Annexure I

TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

New Delhi, 9 August 1971

DESIRIOUS of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

BELIEVING that the further development of friendship and cooperation meets the basic national interests of both the States as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world,

DETERMINED to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation international tensions and the final elimination of the remnants of colonialism,

UPHOLDING their firm faith in the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between States with different political and social systems,

CONVINCED that in the world today international problems can only be solved by cooperation and not by conflict,

REAFFIRMING their determination to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

The Republic of India on one side,

AND

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on the other side.

HAVE decided to conclude the present Treaty, for which purposes the following Plenipotentiaries have been appointed:

On behalf of the Republic of India:
SARDAR SWARAN SINGH, Minister of External Affairs,

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic:
Mr. A.A. GROMYKO, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

WHO, having each presented their Credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOW:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples. Each Party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The high Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, goods neighborliness and comprehensive cooperation existing between them on the biases of the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.
Article II

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to hard the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

Article III

Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all Peoples and Nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and reclaims in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other States to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

Article IV

The Republic of India respects the peace loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.

Article V

Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security attaching great importance to their mutual cooperation in the international field for achieving those aims, the High contracting Parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both of States by means of meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

Article VI

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological co-operation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as will as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement of December 26, 1970.

Article VII

The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

Article VIII

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.
Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other Party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other High contracting Party.

Article IX

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of either Party being subjected to and attach or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

Article X

Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligations, secret or public, with one or more states, which is incompatible with this Treaty. Each high Contracting Party further declares that no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other Party.

Article XI

This treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either High Contracting Party declares its desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other High Contracting Party twelve months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

Article XII

Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this Treaty that may arise between the High Contracting Parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one.

On behalf of the Republic of India

SARDAR SWARAN SINGH
Minister of External Affairs.

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

A.A. GROMYKO
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Source: http://www.meaindia.nic.in/treatiesagreement/1971/chap434.htm
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MAR 23 1954

AIR MAIL
SECRET

Dear Horace:

Enclosed you will find a copy of a letter dated February 27, 1954 from the Governor General of Pakistan to the Secretary together with the Secretary's reply. I think that you will find the Governor General's letter to be an astonishing document.

We believe that Ghulam Mohammed's communication makes it necessary for us to explain quite clearly to him and other members of the Government of Pakistan as appropriate that United States military assistance to Pakistan does not involve any commitment on our part to support Pakistan vis-a-vis India.

Other leaders of the Pakistan Government, including the Prime Minister, may not know of the Governor General's letter. Further, I can see that it would become embarrassing to you for exchanges of such importance to be carried on without your knowledge. I, therefore, would like for you personally to deliver the Secretary's reply to Ghulam Mohammed. At that time you could tell him that you had been asked to deliver the reply and to request permission to give copies of both communications to the Prime Minister. You could explain that it would be embarrassing to you in carrying out your duties if you were not able to discuss such matters freely with the Prime Minister and perhaps his Foreign Minister.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Henry A. Byroade

Enclosures:

1. Copy of Letter From Ghulam Mohammed.
2. Secretary's Reply to Above Letter.

The Honorable
Horace A. Hildreth,
American Ambassador,
Karachi.
By diplomatic bag.

P

Y

GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S HOUSE

KARACHI

February 27, 1954

Personal

My dear Secretary of State,

You will forgive me for worrying you with a private communication, but I feel I must write to you on the maturity of our mutual plan which has culminated in the Eisenhower Declaration about Arms Aid to Pakistan the other day. I feel I must thank you and congratulate you on the success of your policy.

You will remember that on the 12th November when we dined with your President I came back from White House to the State Department and talked to you about our difficulties which were bound to assume more serious proportions—viz. Kashmir and canal water. As apprehended, it has come out to be true and things are rather difficult.

I had occasion to go through the papers containing the Bank proposals regarding division of the water of the rivers transversing the Punjab. You will forgive me if I say very frankly to you that the Bank proposals do not constitute a fair settlement. They seem to have been guided by political considerations rather than justice and fair play. I expected and looked forward that the USA will exert their influence in favour of fairness and justice, but unfortunately my impression has been belied. I need not tell you that I have utmost faith in you as a great gentleman and experienced politician. I know and I am sure in my heart that you will not agree to anything which smacks of injustice and opportunism and is not based on fundamental rights of countries and lower riparians. I will not worry you more except telling you that my hopes are founded in your promise to me to ensure a fair settlement of the Kashmir and canal-water disputes.

If you
If you will kindly look into the matter at your leisure and examine it carefully, I am sure you will put a stop to any scheme based on political considerations rather than fair play and justice. On hearing from you, I shall be glad to send you a complete note of our views for your information.

Regarding Kashmir, I apprehended trouble from Nehru and he is trying to use the American Aid to us as an excuse for going back on international stipulations and obligations. We took a calculated risk in these two matters depending on your word and promise. I do hope you will stand by us so that Nehru is not allowed to get out of international obligations and is not able to throw dust in the eyes of the world over Kashmir on the excuse of American Aid. I appreciate the delicacy of the situation, but I feel that my country can rely on your promise to ensure justice for us.

Do kindly forgive me this letter, but I feel I must speak frankly to the one man whom I regard as a great friend of Pakistan and a well-wisher of Muslim countries.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Ghulam Mohammed

John Foster Dulles, Esquire
Secretary of State,
White House,
Washington, D.C.,
United States of America.
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM: American Embassy, Karachi

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF: Embassy Despatch No. 749, May 11; Embassy Cable No. 933, May 19; Embassy Cable No. 943, May 21, 1954

May 21, 1954

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Revised Document Received from the Governor General

As stated in Embassy's telegram No. 933 (see also Embassy's telegram No. 743, dated May 21), a revision of the note enclosed in the Embassy's despatch No. 749 was sent to the Ambassador under a personal covering note dated May 15. This revision is enclosed.

The Embassy desires to emphasize again that these documents were given to the Ambassador in the strictest confidence and any revelation of the source would seriously damage relationships with the Governor General.

John K. Emerson
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure:

Copy of Revised Note

cc: American Jidda

EXEMPT from Declass.

Per E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-4

Pentagon - 1990

[Handwritten note: Secret file on same subject]
COPI OF REVISED DOCUMENT RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL

I have in the course of my discussions regarding Arab countries joining USA and other countries in a plan for mutual defence, felt that there is a wave of opposition in some Arab countries and that others are lukewarm. My discussions have shown that this opposition proceeds from the causes set out below which need early attention:

(1) The creation of the State of Israel in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world has caused deep and abiding resentment. This has been further aggravated by the methods followed by Israel and the help they have received from USA sources and, as is alleged in some quarters, even from Government and semi-government agencies.

(2) The policy of Israel in driving out helpless refugees in large numbers and delaying any settlement of their rehabilitation has caused great bitterness. I am convinced that as long as these problems remain unresolved and so long as the attitude of Israel remains unconciliatory this sore will go on running and may ultimately lead up to a serious breach of the peace in that area.

(3) The Israel Government received aid - monetary as well as military - through USA and other sources. Most of the armaments are smuggled in by individuals or private organizations. The financial aid to Israel by USA has been fairly large, without which they could not have existed. The Arabs feel alarmed both on economic and political grounds. The failure of Arab military action six years ago has made them more bollicose in their attitude. It is clear that a just settlement of these questions is imperative. So long as fear of Israel aggression against the neighbouring Arab countries persists, there is no possibility of wider and larger problems being approached in a realistic spirit.

2. I would suggest for consideration:

(a) The frontiers between Israel and Arab countries should be guaranteed by USA and UK so that in case of aggression the guarantee can be successfully invoked.

