CHAPTER 1: Introduction

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is dated as the time of the rise of nation states and the contemporary International System traces its origins to that moment in European History. The period of European colonization beginning in the early 17th century and lasting till the late 20th century reorganized most of the world within the pattern of European development which had its roots in the Renaissance that marked the division between the medieval world and the coming of modernity to Europe. The center of the world till the early 20th century was Europe and by the time of the First World War, the United States was beginning to be drawn into that ‘concert’ of European powers that had so far been the subject matter of all International Relations discourse. The expansion of the system of states in its modern form occurred in the period between the two world wars and at the end of this, Europe remained just one of the many regions of the world. The end of the Second World War and the pressures of the inter-war years made colonial empires untenable and national liberation movements resulted in an increasingly larger part of the world becoming independent states. International Relations now had to move beyond the limitation of the European landmass and politics to various regions with the spread of decolonization.

The decolonization process at the end of the Second World War also saw a rise in competition: the cold war between the two big powers that were central to the Allied victory, the United States and Soviet Union. The competition was largely ideological and between two different political and economic systems. Communism, owing to its experience in predominantly agricultural Soviet Union and later in China, made a bid for its spread in similarly impoverished and newly decolonized third world countries. The Americans, owing to their own historical experience of individualism and the exponential growth based on free enterprise and private entrepreneurship spent their effort to oppose this spread of the ‘virus’ of communism. Thus, categorized as an ideological conflict with all its paraphernalia this was a competition between two global powers with their respective worldviews masking nationalist ambitions.
Region

For our purpose, it suffices to mention that as soon as the various regions of the world were coming into their own after a period of colonization; they were pushed into the new global competition of the cold war, bipolar world. The cold war saw the two super powers reaching across the globe in their struggle for influence. Thus, while the behavior of regions was dramatically altered from the colonial era, the cold war still circumscribed their independence, making several of them subservient to the great powers and their ambitions. In effect, the cold war delayed the rise of regions as independent centers and loci of power.

Essentially, a region is a spatial concept, defined by geographical proximity, the intensity of interactions, shared cultural identities and institutional frameworks. But regions are also dynamic entities, not so much measurable building blocks of the international order as spatially defined cultural, economic, and political constructions, whose nature and functions are transformed over time (Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2004: 274). The ‘region’, therefore, can and has been studied from multiple perspectives, each of these perspectives entails their limitations and their functionalism.

It is the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, which is said to have effectively ‘freed’ regions from overarching global powers. Since the end of the cold war, the regional aspect of security has increasingly come to occupy a considerable amount of space in the International Relations literature. It would be important to mention that this focus on regions also received an impetus from the growth of regionalism, in the 1980’s, in the tripolar economy encompassing, North America, North East Asia and Europe that accounted for almost 85% of the world trade and was moving towards some sort of institutional framework. Also contingent here is that the growth of ‘regions’ and ‘regionalism’ were different for different parts. This also appears to be in this short to medium term, a linear developmental vision, which foresees that regions would come to represent the structure of the current European Union (EU) in some form or the other. Others have though challenged the
linear development of all regions and regional structures argument. For, while some or the other form of a regional community is well neigh possible in the various regions of the world, they are more likely to take different trajectories and exhibit myriad differences. This debate into the nature of future regionalism also has its pessimists who believe that this phase of globalization is like any other and not in any manner irreversible considering the immediate past of the early 20th century (Zedillo 2001). From the security perspective, there are different opinions on regionalism, for example, in the Asian security situation, some see Asia imitating the European past that centered around rivalry (Friedberg 1998) while others see a disorder around Asian states efforts to balance a growing China (Acharya 2003/04: 149).

Security

The term security is one of the most important and the most often used concept in International Relations. The understanding of security also remains profoundly contested, ill-defined and ambiguous among concepts in international relations. The following commentary is a brief review of the dominant conceptions about security. It is deemed as a necessary background to the study of the Regional Security Complex Theory. Throughout the discipline’s history, strategic thinking has been dominated by the realist conception of security. According to Realism; threats to a state’s security chiefly arise from outside its borders and these threats are primarily military in nature and generally call for a military response. These assumptions are

