CHAPTER 7

STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND RENEGOTIATING IDENTITIES

New rules and forms of social organization impact the displaced community in the host territories. Instead of passively waiting until their situation is more certain, people may see crisis as an opportunity to expand their horizons, envisage their own future, and take positive steps to realize their aspirations. Local survival, organization, support and negotiation capabilities continue to function during periods of tension and conflict, just as they do in times of stability. Indeed, because survival situations require innovation, these capabilities are dynamic and evolving (Mazur, 2004). The responses of the state, the non-state bodies are all critical in the analysis of internal displacement, even though the displaced people both in Noida and Jammu give primary importance to their own agency in the context of displacement. In this chapter the aim is to look at varied responses to the situation of internal displacement.

According to Sorensen and Vincent (1998, p.269) an understanding is required of individual, family and community-level response strategies. The positive functions of the family is that it acts as an intimate structure that provided strength to individuals in situations where prevalent cultural and social norms had to be transgressed to make ends meet. Within the family the displaced individuals could find reliance, trust and a state of well-being, safety and support. Apart from the other social institutions the family is also an economic unit in which different family members exploit their individual abilities to improve the prospects of the family’s overall circumstances. Within the family and community the individuals exercise their response strategies in the realms of culture, economy or politics in the new locale to integrate in the new locale.
The activities of displaced people reach far beyond merely securing physical survival, even when that is critical. Internally displaced persons, and others living under dire circumstances, are also social and cultural beings, and issues of identity, dignity and social standing remain important to them and are incorporated in their strategies.

Although the displaced people are not in touch with Kashmiri culture to the same extent as before, they are coping with changes in culture. The economy has been adversely affected but they are coping to survive in the new host communities. The displaced individuals may set up communication networks to transmit and receive information. Communication networks may have been set up by the community both before and after displacement and may intensify their role in transmitting and receiving information after displacement. They made use of the opportunities available to them and put their cultural and social capital into use.

CLAIMING IDENTITIES

The status of migrants or minorities is such that they face a crisis of membership in many states. Clear residence, naturalization and citizenship rules for migrants or long-settled people of different origin are ill-defined in many states. Their membership status is somehow disputed or thrown into doubt. They are targeted for expulsion, regardless of national citizenship status. Socio-economic participation and attachment to a place constitute a strong case for membership of a community. This is of course the crux of the issue – how to balance the rights of newcomers with those of the host community. The forcibly uprooted, the IDPs, escapees from violence and natural and man made disasters – are configured by the international state system as the marginalized. Rights flow from being recognized as a citizen within the state system (Manchanda, 2004, p.4179).
Although the IDPs are citizens displaced within their own nation-states they face marginalization on being recognized not as ‘citizens’ or ‘IDPs’ but mere ‘migrants’.

The government has decided not to use the term internally displaced for the persons displaced from Kashmir. The displaced people are not given the status of IDPs by the government. For the displaced persons the word ‘citizen’ has been replaced by ‘migrant’ (Dhingra and Arora, 2005). The fact that the Indian government refers to them as migrants who are expected to go back to Kashmir has made the displaced persons skeptical. There is a sense of anger and mistrust towards the Indian government. The ‘displaced’ status would have entitled them to international humanitarian aid and protection provided to refugees (Bhati, 2005). The government’s reluctance to accord them the status of internally displaced people stems from the alarm that such status will lead to further demands for similar labeling by other groups in other parts of the country and that the government will become bound by international standards governing the treatment of internally displaced people. The obligations of the state would become subject of scrutiny and controversy. This may only add to the complications according to the government (Mishra, 2004).

Although nomenclatured as ‘migrants’ by the government of India the displaced people feel that the term has a negative connotation for them as they are not mere migrants who got voluntarily displaced from Kashmir. Because of armed conflict the displaced people are forcibly displaced from Kashmir. They wish to be identified as ‘Internally Displaced Persons’. The camp leader at Muthi camp in Jammu stated, “We are not migrants, we are displaced persons...The government imposed the ‘migrants’ label on us. A migrant is a person who chooses to leave his home; we have been forced to
leave our homes and become displaced”. The displaced people have exercised their agency by sending petitions to the NHRC that the government should implement the recommendations of the representative of the UN Secretary General and grant them the status of displaced persons (Saha, 2000). The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has turned down a demand of the displaced persons from Kashmir in this respect (Mishra, 2004).

According to Saha (2000) it is questionable that one’s status as an IDP depends solely on the recognition by international organizations based on the prevailing principles and standards of who is an IDP. There is an inherent psychological element to displacement based on self-identification. The children in Noida and Jammu would identify as IDPs but they hold that they can never go back and settle down in Kashmir. They identify with the host community and not with the Kashmiri community living in Kashmir and are well-integrated in Jammu and Noida. The children in the camp area do not want to be labeled as migrants as they feel they are thus associated with harsh camp life by the host populations. They are stigmatized once they are labeled as migrants. On the other hand, some of the elderly people would rather identify themselves as a ‘refugee’ and look at themselves as ‘refugees’; as a people who cannot visit his/her homeland. Although various perspectives may be held by different age groups but the communities displaced from Kashmir wish to be identified as Internally Displaced Persons.

THE NOTION OF KASHMIRIYAT

Hall (1992) states that the question of ‘identity’ implies that the old identities, which stabilized the social world, are in decline, giving rise to new identities and fragmenting the modern individual as a unified, cohesive subject. This so-called ‘crisis
of identity' is seen as part of a wider process of change, which is dislodging the central structures, and processes of modern societies and dejecting the frame works, which gave individuals stable anchorage in the social world. In this section there will be an exploration of ‘Kashmiriyat’ as a sense of identity to the informants after displacement. The concept of ‘Kashmiriyat’ implied that in Kashmir oneness was brought about in different castes and communities (Singh, 2000).

According to Oommen (2004) a concrete nation is a prerequisite for the emergence of nationalism. But there are other factors which are responsible for the emergence of nationalism that is a sense of deprivation, objective or subjective. According to him the co-terminality between religion and territory is not a strong basis for the emergence of nationalism. The claim made for Kashmir valley as a Muslim homeland is indecisive. This is because there are others in Kashmir (e.g., Kashmiri Hindus or Sikhs) whose claim is authentic that Kashmir is their homeland too. In the exodus of Kashmiri Hindus from Kashmir what one witnesses is the inevitable consequence of the perverse notion that there exists co-terminality between territory and religion, that is, territorialization of religion which leads to ethnification of minority or weak nations.

