CHAPTER – V

The Second Indo-Naga Peace Process

Workable-transformative-roadmap

The chapter analyses the Second Indo-Naga Peace Process within the framework of “Workable-transformative-roadmap” or WTR. The Workable-transformative-roadmap as a roadmap is a stepping stone for amicable conclusion in the context of not only the ongoing Indo-Naga peace process which is a culmination of decades old conflict itself. Martin J. Dent’s model of “home rule” almost comes close to it. However, his model is lacking far behind in many areas and aspects from the WTR. Moreover, Dent’s model lacks political content and meaning. This “Workable-transformative-roadmap” is like a bridge connecting two mountain ranges or systems unlike adversarial severing of mutual relationship between two entities, in particular between the Nagas and the Government of India. The roadmap is being suggested after taking into special consideration of the unconditional political dialogue which is underway between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN).

The WTR has been formulated keeping in view the people’s aspirations and desires of both parties. If the WTR could be implemented, both sides will have mutual gain and benefit, which means both the parties win. Therefore, the WTR is not a Zero-sum game (the gain of one party is a lose for the other party). It’s a solution based on the principle of winning by both the parties. Neither of the party will be sacrificing anything. But, both parties meet their aspirations and desires through an integrative approach for an amicable peaceful political solution. Taking the present Indo-Naga political peace talks into consideration, the thesis has come out with this piece of framework so that the roadmap is relevant and indispensable.
It is to be noted here that different kinds of conflicts should have different mechanisms to transform them. For example, economic problem should be dealt with such mechanism which will address the economic problem faced by the concerned people. Here, the point to be noted is that, proper and efficient diagnosis of various kinds of problems are required if researchers are truly searching for their remedial measures. This means an economic problem shall not be diagnosed as a cultural problem. If there is a wrong diagnosis of the problem, then, the mechanism applied to solve the problem will also go wastefully wrong and the result would be that there will be no redressal of the particular problem. And the problem will continue to persist.

In the same way, a political problem, in this case, the Indo-Naga issue should not be misinterpreted. The conflict between Indian Government and the Nagas has not been completely transformed due to the simple reason that the conflict has been wrongly defined and conceived. Different Governments of India since independence, academicians, policy-makers, military strategists and analysts, civil and military administrators, the media personalities, and other oppositional players for the past decades have defined and conceptualized the Indo-Naga political issue as an ethnic issue or law and order problem or insurgency movement or secessionist or separatist movements. These misinterpretations, narrow perceptions and bias analyses of the issue have hardly transformed the conflict. This is one of the major shortcomings on the part of the Government of India and other actors while trying to solve one of the longest running conflicts in the world barring the one in Ireland.

The major mistake of the Government of India and the various so-called experts committed is that the Indo-Naga issue which is political in nature and content has been consciously ignored and neglected. Such conscious policy has led the Government of India to approach the issue with measures such as constitutional formula, counter-insurgency and developmental packages. In the final reading, as the measures undertaken in the past hardly match the conflicting political point, the issue still remains untransformed and persisting. It means that correct mechanism and approach needs to be applied in such a conflict situation. Then, what would be the correct approach and
mechanism to transform the political conflict? It is obvious that political mechanism and approach is the ultimate requirement if the parties are really willing to transform the conflict. This is accompanied by the fact that the Naga Movement has also split and Nagas currently live in different states of North eastern region in India.

The WTR is a mechanism which could be applied to the Naga situation through mutual understanding and consent. This framework is a people-oriented design and democratic in content. This model is being devised for a long-term relationship between the parties. This means the parties should seek out for a politically transformative mechanism even today so that the conflict is creatively transformed and peaceful relationship take positive steps towards peace-building. The ongoing peace process can be said as one of the most opportune time for both the Government of India and the Nagas to find an amicable and mutually acceptable peaceful political solution. The hard-earned peace process should not only transform the Indo-Naga conflict but also a signal for a positive message of the authenticity of such peace process to various conflicts in the sub-continent in particular and the world in general. Once a political solution could be achieved through the peace process, the people will at last see the light of the day which will ultimately let the people think and realize that peace is achievable, transformable and practicable. It must be underlined that the peace process is a product of struggle, accommodation and vision of the parties to the conflict.

It is after due understanding of the political nature of the conflict that is being dealt herewith, and taking cues from the various models as discussed in chapter one, it can be rightly maintained that both sides need to think in terms of not only short-term solution but also in terms of long-term relationship. It needs to be pointed out that the roadmap is suggested as a workable formula to transform the identity-based conflict or nationality-based conflict. As such the negotiating parties need to mutually recognise the fundamental needs of human being in its intrinsic values, such as identity, human rights, dignity, security, existential survival, Psycho-cultural dynamics, equality, positive peace as propounded by the thinkers like Rothman, Azar, Galtung, Elizabeth Crighton, Martha Abele Mac Iver, etc. For example, the recognition of the Nagas aspiration to preserve
their "unique identity"\(^1\) is a sine qua non for the new relationship (NSCN’s Model of a "Special Federal Relationship" and Rothman’s Identity-based Conflict Transformation Model, Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict Transformation Model etc.).

More efforts should be made for the preservation of the Naga democratic ethos, culture, arts, customary laws and usages (Ref. to Article 371 A of the Indian Constitution). While giving this effort, both the parties should make all out effort to strengthen the Indian democracy and the rule of law as well. The genuine aspiration and interest of the Nagas to restore the contiguity of the Naga geographical location which is hitherto separated shall be worked out cooperatively by both the parties as a means in seeking the solution. (NSCN’s Model and Conflict Transformation Theorists for Structural Change Models and Critical Social Theorists).

Martin J. Dent’s ‘sovereign land’, and not necessarily his ‘Super-federalism’, can be modified and deepened to suit the proposed “Workable-transformative-roadmap”. His ‘sovereign land’ which is limited to Nagaland state can be modified in such a manner as to include Naga areas of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur.\(^2\) Importantly, there is an ardent need to transform the over all political, socio-cultural and economic structures, as Kevin Clements, Vayrynen, A. B. Fetherston, Vivienne Jabri, Elise and Kenneth Boulding, John Paul Lederach, Adam Curle, Kumar Rupesinghe, Hugh Miall etc., propounded, which has engendered the conflict. At present it may not be settled as to the nature of that sovereignty- titular, popular, militarist and political.

In transforming the structures, the Nagas should enjoy the full sovereign right over their land, natural and mineral resources, forest, oil, water, air (Suisa’s Proposal). Policing, judiciary, education, banking and financial institutions under the internal affairs of the Naga administrative set up are firmly to be incorporated in any future agreement

\(^{1}\) Karan Thapar used unique identity in his interview with Th. Muivah, General Secretary, NSCN, on 25th April 2005 that was Broadcasted on BBC World: Hard Talk India on 29th April and Re-telecasted on 1st May 2005.

\(^{2}\) We are excluding the Nagas of Burma in this analysis due to the fact the present peace process is only in the Indian side. It does not necessary mean that we cannot include the Nagas of Burma in the ‘sovereign land’ as suggested.
(Suisa's Proposal). In matter of defining real sovereignty the two parties may have to work hard since it could have many internal and external policy orientations. However, in the areas of External, Defence, Monetary Policy, Communications and Transportations, there will be a joint-management by both Government of India and the Nagas though the Government of India will have a primary role in these areas (NSCN's Model). It may be suggested that the Indian Currency could be a common currency for both parties. As far as Herb Feith's and Alan Smith's suggestions are concerned, the wisdom of the conflictants will decide.

A modernized infrastructure would be engineered to effectuate the opening and development of roads between neighbouring Naga territories as a part of the roadmap (included in Grace Collins’s Goodwill Missions Team Report, Unofficial White Paper Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Naga Areas May 16-27, 2005). Joint Economic Development Council should be formed to promote trade and investment (Grace Collins). Besides, Line of Control may be created to safeguard each other's interest. A "No War" policy would be declared as part of peaceful relationship (Grace Collins).

The continuation of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, Restricted Area Permit, Disturbed Area Act, etc. in the Naga areas has always been hindering factors in the process of conflict transformation (B.K. Roy Burman's Proposal). To this we may recall what Kevin Clements had to say, conflict transformation occurs when violence ceases and/or is expressed in non-violent ways, and when the original structural sources of the conflict (economic, social, political, military, and cultural) are changed in some ways. The propensity for violence is diminished by democratization, demilitarization, de-alignment, socio-economic development, and expansion of human rights, humanitarian law, and socio-cultural openness (Kelvin Clements). Both the parties should also address the psychocultural dynamics as Ross’s suggests that intransigent conflict results from a complex interplay between psychocultural dynamics and interpretations and substantive "interest".³ Ross’s suggestion is relevant as far as the Nagas’ assertion for recognition of

³ M. Ross, The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993, as cited in Jay Rothman, Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in
their national identity is concerned. Psychocultural dynamics are complex and have multidimensional aspects which are deeply rooted in the hearts and minds of the people and not in the material world. If there is a declaration of no 'war' by both parties it will create conditions for a rethink on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and lead to repeal of it, perhaps.

It might be added here of what B.K. Roy Burman’s proposition had to say, as a confidence-building measure (CBM), the GoI should take steps among others to repeal the draconian Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and the Regulations that are being imposed in the Naga areas, though his non-territorial solution and the rest of his formulation in line with the Saami Council could not be fitted into our formulation in this chapter. The idea behind repealing the Act and other provisions is in keeping with the spirit of peaceful environment so that the real sovereignty lies with the people, and that they experience the true meaning of democracy and the rule of law. Here the emphasis is on the importance of reclaiming the shrinking of democratic space in the society. The principles and values such as rights, justice, liberty, freedom of expression, human security and well-being are all for the common good of the people.

