CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Purpose of this chapter is to introduce the subject of this study in its various ramifications. It begins with a concise treatment of the theoretical perspective of Soviet foreign policy within a broader framework of Marxian understanding of international relations. It is, indeed, interesting to notice the interpolation of the Soviet Union's real politik and strategic compulsions arising out of its geo-political and historical situation and its loud and clear profession to the Marxist-Leninist ideological position during the period under investigation.

Obviously this chapter doesn't have a single line of argument as it has been divided into various sub-headings such as the theoretical perspective of the Soviet foreign policy, meaning and implication of the German Question, nature and scope as well as need and importance of this study, formulation of hypotheses, methodology being adopted and, of course, providing justification for the scheme of chapters of the study.

1. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Critics of the Marxist theory of international relations allege that "all that it offers is an a posteriori justification of political expediency". Well established rules of the game regarding the regulation of conduct amongst states, according to the Marxist-Leninist theory, is considered to be tantamount to the

Communist Party resolutions drafted by the Party ideologues and adopted during the Party Congresses held periodically. In other words, the latest Party line developed at a given point of time by the Party ideologues to justify political decisions already taken, is construed as the theoretical standing of the government as such.

Nevertheless, the Marxist theory of international relations has, indeed, contributed immensely in bringing international politics out of the straight-jacketed 'Game theory' and 'pursuit of power' propositions by putting it in perspective of class-conflict, thereby providing a new dimension to the international relations in which international conducts among nations are supposed to be based less and less on legal and diplomatic devices and more and more on political and sociological insights which cut across state frontiers.

In other words, while the liberal theory of international relations is based on the horizontal division, i.e., the divisions of mankind into nations


and states\(^5\); the Marxist theory looks at it through vertical divisions of classes.\(^6\) It is the vertical divisions of mankind that Marx wants first to do away with in order to eliminate state as a state. It is the existing class-antagonism, mainly arising out of vertical divisions in the society, that Marx wants to get galvanized in the form of proletarian\(^7\) revolution to overthrow bourgeois\(^8\) state machinery. He gives a detailed blueprint for the programme of action according to which the regulation of society through state shall ultimately become irrelevant. At the same time he envisages unity of mankind\(^9\) in which man shall journey through the realm of necessity to

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5. Marx and Engels used the terms Nation and State with that of the 'country' interchangeably. State, according to Marx, is only a transitional institution which can be used during a revolution to hold down the bourgeoisie by force and during the transition period, i.e., the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, as an instrument to crush the last remnants of the bourgeoisie.

6. "Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy".---V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, (Moscow:Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963), vol.29 p.421, quoted in Kubalkova, n.1, p.307.

7. By proletariat is meant the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to survive.

8. The bourgeois is meant to be the class of modern capitalists who own the means of production.

9. The notion of the unity of mankind with no vertical and horizontal divisions seems to be one of the basic assumption of Marx's philosophical system. The four aspects of alienation: "In estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions, his life activity, estranged labour estranges the species from man .... Estranged labour turns thus : (3) man's species-being, both nature and his spiritual species -property, into a being alien to him, into a means for his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect. (4) And immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activities, from his species-being is the estrangement of man from man.: When man confronts himself, he confronts the other
the realm of freedom. In such a moral order of the society each one shall work according to one's capacity and shall get according to his needs. It is here that the very existence of the state shall become irrelevant. It is at this stage that the state shall finally wither away\textsuperscript{10} establishing thereby a classless society of communism\textsuperscript{11}.

As regarding horizontal divisions of mankind, Marx again believes that there exists an inherent conflict between the bourgeois states. In order to sell

\textit{\ldots\textsuperscript{continued}}

\textsuperscript{10}. Here Marx's logic behind eventual withering away of state is simple and easy to follow. The state is an expression of political power. Such political power is used to regulate the existing antagonism in a civil society. In a classless society there shall exist no antagonism hence no need of regulation of the society through political power which is "precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society". - Marx, \textit{Poverty of Philosophy}, quoted in Kubalkova, n.1, p.41.