Kashmir nourished the philosophies of Buddhism, Shaivism, Kashmir Islam, Rishi-Sufi School and Vaishnavism. Rulers of Kashmir gave shelter and honour to the foreigners and there was never any conflict among the various sects. According to Singh (2000) Islam spread in Kashmir not by forcible conquest but under the influence of the Sufi sect. Liberal and orthodox trends characterized the rule of Muslim sultans. While some like Sultan Sikandar (1389-1413) and Ali Shah (1413-29) persecuted Hindus and
desecrated temples, others like the great Zainul Abedin (1420-70) not only reinstated the right of the Hindus, but also passed laws to protect the minorities (Joshi, 1999).

Bazaz (1954) states that in Kashmir Hindus and Muslim saints appeared who preached the cult of religious humanism which was the intellectual foundation on which Kashmir nationalism has been reared. There is hardly any shrine, temple or kanqah of importance in the valley which is not looked upon by the local people with respect without any consideration of creed or caste. The spread of religious humanism has changed the complexion of both Hinduism and Islam in Kashmir. A Kashmiri Muslim shares in common with his Hindu compatriots many practices and intellectual freedom which is unknown to Islam.

KASHMIRIYAT REDEFINED

Singh et. al. (2003) claim that Kashmiriyat (Ladakhiyat or Jammuriyat) is a recent concept but an old idea and implies a syncretic view of the World. Kashmiriyat stands for a composite culture and like composite culture elsewhere in the World Kashmiriyat is under attack by fundamentalism. The fundamentalists aim is to devise a one-dimensional view of society which strikes at the root of the notion of people living together. Because of the impact of fundamentalism new constructions were being put on history, language and culture in Kashmir.

In the four decades after independence there has been a weakening of Kashmir sub-nationalism and consequently of the ethno-cultural edge of Kashmiri identity (Punjabi, 1999). He holds that at the ideological level a divide was building up in Kashmir society because of the spread of an Islamic orientation of Kashmir sub-nationalism which was manifested in the mobilization of students and youth in 1970-80
under the Students Islamic Federation. Corruption and maladministration in Jammu And Kashmir State and the growth of fundamentalism in the Jammu and Ladakh regions of the state provided grounds for the dissemination of Islamic ideology. Thus on one hand Kashmir sub-nationalism was based on ethno-cultural lines. On the other hand it was based on Islamic lines. There was a heightening of tension between the two groups representing the two ideologies. According to Punjabi (1995) in May 1995, the entire Charar-e-Sharief locality was destroyed because of the fire that took place between the militants and the security forces. The practices and traditions followed at the shrine had made it a significant socio-religious centre symbolizing Kashmir ethos, known as ‘Kashmiriyat’. The appreciated Sheikh was ‘Alamdar-e-Kashmir’ (leader, torch bearer of Kashmir) to the Muslims, and ‘Nund Rishi’, (The pious and favourite rishi of the Hindus of Kashmir).

With the onset of militancy in Kashmir in 1990, the Pro-Pakistan and pan-Islamic oriented militant groups tried to exhort the people to desist from the specific practices, which were rooted in Kashmir identity or ‘Kashmiriyat’. The resistance on the part of the people led to tensions and even clashes. Thus, there has been a persistent effort to dilute and ultimately demolish the symbols of ‘Kashmiriyat’. However, there has equally been resistance to these attempts as well. There has been a destruction of a few Hindu temples and burning down of migrant Kashmiri Hindu houses by the pro-Islamic oriented militant groups. Such acts could have led to polarization between the Hindus and the Muslims in the valley but the resentment of local Kashmiri Muslims against such acts halted this process of polarization (Punjabi, 1995). The aim of the foreign mercenaries was to unite Muslims across the World on the basis of a Caliphate ideology by bringing about changes
in the values and norms of the society. Although coercive strategies were employed by
the fundamentalists the people in Kashmir did not adopt the codes imposed on them and
still have faith in the cultural component of the Kashmir subnationalism.

Displacement is a political process for citizens caught up in the struggle for
power. Social identity and power relations are reformulated in the process of flight. One
person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter (Hampton, 1998). There has been a
reconstruction of the notion of 'nationhood' and 'nationalism'. This reformulation of the
notion of Kashmiriyat were be analyzed through the perceptions of the informants. With
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the exodus of the minority community Hindus see
themselves as separate from Muslims in Kashmir. There is a need to look more closely at
how people draw upon their experiences of migration to generate alternative forms of
organization based on a new political reality.

The tables 7.1 and 7.2 reflect on the meaning of Kashmiriyat held by the
informants both in Noida apartments and in the Jammu camp areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1: What Does “Kashmiriyat” “Mean to the Informants (Noida Apartments)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meaning of ‘Kashmiriyat’</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>No Symbolic Meaning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Symbolic of bonding between Kashmiri communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Symbolic of weakened ethno-cultural Kashmiri identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Symbolic of ethno-cultural Kashmiri identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1 explores the notion of “Kashmiriyat” for the informants in Noida Apartments.
52% of the informants do not identify themselves with the notion of “Kashmiriyat” any
more. Only 4% of the informants believe that bonding between Kashmiri communities is
still strong. While 2% of the informants believe that “Kashmiriyat” is symbolic of ethno-
cultural Kashmiri identity. This is the offshoot of lack of frequent interactions between
the community members back at Kashmir. The percentage of no response is inclusive of the informants of age group below 18 years of age.

Table 7.2: What Does “Kashmiriyat” Mean to the Informants (Jammu Camps)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning of ‘Kashmiriyat’</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Symbolic Meaning</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic of bonding between Kashmiri communities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic of weakened ethno-cultural Kashmiri identity</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic of ethno-cultural Kashmiri identity</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 7.2 explores the notion of “Kashmiriyat” for the informants in Jammu Camps Area. The purpose of such an exercise was to explore the various understandings of “Kashmiriyat” after displacement by the informants who are living in (Jammu Camps Area). Here the most important thing is that the heuristic categories mentioned above are fieldwork based and have no universal presence. It was necessary to measure the understanding of the informants. Only 6% of the informants feel that ‘Kashmiriyat’ symbolizes a composite culture and 32% belief that there is a weakening of ethno-cultural Kashmiri identity. The reasons are that there is a change in the perception of ‘Kashmiri’ identity after displacement from the one held in Kashmir. The percentage of no response is inclusive of the informants of age group below 18 years of age.