**Past Peace Processes**

The protracted Indo-Naga conflict, which has witnessed bloody armed battles, has undergone series of political negotiations in the form of 'peace talks'. The numbers of official Agreements, Acts, and Accords signed between the Government of India (GoI) and the Nagas proved the fact that there have been vigorous efforts to solve the Indo-Naga conflict through peaceful means. To reverse the famous Clauswitz observation 'war is politics by other means'⁴, peace talks and political negotiations can often be construed essentially as war by other means. However, the efforts to solve the vexed Indo-Naga political conflict by peaceful means have not yielded much result. It

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also shows that even when there is war other means like diplomacy would be employed all along, as suggested by Lenin.

The most notable among all the root causes of the conflict can be pointedly ascribed to popularly known as, Sir Akbar Hydari agreement or Nine-Point Agreement signed on 27, 28 and 29 June 1947 between Sir Akbar Hydari representing GoI and the Naga National Council (NNC) leadership representing the Nagas. The provision within this agreement vividly stated the illegitimate occupation of the Indian state upon the Nagas. Having clearly known to the historical reality of Nagas in no ways similar to India’s history and traditions, the Indian leadership like Gandhi and Nehru categorically stated the Naga sovereign status. However, owing to the fragile status of newly independent country, India was unwillingly forced to take possession of the Nagas being vulnerable from external aggression. Therefore, 9 point agreement improvised to claim custodian during the transition period. The agreement left all the augmented powers to the NNC leadership for running the affairs of the Nagas.

The last clause (9) of the Agreement which embodied a period of ten years, and after which the NNC leadership are given responsibility to take further course of action, either to extend the period of agreement or opt out from the agreement for sovereign independent status. The non-implementation of the Hydari Agreement bequeathed the Indo-Naga conflict a legacy of controversy and unresolved debates.

The Government of India sought thereafter, speedy end to the Indo-Naga conflict through military operation in the Naga areas, which could not yield to any positive results. Therefore, in order to appease the Naga nationalists and the Naga public from ire of revolutionary activities, Government of India improvised a plan of creating a Nagaland state under the Union of India. Subsequently, Nagaland state was created on, 1st December, 1963 combining formerly Naga Hills district and Mon-Tuensang Tribal areas. This implicitly divided the Nagas among themselves, which became the ultimate dire policies of the Government of India to suppress the violent activities of the Naga

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5 See, Gandhi’s statement at Bhangi colony, and Nehru letter to B. Medhi, the then Chief Minister. Assam.
nationalists. Thereupon, both the conflicting parties agreed to enter into ceasefire, to find a solution that was honourable to both the parties.

The initiative for the establishment of peace in the Naga areas came from the Baptist Church leaders who were not ideologically and politically persuaded to the issue. Most of the Church leaders were responsible for depoliticisation of the Naga cause which has negative implications. It could be true that they were talking peace without political content and meaning. The Baptist Church leaders also suggested for the facilitation of Peace Mission into the peace talks. Accordingly, “B.P. Chaliha, the then Chief Minister of Assam, Jayaprakash Narayan, the noted Sarvodaya leader of India, Shanker Rao Deo, an Assamese and Rev. Michael Scott, a British citizen,”⁶ who had worked for the Indians in South Africa was formed as a members of Peace Mission to look into the Indo-Naga conflict.

To create a congenial atmosphere for peaceful negotiation, the cease fire agreement was signed by both the parties on August 15, 1964...which came into effect from September 6, 1964.⁷

A part of the cease fire agreement read as:⁸

“The government of India welcome the steps intended to bring about peace in Nagaland and with this in view as already stated, they will depute representatives, with whom, will be associated the representatives of the government of Nagaland, to take part in talks with leaders of the underground...”

Thus, the first session of the peace talks between the representatives of the Government of India and the Federal Government of Nagaland commenced on the 23 September 1964 at the Peace Camp, Chedema near Kohima.⁹ For the Government of

⁶ M. Horam, Naga Insurgency- The Last Thirty Years. Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1988, p.105
⁷ Ibid. p.107
⁸ Ibid., P. 107, 108.
⁹ Nagas: Their Pilgrimage for Self Existence and Quest for Dignity and Peace, p. 15, Arranged and Published by, Oking Publicity and Information Department, Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim, 2005.
India, it was law and order problems, but the Naga nationalist considered the conflicts as the result of the external aggression to the people of the Nagas and its territories. Therefore, the Federal government's representatives took a firm stand and insisted that the Government of India that handle politically to find a practical solution to the Indo-Naga problem. But, owing to the repressive attitudes of the Government of India to deal the problems as "law and order", which, shall be dealt internally within the administrative constitution of India, the talks could not yield to any positive results. In due course of the peace talks, the Tatar Hoho (Federal Parliament) was summoned at the Wokha session and the Peace Mission were invited, who clearly admitted when asked in the session that the Indo-Naga issue was not 'Law and Order' but political pure and simple. For which the deadlock created by the government of India being unable to identify the nature of the problem was somehow persuaded to engage with the talks.

The talks took place in New Delhi, India's capital, for six rounds. In the course of talks Federal government submitted 14 historical points to the Prime Minister of India. Among other things, the Federal government restated the free independent status of Nagas, who were neither conquered nor defeated by any external forces before the advent of the British, the dissimilar culture, traditions, and history of the Nagas to the rest of the India, that the Nagas had never entered into any agreement or treaty to surrender their sovereignty to any entities, and on August 14, 1947, the Nagas declared Independence of Nagaland which was confirmed by a referendum in May, 1951 with 99.9% in favour of Independent Sovereign Naga State. Therefore, upon these 14 historical points, the Federal government built its basis for the ground of the talks which the government of India failed to take cognizance of the Nagas rights. Conspicuously, the position of the conflicting parties unable to find agreeable points to begin with formal talks, the peace talks got protracted for eight years until it was unilaterally backtracked by the Government of India.

The Peace Mission at their best level efforts tried several times to bring the two conflicting parties to continue for political negotiations. The members of the Peace

10 M. Horam, Naga Insurgency, Ibid., p.130,
Mission eruditely understood the rights of the Nagas. Thus, Peace Mission put forward a sixteen-point proposal on the 20th of November, 1964. The emphatic assertion of the right to self-determination in the proposal boosted the morale of the Nagas and supported their viewpoint to a large extend. The Indian side reiterated their stand of finding the solution of the Naga issue within the framework of the Indian union, while the Nagas insisted on the right to self-determination and creation of an independent Nagaland state. The Sixth or the last round of talks held on 5 October, 1967, put to rest the whole anemic efforts of the Peace Mission that the Government of India unable to recognize the Historical Statement of the Nagas, enunciated on the fourteen-Point proposal.

Above all, learning the positions of the members of the Peace Mission, the Government of India in no time evicted Rev. Michael Scott from the country. In continuation of its attitude of treating the challenge of the Naga political issue as an internal problem of "law and order", on August 31, 1972, the Government of India declared the Naga National Council, the Federal Government of Nagaland and the Naga Army as "unlawful associations" under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act No. 37 of 1967. At this time, the State of Nagaland was transferred from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Ministry of Home Affairs, in contravention of the Sixteen-Point Agreement of 1960, which says that Nagaland shall be under the Ministry of External Affairs of the GoI. The peace process altogether was shattered in this situation and followed with the outbreak of round of violence in the Naga areas. The relation was further aggravated by strong military repression by the Indian state, where innocent Naga civilians were at the receiving end. Numerous innocent civilians were killed, tortured, women were raped and a lot of villages were destroyed by the Indian security forces. Thus, another opportunity to resolve the Indo-Naga political issue through peaceful means was shredded.

In dispirited situation of the Naga movement after the failure of the peace talks, the Government of India found it possible to focus on Naga faultlines- divide and rule

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11 Nagas: The Pilgrimage For Self-Existence and Quest for Dignity and Peace, Oking Publicity & Information Department, Government of the People's Republic of Nagalim, November 2005, p. 15
12 Ibid. p. 15
policy striking the vulnerable chord of tribal lines, and its effort to distance the nationalists from the Naga public. Further, the President's Rule was imposed in Nagaland on March 25, 1975, which was accentuated by the declaration of National Emergency in April the same year.

On the heavily burdened maze of Indo-Naga conflictual terrain, Indian democracy was then burning under the National Emergency. The country faced an authoritarian regime during the Emergency. For which, in order to explore another avenues to settle Indo-Naga problems, the government of India constituted Nagaland Peace Council (NPC), on February 5, 1975, mostly its members were Church leaders and Sarvodaya Peace observers. Under the chairmanship of Rev. Longri Ao, NPC took initiative to bring both the parties to the conference table in 1975. They submitted Four Point-Proposal to the Governor of Nagaland, L.P. Singh to explore fresh avenues for restoring permanent solution to the Indo-Naga conflict. The NPC also approached the Naga Nationalist, after which they set up six member representatives, namely, Kevi Vallely, Z. Ramyo, Major General M. Asa, Sanayi Dahru, I. Temjenba and Venyiyi Rahakha. In a serious doubt to the constituted representatives of the Naga nationalists in absence of their Prime Minister and General Secretary, the then Governor of Nagaland L.P. Singh instructed his advisors H. Zopianga and M. Ramunny to ascertain whether the representatives of the Naga bears competent authority to make any decision.

However, the assurance given by the selected six representatives of the Nagas reiterated their assurance of their competency to the Governor. Thereupon, the talks began in Shillong on 10th November, 1975. After several rounds of talks in Shillong, the infamous Shillong Accord was signed on 11 November-1975 under duress. Shillong Accord became the greatest setback to the Nagas for its unconditional capitulation, and acceptance of the Indian constitution. Without any further hesitation the Alee Command or the 'China returning group', Alee (Foreign) Minister Isak Chisi Swu, General

Secretary, Th. Muivah and various rank and file of the NNC on all capacity condemned the Accord and termed the accordists as traitors of a national cause. Now it appears that there could be plurality of interpretations of such causes.