(b) A settlement should be arrived at on the question of refugees, whereunder Israel should accept liability for the rehabilitation of a substantial proportion of the refugees in their original homes. Unless some such action is taken, I am afraid the attitude of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon will not change.

I attach importance to these countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Syria, joining the other countries of the region for mutual defence. I am particularly concerned lest the oil resources of these countries, including those of Iran, should fall into the hands of the enemy at any stage. There is an apprehension in the minds of the Arabs that the Jews being wealthy they dominate the press and party organizations in USA and thus exercise a powerful influence in Washington. That fear coupled with past experience makes them distrustful of USA. I have tried to assure many Arab leaders that in case they join the peace pact, the USA would not seek to interfere in the internal
affairs of Arab countries but their suspicions and apprehensions are so deep and have taken such firm roots that positive action on the lines suggested above is needed to dispel their distrust.

3. The Muslim lands starting from Pakistan and ending with Turkey, including the Arab States and Egypt, may prove crucial from the point of view of defence in case of any world conflagration. I need not dilate on the strategic importance of this area, its resources and its manpower. I feel sure that some action on the lines suggested is imperative if it is desired to secure the cooperation of the peoples of this area in a plan of mutual defence. I have myself doubts about the intentions and designs of Israel. Their recent behaviour in carrying out repeated attacks against neighbouring Arab countries and causing loss of life and damage to property does not encourage the view that Israel may not be inspired by expansionist designs.
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM: AMONGEN LAHORE

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF: Annexure IV

DATE: 23 December 1952

SUBJECT: MEMO OF CONVERSATION: GENERAL MOHAMMED Ayub KHAJ, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PAKISTAN ARMY, AND RALPH A. GIBSON

The Commander-in-Chief, in relation to the talk of some of the younger officers concerning military governments in Egypt and Syria, and Lebanon, stated that he had talked with his Divisional Commanders and had reviewed the situation in the three countries. He stated that he had told the Divisional Commanders that "talk of the Pakistan Army taking over the Government" was to be stopped, and that the position of the Army was to protect the country. He pointed out that the Pakistan Army did not have trained men in governmental affairs, and that such talk was a danger to the country.

General Ayub stated that he had been talking to the leading politicians of Pakistan, and had told them that they must make up their minds to go whole-heartedly with the West. He stated that last year when Pakistan was in a strong financial position, the political leaders were not interested in making a decision, and wanted to stay neutral. Now they realize the position of the country.

He stated that the Pakistan Army will not allow the political leaders to get out of hand, and the same is true regarding the people of Pakistan. He stated that he realized that the Army was taking a large responsibility, but that the Army's duty was to protect the country.

The Commander-in-Chief stated that the Pakistan Army was friendly to the United States.

Ralph A. Gibson
American Consul General
ANNEXURE V


R 161050Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7884
PLEASE PASS: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, DEPARTMENTS OF AIR FORCE, ARMY AND NAVY, JCS, CINCSTRIKE
FROM AMBASSADOR
SUBJ: MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY FOR SOUTH ASIA
A. WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT HERE.
1. THE AGREEMENT OF RUSSIA TO SUPPLY SOME LETHAL EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN AND THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN PAKISTAN REPRESENT TWO NEW DIMENSIONS TO THIS PROBLEM. THEY WILL BE DISCUSSED LATER ON IN THIS MESSAGE, BUT FIRST IT MIGHT BE WELL TO REVIEW WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT HERE.
2. DURING THE EISENHOWER-NIXON ADMINISTRATION PAKISTAN WAS SOMETIMES CALLED "THE MOST ALLIED OF OUR ALLIES."
   (A) SEATO
   (B) CENTO
   (C) UNCURK
   (D) U-2 STAGING PRIVILEGES
   (E) PESHAWAR
3. TODAY:
   (A) INACTIVE IN SEATO
   (B) INACTIVE IN CENTO EXCEPT FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
   (C) INACTIVE IN UNCURK
   (D) U-2 PRIVILEGES LONG DEPARTED.
   (E) PESHAWAR BEING PHASED OUT
   (F) CLOSE TIES WITH BOTH USSR AND CHICOMS
   (G) FURTHERMORE, FOR REASONS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH US, THE AYUB GOVERNMENT HAS FALLEN AND MARTIAL LAW HAS BEEN IMPOSED BECAUSE OF CHAOS, ANARCHY, AND THREATS BOTH TO STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
AND OF EXTREME LEFTIST-ORIENTED DOMINATIONS OF EAST WING WHERE RADICAL ELEMENTS WERE IN ASCENDANCY.

4. HOW DID THIS TRANSFORMATION TAKE PLACE IN A FEW YEARS? OBVIOUSLY THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE FAULT ON THE PART OF THE PAKS, BUT LET US CONSIDER OUR FAULT AS IT APPEARS TO THEIR EYES IN SPITE OF THE SUPPORT WE HAVE GIVEN THEM IN SEVERAL WAYS ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC AID:

(A) IN 1962, CONTRARY TO OUR PLEDGED WORD, WE FURNISHED LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO INDIA WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH PAKISTAN;

(B) IN THE SPRING OF 1965 WE RUDELY AND ABRUPTLY CALLED OFF A SCHEDULED TRIP TO THE US BY PRESIDENT AYUB;

(C) IN THE FALL OF 1965, THE PAKS BELIEVE CONTRARY TO OUR WRITTEN ASSURANCES, WE FAILED TO COME TO PAKISTAN'S AID WHEN IT WAS QUOTE ATTACKED UNQUOTE BY INDIA. (ON NOVEMBER 5, 1962 AMBASSADOR MCCONAUGHY HAD DELIVERED TO THE GOP A SECRET AIDE MEMOIRE STATING: "THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REAFFIRMS ITS PREVIOUS ASSURANCES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THAT IT WILL COME TO PAKISTAN'S ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION FROM INDIA AGAINST PAKISTAN.")

THERE IS NO REPEAT NO DOUBT THAT INDIA DID COMMIT AGGRESSION AGAINST PAKISTAN IN SEPTEMBER OF 1965. THE PRINCIPAL JUSTIFICATION FOR IT AND FOR OUR SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS WAS THAT PAKISTAN, AMONG OTHER THINGS, HAD BEEN INFILTRATING ARMS AND MEN INTO INDIAN-HELD KASHMIR. THERE IS NO REPEAT NO DOUBT THAT THIS WAS TRUE. BUT WHERE DOES ONE STOP UNWINDING THE BALL OF CORD OF THE PAST? IT IS ALSO EQUALLY TRUE THAT INDIA HAD RENEGED ON SEVERAL PROMISES TO HOLD KASHMIR PLEBISCITE, WHICH HAD ALSO BEEN CALLED FOR BY UN RESOLUTIONS.