The displaced people residing in the camps in Jammu and in the apartments in Noida do not identify with the Kashmiri Muslims in Kashmir. The term Kashmiriyat is dismissed as having a connotation which implied hidden political agenda for the power-hungry politicians in Kashmir. One of the informants in Noida held that the concept of Kashmiriyat was used by the political groups in Kashmir for collective mobilization. It did not symbolize any bonding between the Hindus and the Muslims to him. To him if the term Kashmiriyat stood for what it symbolized they would not be living outside their
 homeland. There are context-related changes in the way in which identity is used as a basis of collective mobilization of one kind or the other (Gupta, 1996, p.1).

Mishra (2004) claims that the encounter between the militants and the armed forces in Kashmir over the last two decades has led to a state that the valley is no more the homeland to a diverse ethnic population. Despite the strong sense of regional identity nurtured through decades of co-existence, the minority Hindus and majority Muslims began to see themselves as distinct from each other. Earlier the relations between the Hindus and the Muslims were amicable. But after displacement the Hindu informants held that the Muslims also acquired the jobs which fell vacant by the displaced people or acquired the properties of the displaced people at cheap prices. The Hindu informants also reported that because of the spread of fundamentalism in Kashmir sometimes they suffered a minority complex in Kashmir. The trust that existed between the different communities in Kashmir is destroyed after displacement.

The Kashmiri Hindu children both in Noida and Jammu have not been brought up in Kashmir beside Kashmiri Muslims and so their familiarity with the Kashmiri Muslims is not there. Cooley and Mead talk about ‘identity’ while trying to understand the formation of an ‘individual self’ in a collectivity through the experience of meaningful interactions as part of the socialization process and significance of ‘others’ in the formation of an individual’s self-identity (Jodhka, 2001, p.19). In the Jammu camps the elders said that back in Kashmir the Kashmiri Muslim children have no knowledge of the Hindus and thus in which context can the term Kashmiriyat be held. They are unaware of the peaceful relation that existed between the Hindus and Muslims back in Kashmir. The
younger generation in the Noida apartments held that the Muslims labeled the Kashmiri Hindus as *kafirs* (non-believers).

For some people the concept of Kashmiriyat stood for a distinct culture. Parvaiz (2007) on the other hand holds that there is a widespread use of the term ‘Kashmiriyat’ by the politicians in Kashmir without comprehending the actual meaning of the term. Apart from the spirit of brotherhood Kashmiriyat also implies a distinct Kashmiri ethos and culture. There was an aesthetic concept to it. It stood for traditional Kashmiri craft and skills manifested in the form of kashmiri handicrafts. In the host territory the informants reported that they own very little of traditional Kashmiri items. The informants reported that there has been a change in the concept of Kashmiriyat which stood for a distinct ethno-cultural identity. The love and hospitality that existed back in Kashmir does not exist in the host territories between them and their neighbours.

The common perception held by the displaced people in Noida was that on a one to one basis they could still relate to Kashmiri Muslims. Some of them had contact with their Kashmiri Muslim neighbours or friends but they felt that collectively the interests of the Kashmiri Muslims were opposed to Kashmiri Hindus. The informants in Jammu and Noida reported that the trust that existed between the communities before displacement was not the same. As Mazur (2004) holds that in a community members rely heavily on each other for support, guidance, information, services, and security. In conflicts there may be a collective breakdown of social relationships. Once trust is destroyed, returning the community to a level of deep trust and assurance requires tremendous commitment, effort and time.
LANGUAGE AND THE NOTION OF KASHMIRIYAT

According to Kishwar (1998) there is a continuing neglect of the Kashmiri language in Kashmir. Nobody in Kashmir knows how to read and write in Kashmiri but it is largely used in oral communication. It is not taught in schools. There is a different ethos imposed on the language by the Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir. While Kashmiri Hindus believe that Kashmiri can only be written in the Sharda script, the Muslims hold that Kashmiri in Persian script has served their purpose for four hundred years and will continue to do so. The agenda of the pro-Pakistani groups is to banish the Kashmiri sentiment of Azadi by promoting Urdu rather than Kashmiri. Despite this, a large majority of Muslims in Kashmir continue to feel like a Kashmiri first and a Muslim next.

After displacement there has also been attempts made by the AIKS (All India Kashmiri Samaj) to present Kashmiri language in the Devnagri script. This reflects the attempts of a section of the Kashmiri Hindus to forge their Hindu identity and there is a heightened consciousness of being a Hindu. There is a endorsement by the welfare organizations that the language is to be used with the Devnagri script by the Kashmiri Hindu organizations but very few Kashmiri Hindus learn to read and write Kashmiri as it is largely a spoken language. Kaul (2001, p.135-137) writes,

While most of the parents continued to converse amongst themselves and with other family members in Kashmiri, they would immediately switch over to Hindi or English when it came to talking to their kids...It is no comfort to hear from some of our community members that even if their children are unable to speak and converse in Kashmiri, they do understand the purport of what we talk at home.

After displacement the Kashmiri language has become alien to the children and so have the vast literature, folklore, poetry and music in Kashmiri (Kaul, 2001). In the host

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territories the children of the displaced Kashmiri people do not know the Kashmiri language properly. Kashmiri is not taught in the Jammu or Noida schools and most of the elderly persons in Jammu held that in the host territory if the children speak Kashmiri they speak it with the dogri accent. In Noida the children reported that they mostly conversed in Hindi or English and had a lot of difficulty in speaking Kashmiri. Similar observation was found in Jammu. This has been one of the social consequences of displacement from the Kashmir valley. Kashmiri language, one of the definers of their Kashmiri identity has been neglected.

STATE'S RESPONSE IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

According to Cohen (2004) in the growing debate on how best to enhance protection and assistance for internally displaced people, many proposals have been put forward. Entitled the guiding principles on internal displacement, they were presented to the UN Commission on human rights in 1998 by Francis M Deng, Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons. The guiding principles fill a major gap in the international protection system for the internally displaced people. They set forth the rights of the IDPs and the obligations of governments and insurgent forces in all places of displacement. They offer protection before internal displacement occurs (that is, protection against arbitrary displacement), during situations of displacement, and in post-conflict return and reintegration (Hampton, 1998). The Guiding Principles have come into existence only in 1998. These Guiding Principles however have not been applicable to the internally displaced Kashmiri people. India has denied any kind of external assistance and so they have not been applicable to the displaced Kashmiri people.
The Guiding Principles affirm the right of IDPs to request international humanitarian assistance, the right of international actors to offer such assistance, and the duty of states to accept such offers. Although not a binding instrument, the Guiding Principles have immense practical value in providing a yardstick for monitoring the treatment of IDPs. They can be expected to strengthen the advocacy work of humanitarian, human rights and development organizations on behalf of the displaced people and can also be of use to the governments in drafting laws to protect internally displaced people. By offering an authoritative statement of the rights of internally displaced people, they should raise international awareness of their plight. Over time, they could contribute to the creation of a moral and political climate in which they might attain the force of a customary law. The challenge of securing protection for IDPs is one that requires international effort not only by the international community but at the national and local levels as well.