Eventually, the worse thing occurred, when all the Naga leaders gathered at sector 2 HO camp for holding Central Executive Council meeting, Lt. Col., Subong Ao, the Commanding officer, and the pro-Accord cadres staged a military takeover and declared ‘martial law’ as part of their strategy to contain opposition to the Accord on August 30, 1978. But when S.S. Khaplang realized that he had been deceived, he parted company with the Accord group. Then as President of the FGN, he issued an order to eliminate all those responsible for imposition of martial law and Shillong Accordists for their rapacity to impose the Shillong Accord on the Nagas. The Martial Law was finally lifted on March 9, 1979 due to severe criticism and pressure from the Naga public.

Subsequently, National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) was formed as a refined banner to champion the cause of the Nagas on January 31, 1980 after the merger between the Eastern Naga National Council headed by S.S. Khaplang and the Naga National Council under the leadership of Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah on January 29, 1980. Under the leadership of Isak Chisi Swu, Th. Muivah and S.S. Khaplang proved wrong the estimated calculations of the Indian leaders to suppress the Nagas under duress, and they severed ties from the NNC and FGN corporate. The NSCN leadership disclaimed the accord primarily on the ground that the Constitution of the FGN state, any matter relating to the Sovereignty of the Naga question shall always have the final consent of the Prime Minister of the FGN and President of the NNC, but the Accordists failed to do so. Dishonouring the Constitution of the FGN, the accordists on

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17 Written Interview of Th. Muivah; Maj. Ramkathing, A Brief Account of Martial Law, in A.S. Atai Shimray, Ibid. p. 119
their own went ahead and entered into signing the Shillong Accord which was unmatched with the Nagas' struggle for the right to self-determination.

The Naga Nationalist did not only doubt the sincerity of the government of India but also became very critical of the Church's role in relations to the signing of the Shillong Accord which according to them overstepped their responsibility. It is learnt that the success of the IB in setting up of the Naga People's Convention was pointer in this direction. Further, the then commissioner of Nagaland S.C. Dev aptly stated that,

"No guerrilla insurgency can be suppressed without a good intelligence network... all those who were concerned with 'intelligence' will gratefully remember the services rendered by the officers of the subsidiary intelligence Bureau. They will have to remain in the background for obvious reason." 21

In all these efforts of subjugation and betrayals, the government of India wasted its prestige of sincerity to solve the Indo-Naga issue. The Nagas became distrustful and cautious for which the experienced markedly indicated that the government of India considered peace processes, ceasefires, accords etc., as a means to weaken the spirit of Naga nationalism. The government of India, unable to hoodwink the Nagas, resorted once again to heavy deployment of armed forces in the Naga areas.

As a result, the war between the Indian security forces and the Naga Army escalated in every corner of the Naga areas. Naga villages were razed down, innocent people were killed, maimed, women were raped; houses looted, insurmountable amounts of human rights violations were committed. It brought to a full scale of war between the two nations, until the informal parleys the Indian leaders entered into with the NSCN leadership to arrive at a common understanding that would give the Indo-Naga issue yet another opportunity for a peaceful and honorable settlement. It took another 33 years and thousands lives after the first ceasefire, which the Government of India and the Naga

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21 Ibid. p 89
Nationalist entered for the second time into a bi-lateral ceasefire agreement on 1st August, 1997.22

As per our model, we notice that the perceptions of the Nagas and the Government of India amounted to ‘external aggression’ and ‘war’. The second ceasefire is an intermediate step on the part of both sides to come to a position of suspended hostilities as prelude to No War declaration.

**The Beginning of Second Indo-Naga Peace Talk**

After more than five decades of military operations against the Nagas, three Generals of the Indian armed forces acknowledged that a “Military solution is not possible: the Naga issue is a political one requiring political solution.”23 After long intensive low-key negotiations, a landmark meeting was held in June 1995, in Paris between the then Prime Minister of India, late P. V. Narasimha Rao and the Collective Leadership of the NSCN, 24 Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah wherein various substantive issues were discussed. During the talks, Mr Rao stated, “I believe in a political solution. We must solve the problem through political talks and dialogue. We should be patient enough and tolerant in tackling the problem.”25 The recognition of Indo-Naga problem as a ‘political’ one paved the way for solving the conflict through peaceful means. It created a congenial atmosphere of understanding and patience for peace talks. These changes in recognizing the nature of the problem can be considered a significant shift on the part of the Indian Government and its approach towards conflict transformation. Subsequently, a series of meetings were held with various functionaries of the Government of India. The political initiatives were further strengthened when in February 1997 Mr. H. D. Deve Gowda, the then Prime Minister of India met the NSCN

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22 *Souvenir*, p. 17, and See also Index, in Nagalim', Calendar, Published by Ministry of Information and Publicity, GPRN, 2005.


24 Collective leadership of the NSCN is the distinctive feature of the NSCN. In all matters of policies and programs, collective decision of the Central Committee members is necessary. The organisation, government and army are all controlled by them. Collective Leadership is applied to both, at the Centre and at the regional levels, so as to make their governing and functioning more democratic. It also seeks to avoid any credulous error of the leaders.

Collective Leadership in Zurich, Switzerland. The Prime Minister of India assured that “We believe in peaceful means. We must seek a political solution.”

The Modalities of Peace Talk

All these significant meetings that unfolded through this delicate process entered into a new phase of formal negotiations when the Second Indo-Naga Ceasefire Agreement was declared in Indian Parliament by the then Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and the Chairman, NSCN, Isak Chishi Swu at the UNPO Headquarter, The Hague, the Netherlands on 25th July 1997 for a period of three months with effect from 1st August 1997.

The Agreement reads:

“For securing a peaceful political solution discussion had been held between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim leadership. It has been mutually decided to Cease fire for a period of three months (3) with effects from the 1st August 1997 and embark upon political level discussions.”

As congenial environment were necessary to hold political negotiations, therefore, the NSCN and GoI formulated certain modalities for peace talks known as ‘Ceasefire Ground Rules’ that will be abided by both the parties. Accordingly, the Ceasefire Ground Rules were finalized between the GoI and the NSCN on 12th December 1997. The three guiding principles, on which the ceasefire agreement was bilaterally agreed upon, were that:

1. Without any condition (Unconditional);
2. At the highest level i.e., Prime Ministerial level; and,
3. In a third Country.

It was based on these principles and understanding that the second peace process in 52 years of Indo-Naga conflict began since then.

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26 Ibid, p. 19
27 Souvenir, Ibid., p. 17, and See also Index, in ‘Nagalim’, Calendar, Published by Ministry of Information and Publicity, GPRN, 2005.
28 Souvenir, 2005, Ibid., p.17.
29 Ibid., p.19.
A series of political negotiations were held after the commencement of ceasefire, at the Prime Ministerial level, and in many of the instances represented by the emissaries of both the sides. Swaraj Kaushal, former Home Secretary represented as interlocutor to the Prime Minister of India, until July 22, 1999. He resigned from interlocutorship for the alleged sinister campaign against him by the PMO, for his inclination to solve the Indo-Naga issue earnestly, as reported. He was replaced by Mr. K. Padmanabhaiah, former Home Secretary. Mr. V.S. Atem, Retd. General, represented as an emissary to the Collective Leadership from the commencement of the Ceasefire. The endeavours undertaken by N.N. Vohra, who was appointed the interlocutor of the Indian government with various groups in Jammu and Kashmir and the current role that former Home Secretary of India, K. Padmanabhaiah, is playing, as interlocutor, in the Indo-Naga peace process were cited as “track one and a half” diplomacy.

And the duration of ceasefire have been reviewed many times and extended to the current phase. However, the era of coalition instabilities in India has made it impossible to transit serious negotiations on the substantive issues. But despite the fact that these negotiations have yet to yield any progress, the two sides have agreed to give the process more time. The commitment to the ceasefire has remained and both sides respect the commitment of the other to the terms. Although, there has not been a complete stand-down of military forces on either sides – incidents of fighting and killing between the forces have taken place on a number of occasions – both sides have taken steps to ensure that such incidents do not escalate to the point of violating the ground-rules of ceasefire. The animated peace or suspended animation is not irreversible. It is also a step in the right direction. It is not a solution. It is a means.

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30 Telegraph, 24-7-1999
31 This insight was provided by Satish Kumar, Editor, India’s Annual National Security Review, New Delhi, at the annual South Asian Workshop, titled Transcending Conflict, held in June 2003 in New Delhi, in Meenakshi Gopinath and Manjrika Sewak, Transcending Conflict: A Resource Book on Conflict Transformation, WISCOMP (Women in security, Conflict Management and Peace), Foundation for Universal Responsibility of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, New Delhi, 2003, p. 52
Peace Talk with NSCN (K)

While the peace process with NSCN has been going for a considerable time, the K group that is led by S. S. Khaplang had left out of the purview of political negotiations. NSCN (K) has been an offshoot of the NSCN that was established in 1980, and its leader S.S. Khaplang had been a co-founder of NSCN. The split in NSCN took place in 1988, when Khaplang along with some of his men attacked the functionaries of NSCN. Subsequently, Khaplang was expelled from the organization in 1989. Khaplang then establish his own organization known by the same name, NSCN. To distinguish the two groups, journalists have often referred to them by their leader's initials: NSCN (I-M) and NSCN (K). Khaplang group continues to function up to the present, and has presence in some parts of Nagaland, Manipur and a large portion of Naga areas in Burma (Myanmar).

