was nearing towards its nuclear deterrent program and the series of crises and the continuing Pakistani state policy of low intensity conflict that exhibits the durability of its challenge. The rationale of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions is India as are most of its foreign and security policies. It would be interesting to point out that most analysts attribute the Pakistani entanglement in Afghan affairs as, Pakistan's search for
strategic depth against India. This obsession with the Indian threat is understandable, especially in the post-1971 and the post-1974 power equations that held in South Asia.

Brasstacks, 1987

The first nuclear stand off had its origins in an Indian military exercise code named ‘Brasstacks’ against the backdrop of continuing turmoil and Pakistani abetted violence in Punjab and a restive Sindh. The exercise was the brainchild of Gen. K. Sundarji, the Chief of Army Staff and its size and complexity was without parallel and it was also held along an east-west axis (pointing towards Pakistan) instead of the usual north-south axis in the state of Rajasthan (Ganguly 2002: 86). The size and location of the exercise caused anxiety in Pakistan and on enquiry they received sketchy information and inaccurate figures. Unable to be reassured of the goals and significance of the exercise the Pakistani military despite completion of their planned exercise in November/December 1986 remained in battle ready positions (Bajpai et all 1995: 27-30). The crisis erupted in mid January 1987 and regular contacts across Islamabad and New Delhi managed to defuse it by February.

It has been stressed often that this crisis also had a nuclear dimension to it. In an interview conducted in the end of January 1987, the Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar was told by the Dr. A.Q Khan that, “Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened.” (Perkovich 2002a: 280) But this report was only published on March 1, in The Observer of London and by this time the crisis had been settled and had little effect on its evolution. Perkovich states that the statement did not necessarily reflect official Pakistani calculations and it cannot be said to have influenced the Brasstacks crisis. However, Khan’s statements affected subsequent perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in India-Pakistan power equations.

The Pakistani state perceived an Indian effort to force them into a preemptive war most likely in Punjab while the Indian troops cut Pakistan in a North-South Axis in event of hostilities in the open plains of Sindh. Such an eventuality was expected to drastically re configure the power equations. This confusion with regard to Indian intentions was triggered partly by the reputation of an ambitious Gen. Sundarji. The
series of events in this crisis differ with the perception of the various actors. One overview was that Exercise Brasstacks was an ambitious war game along the East-West axis planned over a three-month period in the state of Rajasthan. Owing to misperception and lack of information for the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the crisis deteriorated in his absence and after his return was avoided due to quick communication (Interview with Lt. Gen. PN Hoon, Rediff). Another narration is that the ambitious Indian army Chief Gen. Sundarji, owing to the state of India-Pakistan relations (Punjab on the boil in India and Sindh dissatisfied in Pakistan), planned Operation Trident along the North-South axis (in a swift movement to cross the Indira Gandhi canal and cut off Pakistan in North-South and detach the restive Sindh province) within the cover of Exercise Brasstacks to force the Pakistanis in a miscalculation and strike in the Punjab region and make territorial gains (Sidhu 2004: 8).