They emphasize that primary responsibility for the displaced people rests with their governments, but they also emphasize the important role the international community has to play when governments fail to fulfill these responsibilities. The response to the guiding principles by Asia is not that positive. Asian governments except the government of Japan, Srilanka and the Republic of Korea have generally exhibited discomfort about being held to international principles on internal displacement. They have been missing when it comes to speaking in support of the Guiding Principles. India for instance asserts that the guiding principles are not legally binding though they are useful guidelines for the states. India holds that international action with regard to the internally displaced persons should be with the consent of country concerned and should
uphold the sovereignty principle. It is justified on the grounds that in the garb of humanitarian action powerful countries may interfere in the internal affairs of weaker states. There is increased suspicion by Asian governments with regard to international assistance and the states may not want it to be known that they are not able to care for its citizens.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

In a study by Sorensen and Vincent (1998, p.269) on forced migration the ability to rely on existing social structures, such as the family, the village, the community or other extended social networks, was of overriding importance to the displaced individuals. The role of the state and the welfare organizations is considered secondary to their own agency by the informants in Jammu and Noida. The role of the state is however recognized by the people living in the camp areas. A large number of informants both in the Noida apartments and in the Jammu camps held that they received no external support after displacement. The survival in the host territories is attributed by them to their own agency.

In the various realms of society they utilized various response strategies to reintegrate in the new locales. The informants relied on their own families for material, social and mental support. The role of the kin relations residing in the host territories before displacement is also attributed as significant by the informants. The informants in Noida are mostly salaried middle class professionals and they did not receive much support from the government agencies. It was the informants in Jammu camps who received economic support from the government agencies. There is an ambivalent attitude towards the welfare organizations that provided them some support in the initial
period of arrival in the host territory but in the day to day life after displacement their role is viewed as minimal.

The role of the state is to be recognized in providing relief, ration and ORTs to the displaced people. The informants living in the camp areas however reported of a laid back attitude on the part of the government in giving them the appropriate infrastructure. The Relief Organization Jammu is the Nodal Agency of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, Department of Revenue, Relief and Rehabilitation, looking after the welfare of the people of the Kashmir valley who migrated from their homes in the wake of the disturbed conditions. The Relief Organization is entrusted with the tasks of registration, relief and rehabilitation of the IDPs until their dignified return to their homes in the valley. The organization disburses cash and rations assistance, sets up infrastructure for the migrants and also takes care of their administrative needs such as issue of certain certificates for which, otherwise, the IDPs would have to travel to the valley (Relief Commissioner).

According to the ‘Status Report with Regard to the Kashmiri Migrants’ of the (J&K government 2006) during the initial arrival in Jammu the displaced persons were accommodated in government building and tents. Some of the families hired private accommodations on their own. The interviews with IDPs residing outside the camp confirmed the fact that since the government was providing little infrastructure they preferred to make their own private arrangements in order to avoid harsh conditions of living in the camps. The camps were established in the period between 1991- 1994. According to the relief commissioner no additional camps were set up after 1994 and even if people applied for camp status their requests were not adhered to. The relief
commissioner held that the state government was not going to provide more ORTs for the displaced people who may be in a dire need for one room tenements.

According to the ‘Status Report with regard to the Kashmiri Migrants’ of the (J&K government 2006) for the distribution of relief to the displaced persons who are staying in their own/ hired accommodation in Jammu about 44 sub-offices exist which are under the supervision of the zonal officers of the relief organization. According to one of the officials in the relief office, a displaced Kashmiri, in rented accommodations those individuals were residing who was well-settled in Kashmir in the urban areas and could afford the accommodation. Some of the government employees from both rural and urban areas were staying outside the camps as they could afford a stable monthly income. The government employees drawing less salary were mainly confined to the camps. In the camps the percentage of people from rural areas was high because these people had experienced significant downward mobility after displacement. They had lost the access to their land, orchards, dairy farms and poultry farms after displacement.

In Jammu the relief benefits given to displaced persons from Kashmir is cash relief which amounts to Rs. 750 per person per month subject to a maximum ceiling of Rs. 3000 per family per month which is reimbursed by the Central Government. Also free ration is given to the displaced persons are entitled to free ration which is 9 kgs, of rice, 2 kgs. of flour and 1 kg. of sugar per person per month. The government employees are not entitled to any relief, only basic pay. There is a deferment of income tax for the government employees. Many of the families complained that the amount given to them was not sufficient.
Many of the camp residents were doing work outside the camp areas in Jammu, as helpers in private shops or factories. Some of the camp residents have opened up private transitory shops (shops selling grocery goods, vegetables, electric goods, bakery items) outside the ORTs. A few had taken up government jobs in the police department or were doing service in a private company. Thus the displaced persons were not subsisting only on the government aid in the host territory. They were using their skills to earn a living and were exercising their agency to exist in the host community.

According to the ‘Annual Report 2004-2005’ of the (Government of India), various State Governments/UT Administrations where Kashmiri displaced persons are staying have been providing relief to displaced people in accordance with the rules in their States. Government of NCT of Delhi is giving cash relief of Rs.800/- per head per month subject to a maximum of Rs.3200/- per family per month for non-camp migrants and Rs.600/- per head per month subject to a maximum of Rs.2400/- per family per month plus basic dry ration for those living in camps. While the relief provided by J&K Government is reimbursed by the Central Government from State Related Expenditure, all other State Governments/ Union territories pays such relief from their own funds.

The informants in the Noida were mostly those who themselves were government servants or their parents were government servants. They were not entitled to any relief and attributed their survival and well being in the host territory to their own efforts. The minimal non- government employees who were interviewed held that in the Delhi region the distances were huge and it was tiresome for the elderly people to travel to collect the relief that was their due. One of the informants held that although money was a necessity
but the cost and time of travel to collect a small amount acted as a deterrent for them to collect relief.

The informants in the Jammu camps held that initially on arrival in the host territory they had to register themselves as ‘migrants’. They had to fill up forms comprising information about the number of family members, proof of it etc. They were required to show their voter cards and that they were state subjects. Then they were granted the ration cards. It was a long procedure until their cards were granted. They go to the Camp Commander every month to get their relief. There is no fixed date so they just have to wait not knowing when the money will arrive. Only the head of the families can go to collect the cheque unless a power of attorney is given to their wives.