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1 The Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Rodolfo C. Severino, speaking at the European Policy Center in Brussels, compared the question “Will ASEAN be like the EU?” is like the one that Professor Higgins asks in My Fair Lady: “Why can’t a woman be more like a man?” -- a plaintive question uttered in extreme frustration. To ask such a question of ASEAN and the EU is similarly futile and could be frustrating. In many ways, ASEAN is not like the EU, probably never will be, as women will always be different, in many ways, from men. We all know the forces that impelled the EU’s formation and shaped its character. We all know the historical, cultural and ideological foundations that have made it possible for the EU to take the shape and direction that it has. It is these unique forces, circumstances and foundations that have made the EU unique. Cited From, Will ASEAN be like the EU?, available at http://www.aseansec.org/3112.htm

best summed up by Walter Lippmann's statement that, 'a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war' (1943: 51). The realist orthodox definition of security implies that security is concerned with the ability of a state to deter or defeat an external attack primarily of military nature.

Scholars belonging to the liberal school, though, define security somewhat differently. Focusing on *interstate* rather than *state* security, their principle concern is with the integration of national security with systemic security concerns. Arguing that due to the interdependence between states, the security of the parts cannot be distinguished from that of the system as a whole (Burchill 2001: 35). In other words, due to the extent of interlinking of the various divisions of the international system, security and welfare are dependent upon each other. Thus, it is imperative that the international as well as national system must be preserved for peace. This definition, focusing on the state as the unit of analysis and external threats of military nature, is similar to the realist orthodox and is regarded as the key issue to resolve in order to improve the security of a state.

With the wave of decolonization and a number of new states emerging towards the 1980s, an attempt was made to improve upon the traditional concept of security. The changing nature of the International Order and the different problems of the new states, demanded critically examining and questioning the traditional notions about security, especially as they are applied to the Third World. The traditional concept of security which focused on the external military threats to the state, took on a different dimension in the Third World. The external threats remained but they dialectically interacted with internal powers and there was the new threat to the state from within; other ethnic groups with their own claims to a 'nation'. Thus the efficacy of the concept, as conventionally defined, is greatly reduced when applied to Third World contexts. The sense of insecurity stems not only from external military threats but rather also from internal threats involving different facets of social life. Even where external threats exist, they often attain saliency because of the pre-existence of internal insecurities and conflicts within the state (Thomas 1987). The Third World also has tenuous ties with the international system owing to colonial grievances as well as the structure of the system that puts them at the bottom. This is made worse by
the needs of systemic security which further restrict the utility of the traditional concept of security in explaining the problem of security in their world. The fact that the Third World served as an arena for East-West rivalry during the post-WWII era, demonstrates the low priority attached to the Third World in maintaining the systemic security and there is a 'janus' faced a state which while fighting subversion within is not too unenthusiastic about a similar subversion externally (Ayoob 1991: 264).

The need for "systemic security" has often contributed to insecurity in the Third World as it was only the newly decolonized/independent states where both inter- and intra-state conflicts proliferated (Cohen 1989: 37). Since the end of World War II, the European and the American world were free of such violence. This unsatisfactory state of affairs and the failure of theory to account for the Third World reality is what led to the long-established concept of security to be questioned, thereby paving the way, for an expansion and redefinition of what security means. The 1982 Palme Commission, for example, formulated the notion of Common security, which eschewed competitive, zero-sum notions of deterrence and power, and emphasized instead cooperation, dialogue, and confidence building. The Commission promoted the idea of peace with others and not against them. By expanding the concept of security to include various internal insecurities, the notion of Common security attempted to escape from the narrow focus of the traditional concept on external military threats (Dupont 1997: 35). This new concept of security (Tickner 1992; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998; Wyn Jones 1999; Axworthy 2001; Wibben 2004; Booth 2005) brought about two changes to the traditional concept, first being the escape from state-centrism and redefinition of threat from being military in nature to also non-military, especially socio-economic.

The revision of the traditional concept of security was provided a fillip to the growth of the concept of regional security (Chipman 1997: 21). The concept by definition is established upon the hubris of regionalism. Essentially supposing that regionalism is the best approach to the resolution of regional issues. External influence can only have a neo-imperial motivation, or result in some form of political dependency. It also draws from the notion that regional approaches and institutions can help develop locally derived and by extension locally supported solutions to security-related issues. On this basis, regional institutions provide a preliminary
framework in which regional states can judge and act on the challenges to peace that affect them. One way of doing this is to cultivate norms of behavior and promote cooperation among the members, which will eradicate the ‘resort to force’ as a method of settling disputes.

