CHAPTER 5:

Nuclearization and the Regional Security Complex

This chapter will take stock of the findings of the previous three chapters that examined first, the region of South Asia, second, the power configuration of the region and lastly the role of external powers. In the process, this chapter will scrutinize the theoretical framework of the regional security complexes with regard to this study and compare them. This chapter would also assess the hypothesis with regard to the evidences collected.

It would be important to keep in mind the chief tasks that this study examines i.e. the exclusion of China from Buzan's South Asian security complex and in extension to scrutinize the new and evolving power configuration in this 'new' region. The nuclearization of South Asia is the primary variable that was used to examine the above two issues. The argument being that following the May 1998 nuclear tests through which India and Pakistan gate crashed into the nuclear club and the drive towards weaponization that entails the possession and future development of Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability, results in an expansion of this security complex. At another level of argument, the study also factors in the other developments that are taking place concomitantly. These 'newer' developments are related to the process of Chinese modernization that has connected Tibet to the Chinese heartland through a network of rail and road infrastructure. Some of these rail and road heads are very close to the Indian borders in the Ladakh, Sikkim and Arunchal Pradesh. In the last few years, we have also seen the beginnings of border trade that was interrupted due to the border dispute in South Asia. The opening of the Nathula Pass in Sikkim is a good example of this sort of expansion and the plans for re opening trade through the Shipki La pass in Himachal Pradesh ([Steps Being Taken to Increase Trade with China through Land route], Press Release, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and & Industry, Government of India, 14 July 2004). The Chinese infrastructure growth also lead up to Central Asia and while we discuss this, it would be imperative to mention the Pakistan-China Friendship Highway also known as the Karakoram Highway that links the ancient Xinjiang town.
of Kashgar in China to Havelian in Abbotabad, finally linking unto the Grand Trunk road near Islamabad. Future plans involve the building of the Lhasa-Kathmandu and the Lhasa-Shigatse and Yadong (Near Nathula in Sikkim) rail link and the Chinese are said to be waiting for the response of the Indian government (Dasgupta 2006).

The energies unleashed by globalization and the intermeshing of national economies have also brought the Tibetan region of China closer to South Asia after the cold post-independence and liberation period and China’s New Tibet Policy also seeks to promote regional economic and trade cooperation with South Asian countries (Dasgupta 2007). Moreover, in the April 2007 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit, China was admitted with Observer status into the SAARC (Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC Summit). Thus, the study, while from drawing on present developments and cognisant of the future trajectory of future into the future also has in chapter two also examined the historical, cultural linkages between Tibet and South Asia to buttress our argument. While the core Chinese state is located in East Asia, its occupation of Tibet and the subsequent interactions with the South Asian states, makes China not only internal to the region but also its key state.

In accepting the Buzan point, that the lack of balance in an insecurity link (Buzan 1991: 194-95), indicates the existence of a boundary between a lower- and higher -level security complex, wherein high-level complexes define global or systemic complexes, we run into the problem of separating the grain from chaff when it comes to determining the ‘mutuality’ of threat perception through rhetoric and actions. It is an evidenced fact that both China and India mutually feel threatened of each other: the issue that can be considered debatable is the relative strength or weakness of the threat perception and the resultant balancing to ameliorate that threat. The discussions in chapter two have so far proved the salience of China in the region and we have also discussed why the Chinese discussions of threat perception from India are less visible than vice versa.

To further illustrate the point we will imagine the United States in place of China. By Buzan’s logic, both these states are external to the region and one chooses the United States due to its capacity to project and wield power in all corners of the
world. But we do not get the same picture. The United States despite being the only global power with projection capabilities across the globe, matters relatively less in the South Asian security calculus than the Chinese. There could be many reasons for this, perhaps its distant location, due to the significant disinterest with which the United States views the region (and by corollary the significant interest with which China views the region; evidenced in its intensive interactions positive and negative with all the South Asian states). Therefore, geographic proximity is the key intervening variable here. This geographic determination of security is also maintains fidelity to the key dictum of the regional security complex that security while a relational phenomenon is negotiated by geography.

According to the RSCT criteria of change, after the end of the cold war and the sub-continental nuclear tests in 1998, the South Asian complex reflects ‘continuity’, with India looking hegemonic in the region (Buzan 2004). In chapter 2, Genealogy of the Region, we looked at the nuclear factor in the expansion of the region; the area studies conundrum informing on the subject of ‘regions’ and using these two factors worked around the terminological riddle of South Asia versus Southern Asia. In support of the argument that China by virtue of its take over of Tibet we cited historical factors, we briefly dealt with the politics of ‘regions’ and also took cognizance of the missile capability of South Asian states. In this section we propose to take our evidences and make a detailed examination of the way Buzan deals with the China-South Asia issue and conclude while suggesting the weakness in Buzan’s South Asia formulation.

This study proposes that China is a part of this expanded region owing to developments in the period after 1949 and continues unabated with technological changes and new circumstances wrought about with the growth of ‘regionalism’ and the globalization of security. Secondly, based on our findings in chapter 3, Reconfiguration of Power: Impact of the Indo-Pak Nuclear Tests, we conclude that India is not dominant in South Asia as Pakistan has posed more than a credible challenge to India at first using external alliance and later with its nuclear deterrent. In this new view of ‘Southern Asia’ as we choose to call this redefined region we choose to examine the interplay between three nuclear powered states which has strong issues of
nationalism, identity, ambition and territorial disputes that makes this triangle highly volatile despite the benign phase that this region is undergoing. We do not seek to over hype the 'volatility' of this region, the intentions are academic in all its representations and tries to understand the crucial issue in regional security terms for a better description in the hope that a enhanced understanding is more likely to produce superior policy making on parts of the governments and mark out issues of future research for the analysts.

In its redefinition of the location of China, this study attempts two paths of arguing against Buzan's framework. The first is the historical one stating that Tibet is part of the 'South Asian' world by virtue of its location, modern history and the ties that bind it to the region, cultural, religious and linguistic. And by virtue of the amalgamation of Tibet in the People's Republic of China, South Asia should ideally include China to be able to do justice to mapping the realities. The second level of argument takes the route that uses the nuclearization of South Asia as a variable and contingent on the weaponization that includes the development and procurement of ICBM technology as well as development of refueling aircrafts, the security perimeters both India and Pakistan expands South Asia to Southern Asia to include China and the adjoining regions. This is all attempted within, the structural options for change laid down by the RSCT, an important schema to gauge change and continuity in the system is to map any change in the essential structure, external or internal. A change in the boundary of the complex, as per the RSCT is called an external transformation while a change in the configuration of power in the essential structure is said to transform the complex from within. This study proposes, based on its findings, that due to change in the boundaries of the region there has been an external transformation and in challenging the India dominant argument and with the inclusion of China in this region, it also argues a case for changes in the internal configuration of power.