However, Khaplang has his own limitations in making a contribution in highlighting the Naga political problem in international platform. When the NSCN was carrying out political negotiations with the Indian state, strictly adhered to the Ceasefire ground rules, Khaplang group continues to wield arms in the jungle and involved in mass scale violence. Therefore, civil societies and state government urged the Khaplang group to enter into the Ceasefire agreement and open up for possible negotiation. Initially, the Government of India declared unilateral ceasefire to Khaplang group but they did not give positive response, instead they continue to create violence.

However, under the pressure from Naga civil societies and state government, the Khaplang group showed willingness to come to the negotiating table. After two months hectic informal discussion, the Khaplang group announced to accept the offer of Indian government for ceasefire in April 2001. Since then, the Khaplang group has been having Ceasefire with the Government of India. But far less is known about the issues that Khaplang group has put up before the Government of India. Neither, Khaplang group has come out openly with its vision for bringing solution to the Indo-Naga problem. Instead, Khaplang group accused the NSCN for democratic stands to the

33 The Telegraph, Calcutta, 10/04/2000.
negotiating terms and its process. They, however claim to be the custodians of “complete sovereignty” for the Nagas. But the fact of the matter remained undeterred that the Khaplang group is allegedly allowing itself to be manipulated by the Government of India to affect the peace process. Further enunciating the truth, it was learnt that Khaplang and its accomplice were closely monitored and supported by the government of India to wreck the NSCN organisation. It was confirmed with various information gathered, among other things, ‘the confession of C. Alemla, a close associate of Dally Mungro (General Secretary of dissident Khaplang’s group), that Khaplang’s associates and Indian security forces were in close coordination’… also confided that Khetovi Zhimomi, Defence Secretary of Dissident Khaplang group receiving financial help from S. C. Jamir’. The patronizing role of S.C. Jamir with the Khaplang group is even confirmed in the report of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). 34 There cannot however be any official confirmation about this view. On the face of it the Khaplang faction is now at odds with the political strategy of the NSCN.

However, the independence movement of the Nagas has gained international supports through Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), KWIA, a Belgium based Civil Society for the Indigenous Peoples, Society for Threatened Peoples, Germany, International Human Rights Association of American Minorities (IHRAAM), UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), etc. The NSCN was able to register Naga people’s movement for independence under UNPO on 23 January, 1993 as its primary member. 35 To mobilize for the Naga cause, support centres have been set in different countries of the world such as Naga-American Council and Naga Support Group (UK). The NSCN has also become member of the Parliamentarians for National Self-Determination (PNSD) in 2006.

35 Uniqueness of Naga History, Published by Concerned Senior Citizens’ Forum, Mokokchung, Nagaland, 2005, p. 19,
Threats to Peace Talks

The Indo-Naga peace talks which began in 1997 have witnessed various forms of threats from different sides. There have been various occasions where Ceasefire agreement was on the verge of breakdown. But, so far, the Ceasefire continues and the threats have made positive contributions as well. One can classify the threats to Indo-Naga peace talks into two: (i) the contending issues between the two entities and (ii) the external factors, especially from those ‘non-entities’ to Indo-Naga peace talks. There have been certain unrelated incidents that have also brought numerous apprehensions on the Nagas that Ceasefire might breakdown. Those incidents are the arrest of Th. Muivah, Gen. Secretary of NSCN in Bangkok, or the protest by certain communities over the extension of ceasefire to all the Naga areas. However, certain temporal solutions were bought over these unexpected developments, and the peace talk was kept on track.

In 1998, the NSCN gave a boycott call to the Nagaland State Assembly, with a warning that ‘stern action’ will be taken against those candidates contesting for election. The reason put up by NSCN was that the need of the hour for the Nagas is political solution, and conducting elections will not solve the Indo-Naga political problem. This call by the Naga leaders was subsequently supported by the Naga civil societies and NGOs, such as the Naga Hoho. And, election became a major contentious issue for the Indian state as well as the Nagas. Apparently, the NSCN leaders were disappointed with the lackadaisical attitude of the Indian state to the peace process; therefore, they resort to put pressure by rallying with the peoples support. And the Nagas consider the peace process as the most opportune time for a peaceful solution to Indo-Naga problem in which election became an unnecessary exercise.

However, the Government of India reacted sharply to this move by the NSCN, and issued a warning that Ceasefire would be called off if the NSCN meddle with the political system of Nagaland state. And, the NSCN also threatened to pull out of the

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36 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 6.01.98
37 The Imphal Free Press, Imphal, 8.2.98
peace talks if the Indian government goes ahead with the election process in Nagaland.\textsuperscript{38} As a result, the election became a major issue for the ‘two entities’, as the Indian state was concerned with the ‘law and order’, while the NSCN was concerned with the political solution. Amidst boycott calls and threats to peace talk election was held in Nagaland. The massive support from the Naga civil societies and the people was clearly reflected in the outcome of election as most of the candidates were elected un-opposed and the turnout of voters was very low.\textsuperscript{39} At the end, the NSCN and the government of India were able to overcome their differences on the election issue and move ahead with the peace process.

The coverage of ceasefire became a major issue for the NSCN as well as the Indian state. The NSCN have been operating in all the Naga areas i.e. Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, not forgetting Nagas in Burma. As there was no clear-cut understanding about the actual coverage of Ceasefire in the initial phase, confusion arose within the ranks of the Naga Armed resistance group and the Indian security forces. Some of the NSCN functionaries in Manipur were arrested for apparently no reason, while ceasefire was enforced in other states. Some Naga politicians also hold that ceasefire should be with the ‘people’ and the idea of having ‘territorial limits’ to Ceasefire has no meaning.\textsuperscript{40} After a long deliberation over the ceasefire coverage issue, the Prime Minister of India in 2001 declared that Indo-Naga Ceasefire will function 'without territorial limits'.\textsuperscript{41} This was considered not just as a necessity but a victory for the Nagas as they have been demanding for the unification of all Naga areas under one administrative system.

However, it did not go down well with the neighboring states where Nagas are living side by side with other communities. The opposition to “without territorial limits” comes mainly from the non-Naga communities in Manipur state, particularly the Meiteis.

\textsuperscript{38} The Imphal Free Press, Imphal, 11.2.98
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} In an interview to the Indian civil societies, Mr. Neiphio Rio told that he has voiced his disagreement to the Home Ministry over the ceasefire coverage issue. Kumar and Murthy, Four Years of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim: Promises and Pitfalls, New Delhi, 2002
\textsuperscript{41} "Joint Statement", Bangkok, June 14, 2001.
On June 18, protest over the ceasefire extension in Imphal turned violent and led to burning down of Manipur Assembly and other state government offices and residence of MLAs.\textsuperscript{42} According to the news report the anger in Manipur stems largely from the fear that the Indian Government, having conceded the NSCN’s demand to extend the ceasefire beyond the Nagaland state, will, in the future grant Nagalim as sought by the Naga political organization. The Government of India’s categorical assurance that the ‘territorial integrity’ of Manipur will be safeguarded was not able to satisfy the protesters in Imphal. The protesters demanded for the ‘revocation’ of ceasefire extension and not just review.\textsuperscript{43} This revealed the complexity of the peace process.

The extension of ceasefire to all Naga areas became a serious political issue, as the dynamics of situation turn into community politics as the lines were drawn between the Nagas and non-Nagas. The Government of India became clueless about the turn of events. Even the President’s rule imposed on Manipur failed to contain the situation. At this juncture the Ceasefire between the Government of India and the NSCN hangs in balance. On the one side the NSCN refused to backtrack from their hard earned desire, and the Indian Government came under pressure from the Northeastern states to revoke the extension of Ceasefire. There was apprehension in the mind of the Nagas that NSCN might pull out of the peace talks if the agreement over the extension of ceasefire is revoked. Finally, the Indian Government declared that the three words (without territorial limits) in the agreement between the Indian government and the NSCN got deleted after consultation with the NSCN leaders.\textsuperscript{44} It was mutually agreed that formally Ceasefire will be enforced only in Nagaland state, whereas it will ‘informally’ be implemented in other Northeastern states like Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, and Arunachal.

Politicians from Northeast blamed the Government of India for not consulting with the State Governments before the extension of Ceasefire coverage as the main reason of the fall out. Whereas, non-Naga communities in states like Manipur began to demand that they should be part of the negotiation between NSCN and Indian state

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\textsuperscript{42} Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 26, 2001
\textsuperscript{43} Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 10, 2001
\textsuperscript{44} Hindustan Times, July 28, 2001
\end{footnotesize}
which was vehemently opposed by the Naga leaders. For the first time since the political dialogue between the NSCN and the Government of India began, the ‘non-entities’ or other communities to the Indo-Naga peace process became a factor that pose as a threat to the on-going peace process. Nagas resented this new development and made it categorically clear that the ‘future’ of Nagas should not be determined by other community’s interest and Nagas’ aspiration is paramount as far as Indo-Naga political solution is concern. This incident highlighted how various communities in Northeast are experiencing un-easy coexistence. And an issue that pertains to a particular community can have impact on the nature of inter-community relationships. This further changes the dynamics of the peace process.

The threat to peace process has been also created by the violations of the Ceasefire Ground Rules by the security forces. After the deletion of the three words “without territorial limits” from the ceasefire area coverage, the Indian armed forces killed several NSCN cadres. Till October 6, 2005, a total of ninety six (96) NSCN cadres were killed and murdered in unprovoked and faked encounters.45 To give some instances, right after the signing of ceasefire in 1997, the Indian security forces killed 3 NSCN cadres at different places in the same year.46 On March 9, 1999, NSCN cadres were killed in the Joint Operation team of Army and Assam Rifles titled “Synergy”, and on July 11, 2000, 12 NSCN were killed mercilessly by the 17 Para Filed Regiment in Jiriphai in North Cachar.47 In 2002, 11 NSCN cadres were brutally murdered in cold blood by personnel of the Indian Reserve Battalion on March 16, 2002 at Pallel Bazaar in Chandel district in Manipur.48 In a faked encounter, 3 NSCN cadres and two civilians were apprehended by the Meghalaya Police (Special Operation Team) and inhumanely tortured to death while in their custody on October 5, 2005 in Mawlyngad village near Sohryngkham, East Khasi Hills in Shillong.49 Their heads were battered and their eyes were gouged out. However, the NSCN did not retaliate the Indian security forces. The above instances are not only indications of blatant violations of human rights, the right to

46 Ibid., Oct. 2002
47 Ibid.
48 North East Sun, April 15-30, 2002
49 NSCN Press Release, Dated October 6, 2005
life and liberty, the Ceasefire Ground Rules but also posed grave danger to the ongoing peace process. These instances are nothing short of double standards of making the peace process another strategy of the so-called counter-insurgency by the Indian state.