Kashmir 1990

Due to domestic mishandling of center-state tensions in Jammu & Kashmir and due to widespread dissatisfaction protests, demonstrations and violent incidents swept across the Kashmir valley in 1988-89. This period had actually seen an upturn in India-Pakistan relations with the return of democracy to Pakistan and with Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto at the helm, the young leaders were expected to be able to work out some kind of political rapprochement owing to their status as second generation leaders without memory of the partition. The second non-Congress government had just taken oath in New Delhi in December 1990 with V.P. Singh as Prime Minister and Inder Kumar Gujral as the external affairs minister. As Kashmir moved towards chaos, opposition parties in Pakistan continued to outbid Benazir on the question of Kashmir, leading her to raise her rhetorical skills (Ganguly 2002: 92; Hersh 1993). According to Perkovich, Benazir’s bellicosity ‘reflected the influence of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Chief of Army Staff General Aslam Beg, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), who were militantly anti-Indian and determined to up the ante in Kashmir’ (Perkovich 2002a: 307). The President and the Army Chief along with the ISI wielded enormous power in the Pakistani power structure and held in many ways the Prime Minister hostage.
The conflict in Kashmir opened up avenues for Pakistani military aid to insurgents and the incipient nuclear capability was to deter an Indian conventional attack on Pakistan. The exchange of hostile rhetoric took place and both countries mobilized forces on the international border and Pakistan even called up its military reserves. Talks at the foreign ministry level were held to help quell the tension. At the meet between the foreign ministers, I.K. Gujral was warned of 'war clouds hovering over the sub continent' by the Pakistani foreign minister Sahibzada Yakub Khan (Hagerty 1995/96: 79-114). According to a Stimson Center report, '...it appears that the United States intercepted a message to the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) ordering it to assemble at least one nuclear weapon' (Faruque and Krepon 1994: 30-31). The knowledge of this and concern about full-scale war in the sub continent led the Bush administration to send US deputy national security adviser Robert Gates and Richard Haas to South Asia(Perkovich 2002a: 310). The Indians were not worrying explicitly about a nuclear threat from Pakistan, as they did not know about the activity detected by American Intelligence and Robert Gates did not tell them about it. In an interview with George Perkovich, shortly after his retirement in 1992, General Aslam Beg stated that, 'The fear of retaliation lessens the likelihood of war between India and Pakistan. I can assure you that if there were no such fear, we would probably have gone to war in 1990' (Perkovich 2002a: 312).

The Seymour Hersh article\(^{11}\) that broke the lid of the crisis states that, '...General Beg had authorized the technicians at Kahuta to put together nuclear weapons...‘ (Hersh cited in Hagerty 1998: 154). The literature on the crisis does not look into the dynamics of decision making and who was calling the shots but Hagerty quoting the American ambassador in Pakistan, Robert Oakley states that, "ISI was putting out all sorts of messages" (Ibid. 160). Hagerty further states that intelligence analysts in Washington found these messages to be more credible than the diplomats in the field and which might point to institutional rift within the United States government. While the nuclear dimensions of the 1990 crisis are still disputed especially by officials, the Pakistani establishment support to the Kashmiri insurgents, sought deliberately to 'empower radical Islamic organizations, thereby combining the

\(^{11}\) Seymour Hersh. "On the Nuclear Edge", The New Yorker, March 29, 1993. Though most participants in the crisis have denied much of what Hersh claims and its authenticity is doubted and has been termed sensationalist.
forces of religion and nationalism, a mixture that had been successful in Afghanistan against Soviet forces' (Perkovich 2002a: 307).

The Kargil Conflict 1999

The Kargil war followed close on the heels of the Lahore Declaration signed when the Indian Prime Minister visited Lahore in February 1999. The political leaders of India and Pakistan were set, ostensibly on a course for the diplomatic normalization of relations after the nuclear tests in May 1998. This short bonhomme was cut short by a Pakistani attempt to intrude regular troops from the Northern Light Infantry and Kashmiri insurgents in the Kargil region in the spring of 1999 that caught the Indian military and intelligence completely off guard (Ganguly 2002: 114).

The Kargil war raged from May to mid-July 1999 and inflicted heavy casualties on both sides (War In The High Mountains: 1999 Kargil Conflict). As in earlier Indo-Pak crises in 1987 and 1990, the actual level of nuclear threat hanging over Kargil conflict remained uncertain. Nuclear threats implicit and explicit were exchanged through the crisis but it remained uncertain if any material intent lay behind the rhetoric. The Kargil crisis threw up two important variables with regard to military supremacy in democratic Pakistan. The first was the question as to whether the Prime Minister was aware of the military endeavor and the second whether there was any material reality towards the nuclear threats exchanged.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was in his second term and his government enjoyed a majority in the National Assembly. This was the most stable civilian government in Pakistan since Zulfikar Bhutto's government in 1972. The Sharif government had managed to have its way in almost all spheres of democratic life, with the stifling of the media, meddling in the appointments of judges to the Supreme Court of Pakistan and in even the resignation of an army chief when the General's indictment of the government, evoked a strong displeasing statement and the dismissal of a Naval Chief which was a precedent for Musharaf. The Prime Minister, feigned ignorance of the Kargil intrusion and this was corroborated by the Indian

Prime Minister and Defence Minister’s statement who said that they believed it was the army which had created the trouble without the knowledge of the civilian regime.