But despite this movement toward a more encompassing and region-sensitive view of security, the legacies of the omnipresent bipolar confrontation between the US and the USSR only strengthened the traditional notions about security (Buzan 1995: 198). The cold war had stifled the chances of revising the major connotations of security used in the traditional sense, by dividing the Western world into two halves and stabilizing that division for several decades by means of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The notion of alliance security, for example, was superimposed on the concept of state security, of which externally directed thrust remained unchanged (Ayoob 1991: 265). By making the security of the industrialized countries of Europe, North America and Japan as the prime concern of the security of the international system as a whole, the dominant strand in Western strategic thinking increasingly obliterated, the distinction between the realist (state-centric) and idealist/liberal (system-centric) approaches. Thus, traditional notions of security came to be institutionalized. In sum, the traditional concept of security, takes it as a given to be maximized and defines it as external threats, usually of military nature to the state, ignoring the other dimensions of security.

Regional Security

The discipline of political science examines all phenomena from the international order to political development and societal and institutional interactions. At the higher end is the system level of analysis (neo realism), while beneficial for its comprehensive point of view, is lacking in details. The systemic focus while exaggerating the influence of the system on state actors also suggests uniformity in behavior and does not count for the influence of national actors on the system. On the other hand, most studies which focus on the nation-state as an actor (realism) have the tendency to exaggerate difference in state behaviour and leads to an overwhelming amount of details, though these details help in a deeper examination (Singer 1961).
The regional level lies in between this two ends of the system and the sub-systemic analysis at state level. Being in between the two dominant levels, it attempts to incorporate the advantages of the two by keeping the comprehensiveness of the systemic level intact and the details of the state level of analysis. The regional level had for a long time been dealt in the area studies perspective but the expansion of the security discourse has now postulated the region as a fundamental unit and referent for security analysis. The end of the cold war and the era of bipolarity saw a period of American unilateralism of the decisive kinds but with weak results. This credibility gap between bipolarity and the unipolar moment is what has brought about renewed focus on the regional level of analysis and together with the thriving of regionalisms, has facilitated the dominance of the Regional Security Complex Theory.

Regional Security Complex Theory

The narrative will now delineate the Regional Security Complex Theory (henceforth RSCT) in some detail. Buzan (1991:187) notes that security is a relational phenomenon, and so consequently one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded. A comprehensive security analysis calls for focus on how the regional level of political interaction mediates the interplay between states and the international system as a whole (Buzan 1991:188). The idea of a regional system has been historically linked to Europe and its inherent balance of power dynamics (Buzan 1991:188). Even the massive process of decolonisation, which should have caused attention to be given to emerging regional security sub-systems, was unfortunately overshadowed by the global superpower rivalry (Buzan 1991:188).

Significantly, in Buzan’s schema, security complexes are analytical devices, being an empirical phenomenon with both historic and geopolitical roots. Despite such an assertion and a rather cursory look at world history and the ancient empires, Buzan writes that the current pattern of regional security is of ‘recent vintage’ and goes further when he states that the South Asian complex sprang into existence fully formed in 1947 (1991: 202-205). On the issue of locating the boundaries of such a security complex, Buzan writes that the task of
identifying a security complex involves making judgments about the relative strengths of security interdependencies among different countries. The principal factor defining a complex is usually a high level of threat/fear which if felt mutually among two or more major states (ibid. emphasis added).

The criteria for using the mutuality criteria in defining the security complex is the problem that exists because of a lopsided security link between two major local states. The relationship between China on the one hand, and India,... provides a clear example... China is a major security concern for India... arguably even the principal one... This evidence points to a strong insecurity link and therefore possibly to a security complex. But the lack of balance in the relationships points to distinct complexes instead. India... relatively minor security concern(s) for China... weigh little compared with the other threats to China interests.... A situation like this typically indicates the existence of a boundary between a lower- and a higher-level security complex. The question then becomes not a dispute about the boundaries of a security complex, but about the relative weight of local security dynamics in relation to those pressing on the region from outside (ibid. 194-95).