There is also an obstacle to peace process from some of politicians among the Nagas. The Naga civil societies such as, Naga Students’ Federation (NSF), Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA) and the Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights in their meeting with the Congress President, Ms. Sonia Gandhi in 2004 apprised her about S.C. Jamir’s alleged attempt to “sabotage” the peace process in the form of his controversial ‘confidential document’ which has created quite a furore in Nagaland. Referring to the ‘confidential document’, they impressed upon her of the fact that any “statement or intervention made against the ongoing political talks are contradictory and anti-peace process.”

In 2000, Jamir’s Bedrock of Naga Society, has created a lot of controversy because the booklet defended the 16-Point Agreement which was a total contradiction to the Nagas vision for their society. The Naga civil society has stated that, “...as the Parliamentary Secretary to Pandit Nehru in 1964 also, Jamir tried to sabotage the peace talks between Phizo and Nehru.” In an interview, K. Therie, the then former Power Minister during Jamir’s Chief Ministership, told the North East Sun that “Jamir was an obstacle to the peace process because he defended the 16-Point Agreement.” Therie said that, “Jamir just wants to defend his 16-Point Agreement.” “Jamir has been saying that settlement should be within the Indian Constitution or this or that.” “He is trying to impose conditions whereas the NSCN and the GoI are holding talks without any conditions.” For Therie, “anyone who works against peace should be termed as anti-Naga.”

50 North East Sun, July 31, 2004, p. 24
51 Ibid., p. 24
52 North East Sun, June 1-14, 2002, p. 11
53 Ibid., p. 11
The arrest of Mr. Th. Muivah, Gen. Secy. of NSCN in Bangkok airport in Thailand on January 19, 2000 became a major cause of concern during the peace talks. He was arrested for traveling on a fake South Korean passport, which the security officers came to know while carrying out regular checking. He then jumped bail and was re-arrested on January 29, 2000 while he was trying to fly to Malaysia on a Singaporean Passport. Subsequently, Th. Muivah was put into Thai prison. The timing of his arrest became ominous for the on-going peace process as the time slated for peace talks was about to come. Meanwhile, the Government of India refuses to intervene to facilitate Muivah’s release as he was not carrying Indian passport and deliberately refuse to apply for one. Even though, the prominent people in India including three ex-Prime Ministers, Chandra Shekhar, VP Singh and HD Deve Gowda, appealed to the Government of India to intervene, but still the Indian government remained adamant about their position. Instead of showing concern about the courses of the peace process and making positive impressions, the Government of India chose not to help in the matter in a magnanimous manner.

Consequently, as Th. Muivah was the Chief negotiator from the Nagas side, the talks could not take place and it was postponed indefinitely. And the NSCN refused to appoint someone in place of Muivah, contrary to media speculation. Some analysts began to perceive this unexpected development on the Naga leaders as beginning of the downfall of Naga organization. They argued that ‘without Muivah the NSCN may disintegrate, or at least split into several factions’. Therefore, at that juncture the peace process appears to have received a serious setback. And, there was much confusion about the turn of events which may have actually derailed the peace process without the release of Th. Muivah. This only showed up the point that the peace process was not irreversible.

Another factor related with Muivah’s arrest was the NSCN’s relations with Pakistan, which has caused much displeasure to the Government of India. When Muivah

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54 *The Week*, New Delhi, March 5, 2000
55 Ibid
was arrested in Thai capital, the flight which he had arrived was from Pakistan. And it
apparently came to light that NSCN has some relation with Pakistan, a declared rival of
India. The Government of India allegedly accuses Muivah of having links with
Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI).\(^{56}\) An unnamed official spokesman of Indian
Government allegedly charged that Muivah’s visit to places like Karachi proved his
relation with ISI.\(^{57}\) And this linkage would naturally resist any pragmatic solution to the
Indo-Naga problem. However, despite having all sorts of differences and apprehensions
the two sides showed determination to carry forward the peace process. Finally, after
first and second hearings on May 25, and July 7, 2001, his case was dismissed by the
Thai Court in July 2001. And the political talks resumed since then.

Soon after the arrest of Th. Muivah in January 2000, Gapumkhai Grinder
Muivah, the nephew of Th. Muivah and a businessman by profession was arrested by the
Calcutta Police on March 5, 2000 on a false charge of planning the hijack of an aircraft
from Mizoram’s Lengpui airport in order to secure the release of NSCN General
Secretary Th. Muivah. Ms. Sonia Muivah, wife of Gapumkhai Grinder Muivah, said that
her husband Gapumkhai Grinder Muivah was asked by the Indian Government to help in
the peace process and actually her husband was helping the Government in peace
negotiation between GoI and the NSCN.\(^{58}\) In fact, Gapumkhai Grinder Muivah was
acting as a go-between the GoI and the NSCN.\(^{59}\) On June 20, 2000, Mr. Grinder Muivah
was released and the case closed in relation to the alleged charges against him with the
help of his lawyer, Ms. Nandita Haksar, Supreme Court Advocate and Human Rights
Activist. Ms. Nandita Haksar, among others, played a remarkable role in the release of
Th. Muivah, General Secretary of the NSCN by the Thai Court. This arrest indicated not
only the dirty game played by some intelligent agencies and Home Ministry officials to
undermine the peace process but also exposed the double standard of the Government of
India in engaging the peace process.\(^{60}\)

\(^{56}\) *The Assam Tribune*, Guwahati, February 5, 2000
\(^{57}\) *The Assam Tribune*, Guwahati, February 5, 2000
\(^{58}\) *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, March 14, 2000
\(^{59}\) *Indian Express*, April 14, 2000
\(^{60}\) *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, March 14, 2000
The real culprit of the hijacking conspiracy was K. Ranju Rangan, who was arrested by Aizawl Police when he visited Mizoram impersonating as a director in the Ministry of Civil Aviation and made attempts to inspect and visit certain sensitive sites in Lengpui Airport at Mizoram. The conspiracy of plane hijacking plot was that Ranju Rangan had actually visited Mizoram in order to make a preliminary study for hijacking a plane and that he was working at the behest of the NSCN. The fact of the matter is that Mr. Grinder Muivah has been falsely implicated in the case and the accused Ranju Rangan had to give a statement against the innocent victim because of the torture inflicted in the custody.61

The Indo-Naga ceasefire process which began in 1997 has witnessed a number of threats, which was expected for this nature of political dialogue. But, the fact that seemingly unrelated issues have also hampered the peace process proves that there was lack of understanding between the two sides, and not enough groundwork had been done before the two sides agreed to have negotiations. The flexibility shown by both sides needs to be appreciated. Instead of taking a rigid stand on all the issues, whether minor or crucial, the two sides have shown much patience and broaden their perspectives to the contending issues and unnecessary threats to peace process. However, major issues remain to be hammered out as the peace process has not made much headway. There is a need for sincerity with both the 'entities' for the talks and hardened commitment to the agreements made. The threats to peace talks have actually broadened the perspective of the political negotiations and various crucial issues have been identified so that the political solutions will be more comprehensive.

The most important crucial issues identified jointly or by respective sides so far in the talks are security concern of the Indian state, the recognition of Indo-Naga conflict as a political issue in nature, the need of the Nagas for a unique identity as a people, territorial integration of all Naga areas in the North east, preservation and protection each other’s culture, history, arts and aesthetics, mineral and natural resources and upholding of democracy and the rule of law. The Naga leaders have made a point clear to the

61 The Assam Tribune, Guwahati, May 4, 2000; Indian Express, New Delhi, April 14, 2000
Government of India that Sovereignty belongs to the Naga people alone which shall not be taken away by others. In fact, it means people's sovereignty. In the talks the Naga negotiators have put forward to the Government of India for joint exercise of defence, external affairs, communications and monetary policies. The Nagas would like to have their own separate Constitution and Flag in the administrative set up in the future. However, the Nagas are not averse to using Indian Currency as a common currency for both the-entities. It is also understood to have discussed that the Indian Government is also not averse to establishing cultural offices for the Nagas at different countries. The Indian Government has been trying to manage the conflict through the Indian Constitution even during this peace process. However, it is not acceptable to the Nagas as far as constitutional mechanism to transform the conflict is concerned. The talks are still underway indefinitely. Both the sides have been negotiating unconditionally since 1997 at different countries through peaceful means. However, the result is yet to come though crucial issues confronting both the parties have been already tabled and discussed.

The Role of Civil Societies

Initially, the third party mediation to the Indo-Naga was demanded by the NSCN so that there would be more equilibrium in the negotiations and accountability on both the parties, and also to sort out the deadlocks whenever and wherever it arises. However, this suggestion was ruled out by the Government of India as it apprehends that such intervention from another nation or agency will only internationalize Naga political issue and cause embarrassment for the Indian state. But, the involvement of a neutral party for monitoring might have helped the political negotiation, even if the Government of India did not prefer any form of intervention from the third party.