Every camp in the Jammu district is provided with a community hall and a dispensary. Even schools are provided for the displaced persons in the camp areas. However the informants in the camp areas held that sufficient medicines were not available in the dispensaries and many a time they had to buy expensive medicines from private shops in Jammu.

In the Muthi-I camp 1828 individuals were sharing 104 toilets. In the Gol Quarter camp 2242 individuals were sharing 86 toilets. In the Purkhuo camp 2270 families were sharing 108 toilets. According to the ‘Status Report with Regard to the Kashmiri Migrants’, of the (J&K government, 2006) “the infrastructure which is provided in the camps is that of lanes, drains, drinking water, electricity, sanitation, medical facilities, schools, community halls etc.,” (2006, p.11). Although the government reports providing basic infrastructural facilities a closer observation reveals that the basic facilities provided by the government are quite negligible and there is disregard the human rights
of the individuals. The people in the camp areas complained about lack of basic infrastructural facilities.

During the visit to the camp areas it was observed that narrow, dingy lanes were separating the ORTs. There is hardly any place for a person to walk in these lanes separating these ORTs. The drainage system observed was uncovered. The ORTs were without sufficient ventilation as there were not enough windows. There was shortage of space in the ORTs in which entire families of four-five members or more are housed. In one of the camps the Gol quarter camp the informants reported that even fresh water was not there daily. In the Muthi camp on the other hand the informants complained of the fact that the government did not provide them access to water outlets at their individual ORTs. They exercised their own agency and got the water outlets from the main line to their individual ORTs on their own.

Initially one water outlet existed for fifty-one ORTs in the Muthi camp. The people had to travel a distance to fetch water which is so basic for survival. Then in the Muthi camp people mobilized and brought the main water pipe line to their houses. It was an illegal act as it was done without government support, but they did it, because they could not live without the basic facility like water. Raj held, “The government was so insensitive to us that we relied on our own efforts. After sixteen years however, now the government is taking the initiative to bring water outlets directly to each One Room Tenements.”

The fact that in one single room the entire family is housed is resented by the displaced people, both men and women. Due to the lack of infrastructure the women feel insecure living in the ORTs. The ORTs are constructed in such a way that they neglect
the human rights of women; that is in one room the entire family is housed without the basic provision of attached bathing rooms or toilets. The women largely feel their privacy is being encroached upon. With common baths to bathe the younger women typically find it difficult to walk large distances to have a bath. The women also find it increasingly difficult to go about their daily chores whether it is changing clothes or cooking in the heat in the ORTs. Not satisfied with the basic facilities provided by the government many of the camp people have made makeshifts kitchens or baths by encroaching upon a little piece of land beside their ORTs.

Majority of the displaced people living in the camp areas in Jammu extended their ORTs by constructing small rooms which serve as a kitchen, a bathing room or a small sitting room. Most of the displaced people in the camp areas have equipped themselves with a cooler, a fridge or a television at times which are either second hand or of low quality. They have tried to equip themselves with the necessities in order to adjust and acclimatize in the host territory.

According to the (Government of India), Annual Report 2004-2005, in 1996, 2003 the then Prime Ministers announced a special package of a few crores for improvement of facilities in Jammu camps. The amount was utilized in the construction of one-room tenements, toilet complexes, drainage scheme and school buildings. But as observed in the camp areas, Muthi, Gol quarter and Purkho the camp conditions are far from satisfactory. The government had also sanctioned money for construction of 500 new one room tenements (ORTs) at Purkho, phase-IV to accommodate the displaced people staying in various government/semi-government buildings and construction of 504 ORTs at Muthi Phase-II in replacement of the existing leaking dome type ORTs. It has taken
sixteen years on the part of the government to realize that the ORTs in the Gol quarter camp are improper to live in the rainy season or that the people living in government or semi-government buildings need proper accommodation. One of the informants of the Purkhoo camp held that the government officials hold public meetings and disappear. The funds sanctioned to the displaced people are not properly utilized. There is delayed work.

The people living in the Noida apartments and Jammu camps feel alienated from the Indian government or the J&K state government. The displaced people, especially living in the Noida apartments felt that nothing substantial was done for them by the Jammu and Kashmir government. Even to get pension after retirement one had to have a service book and a government affidavit. For people whose documents were left in Kashmir due to displacement the people had to go through government procedures to get their dues. Bharati of the Noida apartments was angry because to get her monthly pension she had to file a case at the Supreme Court as her service book got left behind in Kashmir.

The Delhi government helped the informants in Noida in identifying cheap locations in buying property so that they could pay their installments easily. The government helped the displaced people to identify cheap locations in Noida to resettle. In paying the installments only the simple interest was charged. The compound interest was waived off. The transfer fees to purchase the apartments are not charged to the displaced Kashmiri people by the Noida administration. After March 2005 half of the registration fees have been pardoned to the internally displaced Kashmiri people by the U.P. state administration. The government also provided jobs to some people as teachers
on contract basis in Noida. In the sample there were two women who reported that to them jobs were provided as teachers on contract basis by the Delhi government thus helping a section of the displaced people in their empowerment in the host community. The Delhi Cabinet has employed 230 Kashmiri displaced teachers on contract basis in Capital’s government schools.

Mazur (2004) writes that local actors display pragmatic strategies and represent creative responses to the social trauma, lack of human resources, institutional fragility, and political volatility. It is the people themselves, their resilience, creativity, pragmatism and capacity to adapt in a new territory that is of utmost significance. In varying discourses the importance of the role of internal actors (local people, the private sector, and women) is generally undervalued – in contrast to external actors (bilateral aid agencies, the state and public sector). External actors have important roles to play in complementing local capacities for rebuilding by providing appropriate assistance. Democratic principles and participatory practices must be adopted in humanitarian assistance operations, community development programs, and larger scale aid projects in dealing with societies that have gone through conflict situations.

The displaced persons continually gain knowledge of new skills for survival and development, adopt new vocations, and develop new social frameworks. They develop strategies for building a life that is economically satisfying and socially and culturally fulfilling. The displaced persons use the knowledge, skills, and social networks developed in the new territory with those which they learnt prior to displacement.

**RECLAIMING COMPENSATION: A CONTESTED REALM**

In this section there will be an exploration of the compensation provided by the government if there is loss of property in Kashmir. Among both the people displaced to
Noida and to Jammu camps there were cases when the property of the displaced people was destroyed back in Kashmir or occupied by the locals. The ex-gratia relief if procured by the few displaced people has been meager. Due to need of proper accommodations in the host territories a few of the displaced people in Noida and Jammu sold off their properties back in Kashmir at throwaway prices. The displaced people had friends and acquaintances back in Kashmir through whom the negotiation of the sale of their properties was carried on. A few of the Muslims back in Kashmir bought properties of the minority community at cheap prices.