\textsuperscript{11}. The Programme of the CPSU defines Communism as under:

"Communism is a classless social system with one form of public ownership of the means of production and full social equality of all the members of society; under it, the all-round development of people will be accompanied by the growth of the productive forces through continuous progress in science and technology; all the springs of co-operative wealth will flow more abundantly, and the great principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" will be implemented. Communism is a highly organised society of free, socially conscious working people in which public self-government will be established, a society in which labour for the good of the society will become the prime vital requirement of everyone, a necessity recognised by one and all, and the ability of each person will be employed to the greatest benefit of the people". - \textit{Programme of the CPSU} (Moscow:Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), P. 59.
their huge products the bourgeois states "must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere." According to Marx, one capitalist state will inevitably clash with another capitalist state while competing for market. In order to regulate the constant fight for market to their products the capitalist states enter into international relations. Such states do agree to observe certain rules of the game but the struggle for market continues. The capitalist states, therefore, are always at war with one another. It is this inherent contradiction in the capitalist system that will, as Marx visualizes, lead to its ultimate down fall. "In this manner will the communist revolution be heralded whose society will know no classes, no world market, *ergo* no international relations."13

In other words, the ultimate purpose of all political action in a socialist state is to establish a dynamic social order.

The foreign policy of a socialist state, therefore, is understood to be basically an instrument of furthering the ongoing class struggle. It is supposed to be above all "a means of attaining the perfection of a temporal and historical ultimate society."15

13. Kubalkova, n.1, p.48
14. The Marxian vision of society is dynamic in the sense that it is based on the principle of "thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis" which is a never ending onward march of mankind from one stage of social formation to another.
It is in this Marxian perspective of international relations that the basic framework of the Soviet foreign policy formulations is briefly surveyed hereunder:

(i) **Proletarian Internationalism**

The Manifesto of the Communist Party ends with the clarion call: "Working men of all countries, unite". This is, for all said and done, the starting point of the Marxian theory of foreign policy. Marx, in fact, starts from the basic assumption of the international solidarity among the working class. Working men, Marx maintains, have no country of their own as such. "They always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole." According to his assumption the massive upsurge of the proletarian revolution, which was to take place in all the advanced industrial countries of the world at the first instance, was to do away with all kinds of man-made barriers dividing man and man on the basis of the ownership of means of production. According to Marx's estimate the momentum of such a revolution was to be so intense that it was to shake the entire world paving the way thereby for the establishment of the rule of the working class at the first instance.

It was Lenin, however, who for the first time fully recognised the importance of the 'national and colonial question' and accordingly directed the


17. Ibid., p.46.
Soviet foreign policy towards such underdeveloped countries, most of whom were colonies of the West, by espousing the doctrine of right to national self-determination. Lenin's logic behind supporting national liberation movements in such colonial countries was that the gradual weakening of the imperialism will subsequently help growing the communist forces in these countries. Hence, unlike Marx, Lenin conceived of a "gradual falling away of the various countries from the capitalist world system".

Thus while justifying communist revolution taking place in a semi-feudal society like Russia, Lenin convincingly replaced the Marxian notion of ripeness for revolution with the idea of the favourable opportunity for revolution. In Russia it was the prevalence of the revolutionary situation arising out of the war coupled with the presence of a fleet of professional revolutionaries consisting chiefly of intellectuals in Lenin's Party that was able to mobilize the masses against the existing social order.