Nonetheless, the NSCN and the Indian Government have agreed to take help from certain non-governmental agencies that have engaged with conflict resolution in other parts of the world. Still, the Indian Government refused to acknowledge the presence of other parties in the peace talks and declined to officially admit their engagement with the talks, even if expert advices are being sought. But to have third
party mediator was formally agreed by both the parties in Bangkok in December 2005. As there has not been formal third party mediator in the initial phases of the talks, the Naga civil societies have been indirectly intervening in the peace process whenever necessary. Even before the Indo-Naga peace process began Naga organizations like Naga Hoho, Naga Students’ federation (NSF), Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA), Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights, United Naga Council, Manipur UNC), All Naga Students’ Association, Manipur (ANSAM), Naga Women Union, Manipur (NWUM) etc. have been expressing their wish for the war to be solved through peaceful negotiation. Since the beginning of the armed battles between the Naga army and the Indian security forces, serious casualties, atrocities, tortures, rapes etc. were inflicted on the Naga civilians. Therefore, their desire to have peaceful solution in place of bloody armed battle is imperative. The Naga civil societies took several important initiatives to strengthen the peace process by engaging with the Government of India, various Naga political organisations, the Indian civil societies, various other communities in the Northeast who share close geographical boundaries with the Nagas.

The Naga Hoho, while vehemently supporting the peaceful political negotiations between the Government of India and NSCN, also took initiatives to bring unity in Naga society and urge the warring nationalists to shun violence and unify for the greater interest of the Nagas. The rivalry between the NSCN and Khaplang group, and also with other Naga political organizations like NNC has left Naga society divided and inimically put to danger the lives of the innocent people.

Historically, there have been various differences between various Naga political organizations, Naga Hoho, being an apex traditional Naga civil society took the necessary steps and urged them to bury the hatchet, and take this political negotiation as an opportunity to open-up their rigid political positions and seek forgiveness from misgiving and feuds. A unified Naga political front will not only strengthened the Nagas’ position during the peace process, but also help the Indian state to lessen its burden.

62 Naga Hoho is an apex traditional Naga organization; it functions in all Naga inhabited areas, and has representatives from all Naga tribes in India and Myanmar. The Asian Age, New Delhi, 19.05.1997
63 The Telegraph, Calcutta, 19.05.1999
Members of Naga Hoho went to meet NSCN leaders all the way from Naga homeland to Bangkok for holding substantive discussions on the ongoing political negotiations. Some prominent Naga leaders felt that a piecemeal solution would not bring lasting peace and all the sections of the Nagas should be taken into confidence to find out a permanent solution. Initially, the efforts of the Naga civil societies were received with positive response from the Naga nationalists. The Naga civil societies urged the Naga nationalists of all organisations to hold ceasefire among them in the same way as they have ceasefire with the Government of India. The efforts of the Naga civil societies was paid off as the warring nationalists formally declared ceasefire between them in 1997 during the celebration of 125 years of Christianity in Naga areas. It was for the first time in 50 years that guns stopped booming and common people were able to live in peace. However, despite all the efforts of the civil societies, this internal problem of the Nagas failed to accept the formal merger proposed by the Naga Hoho. Nevertheless, the Naga civil societies have continued to intervene whenever it is necessary, and stood for the unity of all the Nagas.

The Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) is one of the major civil societies that have a long history of demanding for human rights in Naga society as well as Northeast region and in other parts of the world. By interacting and having dialogue with other civil societies in India, they have build up comprehensive understanding on various issues pertaining to Nagas with the people of India. During the peace process NPMHR took the initiatives to have people to people dialogue with the Indian masses. Some analysts call this development as ‘Track Two’ of the on-going peace process. According to Sanjoy Hazarika, “Peace is not forged merely between governments or high negotiating parties. Unofficial, Track Two conversations between scholars, former officials, economists, writers and lawyers from both sides which will help bring about better understanding of each other’s vision and perceptions should continue. Public goodwill should be built up in this manner so that civil society is

64 Ibid.
65 The Assam Tribune, Guwahati, 01.06.1999
66 The Asian Age, New Delhi, 27.11.1997

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strengthened and public involvement and pressure is built up to maintain the peace process at official level."\(^{67}\)

Since India's independence or even before that there has been virtually not much interaction between the Nagas and the people of India; which is responsible for creating a lot of confusions and misconception about the Naga political movement and the mindset of the Indian people. And India's media, by highlighting only the violence and negative aspects of Nagas is also responsible for most of the misconceptions generated in other parts of India about the Nagas. Accepting this unfortunate reality as a fact and a challenge, the NPMHR along with various other Naga civil societies and India's civil societies took up the 'journey of conscience to New Delhi' on 29 January, 2000 to 'express their goodwill for a people-to-people dialogue'.\(^{68}\) This journey was taken at the backdrop of signing the Ceasefire agreement between the Government of India and the NSCN in 1997.

To achieve the integration/unification of Nagas in one administration, the Naga People Convention (NPC) convened by the United Naga Council launched Non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience Movements against the Government of Manipur at Taphou Naga village in Senapati on November 4, 2005.\(^{69}\) This declaration was in reiteration of the declaration on the political stand of the Nagas living in the present state of Manipur taken in the last NPC held on 8-9 August 2001 at Senapati "That our identity and history have to be defended and preserved at all cost, and the firm political stand of the Nagas of Manipur is to uphold the resolution of the Naga people for integration of all Naga areas under one administration."\(^{70}\) The immediate actions of non-cooperation identified for implementation contain the following resolutions:

1. "Return of red blankets by village chiefs/authorities."
2. "Change of names of villages, ranges, rivers, districts, to indigenous names."

\(^{67}\) The Assam Tribune, Guwahati, 06. 08. 2000  
\(^{68}\) NPMHR Press Release, New Delhi, 31. 01. 2000  
\(^{69}\) Declaration of the Naga People's Convention held on 4\textsuperscript{th} November 2005, at Taphou Village, Senapati.  
\(^{70}\) Ibid.
3. “Payment of house tax directly to Delhi or to Kohima.”
4. “Non acceptance of any development fund/schemes through the Government of Manipur w.e.f 1/4/06.” And,
5. “All Nagas without exception will desist from associating themselves with any forum, platform or organisation associated with the Meiteis/ Manipuris.”

Following the above declaration, an eleven member delegation led by UNC representing the Nagas from the present state of Manipur came to Delhi on June 18, 2006, to handover the Manipur Hill House Tax of 94894 households an amount of Rs. 14,23420 only for the year 2006 to the Prime Minister’s Office as per the Naga People’s Convention Resolution of November 4, 2005.

In support of the peace process and to strengthen it, the two Naga Members of Parliament- Rishang Keishing, MP, Rajya Sabha and Mani Charenamei, MP, Lok Sabha and eleven Members of Legislative Assembly from Manipur submitted a Memorandum to the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh on Many 27, 2005. It reads among others that the MPs, MLAs and Ministers from Manipur have expressed “deep appreciations to the Government of India for acknowledging the ‘Unique History and Situation of the Nagas’.” It also says that “In the case of territorial integrity of the Naga areas, we believe it is a sincere quest and basic fundamental right of the Naga people to be under one political entity and live together. We, therefore, fully support the aspiration of the Naga people for integration.” With regard to integration of Naga areas the Nagaland State Assembly had passed four time resolutions since 1960s.

Apart from Naga civil societies, students have also played their own parts in strengthening the peace process. On many occasions, the Naga students elsewhere in India particularly various Naga students bodies in Delhi have voiced their serious concerns for early solution to the conflict. Peace rallies, demonstrations, seminars,

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71 Ibid.
72 Press Statement of the United Naga Council on July 8, 2006, New Delhi
73 Memorandum, New Delhi, May 27, 2005, pp. 1-3
workshops, cultural events were being organized to impressed upon both the GoI and the NSCN on the importance of arriving at the fruitful result of the ongoing political talks. Naga Students’ Union, Delhi (NSUD) has played its own important part in this endeavour. The NSUD as the apex student body of the Nagas in Delhi organized seminars, workshops, taken out rallies and demonstrations in the India’s capital to strengthen the peace process. Several representations have also been submitted to the Government of India in the form of memorandum. In all these events the large turn up-of the student community clearly indicated the yearning of the students for peace with justice. In fact NSUD has been playing an important role not only in supporting the process but also in furthering a good relationship with all other communities in Delhi.

Federal Relationship

From whence, the Indo-Naga talks were taken place at different countries, namely, Amsterdam, Switzerland, Tokyo, Paris, Bangkok, etc. At the prompt invitation of the government of India, the Collective Leadership of the NSCN has visited India for series of talks. Till this date, after more than 9 years of Ceasefire, roughly 60 rounds of talks at different countries of the world and in India has taken place. However, no substantive resolution has been made, other than harbouring over the proposal of the Collective Leadership for having a “Special Federal Relationship” between India and the Nagalim. Speaking out for the first time since a dialogue on the Indo-Naga Political Issue between the Representatives of the Naga National Movement and the New Delhi resumed last December (2004), Thuingaleng Muivah, General Secretary, NSCN, told BBC World: Hard Talk India that, “Nagaland was never a part of India either by conquest by India or by consent of the Nagas. This is very clear.” On Sovereignty, which, he said, belongs “to the Naga people and to the Naga people alone”, he spoke about “a special federal relationship” with India but not within India: “Sovereignty of the

74 Th. Muivah Talks of a “Special Federal Relationship” with India’, The Hindu, Friday, April 29, 2005, p.12, Karan Thapar, President, Infotainment Television Pvt. Ltd., interviewed with Th. Muivah, General Secretary, NSCN, on 25th April 2005 was Broadcasted on BBC World: Hard Talk India on 29th April and Re-telecasted on 1st May 2005.
75 Th. Muivah Talks of a “Special Federal Relationship” with India’, The Hindu, Friday, April 29, 2005, p.12, Karan Thapar, President, Infotainment Television Pvt. Ltd., interviewed with Th. Muivah, General Secretary, NSCN, on 25th April 2005 was Broadcasted on BBC World: Hard Talk India on 29th April and Re-telecasted on 1st May 2005.
Naga people belongs to the Naga people and to the Naga people alone. There cannot be otherwise. Nagas have a right to decide their future, to determine their faith also. So long as that is there adjustments can be made... So long as the national identity of the Nagas is recognized and honoured that (adjustment) is possible... When we say a special federal relationship it has to be on the terms of agreement that can be arrived at... It should be a federation of India and Nagalim. Within the Indian Union or within the framework of the Indian Constitution is not possible. 

