Intelligence is the lamp that sheds light along the dark road of diplomacy

- Amin Huwaidi

Cairo. 7.12.1982
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The intelligence function in diplomacy has been, and remains to be, one of the most important dimensions of the institution of diplomacy. Yet as an area of academic research in the field of international relations it has been considerably neglected. This is not entirely surprising, considering the sensitive nature of the subject and the difficulty in obtaining original source material. Most studies in this area have been in the nature of investigative journalism. It is only in recent years that much information of a more reliable nature has been revealed by intelligence personnel, investigative committees, espionage-trials and memoirs of some statesmen and diplomats. With the passage of time, the veil of secrecy over past intelligence activities has been dropped in some countries, giving new insights into this dimension of diplomacy. Pioneering efforts have now been undertaken, to systematically collate, analyse and interpret the available information on the subject, by academicians and others interested in this area.

To study intelligence, however, solely in the context of a function of diplomacy, is to separate it from its broader framework of operation and a distortion of its overall impact. Hence it is necessary to consider intelligence in the context of decision-making, foreign policy, national security and overall impact on international relations. It is widely acknowledged among contemporary scholars that intelligence is a significant input in the dynamics of international relations. Of specific importance to the study is the clandestine pursuit of national
interests and the effect that the discovery of such operations
can have on relations between nations. Most of these aspects
will be studied in detail in the concluding chapters. It is
necessary to point out here, that the entire study has been
undertaken from the intelligence approach. This is essential to
prevent unwieldiness and diversion into non-essential areas.
The linkages to diplomacy and foreign policy have been provided
wherever they are relevant.

Definitions

The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines intelligence as
"the acquiring of information on a national scale, usually about
a rival, but sometimes about an ally, or neutral country." Seeking a definition, the Hoover Commission Task Force surveying the
American intelligence community in 1955, arrived at the follow­ing "intelligence deals with all the things which should be known
in advance of initiating a course of action." This is a broad
conception of intelligence describing an ideal situation which
few decision-makers expect. It also suggests a completeness of
the product which few intelligence estimators would claim attain­
able. A decision is the action, an executive must take, when
he has information so incomplete, that the answer does not suggest
itself. Since complete or perfect intelligence is unattainable,

1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 12 (Chicago, William
Benton, 1969). (1st Ed.-Society of Gentlemen in Scotland,
1768), p. 347.

2 Quoted in Harry Howe Sinston, Central Intelligence and
National Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
the intelligence community tries to increase the probability of the right decision by the executive.

A less idealized and more useful definition is found in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage: "intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or, of areas or operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to planning." It is clear from such a definition that each of the many agencies of government concerned with national security will have its own particular intelligence requirements in order that the responsible leaders may make and implement decisions on plans and programmes. The pursuit of intelligence is thus the pursuit of information required for decision or policy making. The same word intelligence is often used interchangeably to denote the process of information gathering and sometimes, the product. The intelligence process, crude or refined, instinctive or conscious is common to almost every level of human activity. Most ordinary decisions must be based, in part, upon factors in which precise predictions are not usually possible such as the weather, or human behaviour. The intelligence process and product required for national security policy-making however, is infinitely more complex, though it has characteristics common to human decision.


4 Hansom, n. 2, p. 7.
The above definitions however, do not indicate or cover the entire range of activities undertaken by intelligence services. Though information-gathering theoretically remains the most important function, depending upon the circumstances, other functions may assume primary importance during certain periods of time. The perceptions of the political leadership and the capabilities of a given nation are factors determining the priority of functions allotted to intelligence services. The area of intelligence activity can however, be broadly divided into three main areas: (a) information-gathering both overt and clandestine; (b) counter-intelligence or the preservation of secrecy and security and (c) covert action or the clandestine pursuit of national interests. It is necessary to analyse these functions further to provide the linkage of intelligence to diplomacy or foreign policy, and understand the overall impact of intelligence services.