He further goes on to say that in defining the shape and structure of security complexes, cultural and racial patterns may well be an important contributing factor, though they come second to the patterns of security perceptions which are the principle defining factor (Buzan 1991: 197). Buzan puts forward two reasons as to why it may be difficult to locate the boundaries of a complex whose existence is not in doubt. The first being that the boundaries of two complexes are dissolving and the other being the existence of a lop sided security interdependence when higher and lower level complexes are adjacent. He further says

[The] best place to deal with them is when looking at the interaction between the higher level complex(es) at the system level, and the lower level ones rooted in particular regions. The issue is then about the relative autonomy and interaction between the dynamics at the two levels (Buzan 1991: 199).

Having established the fact that security complexes are useful objects of analysis, Buzan et al., (1998:13-14) identify the three main components of the essential structure of any given security complex. Essential structure is the standard by which change can be measured in a given security complex (Buzan 1991:211). These three
main components of essential structure of security complexes are as follows (Buzan et al., 1998:13-14): (a) the arrangement of units and the differentiation between them, (b) the patterns of amity and enmity that exist between those units over time and (c) the distribution of power between the principle units.

The changes bearing on any given security complex are numerous and continuous. For this reason, the key analytical question to ask is how such changes work to either sustain or alter the essential structure of the security complex (Buzan 1991:216-220; Buzan et al., 1998:13-14). According to Buzan, four main structural options are evident:

- Maintenance of the status quo means that the essential structure of a given security complex remains fundamentally intact over time. This does not mean that change does not occur, but it does mean that those changes tend to support rather than undermine the prevailing structure.
- Internal transformation of a given security complex occurs when the essential structure changes within the context of the existing outer boundary. This can occur as the result of regional political integration, changes in the distribution of power or changes to the pattern of amity and enmity.
- External transformation of a given security complex occurs when the essential structure shows change in the existing outer boundary. This can occur when major states join or leave the complex or a major change in the overall distribution of power, amity and enmity is evident.
- Overlay/Penetration can be the cause of change within a given security complex when one or more external powers move directly into, or out of that complex. This situation is distinct from the normal process of great power intervention (2003: 49).

This study works within these criteria for transformation that Buzan lays out. The change is discerned in the essential structure of the security complex and the structural transformation that occurs. In the case of this study, the external boundary of the complex in South Asia has changed as well as the power differentiation between the major units has altered as a result of the nuclearization of India and Pakistan. Thus, the proposition follows that the structure of Buzan's South Asian
security complex has undergone a transformation in its essential structure.

One of the most crucial advantages of Buzan's Regional Security Complex Theory is its ability to actually move beyond the developed world-centric approach to International Relations. The framework in intent also avoids the deterministic element of scientific theories in which neo-realism flourishes, as well as its lack of policy utility. In this, the detailed examination of the sub-state, state and the regional element expect to be of a better tool for policy utility that the generic systems theories lack. It is also the advantage of the region itself as a unit and referent of security. The neo-realist with their roots in this orthodox realist tradition emphasize state-centric security and the primacy of the global level. For them the global political structure is determined by the distribution of material power and is built around the two levels, system and the unit and neo-realism focuses on the systemic level. However, the RSCT is a combination of structure (neo-realism) and the process of securitization (constructivism), bringing together the two diametrically different theoretical approaches to International Relations. Both these approaches determine the content of regional security in the security complex framework.

The RSCT can also be more accurately contextualised between the three post-cold war theoretical worlds of state-centric (neo-realism), globalist (Liberal and Marxist) perspectives and the regionalist one. The patterns in RSC are determined by structure and domestic politics, where the determinism of structure is qualified by when and how were the issues securitised, essentially providing the bridge between the structure (neo-realism)-agent (constructivism) problem (Buzan 2003: 71).

Regional differences have been explored through the discipline of area studies and later even through strategic culture studies but there has not been any over-arching theory approach to understanding regions. The area studies literature looks at each designated area as specific and a world unto itself, emphasizing the particular while ignoring the commonalities, thereby rejecting any comparison. The RSCT rejects the area studies contention of each region being unique and incomparable and envisions and compares regions across the world in its framework, thereby offering important

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1 This section draws from Basrur, Rajesh M. (2006), "Decentralizing Theory: Regional International Politics", International Studies, 43 (4): 419-424.
insights into what makes one region more amenable to peace and consolidation compared to others. The RSCT addresses three significant weaknesses of neorealism: (i) 'it lacks a clear conception of the specificity of the regional level and therefore ... overestimates the importance of global polarity' (Buzan 2003: 481); (ii) it 'concentrates too heavily on military security and the state' (Buzan 2003: 481); and (iii) it tends to 'overlook the dynamics related to the social construction of regions and security' (Buzan 2003: 482).

