Chapter II

INTELLIGENCE AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT
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The origins of the Arab-Israel conflict can be traced to the foundation of the Zionist Movement, started by Theodore Herzl, towards the end of the nineteenth century and the decision of the European Jews to emigrate to Palestine and colonize uninhabited areas. By 1920 the rate of Jewish immigration had increased to the extent of causing concern among the Arab Palestinians and neighbouring Arab states of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Religious animosity, cultural differences and demographic factors resulted in riots, and political pressure was applied by other Arab states, to stem the tide of immigration. Britain, which had been given the mandate over Palestine, by the League of Nations in 1920, was unable to come to terms with the problem.

The Nazi persecution of the Jews in Europe during the thirties was an important determining factor in the decision of the Jews, to create a Zionist state of Israel where the Jews scattered all over the world could return and settle down in peace, free from persecution. In preparing for Israel, the Jews of Palestine began to clandestinely arm themselves and assist in the illegal immigration of European Jews into Palestine. The realization that the Second World War would soon be over and that Palestine would become free of the British mandate, added

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to the urgency of being ready for the civil war which would eventually break out. The Arab Palestinians were also making similar preparations, assisted by the Arab States.

The creation of a Jewish intelligence system became necessary during this period to assist in illegal procuring of arms and in illegal immigration. Shai, the intelligence wing of Haganah, the Jewish underground army, became the predecessor of Israeli intelligence. Thus the Israeli intelligence system, unlike the Egyptian system finds its roots in the Arab-Israel conflict. The Egyptian intelligence system grew from the British organisation, set up in Egypt to suppress Egyptian extremist nationalists and foreign spies.

When the Second World War ended in 1945, there was tremendous support for the creation of Israel from the victorious Allies. The United Nations partition plan for Palestine, before Britain surrendered its mandate, was not accepted by the Arab Palestinians. In the midst of a civil war in 1948, the British withdrew from Palestine. On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel came into existence and was immediately attacked by the joint armies of five Arab states. Large scale displacement of Arab Palestinians took place but the Arab armies were unable to defeat Israel. Since then, there have been innumerable minor skirmishes and three major wars in this

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tense and conflict prone area. In October 1956, Israel attacked Egypt for its fedayeen raids on Israel and the closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. In June 1967, Israel undertook a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and Syria in response to their belligerency and captured the Golan Heights, West Bank, Gaza strip and the Sinai. In October 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel to regain lost territories but the war ended in a stalemate and Egypt regained the Sinai only after making peace with Israel in 1979. The 1969-70 war of Attrition was a prolonged artillery battle between Egypt and Israel, joined by their respective air forces. In most of these wars Egypt bore the brunt of the conflict with Israel and suffered tremendous casualties. Syria and Jordan also played an active and important role but other Arab states either assisted financially or sent symbolic armed forces to the battle front.

In each of these conflicts, the intelligence services of Egypt and Israel have had an important role to play. Even during the periods of armed peace much of their activities related to the gathering and analysis of information regarding the enemy and keeping the political leadership informed of enemy intentions and plans. During the periods of war also, they have acted in an important supporting role to the military, through signals inter-

ception and deception operations. However before undertaking a review of intelligence activity and their contribution in the Arab-Israel conflict, it is necessary to briefly study the historical development and the structure and functions of Egyptian and Israeli intelligence systems.

**Historical Background**

The Egyptian intelligence system could probably be traced back to the ancient Egyptian civilization, but its more recent history begins prior to the Second World War, when Egypt was a British colony. During the war, it was the gateway to Africa and attracted the attention of the Great Powers of Europe, notably Germany whose intelligence service was very active in the region. British intelligence had trained and organised the secret police network of King Farouk, whose unstable regime had a number of domestic political opponents. This Royal Intelligence service was quite active as is evident from the numerous spy trials that began as early as 1942, when revolutionaries and German agents were arrested. The security system was however, fully developed and perfected between 1946 and 1952, during the hunt for Communists, Muslim Brethren, terrorists and other subversives. In fact some of the intelligence directors who were to organize and direct Nasser's intelligence such as Ali-Sabri (Air Force Intelligence) had their early training in this organization.

After 1947, there was no British military mission to

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inhibit the political activities of Egyptian officers. With their growing alienation from the King and politicians, sedition became possible. Ideas of a coup d'etat gained ground with developments in other Arab states, and the deteriorating political order was discredited. Moreover, it was difficult for the limited Egyptian Military Intelligence structure to keep every cabal under surveillance. The state security establishment, consisting mainly of the political police was too busy with the seditious activities of the Ikhwan and other extremist groups. Soon the military intelligence and Royal intelligence service was infiltrated by Free Officers, the revolutionary nationalist and anti-monarchy group. Osman Nuri and Abd el Muneim were two officers in intelligence, who supported and kept the Free Officers Movement informed of political developments. Anwar el Sadat also was instrumental in misguiding Yusuf Rashad the Chief of the Royal intelligence service, that the Free Officers movement was the work of a megalomaniac officer, who lacked popular support from the army, at the same time extracting information on the moves of the monarchy.

