Chapter VI

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The clandestine pursuit of national interest, is not a new feature of international politics, though its systematic study and analysis is a recent development. As mentioned earlier there are three aspects to intelligence, information-gathering both clandestine and overt, counter-intelligence and covert action. Historically, until the legitimisation of the more conventional instruments of foreign policy, clandestine operations were considered and accepted as an important instrument in inter-state relations. This is partially explained by the nature of polity in those days and the pragmatic acceptance of power politics, as the prime motivation in inter-state relations. However, with the development of new code of conduct and ethics in international relations, that became embodied in treaties, charters and eventually international bodies, the clandestine pursuit of national policy or interests came to be considered as a contravention of these rules. One of the prime agreements among nations and what came to be regarded as International Law which is mostly observed in the breach, was the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, thereby accepting not to interfere in the internal affairs of another nation. Yet, covert action which often involves interference in the political, social, economic or religious affairs of the target nation, which is independent and sovereign, has not declined in value or usage, as an instrument of inter-state relations. It is this anomaly in the behaviour of nations,
which on the one hand, claim to accept the ethical code of
court in inter-state relations and International Law, but on
the other, pursue covert action, that has prevented the rational
discussion of intelligence and its utility. Since nations rarely
claim to behave in contravention of International Law, there is
a natural reluctance to publicize intelligence operations,
which in turn create a paucity of primary documents and asso-
ciated information, except in the case where operations fail and
are exposed, or former intelligence personnel write about their
experiences.

It is important to remember that the collection of
information on foreign nations, except in protected and stra-
tegic areas, is not only considered a legitimate pursuit, but
is essential for the effective pursuit of foreign policy and na-
tional survival. There is no evident case of any nation in
the world lacking in an intelligence system or its usage. Counter-
intelligence begins with the assumption that foreign agents are
operating within one's territories and is essential for the pro-
tection of one's own secrets and the uncovering of foreign activ-
ities. To assume that no nation would be interested in one's
secrets or that foreign nations do not have a stake in one's
own policies, is to court national disaster, and create oppor-
tunities through this naive approach. Even neutral nations
cannot afford to take such an approach, as some of them have dis-
covered to their regret. Thus the first two aspects of intelli-
tence work are accepted as legitimate and necessary by all
nations and are common to their behaviour.
important

What however is the most question here, is whether covert action or the clandestine pursuit of national interests is accepted by nations as an effective and necessary instrument of achieving foreign policy goals? Evidently the answer would be varied depending on the individual nations extent of interests, sum total of capabilities, the nature of threat perception, the political culture of the people and leadership as well as the context in which each nation has operated, historically and current situations. The factors that go into the resultant use of covert action, are multiple and can be extended to inputs such as the social psychology of the people. Thus not many nations could be made to agree on the point whether covert action is necessary and why a nation should undertake the pursuit of each policy. It is sufficient that nations are aware of the existence of the instrument of covert action in inter-state relations and guard adequately against it. Until nations have achieved a more stable international community and ideal form of interaction, there is no possibility of a reduction, in the use of covert action in international politics.

Clandestine operations are not an isolated instrument of foreign policy and must thus be considered in conjunction with the other available instruments. The more conventional and accepted instruments of foreign policy have been treaties, alliances, the balance of power, international law, international organisations, along with the more bilateral or localised instruments of war and diplomacy. The utilization of each of
instruments has a variety of dimensions to it and a range of adoptable techniques. The most widely adopted instrument to achieve foreign policy objectives in inter-state relations is diplomacy. Among the important dimensions and inputs that go into the diplomatic process are foreign aid, cultural diplomacy, transfer of arms and propaganda, normally carried out through negotiations or in the case of propaganda, by direct contact with the target groups. While the two instruments of intelligence and diplomacy differ in their methods, the goal of achieving foreign policy aims is the same and the linkage between these two instruments goes deeper than is normally visible or acknowledged.