Scope of the Problem

1. Information-gathering: a) Overt: The primary goal of intelligence is to provide foreknowledge, to supply policymakers with sound evaluations of the present and future status, capabilities and intentions of foreign powers. The charters or acts that bring into existence the intelligence services in most nations enumerate this function as primary. Intelligence can be of two kinds: general intelligence which deals with political, economic or social aspects of foreign nations and the other is military intelligence dealing with the capability of the armed forces of foreign nations. Intelligence can also be classified
either as strategic or tactical. Strategic intelligence is
designed to satisfy the needs of strategic planners and policy
makers. Tactical intelligence, known also as operational or
combat intelligence is intended for use by military field com-
manders and units.

The intelligence process however passes through many
stages, beginning with "raw" intelligence and resulting in
"finished" intelligence, often in the form of "intelligence esti-
mates". The process begins with the collection of information
from various sources, both human and mechanical, which are co-
ordinated. Next comes the collation and evaluation of the value
and reliability of information collected and finally its inter-
pretation or analysis to produce intelligence estimates. The
process is lengthy, difficult cumbersome and by no means free of
human error. Of special importance to this study however, is
the process of information collection itself. It should be
noted here, that a major portion of the information collected by
intelligence services on other nations comes from public or
"open" sources such as diplomatic sources, Government publica-
tions, scientific journals and the mass-media. Only about a
quarter of the information comes from the illegal procurement of
protected information through sophisticated technical gadgets,
or the human spy.

---

5 Encyclopaedia Britannica, n. 1, p. 347.
6 For details on the various stages in the intelli-
  gence process see Harry Howe, aanson, The Intelligence
  Establishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
One of the most important functions of a diplomat is acknowledged to be the collection of information on the country to which he is accredited. It is in this narrow area of information gathering, that the elementary linkage between diplomacy and intelligence is provided. The information collected legally by the diplomat in the course of his duty on the social, political, economic and military developments in the host nation as well as its current capabilities and future intentions, is sent back to the Foreign Affairs Ministry. A similar process of evaluation is made and possible counter-strategies or modifications made to current foreign policy. Thus, at least in one major area of functioning, the objectives of both diplomacy and intelligence services converge and meet. In reality, however, as an attempt will be made to show during the study, the interests, objectives and functioning of the diplomatic service and the intelligence service converge in many more areas, than normally expected or visible. Indeed, it is not without basis or reason, that in earlier history the diplomat and the spy were considered synonymous. As is evident, even today by the frequent expulsion of diplomats, the dividing line may often be thin and the diplomat is often regarded as "a spy in striped pants". It is however considered to be within diplomatic norms and legal, for a foreign diplomat to collect information in the course of duty, which is not considered protected or illegal to possess, just as the intelligence service has access to legally published information. Yet to synthesize these two instruments of foreign policy would be gross distortion and oversimplification of the problem. There
are fundamental and inherent contradictions between the two
institutions of diplomacy and intelligence, that will be ana-
lysed, at a later stage.

b) Information gathering: Clandestine: The Royal Aus-
tralian Commission on Intelligence and Security defines espionage
as "the covert collection of intelligence, generally though not
necessarily secret intelligence." Espionage is the clandestine
collection of information which is protected and thus not accessi-
ble through legal means. Espionage is often concerned with
material coming under the Official Secrets Acts and information
about prohibited places and other classified material. Thus,
knowledge that can be of strategic importance in military plan-
ing to an enemy state, is often the target of espionage. The
actual classification of information into strategic would depend
on the security perceptions of the individual nation concerned.

The tools of espionage can be mechanical, such as
the reconnaissance aircraft, satellites and communication inter-
ception or the human spy. When, however, technical gadgets cannot
penetrate the target or get access to protected information, the
human spy is called into play. The human spy however requires a
base for his activities and here, another linkage to diplomacy is
provided. It is evident from the revelations of many espionage
trials that the embassy is the favourite base for espionage acti-

Royal Commission, "The Parliament of the Commonwealth
of Australia", Intelligence and Security, Fourth Report,
vities abroad. From the intelligence side this appears logi-
cal reasoning as the spy can operate safely under "diplomatic
immunity" and have access to elite circles, he may otherwise be
denied. From the diplomatic side however, the discovery of
espionage activities from an embassy base can be disastrous dip-
loamically, acutely embarrassing and often leading to a deter-
ioration in relations between the two nations involved. It is,
therefore, not surprising that such espionage activities are
often tightly controlled and usually undertaken with the acquiescence
of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