Some of the main point proposals during this BBC World: Hard Talk is important to be noted. That, this federation should be engaged in a manner that in the External Affairs, primarily the Government of India will represent. But when it comes to the interest of the Nagas then the Nagas will represent themselves which imply that Nagas would have representative in the UN. That, there should be a joint-Defence system in this federation. That, the national identity of the Nagas should be recognised. Integration of all Naga contiguous areas is a must for without integrating of the Naga areas how could there be a political solution. Besides, the Nagas will have their own constitution and flag while at the same time control over their land, mineral and natural resources, forest, water, oil and air etc. In the earlier occasion on September 21, 2001, the NSCN has put forwarded a 30-Point proposal in Amsterdam. This “Special Federal Relationship” and the 30-Point Proposal are more or less similar in the nature of the points’ proposition. However, the Gol has not shown any positive response towards this proposal and as such there has been a stalemate in the talk for quite sometime after the Government of India’s refusal to come out with concrete proposal to the NSCN’s proposal.

In the wake of the failure to find solution to the vexed problem of such relations, the Government of India employed different strategies of collusion in its efforts to undermine the Ceasefire Ground Rules. One of the most glaring instances of protracted political negotiation can be ascribed to the constant feud of the political rivalry among

76 Ibid., p.12
77 Ibid. p. 12 and also see BBC Hard Talk with Th. Muinah, General Secretary, NSCN, April 29, 2005, Published by Collective Leadership’s Secretariat, 61-Lodhi Estate, New Delhi, May 2005.
the nationalists in Naga areas that play into the hands of the Government of India and its Intelligence agencies substantiated in the preceded arguments. With thumping loyalty of the dissident Khaplang group, the Government of India connived to infuse antagonism amongst the various language groups of Naga Society. Factional clashes wantonly spread across the Naga areas in the name of the Naga nationalism paying heavy casualties of innocent lives in the last two decades, is therefore mostly pictured clearly in the structural difference drawn by the government of India.

Despite, the constant forces of the government of India to checkmate the Indo-Naga political talks through various propaganda and subversive policy, the collective leadership of the Nagas rallied with legitimate support of the Naga public and Civil societies to claim its rightful authority. The confidence of the Naga Public to the democratic mobilising diplomacy of the Collective Leadership of NSCN, made to repose their faith from various organisational level from the Naga public for mandatory representation of the Nagas’ opinion. Above all, the ground preparatory works done at the international level has undoubtedly boosted in all fronts that the government of India is equally obliged to take notice of the struggle of independence of the Nagas.

In the fifth years of the Indo Naga talks, on 11 July, 2002 the government of India in a Joint Communique issued from Amsterdam for the first time in Indo-Naga history, made an official statement recognising “the Unique History and Situation of Nagas... and agreed that the talks should proceed in an accommodative and forward looking manner so that lasting and honourable solution can be arrived at.” The Nagas infer “unique history and situation of the Nagas” to mean that Nagalim never joined the Indian Union by conquest or consent.

Yet, the Government of India failed to honour the Unique History and Situation of Nagas, such that the government buys out times to legitimise the statehood of

78 “Joint Communique”, Amsterdam, 11 July, 2002, also see “Nagas: their pilgrimage for self-existence and quest for dignity and peace”, Published by Oking Publicity and information department, Peoples Republic of Nagalim, 2005. p. 22
Nagaland through despondent feeling of nationalism. The bluntest political ideology of the Government of India to befool the Nagas to avert the Naga nationalism has been through the misconception of democracy. In the name of democracy, the Government of India finds its easy prey on various civil societies, government officers, and ignorant Naga public to dissuade from the revolutionary activities. Inculcating abominable minds towards freedom movement of the Naga nationalists in a constricted ideological guidance of the independence movement, the Naga nationalists were made the victims of the outcry for democratic process to the question of Naga sovereignty. This is part of the political process of a democracy. Even civil society groups are not free from it.

The government of India exactly knew how effectively the Naga public can crush the Naga nationalists through the frenzy of the public and its critics in a democratic process. But having failed to notice the malignant policy of the government of India, the civil societies, government servants, state politicians, etc. on their own vested interest became a harping vantage for government of India.

Different Naga Nationalist organisations continue to engage with the government of India from different standpoint. Notably, the Collective Leadership of the NSCN has been actively engaged not only with the government of India but with the Naga Public too. To find the democratic consensus of the Naga public through various different civil societies, Hohos, organisations, etc. were rallied upon into a different consultations and meetings. To strengthen Indo-Naga Political Talks the 4th Naga People’s Consultation was held at Hebron from 20-21 January 2005 where a declaration was made.

“Naga People and Organizations covering across the length and breadth of Naga homeland after 2 days of intensive, sincere and honest interactions with the Collective Leadership of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim, declares;

1. The fullest support for an honourable solution to the Indo-Naga political issue on the basis of the uniqueness of Naga history and situation;

2. That the unification of all Naga areas is legitimate and therefore non-negotiable;

3. That the political solution should be found through peaceful means; and,

4. That both the Govt and the NSCN uphold utmost honesty and sincerity towards finding a political solution.

We, the Naga People, on this historic gathering at Hebron accept and affirm this declaration on 21st January 2005.”

Moreover, the 5th Naga People’s Consultative Meeting on the Indo-Naga Peace Process was held at Bangkok between September 6-7, 2005 making a declaration that continuity or discontinuity of the ceasefire will be decided by the “Will of the Naga People.”\(^{81}\) The various consultative meetings held among all the Naga people across boundaries at various shows the kind of democratization that is taking place within the NSCN and its leadership. It can be rightly said that in the last several consultations at home and foreign countries with all sections of the Naga society from village headmen to the top leaders of highest civil society clearly indicates that the Naga national movement still draw its strength from the people. The NSCN leadership has greatly democratized the peace process as the people are given space to express and suggest views and ideas.

Taking into serious consideration of the importance of unity among the Nagas as part of the political solution, the Collective Leadership though burdened with hectic schedules, availed themselves to participate at a 3-day national leaders’ fasting and prayer programme held at CHQ Church, Hebron from January 11-13, 2007 on the theme ‘Forgiveness and Reconciliation’.\(^{82}\) The call of the day: “Let reconciliation, forgiveness


and compassion ring all over Nagalim,“ Yaruiwo (President), Isak Chishi Swu proclaiming peace and reconciliation on the last day in a landmark proclamation stated, “In the name of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ and to glorify His name, I, the Yaruiwo of Nagalim, solemnly do hereby declare this proclamation on this day, the 13th January 2007, that whosoever committed crime against the people and the NSCN is forgiven. We also earnestly urge those groups and individuals, who have committed serious political mistakes in the past, to seek forgiveness from the people.”83 All the people in the congregation led by Ato Kilonser (Prime Minister), Th. Muivah raised their hands in conformity to the call.

Beyond the Bilateral Peace Process

As part of the international diplomacy the NSCN has participated in the International Conference organized by Parliamentarians for National Self-determination (PNSD) held at the Houses of Parliament, Westminster, London on May 11, 2006.84 Rh. Raising, Secretary, Steering Committee of the NSCN and Angnaikham Makunga, Kilonser (Minister) represented the Nagas. Mr. Rh. Raising said in the conference that, "the British, being once our colonial power, have the moral responsibility to say something on the issue so that justice is done to the Nagas."85 Rh. Raising appealed to British people and their government in particular and the world in general to help solve the problem. Subsequent to the conference, the NSCN set up Naga Support Group (UK) on May 13, 2006.

As a member of the UNPO, the President of the GPRN, Isak Chishi Swu attended and addressed the 8th general assembly of the UNPO held at Taipei, Taiwan on October 27 to 29, 2006, highlighted the violations and strangulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights envisaged in the UN charter in Nagalim and the actual position of the ongoing Indo-Naga political talks which has seen no breakthrough inspite of many rounds of talks at different places. He therefore appealed to the house of the assembly for a Third Party intervention endorsed to the UN through the initiation of the UNPO, so that

83 Ibid., p. 1
84 http://www,nagalim.nl, May 13, 2006
85 http://www.nagalim.nl, May 13, 2006

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the long standing Indo-Naga political conflict is settled at the earliest.\textsuperscript{86} In 2003, the NSCN/GPRN officially asked Grace Lyu Collins to represent the Naga people in the US on a full time basis as their Honorary Ambassador in hopes of her attracting US and UN political support.\textsuperscript{87} Ms. Collins met the President of GPRN, Isak Chishi Swu in 1997, when she was hosting a Museum of Compassion for the 50\textsuperscript{th} year of declaration of Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland. It is at this time that she started voluntarily speaking on behalf of the Nagas to churches and art Museum.\textsuperscript{88} Naga-American Council (NAC) was established in 2003 for political diplomacy in Washington DC.\textsuperscript{89} The Naga International Support Center (NISC), a human rights organisation was launched on May 31, 2001 with Jacques de Kort as Chairman, Jan Achten as Treasurer, Frans Welman as Secretary and Fred Kolman as member at de Havelaar, Douwes Dekkerstraat 2, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. \textsuperscript{90} NISC was set up to focus attention on a very but forgotten conflict between the Naga people, India and Myanmar. It focuses on stimulating European involvement in promoting peace in Nagalim.\textsuperscript{91}

Moreover, a ten member delegation led by late Angelus Shimrah, the then Secretary, Steering Committee, Brig. Phungthing Shimrang, Convener, Ceasefire Monitoring Cell, and Ninghor Raikham, Secretary of Education, Government of the People's Republic of Nagalim (GPRN) visited Papua New Guinea.\textsuperscript{92} The team which included representatives of the Naga people such as, Naga Hoho, Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), Naga Students' federation (NSF), Naga Mothers' Association (NMA) and Naga Women's Union, Manipur (NWUM) reached Papua New Guinea for two weeks to study the Bougainville peace process on March 12, 2006. The delegation met representatives of all the parties involved in the Bougainville

\textsuperscript{86} Nagalim Voice, Oking, Vol. 1, Issue. 1., December, 2006, p. 1
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. p. 63
\textsuperscript{89} http://www.nagalim.us
\textsuperscript{90} Frans Welman, Enter the Forbidden Land: The Quest for Nagalim, Publish America, Baltimore, USA, 2005
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid. pp. 49-57, 118-147
\textsuperscript{92} Nagalim Voice, Op. cit., p. 2
peace process to share their experiences and gather ideas that could help the Nagas arrive at settlement with Delhi.  