George Perkovich, in the afterward to his study of the history of the Indian nuclear bomb, agrees to this interpretation of events. As per Perkovich, ‘Unfortunately, not all centers of power in Pakistan shared the spirit of the Lahore Declaration. Key military leaders at General Headquarters in Rawalpindi bristled at the lofty, conciliatory rhetoric and the intimations of pending rapprochement’ (Perkovich 2002a: 472). General Pervaiz Musharraf, the new army chief appointed by Sharif after the resignation of Jehangir Karamat, stated that, he objected to the Lahore Declaration and as he could not accept the lack of emphasis on Kashmir and felt that at Lahore, Sharif had surrendered Pakistan’s leverage for extracting Indian concessions in Kashmir (Parthasarathy 2000).

Thus, Sharif claimed innocence of the Kargil intrusion and blamed it on the military. But other sources point out that Sharif was aware of the Kargil intrusion, even before the Lahore declaration and had even approved of it. A number of scholars do not believe the Sharif testimony of not being privy to the Kargil intrusion (Ali 2003: 249; Reidel 2002)***. This lie and the subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani troops decided by Sharif at Washington without consulting the top brass may have been responsible for the October 12, 1999 coup in which Musharraf removed Sharif from power (Rizvi 2002: 232).

The second element was whether any real effort at nuclear mobilization took place and if so who directed those efforts. Bruce Reidel, who was President Clinton’s Special Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs at the National Security Council, has written an account of the July 4th 1999 meet between Nawaz Sharif and Clinton.+++ It was at this meet that Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops under harsh international pressure for creating nuclear tensions in South Asia. The account of the meeting is illustrative for the pressures that the military was applying on Sharif to not withdraw. Reidel writes that,

*** Reidel says that Musharraf and Sharif have put out different versions of who said what to whom.

+++ http://www.sas.upenn.edu/cassi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm

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The PM was distraught, deeply worried about the direction the crisis was going toward disaster, but equally worried about his own hold on power and the threat from his military chiefs who were pressing for a tough stand. The Prime Minister told Clinton that he wanted desperately to find a solution that would allow Pakistan to withdraw with some cover. Without something to point to, Sharif warned ominously, the fundamentalists in Pakistan would move against him and this meeting would be his last with Clinton (Reidel 2002).

On the question of the raking up nuclear tensions, Reidel (2002) states that,

Clinton asked Sharif if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war really was? Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles? Sharif seemed taken aback and said only that India was probably doing the same...Sharif was getting exhausted. He denied that he had ordered the preparation of their missile force, said he was against that but he was worried for his life now back in Pakistan.

Reidel further states that, it was not altogether clear who was calling the shots in Islamabad. Prime Minister Sharif had seemed genuinely interested in pursuing the Lahore process and he had argued eloquently with a series of American guests, including America's UN Ambassador Bill Richardson, that he wanted an end to the fifty-year-old quarrel with India. We will probably never know for sure the exact calculus of decision-making in Islamabad. Each of the players had their own reasons for selling a particular version of the process. Musharraf and Sharif have already put out different versions of who said what to whom.

**Operation Parakaram**

Operation Parakaram was the Indian effort to impose its will on Pakistan through coercive diplomacy. The post 9/11 environment provided the cover of spent patience after the December 13 2001 suicide attack by Pakistan backed Kashmiri militants on the Indian Parliament. Operation Parakaram was the name given to the 10 month-long mobilization and deployment of troops along the LOC. The aim of the Operation was to exhibit Indian limits and to threaten punishment to Pakistan for its continuing support to anti-India militants.