Following the "Black Saturday" riots of January 1952 in Cairo, the Free Officers preponed their coup, originally set for 1955. Following a tip-off from an army intelligence officer, that the Royal government was planning to take action against

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them, the Free Officers undertook a successful revolution on 22 July 1952 and established a Republic. Prior to the coup, the Free Officers had established contact with the CIA, and based on these reports, the American government tacitly supported the Free Officers, while claiming outward neutrality, believing that Nasser would be a valuable ally who would keep Communism and Soviet influence out of the Middle East. In the wake of the internal upheaval, came an influx of CIA agents, supposedly to act as 'advisers' to the new regime. It was not long before Nasser invited these advisers to reorganize the intelligence services, the main department of which was to be closely modelled on the CIA and called the "Mukhabarat el Amma". Political considerations meant that official employment of American officers and agents was not possible. Electronic espionage and surveillance apparatus was shipped over from the United States and upon CIA advice several West German intelligence officers were employed as instructors in the use of the equipment. This was mainly to avoid the United States from being too openly involved and thereby invite criticism from other countries, notably Israel.

Thus the Egyptian government turned to West Germany for assistance in developing its intelligence services. Secret negotiations were opened through CIA intermediaries, with General Reinhard Gehlen, head of the Gehlen Organization (which later became the official Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) at Pullach.

Nasser needed experts to organize his secret service, direct espionage, train saboteurs against Israel and advice on the surveillance of internal enemies such as the powerful Muslim Brotherhood. Gehlen sent his colleague, General Otto Skorzeny for the assignment, who moved to Cairo for a year and recruited nearly fifty Germans who had conducted espionage in the Middle East during the Second World War. This group was advised by Gehlen, through a liaison officer in Cairo. During the period 1952-1957, the Egyptian Intelligence Service achieved little against Israel, but it managed to foment trouble in several Arab countries, opposed to Nasser. The Mukhabarat engaged in covert action in no fewer than six Arab countries, exploiting their complex internal politics. However, after the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Egypt-Czechoslovakia Arms Deal, Egypt-American relations deteriorated, many of the CIA agents in Cairo were withdrawn and the Gehlen organization stopped its co-operation with Egyptian intelligence.

The origins of the Israeli intelligence service are to be found in the Shai, the intelligence wing of the underground Jewish army, the Haganah, which operated in Palestine when it was under the British mandate. Around the period of the Second World War and the immediate years that followed, the task of the Shai was to gather information on movements of British police troops

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and Arab irregular forces. But the difficult circumstances of the Jewish Movement compelled it to move into other areas of activity and to establish or open contacts and branches in Europe. Among its most important functions were the purchase and hiding of weapons and ammunition, in anticipation of the forthcoming war of independence, opening of secret routes to assist in the illegal immigration of Jews from Europe into Palestine and to act as a courier service among the Jewish underground leadership. Many of the Shai members worked and were trained in British intelligence and police forces. This training was to be useful later, but in service, these Shai members intercepted secret intelligence communications that enabled the Haganah to keep one step ahead of the police.

With the creation of Israel in 1948, the Shai was officially disbanded and a new apparatus formed, which consisted of three main departments. Department I was subdivided into Aman, for military intelligence and Raman, for counter-intelligence. Department II was to be the political section of the Foreign Ministry and Department III, Shin Beth, the internal security service. The early period of the existence of Israel was a difficult time for


the newly created secret service. Unlike Egypt which had access to CIA equipment and West German training, the Israeli directors had no access to training and operational details on which to base their organisation, and no other nation was willing to impart such information. Undoubtedly the influence of the British model was felt, but the Israelis had to evolve their own techniques, a situation which, coupled with the internal strife, tended to make the agents over-zealous and it was some time before they achieved moderation. From seemingly disorganized beginnings there evolved an intelligence service, that is today, the envy of most other intelligence services, with a reputation for unorthodox style of functioning, ruthlessness and efficiency. It is also a highly secretive organization; the names of the Directors and Heads were never revealed to the public, until recently, The existence of the Shin Beth was revealed in the Knesset, by the Prime Minister, only in 1957.

In 1951, the powers of the Aman were cut back. The Political Department was found to be inadequate and had to be disbanded and another department was set up with much 'wider interests' The Mossad was formed with instructions to act as a general intelligence agency and to avoid the mistake of concentrating too much on foreign political intelligence. The Mossad and Shin Beth soon formed a close working relationship, a situation that does not exist in many countries, where intelligence and counter-intelligence consider themselves as rivals. The Israeli intelligence expanded rapidly beginning with several bases in Western Europe and soon set up a vast network of agents all over the world, the primary
emphasis relating to developments in the Arab nations.

It is evident that the Egyptian intelligence system was well established and trained even before the illegal Shai began its clandestine operations. The circumstances in which each of these systems were created and grew initially are vastly different, leading to differences in primarily the style of functioning and to some extent the structure. While Egypt had access to modern equipment and training, Israel had to evolve its own methods and techniques in addition to building up the organizational infrastructure, a problem not faced by Egypt. In many ways, the difficult circumstances in which Israeli intelligence began, has contributed to its ruthlessness and efficiency.

Structure

The intelligence system of Egypt, though broadly divided into three departments is a complex organisation. Each of these departments is divided into sections and further sub-sections. The main department is the Mukhabarat el-Amma or the General Intelligence Agency, which reports directly to the President, operating under his direct jurisdiction and headed by the Director of Intelligence (General). The Second Department is the Mbakhas el-Amma or the state security department and last but equally important is the Department of Military Intelligence. The Mbakhas and Military Intelligence operate under the Ministry of Interior and

the Ministry of Defence, through the respective Ministers.