The value of covert action can be discerned only when it is considered as one element in the overall pursuit of foreign policy, in conjunction with the usage of other instruments. Since covert action is an instrument infrequently resorted to in extreme cases, where all other instruments have failed to achieve the desired objectives, it is normally used to achieve only limited short-term political objectives. Covert action cannot and does not seek to displace the other instruments and their usage, nor can it replace completely the pursuit of a more consistent long-term foreign policy in that region, through conventional diplomatic processes. In fact, it is mostly used to achieve the goals that the other instruments have failed to achieve despite their consistent application. While this would indicate certain fundamental inadequacies in the foreign policy of the nation that resorts to covert action, it
is to be remembered that relations between nations have not been perfected yet. One obvious fact is that all nations are not equal in terms of power and capability which compels the nations that do not have the adequate military, political-diplomatic and economic leverage to achieve foreign policy goals, to increasingly rely on their intelligence services to keep themselves informed and resort to covert action. But there are also fundamental differences in perception, polity, economy, culture, religion as well as historical experience, that hinder the achievement of foreign policy goals of any given nation. When compared to war, covert action, is less costly in terms of lives and material, and when compared to diplomacy, covert action is quicker and less complicated. Considering the difficulties of achieving foreign policy goals of most nations, and the advantages of covert action, over other instruments, it is not surprising that some of them would resort to covert action under certain circumstances.

Like most of the other instruments of foreign policy, covert action is a double-edged weapon. When skilfully used as a supportive instrument to war or diplomacy it can achieve the desired results at considerably lesser cost. Often it may appear as the only solution out of a crisis situation. In most cases where espionage or covert action is uncovered within one's territories undertaken by a foreign nation, the effect on the relation between the target and the aggressor, will be determined by the current trends or state of relations as well as considerations of the potential or desired relationship. Thus many cases
of espionage and covert action are not unduly publicised by either nation, unless the relations between them are extremely strained or there is some immediate propaganda value to be achieved in publicization of the affair. This trend towards covering up of exposed operations and public low-level treatment would almost indicate that most nations accept such operations, their existence and the fact that it may be a necessary distortion in inter-state relations, until relations among nations improve to the extent that it would no longer be necessary.

One of the important factors in the near legitimization of clandestine operations, was the Cold War and the emergence of two power blocs with ideology as the main theme in international politics. While super power covert action initially tended to restrict itself to Eastern and then Western Europe, its emphasis shifted by the early fifties to the newly liberated nations of Asia and Africa. With the realization of the extent and capabilities of covert action came the change in the perception of the political leadership of some nations. What, however, is to be emphasized here, is that the existence of two fundamentally opposed power blocs with the non-aligned nations between them, has considerably reduced the chances of moderation and compromise among the community of nations. The lesser the chances of compromise in interstate relations, the greater is the possibility of covert action being undertaken to achieve foreign policy goals. Yet paradoxically, it is these same intelligence services which have been used to negotiate moderation between enemies and at
at times to localise conflict.

Coming back to the general functioning of intelligence services, it can be established that they can serve both negative as well as positive functions in interstate relations. Recent history is full of examples to show that intelligence activities can have a profound and negative effect on the course of international politics and the foreign policies of various nations. In May 1957, the United States spyship "U.S.S. Liberty" which moved close to the coast of Israel to monitor the course of the Arab-Israeli war, uncovered a massive deception operation by Israel to trap Jordanian forces. The Liberty was attacked by Israeli naval defences and aircraft killing and wounding many American personnel. The initial reaction in the Pentagon was to undertake a retaliatory strike against the Israeli naval base, until saner thought and wisdom prevailed. But this was one occasion when the United States and Israel came close to attacking each other, an event that could have had a dramatic effect on the course of international politics.

Two points may be noted here. Firstly intelligence operations conducted in the context when two nations are opposed to each other's policies, can be a stumbling block or hinderance to the improvement of relations, until they are suspended or stopped completely. Secondly, the most serious impact of clandestine relations is in the context of two nations that are engaged in a direct or Cold War. In such situations the
uncovering of clandestine operations increases belligerency on both sides and can become an explosive issue or factor in an already difficult situation, creating thereby a crisis. The example of Egypt during the decade 1956-1967, in its relations with the Arab world proves this point.