(D) WE NOT REPEAT NOT ONLY FAILED TO COME TO PAKISTAN'S AID AT THE TIME OF THE 1965 WAR, BUT WE SUSPENDED ECONOMIC AIDE, CANCELLED THE MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM WHICH WAS THEN UNCOMPLETED, AND CANCELLED ALL SPARE PARTS PROGRAMS. WHILE WE DID THE SAME TO INDIA, THE EFFECTS ON PAKISTAN WERE MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN ON INDIA BECAUSE ALL OF PAKISTAN'S EQUIPMENT WAS AMERICAN WHILE VERY LITTLE OF INDIA'S WAS;

(E) CHINA CAME TO PAKISTAN'S AID BY MASSING TROOPS ON THE INDIAN BORDER ISSUING ULTIMATUMS TO INDIA, AND LATER FURNISHING PAKISTAN WITH SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF TANKS, AIRCRAFT AND OTHER EQUIPMENT,
AND STARTED ECONOMIC AID TO PAKISTAN.
(F) ALL OF THIS HAD THE FOLLOWING RESULTS:
I. PAKISTANIS AT ALL LEVELS FELT THAT ITS ALLY, THE UNITED STATES, HAD STABBED IT IN THE BACK;
II. PAKISTANIS AT ALL LEVELS WERE GRATEFUL TO CHINA AND BELIEVED THAT IN ALL THE WORLD CHINA WAS THE ONLY DEPENDABLE FRIEND THEY HAD;
III. CHINA'S MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID BROUGHT TO PAKISTAN CHINESE EXPERTS, TECHNICIANS, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND WORKERS;
III. THOSE CHINESE BROUGHT WITH THEM THE RED BOOK, MAO BADGES AND SLOGANS AND ALL OF THE OTHER TRAPPINGS OF CHINESE PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSION;
5. IN APRIL OF 1967 WE INFORMED THE PAKS THAT WE WERE NOW REPEATING NOW RESUMING THE SALE OF SPARE PARTS AND WOULD HENCEFORTH APPROVE THIRD COUNTRY SALES, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, OF LETHAL END-ITEMS CONTROLLED BY THE UNITED STATES.
(A) EFFORTS TO OBTAIN TANKS FROM GERMANY, ITALY, AND BELGIUM ALL ABORTED DESPITE OUR PRESIDENT'S PROMISE OF OVER A YEAR AGO TO PRESIDENT AYUB THAT 100 WOULD BE FURNISHED "NOW" AND 100 "LATER".
(B) A POSSIBLE TURKISH TRANSACTION HAS BEEN IN THE WORKS FOR MONTHS, BUT HAS HIT MANY SNAGS AND MAY NOT RPT NOT BE CONSUMMATED. IF IT IS CONSUMMATED, DELIVERIES WOULD APPEAR TO BE 15 MONTHS AWAY.
(C) MEANWHILE, IRAN HAS BEEN CLAMORING TO FURNISH THE TANKS, BUT WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED APPARENTLY OUR "THIRD COUNTRY POLICY" MEANS ANY THIRD COUNTRY EXCEPT IRAN -- OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY WHICH IS READY, ABLE, AND WILLING TO PERFORM.
NOTE: NOT PASSED DOD BY OCT.
R 161100Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7885
PLEASE PASS: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, DEPARTMENTS OF AIRFORCE, ARMY AND
NAVY, JCS, CINCSTRIKE
FROM AMBASSADOR
SUBJ: MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY FOR SOUTH ASIA
RP6. AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE ABORTIVE EFFORTS WE HAVE SUCCEEDED
ONLY IN:
(A) ANNOYING INDIA REPEATEDLY;
(B) EMBARRASSING GERMANY, ITALY, BELGIUM, AND TURKEY;
(C) UPSETTING GREECE (WHICH OBJECTS TO THE UPGRADED TURKISH
TANKS WHICH THE PAK DEAL ENVISAGES);
(D) OFFENDING IRAN; AND
(E) ESTRANGING PAKISTAN WHICH IS BECOMING CONVINCED THAT WE NEVER
REPEAT NEVER DID MEAN TO HELP IT BUT HAVE ONLY BEEN ENGAGED IN
LEADING IT DOWN A PRIMROSE PATH.
7. MEANWHILE, INDIA HAS HAD MAJOR AID FROM RUSSIA, AND HAS CREATED
INDIGENOUS CAPACITY TO PRODUCE TANKS, JET AIRCRAFT AND OTHER
EQUIPMENT.
8. THE PAKS WANT AMERICAN EQUIPMENT FOR LOGISTICS, TRAINING, FINANCIAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL REASONS. THEY DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT TO BE
DEPENDENT UPON THE COMMUNISTS FOR ALL OFF THE SAME REASONS BUT
WHAT CHOICE HAVE THEY?
9. IT IS EVIDENT THAT, IN DESPERATION, THEY ARE AGAIN TURNING TO THE
COMMUNISTS FOR THEIR PRINCIPAL SUPPLIES. IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT TOO LATE
TO ARREST THIS.
10. IN THE RECENT POLITICAL TURMOIL IN PAKISTAN THE IMPERATIVES HAD
BECOME EVEN MORE ACUTE.
(A) PRO-CHICOM BHASHANI AND RADICAL OPPORTUNIST BHUTTO WERE
FLIRTING WITH EACH OTHER AND MIGHT WELL HAVE JOINED FORCES.
(B) THE MILITARY FORESAW A RADICALIZATION OF THE EAST PAKISTAN
SEGMENT OF THIS STRATEGICALLY LOCATED NATION OF 125,000,000 PEOPLE --
THE FIFTH LARGEST IN THE WORLD.
11. DESPITE ITS INCLINATIONS AND PREFERENCES, HOW EFFECTIVE AN
ANTI-COMMUNIST INSTRUMENT CAN A MILITARY BE WHICH IS DEPENDENT UPON
THE COMMUNISTS FOR ITS EQUIPMENT? DESPITE OUR TREATY OBLIGATIONS, WE CAN NOT RPT NOT PERMIT OURSELVES TO BE DRAGGED INTO ANOTHER VIETNAM IN EAST PAKISTAN, AND THE BEST WAY TO AVOID IT IS TO SELL THE LIMITED EQUIPMENT NEEDED WHILE MAKING IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THEY MUST DEFEND THEMSELVES. CERTAINLY WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT THIS BULWARK TO GO INTO HOCK TO THE COMMUNISTS BY DEFAULT.

12. (A) OUR PRESENT POLICY BASED PARTLY ON THE PREMISES THAT IT WILL PREVENT A DANGEROUS ARMS BUILD-UP AND WILL DISCOURAGE DIVERSION OF RESOURCES FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO MILITARY HARDWARE, BOTH PREMISES HAVE BEEN PROVED FALSE BOTH IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. THEREFORE, THE POLICY HAS FAILED.

(B) THE OTHER PREMISE FOR OUR PRESENT POLICY IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT FURNISH LETHAL EQUIPMENT TO EITHER INDIA OR PAKISTAN BECAUSE IN 1965 THEY USED OUR EQUIPMENT TO FIGHT EACH OTHER. THIS HAS A HOLLOW RING WHEN WE ARE NOW RPT NOW FURNISHING EQUIPMENT TO BOTH JORDAN AND ISRAEL, WHO FOUGHT A WAR WITH EACH OTHER IN 1967 AND WHO ARE STILL SHOOTING AT EACH OTHER. IT IS TRUE THAT, ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT RPT NOT PREVENT THE 1965 WAR OUR MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY LEVERAGE, ESPECIALLY WITH PAKISTAN, DID HELP END IT QUICKLY.

13. DIRECT (BUT LIMITED) US SALES WOULD:

(A) GIVE US AN ELEMENT OF LEVERAGE INSTEAD OF THE COMMUNISTS;

(B) HOLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES WITHIN REASON BECAUSE OF:

   I. THAT ELEMENT OF LEVERAGE; AND

   II. THE CHEAPER PRICE AND GREATER VALUE OF OUR EQUIPMENT.

(C) BENEFIT OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SITUATION ALONG WITH OTHER ECONOMIC BENEFITS. IF THE 100 TURKISH TANK SALE DOES TAKE PLACE IT WILL COST UP TO $4,000,000, WHEREAS WE WOULD PROFIT FROM A DIRECT SALE.

(D) REMOVE THE HYPOCRISY, INEFFECTIVENESS AND EMBARRASSING THIRD COUNTRY ELEMENTS OF OUR PRESENT POLICY.

