

Acknowledgements

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of epistemology and historiography would have foundered without foothold but for the valuable analytical and critical discussions these two keen minds have allowed me to benefit from.

Although I did not begin with any profound anxiety about the lack of contact between history and philosophy or the conviction that the chief business of philosophy is to reckon with history, a la Collingwood, breaking the barrier of the forceful logic of Kuhnian historicism and psychologism and the Popperian antihistoricism and antipsychologism and Feyerabendian scepticism and anarchism that defied all certitude in science and philosophy towards an acceptance of a critical praxiological framework that seeks to reunite the logic and methods of metaphysics and science was an uphill task to ^{come to} grips with. This informs the essential tension that renders itself while dispelling the notion that, after abandoning the traditional metaphysics, the only possible way through which reality could be confronted, analysed or understood is the inductive, empirical generalisation. I was awakened to these issues of philosophy of science by many philosophers but special mention must be made of the four philosophers whom I have tried to reevaluate and perhaps refute. My guidance came from John Krige whom I have quoted freely and profusely, if only to refute him.

If any resemblance in the pattern of treatment of the subject exists, it is deliberate, deliberately chosen to expose effectively and systematically his philosophical infirmities.

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