It is not the intention of this thesis to enter into the discussion of the morality or otherwise of intelligence activity, but to impartially present its utility to foreign policy and draw out its links to diplomacy. It is thus necessary here to discuss the positive functions of intelligence activity and its important contribution to international politics. Intelligence services have assumed a new vital and creative role in interstate relations, such as has not been recorded in earlier history. Espionage, after the threat of nuclear war, is today, the strongest contributor to the maintenance of the peace among nations, more efficient in its end results than the national and international associations, whose avowed purpose it is. The transformation of espionage from war-monger to peacemaker is possible and is exemplified in the activity of the Israeli intelligence service. For the peace of the world, the relative powers must always be kept in balance, neither side must be allowed to attain a permanent advantage over the other. For this, a most delicate mechanism is required, which can detect and register minute changes in the scientific, military and political fields that may upset the equilibrium, so that immediate counter-measures can be taken to restore the balance.
The intelligence services provide this essential mechanism.

Wars spring from fear and prejudice, among the leaders and masses of a nation, developing at times into a situation that may lead to war. Fears and prejudices are the product of ignorance and it is the function of national intelligence to dispel this ignorance, especially amongst the political leadership. To this extent, it is a vital and necessary institution. On every side, the huge organisation of highly trained specialists which constitute the intelligence service, has become part of the process of government, especially in foreign affairs and defence matters. This has introduced a scientific approach into foreign affairs, which was unknown before the Second World War. Both the political and military leadership have become accustomed to using the objective assessments of the intelligence services rather than deductions based on rough estimates, previous experience or wishful thinking, in determining their daily decisions on national and foreign policy. This is true of the Communist nations also whose approach to international relations has moved from the highly emotional doctrinaire to a calculating pragmatism. This new approach has substantially affected the nature of political interaction between nations. It has taught them to calculate beforehand the results of any armed conflict, or political or economic move. International diplomacy is played now on a chessboard where possible reactions to each move, are computed by the intelligence service. Since rational calculation will show that armed conflict among major
powers will lead to universal destruction, moves leading directly to this situation, are avoided. The emotional factors which might have started a major war are now checked, because the progress and outcome of such a war, can be accurately calculated.

Intelligence services have become increasingly involved in unofficial quasi-diplomacy and the moderation of conflict. While this may appear contradictory and paradoxical in the context of covert action, it is nonetheless well established that it plays a significant role in a crisis situation and conflict moderation through what is termed 'liaison'. When the official channels of diplomatic communication have broken down, it is normal to use intelligence services as a clandestine channel of communication. Sometimes even, when the official channels are open, the intelligence services are used to discuss or negotiate matters that cannot be officially discussed owing to peculiar circumstances in that situation. Intelligence personnel, much more than politicians or career diplomats, work from a standpoint of realism, and as these negotiations are never meant for public consumption or carried out in public, these negotiators do not have to worry about prestige, face-saving or political dogma. If there is to be found directness and bluntness in any interstate negotiations, it is among negotiations carried out by the intelligence services. This is partly due to the fact that intelligence personnel are sometimes better informed of developments abroad, and that such negotiations, when it concerns an enemy nation is normally undertaken
in a crisis-situation. Considering the procedure and protocol that is necessary for official negotiations, intelligence services have quicker and easier access to the opposition.

Though this balancing mechanism has yet to be perfected to avoid all wars, it has stopped some of them from becoming world wide engagements. This principle can be applied equally to bilateral relations among other nations of the world, if there is a realization of the utility of this instrument in conflict moderation. There is hope that this scientific approach will perfect itself and thus establish a routine of checks and counterchecks before major decisions are taken. Whereas associations and organisations based on the higher aspirations of mankind, have failed to bring the human race closer to lasting peace, the intelligence services based on the more primitive instincts of distrust and enmity, have ironically become the more effective instruments in preserving peace amongst the major powers in the atomic age.