(E) THE SUPPLYING OF ARMS TO BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN WOULD INCREASE OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THEM TOWARD AN ULTIMATE RAPPROCHEMENT.

(F) GIVE US MORE LEVERAGE TO WORK TOWARD USG-USSR COOPERATION IN THE SUBCONTINENT.

14. IT IS SAID THAT CHANGE IN POLICY WOULD OFFEND INDIA:

(A) INDIA IS OFFENDED BY OUR PRESENT POLICY;

(B) INDIA HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT IT TOO WOULD LIKE TO PURCHASE
LETHAL EQUIPMENT FROM US;
(C) WHAT WOULD INDIA DO IF OFFENDED? IT IS ALREADY OPPOSED TO US ON ALMOST ALL INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. IT IS ALREADY CLOSELY ORIENTED TOWARD RUSSIA. IT ALREADY HAS COMMUNISTS GOVERNING IN A NUMBER OF STATES.
(D) A LIBERALIZATION OF MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY FOR THE SUBCONTINENT WOULD NOT RPT NOT REPRESENT A CHOOSING OF PAKISTAN OVER INDIA NO RPT NO SUCH CHOICE IS NECESSARY EITHER WAY.
(E) INDIA WOULD OF COURSE FEEL CALLED UPON TO OBJECT, FOR THE RECORD, BUT THE INDIANS ARE SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH TO REALIZE THAT PAKISTAN WOULD GET THE ARMS IT NEEDS SOMEWHERE, AND IT SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT A FEAT OF DIPLOMACY TO CONVINCE THEM THAT IT IS IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS THAT IT COMES FROM US RATHER THAN FROM CHINA OR EVEN RUSSIA.
B. RUSSIAN MILITARY SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN.
1. WE HAVE EXCELLENT REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED BETWEEN THE GOP AND THE SOVIETS CONCERNING SUPPLY OF LIMITED NUMBER OF TANKS (BUT LESS THAN PREVIOUSLY SUPPOSED) AND ARTILLERY AND THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO SUPPLY SU-7 AND MIG-21 AIRCRAFT. WE ALSO HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT EXCHANGES OF DELEGATIONS, ASSIGNING PAK PERSONNELL TO SOVIET MILITARY COLLEGES AND ACADEMIES, VISITS OF SOVIET NAVAL SHIPS TO PAK HARBORS FOR REFITTING, ETC., CULTURAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY EXERCISES, ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION.
NOTE: #AS RECEIVED,
WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.
NOT PASSED DEFENSE BY OC/T.
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7886
PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE, DOD, DEPARTMENTS OF AIR FORCE, ARMY AND NAVY, JCS, CINCSTRIKE
FROM AMBASSADOR
SUBJ: MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY FOR SOUTH ASIA
2. TO MY MIND THE FACT THAT RUSSIAN MILITARY SUPPLY HAS COMMENCED, AS WE FEARED FOR TWO YEARS IT WOULD, IS NO RPT NO REASON NOT RPT NOT TO LIBERALIZE OUR POLICY. ON THE CONTRARY, IT EMPHASIZES THE URGENCY OF A PROMPT LIBERALIZATION.
(A) THE QUANTITY OF MATERIEL SO FAR AGREED ON IS NOT RPT NOT VERY SIGNIFICANT. A SMALL NUMBER OF SOVIET TANKS PLUS 100 FROM TURKEY FIFTEEN MONTHS FROM NOW (IF THEY MATERIALIZED) STILL LEAVES PAKISTAN BEHIND THE SCHEDULE OF "100 NOW AND 100 LATER" WHICH WE PROMISED AS OF MARCH 1, 1968, AND FAR BEHIND OUR ORIGINAL MAAG AND MAP PROGRAMS.
(B) THE FACT THAT THE DOOR TO RUSSIA IS NOW RPT NOW OPEN AND MORE CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE, ALONG WITH TRAINING, MANEUVER AND OTHER PERSONAL RELATIONS, INDICATES THAT UNLESS WE DO STEP IN PROMPTLY IT WILL BE TOO LATE;
(C) WITH A POWERFUL RUSSIAN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND RUSSIAN NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE ARABIAN SEA AND INTERMITTENTLY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, THE THREATS AND PRESSURES ON IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, THE TRUCIAL STATES, OTHER FRIENDLY ARABS AND TURKEY ARE INCREASING. A PAKISTAN ORIENTED TO RUSSIA AND/OR CHINA WOULD ADD TO THOSE PRESSURES AND THREATS WE KNOW THAT THESE NATIONS ARE CONCERNED, ESPECIALLY THE SHAH WHO HAS BEEN ANXIOUS TO HELP, OR TO SEE US HELP, PAKISTAN MILITARILY, AND SAUDI ARABIA, AS RECENTLY CONFIRMED BY JIDDA 1167 OR APRIL 9, 1969.
C. MARTIAL LAW
1. IT RECOGNIZED THAT THE EXISTENCE OF MARTIAL LAW MAY MAKE THE CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM GREATER (REUSS AMENDMENT) BUT ONE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT SHRINK FROM A PROPER DECISION BECAUSE IT WILL ENCOUNTER SOME OPPOSITION. IF THE EXECUTIVE WILL ACT ONLY WITH UNANIMOUS OR EVEN NEAR UNANIMOUS CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL THEN IT WILL BE
PARALYZED, FOR NEARLY ALL POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND DECISIONS MEET WITH AT LEAST SOME DEGREE OF CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION.

THE REUSS AMENDMENT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT EXPRESS THE SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT SALES SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE MADE TO MILITARY GOVERNMENTS BUT RATHER ONLY NOT REPEAT NOT TO MILITARY "DICTATORS" WHO "ARE DENYING SOCIAL PROGRESS TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE."

(A) THERE IS NO RPT NO EVIDENCE THAT YAHYA IS A MILITARY DICTATOR;
(B) THERE IS NO RPT NO EVIDENCE THAT THE MARTIAL LAW REGIME IS DENYING SOCIAL PROGRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN;

(C) ON THE CONTRARY, IN ITS THREE WEEKS OF POWER THE REGIME HAS REFRAINED FROM PRESS CENSORSHIP, HAS NOT RPT NOT OUTLAWED POLITICAL PARTIES, HAS MOVED TO INCREASE FOOD AVAILABILITY IN EAST PAKISTAN AND TO REDUCE FOOD PRICES, HAS RAISED SALARIES OF LOWER PAID GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, HAS TAKEN LEIBERAL STEPS IN THE FIELD OF LABOR RELATIONS HAS REOPENED THE SCHOOLS, COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, HAS MET THE JUST STUDENT DEMANDS INCLUDING LOWER FEES AND INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS, HAS SET UP MACHINERY TO ATTACK THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND HAS ELIMINATED THE REQUIREMENT THAT PAKISTANIS OBTAIN EXIT PERMITS TO VISIT INDIA. IT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTIONS TO HOLD ELECTIONS AND TO RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND I FOR ONE BELIEVE THEY MEANT IT. IT HAS MAINTAINED A VERY LOW PROFILE, INTRUDED AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE INTO CIVIL AFFAIRS LEAVING ADMINISTRATION TO THE CIVIL SERVICE, MADE LITTLE OR NO REPEAT NO SHOW OF FORCE, AND MADE ONLY SCATTERED ARRESTS NOT RPT NOT INCLUDING ANY PROMINÉNT POLITICAL LEADERS. IT HAS NOT RPT NOT YET SHOWN ITS HAND IN VERY SENSITIVE AREAS OF EAST WING AUTONOMY, INCREASED ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO EAST, EXCEPT FOOD GRAINS, POWER OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT VERSUS PROVINCES, AND PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATION IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, ETC. BUT IT IS TOO SOON TO EXPECT IT TO DO SO.