The complexity is caused to some extent by the fact that the jurisdiction or official duties of the Mukhabarat are not defined anywhere. Its powers are thus virtually unlimited and its direct access to the President, contributes to its primacy in the intelligence hierarchy. Primarily it remains responsible for the collection of external intelligence, its analysis, and estimates of data on the developments abroad. It also undertakes covert action operations outside Egyptian territory, is responsible for liaison with foreign intelligence agencies and directs or trains Arab political exiles living in Cairo, along with Military Intelligence. However, its function at times has extended to counter-intelligence and thereby indirect involvement in domestic affairs of Egypt. It is actually the ḳabakhas, that is officially responsible for internal and political security. Both the Mukhabarat and the ḳabakhas have under their jurisdiction the uniformed police. The third and integral part of the organisation, Military Intelligence, is responsible for the reconnaissance of military objectives and developments, especially of Israel, to which a large extent of its resources were devoted. This department has acquired greater importance prior and during periods of war, often surpassing the other intelligence departments, in this context. The intelligence hierarchy with three vertically organised departments

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is a pyramid, with its apex as the President and Director of Intelligence.

The Director of Intelligence, theoretically the organiser, supervisor and co-ordinator of the system, was overshadowed for a number of years by the 'Office of the President'. The Presidential Adviser for Information, functioning within the Office of the President, became the link and adviser to the President on intelligence matters and was charged with the co-ordination of the various official intelligence departments and the organising of the President's personal intelligence agencies. Primary among these personal agencies was the intricate "special services" performed by the Presidential Office and the secret 'Vanguard Organization' within the Arab Socialist Union. The existence of these agencies added to the complexity of the regular intelligence organization and created the problem of overlapping jurisdiction.

The intelligence system of Israel is divided into five departments, each having further divisions and sub-sections. The five separate agencies composing the intelligence community are:

(1) Ha Mossad Bitachon Leumi (The Institute for State Security),
(2) Sherut Bitachon (Security Service-General),
(3) Agafmodi'in (Military Intelligence Bureau of Tzahal - Israel's Armed Forces),
(4) Heker (Research Department of the Foreign Office - Political

See Wolfgang Lotz, The Champagne Spy: Israel's Masterspy Tells His Story (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972); also see Tregenza, n. 10, p. 67.

Vatikiotis, n. 4, p. 164. Most of this information came out during the various intelligence trials of 1967 and 1971.
Intelligence), (5) Anaf Tafkidim Me'uhadim (Special Tasks Branch of Police). The Mossad is the main intelligence department that operates outside Israel. Its main function is the collection of military, economic and political information - basic intelligence gathering. It is important to note here that the collation and analysis of this information, especially when it relates to military issues, is undertaken by Aman, the Military Intelligence, even though the Chief of the Mossad has direct access to the Prime Ministers' Office and can advise him. However, the Mossad's functions are far from limited to information gathering, as it undertakes special operations such as the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann or the direction of special squads to combat terrorism.

The Shin Beth is responsible for internal security and counter-intelligence within Israel and since 1967 within the occupied territories also. It has duties abroad too, in the protection of Israeli installations and offices. The Aman operating under the Ministry of Defence deals with the military strength of the Arab world, and undertakes most of the estimates and analysis of information collected from various sources and has direct access to the Prime Minister's Office. The other two departments are involved indirectly with intelligence since the Special Branch of the police acts as the executive arm of the Shin Beth, and the Research Department of the Foreign Office working under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs gathers and analyses political intelligence collected through diplomatic sources.

The various intelligence departments co-ordinate their activities through the Joint Intelligence Committee. The members of this committee apart from the heads of the five agencies include the Director General of the Foreign Office and the Chief of the Police. It is important to note that the Chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee is the Chief of the Mossad, who is the Director of Intelligence (General) and reports directly to the Prime Minister. Although the Committee exists to bring together the multiple threads of intelligence, departmental interests and conflicting personalities have led to friction from time to time.

There are structural defects in the intelligence systems of both Egypt and Israel. The problem of intelligence organisation has not been settled satisfactorily anywhere in the world, though the best brains have been devoted to it for centuries. However, these structural defects have impaired the functioning of these organisations, at times leading to grave problems. In Egypt the multiplicity and complexity of the organization or departments has created the problem of conflicting personalities, and organizational rivalry is made worse by the fact that the functions and jurisdiction of the various departments are not clearly demarcated, leading to overlapping jurisdiction. There are no public references to a co-ordinating committee as in the case of Israel, the links to the President apparently being through the various Ministers. Moreover the three departments are of almost equal strength in terms of political leverage, and the various services have at times been complementary or competitive. The extra-constitutional personal agencies and the Office of the President complicated the problem,
leading to a division of power and responsibility. The problem in Israel is not one of co-ordination but of division of functions. Normally relations between the various departments have been co-operative in nature especially between the Mossad and Shin Beth. Because of the almost continuous state of war that Israel is operating in, the Aman is in reality as important as the Mossad, if not more so, especially during the periods of war. Though the Chief of the Mossad is the Director of Intelligence and the Mossad is the prime agency for intelligence gathering, most of the analysis and estimates is undertaken by the Aman, especially when it relates to military issues. The Mossad did not undertake any analysis, until this structural defect, led to the 1973 intelligence disaster. Steps have been taken to improve the situation since then by broadening the base for analysis, but the Mossad and Aman have clashed and had different perspectives on important issues. Naturally the Aman, which was earlier the prime intelligence agency lost much of its powers in later years, to the Mossad which has earned a reputation for efficiency.