Intelligence and Diplomacy

It is one of the paradoxes of international relations, that the two institutions of diplomacy and intelligence which were closely linked in their historical growth and objectives to the extent that at one time they were considered synonymous, should be fundamentally opposed to each other in methods and ethos of functioning. This aspect of conflict and co-operation in the

practice of these arts, has taxed the best brains of the practitioner and theorists interested in the resolution of this problem. The compulsions to co-operate are as strong as the tendencies towards conflict which arise in joint functioning, and this makes the satisfactory resolution of the problem virtually impossible. To forcibly separate these two instruments of foreign policy is to considerably reduce the efficiency and capability of each instrument individually, as well as to interfere in a natural process.

The diametrical opposition of diplomacy and intelligence begins with the desire and faith in the instrument of diplomacy as a means to avoid unnecessary war, thereby saving lives and property. The practice of diplomacy begins with the assumption that it is an amicable method of settling disputes between nations, reducing tensions, increasing goodwill and co-operation among nations and the philosophical rationalization that man is amenable to reason. Through the process of negotiations and the adherence to the rules and regulations of the code of conduct for interstate relations called International Law, peace can be achieved among nations. Increased direct contacts among the peoples of various nations, the transfer of technology and wealth in a spirit of co-operation, strengthened by government to government negotiations to clarify positions, dispel doubts and achieve mutually acceptable settlements, can relatively go a long way in achieving peace among nations and stability necessary for growth and development. Evidently, the
conflict arises with intelligence services on the issue of espionage and covert action, which are often carried out under diplomatic cover. The discovery of such clandestine operations, especially when they are organized, financed and directed by a foreign embassy, must necessarily have an adverse effect on interstate relations, even if the two nations are considered allies in foreign policy. The more serious nature of covert political action or paramilitary operations, can lead to a breakdown in diplomatic channels, increase hostility and tensions or even lead to a military conflict. Definitely a deterioration of relations between the two nations is involved. The least possible punishment for interference in the domestic affairs of a foreign nation has often involved the recall of the ambassador and the forcible reduction of diplomatic staff in that embassy. The lesser cases of espionage which are more frequent, have involved the expulsion of the responsible diplomats and their declaration as "personae-non-grata". Possibly what is more important to the career diplomat here, is loss of diplomatic "face" and the branding of the guilty nation as having acted in contravention of the code of International Law. It is this single factor that is the greatest deterrent to most nations from undertaking espionage or covert action that emanates from the embassy, and the extreme caution applied, where such operations are considered necessary. It is to be expected the subsequent political fall-out, are calculated among the costs of clandestine operations.

Thus from one approach, espionage and covert action go
against the ethics and morality of diplomatic practice, creating the oft evident bitterness and conflict. There is, however, the lesser accepted view that diplomacy begins where war ends, and that war is an extension of diplomacy. Diplomacy is directed towards attaining the end results of war at lesser cost. It is this view that has often produced the rationalization for covert action, since diplomacy and intelligence are directed towards the same goal and must hence necessarily co-operate. This rationalization has found a peculiar validity for some governments, in the context of a bipolar world engaged in a Cold War, with fewer chances of ideological, political or military compromises.

When the clandestine pursuit of national interest is considered as only one of a number of mutually complimentary instruments of foreign policy, all directed to achieving a single foreign policy goal, the conflict between diplomacy and intelligence loses its validity.

However, since career diplomats and diplomatic theoreticians, with faith in the higher ideals and aspirations of mankind and interstate relations find it difficult to accept this alternate approach, a multitude of problems are evident, of conflict and co-operation, at various levels where diplomacy and intelligence meet in practice. It is also not surprising that the practitioners of the two kinds of intervention, diplomatic and covert, should differ temperamentally and in their preferences for techniques, friends, ideologies or political approaches to
to the problems in interstate relations.