2) Counter-intelligence and Security: Counter-intelligence
are security measures taken to safeguard the secrets of any
nation. It is essentially a two-pronged attack as it checks the
activities of foreign spies within the target nation, while re-
gulating the security measures in strategic areas. Although
mainly related to war and defence measures in peace-time, counter-
intelligence is concerned with the safeguarding of diplomatic,
economic and industrial information. The acquisition and safe-
guarding of information are so closely associated that in some
countries they are both the concern of the same organization.
The effectiveness of counter-intelligence measures may often depend
on the amount of positive intelligence available. Correspondingly,
the efficient acquisition of information may hinge on adequate
security.

Although the general organization and methods of collect-
ing information are common to most countries, there is a marked
difference in counter-intelligence methods. In most democracies, conduct of security measures is somewhat limited by the need to proceed according to ordinary law, which is applicable to military and police personnel engaged in security duties, as to other citizens. In many other countries, the security organisation or secret police who are responsible for security have exceptional powers of arrest, detention and interrogation. It is an important duty of counter-intelligence organizations to protect the system and methods by which it operates. Hence, detailed information regarding organization and methods of intelligence agencies in many countries are not obtainable.

3. Covert Action: The Clandestine Pursuit of National Interests: A working definition of covert action as given by the CIA is: "any clandestine operation or activity designed to influence foreign governments, organisations, persons or events in support of United States foreign policy." The Royal Australian Commission using the Russian term for covert action, describes it thus: "active measures: a general expression to cover a variety of activities by which a power can weaken another power, or strengthen itself vis-a-vis that other power. These activities can be conveniently classified in this way: i) the

---

8 Encyclopaedia Britannica, n. l, p. 349.
establishment of "agents of influence"; ii) the dissemination of "disinformation"; iii) other forms of clandestine or deceptive action." Since clandestine political and paramilitary operations are the methods of covert action, the following activities come within its scope. 1) Subversion activity designed to undermine, weaken or ultimately overthrow a constitutional government ii) Sabotage; destruction of defence and other installations useful to a foreign power iii) Terrorism: politically motivated violence or the threat thereof; iv) other violent political activity organised or assisted in foreign countries.

An analysis of clandestine operations, indicates that they may be political, military, economic or psychological in nature, often, a combination. While these methods and techniques have been revealed, the extent of such operations is still a matter of debate among scholars. The tactics of covert intervention as outlined by the Frank Church Committee and used by the CIA are 1) advice and counsel 2) subsidies to individual leaders 3) financial support and technical assistance to political parties; 4) support to private organisations including labour unions, business firms and cooperatives 5) covert propaganda 6) "private" training of individuals and exchange of persons (military training) 7) economic operations and 8) paramilitary or political action operations designed to support or overthrow a

10 Royal Australian Commission, n. 7, p. 16.
When war is defined as an extension of diplomacy, or war by other means, it is evident that the objectives of covert action and diplomacy synchronize. The objective of war, diplomacy and covert action is to ensure that a foreign nation pursues a foreign policy favourable to the national interests of the initiating nation. Diplomacy seeks to convince the target nation through negotiations, having at its disposal a variety of instruments to apply leverage or pressure. Cultural diplomacy, the transfer of arms, foreign economic aid and assistance or the transfer of technology are some of the important dimensions of diplomacy. Covert action seeks the same goals through clandestine political manoeuvres or paramilitary action.

Yet, though the needs and objectives of these two instruments are the same, there is a fundamental contradiction in the methods used, and the rules, regulations and ethics governing the conduct of these two institutions. This contradiction is made more obvious, when the embassy abroad is used as a base and providing cover, for clandestine operations, or providing assistance indirectly by channelising funds. An attempt to demonstrate this linkage will be made in the course of the study. One facet of this contradiction is most evident in the need for a diplomat

to desist in interference of local affairs and keeping his hands "clean". In broader terms, diplomacy seeks peace, but covert action involves war or at least often, paramilitary action.