Security complex bears striking resemblance to groups of states variously called subordinate systems, sub systems or regional subsystems. The Cantori-Spiegel notion of the core (1970: 20) is similar to the security complex. A multi core region equals the complex of complexes (1990: 11) in Buzan. The Cantori-Speigel concept of intrusive system (1970: 25) is simpler than Buzan's superregional level of analysis. The concept of intrusive system is particularly helpful with respect to China, which in Buzan's categorization is not at global level, nor can be located at the regional level (Buzan 1990: 17).

The system is not inherently global-centric in conception, even if its practice has been. The strength of systems theory is that any set of interacting units can be utilized as a frame of reference with the proviso that it be an 'interesting' rather than a 'trivial' system (Easton 1965: 25–34). On this basis, it is possible, theoretically, to treat regions as subsystems with varying degrees of autonomy with regard to each other and to the global system (in terms of loose or tight coupling); to find differing patterns of polarity and penetration in the numerous regional systems; and to incorporate military, economic and environmental interactions in a unified systemic theorization of global and regional politics (Basrur 2006: 422).

One of the over looked aspect of the RSCT is the centrality of the state-centric focus. This despite Buzan et al claims to a widening of the security agenda away from traditional modes. The state/systemic centric approaches to security cannot be done away with as the state and the international system drive particular security interests. The triumph of Buzan's regional analysis is that in line with the widening of the security agenda, the RSC incorporates the articulations of security from the regional level. To the credit of Buzan and Wæver, who are open about their objectives and their approach, they admit to the state being the central unit of analysis within their
theory and recognize that this could be problematic for analyzing non-state-centric situations (2003: 75). Instead of developing these various levels of analysis, the discussion of regional security in *Regions and Powers* (2003) is between the state and the international system. In effect, a very state-centric security analysis is presented with undue recognition of the impact of internal and external great powers and superpowers. The framework misses the dynamism of the region as a level of analysis; Buzan and Wæver do little to make regions more than the sum of their parts. Even though they take pains to discuss security from the domestic to the interregional and the global levels, ultimately, everything centers on the state.

At another level, Buzan and Wæver emphasize territoriality and territorial proximity as defining features of regions. Therefore, deterritorialized security issues like economic security, which are often raised from global perspectives, do not override territorial security considerations when speaking of regions. The twin focus on structure, albeit a structure ‘lower’ than the international system, and territoriality ensures that Buzan and Wæver’s application of regional security theory is solidly linked to the dominant security discourses within the field of international relations.

**Concerns of the study**

This study seeks to examine the construction of the ‘security complex’ in South Asia. The regional security complex theory categorizes South Asia as an independent historical region and has been called a ‘civilisational area’ (Buzan 1991: 187). The study seeks to examine the exclusion of China from Buzan’s South Asian security complex and scrutinize the evolving new power configuration in this region.

Specifically this study proposes to use the nuclearization of South Asia as a variable to examine the two issues in focus. The nuclearization of India and Pakistan and the resultant drive towards weaponization entails the possession or future development of Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability that has resulted in an expansion of this security complex. As per the regional security complex theory criteria of change, after the end of the cold war and the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, the South Asian complex reflects ‘continuity’, with India no longer looking hegemonic in the region (Buzan 2004: 6). Nuclear weapons have enhanced
Pakistani security and parity with India, thereby ending Indian’s conventional superiority. This study will first examine the ‘location’ of China in this new context of formally nuclearised India and Pakistan and then examine this ‘India dominant’ argument that lies at the core of Buzan’s South Asia security complex theory that seems to miss the interplay between three nuclear powers, India, Pakistan and China.

At the primary level, the study tries to locate China in Buzan’s South Asia RSC. The study tries to examine the South Asian region both as it is defined in Buzan’s RSCT and also its transformation in the current context with ICBM and mid air refueling technology that expands the region. This is attempted within the structural options for change laid down by the RSCT. The important schema to gauge change and continuity in the system is to map any change in the essential structure, external or internal. A change in the boundary of the complex, as per the RSCT is called an external transformation while a change in the configuration of power in the essential structure is said to transform the complex from within.