(D) FOR ALL OF THE ABOVE REASONS, THE REUSS AMENDMENT IS NOT RPT NOT APPLICABLE CERTAINLY AT THIS TIME;

(E) EVEN IF IT WERE APPLICABLE, THE PRESIDENT HAS THE RIGHT TO WAVE IT;
(F) WHILE I HAVE NOT RPT NOT RECOMMENDED IT, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE REUSS AMENDMENT APPARENTLY WOULD NOT RPT NOT APPLY TO GRANT AID.

2. ALTHOUGH I HAVE HAD NO RPT NO OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS SINCE THE INSTALLATION OF MARTIAL LAW, I CAN STATE THAT IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM IN JUNE OF 1968 AND MARCH OF 1969 I FOUND THE GREATER MAJORITY OF THOSE TO WHOM I TALKED (INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE APPROPRIATIONS FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES OF BOTH HOUSES) TO BE IN FAVOR OF A LIBERALIZATION. IN FACT NO RPT NO SINGLE ONE EXPRESSED HIMSELF TO ME AS BEING OPPOSED TO IT. IN SENATOR SYMINGTON'S LETTER TO ME ON MARCH 14, 1969 (COPIES TO UNDER SECRETARY RICHARDSON AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO) HE STATES THAT "...IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WRITES THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO THE SELLING OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN, AND THAT HE BELIEVES SUCH SALES WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, I PERSONALLY WOULD HAVE NO REPEAT NO OBJECTION."

3. WE HAVE HAD, AND ARE HAVING, ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH OTHER MILITARY GOVERNMENTS.

4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT FOR SOME TIME TO COME THE PAKISTANI MILITARY WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL DETERMINANT OF BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICY. IT IS ENGAGED, IN ITS VIEW, IN PRESERVING THE COUNTRY FROM CHAOS AND FROM COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AT HOME AND FROM ABROAD. IT IS PRO-AMERICAN ORIENTED. WE SHOULD KEEP IT THAT WAY. WE CAN NOT RPT NOT EXPECT IT TO STAY THAT WAY IF WE FORCE IT TO BE DEPENDENT ON THE COMMUNISTS FOR ITS VITAL EQUIPMENT. BOTH ITS HARDWARE AND ITS MORALE ARE AT STAKE, AND ITS REQUIREMENTS ARE MODEST, BOTH IN TERMS OF QUANTITIES AND DEGREE OF SOPHISTICATION. IT DOES NOT RPT NOT SEEK SUBSTANTIAL EXPANSION OF NUMBERS OF EQUIPMENT OR (AT THIS TIME) AN INCREASED LEVEL OF MODERNITY BUT BASICALLY ONLY REPLACEMENT.

NOTE: NOT PASSED DEFENSE BY OC/T

# AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.
FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJ: MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY FOR SOUTH ASIA

5. The GOP military command sees its equipment requirements as necessary both to meet external threats and to preserve internal law and order. The most urgent requirements will be used to maintain its general position of strength relative to India. But intelligence reports in recent months indicated growing activity of revolutionary-minded, pro-Peking domestic elements, and the military must face this contingency as well. We even have one unconfirmed report of the training of guerrillas in North Vietnam. A pro-Peking take-over in East Pakistan would be as dangerous to India as it would be to our own national interests.

6. Most important of all, a liberalization of policy would give us leverage to persuade the martial law government to continue to work for social justice, to effect an early return to constitutional civilian government, and to provide for a better deal for East Pakistan. The greater the percentage of their hardware which is American, the more important are our spare parts and training programs, among other considerations. The thrust of the communists will be to influence the GOP toward the retention of an authoritarian government and against the private sector of the economy. We must not RPT not leave the most important leverage to influence the present and future course of this and successor governments to the communists, and time is of the essence.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. It is recommended that our arms policy toward both India and Pakistan be liberalized to permit direct sales of lethal equipment on a case-by-case basis. In effectuating such a policy we would be selective and deliberate, and we could impose inhibiting conditions on acquisitions elsewhere as we have with respect to third country sales. The Conte and Symington amendments could be more effectively implemented if we were in the supply picture.

2. It is recommended that such a decision be reached ASAP.

3. At some appropriate occasion, either upon advising Yahya of a decision on military supply and/or in connection with economic
SISTANCE. WE SHOULD DISCUSS WITH HIM OUR LINE OF THINKING ABOUT THE
STORATION OF POLITICAL LIFE, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ETC., AND INFORM
THAT IN OUR VIEW OUR ASSISTANCE MUST BE RELATED TO THESE.
I SHOULD BE NOTED THAT A CHANGE IN POLICY NOT RPT NOT MEAN INSTANT
IVERY OF HARDWARE. THERE WOULD OF NECESSITY BE A SUBSTANTIAL
D-TIME BETWEEN A DECISION AND AGREEMENT ON ITEMS AND CONDITIONS
D THEIR DELIVERY THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO WORK FOR THE CONDITIONS
WANT HERE AND TO RECONSIDER IF THE SITUATION SHOULD DETERIORATE.
HE HUGE ECONOMIC EFFORT WE HAVE MADE IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAS
UGHT US FAR LESS GOODWILL THAN THE RUSSIANS HAVE OBTAINED BY
ING INDIA AND THAN THE CHINESE AND IN THE FUTURE THE RUSSIANS HAVE
AINED BY SUPPLYING ARMS TO PAKISTAN.
AKISTAN PER SE MEANS NOTHING RPT NOTHING TO ME. THE UNITED STATES
MERICA DOES. I'M PROUD OF THE FACT THAT I'M STILL SQUARE ENOUGH TO
IE IN THE BOY SCOUT OATH. WHEN I ABANDONED MY OWN CAREER TO
E HERE FOR TWO YEARS IT WAS IN THE HOPE OF BEING ABLE TO HELP
RE SOME OF AMERICA'S LOST PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE. I DID NOT RPT
OME TO PRESIDE OVER THE FUNERAL OF THE LAST VESTIGES OF THAT
STIGE AND INFLUENCE. I HOPE THAT HISTORY HAS NOT RPT NOT CAST ME IN
UNWILLING ROLE.
OVE ALL THIS IS NO RPT NO TIME FOR FURTHER PROCRASTINATION. A
URE TO MAKE AND ANNOUNCE A DECISION NOW RPT NOW WILL
UESTIONABLY BE INTERPRETED BY THE GOP AS ONE MORE EFFORT AT
Y AND DECEPTION. ALTHOUGH I WOULD CONSIDER IT A GRIEVOUS ERROR
THE VIEWPOINT OF US INTERESTS, I WOULD PREFER TO TELL THEM
KLY THAT WE WILL NOT RPT NOT LIBERALIZE OUR POLICY IN THE
SEEABLE FUTURE RATHER THAN TO SAY THAT WE MUST CONSIDER THE
TER FURTHER. AT LEAST WE WOULD PRESERVE SOME SELF-RESPECT FOR
VERNMENT AND FOR THIS MISSION.
EE OUR HELP NOW RPT NOW. THEY NEED IT DESPERATELY. A FRIEND IS
SON WHO HELPS YOU WHEN YOU NEED IT.
VE BOLDLY AND COURAGEOUSLY, AND NOT RPT NOT SLINK IN THE
OWS OF INDECISION.
ERT.
OT PASSED DEFENSE DEPT BY OC/T.
NOTE

This estimate assesses the present and prospective state of the Pakistani civil war, the role of India and other powers, and the outlook for Pakistan's two components -- if the Bengali uprising should be put down, and if it should succeed.