The role of covert action can best be understood by contrast with the overt activities of a government. Diplomacy seeks results by bargaining on a government to government basis, sometimes openly, sometimes privately. Foreign economic policy and cultural programmes seek to modify benignly the economies of other countries and the climate of opinion in them. An effort to build up the economy of a developing nation must be subtle, long-continued, probably quite costly and must openly enlist the co-operation of major groups within the country, if it is to have any influence. Covert intervention is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with short term objectives in view. An effort to weaken the local opposition or ruling party or win elections; and seeking to achieve results within a few years; must obviously be covert and pragmatically use the people and instrumentalities available, with methods having highest possibility of success. It is not surprising that the practitioners of these two types of intervention often differ temperamentally and in their preference of methods.

Reviewing the complementary aspects of covert action, it is conceived as a technique, to support the process of diplomacy in the management of international relations. It was not intended to be a substitute for diplomacy which continues to serve as the

---

Marchetti and Marks, ibid, pp. 388-9.
most widely-respected means of conducting inter-state relations. At best, covert action can serve as a coercive reinforcement to diplomacy, so that certain objectives which otherwise would be achieved by war, could be achieved without the cost and convulsions of a war. Certain scholars however, believe that covert action has resulted in distorting and devaluing the process of diplomacy and undermining its foundations. Firstly intelligence services being difficult to control, tend to shape foreign policy at cross purposes to the avowed overt intentions of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Secondly, as independent actors in the diplomatic process they may bypass, disregard and undermine the role of the ambassador or career diplomat in the embassy and lastly as covert action is undertaken in gross violation of international law, it undermines the foundations of the institution of diplomacy.

Before proceeding to the theoretical framework of the study and introduction to the case studies, it is necessary to highlight the intelligence theories expounded, regarding the impact of intelligence on decision-making and foreign policy.

Intelligence and Decision-Making: H. H. Kanso's Theory:

Given a policy issue, the first rational step in the decision-making process starts with an appraisal of the external situation; "a call for the pertinent facts." In the nuclear age, when in spite of long-range planning, crucial decisions have to be made within a few minutes, the right decisions can be made only when all the pertinent data is available, and a recognition that such data is essential to their decision, on the part of

the decision makers. The best intelligence product in the world will never be a substitute for human judgement in the final casting of national policy, but more is expected, than a reliance by the decision-maker, on personal bias of conditioned reflexes. A corollary requisite is a continuing rapport between the producers of intelligence and the consumers - the decision-makers. All the pertinent data will not be forthcoming, if information needs have not been anticipated. Guidelines must be established for the producer through anticipation by the intelligence community and suggestions from the consumers, of what is needed for policy decisions.

One of the most important problems of central intelligence is the credibility of the product. Most users of intelligence, apparently approach intelligence with mixed ideas and expectations. On the one hand, they desire to have enough pertinent facts as to make the policy-choice clear and on the other, they are suspicious of the sources of intelligence and the possibility of fallibility of human judgement, in the process of analysis of the information. More important, intelligence has to compete with the decision-makers bias, experiences and other "pictures in the mind." The decision-maker is daily exposed to the media, advisers, foreign visitors, all attempting to influence and shape his images. Popular sentiment such as the media often reveals skepticism, suspicion and ignorance of the nature of intelligence product.

Further, intelligence analysts cannot disregard their own government's policies and intentions when constructing esti-
mates. If the analyst is committed to his government's plans, this could "colour" his estimate of the enemy's capabilities and intentions. This is to be avoided, all the more, in crucial periods when mistaken estimates can result in war. The relationship between policy and intelligence is thus a delicate and carefully balanced one. There is a natural tension between the two and if the relationship is to work, there must be mutual trust, respect, and a certain distance. Intelligence must provide the best judgement possible, avoid intrusion on decision-making and attempts to influence it. Policy-makers must assume the integrity of the intelligence provided and avoid attempts to get data suited to their preconceptions.