Intelligence in the Arab-Israel Conflict

The outcome of military conflict in the modern world depends on a number of crucial inputs. One such important input

is the detailed information collected by intelligence services over a period of years on the enemy's strength, weakness, positions, capabilities and morale. By discovering the plans and intentions of the enemy it can reduce the element of surprise and contribute to strategy. Intelligence services also assist in paramilitary operations, psychological warfare and deception operations. Counter-intelligence is vital to the maintaining of national security. The monitoring and capture of foreign spies and their local networks is necessary to reduce the danger of subversion, foreign interference and the loss of vital information which is potentially damaging.

The intelligence services of Egypt and Israel have entered into new areas of positive foreign, military and counter-intelligence. They have actively assisted in the search for military and nuclear technology. In the case of Israel, the intelligence services are directly involved in unconventional paramilitary operations which affect the national security of Israel. Its activity now extends to terrorism and counter-terrorism, which could be classified under counter-intelligence. A review of the major operations of Egyptian and Israeli intelligence and an evaluation of their overall functioning, in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict can now be undertaken.

Egyptian intelligence actively assisted in efforts undertaken to improve the military technology of Egypt, during the late fifties. On 21 July 1962, to the shock of Israel and the whole world, twenty missiles were paraded in Cairo and a mock attack staged; four missiles perfectly launched reached their targets at the military parade on the Tenth Anniversary of the Revolution.
The operation had begun around mid-1959 when Nasser decided to recruit German technicians, engineers and scientists still available - the Allies having taken away the best - to man the secret army section: the Office of Special Military Programmes, designed to perfect secret weapons and operational rockets. The former Head of Air Force Intelligence, General Mahmoud Khalil, was appointed to direct the secret project. In Germany, he signed a contract with Willy Messerschmitt Aircraft in November 1959, for construction of an aircraft factory in Egypt. At Stuttgart he found many dissatisfied scientists at the Institute for the Study of Jet Propulsion, who had sought asylum with Egypt in 1945. He signed contracts with various section heads and scientists, as well as Hans Kleinwachter, director of an electronics laboratory who had worked on the Vennica rocket project. These scientists were asked to secretly develop ballistic missiles for surface to surface combat. Ferdinand Boranduer, an engineer in the Diamler-Benz firm was recruited to build a jet-engine plant.

A few months later, an Egyptian millionaire living in Switzerland, in conjunction with Messerschmitt and Boranduer formed two "dummy" corporations to purchase raw materials and precision parts. Another firm Intra-Handel, with offices located in the German offices of United Arab Airlines, purchased patents and forwarded the parts. The various teams arrived in Egypt in 1960 carrying plans for modified versions of the V-1 and V-2 rockets. Early in 1961, installations to manufacture the missiles were built. The result of the scientists' work was seen in July 1962. The West German Government which had discovered the links between the various
companies, tried to stop the plan but failed evidently.  

A substantial part of Egyptian Intelligence efforts were devoted to uncovering information on Israel, which could have a positive effect on future Egypt-Israel conflicts. One major penetration operation undertaken by the Mukhabarat, which indicates its efficiency was discovered by the Israeli counter-intelligence in 1970. Abdel-Rahim Abd el-Raouf Karaman, was an Arab with Israeli citizenship and one of Egypt's greatest spies, tried and convicted for the crime of high treason in Haifa. During his indictment it was established that he was recruited in Paris in 1968 by an Egyptian intelligence agent at the Embassy in France. Searching for a Palestinian or Egyptian child to adopt, he had gone to Paris where he was contacted by the Mukhabarat through the Egyptian consul. He returned to Israel after a stay in a Mukhabarat residence on the Belgian Coast where he was taught the use of hidden cameras, micro-transmitters and invisible inks. Earlier, in contact with some Israeli politicians, he now took advantage of his connections with the authorities to photograph the Golan region defences and build up friendships with Arabs employed by firms constructing the Bar-Lev Line. He was also assigned to infiltrate the far left Israeli Matzpen political group which was militarily opposed to territorial occupation. According to reports in the Cairo Weekly "Ahar Saah"

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16 See Jacques Derogy and Hesi Carmel, The Untold History of Israel (New York: Grove Press, 1979), pp. 184-6. Hesi Carmel was a former Israeli career diplomat.
in 1976, he had obtained plans of the Bar-Lev Line for the Mukhabarat, and had managed to befriend Moshe Dayan, whose weakness for antiques was common knowledge and exploited by the gift of a fake Egyptian miniature procured from Cairo headquarters. After the 1973 war, he was exchanged for the Israeli spy Misrahi, and the Egyptian press was to tell of Sadat's personal intervention with Kissinger to obtain Karaman's exchange and release. Undoubtedly Karaman's reports enabled the Egyptian army to penetrate the Bar-Lev Line on 6 October 1973, within a matter of 17 hours.

The initial success of Egyptian forces' attack on Israel on 6 October 1973, was in large extent due to a massive deception operation undertaken by Egyptian Military Intelligence. The cover for "Operation Badr" was the annual autumn manoeuvres, the signals of which Israeli intelligence monitored annually, and hence were kept up and improvised on. A distraction was provided when an American company entered an agreement with Egypt to build an oil pipeline in the likely area of conflict. The deception was strengthened by sending back some of the manoeuvre troops to regular work on routine transfer. The military correspondents of leading dailies were asked not to escalate tension, but maintain normal tone. The classic touch came from the Military Intelligence which inserted a small item under the military correspondent by-line in the "Al-Ahram" saying that the Commander-in-Chief had

17 Caroz, n. 11, p. 192-4. A more complete record of the various Egyptian operations designed to extract information on Israel are available in the same book.
opened a list for officers who wanted to go on a small pilgrimage. It was known that Israel got an early copy, daily via Cyprus and studied it carefully. Another item said that the Defence Minister was preparing for his meeting with the visiting Rumanian Defence Minister fixed for 8 October, three days prior to the war. All these tactics no doubt strengthened Israeli Military Intelligence perceptions.