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The underlying assumption on which Operation Parakaram was based was the assumed support and cooperation of the US to end cross border terrorism. However, US preoccupations with its own Afghan war got just reassurances for India and well timed speeches by Gen. Musharraf defused the volatile situation. While Musharraf's 12 January speech was a tactic to buy time in the face of Indian mobilization, the 27 May speech was seen as a statement of intent to end cross-border terrorism. The deployment lasted for over ten months. This crisis was the last of the stand off's that proves in no uncertain terms the limits of Indian superiority in imposing its will on Pakistan. And it would be important to remember that this was the decade of highest economic growth and India was supposed to have left Pakistan behind. There were other factors involved too which limited the scope of India carrying the threat of punishment. Factors such as the American presence in Afghanistan, the ongoing conflict with Taliban forces and paradoxically the growing warmth in Indo-US relations acted as a constrain for Indian military action.

There were two close points during the entire ten month mobilization. These occurred in the build up to the mobilization which started in December 2001 and the second in the month of May 2002, when terrorists attacked a para military camp in Jammu killing the families of military men. It is not wrong to suggest that India while constrained by the United States had the best chance to punish Pakistan especially in the post-9/11 world. But the weakness exhibited itself in terms of handling of the political ramifications of such an attack. It would have resulted in a fracas with the United States, ties with which had just about picked momentum. The favorable international but an unfavorable ally led to the mobilization being reduced to what has often been termed an exercise in 'coercive diplomacy' (Kapila 2003). Though, the Operation was not without its gains, getting Musharraf to promise on about the need to end cross border terrorism.

The Pakistan Challenge : Bringing Extra Regional Actors

If we evaluate the above narration in which the chapter tries to map, first the configuration of power as also the pattern of relations among South Asian states, we realize that the situation is rather complicated. The situation in South Asia is such that
none of the conclusions reached by Buzan holds true in toto. Neither has India succeeded in dominating the entire region nor has the Pakistan challenge managed to countervail India's superiority. This gap between the two positions is what is responsible for the instability in the region that precludes predictable behavior or successful resolution of disputes. In a situation where two states of equal power fight for control, the situation is stable but in the case of South Asia, it is unstable due to the difference in power configuration of India vis-à-vis Pakistan. India’s position in the region has been variously described as that of 'weak unipolarity' or 'arrested unipolarity' (Ayoob 2001: 126-127 and 1991). The contested unipolarity has been as much a result of an underdeveloped economy as much as it has been a result of the challenge from Pakistan. The challenge from Pakistan came through external alliances with the United States and later with China. In the aftermath of the 1971 war and the emergence of Bangladesh it was assumed that the challenge from Pakistan was over and India would be able to achieve its pre-partition position of pre-eminence. However, the changes in the post-1971 period ironically went against India, as the United States established ties with the People's Republic of China through the good office of the Pakistanis. And militarily, West Pakistan without the eastern province became better defensible.

Pakistan has often been described as an 'insecure state' that perceives itself not only as small and disadvantaged but on the defensive against a real and present threat, with its survival at stake (Thornton 1999: 171). Thus a central element of Pakistani policy has been to reach outside South Asia to find support that might offset Indian dominance within the South Asian security system as also to avoid bilateral arrangements that would put Pakistan in a one-on-one relationship with India. While Pakistan recognized the fact of overwhelming American predominance in an essentially bipolar world of 1947, it was only in the 1950's that Pakistan looked seriously for strategic support from the USA.

The Nuclear Equalizer

In the early fifties it was only the United States and the Soviet Union that could lay claim over the advanced technology that lay in the atom. However, this strand of thinking was not completely missing in South Asia. In the words of Nehru
“the application of which [nuclear energy] to peaceful and constructive purposes has opened limitless possibilities for human development, prosperity and overabundance” (Perkovich 1995: 15). In India at this time, there existed a scientific and technological base since the mid-1940s; Nehru and Bhabha had in right earnest decided to harness the atom though for developmental purposes.