THE ESTIMATE

I. THE CONFLICT IN BENGAL

1. When they launched their campaign on 25 March, the West Pakistani military leaders probably expected -- or at least hoped -- to destroy the Awami League (AL) and regain effective control of East Bengal in a matter of days, if not hours. They clearly miscalculated; most of the top AL leaders have been arrested, but lower level party leaders continue to be active throughout much of the countryside. While no precise figures are available, substantial elements of the 13,000-man East Pakistani Rifles (the provincial paramilitary force) remain in being, as do a few of the Bengali units of the Pakistani Army. Although beset by serious logistic and leadership problems, these armed cadres continue to resist the West Pakistani units in East Bengal; they are able to move fairly easily through most of the countryside.

2. Islamabad's forces are in command of the two principal cities, Dacca and Chittagong, and a few of the lesser ones. Even there, the Army's hold is maintained by severely repressive measures and rigid curfews. Most economic activity has halted; the ports are virtually closed and most transport is disrupted. A number of bridges have been destroyed, ferry boats sunk, and rail lines (including that between Dacca and Chittagong) cut. Nonetheless, regular army forces can move through the region at will, except where inhibited by transport difficulties.

3. The prospects are poor that the 30,000-odd West Pakistani troops can substantially improve their position, much less reassert control over 75 million rebellious Bengalis. This is likely to be the case even if the expeditionary forces is augmented. For most of East Pakistan's residents, the time has come for a separate Bengali nation. Many years of
economic discrimination and political repression by the west wing had made an autonomous Bangla Desh the choice of over 75 percent of Bengali voters in the December 1970 elections. The refusal of Pakistan's military leaders to honor that choice and their attempt to terrorize the Bengalis into submission have almost certainly ended any general desire in East Bengal to see the Pakistani union continue.

4. Whether the army is to face widespread non-cooperation or continued active resistance will depend in part on how much help India gives the Bengalis. All but a few miles of East Bengal's land frontiers are with India, and the movement of arms and guerrillas across these very extensive borders cannot be prevented. There is considerable evidence that some arms shipments have already taken place.* The Indian Government's support for the Bengalis will be determined by a mix of response to domestic popular pressures -- which are quite strong -- and of an assessment of India's own national interests. Statements of support in parliament and the press have been very strong. West Pakistan, with its military forces, has long been a principal enemy of India. A successful Bengali insurgency would serve to weaken and discredit West Pakistan. The East Wing, basically uninterested in the Kashmir dispute and never the scene of major Indo-Pakistani fighting, poses no military threat to New Delhi. To the contrary, its leaders -- particularly Mujibur Rahman of the AL -- have advocated cordial relations with India. Hence, we estimate that India will continue and increase its arms aid to the Bengalis and this will enable them to develop at a minimum the kind of insurgency capability which the army cannot entirely suppress. In so doing, India is accepting the risk that some of its arms may fall into extremist hands. In the time the Bengalis may prove more than a match for the army except where the latter is concentrated in a few strong points.

* The evidence for this includes observation of weapons being trucked into East Bengal from the Indian border [text not declassified]

5. New Delhi has an additional incentive to aid the Bengalis -- and sooner rather than later. It is probably concerned that a rebellion lasting for a considerable period could throw up a new, extremist leadership (as opposed to the relatively moderate AL one) which would eventually take over the new country. The advent of a radical regime in East Bengal would create very severe problems for India, especially in the neighboring Indian state of West Bengal. The latter, a very important industrial center, is badly troubled in its own right. Several extremist Communist groups are major political parties there. Social and economic conditions in its capital of Calcutta are exceptionally grim, and its residents would be quite susceptible to disruptive or even secessionist appeals from a radical East Bengal regime. Accordingly, the Indians are likely not merely to work for the liberation of Bengla
Desh from West Pakistan, but also to seek to assure the advent there of a new government satisfactory to them.

6. India would prefer to aid the Bengalis by more or less clandestine means -- e.g. non-official "advisors", covert arms support, and sanctuaries. It could also undertake various forms of pressure, including troop movements towards either of its frontiers with Pakistan. If a rebellion dragged on or if India saw significant chance of a radical leadership emerging, it would probably give more direct support. These actions could lead to deeper and deeper Indian involvement and to armed clashes with Pakistani forces; even open military intervention by India could not be ruled out. India has sufficient forces to defeat Pakistani forces in East Bengal without drawing down heavily on its troops on its other frontiers.

7. India of course runs the risk in supporting or intervening in a Bengali rebellion. To do so could provoke Islamabad into launching an attack on Western India. However, in the 1965 war the Indian military showed itself more than a match for the Pakistanis. The Indians are now much better equipped than in 1965, and face forces weakened by transfer of Pakistani units to East Bengal.

8. In addition to clandestine support, India has been applying diplomatic pressure in aid of Bengla Desh. It has urged the UN and major powers to express humanitarian concern and had pressured Ceylon -- with only limited resources -- to withdraw landing rights of Pakistani military flights to East Pakistan. In addition, India would probably extend diplomatic recognition to a government of Bengla Desh if and when one satisfactory to India could demonstrate effective control of even a moderate portion of East Bengal.

9. Whatever the extent of Indian support to the Bengalis, the West Pakistanis will face increasingly serious difficulties in East Bengal. The area is principally riverine. With the advent of the monsoon in late May or early June, there will be extensive flooding which will further isolate the Pakistani Army in a few urban strong-points. Given the army's lack of complete control of water transport, it will probably be forced to abandon a number of bases in the region, and limit its presence to those half dozen or so places which can be reached by air (helicopters are scarce) and those which can be reached by sea -- principally Chittagong. Even supplying these will not be easy. Transport of troops and supplies would be made more difficult if Ceylon terminated the landing rights it is now extending to Pakistani aircraft. The bulk of the arms and ammunition must be transported by sea from the west wing at a pace likely to strain Pakistani shipping capacities, and may result in the shortage of such items in the expeditionary force. Nonetheless, West Pakistani forces could probably, if they so chose, hang on to these selected bases for some time and conduct occasional forays into nearby areas. But if the Bengalis acquire greater military capabilities and develop something approaching a new national political leadership, the
West Pakistanis' days in Bengal would be numbered, though the date and manner of their departure cannot now be forecast.

10. A good deal would probably depend on outside pressures, particularly by the great powers, and on developments in the west wing itself. In West Pakistan, the army's move against the Bengalis appears to have been generally popular at first. Support is likely to dwindle, however, if the cause appears to be a losing one and as adverse economic consequences become apparent. Further, however much they wish to keep the east wing, the westerners know they would pay a very high price if they alienated the US, the USSR, and the West European countries. All these powers figure importantly, one way or another, in assuring a continued flow of trade and foreign aid necessary to the west wing's economy, in getting acceptance in the international community, and – ultimately – in helping provide protection against the threat believed to be posed by its large and hostile Indian neighbor.

11. So far, with the qualified exception of China, none of the major powers have shown any support for the central government's efforts in Bengal. Moscow has put itself firmly on the record in opposition to the West Pakistani military suppression of East Pakistan; its choice was no doubt heavily influenced by the Indian attitude. It has called for a political settlement, and probably does not believe Soviet interests would be served by prolongation of the conflict. The Soviets have probably concluded that the odds favor a separatist solution or at least that Islamabad has little chance of imposing its will on East Bengal in any lasting and effective way.