It is however in the field of counter-intelligence that Egyptian intelligence has excelled. Counter-intelligence begins with the assumption that foreign-spies are operating within ones territories, and its primary function is to uncover them, or other subversive activities. Spy and conspiracy trials have become a recurring and constant feature in Egypt, a number of Israeli spy-rings having been uncovered over the years while the Muslim Brotherhood a militant religious organisation, has figured conspicuously in the conspiracy trials. In July 1954, an Israeli spy ring was discovered trying to sabotage the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on withdrawal of British troops from the Suez area. The trial itself was fairly conducted and held in public in October 1954, some of the accused convicted to death, some to life imprisonment and two accused were acquitted. This spy trial had come hard on the heels of an attempt on Nasser's life and the trial and execution of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders.


19 See The Story of Zionist Espionage in Egypt (Cairo: Ministry of Information, n.d.), pp. 7-39; refer also Jewish Observer (Tel Aviv), 18 December 1964, p. 12.
Wolfgang Lotz was arrested in 1965 after transmission and other spy paraphernalia were found at his residence. He was brought to trial, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, but exchanged after the 1967 war, for Egyptian prisoners-of-war. The exchange rate was 2 Egyptian Generals, 8 Officers and 2,000 infantry. Another famous Israeli spy ring was uncovered in 1968 and in 1972, the Israeli spy of Egyptian origin, captain Baruch Zaki Misrahi was extradited from the Republic of Yemen, tried by an Egyptian military tribunal and sentenced to solitary confinement. Among the other counter-intelligence efforts were the arrest and conviction of Mustafa Amin, ex-publisher of "Al-Akhbar" as an American spy in 1965, the uncovering of a Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy against the regime in 1966, when hundreds of its members were arrested and some of the top leaders and ideologues of the movement executed. In November 1968, another round of spy and conspiracy trials were held when a secret organisation called the "Egyptian National Council" with the aim of overthrowing Nasser and concluding a peace treaty with Israel, was uncovered and its leading members convicted of treason.

Among the major successes of the Mossad during the course of the Arab-Israel conflict, that have been acknowledged or widely known, before 1967, are the penetrations of Syria and Egypt through Eli Cohen and Wolfgang Lotz. Eli Cohen was an Egyptian Jew who had

20 Lotz, n. 12, Chapters 8-12; see also Cookeridge, n. 7, pp. 355-8.

migrated to Israel, fluent in Arabic and having a retentive memory. The Mossad sent him to Argentina as a Syrian businessman and using Syrian contacts there, returned to Damascus as a businessman, nationalist and supporter of the Baath Socialist Party. Supplied with plenty of money he was polite, pleasant and an easy social mixer, making friends with leading Baath personalities and military commanders. After the Baath came to power, he used his contacts to gather military intelligence, and study and photograph the Golan Heights defence system. Living opposite the military headquarters, he was able to watch the level of activity there during crisis periods. However, following complaints by an Embassy in the area, of disturbed reception and interference, the Syrian Deuxième Bureau, counter-intelligence tracked down the disturbance to Cohen's flat and transmitter. He was arrested, tried by a special Military Court and hung publicly in May 1965. The intelligence Cohen transmitted, contributed to the Israeli victory over Syria in six hours in the May 1967 hostilities.  

Wolfgang Lotz was a German Jew, recruited by the Mossad and sent to West Germany, after training. With the help of the Gehlen organisation he moved to Cairo as a wealthy ex-Hazi seeking asylum. Also a good socialite with the art of making friends, he opened an equestrian club, where numerous Egyptian military and police officers came to relax. Gathering intelligence at various parties

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and making ventures across to military installations, he studied troops and artillery movements near the Suez zone, passing the vital information on Egyptian defences. A routine check was made by the Egyptian police on former Nazis residing in Cairo who were expected to create trouble when Walter Ulbricht, the East German Prime Minister came to visit Egypt. The spy paraphernalia was discovered during the search of Lotz's residence. The information he transmitted also enabled Israel's victory over Egypt in the 1967 war.

The search for nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons technology, is a new dimension to intelligence activity. Nuclear weapons are the outcome of the desire for improving the nations' defence capabilities, either for offensive or defensive purposes. Probably the most challenging assignment undertaken by the Mossad was the procurement of uranium for Israel's nuclear reactors and possibly nuclear weapons. Israel, which does not allow international inspection of its reactors and nuclear installations, began its program clandestinely by setting up the Dimona reactor, in the Negev desert. According to the story reconstructed by various authors, in its search for uranium the Mossad made contacts with European businessmen in the late sixties. Two front companies owned by friendly Germans were procured and under rules of Euratom (European Economic Community Atomic Energy Agency), 200 tons of uranium was purchased for processing and further usage in treatment of chemicals. In

early 1968, the ship "Scheersburg-A" left the port of Antwerp with the consignment which was to be delivered at Genoa, to another front company, for processing. The ship vanished for several months and turned up later at the Turkish port of Iskenderum with a new name, new crew and no uranium. Somewhere off the coast of Italy, the uranium was transferred to a second ship and taken to Israel.