**The Third Party Mediator**

To salvage the peace process, both the GoI and the NSCN formally agreed Michael C. van Walt van Praag, the Executive President of the International NGO Kreddha, to act as a Third-Party Mediator during the talk in Bangkok on 16-17 December 2005. Kraibo Chawang, Deputy Kilonser (Minister) confirmed that Praag would be the “Pointsman” in the peace process. Praag, a former General Secretary of UNPO, has been mediating unofficially in the Indo-Naga peace process since 2001 and visited Nagaland in 2002 and 2004. It was in 2001 that Praag first got involved and saved the peace process from being derailed. “Again, it was the GoI that sent him to our Collective Leadership to convince to come to India”, an NSCN functionary said.

Kreddha means ‘to place trust’. This Indo-European word is derived from the word (heart), the root word of ‘Concord’. Kraddha, an International Peace Council for States, Peoples and Minorities is dedicated to the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts between populations, groups and states. It believes that development of meaningful dialogue between governments and population groups aspiring to a large degree of self-rule is essential in efforts to end violent conflicts between them. Kreddha is administered by the council of nine eminent conflict-resolution experts. It has offices in The Hague, the Netherlands and the US. Its council members include former Rajya Sabha member late Nirmala Deshpande and Nobel Laureates Mairead Corrigan Maguire and Jose Ramos Horta. Apart from him, many renowned international constitutional experts such as, Yash Ghai, Anthony Reagan etc are lending their hands of support to both the NSCN and the GoI in their search for a concrete political solution.

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93 Ibid. p. 2  
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid.
However, there is no denying the fact that clash among the nationalists has also created certain problem for the Nagas as a whole. This problem has been attributed to the GoI by the NSCN in particular and the Naga people in general so as to derailing the hard-earned peace process.

The ongoing Indo-Naga dialogue is deeply entrenched into the problem, inadvertently affecting the whole Naga society. The Naga public is set against each other along the Nationalist groups, for which the hostilities continues to shed blood among the Naga brothers. Therefore, in order to maintain the law and order problems, all devilish laws like Armed Forces Special Powers Act and, Unlawful Activities Preventions Act, etc. roams the streets with watchful eyes. Inspite of the public hue and cry for repealing the undemocratic laws, and pressure from different corners of the globe, the state politicians are still paid hefty amounts to stand against the people. In all effort to buy the silent consent of the people, draconian laws are legitimised through a situation of counter public, not just in the Naga areas but in the whole North East region. Today, North east stand as a human laboratory, where all are against all, one community juxtaposed against another.

But, the whole problems in the North East shall remain as it is or will accentuate unless it is pointedly read from the true nature of the rights that belong to the people. Particularly the Naga movement known as the longest people’s struggle in the region is currently put to test the sincerity of the government of India in solving the problems and issues. What we have seen in the last more than 10 years is nothing but ‘Negative Peace’ having ceasefire. It can be observed from the foregoing pages as to how the peace process has been treading its journey. In spite of the difficulties faced by the Government in its domestic fronts, one thing which has come out very clear during this long ceasefire is that sincerity is lacking on the part of the Indian Government. Some kind of double-standard policy and strategy employed by the Government of India is conspicuous and unambiguous. The arrest of Th. Muivah in 2000 was an obvious act of delaying tactic of the Indian Government. The point here is that the Government of India has made used of numerous tactics and strategies to prolonging the peace process. During this long
ceasefire, the Indian Government has been wavering in its political stand. Words and actions on the part of the Government of India go in the opposite direction. One example of the Indian Government's inaction and insincerity is the inclusion of a clause in the National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP) of the UPA-led Government which says, "Territorial Integrity of the North Eastern states will not be disturbed" which goes against the spirit of the Ceasefire Modalities.

In line with the NCMP, the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh made statements which say territorial integrity of North Eastern states will not be disturbed. This is in clear violation of the unconditional peace talks between the two entities. Even the Home Minister of India has also said that Naga issue should be solved within the Indian constitution. Recently, in the run up to the recently held election in Nagaland state, the National Security Advisor, M.K. Narayanan stated that, 'the peace process has been slowed down due to the non acceptance of the Indian Constitution by the NSCN. Even, the UPA Chairperson, Ms. Sonia Gandhi said in Nagaland state that, 'Indian Constitution has a lot of space to accommodate the Nagas aspiration.' The statements as stated above are in clear contradictions not only to the Ceasefire Modalities but also an indication of a double-standard on the part of the Indian Government. The statements are nothing but to indicate that Indo-Naga political solution can be found within the four walls of the Indian Constitution. However, the history has shown otherwise.

There has also been an implicit pitting of communal fissure among the Nagas and also between the Nagas and other communities in the North Eastern states. The Indian state and the media have coordinated together in rousing voices of the rest of North people against the issues such as territorial integration of the Nagas. Instead of democratic persuasion of the people for mutual acceptance for the territorial integration of the Nagas, the media and the Indian state have been critical of the territorial integration of the contiguous Naga areas in the North East. It may not be out of place to say that the Indian Government has always been playing appeasement policy in favour of other communities of the North East against the aspiration of the Nagas. Another important point for critics of the Indian Government's non seriousness is that the political
issue has not been debated in the Parliament even for a single moment apart from time to time announcement of extension of the Ceasefire.

The Government of India is averse to the idea of an official third-party intervention into the peace process though some civil society such as Kreddha and some individuals like Michael C van Walt van Praag, Yash Ghai, Zoramthanga etc. have been helping both the parties. The Government of India has not made its position clear on all aspects of the political talks except utterance of solving the political issue with the Indian Constitution. However, it’s high to acknowledge that the past methods of conflict management and conflict resolution through the constitutional mechanism complimented by military forces may not work out as an enduring peace formula because such formulae have been a failure in the past several occasions. The Government of India should rather focus on the transformable mechanism of the conflict by getting rid of the old models and methods. It must go beyond the management and resolution mechanisms so as to make more workable and lasting. Workable-transformative-roadmap will certainly help the parties in conflict to transform the same. In this sense, not only the genuine aspiration of the Nagas for oneness culturally, politically and geographically but also the Nagas aspiration for distinctive and unique identity, human rights, peace with justice, liberty and fairness shall form intrinsic part of the Workable-transformative-roadmap.

It can be observed that, the Second Indo-Naga Peace Process which was started in 1997 involve several important crucial issues that are confronting India and the Nagas. In that light the two parties have spent enough time in coming closer to each other to better understand each other’s difficulties and problems. The negotiations are informed by issues which go beyond resource-based or interest-based conflicts as the conflict is rooted in the deep aspiration of the Nagas for political independence. This means, the parties have to creatively formulate outcomes that will not neglect issues of Naga national identity, territorial integration of all Naga areas, historical and political rights of the people, preservation and protection of each other’s culture, history, arts and aesthetics, heritages, mineral and natural resources, democracy and rule of law, security concerns of the parties, amicable agreement in the areas of defence system, external
affairs, communications, financial and monetary policies, institution of an appropriate
governing political system of the Nagas, mutual and friendly relationship among all
parties including other North eastern states, peaceful co-existence, increased
connectivity, etc.

The Workable-transformative-roadmap or WTR as suggested in this thesis can
accommodate to the above concerns of both parties. The two parties have already
discussed and analysed on all issues confronting them. However, the two parties are still
taking time to come out with a clear concrete proposal and agreement. It is
understandable that political bargaining process is taking place with the two parties.

Though some new developments have taken place in the Naga areas, the Second
Indo-Naga Peace Process have brought certain changes in terms of reduced violent
conflict between the Indian Security Forces and the Naga Army. The past ten years was
marked by mixture of relatively peaceful time and violent conflict time. In the peace
process, the Government of India have poured in a lot of developmental packages to all
the North eastern states, but it can be observed that uneven distribution and corruption
have not helped in percolating down these packages to the grass-roots level.

The Naga people are watching carefully of the likelihood of the outcome of the
peace process. It is felt by all that such an opportunity like the present peace process may
not come again for both parties. For which, the people strongly felt that the parties
should not miss this opportunity in transforming the conflict. The parties need to
expedite the peace process so that the crucial issues are transformed and the conflict
paves the way for amicable future relationship. It may be noted that if both parties take a
rigid or absolutist positions like in the past, there is a high probability of collapsing the
peace process. If the peace process collapse, then, it is not only lost of time, resources
and energy to the parties but also an indicative of unpeaceful relations mark by violent
relationship and bloodshed.