12. Communist China, circumspect at first in its reactions to Pakistani developments, has recently sent a note to the Indian Government accusing it of interfering in Pakistani affairs. Peking, particularly if strongly urged to do so by the Islamabad government, will probably undertake other measures to assist. These may include an increase in deliveries of military equipment to West Pakistan, sharper threatening words to the Indians, and even a maneuvering of Chinese troops near the Indian border. Chinese military intervention in support of the West Pakistanis does not now seem likely. Further, the Indians, pleased with Soviet condemnations of Islamabad's repression of the Bengalis, probably see Moscow serving as a strong inhibition on Chinese moves in the subcontinent. Such an assessment is probably correct; the Chinese leadership is not likely to risk a major conflagration in an effort to bail out beleaguered West Pakistanis trying to repress a popular uprising. The Chinese may in time face a dilemma should an extremist group come to the fore in East Bengal and seek Peking's support.

13. Stories of atrocities in Dacca and elsewhere have been widely circulated in the Western world, and West Pakistani actions have been condemned by a number of private citizens and groups. No single Western country has much influence on the situation, but general
Western disapproval may make the government in Islamabad less certain of the wisdom of present policies and more amenable to pressures for change.

II. PROSPECTS FOR EAST BENGAL

A. As a Part of a United Pakistan

14. In the unlikely event that the West Pakistanis did succeed in reasserting military control over the Bengalis, they would almost certainly find it impossible to develop a new political system based on anything approaching a consensus of opinion in the two wings. In the December 1970 elections, the Bengalis gave an overwhelming mandate for political and economic autonomy: opinions have since hardened. The best the West Pakistanis could hope to achieve would be something like a restoration of conditions which existed under Ayub (and which were ended by mass public uprisings in 1968-1969). Routine and low-level administrative duties would be in the hands of Bengalis loyal to Islamabad (and such individuals do remain, though they are in a minority); ultimate authority would continue to be in the hands of West Pakistani authorities, and the army would remain the final arbiter of power. The two areas would remain one economic unit, and the central government would make some effort to cope with the formidable economic problems of East Bengal. But a substantial majority of the population would continue to be strongly disaffected, probably to the point of launching sporadic uprisings. The Pakistani Government’s talk about enlisting loyalist Bengalis in any significant numbers is wishful thinking.

B. As an Independent Nation

15. The political complexion and outlook of an independent Bangla Desh are extremely difficult to forecast. If it came into being rather soon, and if Mujib and the principal AL leaders were still alive and permitted to return, they would quickly take over. Mujib’s political and economic philosophies are essentially moderate ones; he wishes to develop good relations with India and adopt a generally balanced and neutralist international posture. In domestic affairs he advocates a mild type of socialism, emphasizing an improvement in the living standards of the Bengali people and a concerted attack on the many economic problems of the area. On the other hand, the longer the fighting goes on, the more the prospects for a takeover by an extremist and radical leadership could be enhanced. We know almost nothing about such radicals; in recent years the politics of East Bengali protest have focused almost exclusively on the issue of autonomy. Nonetheless, given the large number of Bengali extremists in India and the ease of interchange of ideas and people between the two regions, radical movements could develop extremely rapidly.

16. Whatever its government, and independent Bangla Desh would, in the short term, have some things going for it. Relatively speaking for an underdeveloped country, its balance of payments problems would not be bad, thanks to its large current exports of jute. It would
almost certainly repudiate the large debts to West Pakistan and the outside world incurred in its name. Able to trade freely with India, as it has not been in the past, it could buy many goods more cheaply.

17. But Bangla Desh would face serious problems both in the short and long term. The floods and cyclone of 1970 raised import requirements to about 3 million tons of food grains for the period until June 1971. Some, though almost certainly not all, of this has already been met by shipments of PL 480 and West Pakistani food grains. But Bengali ports have been closed since 25 March, and ships carrying food have been diverted. The internal transportation network has been disrupted. We have no information about food conditions throughout East Bengal now, but severe food shortages are almost certain and far distant certain areas not out of the question. Beyond this, the basic economic problems in that region are as severe as those faced by any country in the world, and they appear unlikely to improve much in the next several years.

18. Indeed the formidable and probably insoluble nature of these problems will make East Bengal – be it East Pakistan or Bangla Desh – an object of concern to its people, its neighbors, and the world in general for the foreseeable future. With 70 to 80 million people packed into an area the size of Florida, unable to grow enough food to feed itself, almost devoid of natural resources, facing a decline in the sale of jute (its principle export), periodically subjected to floods and cyclones, East Bengal will be plagued by economic privation and political crisis. Were the moderate Mujib to come to power, it is questionable whether he could do much to improve the lot of his people. If he did not, the euphoria of independence would likely disappear within a comparatively short period of time, and there would be an increased interest in and susceptibility to the radical and extremist ideas and groups which now exist in West Bengal. Its government, lacking well-organized security services, might have difficulties coping with such challenges.

19. This would of course make Bangla Desh a continuing object of concern to the Indian Government. East Bengal – weak but potentially dangerous – is likely to be under constant Indian scrutiny. It will probably, in the name of national security, be an object of manipulation and even of open interference on New Delhi’s part. Indeed, an independent Bangla Desh is likely to remain very much in the Indian orbit so long as that country has a government strong and decisive enough to seek to exercise its influence. *

III. PROSPECTS FOR A SEPARATE WEST PAKISTAN

20. The successful secession of the east wing would produce a severe psychological shock in West Pakistan. Indeed, President Yahya may well either resign or be ousted before the issue is decided in the east. Separation would also bring on painful economic difficulties, e.g., lower foreign exchange earnings, the loss of a protected market for its
industry, higher per capita expenses for its armed forces, among others. The region might experience so severe a crisis that West Pakistan could itself split into as many as four separate nations, though this contingency now appears unlikely. Its relatively large and indigenous army, embittered by the loss of the east wing, could probably stifle any secessionist or insurgent efforts in the west. Unlike East Bengal, West Pakistan's longer term economic prospects are fairly promising, though it remains a poor country. It is a net food exporter, has a modest but growing industrial base, and experiences no severe population pressures on the land.

* The Indians have the capability both in terms of contiguity of territory and numbers of troops to maintain control of both East and West Bengal, however difficult or unpleasant the task would be.

21. The army is likely to remain a principal political factor in West Pakistan, though it might eventually turn over formal political power to some civilian groups whose views are compatible with those of the military establishment. Whoever takes charge is likely to suffer from the diminished prestige and stature that comes with being the spokesman of 55 million people as opposed to 130 million. But over time this is likely to appear less serious. The loss of East Pakistan, which would probably have become an increasing economic and political burden, could prove to be a blessing in the long run.

22. The West Pakistani military machine's capabilities would remain – the army would see to that. West Pakistan would be likely to pursue the same foreign policies it now does: maintaining an antagonistic posture towards India; seeking close ties with China, particularly in the field of military supply; and at the same time trying to achieve the best possible relations with the US, West Europe, Japan, and the USSR with the object of enabling its economic development programs and enhancing its international stature.
DIPLOMATIC TELEGRAM

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPT PASS AEC GERMANTOWN

INFO: US Mission GENEVA (DISTO)

Amembassy ISLAMABAD

FROM: US Mission IAEA VIENNA ANALYST

SUBJECT: Discussion with I.H. USMANI, Former Chairman

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

RE: Discussion with I.H. USMANI, Former Chairman

Pakistan's Under Secretary for Science and Technology

(formerly Chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy
Commission) overnighted in Vienna, enroute to the

Stockholm Environment Conference, for the purpose of

seeing the U.S. Mission. He asked USG support for his

candidacy for the position of Director General of the

IAEA in the event Director General Eklund does not run

again. I explained to him that the USG had no

knowledge of Eklund's intentions, that we had not

focused on the problem and would not do so for some

time (Eklund's current tour concludes at the end of

1973), and that the views of many other governments

besides the United States would affect the final
decision. I mentioned specifically the obvious Soviet

support for Eklund and the frequent favorable
comments of the Board of Governors on Eklund's sound
budgetary practices and frugal management of the IAEA.