Israel's nuclear capability came to world attention dramatically in May 1977 at Salzburg, when at the Conference on a Non-Nuclear Future, Paul L. Leventhal (former Staff Nuclear Weapons Expert for the U.S. Senate Government Operations Committee) announced that the missing consignment of uranium of 1969 in the Mediterranean, had reached Israel. Ten days later, the former Norwegian Chief Staff Prosecutor, announced that Dan Aerbel, a Mossad agent arrested in July 1973 in connection with the murder of an Arab, had revealed participation in the operation to divert the uranium.

However, the Mossad's quest for uranium had taken it to the United States, where connections with Jewish scientists and the CIA, aided its efforts. The Atomic Energy Commission informed Congress in a secret session on 14 February 1966, that the Apollo plant of NUMEC (Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation) directed by Zalman M. Shapiro, a Zionist activist, had "incomplete, missing

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or inaccurate" records and the exact extent of loss of nuclear material could not be reconstructed. In February 1978, the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Internal Inspection) published a report that information had been given by a high-CIA official in 1976, to the NRC at a closed meeting that Israel possessed atomic weapons and President Johnson, having been informed requested the CIA to keep the information secret. What, however, is the most damaging evidence is Israel's request to America in 1975, for the Pershing Missiles which are used solely to carry atomic war heads.

The Aman also has contributed significantly to the efficiency and preparedness of Tzahal. In co-operation with the Israeli Navy it undertook a daring operation in December 1969, to enable the Navy to improve its strike-power. Israel had placed orders for twelve missile gunboats with a German firm to be built at the French naval port of Cherbourg, in 1965. However, after the 1967 war, President de Gaulle imposed an arms embargo on Israel and five gunboats ready for delivery were impounded. Failing to repurchase them through a Panaman front company, in December 1969, Israeli naval officers penetrated the dockyard on Christmas eve, and drove the gunboats away into the Mediterranean, where they were refuelled and sent to Israel. At Haifa, a Press Conference was

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26 Ibid., p. 332.
called to announce the retrieval of the gunboats. These gunboats were effectively utilized during the War of Attrition against Egyptian naval forces.

In an effort to study and assess the technology of the MiG-21, the basis of Arab air strength, Aman contacted an Iraqi Christian pilot on vacation in Europe, and bribed him with money and the promise of safe conduct of his family from Iraq to Israel. The pilot, on a test flight in August 1966 from Damascus landed in Israel. The aircraft was handed over to the Air Force Intelligence which searched for its vulnerabilities and put the information to good use in later wars. In 1968, Israel wanted to develop a plane combining the best technological devices of the Mirage aircraft. Indications showed the Mirage III developed by Sulzer Brothers for the Swiss Air Force was specially devised for mountain terrain, with improved rate of climb and shorter distance for take-off. Aman contacted Alfred Frauenknecht, a Swiss engineer favourable to the Jewish cause who worked for Sulzer Brothers. In September 1969, Frauenknecht was arrested and charged with espionage. He confessed diverting documents and blueprints of the Mirage III to Israel for £86,000 and on 29 September, the Swiss Government announced to the Press at Genoa, that Aman had obtained plans relating to the production of its new jet engine.

The 1967 victory against Egypt and Syria is undoubtedly to a large extent, the credit of Israeli intelligence, which had

28 Ibid., pp. 207-9.
undertaken effective photographic reconnaissance of Egyptian forces and made a detailed psychological study and portrait of Egyptian officers, individually. It was also able to break the Egyptian codes and ciphers and undertake a massive deception operation during the war, to trap Jordanian forces. Among the more recent operations, the Entebbe rescue of 1975 and the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, are to be included, as the Mossad and Aman apart from providing basic intelligence, are involved in planning and direction of all Israeli military or paramilitary operations, originating in Israel but later crossing its territories.

Israeli intelligence, however, has had its share of disastrous operations and intelligence failures. The earliest was the "Lavon Affair" in 1954. In 1952, Pinhas Lavon, the brilliant leader of the Mapai Left Wing became Defence Minister. Known for his aggressiveness, he approved in mid-July 1954 an operation which was a programme of provocation planned by Aman to force the British troops to stay on in Egypt, by simulating Egyptian outrages against British and American installations in Cairo. It was hoped that the bomb attacks on British installations would scuttle the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on withdrawal of British troops, then being negotiated. However, before Lavon could give his approval, an amateur Jewish spy ring had been recruited by Aman, in Egypt and had undertaken the operation. However, the spies were caught by Egyptian secret police after a bomb attack and two members, Samuel Azzar and Moussa Marzouta were sentenced to death and six others given long prison terms by the Special Court. The Government of Israel appointed an Inquiry Committee in December, headed by Yitzak Olshan (President of Supreme Court) and Yaakov Devov (former Chief of Staff). Owing to the over-
whelming mass of documents and questionable testimony, the Committee reported to Prime Minister Moshe Sharett in January 1955, that they were unable to decide whether or not Benjamin Gibli (Chief of Aman) had acted on orders from Lavon.