There is a close consumer-producer relationship between diplomacy and intelligence. Intelligence information and estimates of military and political trends in foreign nations are of tremendous value in the application of diplomatic tools and techniques. The application of foreign aid, transfer of technology, transfer of arms or cultural diplomacy, requires an advance knowledge of the overall politico-military situation in the target nation. Undoubtedly the diplomats themselves are in an excellent position of being aware of these developments, but diplomacy cannot compete with the depth and width of intelligence coverage, which can often provide the missing links of information, clues to alternative policy choices, identify the relative strength and weakness of various political groups, and most important of all functions, act as an information pool for the cross-checking and verification of the information gleaned by the diplomats in the course of their duty. This relationship however, works on a mutually reciprocal basis, since the information gathered from the diplomatic pool can assist in increasing the range and accuracy of intelligence information. In the analysis of intelligence gathered and the formation of estimates necessary for policy formulation, diplomacy and intelligence are an invaluable aid to each other. This relationship

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can be extended further to point out that much of the success of the other foreign policy instruments applied such as war, treaties, alliances, will depend to a large extent on the accuracy and validity of the intelligence analysis or estimates that have gone into the decision-making process. Good intelligence cannot insure against bad policy, but bad intelligence can disrupt even good policy formulations.

Foreknowledge can be one of the greatest assets to a negotiator. First it prevents the home-delegation from being taken by surprise. In the subtle art of negotiation surprise can lead to misjudgements, wrong calculations and even submission through psychological pressure or blackmail. On the other hand, when the home-negotiators are aware of what the opposition wants, what it will give in return, what its calculated expectations are, as well as the discrepancies between what is said and what is done, it can begin with a better bargaining position, or enhance it later. Secondly, foreknowledge of the precise calculations of the opposition, afford greater manoeuvrability during negotiations and a wider range of bargaining positions. With intelligence, one can extract the maximum possibilities that are offered in any interstate negotiations. To know the opponents cards in advance, to virtually win the game.

While the more positive aspects of the linkage between diplomacy and intelligence have been covered it is necessary to discuss the negative aspects of conflict, that is brought
about in the forced process of co-operation. This conflict can be seen at two levels, where on the domestic front the foreign affairs ministry and at field level, the embassy, and the intelligence community, are characterized by conflict and competition in their relations. The problem is essentially one of competition for influence over the decision-making process, on issues of covert action undertaken abroad. Often, the Ministry may not agree with the analysis and estimates of the intelligence community, and there are vested interests on both sides that seek to compete with each other, in convincing the decision-makers of their own views. The actual source of aggravation is the intelligence departments that every foreign affairs ministry necessarily maintains as part of its structure. In the allocation of funds and authority, a natural conflict arises between these two departments and the regular intelligence community has an upper hand over the Foreign Ministry intelligence wing. While there are joint committees to co-ordinate the functioning of these overlapping departments, these committees are often bypassed or paralysed. In the allotment of diplomatic postings abroad, most nations have a quota or "slot" postings reserved for the intelligence community. But the question of whether the posts are available or vacant, has to be decided by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which is more likely to prefer one of its own career diplomats in these posts.

The second problem relates to the question of jurisdiction over clandestine operations. This need not apply only to those
that emanate from the embassy but from other cover also, since the adverse immediate impact of disastrous covert programmes is likely to be felt by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The normal procedure is to involve the Ministry in the final stages of the operation by obtaining its clearance, thereby keeping the details secret. There are some cases like Great Britain, where the Foreign intelligence department, the MI6 (now, Director of Intelligence, Section 6) is under the jurisdiction of the External Affairs Ministry. But the more common case is for the intelligence community to be under the jurisdiction of Ministry of the Interior or directly under the Chief Executive. The Foreign Ministries in most nations have made consistent efforts to obtain greater jurisdiction if not total, over clandestine operations that are likely to have an adverse effect on interstate relations, and have succeeded in some cases. But in the joint committees deciding these issues, it is more likely that the intelligence community can thwart such efforts on grounds of the secrecy necessary for the success of such operations, and a variety of other techniques developed over the years. However, in all cases, the relative commitment to international law and ethics, as well as the personal impact of the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Director of Intelligence on the Chief Executive, is an important factor in deciding this issue.