The omission of China from the South Asia creates two essential problems. First, China is treated as an external power in the region, despite it sharing over a four thousand kilometers of land border with South Asia especially after the occupation of Tibet in 1951. Second, as per the definition of the security interdependencies, China remains the principle determinant of the nature of South Asian security environment; and any analysis in Buzan’s framework cannot be done strictly at the regional level of South Asia. The presence of China in any India-Pakistan confrontation has to be factored in owing to the opaque military relationship, and political support that China provides Pakistan as also its close interaction with other South Asian states like Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

For a long time the Sino-Pak relationship has also involved transfer of crucial nuclear and missile technologies. At the superficial level, it appears that there is a unequal security link between China and India, while China is a major security concern for India; India is a relatively minor security concern for China. While this is expedient to Buzan’s aims, yet it appears to be ignorant of the geographical realities and empirical evidence. In the post-1998 engagement with India, China has shown increasing awareness of Indian defense capabilities which has altered the nature of its
engagement with India and South Asia. Along with the increasing importance of terrorist threats in the post-9/11 scenario, terrorism is also an important constituent of the common India-China agenda, thereby adding another layer to the security integration of China and South Asia.

The argument of China being integral to South Asia can, in fact, be traced back as far back as the early 1950's when Tibet ceased to exist as a buffer independent state between India and China and globalization as also the technological changes unleashed specifically by the nuclear and missile technology. Empirically, the Chinese efforts at containing India through a series of strategic defense relationship with compliant states on the Indian periphery, the presence of nuclear missiles in Tibet, can detract from the ‘minor’ security concern that India is said to be. Moreover, if we can for the purpose of this study separate Tibet and Chinese unity prior to the rise of the People’s Republic of China, we can make a persuasive argument regarding the strong linkages, religious and cultural between the Indian sub continent and Tibet.

The other issue to be explored is the ‘India Dominant’ argument made by Buzan in his article for International Studies titled, “South Asia Moving Towards Transformation: Emergence of India as a Great Power” (2004: 6). Buzan’s argument is that South Asia is an India dominated region and it was a matter of time before the challenge from Pakistan would be brushed aside. Pakistan in his view was able to challenge India through external alliances and later through the nuclear deterrence operating in the sub continent since the mid-late 1980’s. The RSCT believes that India is the successor state of the Mauryas, Mughals and also the British. During the cold war years and importantly prior to the India-Pakistan nuclear tests, South Asia was called bi-polar in structure and that after the fading away of the Pakistan resistance, India was expected to be the preponderant power in the region. However, this study holds that the nuclearization of India and Pakistan has affected and frozen the distribution of power in the South Asian security complex and this argument is explored within the context of a ‘regional order’.

The dominating power in a region is expected to define the configuration of order as per its security interests. When such a power is able to exercise control and
provide public goods such as security, a better commercial regime and infrastructure to the region, the region benefits and can free ride on the regional power. The importance of a regional order in an anarchic, self-help world cannot be over emphasized, especially so in an era where regional forces have been on the ascendance since the end of the cold war (Ayoob 2001: 127; Lake and Morgan 1997).

Regional order can be maintained in two ways (Ayoob 2001: 126). The first is when the pivotal or the dominating power acts as the security manager for the entire region; for example, India aspires to such a position in South Asia. Legitimacy in such cases is drawn from the public goods for the other members of the system. The pivotal or the pre-eminent power has hegemonic or managerial aspirations. This pivotal/pre-eminence provides coherence to the system by arranging the security concern of the region around its ambition and capabilities. Such powers have the potential to dramatically exacerbate the contours of conflict if disputed or challenged. In the absence of consensus and challenges to its legitimacy the region will suffer from chronic instability. In simple terms a pivotal power gives region cohesiveness, provides sense of security and keeps interfering external powers out.