Because of displacement huge economic losses have incurred to the displaced people. The informants held that their houses were destroyed in fire, looted and abandoned, forcibly occupied or destroyed due to natural calamities. In order to get insurance claims their property back in Kashmir had to be insured. Many people in the camp areas and in the apartments in Noida held that every family did not get the compensation due to them because of damage to their properties. Many families did not carry their property papers with them as the displacement was very sudden. The informants held that their cases are pending with the government but there is delayed work with regard to government proceedings because of which a large number of people have not been able to claim their dues.

The government has sanctioned ex-gratia relief to the owners of the burnt properties at the rate of 50% of loss assessed subject to a maximum of Rs. 1 lakh for each house. According to rules and procedures of Jammu and Kashmir government, ex-gratia relief was sanctioned up to 1989 in such cases where loss was caused due to natural calamities or due to accidents (Status Report with Regard to the Kashmiri Migrants 2006, 270).
The displaced persons held that they were not aware of how much was the loss to be assessed as they could not see their properties that was destroyed by militancy in Kashmir. Thus they have to rely on the evaluation of the loss of their property made by the state officials.

Omprakash’s house got burnt by the militants in 1994. A court case has been going on. No ex-gratia relief has been received by him. He said tauntingly *Hum Hindustani Hain* (We are all Indians). The Government comes up with new rules which are so precise, that sometimes it becomes impossible for people to get any compensation. When ex-gratia relief is given to people whose property got destroyed the amount is Rs. 1 lakh for a building which may be worth Rs. 5 lakh. Out of the Rs. 1 lakh 50% is kept by the government on the promise that it will be returned to them when they go home. Who knows when they will go back to Kashmir? Omprakash personally had about 5 and half canals back in Kashmir. He got Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 15,000 from it only the sale of wood for cricket bats. There are cases where land and even temple land has been encroached by the Mulsim militants. He sold his land worth Rs. 10 to Rs. 15 lakhs at a throwaway price of Rs. 1 lakh. On the other hand, Dharmendra of the Noida apartments held that insurance was required to claim property compensation for the property which was destroyed after displacement. He did not get any compensation since there were lapses in the insurance policy and their premium was overdue. Dharmendra repented that it was a pity that he could not fight for any of the insurance claims. He got a petty amount of Rs.2 lakhs and even the cost of the rubble and the timber which was left of their property was taken into account while ascertaining the insurance claim.
The state government has enacted the J&K Migrants Immovable Property (Preservation, Protection and Restraint of Distress Sales) Act of 1997 aimed at preventing distress sale of immovable property by the displaced persons. The state government has also enacted the J&K Migrants (Stay of Proceedings) Act, 1997 to stop undue harassment of migrants due to legal proceedings in absentia. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Migrants Immovable Property (Preservation, Protection and Restraint of Distress Sales) Act of 1997, the IDPs’ houses which have been illegally occupied by the civilians, necessary notices have been issued to them by the Deputy Commissioners concerned. The acts have been unable to check the distress sales or the forcible occupation of the property of the displaced persons. As far as the houses occupied by the security forces are concerned, rent is reimbursed under Security Related Expenses (SRE) (Bhati, 2005).

The agriculturalists from rural areas who were living in the camp area in Jammu were vocal of the fact that their land and orchards which was a source of livelihood for them was forcibly occupied by the militants in the valley or left abandoned and uncared for. Two of the informants however held that their land was being looked after by the local Muslims in Kashmir who gave them a small profit that accrued from their lands or orchards in Kashmir.

The office of the Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir conducted a survey of migrant property in 1997. It was reported that a number of displaced persons have sold their property. The Distress Sales of Migrant Property Act exists and the sale deeds cannot be executed. Some of the displaced persons have authorized the local people in Kashmir to use the power of attorney to execute the sale deeds. After displacement thus interaction of the displaced persons with the local population of Kashmir whether Hindus
or Muslims exists especially in matters when information is to be given by the Muslims in Kashmir about the property of the displaced people. Similarly a handful of Muslims still work as tenants on the lands of the Kashmiri Hindus. After displacement, a clear cut severing of contacts between the Hindus and the Muslims is not there.

**POLITICIZING THE ISSUE**

Many local cultural traditions develop more recognized ways of dealing with the loss associated with displacement. Disruption in social relations not only involves personal loss; it dismantles existing power structures. There is the reinforcement by the community of a shared struggle. When we analyze the role of community initiatives and networks through their response strategies it is found that they think and act not only locally, regionally, nationally but also internationally (Sorensen and Vincent, 1998). In the case of Kashmiri Hindus there has been a growth of various political organizations, movements and associations.

In conflict situations the response strategies are not only limited to the local level but also have regional, national and international dimension. With Hindu migration out of the Kashmir valley the Kashmiri sentiment of independence from India is seen as one of Kashmiri Muslims versus India. Most Kashmiri Muslims want a sovereign state but they do not want to join Pakistan. Such sentiments of the Kashmir Muslims are bound to encourage anti-Muslim sentiments from the pro-Hindu Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) party across India. Ethnic movements in developing democracies like India thus constitute a political process whereby the central state and mobilized groups in the sub regions discover their relative power balances (Basu and Kohli, 1998).
The benevolent attitude of the BJP government (which largely seeks to represent the interests of the majority community of India) in the initial stages of exodus is appreciated both in the Jammu camps and in the Noida apartments. The political party gave help in kind by providing food and daily items of consumption which were initially needed after displacement as reported by the people in the camp areas in Jammu. Help was given by Maharashtra’s Shiv Sena government by providing for reservation of seats in engineering colleges. The informants however reported that when any of the political parties was in power not much help was given to the displaced people from Kashmir and political parties were after power politics. The aid given by a political party is linked to its interests. The distribution of aid affects inter group relations and legitimizes peoples’ agendas, and actions to their support for war or peace.

Displacement is rarely an apolitical process for citizens caught up in the struggle for power. Social identity and power relations are reformulated in the process of displacement. The fact that the Kashmiri Hindus view themselves as separate from the Kashmiri Muslims after displacement is evident from the fact that ‘Panun Kashmir’ a movement of the displaced Kashmiri Hindus has demanded a separate homeland on the North East of river Jhelum with a Union Territory status (Mishra, 1999). Therefore there is a change among the Kashmiri Hindus who as an ‘imagined community’ believe in forging their Hindu identity more than their kashmiriyat identity as observed in earlier analysis. Although displaced all over India the displaced Kashmiri people are victims of a shared struggle and heritage.