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19. Ibid.
20. "In a multi-national state like Russia oppressed nationalities could also be expected to form a source of support for revolution. Thus, since Lenin, the agrarian question and, in connection with the national question, the right of national self-determination have occupied a central position in world revolutionary strategy and tactics. For this reason it was proper to support the national liberation movement in colonial and dependent nations so as to transform these 'reserves of imperialism' into 'reserves of the proletarian revolution'". - Kernig, n.15, p.382.
Anti-imperialism

Quite contrary to a somewhat Eurocentric observations made by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto, Lenin propounded the doctrine of "revolution in one country" based on his analysis of imperialism as "a new stage of the monopoly capitalism". The monopoly capitalism, according to Lenin's estimate, was bound to generate uneven economic and political development world over. The proletarian socialist revolution, therefore, was possible "even in one capitalist country, taken singly".\(^{21}\)

In other words, Lenin preferred 'local revolution' to total revolution as envisaged by Marx and Engels. Lenin's doctrine of 'revolution in one country' also found "the justification for the establishment by force of a minority dictatorship such as Marx and Engels had always refused to countenance and the contention that the 'victory of socialism' was possible in one country alone even if the completion of the construction of socialism was not".\(^{22}\)

\(^{21}\) "This was the starting-point of the theory of 'socialism in one country' which took an extreme form later in Stalin's doctrine of the possibility even of full communism (or the 'higher stage of socialism') in one country", quoted by Arun Bose, "The Marxian Theory of International Relations" in K P Mishra & Richard Smith Beal, (ed.), International Relations Theory: Western and Non-western Perspective (New Delhi:Vikas Publishing House, 1980), p.162.

In fact, it was Lenin's theory of "revolution in one country" that Stalin took the cue from and stretched it to the extreme extent of "communism in one country". For details see Stalin's Report to the 18th Congress of the CPSU, 1939, in Stalin, Problem of Leninism (Moscow, 1947).

\(^{22}\) Kernig, n.15, p.382.
When Stalin succeeded Lenin, he promptly took this doctrine one stage further and elaborated as his own theory of "socialism in one country". In order "to justify the Soviet Union's self-chosen isolation and its consequent concentration on internal reconstruction and the intensification of its power potential" Stalin further evolved his theory into the doctrine of "communism in one country".

Logically, therefore, the USSR under Stalin started being regarded as the 'base for world revolution'.

(iii) The Two-Camp Theory

The Soviet Russia emerged as the first socialist state after the successful completion of the October Revolution, splitting thereby the hitherto somewhat homogeneous world into the two mutually hostile camps of capitalism and socialism.

In such a situation, the Soviet Union had to play a dual role of defending the Soviet Union as a nascent socialist state and, at the same time, carry forward the on going revolutionary process towards the ultimate realization of the world revolution because the establishment of communist socialism in one country was logically considered not an end in itself but an instrument and "a means of accelerating the victory of the proletariat in all countries." 24

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
The Soviet Union as a base for world revolution must, therefore, be powerful enough to run the show. And it was in this context that the immediate security of the Soviet Union both as a state and a newly constructed socialist social order was to be given first priority over any long run revolutionary objectives.

(iv) Peaceful Co-existence

The objective behind floating the idea of "peaceful coexistence" 25, which was officially sanctioned in 1927, was "to protect the base for world revolution in dangerous times of ebb and to prepare the ground for the turn of the tide." 26

Justifying the idea of peaceful co-existence, that of course goes against the classical communist ideology of war and revolution which are considered to be the highest forms of class struggle and hence not only possible but inevitable when two mutually hostile world systems exist side by side, Lenin wrote: "If our forces are obviously small, the best means of defense is to retreat into the interior of the country," 27 because "a heroic retreat is just as important as the

25. During Lenin's life time it was the term 'peaceful living together in cohabitation (mirnoe sozhitelstvo) which was in frequent use. It was apparently "Trotsky and Chichenin who originated the term"* peaceful co-existence (mirnoe sosuschestvovanie).


launching of heroic assaults". And herein lies the rationale behind accepting the notion of peaceful coexistence.

Khrushchev utilized the theory of peaceful co-existence as an instrument of strategy and tactics while confronting the hostile capitalist system outside Soviet area of influence so much so that in the 1961 Party Programme particular emphasis was put on the economic competition. The Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, accordingly, rejected the inevitability of international wars and acknowledged that there were many roads to revolution. Peace was, indeed, one of them.