The most difficult aspect of intelligence analysis, however, is the evaluation of intentions. While it is easy to produce and correlate facts and figures to judge the enemy's strength and capability, it is much more difficult to evaluate the intentions, the "why?" aspect of foreign nations. Here, a realistic understanding of the limitations of intelligence is needed from both the decision-maker and the intelligence analyst. What it can do, is to follow the behaviour of foreign leaders and groups, over a long period of time, in order to get a sense of the parameter within which their policies move. Precise intentions in a given situation cannot be predicted, nor can they be expected to predict human events when often, the actors involved themselves, do not know their moves in advance. The intelligence community can at best reduce the uncertainties and construct plausible hypothesis about these factors, on the basis
of what continues to be partial and often, conflicting evidence. To expect more is to court disappointment. In any case, accurate prediction cannot insure against bad policy.

**Intelligence and Foreign Policy**

Though foreign policy would broadly come under the category of decision-making, it is necessary to deal with it separately, since the ramifications of intelligence on foreign policy go deeper than is normally acknowledged, or visible. Firstly, as mentioned above, intelligence plays an important role in formulation of foreign policy. Secondly, though not within its envisaged role, intelligence services have entered into the implementation of foreign policy. Thirdly, being involved in the achievement of foreign policy goals, intelligence operations can create a number of problems when they are discovered, or abort, in the course of clandestine activity.

Intelligence is the key to decision-making and thus indirectly enters the process of foreign policy formulation. A crucial factor in deciding foreign policy issues is intelligence. The relationship between intelligence and policy, in a broader sense is that between knowledge and action. In a crisis situation, the impact is enhanced. There is a continuous search

---

14 The theory has been constructed by one of the pioneers of intelligence studies, Harry Howe Ransom in *The Intelligence Establishment*, n. 6, pp. 3-6, and 221-30. In reality or practice however, the theory breaks down, due to the human element, as an attempt will be made to show, in the course of the study.
for policies to be adopted, if a certain course of action is pursued by other nations, for alternate decisions and their counter-effect on policies of other nations. Decision-makers often look to the intelligence service to provide the answer, for the meaning of enemy moves, countermeasures, future projections, what is plausible, as opposed to what is desirable and future foreign policy objectives. Faulty intelligence could threaten national survival as it provides the informational foundation of security policy. Further, a nation's success in fulfilling commitments and attaining foreign policy objectives will depend heavily upon the quality of such intelligence, for the accuracy of estimates prepared, has a profound impact on the adequacy of planning.

The successful use of any of the major instruments of foreign policy also depends upon the quality of intelligence estimate. In the use of diplomacy military power, economic pressure, propaganda, psychological warfare or covert action, or any combination of these, accurate intelligence is necessary, particularly in a period of complex international tensions. To be ignorant of present status, capability, probable intentions of foreign nations, especially potential enemies, allies and neutrals as well, is to court national disaster.

There are many ways in which intelligence services have a profound determinitive effect on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy objectives; covert action being the most important one. The very existence of intelligence services
as an instrument for clandestine intervention changes the perceptions of the political leadership or decision-maker. If open political and economic initiatives fail, the intelligence services can be considered as an alternative. The extreme secrecy in which covert action is undertaken, increases the chances of this instrument being put into action, even though it is against International Law to intervene in the affairs of other nations. As the decision-maker usually does not have to justify these activities to the parliament, press or people, no institutional force can stop covert action, barring premature disclosure. The secrecy of these operations ensure that they are not traced back to the responsible country, or even if they are, such operations are easily "deniable" due to the lack of definite evidence.

Clandestine operations can thus appear as a panacea, a saving device, without having to go through the effort and aggravation of tortuous diplomatic negotiations. Further it has been proved that intelligence agencies are better equipped to act quickly in a crisis, than the regular military apparatus, which is hindered by cumbersome bureaucracy. Covert action personnel, rarely demand the support facilities required by the regular military forces, while there is little conflict regarding tactics and fewer political restrictions. However, such covert action programmes can have an unforeseen effect on foreign policy, as that nation can be subjected to blackmail, if the operations go wrong.