The global debate on nuclear non-proliferation policy began with an initiative by Ireland in 1958 (Perkovich 2002: 99). The international community had floated various proposals for a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons but the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and others vacillated in their reactions to these proposals. By the mid-1960's momentum had built to do something to ward off imminent proliferation. Much of the debate in Washington stemmed from the Chinese nuclear test and fear that it would stimulate nuclear proliferation elsewhere, particularly India. This is where nuclear weapons had first entered Pakistan's public debates.

However the concept of non-proliferation was evolved by major powers simply to discourage and prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons. It is also propagated by the nuclear powers that the proliferation of nuclear weapons among established powers was balanced and under control but the spread of nuclear weapons to less stable states was undesirable because such governments are unreliable power centers (Segal 1987: 97). The United States was to adopt the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as one of its fundamental principles of foreign policy.

The 1998 nuclear tests on the subcontinent, was an attempt to gate crash into the nuclear weapon state club by India and in reaction by Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear program (a remarkable technological accomplishment and a rational response to Pakistan's strategic situation) was more reliable as an 'equalizer' in its relationship with India than the political support it has sought externally and has considerably increased Pakistan's capability of passive deterrence against India. Both the Indian and the Pakistani programs were not a surprise to the world and especially to the Americans. In fact during the Afghan war the United States was instrumental, in ignoring the Pakistani program, in effect actually abetting it, because of its use as a
frontline state. With the change in regimes in Latin America, South Africa and the unilateral surrender of their nuclear option by three ex-Soviet republics has left South Asia as the most important area of concern vis-à-vis nuclear proliferation.

The presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and its state of perpetual crisis has deeply ingrained fears of the weapons falling into the hands of religious extremist of the Taliban types. In addition, the traditional hostility between India and Pakistan, especially over Kashmir, accentuates the dangers inherent in a nuclear capable South Asia. In addition, the world worries about the inadequacy of safeguards, the lack of circumspect behaviour in decision-making, and whether command and control arrangements are sufficient to prevent a possible nuclear conflagration because of misperception, miscalculation, or both (Bhimayya 1994: 647).

Contextualising Prevailing Circumstances in Pakistan

The ongoing India Pakistan peace talks are seen as an important process which was long over due to unshackle the two countries trapped in their congenital mutual fixations. But the process cannot be seen as a conclusive one as there have been instances in the past where a dramatic crest was achieved and then relations plummeted to an equally remarkable trough. The Lahore visit of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1999 which was followed by the Kargil war, being the most recent. Owing to such a cyclical nature of ties, it is suspected that the current thaw will be followed by another freeze and this time around the object of doubt remains President Musharraf.

At the time of writing, the situation in Pakistan has changed drastically over the impasse owing to the democratic upsurge in Pakistan and the increasing terrorist strikes that while targeting civilians have also been able to do considerable damage to high value political targets. But for a longer view we will analyse the period prior to the present day circumstances. For long, since the coup by General Musharraf when the Nawaz Sharif government was dismissed in Pakistan and the army took over reins of government for the third time, considerable sections of the media and the strategic community have debated the trust worthiness of President Musharraf. Musharraf is blamed for the Kargil crisis despite no conclusive evidence. In 2001, after the 9/11 World Trade Centre (WTC) strikes by Islamist terrorists in heartland America,
Pakistan was pushed to cooperating with the United States in the war against terror. In order to legitimize his position in the domestic polity, Musharraf stood for Presidential elections and was the army chief for another six years by the help of a breakaway faction of the Pakistan Muslim League.

This attention on Musharraf is symptomatic of the role of the Pakistan military in India-Pakistan relations. However, the debate has missed the point as in the study of international relations; it is fallacious to read so much into the predilections of a decision-maker. A leader works within the space offered by the external and internal environments and not strictly by his whims and fancies. Along with this he is also expected to calculate the cost and benefits of the trajectory along which he runs his foreign policy formulations.