The above findings however have to account for the efficacy of Buzan's scheme in his efforts of theory building conforming to the criterion that the RSCT mandates. Since we first dealt with the region argument, we will first discuss it. The omission of China from the South Asia creates two essential problems. First, China is
categorized as an external power despite it sharing over a four thousand kilometers of border with South Asia after the Chinese integration of Tibet in 1954. Second, as per the definition of the security interdependencies, China is the principle security concern for India; and any analysis in Buzan’s framework cannot be done at the regional level of South Asia. The presence of China in all the India-Pakistan confrontation has to be factored in owing to the opaque military relationship, and political support that China provides Pakistan as also its close strategic interaction with other South Asian states like Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Sino-Pak relationship has also involved transfer of crucial nuclear and missile technologies. At the superficial level, it appears that there is a unequal security link between China and India, while China is a major security concern for India; India is a relatively minor security concern for China. While this is expedient to Buzan’s aims, yet it betrays ignorance of the geographical realities and empirical evidence. The argument of China being integral to South Asia can, in fact, be traced back as far back as the early 1950’s when Tibet ceased to exist as a buffer independent state between India and China and the forces of globalization as also the technological changes have since been unleashed, specifically by the nuclear and missile technology. Empirically, the Chinese efforts at containing India through a series of defense and strategic relationships with compliant states on the Indian periphery, the presence of nuclear missiles in Tibet, can detract from the ‘minor’ security concern that India is said to be. Moreover, if we can for the purpose of this study separate Tibet and Chinese unity prior to the rise of the People’s Republic of China, we can make a persuasive argument regarding the strong linkages, religious and cultural, between the Indian subcontinent and Tibet.

**Buzan on the China conundrum**

This section will flesh out the development of Buzan’s definition of the South Asian region and how he handles the China problem with the series of his writings beginning in 1986 when in the edited book with Gowher Rizvi, *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers*, the regional security complex first makes its appearance (Buzan 1986). In the introduction wherein the complex is introduced, Buzan mentions that there is sometimes a
difficulty in the identification of a security complex is the existence of a lopsided security link between two major local states...China and India provides a clear example of this problem. China is a major security concern for India: arguably even the principal one. Chinese military strength lies close to India's main centre of population, and China holds territory claimed by India. But by itself, India is a relatively minor security concern for China, Indian military strength sits far from China's heartlands, and weighs little compared with other threats to China's interests...A situation like this typically indicates the existence of a boundary between a lower and a higher level security complex.. (Buzan 1986: 11).

Buzan goes on to term the lower complex as composing local states whose power does not extend beyond their immediate neighbors, he builds this along with the remark that 'constraint on power is a key element in the existence of relatively self-contained local security dynamics' and further infuses his conception of great powers which tally and make a higher level complex 'whose power is sufficient to impinge on several sectors' (Ibid: 11) due to their enormous size. This distinction also enables Buzan to define the range of levels of the framework from the internal security environment of individual states-lower level (local security complex)-higher or great power complex (or complexes define the system level and penetrate to varying degrees into local complexes) (Ibid: 11-12). On China, Buzan writing during the cold war era postulates that South Asia shares its border with the higher level Sino-Soviet complex which due to geographical proximity is discussed at a super-regional level and not a global one. Buzan further suggests that a case could be made for including China in the global level owing to its key position in the Soviet-American balance but its reach is not global and its rivalry with Soviet Union is 'beginning to take on the form of an Asian supercomplex. The odd position of China means that some confusion will result no matter what level it is included within' (Buzan 1986: 17).

In People, States and Fear (1991), Buzan introduces the element of 'mutuality' to solve the problem of a lopsided security link as between China and India, China and Vietnam (Buzan 1991: 194). The evidence points to a strong insecurity link and so possibly a security complex but the lack of balance in the relationships points to distinct complexes. And in keeping with his 1986 formulation that included great power states as composing higher level complex, Buzan states that 'the question then becomes not a dispute about boundaries of a security complex but
about the relative weight of local security dynamics in relation to those pressing on the region from outside’ (Buzan 1991: 195). In *Regions and Powers* (2003), Buzan et al admit that

significant security dynamics between South Asia and China posed a problem for early attempts to formulate South Asia as a model for RSCT. This problem was handled by putting China wholly at the global level. In light of a more fully formulated theory, the Sino-Indian security dynamics arising during the later 1950’s [the occupation of Tibet] can be better seen as part of the wider process by which an Asian supercomplex was forming at that time (Buzan 2003: 103-4).

Buzan further suggests that over the past half a decade or so with China becoming more powerful and influential and steadily

knitting together the three regional security dynamics especially between North East and South East Asia and, to a lesser extent... South Asia... The resultant interregional security dynamics were both strong enough and sustained enough to generate an Asian supercomplex centered on China, but with only weak links between South And Southeast Asia (Buzan 2003: 96-97).

In short Asia is in the process of forming an Asian Supercomplex centered on China (located at the interregional level due to weak mutual security linkages with India) and including the earlier southeast, northeast and South Asian complex.

The supercomplex could indeed already be in existence and the ‘weak links’ between South Asia and Southeast Asia, not so weak after all. India’s Look East Policy (LEP) traced to the Narasimha Rao regime in Delhi is perhaps the most important evidence of the salience of South East Asia in India’s post-cold war strategic outlook as well as the continuation of older relations in the changed world. The LEP was designed to foment economic linkages with the new economic tigers of South East and the Asia-Pacific region. There is a significant view that sees India’s LEP designed to counter growing Chinese influence in the South East and Asia Pacific region* (Naidu 2000: 338; Batabayal 2006:180; Acharya 2003-04: 150-51). This is not to suggest that the sole motivation for the LEP is to counter China, rather it

* For a good exposition on this line of thought, see Batabayal, Anindya (2006). “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India’s Look East Strategy”. *China Report*, 42 (2). Batabayal works with the assumptions of an extended neighbourhood for the new century’s foreign policy, of which South East Asia and Asia Pacific are integral to the centrality of India in the Indian Ocean littoral region.
should be understood as a multi-pronged policy measure to network with the pulsating economies of South East Asia, help develop the landlocked North East region by seeking an outlet to the East. This also provided hope for being free of the region that was mired in conflict and connecting linkages with similarly poised regions.