In 1963 another disaster occurred. Following intelligence reports in early 1962 that Egypt was building rockets and missiles with the help of ex-Nazi scientists, the Mossad undertook a massive campaign of letter bombs and threats against the families of these scientists in Switzerland, West Germany and Egypt, to persuade them to stop co-operating with Egypt. Otto Joklik, an Austrian scientist who had worked in Cairo previously and Joseph Ben-Gal, a Mossad agent, were caught in Basel in March 1963, while threatening Heidi Goerke, the daughter of a German scientist working in Cairo. The Swiss police had in fact taped the whole conversation after laying a trap. The Israeli Government heard of the failure through diplomatic channels, and attempted to persuade the Swiss authorities to free their agents quietly, but the Swiss refused as they had been served legal papers by the West German Government for the agents’ extradition involving their complicity in an abortive attack on Dr. Kelinhachter, earlier, in Lorrach. A real storm broke out when it was discovered by the Israeli public that Egypt might be producing atomic and chemical weapons, the press being largely responsible for the panic, possibly inspired by Issar Harel, Director

of Mossad. In June 1963, the trial of the Mossad agents opened in Switzerland, which had finally refused to extradite them to Germany. In their defence were shown purchase orders by German scientists in Cairo, for missile equipment and the fact was stressed that Heidi Goerke's father was perfecting the teleguidance system for the missiles. The court handed down a suspended two month sentence for each of the accused.

In 1973, in Norway, members of a Mossad "Hit" team were arrested, after an Arab waiter bearing strong resemblance to a terrorist was shot dead at Lillenhammer. Though some of the members, who appeared to be amateurs, broke down and confessed guilty, they were treated leniently by the Norwegian Court which tried them and sentenced them to terms ranging from two to five years. However, the greatest disaster came the same year, in the intelligence failure to predict the 1973 Egyptian-Syrian attack.

The Aman and the political leadership were not convinced that the war would start, until a few hours before the actual attack by Egyptian forces across the Suez Canal on 6 October. The failure was partly caused by the tendency of Aman to doubt reports filed by Mossad operatives and adherence to "the conception" that Egypt was not militarily in a position to attack Israel. Eli Zeira, the head of Aman, appointed the previous year, appears to have been ignorant of the value and intricacies of intelligence evaluation. The Mossad, preoccupied with terrorists, was equally responsible to the extent

30 Derogy and Carmel, n. 16, pp. 190-7.
that it could not convince Zeira or the political leadership about Egyptian preparations a few days before the war. Most of the Mossad's reliable reports came in around this time, and the indications are that there was a definite lack of co-operation and co-ordination between Aman and Mossad, which normally get along better than similar agencies, elsewhere in the world. It was the junior officers of the intelligence service who were first aware of Egypt's moves and tried to alert their superiors of the threat.

(1) In May 1973, aerial photographs showed additional defences and constant movements on the West Bank of Suez. The junior Aman officers thought war to be imminent, but Director Zeira, did not agree. (2) Drew Middleton (New York Times military correspondent) states that in September 1973, the CIA and NSA using electronic intelligence were convinced of a major Arab attack on Israel and warned Israel. This is only partly true, since top CIA officials themselves did not believe the analysis. As Moshe Dayan points out in his memoirs, the Americans shared Israel's doubts that Egypt would go to war. Ray S. Cline (former DDI, CIA) blamed the intelligence breakdown on Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger "who was unwilling to accept the conclusions reached by the intelligence community." (3) In May-August, there were indications of secret negotiations going on between Egypt and Syria. (4) By September end, military intelligence reported distribution of SAM units to armoured divisions of Egyptian army, interpreted in Israel as a routine exercise. (5) On 4 October, a veteran Mossad Operator covering Europe, arrived in Israel with
plans for "Operation Badr" with complete sets of photostats
down to the last details of time and place of attack. Zvi Zamir,
Chief of Mossad, trusting the accuracy of the report tried to per­
suade Golda Meir and Eli Zeira but they felt it was disinforma­
tion, being deliberately fed to Israel. (6) On 4th evening,
the Soviet Union launched the Cosmos 596 satellite to a position
that could monitor the battlefields, while earlier Aman officers
reported earth-moving and excavations along the Suez West Bank.
(7) On 5 October, Intelligence reported evacuation of Russian
advisers from Cairo. (8) On 5th evening a lengthy dossier showed
evidence of Egypt moving heavy bridging and water-obstacle equip­
ment to the Canal. (9) On 6th, early morning, the most reliable
reports came in reporting that Egypt would start the war at 6.00 p.m.
in the evening, which was four hours later than it actually did.
At the morning Cabinet session, opinion was still divided and the
Defence Minister allowed only for partial mobilisation.

The Shimon Agranat Commission of Inquiry into the Yom
Kippur war, has established that on 5 October, the confidence
of the Intelligence in its evaluation was shaken when it received
clear reports of hostile moves, but the correct conclusions were
not drawn and the evaluation was "low probability" and "lower than
low". Only on 6 October did the evaluation change. The decisive

32 These are the developments in intelligence inflow,
as reconstructed by Deacon, n. 23, pp. 259-65. See also
Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington:
Acropolis Books, 1976), pp. 131-4, and see also Moshe
Dayan, Story of My Life (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
influence in evaluation of enemy moves and intentions were the DMI and the Research Division of the Intelligence Branch (the only centre for the evaluation of military intelligence), which had tagged on its own evaluation as "intelligence" and disseminated the view.