Therefore, President Musharraf should be less an object of study than the environment, external and domestic, that has pushed Pakistan towards the peace process. In the external environment, the war on terrorism was the most decisive and important pointer to the changed international landscape in tolerating terrorism of the kind Pakistan fuelled for a decade. For any leader in Pakistan, to persist with a similar course of action, especially in the post-9/11 scenario, would have been acting against the reading on the wall. It would also be important to note that since the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, most countries responsible for financing and arming the mujahideen, the United States, People's Republic of China and Saudi Arabia, even before 9/11 had ended all relations with the Taliban. It was only Pakistan that still needed their services to fight the proxy war in Kashmir. And the Pakistani tolerance of Islamic fundamentalism well beyond the Afghan conflict was a source of embarrassment to the US and China, especially when these two states themselves became targets. It was in the late 1990's that the Chinese realized that the trouble in the Xinjiang province was a result of the Islamic fundamentalism fomented in Pakistan and that most arms and ammunition recovered bore Chinese marks and were the ones which had been exported to Pakistan during and after the Afghan conflict (Ahrari 2000: 662).

Secondly, the Indian state's experience with the Pakistani-fomented and equipped terror problem has taught the political establishment a number of lessons.
'Operation Parakaram' for whatever it was worth was reflective of the Indian state's fatigue with tolerating any obvious Pakistani support to such low intensity warfare. 'Parakaram' may be described as a failure and a lack of resolve on part of the Indian state, but for that period of over ten months, it had the Pakistan Army on its toes and the international community's pressure which resulted in two promises, to end the terror network made by Musharraf on 12 January 2002 and then again in May 2002.

The other important change is the new international profile of India that Pakistan is conscious of and finds hard to contest. To mark it after the nuclear tests in 1998 may seem a folly, but the engagement between the United States and India was the most comprehensive after the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks. With the economy in high gear, driven by the Information Technology engine and the international media discussing India as the next big power after China, Pakistan is bound to be envious of the Indian success story since the early 1990's. And, all this, despite the bleeding neck in Kashmir.

In the domestic environment, Pakistan is dealing with the ugly head of a rising trend towards extremism. The mullah-military alliance that gained ascendancy during the struggle against the Soviets made Pakistan the center of Islamic jihad and this resulted in rising sectarianism as well as the proliferation of arms and ammunition, which were financed with the narcotics trade from the Northwest provinces and from Afghanistan. This rising tide of Islamization, if nothing, has produced greater cleavages in Pakistani society and intensified their own internal conflicts.

Here it would be pertinent to mention President Musharraf's efforts at institutionalising the role of the armed forces in the formal power hierarchy. This could be an extremely important development. With the Pakistani army at the center of action in the nation hopefully the bogey of the Indian threat may be dispensed with forever. This is based on the assumption that in the past, to stay central to Pakistani polity the army harped on the Indian threat. But now with incipient institutionalization of the role of the military, this high cost option could be given up.

Pakistan's security model can be summed up in five words: survival in a hostile environment, which revolves around territorial integrity. It feels insecure as long as the Kashmir dispute is not settled to the satisfaction of all the three parties.
concerned. Pakistan's security model includes the protection of its 1,000 km coastline, its essential economic zone in the Arabian Sea and the defense of its sea-lanes to west Asia. Furthermore, increasingly the conservative elements also insist on guarding the ideological frontiers, which, face an onslaught from India and the west. As far as Pakistan is concerned, Pakistan always quests for security against India, especially after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. Nuclear deterrence provides a psychological security in the minds of Pakistan's ruling elite that's why there is a consensus on the nuclear issue among Pakistan's decision makers. The Pakistani nuclear tests were largely a reaction to the Indian nuclear tests. Similarly, Pakistan's nuclear program has been basically reactive and inextricably linked to that of India. India's nuclear development and especially the Indian nuclear test in 1974 provided the impetus to the initiation of Pakistani efforts to acquire a nuclear capability (Khan 1996: 45).