Another interesting point to note is that, when one nation requires intelligence facilities in a foreign country, to monitor a third nation, the price to be paid for the right to instal eaves-
dropping equipment, is the pursuit of a favourable policy to that foreign country.

Theoretical Framework of the Study

The broad focus of this study is the intelligence function in diplomacy, in all its manifestations. The intention of the study is to specify and analyse the relationship, the extent of co-operation and conflict between these two institutions, that are important instruments of foreign policy. The involvement of intelligence services takes place at many levels, and can be conveniently analysed at the international, national or ministry levels. To begin with, however, a politico-historical analysis will be made to draw out the origins and causes for the linkage between diplomacy and intelligence, while the possibility of separating the two instruments will be examined in the concluding chapter.

The important aspects of the study are as follows:

a) The intelligence base for negotiations;
b) the involvement of intelligence services in undertaking quasi-diplomatic functions;
c) intelligence in a crisis-situation, its possibilities of moderating conflict;
d) the problem of covert action, their discovery and impact on interstate relations, especially when the embassies

---

Marchetti and Marks, n. 11, pp.277-8, 301. These observations are made by Marchetti with regard to CIA covert operations, but can be applied equally well, to other nations' intelligence services also, with minor modifications.
abroad are used as a base e) counter-intelligence and security f) the Foreign Affairs Ministry as consumer and producer of intelligence g) the contribution of intelligence services to military technology and preparedness h) the limitations on intelligence.

Evidently, the question providing the underlying link to the entire study is: what exactly is the impact of intelligence services on decision-making, diplomacy and foreign policy? The methodology utilised to provide the answer is that of a comparative case study. The impact and utility of this instrument varies from nation to nation, assuming primarily that they are interested in utilising this instrument of foreign policy. The two categories of nations of relevance to this study however are: a) regional powers and b) small strategic nations. This categorization is evidently not complete as it does not include the great powers and many of the developing nations, nor is it precise in the sense that one nation can overlap into two categories. However, as the question of categorization of nations in the study of international relations, has never been fully or satisfactorily settled, this categorisation will conveniently serve the purpose. Each of these categories of nations reveal many similarities in their methods, techniques and approach to inter-state relations.

The behaviour of small nations in interstate relations is acquiring increasing importance as an area of study of international relations. The problems of survival and development to
be coped with, force the small nation to differ in the utilisation of the instruments of foreign policy, in their overall methods and approach to interstate relations. It is generally acknowledged that the instruments of diplomacy and intelligence can be utilized effectively to grapple with the problem of survival and growth. To students of diplomacy and intelligence the activities of small nations are a fascinating field of study. The specific thrust of this study is therefore to examine the utility of intelligence to small nations. An attempt has been made to build up the theory that nations which do not have the adequate military, politico-diplomatic and economic leverage to achieve the objectives of their foreign policies are forced to rely to greater extent on intelligence. Undoubtedly the sum total of their capabilities will determine to what extent they can succeed in achieving their goals, but it is these same limitations on their capability which compels small nations to not only utilize the instrument of intelligence, but to utilize it much more effectively and efficiently.

The generally accepted theory of international relations believes that, all things being equal, the state with greater utilization of economic resources, military power and population has more influence on events outside its frontiers, greater security from pressure and attack, and a larger element of choice in respect of the national policy it pursues. A small state is more vulnerable to pressure, more likely to give way under stress, subject to a tighter connection between domestic and national affairs and more limited in respect of the political
options open to it. This is undoubtedly true to a large extent, but what however has not been generally examined is the possibilities open to a small state in interstate relations and in what manner it utilises the instruments of foreign policy, especially diplomacy and intelligence. Among the scholars who have examined this lesser-known aspect of small-state behaviour are David Vital and Arthur Andrew. An attempt will be made to illustrate some of David Vital's contentions. The theory will however be further modified and built up, to develop a more coherent and detailed analysis of the intelligence function in diplomacy.