For all said and done, the Soviet foreign policy, at least since Stalin, had mainly been determined by nationalist motives rather than that of the lofty ideals of world communist revolution so much so that the "Soviet policy under Stalin appeared to be partially a continuation of the traditional foreign policy of Tsarist Russia, the characteristic features of which were the drive towards the open seas and Pan-Slav ambitions in Eastern and Central Europe". 

Therefore, despite all ideological tapestry, it was, in the ultimate analysis, the power politics for the sake of power particularly since USSR's

28. Ibid.
29. Kernig, n.15, p.386.
30. "The Soviet theory has relied increasingly on the concept of power as an explanatory device for past events, the assurance of present security and the promise of future change". *

Moreover, like any other Western countries, the socialist Soviet Union too seems to had been using 'political power' as an instrument to preserve status quo in any given point of time despite the fact that "one of the things that distinguishes Marxism from other ideologies is that it claims not only cognition of the world but also the ability to change the world by changing people's consciousness". **

* Margot Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations*
recognition as one of the two superpowers in the postwar period, that constituted
one of the main impulses of the Soviet foreign policy.

It is against this theoretical background that this study examines the Soviet
policy towards the German Question.

2. THE GERMAN QUESTION

The German Question has been one of the central problems of
international relations in Europe since long before the beginning of the World
War II. However, this study examines the meaning and implications of the
German Question vis-a-vis the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World
War. Nonetheless, when seen in historical perspective, the idea of German
National unity, which consequently constitutes the major part of the German
Question under investigation, was hardly appreciated by the European
neighbours because a united Germany situated at the heart of the Central Europe
was always perceived as a threat to peace in Europe.

Moreover, a neutralized Central Europe without a focus of political power
was considered to be essential for preserving peace until the impressive start of
nineteenth century. Subsequently, "at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, after the
collapse of Napoleon's policy of European hegemony, the Great Powers again
agreed on a rearrangement of German states in a new looser grouping, the

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                        ...Continued...

**. Ibid., p.323.

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German confederation, which they would guarantee".  

The last hundred years in German history had, indeed, been the history of continuity and change. Forms of the German Question had been changing, vis-a-vis the continually changing scenario of international relations but the content remained the same, i.e., how to incorporate Germany into Europe. It has been one of the great questions the European civilization had been facing "ever since the system of European power came into being".  

The de facto division of Germany at the end of the World War II reopened the German Question: "How to build Europe, how to bind Germany". Moreover, the German Question now had become a European question as the partition of Germany epitomized the division of Europe. Any solution, therefore, of the German Question had to precede the political restoration of Europe as such. The restoration of Europe required the voluntary or involuntary collaboration of both - the then Soviet Union and the United States. But neither of the aforesaid two nor the other European heavy weights wanted sincerely to answer the German Question which has always been "the question of where in Europe the Germans belong: looking westwards or wandering between East and West; reorganizing their central geographical


32. Gebhard Schweighler, "German Questions or the Shrinking of Germany", in F. Stephen Larrabee, n.31, pp.76-77.

position or breaking out of it" at least since 1648 when at the Peace of Westphalia the German Question emerged as a wider European issue which subsequently provided the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation an international legal framework.

However, in the postwar period, the German Question connoted two mutually antagonistic meanings for Germany and the four war-time allied powers. For Germany how "to find itself in its history" constituted the real German Question. For the US, USSR, UK and France, how to keep Germany divided for a safer Europe or at least how to keep Germany bridled politically, economically, territorially and militarily in order to ensure status-quo in Europe, if at all it was to get reunited, constituted the main problem of the German Question.

The German Question by now, therefore, was wide open. It encompassed now not only the problem of partition of Germany as geographical entity but also West German's European and trans-Atlantic ties, relationship between East Germany and the Soviet Union, the status of Berlin and, of course, the inter-German relations.