Conclusion

Military disputes that last over twenty years are described as 'protracted conflict' and these also cover intra-state and societal conflicts, whereas enduring conflicts take on the meaning of exclusively-inter-state conflicts. South Asia has always been considered an area of enduring conflict between India and Pakistan. Developing the concept of 'truncated symmetry', TV Paul notes that the conflict between the two South Asian countries, while an enduring one, differs from other such conflicts because it was also one between unequal powers and asymmetric in nature§§. One of the reasons for the durability of this asymmetric conflict has been the external support to the Pakistani state, in terms of financial and military aid or nuclear weapons technology. India's domestic failure in Kashmir has given Pakistan the space to follow a policy of irredentism.

Kashmir's terrain requires India to achieve a significant superiority over Pakistani troops in places to hold its ground. In a longer war, India would prevail. But wars in the subcontinent have been of short duration. Both the United States and

China have used Pakistan in their geopolitical calculations. This has made India and Pakistan 'co-equals', allowing Pakistan to maintain parity with India and allowing it to pursue a high risk strategy. Neither India nor Pakistan has achieved a decisive victory and both are somewhat 'exhausted' by it. India is limited by this tying down in South Asia but recent economic changes have assisted to some extent to dwarf the political handicaps.

The end of the Cold War did not alter the situation in South Asia as much as in other regions but events since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have had a larger impact. The ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan is a result of the International environment due to the forces unleashed by 'the war on terror' and the turn about in Pakistan's erstwhile policy of stoking the flame of Islamic fundamentalism. There has also been a change in the American perceptions with regard to treating both India and Pakistan as 'co-equals'. Beginning in the final days of the Clinton administration, this de-linking of India with Pakistan in American view has achieved a durable and salient phase in the two Bush administrations. China too has altered its policies to allay its anxieties about a closer relationship between India and the US as well as due to the developing warmth in Sino-Indian relations.

Though India has successfully overcome some constraints on its political dynamism (for example, India's Look East Policy), Pakistan still remains an irritant for India. War as a continuation of policy is increasingly facing redundancy in the globalised world though important states continue to arm themselves. The core issue in the current age is that of globalization and the mantra of liberalization is the economy. However, several unknown factors exist within Indo-Pakistan relations. First and the most important is the future of the current situation in Pakistan. With the war on terror ongoing in the tribal territories in Pakistan, it exerts a huge pressure on the regime in Islamabad. This pressure is compounded due to the constant American presence owing to their own battles against the extremist in Afghanistan. This single issue and its resolution in the immediate future will determine to a large extent the direction Pakistan moves in the near and immediate future. With the February 2008 election results in and the defeat of the PML-(Q), it is certain that some sort of a democratic period has been ushered. But will the PML (N) continue insist on confronting President Musharraf, what would the dynamics between the PPP and the
PML (N) be and how long would the bonhomie last? These are crucial areas of concern and to watch out for. For the first time in this election, anti-India rhetoric was missing in Pakistan. The threat of the jehadis remain despite the defeat of even the right wing forces that earlier ran the provincial government in North West Frontier Province as well as supporting the PML (Q) at the center. Secondly, how will the army respond to the future that awaits the domestic polity in Pakistan.

Perhaps, for the first time, Kashmir seems to be far from the imaginations and ambitions of politicians to score political points. This is indeed a unique development but one has to wait for a longer period than get excited and reach premature conclusions. The logic from the Indian point of view appears rather simple. The Afghan war’s strategy while successfully applied in Punjab and Kashmir took its costs on the domestic polity of Pakistan. The proliferation of arms and ammunition in society, the low intensity conflict waged through drug profits have hit home. And the past half a decade have had tables turned on Pakistan by serious attacks on President Musharraf, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the other high casualties with targeting of police, government and even military officers. What had been the concern of India for over two decades came to haunt the Pakistan establishment. For two decades, India had made the argument of the presence of terrorist training camps in Pakistan of the state providing crucial patronage to the soldiers of Islamic extremism and of being soft on Indian demands dealing with terrorist activity in Kashmir. From our prevailing situation, they all appear to have come to life in Pakistan and also threaten the Pakistani state. Pakistan also faces a mortal danger from the extremists.