David Vital's Theory

A particularly valuable instrument for a country obliged to practise responsive diplomacy, is the covert gathering of information or espionage. The small power when engaged in intelligence operations tends to limit itself to targets of immediate concern: the neighbouring states and the superpowers, while the Great Powers must back up their worldwide interests and activities with wider collection of information. Reliable information regarding the intentions and capabilities of other nations, the availability of data on matters before they arise and the capacity to prepare one's moves and execute them with the high probability of having chosen the correct alternative, alters the

16 See David Vital, Inequality of States, A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); and also Arthur Andrew, Defence by Other Means: Diplomacy for the Underdog (Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1970).
diplomacy of a small nation in terms of tactical advantage, operational competence and the ability to evaluate moves.

However due to the political risks involved, technological levels required, operational problems involved and expense in terms of cost-effectiveness, the small nation can use this instrument only to a limited extent in practice. This limitation can be overcome by greater effort and investment, a high degree of devotion, sheer flair, or by depending on the intelligence provided by the Great Powers. Where this instrument is of greater value to the small nation, is, in its attempts to obtain information by covert means and to use the same means to influence countries, lower on the power-scale than themselves.

It is essential and just as important, to prevent undercover intelligence activities of other nations, directed within the country and the protection of information regarding one's foreign policy objectives and tactics. Security forms one of the greatest inhibitions on the diplomat. The co-operation with other nations that is often vital to a small nation, depends on strict confidentiality and the risk factor involved in insecure governments, hinders this process. The small nation is therefore compelled to incorporate into its diplomatic system, effective security arrangements to protect their own plans, information entrusted by others and to be able to reassure others that their confidences are well protected.

While excessive reliance on intelligence sources, may increase the risk of being deliberately fed misleading information these sources are most useful as a check against information
obtained in the ordinary way, or as a means of preparing against being caught off balance in the course of negotiations. As an aid to diplomacy, a small nation's intelligence operations, are at best of secondary use and can lead to potentially unfavourable situations, when applied to relations with a Great Power.

One of the options open to a small nation in its struggle for survival, is following an active or aggressive strategy towards its weaker neighbours to improve its own position. There may be opportunities for small states to exploit or strengthen itself in relation to weaker neighbours, specially where authority is not accepted by the population and there is a lack of political cohesion. These features are often available in new states, liberated from colonialism. Here, subversion is a more economical method than war and there are distinct advantages in aiding guerrilla wars, undertaking propaganda, providing financial or military support or boosting exiles abroad, to exploit internal differences. Being covert, subversion is safer, also more easily controlled and providing greater freedom of choice, does not create the same reaction as open warfare. The advantages of such a policy, when successful, to a small state means the gaining of regional preponderance. There are possibilities of creating a quasi-federation which reduces discrepancies between states and increases the total resources available in times of war. Most important however is the fact that it broadens the field of manoeuvre and policy choice open to a small nation.

17 Ibid., pp. 20-26, and 123-34.
Introduction to Case Studies

Using the comparative case study method it is intended to show the utility of intelligence services to various categories of nations. The arena of conflict chosen for the case study is the Middle East, an area offering an example of a potentially explosive situation, where intelligence has an important role to play in crisis management and foreign policy. It also indicates the factors that are exploited or offer potential for covert action: the weakness of democratic institutions, political fragmentation, religious conflict and the existence of a section of political elite interested in revolution and a change in status quo. Being a strategic area, a focus of Super Power rivalry and economic potential with oil supplies, it has attracted the attention of the great powers who colonised parts of it, and in the contemporary world the attention of both the United States and the Soviet Union. With vital interests at stake and the clash of ideology the Middle East has been caught up in Super Power rivalry.

Further, the Middle East has the kind of nations, necessary for this study. Egypt has been chosen as an example of a regional power, which may follow an aggressive foreign policy during certain periods of time, as it did between 1956 and 1967, under President Nasser, in relation to the Arab world.
Egypt as a strategic power has been the target of super power interest. On the one hand, it is faced with the problem of growth and development and on the other its threat perceptions of Israel and Zionism. As a non-aligned country it has strived to pursue an independent perception of what its role in world affairs should be. An ancient civilization coupled with economic and military strength as compared to other Arab nations it has naturally aspired for political leadership of the Arab world, and played an important role in Arab affairs. Given this situation, its intelligence service has played an important role in national security, decision-making and foreign policy.