India became a sectoral dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1995, a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996, and a summit level partner (on par with China, Japan and Korea) in 2002 (ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations). This period also saw the expansion of ASEAN to Indian borders with the inclusion of Myanmar, thus, strengthening linkages. India is also involved in a whole range of regional initiatives in South East Asia such as the BIMSTEC, Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Forum and the Indian Ocean Rim countries. The ranges of agreements with the ASEAN are also a reflection of the depth and the outlook of relations that India and ASEAN nations seek with the other. So far, the following agreements have been inked; Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (for establishing a FTA in a time frame of 10 years), Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Agreement on "India-ASEAN Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity", Entrepreneurship Development Centres (ASEAN Secretariat). The suggestion is that the mix of security related and economic initiatives with the region point towards more than weak linkages as does the sheer gamut of regional initiatives that India is participating in.

**South Asian Configuration**

This section will try to conclude the argument regarding the transformation of the power configuration complex in the South Asian region. We have examined the background of India-Pakistan relations, the consequential power configuration and also briefly delved into the four major crises as markers and evidence of the ‘durable transformation’ in South Asia that Buzan offers. Towards this end this section will be drawing from arguments detailed in chapter 3. The background of India Pakistan relations mapped in that chapter will serve as our indicators of the trajectory of

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1 Available at http://www.aseansec.org/4971.htm
relations in the enmity-amity plane and discern if there has been an evolution in the past 60 years or are India-Pakistan moving about in alternating cycles of hope and hate. In the examination of the gamut of issues between the two South Asian leaders we used Buzan’s scheme as our guiding posts and in these they will be used as a benchmark to assess some of the points fleshed and the clincher arguments which will be enumerated. This is in conformity laid out in the descriptive RSCT that organizes regional security in an empirical manner and more specifically tells us what to look for and how to draw from these conclusions.

Buzan’s RSCT applied in the South Asian region believes that India being the successor state of the Mauryas, Mughals and also the British, is the dominant power in South Asia. For a long time it was predicted that South Asia was expected to be India hegemonic and that the challenge from Pakistan would be swept aside with time. During the cold war years and importantly prior to the India-Pakistan nuclear tests, South Asia was termed a bi-polar region with the rider that after the fading away of the Pakistan resistance, India would be the preponderant in the region.

It is important to keep in mind that this discussion is regarding the region, South Asia that Buzan identifies. The effort in this study has been to prove that South Asia as a region does not capture the empirical dynamics of security mutuality and that Southern Asia offers a more comprehensive regional level of analysis. The efficacy of Southern Asia is especially true with regard to any discussion of power configuration between India and Pakistan. For it is an obvious fact that India is much bigger in size and can draw from a larger resource base than Pakistan. This gets to the point as to how has a revisionist Pakistan been able to challenge and continues to confront India for over half a century?

The Pakistan challenge was earlier propped by external actor and super power the United States of America and later by the regional backing of the People’s Republic of China. This study suggests that the nuclearization of India and Pakistan has successfully frozen the distribution of power in the South Asian security complex. An evaluation of the recounting in chapter three offers that the situation is not that of a hegemonic India. If we merely discuss India and Pakistan, the situation is that of
contested dominance as Pakistan leverage its relationship with the United States and with China into aberrant balance with India that neutralized the latter's superiority. And for our theoretical purposes, while we can account for the US support due to its super power status, how is one to account for the Chinese support that began in the early 1960's after the rupturing of the India-China bonhomie over Tibet? In the current context such support can be explained by the virtue of China's Great Power status (reach in more than one region) but it would be difficult to account for such support in the 1960's without acknowledging the integrity of China to Southern Asia. It is important to keep in mind that the definition of a Great Power also offers confusion as, China, due to its large territory is a part of four recognized regions and there integral to all of them even without the developments of the last two decades.

Restricting our selves to Buzan's notion of the South Asian regional rivalry, this study holds that none of the conditions laid out by Buzan holds true. Neither has India succeeded in dominating the entire region nor has the Pakistan challenge manages to countervail India's superiority or even successfully lead a group of states to challenge India. This gap between the two positions is what is responsible for the instability in the region that precludes predictable behavior or successful resolution of disputes.

India's position in the region has been variously described as that of 'weak unipolarity' or 'arrested unipolarity' (Ayoob 2001: 126-127 and 1991). The contested unipolarity has been as much a result of an underdeveloped economy as much as it has been a result of the challenge from Pakistan. In the aftermath of the 1971 war and the emergence of Bangladesh it was assumed that the challenge from Pakistan was over and India would be able to regain its pre-partition position of pre-eminence. However, the changes in the post-1971 period ironically went against India, as the United States established ties with the People's Republic of China through the good office of the Pakistanis. And militarily, West Pakistan without the eastern province was better defensible. Arrested unipolarity is a highly unstable configuration as it encourages both India and Pakistan to stick to their past patterns of behavior, Pakistan aspires to turn the aberrant equilibrium to a real balance of power by demonstrating its revisionist agenda in Kashmir and India wishing to ensure, the stability and
legitimacy of its regional predominance by proving that the Pakistani challenge to Indian power is based on false premises (Ayoob 2001: 128-29).

Pakistan is India's greatest foreign policy challenge and it has to be managed, as it is crucial for the success of internal developmental goals as well as for external policy benefits. Over the past decade, India has tried almost every strategy to bring Pakistan around. A safer neighbourhood and amicable relations with the neighbors would go a long way in achieving domestic stability and pursuing the path of economic development. Economic interaction and cooperation within the region would also generate a number of positive political and economic externalities. It would not be inaccurate to state that the International environment is not conducive to the earlier Pakistani policy of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) in Kashmir but the hobble of the peace process has given rise to numerous speculations. The Pakistan challenge through external balancing has for over fifty years boxed India into its immediate region. For an aspiring global power, it is important to secure its immediate region to exercise and influence power in other regions. An amicable settlement on Kashmir can also be expected to have a domino effect on the other festering self determination movements across India as well as boost its international reputation as a responsible and an influential state.