Usmani then shifted ground, saying he could understand
that there could be no decision or commitment at this
time regarding the next Director General. He said he
was definitely interested in replacing Upendra GOSWAMI

as Deputy Director General in charge of Technical

Assistance (Goswami's current tour extends into the

Spring of 1973). I reacted with some surprise to

Usmani's professed interest in this job, particularly

in view of the long discussion we had just had

concerning the importance and significance of what he

was now doing in Pakistan. Usmani said he was tired,

felt he needed a change of environment and was
particularly interested in getting back into his primary field of atomic energy and bringing its benefits to the developing world. I told him that it was my understanding that the Latin American countries were anxious to provide a candidate to replace Goswami and that the matter had been discussed with the Director General, who seemed to be inclined to securing a Latin American candidate. The USG had already indicated that it would support such a candidate and it might be awkward for us to change our position. Usmani's answer was that a deal should be made with the Latins whereby he would get the DSG job and they would provide the candidate for the now vacant No. 2 position as Director of Technical/Option XX. We left it that the United States would take another look at the matter, but I made clear there was no commitment.

Usmani said he wished to discuss the matter with Eklund in Stockholm and subsequently telephone Ambassador Glennan about June 20 in Vienna. Usmani will then be in the UK.

COMMENT: Despite Usmani's professed support for and devotion to Bhutto, I got the impression that he may feel that his tenure in his present job is uncertain. It is of course also possible that he finds the frustrations of the science and technology job so great at the moment that he is seeking a way out. (End LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

(Begin SECRET) At one point in the conversation, Usmani alluded to a remark by Bhutto which implied a Bhutto criticism of Pakistan's not having done enough in its atomic energy program to leave a possible option for development of a nuclear weapon capacity. In saying this, Usmani emphasized his own personal dedication to assuring that the Pakistani program had been limited to peaceful objectives. He hoped the program would continue in the course he had set, with no diversion of resources to possible military applications. He added that he thought Bhutto's remarks were based essentially on his frustrations in dealing with an India which has kept open a nuclear option. Usmani felt confident that Bhutto would ultimately reconsider the matter and come to the inevitable conclusion that Pakistan could not play the game of trying to be a threshold nuclear weapon power. Nonetheless, Usmani more than hinted that one of the principal reasons he wanted to leave Pakistan was his disagreement with any policy decision which might divert some of the resources of the Pakistani atomic energy program away from peaceful applications.
13 May 1998

Text of the Indian Prime Minister’s letter to the American President

The following is the text of the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee’s letter to the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton:

Dear Mr. President,

You would already be aware of the underground nuclear tests carried out in India. In this letter, I would like to explain the rationale for the tests.

I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, specially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years. And for the last 10 years we have been the victim of unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it in several parts of our country, specially Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.

Fortunately, the faith of the people in our democratic system as also their patriotism has enabled India to counter the activities of the terrorists and militants aided and abetted from abroad.

The series of tests are limited in number and pose no danger to any country, which has no inimical intentions towards India. We value our friendship and cooperation with your country and you personally. We hope that you will show understanding of our concern for India’s security.

I assure you that India will continue to work with your country in a multilateral or bilateral framework to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament. Our commitment to participate in non-discriminatory and verifiable global disarmament measures is amply demonstrated by our adherence to the two conventions on biological and chemical weapons. In particular, we are ready to participate in the negotiations to be held in Geneva in the conference on disarmament for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.
I enclose for your information the text of the press statement issued after the nuclear tests were carried out today. I close with the expression of my highest consideration for your country and yourself.

Yours Sincerely,

A. B. Vajpayee
Annexure IX

Following is the full text of the Sino-U.S. Joint Statement on South Asia issued in Beijing on June 27: Sino-U.S. Presidential Joint Statement on South Asia Beijing, 27 June 1998

Introduction

Recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, and the resulting increase in tension between them, are a source of deep and lasting concern to both of us. Our shared interests in a peaceful and stable South Asia and in a strong global nonproliferation regime have been put at risk by these tests, which we have joined in condemning. We have agreed to continue to work closely together, within the P-5, the Security Council and with others, to prevent an accelerating nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia, strengthen international nonproliferation efforts, and promote reconciliation and the peaceful resolution of differences between India and Pakistan.

Preventing a Nuclear and Missile Race in South Asia

The P-5 Joint Communiqué of June 4, which was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1172, sets out clear and comprehensive objectives and a plan for action to address the threat of a South Asian nuclear and missile arms race. We pledge our full support for the steps outlined in the Joint Communiqué, and again call on India and Pakistan to stop all further nuclear tests and adhere immediately and unconditionally to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to refrain from weaponization or deployment of nuclear weapons, and from the testing or deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and to enter into firm commitment not to weaponize or deploy nuclear weapons or the missiles capable of delivering them.

Strengthening Global Non-Proliferation Cooperation

China and the United States remain firmly committed to strong and effective international cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, with the NPT as its cornerstone. We will continue to bolster global nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and reiterate that our goal is adherence of all countries, including India and Pakistan, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as it stands, without any modification. States that do not adhere to the Treaty cannot expect to be accorded the same benefits and international standing as are accorded to NPT parties. Notwithstanding their recent nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapons states in accordance with the NPT.

We reaffirm our determination to fulfill our commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. To this end, both countries have signed the
We call for the prompt initiation and conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of the 1995 agreed mandate, for a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We urge India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit, in such negotiations with other states in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to reaching early agreement.

We both actively support the Strengthened Safeguards System now being implemented by the IAEA, and will promptly take steps to implement it in our countries.

Reducing Tensions and Encouraging the Peaceful Resolution of Differences between India and Pakistan

We are committed to assist where possible India and Pakistan to resolve peacefully the difficult and long-standing differences between them, including the issue of Kashmir. We welcome the resumption of dialogue between the two countries and encourage them to continue such dialogue, and we stand ready to assist in the implementation of confidence-building measures between them, and encourage the consideration of additional measures of this type.

Responsibilities of China and the U.S.

China and the United States have long sought friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. We reaffirm this goal and our hope that we can jointly and individually contribute to the achievement of a peaceful, prosperous, and secure South Asia. As P-5 members, and as states with important relationships with the countries of the region, we recognize our responsibility to contribute actively to the maintenance of peace, stability and security in the region, and to do all we can to address the root causes of tension.

We reaffirm that our respective policies are to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and that to this end, we will strengthen our national export control systems.

Next Steps

Close coordination between China and the United States is essential to building strong international support behind the goals to which we are committed in response to nuclear testing by India and Pakistan. We will stay closely in touch on this issue, and will work with other members of the P-5 and the Security Council, with other Asian and Pacific countries, and with the broader international community to forestall
further instability in South Asia, achieve a peaceful and mutually acceptable resolution of differences between India and Pakistan, and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.

SIMLA AGREEMENT

Simla Agreement on Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and President of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto, in Simla on July 3, 1972.

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.

In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:

(i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.

(ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peace and harmonious relations.

(iii) That the prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful coexistence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

(iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means.

(v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality.

(vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

Both governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.

In order progressively to restore and normalise relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:

(i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land, including border posts, and air links, including over flights.

(ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.
(iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.

(iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.

In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the governments agree that:

(i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.

(ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

(iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.

This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Both governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that in the meanwhile the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.