Presently the Pandit community has organized itself under the banner of various political groups like the PKM (Panun Kashmir Movement), Kashmir Sikh Displaced
Forum (KSDF), Jammu Kashmir Vichar Manch (JKVM) and has demanded a number of safeguards. This has included a separate homeland demand for the Kashmiri Hindus on the North East of Jhelum in Kashmir, representation to the National Minorities Commission for being considered a minority. Also included in the set of demands is the question of political representation in the decision making bodies of the state. This would entail reservation of seats for the community members in the Assembly and other government bodies (Mishra, 2004).

There is also the emergence of political organization among the displaced Kashmiri youth. There is the Youth Progressive Front which demands a special employment package for the displaced Kashmiri youth and their absorption against the vacancies created due to retirement of migrant employees (Migrant Youth Convention Organized, 2007).

**CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES**

The role of some of the Kashmiri voluntary organizations which existed much before displacement has magnified. The Kashmiri Association of Europe, whose founder-chairman was Mr L. Zutshi, is a Pandit from Srinagar who was living in England since about 1920 (Madan, 2004). According to Driver and Driver (2003) voluntary associations arise and function either to provide socio-economic support especially for the migrants living far away from their customary primary groups and confronted with anonymity of urban living or to intercede between the powerful political state and the citizens in the pursuit of economic and social ends.

According to Moza (2001, p.152) after independence and even before the exodus of the Kashmiri Hindu community in 1989-90 Kashmiri Hindus migrated to other places
in India outside their homeland in search of education, employment and opportunities for higher education. Delhi and other metropolitan cities in the North became their first choice. These migrant Kashmiri Hindus set up community associations for social and political reasons. But there was no cohesion among the numerous organizations. So in 1980 the All India Kashmiri Samaj was formed with Delhi as its nerve centre. Although the AIKS in Delhi and Kashmiri Association of Europe served the interests of the migrants in Delhi and abroad much before displacement took place their role in providing emotional support to the displaced persons enlarged after displacement. Voluntary associations of the Kashmiri Hindus already existed in Mumbai, Calcutta, Delhi, Allahabad much before displacement took place (Kaul, 2001). These organizations have been a major source of support to the displaced people and performed both instrumental and expressive role in the initial years of displacement.

In Jammu the objectives of the Samaj are essentially of a coordinating nature. The Samaj provides immense support to the displaced Kashmiri people in putting forward their timely demands to the government such as provision of relief or sanctioning of salaries for the government employees, restoration of the historical temples and shrines in the valley associated with the displaced community. The president of the All State Kashmiri Pandit Conference, Mr. Vaishnavi (personal communication 5th June, 2005) held that the welfare organization took various efforts to help the displaced people when the initial exodus took place. They helped the people get accommodation at Geeta Bhawan initially when they arrived in Jammu. After displacement the Jammu and Kashmir Sahitya Samiti was formed.
The ASKPC (All State Kashmir Pandit Conference) through R.S.S appealed for help to be given to the displaced people in the form of kind or money. It was the Sanatan Dharam Sabha in Jammu which was responsive to their needs and the Geeta Bhawan in Jammu became the nerve centre where the displaced people were housed after displacement. The B.J.P. a pro-Hindu party was the only political party which provided the displaced people with daily need items. There was thus communal reinforcement of a shared struggle.

In Noida the displaced people held that the Kashmiri Welfare Associations have played minimal role in their adjustment. But in the initial phase of arrival in the National Capital Region one of the informants held that the Kashmir Sabha in Lajpat Nagar provided them accommodation in Kashmir Bhawan for sometime. Their role is confined to collection of funds for having cultural activities, traditional ceremonies or building cultural centres. According to the informants, the Noida welfare association is planning to build a cultural centre in Noida. Children usually do not attend the traditional ceremonies organized by the welfare associations in Noida. The reason is that the children born and brought up in Noida in a multi-cultural set-up are disinterested to gain knowledge of their culture. They have not lived in Kashmir and do not identify with its culture in the same way as their elders. The informants in Noida largely expressed their disapproval in the role of the Kashmiri Welfare Associations and gave primacy to their own efforts, hard work and agency in adjusting in the host territory.

Gordon and Babchuck (quoted in Driver and Driver 2003, p.127) hold that the instrumental voluntary associations seek to maintain or to create some normative conditions or change in the society, the expressive type attends to the needs of persons for
sociability and does not seek to influence the larger society (Oommen 1975, quoted in Driver and Driver 2003, p.127). Thus while in Jammu the role of the voluntary association ASKPC is both expressive as it attends to the needs of the displaced persons for sociability and instrumental as since the arrival of the displaced persons the organization has taken positive efforts to rehabilitate the displaced persons and have time to time interceded with the government on behalf of the displaced persons. In Noida the displaced persons held that the welfare organization in Noida have a primary role of organizing havans (religious gatherings) for the people. These gatherings are only attended by the elders in Noida as it is then that they get to socialize with the other members of their community. These havans (ceremonial rituals) are not attended by the children. In Noida the role of the organization is mainly expressive.

**THE IDEA OF RETURNING HOME**

According to Mazur (2004) the return of displaced populations contains a special potential for rebuilding relationships. The ‘minority return’ of ethnic minorities, as will be the case of displaced kashmiris to their places of original residence (Kashmir) is much problematic than ‘majority return’. Returnees risk poverty, rejection, and retaliation and, therefore, there is a need to restore trust with fellow community members. Peaceful relations can be developed from the inside by local and national actors, not imposed from the outside.

According to Mazur (2004) decision making needs to be considered in relation to both constraining and enabling factors, individual and collective agency can shape structures and the development of policy at the wider level, as described by structuration theory. If successful return and rehabilitation of the displaced persons is to take place,
efforts to ensure the full participation of internally displaced persons which is in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, principle 28 part 2. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement stress that peace settlements must attend to the socio-economic disparities which is the source of many conflicts. Access to productive resources (land, property, and means of survival) which they lost after displacement is decisive; especially in facilitating return and integration. The use of participatory appraisal techniques such as resource mapping and wealth ranking by the actors (displaced persons) is helpful in identifying the range and interests of the various classes and other social, religious or political affiliations.

The process of rebuilding unavoidably requires the input and support of all the actors. External actors have role in encouraging and supporting interaction between communities in conflict situations. Rebuilding requires a collective effort in which the state along with the local people and private actors make efforts in mending relations and restoring confidence and trust between people, between ethnic and religious groups, and between people and government authorities. The plan should be to facilitate rather than hamper democratic participation among refugees and internally displaced persons in decision-making processes. This involves reconceptualizing the displaced people not as dependents and victims but as people who have capacities to take risks in unforeseen circumstances exercise decisions and thereby support the civil society in the integration of displaced populations.