The shift in balance of power between India and Pakistan occurred towards the end of the 1980's after the two decades of Indian superiority in the post-1971 period, "The altered balance of power was about Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons...which came to fruition in the late 1980's" (Rajamohan 2003: 186) and Rajamohan further states that "it was this shift in favour of Pakistan that gave Islamabad the confidence to renege on the core assumptions of the Simla Agreement" (Ibid: 186). The nuclearization of South Asia made both India and Pakistan understand that a traditional military conflict with India was no longer possible but for Pakistan this was a window of opportunity for the a low intensity conflict in Kashmir without the fear of a conventional military retaliation from New Delhi. This was a tailor made opportunity for Pakistan as the 'infrastructure to pursue this war was already available... [thanks to the] insurgency in Afghanistan..." (Ibid: 187). Moreover for the first time, with its strong involvement in Afghan affairs, Pakistan's western frontiers were secured. Thus, unlike earlier when crossing the LOC to hit at
militant camps was possible, now India was restrained despite the pressure of its military establishment. For Rajamohan, and one is tempted to agree with him, the most glaring aspect of the Kargil conflict was the changed mood in Islamabad-Rawalpindi after nuclearization that a plan which had been in discussion for the past 30 years was finally put into operation. The set back came with the fierce Indian response while ‘respecting’ the LOC and the diplomatic isolation of Pakistan by its chief backers the United States, China and Saudi Arabia (Ibid.: 189). The other gain for India was as the Kargil Review Committee points that:

Since India did not cross the LoC and reacted strictly within its own territory, the effort to conjure up escalation of a kind that could lead to nuclear war did not succeed. Despite its best efforts Pakistan was unable to link its Kargil caper with a nuclear flashpoint, though some foreign observers believe it was near thing. The international community does not favour alteration of the status quo through nuclear blackmail as this would not be in the interest of the five major nuclear powers (Kargil Review Report 2000: 242).

The reactions to the Kargil War was telling for a number of reasons apart from the tactical and strategic gains made by India but for our purpose it would be interesting to examine the turn about of the United States policy towards India. The US involvement in the region was for the first time unambiguously pro-India and it also proved that US mediation on Kashmir could also be in favour of India. What has prompted this turn about apart from the contingent factors associated with the Kargil conflict? The answer was to be found in economic potential and the emergence of India with its liberalization policies in early 1992 as a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destination and a large market for American and multinational corporations (Rajamohan 2003: 193).

The December 13 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament prompted the largest military mobilization in history in this Indian attempt to coerce Pakistan to stop the cross border terror factories. Both the western and eastern Naval fleets were concentrated in the Arabian Sea, the High Commissioner to Pakistan recalled and all road, rail and air links to Pakistan terminated in its efforts to stop the *jehadi* plug. The Indian establishment was aware of the nuclear dimensions, which are crucial to Pakistan defense in the event of a conventional or a limited Indian attack, but this was India’s efforts to signal the tolerance level for the bleeding neck in Kashmir and
involved the international community effectively. While international politics in our
times prevent the easy use of force, the Anglo-American powers did not oppose the
Indian military mobilization but cautioned it against aggressive postures on the
border. Both Britain and the US fearing an outbreak in hostilities while asking its
citizens to leave the region talked tough to Musharraf about the need to put an end to
cross border terrorism. This confrontation with the mediation of the international
community produced two promises from Pakistan though it did not effectively lead to
the aims of the military mobilization. Rajamohan judges this policy of Indian coercive
diplomacy as a bold departure from the passive postures of the past but in its efforts to
end cross border terrorism he terms it inconclusive (Rajamohan 2003: 199).

Discussing the reactions to the coercive diplomacy, Raja Mohan states that
three broad schools of thought merged in the analysis of the 2001-2002 military
mobilization (Raja Mohan 2003: 199-200). The first termed Indian action of the
manipulation of nuclear risk as reckless. The second argued that coercive policy while
long over due was incomplete in its willingness to use force. The third school assess
the policy on its opportunities and limits and exploiting the narrow space between a
credible threat and avoiding unnecessary escalation for diplomacy to achieve its ends.

Stephan Cohen in his book *Emerging Power: India*, believes that there were
two ‘decisive turning points’ in India-Pakistani efforts to use force to change the
balance of power (2002: 211). The first was in 1971, when the Pakistan Army
surrendered in East Pakistan, if India chosen to press for a decisive victory in the
West. The second opportunity came in 1987 during the Brasstacks crisis when India
enjoyed a conventional superiority and Pakistan had not yet achieved nuclear
capability. In Cohen’s opinion, by 1990 and covert nuclearisation precluded any
change in the fundamental balance of power through use of force (Cohen 2002: 211).
Further citing Cohen on Operation Brasstacks would be enlightening for the purpose
of our study. For Cohen,

Brasstacks was an open ended attempt to probe Pakistan’s defense as well as
the response from its allies, especially US and China. It represented the last
opportunity that India had for a major conventional war with Pakistan before
the latter went nuclear (Cohen 2002: 147).
In the exercise India assembled massive ground and air forces in the direction of the Western border in Rajasthan and in retaliation Pakistan moved its forces towards the Indian Punjab then under militant pressure. Pakistani calculation involved cutting parts of Punjab off and hopefully even road access to Kashmir. Cohen interprets that India blinked and Brasstacks was over without a shot being fired.

Similarly in the 1990 crisis, which involved the Pakistan backed Kashmiri insurgency, fragile governments in Delhi and Islamabad and a Pakistani army using the nuclear umbrella to protect the assistance to Kashmiris which was conveyed to the Indians through nuclear threats from Pakistan. The VP Singh government considered but rejected the option of attacks on training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The crisis needed American intervention that urged calm and communication between the two parties. The chapter titled, India as a Military Power, in Cohen’s aforementioned book has a section evocatively called “From Dominance to Insignificance? 1972-80”. This section examines the period from 1972 when ‘Indian diplomacy moved to consolidate its regionally dominant position’ (Cohen 2002: 136) to sign a number of treaties with its smaller neighbors and absorb Sikkim into India. Cohen also mentions that the USS Enterprise incident in the regional calculations and significantly traces the “Indira Doctrine’ also to this post-1971 period of the consolidation.

Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty in there study of the crises in South Asia called, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (2005) reach the conclusion that ‘the nuclear-deterrence proposition provides the strongest explanation for the absence of major war in the region over the last two decades’ (Ganguly 2005: 11). American intervention played an important but secondary role in the easing of tensions and was most influential during the Kargil war in 1999. Significantly, according to Ganguly and Hagerty, their weakest explanation was the one concerning conventional deterrence...because India nearly always had sufficient conventional military capabilities to inflict a devastating blitzkrieg against Pakistan, except in 1986-87, and consistently chose a different course of action...suggesting that the nuclear deterrence factor generally trumped conventional deterrence (Ibid: 11).
To conclude this section dealing with the power configuration, we will begin with a caveat. The qualification being that the region this study defined is Southern Asia. But our hypothesis purported to examine the power configuration in the region defined by Buzan as South Asia. Based on the discussions here and in chapter three, it can be asserted that the ‘South Asian’ region since its formation in the post-colonial period has always been a bipolar one. We can divide India-Pakistan relations in to three periods for a better understanding of this power analysis. The first period would begin in 1947 and end with the 1971 war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. This quarter of a century is characterized by a larger and more powerful India but the natural Indian superiority in these early years were skillfully managed by the external alliance formed by Pakistan, first with the United States in the 1950’s and the People’s Republic of China in the post-1962 phase. The Kashmir conflict and the two wars during this period are a testimony to the failure of India to impose its will on Pakistan. The year 1971 is chosen as the end of this period as due to a clear coming together of external and internal factors, India was able to use its larger size and proximity to East Bengal to intervene decisively and inflict defeat on Pakistan.

The second period lies within the years 1971 and the year of the nuclear tests in 1998. We choose 1998, as this is the year the Pakistanis officially went nuclear. Though, the nuclear deterrent has been said to be in place by the early 1990’s, the evidence is difficult to support. This period is characterized as that of Indian dominance in literature, but beyond the 1971 war and the negotiations of the Simla Agreement in 1972, we do not have sings of an overwhelming Indian superiority. This is better illustrated with the fact that by the 1980’s, the Khalistan insurgency backed and materially supported by Pakistan was playing itself out in the Indian state of Punjab. Kashmir was soon to explode along similar lines. And despite, a provision in the Simla Agreement on the conversion of the Line of Control into the International Border, India was unable to make headway on the Kashmir front.

The third and the current phase follow’s from 1998. From the time the Pakistani nuclear deterrent becomes a factor in India-Pakistan relations, it has been a tough situation for India. If we are to assume that the deterrent was active in the earlier crises of 1987 and 1990 after the 1998 tests, we have conclusive evidence to state that it was the Pakistani deterrent that held the Government of India in check.
during both, the Kargil war of 1999 and the subsequent military mobilization during
the 2001-2002 Operation Parakaram which followed the suicide attack on the Indian
Parliament. It is only in the current phase that the Indian rate of growth threatens to
economically leave Pakistan behind. But it would be important to remember that
despite its own problems, Pakistan’s growth follows the world wide trend of a
buoyant phase due to increasing share of the better performing non-developed
economies of China, India, South East Asia and Africa. Together with its robust
military and nuclear deterrent, Pakistan, in this phase of relations too, does not appear
to be a push over and given the current state of the regional situation will be a
countervailing factor.

**Power Configuration: Measurements**

In the above segment where we discussed power configuration, it would be
cogent to deal with the concept and measurement of a nation’s power. The second
hypothesis that we set out to test was the power configuration in South Asia/Southern
Asia and the interplay between the three most important states of China, India and
Pakistan. The following section will in brief examine the issues of power and its
measurement.

Power can be defined in several different ways. Political scientists, historians, and
diplomats have defined political power as a goal of states/leaders, as influence or
control over outcomes, events, actors and issues, victory in conflict and the attainment
of security and control over resources and capabilities. The usage of ‘power’ as a goal
in international relations is traced to Realists. Power for them is an inherent goal of
man and by extension the state. All attributes of a state like economic and military
growth, cultural attractiveness all work towards the goal of international power.
Political scientists principally use ‘power’ in terms of an actor’s ability to exercise
influence over other actors within the international system. This influence can be
coercive, attractive, cooperative, or competitive. Mechanisms of influence can include
the threat or use of force, economic interaction or pressure, diplomacy, and cultural
exchange. Joseph Nye, speaking at a public lecture at the London School of
Economics on, “The Powers to Lead”, mentions that specification of contexts is very
important when discussing power (2008). Nye defines power as the ability to affect

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others to get an outcome one wants. There are three ways to do it, sticks (coercion), carrots (payments), or attraction. The first two is categorized as hard power resource and the third as soft power.

‘Power’ is also used to describe military victories or security for their state in the international system. This general usage is most common, for example, a state that has achieved victory in a military campaign against other states can be described as powerful. An actor that has succeeded in protecting its security, sovereignty, or strategic interests from repeated or significant challenge can also be described as powerful. Freeman offers a detailed exposition,

Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft (1997: 3).

Power can also refer to the resources and capabilities of a state. This measurement is largely quantitative and capabilities are described in tangible terms, measurable, weighable and as quantifiable assets. Power of a nation, more often if not always, refers to military capacity and historically, power is ascribed to states that have won significant military victories. Spanier lists three important points about power (1972:135); first, that power is identified with military capacity; secondly, power is what people think it is i.e. drawing a distinction between subjective (perceived) power and objective (actual) power. The third point is that a reputation for power will confer power. Power thus may often be identified with military power and may exist only in the mind. But then what is national power? The common definition says it is the capacity to influence the behaviour of other states in accordance with one’s own objectives (Ibid.: 137). One can also define national power as more than the sum total of population, raw materials and quantitative factors. Power is something that a state has; the exact quantity depends on measurement of each of the various components of power. Power is also a relationship: what matters is not a nation’s absolute power but its relative power.