Undoubtedly espionage and covert action have undermined the basis of international law and the ethics or morality that
underlies the code of conduct for interstate relations. It is more difficult to answer the question whether clandestine operations are necessary and acceptable as an instrument of foreign policy. It is first necessary to recognize that the usage of this instrument is well established. To enter into the ethics and morality of the instrument itself, is to raise the age-old issue of idealism versus realism. In the game of power politics in practice, nations have exhibited amorality in choosing instruments, and have established that the world has a long way to go, before peace and ideal interstate relations are achieved. In such circumstances, it is preferable not to overlook an important input in the process of international relations, to have a pragmatic approach to the instrument of intelligence and thereby avoiding the danger of being at a disadvantage in relation to nations that do use these instruments. In fact, as an attempt has been made to show, nations that begin at a disadvantage in interstate relations can considerably increase their bargaining position and manoeuvrability, as well as effectively ensure their own survival by the skilful use of intelligence.

Intelligence and Regional Powers

The study of Egypt has been undertaken as an example of a Regional Power, which may seek to pursue an aggressive foreign policy during certain periods of time as did Egypt under Nasser during the decade 1957-1967. It is not surprising that Egypt became the first liberated nation of the Arab world and chose to assume the mantle of Arab leadership. As Nasser tries to explain in his 'Philosophy of the Revolution' in the early fifties the Arab world was looking for a leader who could express
Arab resurgence in world politics and Egypt was historically and culturally destined for this role.

Egypt has been the most ancient civilization in that region and over the centuries, become the cultural leader of the Arab world, and the seat of its learning. At the crossroads, of international trade, it was introduced to western ideas and technology that began the process of modernization, as in the case of India. Yet it has had distinct perception of itself as a people with a lasting and important role to be played in international relations. Paradoxically it was ruled for many centuries by foreigners and exploited, but its liberation and overthrow of the monarchy in 1952, only increased its desire to play what it perceived as its destined role in the Arab world. As a founding member of the non-aligned movement, it has been close to both Super Powers at various points of time while seeking to pursue an independent foreign policy and has effectively played off the Super Powers against each other, in an effort to increase its own gains and maintain an independent policy.

The objectives of Nasserist foreign policy regarding the Arab fold were essentially two-fold. The liberation of Palestine and the defeat of Israel naturally assumed a primary role but of equal importance was Arab nationalism that was to be manifested in unity among the Arab nations. The export of the Free Officer Revolution and its philosophy were necessarily directed towards the overthrow of the monarchies of the Arab
nations, which would lead to more progressive elements coming to power and the Union of all Arab nations under Egyptian leadership. In the overall obtaining of these objectives, Egypt used all the available instruments of foreign policy at its disposal. In this, naturally intelligence services had a significant role to play. Egypt in the early fifties definitely did not have the adequate military, político-diplomatic or economic leverage in the Arab world to attain its objectives only through the conventional instruments of diplomacy. Thus propaganda and covert political action were combined and used as an aid or support in the overall usage of other foreign policy instruments. In this limited context, it is evident that the intelligence services served their purpose effectively, though it could do little against Israel.

As outlined in the previous chapters, Egyptian intelligence undertook the limited role in achieving foreign policy goals, by undertaking covert action in the more anti-Nasser nations of Jordan and Lebanon as well as Saudi Arabia. In the case of other nations, it supported and financed as well as directed the activities of political émigrés who sought asylum in Cairo and were sympathetic to the Nasserist policies and Free Officer Revolution. At times it succeeded in creating civil strife, fomenting political trouble, paralysing the monarchies functioning and at times even actively enabling the overthrow of the traditional or anti-Nasser governments. All the techniques of covert action were employed including propaganda, psychological
warfare, the clandestine supply of arms and finance and the Mukhabarat thus effectively exploited the political fragmentation and instability in various Arab nations.