Israel has been offered as representative of a geographically small strategic nation, but militarily powerful and operating in a hostile environment. Though strictly considered, Israel would fall into the category of regional power, the emphasis here is on geographical size and the fact that it operates in a hostile environment. This would bring it nearer to one category of nations such as South Korea, Taiwan or with regard to environment, South Africa. Israel's greatest problem is its threat perception of survival. It has fought three major wars with neighbouring Arab states. As a nation continuously threatened, its reliance on the intelligence service to keep it forewarned of development in the Arab world is crucial. Though aligned to the United States, in a crisis situation it has to rely more on its own military strength and in times of peace,
its diplomacy and intelligence service. Israel offers the best example of a nation, compelled to use the instrument of intelligence effectively and efficiently.

The case studies have, however, been utilized with the intention of building up a broader theory of the intelligence function in diplomacy. An attempt will be made to clarify the relationship between these two instruments of foreign policy and indicate the advantages and disadvantages of such a relationship. As an attempt will be made to show, the intelligence services of both Egypt and Israel have ably assisted in the task of preserving national security and in improving the military technology of each nation. Certain new functions have however evolved in the functioning of intelligence services and the most important of these functions is the involvement in quasi-diplomatic functions. Both Egypt and Israel have at various times felt the need to utilize their intelligence agencies to communicate sensitive messages and also to negotiate with their enemies in a crisis situation. But even more important to the study however, is the clandestine operations undertaken by Egyptian and Israeli intelligence, and the effect these operations had on relations with other nations.

The case studies begin with an introduction which provides the historical background in which the intelligence services of Egypt and Israel were created and developed. The intention is to indicate the compulsions that operated on the
development, the historical experience in intelligence and the differences that arose in the style of functioning of each service. The structure and functions of each service have been outlined to indicate the legitimate duties of each service and to provide a better understanding of the complexity of organisation and the difficulties that arise over jurisdiction of functions. A review of some of the major operations in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been undertaken and their role in enhancing the military technology, preparedness and capability has been provided. The overall functioning has been reviewed so as to offer certain comparisons and indicate the problems or advantages in the style of functioning of each service.

The review of the foreign policy of Egypt, especially during the decade 1966 to 1967 has been used as the framework in which to analyse the role of intelligence. The emphasis relates to three aspects: the impact of intelligence on decision-making, diplomacy and foreign policy. Examples have been provided, in an attempt to show, directly, or indirectly that Regional Powers, when following an aggressive foreign policy in relation to their neighbours have a tendency to increasingly rely on its intelligence service. A similar case-study of Israel has been used to indicate the importance of intelligence to small strategic nations, which have to survive in a hostile atmosphere. Undoubtedly the most important cate-
gory of the Super Powers has been neglected, but this is an area which has already been dealt with by various scholars.

The core of the study relates to the dynamics of intelligence, diplomacy and foreign policy. An attempt has been made here, to build up a coherent theory about the factors that influence the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy. Some of these factors are the nature of political system, the capability of a nation, the environment and most important, the psychological disposition to use or neglect intelligence, which is based on historical experience. The theories of Harry Howe Hansom on decision-making and David Vital on intelligence, have been developed upon, using the case studies as examples.

The conclusion links up the limited framework so far utilized, to the broader arena of international relations. Intelligence services can have both a negative and positive role to play in relations among nations. During periods of tension, covert action can aggravate the situation. However, the purpose of intelligence; the rationale and philosophy that provides the justification for its existence, is that it provides the information necessary to take proper and right decisions, especially during periods of tension. The Appendices provide the original transcripts of the important interviews conducted abroad and in India. It provides a new set of perceptions on most areas covered in the thesis, but it also has potential for further development by other scholars. While most of the
interviewees have tended to substantiate the conclusions and ideas of the thesis, some of them have provided new perceptions on the subject. A final historical background has traced the historical development of intelligence and diplomacy, while providing the linkages between these two institutions during their development.