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What then are the factors that contribute to the foundations of power? They would include: geography, population, natural resources, economic capacity, military strength, political systems and leadership and national morale. Any calculation of a nation’s power and the power balance includes a mix of tangible components as well as intangible components (Spanier 1972: 139). We ought to also distinguish between potential power and actual capability (power mobilized) and it would also be important to put the capabilities of an actor in the context of a ‘policy contingency framework’ (Baldwin 1983: 7). Cline worked out a basic conceptual framework as a formula for measuring national power:

\[ P_p = [(C+E+M)(S+W)] \]

where

- \( P_p \) = Perceived power
- \( C \) = Critical Mass = Population + Territory
- \( E \) = Economic Capability
- \( M \) = Military Capability
- \( S \) = Strategic Purpose
- \( W \) = Will to pursue national strategy (cited in Baldwin 1983: 14)

Though it would be pertinent to mention that Cline’s analysis and formula ignores questions of scope and domain. It is important to specify that power is contextual. The efforts at quantification of power, using both material and ideational categories, are an exercise geared to achieving that end. But there are obvious limitations in the practical world to such quantification and specifically in Cline’s equations where the range of variables and the power calculation may not be able to point to an outcome on the ground. But the purpose of this study is limited in this regard and we delve into specifications and definitions of power to build a larger point regarding the comparison of power configuration between India and Pakistan. The next few sections will go into a discussion of economic capacity and military strength, the two most important and hard power resources through which states try to influence outcomes.
Economic Capacity

A common standard for comparison of national power, probably more reliable than population, is wealth or degree of economic development. Wealth has a direct relation to military power, for the richest state can afford to buy the best weapons and also invest in their development. Wealth can buy power of all kinds. It is the most fungible of all resources. But talking of fungibility, it is important to bear in mind that this is not true the other way around, i.e. no political resource can approach the degree of fungibility of money (Nye and Keohane cited by Baldwin 1985: 8). Essentially military powers without an economic basis run the risk of being less powerful than economic powers with military might. More often both economic power and military strength go together. We might find a powerful economic actor with less military strength owing to its policies, for example, Japan and Sweden but we will rarely find a power military state with weak economic capacity. In the current technological age, modern warfare and the communications revolution has made the development of heavy industries an indispensable element of national power.

A nation’s gross domestic product (GDP)-the total value of its production and services measured in currency-has been used frequently as a relatively accurate and measurable standard for comparing the power of states. Yet, the GDP standard is not completely reliable and nor does it reflect the total production and services. Per capita incomes are also used sometimes as a standard of wealth. Finally two points must be emphasized about economic capacity. First, a nation’s economic capacity is enhanced if it possesses strength in the scientific and technological arenas. As Robert Gilpin notes:

today an independent aerospace and electronics industry, along with the supporting sciences, has become crucial for a nation to enjoy diplomatic and military freedom of action...and secondly that the balance between the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy is clearly desirable and necessary for economic growth and modernization (Gilpin 1968: 149-50).

Military Strength

This factor is recognized as the pertinent element of power since ancient times due to anarchical nature of international politics. Military power is one of the
important standards of measurements. The number of people in uniform is usually the
measure of a nation's military power as also the quantity and quality of the various
weapon systems it contains. Technological innovation and leadership are also
considered vital factors in the military preparedness of the state.

Economic and military instruments of power are intimately linked but the
relationship between them is complex and subtle. Increasingly economic power by
itself is being considered as the more important of the two (Wolf 1994: 225). In
modern times, one of the key components of power is industry. Britain, first of the
early industrializing nations, was 19th century's pre-eminent power. The unification of
Germany and its subsequent industrialization changed European and world politics
forever. The United States entered the First World War and became Europe's balancer,
for
its economic growth during the preceding two or three decades was probably
the single most decisive shift in the long term global balances...[The US] was
growing so fast that it was on the point of out producing all of the European
states combined!(Kennedy 1984: 11).

Economic power, to be effective, sometimes complements (reinforces, or even
requires) military power and at other times and in other circumstances, can even be a
substitute for it. The converse proposition is also valid. The post-cold war world and
Japan's dramatic economic rise and the relative American economic decline showed
that economic interests, issues and instruments are increasingly becoming crucial and

Economic Instruments

The economic instruments of power are GDP, population (labour supply and
per capita GDP) and a country's current surplus. While GDP and per capita GDP are
typically cited in reference to economic power, current account surplus has been
added by Charles Wolf Jr. based on the premise that it represents a capital resource
that, in principle at least, can be guided or shunted by the use of one policy device or
another, towards or away from a particular target area that may be the object of a
The economic instruments of power can be defined in terms of components of the GDP that are believed to be particularly significant—for example, advanced and future technology sectors such as telecommunications, microelectronics, semiconductors, fiber optics, engineering and bio-engineering industries—whose special significance resides in the economy-wide, growth promoting effects they are thought to generate, in the monopoly market power (and super normal profits) they may entail or in their putative connection to present or future military capabilities. Similarly, specific components of the population and manpower pool may be considered of greater significance as economic instruments of power than population as a whole. The components of a country’s international accounts as providing another type of economic power: the size of its market to which foreign access maybe permitted or denied. Another component is the volume of exports of goods and services that a country can direct toward or exclude from some nations.

In conclusion, one can assert that with the rising intermeshing of global economies and interdependence, economic instruments of power have become salient relative to the military instruments. The economic performance is minimally affected by the per cent of GDP allocated for military instruments to the extent that sustained economic performance is equated with what is sometimes referred to as economic ‘security’, its determinants are largely matters of domestic policy rather than foreign policy. The tables in this chapter with their comparison of economic indicators exhibit the relative strengths of India and Pakistan. A similar comparison of military strength is also done. From the figures, it is obvious that India is rather far ahead of Pakistan economically and with the continuing growth rates likely to also increase the gap further. Though, the Indian indicators are worrying especially due the sheer population size and the absolute number of people under poverty. In the event of rising inequalities, which is a world wide trend, it would bring add huge numbers to the under poverty population. Militarily too India seems to be far ahead. But in these comparisons it is important to keep in mind the relative sizes of the two countries. There is no doubt that India is much larger in territory and the other attributes are a function of that larger size. But this is also India’s great strength when it can marshal from a resource base, two to three times larger than Pakistan. Pakistan in comparison to India maybe smaller but it is a middle sized country with all the attributes of a middle power armed with a nuclear deterrent. There is no denying that Pakistan with a
better economic performance could bridge the increasing economic gap with India. But in such an event it would not be wrong to imagine that some sort of a settlement between India and Pakistan had taken place. For it would be difficult to imagine a trading, economically growing Pakistan having bad relations with India.