The second path to regional order stems equal powers contending with each other to maintain stability by checking each other's ambition. The South Asian situation has been one in which neither of the conditions have been met fully. Structurally, South Asia should exhibit an Indian hegemony due to the sheer size of its resources but in practice it has been a mixture of both these paths to regional order. In simple terms, India can and has managed the security of the region with respect to most of the smaller states but not with Pakistan. India has not been as much able to impose its will on Pakistan. This intermixing of the two paths to regional order also perhaps explains the unstable situation in South Asia. The Pakistani challenge makes the Indian management difficult; on the other hand the Pakistan challenge is not credible enough to balance India in South Asia as it has little or no influence on the other states. The current situation is a phase in which the Indian state buoyed by economic growth backed by pragmatic diplomacy is on the rise and increasingly expanding its space. But it would be important to keep in mind that Pakistan is a middle sized state with a nuclear deterrent and it would be impossible for India to impose its will.
Structure of the Thesis

In this section the structure of the thesis will be enumerated. First, the two hypotheses to be tested are mentioned after which the research questions would be briefly explored. Finally, the details of the various chapters are listed out to elucidate the framework that will help navigate through the thesis.

The first hypothesis that we test is: Is China a part of the South Asian regional security complex? This is done through a series of discussion with historical, cultural, geographic and political evidences while also laying out Buzan’s framework and his reasons thereof in categorizing China as outside this complex. Within the same, the study then compares the conception of South Asia from the point of view of India, Pakistan as well as China. In doing this, the study will also draw out the literature on the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan as well as the missile configuration present and under development.

The second hypothesis that we tests is if this nuclearization of India and Pakistan has resulted in the durable expansion of the South Asian region as the bipolar India-Pakistan rivalry gives way to the triangular interplay between India, China and Pakistan? This is done with the evidence available in the history of India-Pakistan relations since 1947. In this narrative, the focus is on digging out the two elements of configuration of power and the patterns of relations. This is done in chapter three and the various wars and the crises are also examined towards collecting evidence to reaching our objectives.

In the process of this study we will also be looking at other contingent questions relevant to this area of work. The various research questions that form part of this study are as follows. Is China a part of South Asia? Does it mean that the region in the South Asian complex needs to be redefined? What is the effect of the overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan on the expanded regional security complex in South Asia? What has been the role of external powers? What does the future hold in terms of external intervention in the region? How does the India-Pakistan-China
triangular nuclear issue affect polarity in the complex? In what manner will this contest be played out and how will it affect regional order in South Asia?

This introductory chapter has laid out the regional security complex theory, locating it in the security literature. The next chapter examines the RSC theory that is scrutinized in the broader context of approaches to regional security. The post-cold war world and the increasing importance of the regional level will also be assessed. This chapter also contains a brief summation of the research project at hand. The second chapter titled, Genealogy of a Region: South Asia, examines the literature on regions, and makes the case for expansion of the South Asian region by going into historical, strategic and official documents. In this narrative the regions of both South Asia and Southern Asia will be defined as well the sub system literature in International Politics used to contextualize the regional security complex theory.

The third chapter titled, Re-configuration of Power: Impact of the Indo-Pak Nuclear Tests, will further the case of transformation of the complex in the region. Tracing the history of the growth of nuclear consciousness, the chapter will examine the impact of the 1998 nuclear tests on the region and the consequential power configuration. The four major crises would be important markers and evidence of the durable transformation in the sub-continent. The chapter tries to map the background of India Pakistan relations by going back to examine the entire gamut of issues between the two South Asian leaders with Buzan's scheme as our guiding posts. The point of the chapter being, to map the shifts in pattern of hostility and the distribution of power. This follows partially from the descriptive RSCT that organizes regional security in an empirical manner and more specifically marks out the landmarks to look for.

The fourth chapter, Factoring External Powers, examines the role of external actors in the region and focuses on alliance pattern and polarity. In particular, the chapter focuses on the role of the United States in the security complex, its past and the coming engagement in the future. The fifth chapter, Nuclearization and the Regional Security Complex, attempts to bring together the theoretical framework and
the evidence accumulated to turn attention to the two central propositions of the study, the location of China and the resultant configuration of power in the region. This chapter also takes cognizance of the evolving pattern of amity and enmity between the three countries.

The conclusion sums up the findings of the research and draws implications for Indian regional policy. The broad conclusions that we test in the study are that the region of South Asia does not account for the deep linkages that China has with the states in the region and the resultant power configuration and security constellation is difficult to explain by keeping China external. The study suggests that Southern Asia (South Asia and China) is a more holistic structure in locating and identifying the region. In the course of the thesis, the power configuration of Buzan’s South Asian region is also tested through an overview of the important markers in India-Pakistan relations. The study also accommodates China in this test of power differential.