But to assume that this development would lead to the Pakistanis dropping Kashmir from the agenda would be short sightedness. The current phase of peace talks between the two countries has Kashmir on its agenda and it is a crucial aspect of the peace talks and its origins. For once, it looks that while concentrating on their domestic situation, Pakistan would continue to provide some or the other form of vocal diplomatic support to the Kashmir question. But what is nevertheless true is that this does appear to be the best circumstances to remove the festering sore from the body politic of South Asia or at least move towards some from of agreement without changing of current boundaries. Domestically, India needs to move to address Kashmiri grievances and remove the root of the problem that invites external
meddling. The situation in South Asia is very different owing to developments in Pakistan-Afghanistan as well as the continuing gallop of the Indian economy. An increasingly prosperous and confident India is likely to play a larger role internationally. This will generate new and more potential pathways for stabilizing relations between India and Pakistan.

In the past decade, despite the hiccups caused by the nuclear tests, India has managed to work around the relationship with China. While the intractable border dispute remains a source of potential danger, the two governments have put political will behind to work out the modalities of its resolution. The Chinese and the Indian governments have also decided to move ahead in other sectors which will move independently of the border dispute and the quantum leap in trade ties as well as general cooperation at multilateral forums is said to be an indication of their vast potential. Thus, owing to the growing Sino-Indian ties in the immediate and short-term period, whatever the past, the future of the Sino-Pakistani relationship looks to be limited. The cold war compulsions that underlay the Chinese attachment to Pakistan are no more and for Beijing, India is more interesting as a negotiating partner than as an enemy shared with Pakistan.

Pakistan remains India's greatest foreign policy challenge and it has to be managed as it is crucial for the success of internal developmental goals as well as for external policy benefits. Over the past decade, India has tried almost every strategy to bring Pakistan around. The Narasimha Rao government ignored it, Deve Gowda and Gujral tried to embrace it, Vajpayee threatened it and yet a settlement has been elusive (Bajpai 2002: 23). A safer neighbourhood and amicable relations with the neighbors would go a long way in achieving domestic stability and pursuing the path of economic development. Economic interaction and cooperation within the region would also generate a number of positive political and economic externalities. It would not be inaccurate to state that the international environment is not conducive to the earlier Pakistani policy of LIC in Kashmir but the hobble of the peace process has given rise to numerous speculations. The Pakistan challenge through external balancing has for over fifty years boxed India into its immediate region. For an aspiring global power, it is important to secure its immediate region to exercise and influence power in other regions. An amicable settlement on Kashmir can also be
expected to have a domino effect on the other festering self-determination movements across India as well as boost its international reputation as a responsible and an influential state.

It would be a premature to judge the direction which Pakistan might head towards especially in context of the prevailing circumstances where the ISI faces accusations from both Afghanistan and India. There have been many warnings on the danger of Pakistan being a failed state. But for the purposes of this study, a brief summing up is necessary with the discussions in this chapter. The historical examination of the past sixty years and the state of India-Pakistan reveals that India while expected to be dominant has not had much success. It has been restricted and tied in a conflictual relationship with its neighbor in the West. There was only one instance in the 1971 war when India was about to decisively prevail over Pakistan. At other times and most crucially when it came to Pakistan’s revisionist agenda of irredentism in Kashmir, India has not been able to pull its potential weight and has been frustrated by the continuing Pakistan backed conflict. Under these circumstances, this study concludes that Pakistan has been able to balance Indian might in the region of South Asia and despite the inherent size advantage India possess has been ingeniously undercut first by Pakistan’s external alliances and later by its nuclear deterrent. The fifth chapter will take up further discussion on this aspect.