Bringing China into this balance is also integral to this study. Please refer to Table 5.1 for an overview of the national economic and social comparisons of India, Pakistan and China. The centre of Chinese power lies in its Eastern and Southern sea board, far away from India. The economic growth in China and the consequent military modernization has though given China the ability to swiftly deploy forces in Tibet and the arms build up in the region has been a constant source of concern for India. China in all indicators, economic, military and social, is far ahead of India in current times and will stay ahead in the future too. By current estimates, China and India will the two leading states in the world due to their size. So the question of polarity in South Asia is not one of unipolarity. It remains bi-polar with a middle power Pakistan unlike what Buzan concludes. Applying the polarity test to the expanded region of Southern Asia, we can extrapolate from the polarity in South Asia to talk of a tripolar region comprising of China-India and Pakistan and the future of the region will be determined in the way these three countries manage their relations with each other. Please refer to Table 5.2 for the military expenditure in US dollars for the period 1988-2007 and the defence budget as a percentage of GDP for India, Pakistan and China.

The one other state which will have important implications for the region is the United States, an external actor whose bilateral relations with each of these countries is the most important of all their relations. The important point to keep in mind when a power comparison is conducted in the Southern Asian scenario is that China should be included in any polarity identifying exercise.
Table 5.1: An overview of Economic and Social Indicators—India, Pakistan and China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Indicators</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1,129,866,154</td>
<td>164,741,924</td>
<td>1,330,044,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (purchasing power parity)</td>
<td>$2.989 trillion</td>
<td>$410 billion</td>
<td>$6.991 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth Rates</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance</td>
<td>-$19.35 billion</td>
<td>-$7.105 billion</td>
<td>$360.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income, in USS</td>
<td>US $ 977</td>
<td>US $1085</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>$150.8 billion</td>
<td>$16.31 billion</td>
<td>$1.217 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>$230.2 billion</td>
<td>$30.33 billion</td>
<td>$901.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Index</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI Rank</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons below Poverty Line</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy in Years</td>
<td>65 Years</td>
<td>64.13 years</td>
<td>73.18 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>64.84%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Force</td>
<td>509.3 million</td>
<td>48.29 million</td>
<td>803.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>3,287,590 sq km</td>
<td>803,940 sq km</td>
<td>9,596,960 sq km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 Military expenditure and Defence Budget as percentage of GDP-India, Pakistan and China, 1988-2007

In constant (2005) US$ m.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India (as % of GDP)</th>
<th>Pakistan (as % of GDP)</th>
<th>China (as % of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>11,440(3.6)</td>
<td>2,896(6.2)</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>12,219(3.5)</td>
<td>2,894(6)</td>
<td>12,282(2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>12,036(3.2)</td>
<td>3,054(5.8)</td>
<td>13,153(2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>11,238(3)</td>
<td>3,270(5.8)</td>
<td>13,698(2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>10,740(2.8)</td>
<td>3,472(6.1)</td>
<td>16,542(2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>12,131(2.9)</td>
<td>3,467(5.7)</td>
<td>15,339(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>12,185(2.8)</td>
<td>3,379(5.3)</td>
<td>14,614(1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>12,550(2.7)</td>
<td>3,434(5.3)</td>
<td>14,994(1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12,778(2.6)</td>
<td>3,430(5.1)</td>
<td>16,614(1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>14,144(2.7)</td>
<td>3,285(4.9)</td>
<td>16,808(1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>14,757(2.8)</td>
<td>3,281(4.8)</td>
<td>19,273(1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>17,150(3.1)</td>
<td>3,311(3.9)</td>
<td>21,636(1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>17,697(3.1)</td>
<td>3,320(3.7)</td>
<td>23,778(1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18,313(3)</td>
<td>3,553(3.9)</td>
<td>28,010(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>18,256(2.9)</td>
<td>3,819(5.9)</td>
<td>33,060(2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>18,664(2.8)</td>
<td>4,077(3.7)</td>
<td>36,552(2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>19,204(2.6)</td>
<td>4,248(3.5)</td>
<td>40,278(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>22,273(2.8)</td>
<td>4,412(3.4)</td>
<td>44,322(1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>23,615(2.7)</td>
<td>4,465(3.2)</td>
<td>51,864(2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24,249</td>
<td>4,517</td>
<td>58,265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnote:
1. The figures for India include expenditure on the paramilitary forces of the Border Security Force, the Central Reserve Police Force, the Assam Rifles and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police but do not include spending on military nuclear activities.
2. Figures for Pakistan are for current spending only (i.e. exclude capital spending)
3. The figures for China are for estimated total military expenditure.

The Nuclear Triangle

In the post-1998 period, Southern Asia faces a new strategic reality and India remains in adversarial relations with China and Pakistan both nuclear capable states with existing and ongoing ambitious delivery programs. This post-Pokharan reality forces difficult and crucial choices on all the three states involved in this triangular relationship. But it would be good to keep in mind some actual state of capabilities in the region. The capabilities of the India-Pakistan-China nuclear triangle are not structured for the conduct of prompt operations. Even China, much more advanced than the other two, does not have weapons mated to the delivery system. Tellis in his book, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture*, sums up his thesis by describing, India's present nuclear posture as movement towards a

force-in-being... The weapons and delivery systems are developed and produced, with key sub-components maintained under civilian custody, but these assets as a whole are not deployed in any way that enables the prompt conduct of nuclear operations. Such assets are, in fact, sequestered and covertly maintained in distributed form, with different custodians exercising strict stewardship over the components entrusted to them for safekeeping (Tellis 2001: 367).

The author concludes that in the years ahead we shall see India do what is best described 'as a creeping weaponisation that will eventually materialize into a force-in-being'. He continues, 'This, rather than a ready arsenal, will remain the outcome as India continues to put the pieces together over this decade and beyond' (Tellis 2001: 474). On deterrence stability between India and China, it ought to also be kept in mind that China does not have any dispute with India that it will find worth resolving at the cost of a nuclear war or at the cost of invoking the threat of a nuclear war; China is also so far ahead of India on the nuclear road and it does not take India as a serious threat.