The policy of the Government in respect of the displaced Kashmiri people is based on the premise that they would return to their homeland when conditions become conducive for their return. Permanent rehabilitation of the displaced persons outside
Kashmir is not envisaged. The thrust of the government has been to ensure that difficulties of the displaced are minimized and the needy families provided a reasonable amount of sustenance and support (Annual Report 2004-2005 of the Government of India). Thus in order to enable safe return of displaced persons to their native places in the Valley, the State Government constituted an Apex-level Committee under the chairmanship of Revenue, Relief and Rehabilitation Minister.

A sub-committee headed by financial commissioner (Planning and Development) prepared a plan for the return of the displaced persons. National Conference Government had in October 1999 approved the Action Plan for the return of the displaced people. The displaced people are to determine when and if conditions are right to return. Most of the displaced persons expressed the apprehension that Kashmir is not safe for them to return. The trust which existed between the majority and minority communities in Kashmir is destroyed after displacement. Also most of the displaced persons expressed anguish about the availability of job opportunities and return of their properties in Kashmir which is forcibly occupied, damaged or destroyed.

The negative attitude of the displaced persons to return to the valley in the current scenario is evident in the following case. According to the (Annual Report 2004-2005), The State Government identified 166 houses forming 15 clusters in Srinagar and Badgam Districts, which were considered safe for the return of the owners of these houses. Steps were taken to identify the families and find their willingness to return to their homes. Government of J&K also proposed construction of flats at Budgam and Anantnag for the rehabilitation of Kashmiri IDPs in March 2004. About 50 families who were registered with the Relief Organization, Jammu were contacted personally to give
their approval for return to the Valley in accordance with a relief package for repair of houses and return proclaimed by the Government. The shrines in Mattan and Kheer Bhavani were identified where the displaced people could be settled temporarily by developing two model clusters (containing temporary shelters), till the government can repair their existing residential houses. Interaction meetings with some of these families were also held, but none of the families agreed to return to the Valley. The following table reflects the responses of the displaced individuals with regard to their wish to return to their homeland.

**Table 7.3: Do you wish to return to Kashmir (Figures in Absolute Number)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence/Reason</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure Environment</td>
<td>Economic Opportunities</td>
<td>Lack of Trust</td>
<td>Well Settled in Host Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noida Apartment</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3 reflects the wish and desire of the informants to return to Kashmir. Although the return to Kashmir at this moment is a prophecy, however in the process of interview the informant's attitudes and opinions with regard to returning home were assessed. It is gathered that 64% of the informants in Jammu Camps Area held that secure environment was a major factor conducive for their return. Similarly in Noida, a large majority of the informants i.e. 42% agree to this scenario. Secondly, settlement in the host territory was attributed as a major deterrent to return to Kashmir by the informants in both field sites. It was 20% in Jammu Camp Areas and 36% in Noida Apartments. While the lack of trust with the Muslim community back in Kashmir accounts only 10% inclusive of both the areas.

In order to ensure the return and rehabilitation of the displaced people back to Valley, the government must try and build confidence and harmony between the two majority and minority communities. It should try and create an atmosphere of security.
for the minorities living in the Valley. These measures would instill confidence in the
government. Return and rehabilitation of the displaced people also requires the allocation
of the original properties of displaced persons in their homeland.

Mishra (2004) holds that the fear of sedition is hard to remove easily among
persons who are victims of civil conflicts. Insurgency has created some kind of
atmosphere of religious polarization. The property and possessions of the displaced
persons are illegally occupied or destroyed due to natural calamities. For them the return
to their homeland will be a new beginning all over again, socially as well as culturally.
Most importantly the economic conditions have changed and the younger generation
feels that the insurgency and militancy has led to a decline of economic activities and
return would mean that gainful employment would remain a problem.

The individuals wish to go back to Kashmir but not for settling down there. There
is a growing concern that there are no jobs for the minorities back in Kashmir. There is a
competition as far as access to scarce resources is concerned between the Hindus and the
Muslims. The displaced people hold that the political scene in Kashmir is occupied by the
Muslims. In the camp areas and in Noida especially the younger generation expressed the
concern that there were lack of job opportunities for them back in Kashmir and thus the
prospects of return were bleak. Bhati (2005) shows that according to census figures,
Kashmiri Pandits constituted fifteen per cent of the Valley’s population in 1941. They
were 5 per cent in 1981 and in 1991; their number dwindled to just 0.1 per cent.

The massacres by the militants continued after displacement from Kashmir. The
Wandhama, Sangrama and the Nadimarg massacres deterred the prospects of return of
the displaced communities. Sikhs were singled out and murdered in Chattisinghpura. The
statewide statistics of the killings, when seen alongside religious lines, discount the fact that the militants were targeting only members of the minority community. The number of innocent Muslims killed in 1990 was 679. In each successive year, the figure of Muslims killed is significantly higher than the number of or other minorities targeted. The selective killing of Pandits at Sangrama (Budgam district) on March 22, 1997 and the massacre of twenty-three Kashmiri Pandits on the eve Republic Day in 1998 at Wandhama (Srinagar district), Nadimarg massacre of March 2003 gave the message that Kashmir was an area where sabotage and subversion existed (Bhati 2005).

According to Mishra (2004) providing humanitarian assistance only cannot stabilize dangerous situations. When displacement is caused by conflict it is only through peace accompanied by developmental programs that safe and viable return can be made possible. The central as well as the state government has likewise held that plans for the return of the displaced people will be implemented only with the consent of the affected people, as ‘unless they are convinced, the plan will not succeed’.

Support is provided to some extent by the state and the political and welfare organizations after displacement. But in a displacement crisis the individuals exercise their own creative skills in readjustment in a new territory. Although the state does provide economic support to the displaced persons but the quality of the basic support provided in the form of infrastructural facilities is negligent of the well-being and basic human rights of individuals. The role of the voluntary organizations in the provision of support and help to the displaced persons is intensified in the initial stage of exodus and is more expressive than instrumental after a period of resettlement in a new terrain. The
aid provided by political groups is context-based depending upon their own political agendas to mobilize groups to act as vote banks.

In the changed context of displacement there are also changes in the way in which a group or a community identifies itself in a new locale. The bond between the Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims is not that strong after displacement to a new locale. The sense of solidarity and trust that a community shares with groups back in the homeland may be disrupted in situations of conflict-induced displacement as the communities are disconnected not only from their home territories but also with the various communities with whom they interacted back home.