Overall Functioning

Egyptian intelligence is one of the most active and professionized intelligence services in the world. It would be an underestimation to expect less from an organisation that was trained by the British (SIS), American (CIA), West German (BND) and possibly the Russians (KGB). Well equipped with devices, gadgets and instruments, acquired through the CIA, in its early years of cooperation, it is definitely the most advanced among the Arab nations of West Asia and North Africa. Compared to the Israeli intelligence, there are two areas where Egyptian intelligence is at an advantage. Firstly, Egyptian intelligence leadership has shown a degree of stability and consistency of policy and approach to intelligence problems, that Israel has not shown. Relatively the various DI's and DMI's of Egypt have held longer tenures, while in Israel, there has been a frequent change in leadership, indicating the difficulty of the task and many retired before completing their terms due to intelligence failures, excessive zeal or political embarrassment caused during operations.

to the government in power. This does not mean Egypt does not have these problems, but it has not taken the same toll as in Israel. Another area where Egypt has excelled has been in counter-intelligence. Considering the nature of problems it faces, Egyptian counter-intelligence has been able to uncover a remarkable number of spies and subversives. This is partly due to the fact that Egypt has historically been at the cross-roads of the world and a major target for spies over the centuries, enabling or even compelling it to develop an effective counter-intelligence, which has also been an important instrument of the government, given the unstable political conditions among Arab nations.

Egyptian Military Intelligence had till 1967, the tendency to exaggerate the strength of the Israeli armed forces. This failure was rectified between 1967 and 1973 when the estimates became more accurate. In fact it broke the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli Air Force when it discovered that Israel had about fifty crack pilots (who were transferred from one front to another and whose feats built up the legend) as was proved during the 1973 war. The performance of the Aman however, appears to have deteriorated in analysis of intentions, during this period. If the 1973 intelligence failure can be discounted as a failure to analyse intentions, the performance of the Aman is definitely superior in calculating estimates of enemy forces, collation of basic intelligence which is mostly computerized, conducting of psychological portraits

34 Heikal, n. 18, p. 60.
of enemy armed forces, in the interception and deciphering of enemy codes and transmissions and undertaking of deception operations. Undoubtedly the Egyptian "Operation Badr" was camouflaged excellently by any standards, but as pointed out earlier, there were many indications that the plan was uncovered by junior Aman officers, though they were unable to convince their superiors.

Part of Egypt's difficulties arise from structural defects where multiplicity of departments, with similar functions and almost equal powers, leads to competition if not friction. Like most other intelligence agencies in the world, these departments often refuse to co-operate or exchange information and even possibly sabotaged each other's operations. A vast apparatus is sometimes hopelessly inefficient and the reliance on an army of informers, the "public eye" as Miles Copeland describes it, can lead to the fabrication of intelligence and conflicting or incorrect reporting. Moreover the large numbers of agents used in some operations ensured that nothing Egyptian intelligence undertook, remained secret for long. Added to this was the problem of involvement in domestic politics by the DI's and DMI's which created factions within the service and demoralization of the staff, following arrests and trials of their superiors for sedition. It is to be expected that some of these impediments have been removed or are being removed, but the paucity of information on the subject prevents a better understanding of these developments.

Israeli intelligence faced similar problems in the early
years of its development especially in the clash of personalities. In fact according to Ḥesi Carmel, a former Israeli career diplomat, Isser Harel was continuously at loggerheads with Aman, which then had greater powers, and was responsible for the sacking of Benjamin Gibli, the second Head of Aman. Reuven Shiloah was forced to relinquish his post in 1952 on grounds of "lack of common sense" while Yeḥoshafat Harkabi was the victim of a psychological campaign. However, things improved under later directors and the Mossad and Aman worked in unison, cooperating to an extent that few other agencies in the world have achieved. Among its defects can be listed the tendency to take independent initiatives without the knowledge of the cabinet, over confidence in its own analysis and a tendency to pick amateurs for some of its operations, that have on many occasions created difficult problems for the Intelligence and political leadership. There is however, one distinct advantage that Israel has over Egypt, and that is its ability to recruit Jews from all parts of the world of various races, culture and language, upon their migration to Israel, or utilizing their commitment to the Zionist cause, for penetration purposes.

Dissatisfied with the lack of clarity in matters relating to subordination and evaluation functions of the departments of the intelligence community, Ben Gurion appointed in 1963 a Committee consisting of Yigal Yadin and Ze'ev Sharef to define the

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35 Derogy and Carmel, n. 16, pp. 96-97, 104.
position and tasks of these bodies. The Committee made two important recommendations in a report submitted in July 1963. Firstly, the Foreign Ministry's Research Department should be strengthened so as to be capable of presenting independent political evaluations, thus creating a balance between security and political evaluation, both these functions until then, in the hands of Intelligence. Secondly, a Special Adviser on Intelligence should be appointed to the Prime Minister, who would assist him to keep in touch with intelligence activities, and watch over these activities. In 1965 Isser Harel was appointed as Special Adviser but the post appears to have fallen into disuse until 1974, remaining only in theory or was removed, as there are no public references to it during the 1973 crisis. In 1974, Yehoshafat Harkabi was appointed Special Adviser. The other recommendation was not implemented.

The Shimon Agranat Commission repeated the same recommendations in its report of April 1974, but added (1) appointment of a high level-committee to act as an independent political-strategic intelligence evaluation centre (2) laying down of clear rules for dissemination and feedback of raw intelligence to various research bodies and to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister (3) effect a fundamental change in the structure of the

intelligence branch and corps by shifting the centre of gravity to military-strategic intelligence, allowing difference of opinion among researchers and including civilians in the Research Department, (4) an evaluation unit for material collected to be set up within the intelligence service.

Some of these changes have been incorporated as seen in the diffusion of responsibility for analysis of information collected, and allowing of junior officers to formally disagree with the opinions and estimates of their superiors. The various operations since 1973, have also considerably improved the morale in spite of its defects.