But what is a fact is that all these capabilities affect regional stability. Pakistan's nuclear weapons provide a deterrent against attack by WMD or an overwhelming Indian conventional force as they perceive themselves as lacking strategic depth. Both the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs were in reaction to the regional (India due to China, Pakistan due to India) rather than global balances of
power. It is also true that by gaining nuclear capability, the respective states expected to improve their status within the international community. So with more than two states deterring each other, the scenarios and calculations are complex and we have to keep in mind the strategic doctrines, capabilities and intentions. In the region, due to the state of affairs in Pakistan, there is that added problem of non-state nuclear threats. The threat of non state actors in Pakistan is suggested in two ways, the first, is that extremist forces take control of Pakistan’s strategic weapons and the second a renegade nuclear force owing to an ideological split in the Pakistani military. The threat has received a lot of attention in the past few years and is a credible and serious one. Finally, in this region of Southern Asia, the scenario is further complicated by relative asymmetries that exist between the capabilities of the three states and the instability that is endemic in an arms race.

Among the three, China, India and Pakistan, two dyads have had past conflicts. The states are locked in a hierarchically defined, distrustful and suspicious relationship. While India and Pakistan can be said to be in a symmetrical nuclear deterrent stage, the Sino-Indian nuclear dyad is asymmetrical in favor of the Chinese owing to India’s limited delivery capacity. The assessment of the nuclear peril facing the region ought to be made without the risks of short-term predictions and the scare mongering that is the norm. In the past few years there have been various attempts to understand the nuclear tangle that India faces. Some of these studies have been focused on India’s deterrent capabilities but a larger focus in strategic literature is given to the India-Pakistan dyad. However, a major gap in this literature is the lack of studies, which factor China into the regional nuclear architecture. It would be pertinent here to cite the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to the US President, Bill Clinton justifying India’s nuclear tests with reference to the Chinese deterrent and its material help to Pakistan in achieving the same potential (See Annexure VIII). Even a cursory look at the history of the Indian nuclear program makes it evident that nuclear weapons as a possibility and a strategic choice entered the Indian lexicon only after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. As mentioned, most studies on the nuclear tangle suffer on the lack of calibrating the China factor in the India-Pakistan equation. For instance, Rajagopalan who calls for an Indian “existential deterrence” (small arsenal) underplays the link between India’s decision to go nuclear and the China factor. The size of India’s nuclear arsenal is a dynamic
and at the basic level aims at deterring both China and Pakistan and would be revised in the light of any changes. In a similar way, Rajagopalan is dismissive of ballistic missile defense (2005: 182) as it would create instability in the India-Pak dyad but does not go into the implication of the Chinese superiority over the Indian nuclear arsenal. So, with this understanding, any arms control measure or regional initiative would need to keep in mind that a India-Pakistan involvement is not going to be very successful unless China is also a part of it.

It is possible in the event, of a transformation of relations between India and Pakistan, and India-China, for an amelioration of the nuclear danger. The nuclear danger is a result of the fractious nature in relations between the group of these three countries, owing to disputes and the lack of trust that feeds into the ambiguities. It might be erroneous to state that the nuclear issue does not contribute to the misperception and distrust in relations but it can be accurate to state that the nuclear factor is not the cause of the rivalry. Thus, nuclear danger in Southern Asia can also be managed from the perspective of an improvement in relations between the three states. For example, despite suspicions and a potential structural rivalry, India and China, are moving on the path of cooperation and engagement in other sectors and the issue of nuclear instability could in the future turn irrelevant. In the current situation, with the war on terror, a warmer India-US relations and the precariousness of the domestic situation in Pakistan, new avenues of cooperation could be generated among the three states as all have a stake in the situation in Pakistan. This is in addition to the existing possibilities for instance the growing economic ties between India and China. Beijing's modernization goals and strategy that have turned China into a 'normal' state in the international system might further encourage its socialization and in this regard China's India orientation would be beneficial to both states. Further, if Indian growth and increase in national strength continues along the same trajectory, it might prompt an acknowledgement of India's great power aspirations and try to remove the sting from a grudging relationship. The Sino-Indian convergence on global issues of environment, WTO, US hegemony and multi-polarity could also provide a platform to work together and develop understanding and trust by their defense of common interests that they share on these issues.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we discussed the findings of the previous three chapters. First, the region of South Asia, this study concludes with evidences ranging from history to ethnicity and cultural-religious factors that Tibet is an integral part of South Asia and by virtue of it being a part of China; the People’s Republic of China should be considered a part of this region. Further it is also suggested that the term Southern Asia is a better representation of the new region as South Asia is essentially understood as the SAARC countries. In support of our contention that China is a part of the region we also approached the problem from different angles and there is ample circumstantial evidence to state that there is a ‘mutuality’ of threat perception between India and China and therefore between the region of South Asia and China.

Secondly, drawing from our narrative in chapter three, the study tried to discern the changing power configuration of the South Asia region. The discussion centered on the larger picture of India-Pakistan relations since independence and was focused on the conflicts and crises that the two states have generated. It is suggested that such an exercise while mapping the patterns of amity and enmity, also hold clues for the power configuration between the two states. It is this study’s contention that Indian advantage of larger size and resources was in the first few years undercut by Pakistan through external alliances and in later times through the nuclear deterrent. Even in the period after 1971, when literature mentions that India looked dominant in the region, we do not have any evidence of India being able to impose its will on Pakistan. In this period, one can explain this anomaly by seeking the explanation from the pattern of relations that Buzan specifies. The roots of the quiescent period in India-Pakistan relations lay in the 1972 Simla Agreement, both India and Pakistan agreed to, ‘put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent’ (Simla Agreement 1972, See Annexure X). The later years proved to be domestically engaging for both Bhutto and Indira Gandhi. So the findings are that India may have been destined to be the hegemonic in the region due to its size and resources, but Pakistan has challenged and will continue to challenge India in the coming years. And if we are to consider Southern Asia-South Asia plus China, in the power configuration, then it is one of
triangular rivalry, Pakistan fighting Indian dominance and the Indians fighting Chinese influence.

The role of external powers in the Southern Asian regional security complex has been such that they have not subsumed the regional security dynamics as in the condition when overlay occurs. The United States and Soviet Union were the two external powers during the cold war years and they penetrated the region by aligning along local rivalries. We can also explain the Soviet Union-Indian relations against the Chinese in the same framework and the small warm period of Indo-US ties in the post-1962 phase. The global rivalry found its local conflict to impinge on the region. The current state of Indo-US-China relations fall within the same ambit, global considerations for the United States and local consideration for the Indians create a convergence of interests. The regional exhibition of the tripolar rivalry is to be seen in the Sino-Indian-Pakistan relations.