The success of this limited effort can be seen in the ultimate establishment of pro-Nasser governments in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and later Libya, the civil strife in Jordan and Lebanon that created fear in hearts of Arab monarchs and the union of Egypt and Syria for more than three years. In many of these cases of change in government, the Egyptian intelligence had a minor though significant role to play. No doubt at various times its activities led to tensions and the isolation of Egypt in the Arab world, and many of the operations ended in failure, but as an aid to the achieving of foreign policy goals, it effectively served its limited purpose.

**Intelligence and Small Strategic Nations**

Israel which has been chosen as an example of a small strategic nation, does not strictly speaking fit into this category and should be considered as a Regional Power. Though Israel is geographically small, it is militarily powerful and its policies and actions have a profound impact on the region. However, there are a category of nations that are similar to the extent, that they are geographically small, strategically located and operate in a hostile environment or under a system of blockades. The other examples are South Korea, Taiwan and by stretching the definition even South Africa, most of them having
an efficient intelligence service. To these nations the major underlying and determinant factor in foreign policy is their survival, as they are surrounded by hostile nations and in a perpetual state of preparedness for war or involved in actual war. As opposed to Egypt, Israel has been aligned and dependent on the political, financial and military support of the United States.

It would not be an understimation to point out that the survival of the state of Israel depends to large extent on the efficiency and accuracy of its intelligence service. The lesson has been brought home only too clearly during the 1973 war, when Israel was misguided by its intelligence service, and not prepared for the Egyptian attack which at one stage came near to a penetration of Israel, which could have led to further disaster. To be one step ahead of the enemy, to be aware of all its political and military moves, both overt and clandestine, is essential to the survival of Israel. It is not therefore surprising that Israel relies extensively on its intelligence service, to plan its policy and actions abroad, and it has been an invaluable institution, aiding the survival and strength of Israel.

The utilization of the instrument of intelligence has been different in the case of Israel, when compared to Egypt, since it neither had the interests, objectives or access that Egypt had to the Arab world. The stress on intelligence functioning is related more to information-gathering, analysis and estimates. But it has contributed to the technology of the
military arsenal, assisted during periods of war in decep-
tion operations, undertaken operations to curb Palestinian
extremist operations and to maintain Israel's military super-
iority over its opponents by thwarting their efforts to develop
better weapons of conventional or nuclear nature. It has also
undertaken operations that do not fit into conventional nature
of intelligence work, due to its unorthodox style of function-
ing. But its single greatest contribution as seen in the 1967
war, is the painstaking, detailed and accurate knowledge of
the Arab armed forces that have been the result of years of
consistent and patient effort, which has been an invaluable aid
in the actual conduct of war.

There is one other function that deserves special
mention: the entry of Israeli intelligence into quasi-diplomatic
functions. While Israel maintains liaison with some intelli-
gence agencies of the world on a formal basis, there are many
other cases of informal exchange of information and ideas. The
intelligence service has been able to build up many friends
and contacts sympathetic to its cause, that had come in useful in
difficult situations. This has been a consistent effort over
the years to search for common interests with other nations.
The value of this function is considerably enhanced since with
many nations, Israel has no formal state to state diplomatic
representation, and even if they do exist, are normally unused
or blocked due to differences in policy and approach.

Reverting back to David Vital's theory of the utility
of intelligence services to lesser nations, it can be seen that the theory has been verified in case of Egypt and of Israel. To conclude, nations which do not have the adequate military, politico-diplomatic or economic leverage to obtain their foreign policy objectives, are compelled to not only utilize the instrument of intelligence, but are compelled to use it more efficiently and effectively. Undoubtedly the capabilities of the nation will define the extent to which it can utilize this instrument, but it is these same limitations which compel that nation to use its intelligence service more effectively and efficiently. In the case of Israel, it is doubtful, if it could have applied a permanent military solution to its problems, while the politico-diplomatic access was cut off, due to the radical differences in perception and approach to fundamental issues, with its Arab neighbours.