In sum, the German Question in postwar period consisted of the question as to who controlled Germany, what role it had been assigned to play in the European community of nations, what weight did it carry among the major nations in the world in an event of international dispute, and above all where did

34. Fritch-Bourmaze, n.31, p.49.

Germans find their identity from? No one had convincing answers to these questions. But to quote the then West German President, Richard von Weizsacker, "a question does not cease to exist simply because nobody has an answer to it".\(^\text{36}\) Obviously he was referring to the question of Germany's future in Europe, the question of Germany's role in international politics and also the question of how and when the division of Germany could be undone.

The reunification of Germany was, of course, the partial but immediate answer to this question. However, the concurrence of modus operandi between the East and the West was, in fact, a pre-condition for it. For "Germany's division was not the cause of the East-West split but it symbolized it".\(^\text{37}\)

In actual reality, nonetheless, in the contemporary world wide struggle between communism and capitalism, Germany had become the pawn which both sides wanted to turn into a queen. So, Germany in the context of the East-West split was not just a question but a dilemma too. "What to do about German power in the heart of Europe"?\(^\text{38}\) became a fundamental security dilemma for the whole of Europe. The stability and security of Europe had always been in question even when Germans were divided but how to keep a united Germany bridled well within its limit vis-a-vis its comparatively smaller neighbours that was again a big question. This is also true, to a great extent, that divided or united it has been Germany, indeed, where not only the balance of Europe but


\(^{37}\) Moreton, n.36, p.7.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., p.6.
global balance has been decided. As such "from a Soviet point of view, and from a Western one, any change in the political loyalties of either part of Germany would radically alter the balance of power, not just in Europe, but around the globe".39

At the same time the division of Germany had been one of the major causes for the continued tense situation in Europe. In other words, the US, the Soviet Union and other European neighbours seemed to be convinced that the division of Germany was a threat to peace in Europe and to their own strategic environment but, at the same time, "they would see a united Germany as even more dangerous because they could jeopardize the balance of power in Europe and peace along with it".40

Thus, instead of providing a definitive answer to the German Question the Western powers as well as the Soviet Union kept on avoiding to confront with the reality postponing thereby the day on which this question could be answered to the entire satisfaction of both the Germanys and the contemporary big powers without disturbing the existing status quo. It is pertinent to point out here that of the three big Western powers, France probably had deepest reservations against reunification of Germany. This had been precisely so because Bismarck facilitated the unification of Germany at the cost of enmity with France. In the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 France was defeated and demoralized. Logically, therefore, the French attitude towards the German Question would be

39. Ibid.

predominantly guided by past prejudices and future apprehensions rather than by contemporary political reality and pragmatism. France wanted the defeated giant to remain divided so that its territorial security might not get threatened at any stage in future. As an immediate neighbour, France never seemed "keen to advance the day when a reunited Germany would again constitute an economic and political Weight at the heart of Europe".41

Britain on its part, had a 'European solution' to the German Question. It wanted that a broader concept of a European peace order must precede the reunification of Germany. There could not be a united Germany in a divided Europe. The division of Germany, for Britain constituted a part of the division of Europe as a whole. Therefore, so long as the 'whole' remains divided the 'part' obviously would remain divided.

America in Europe was faced with two ticklish questions: how to deal with the Soviet expansionism and how to contain the revival of German nationalism. Americans tried to answer these two questions through their meticulously designed economics of Marshal Plan and the stage-managed military might of NATO with, of course, a strong intention of keeping the Red Army away from Western Europe.

Moreover, America at the same time was obsessed with European unity because such unity, according to American estimate, was to "make Western Europe stronger vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, keep West Germany in NATO and

41. Moreton, n.36, p.10.
the EC, and thus prevent it from going nationalist, neutral, or pro-Soviet".42 Otherwise too, the US had almost nothing to lose from the reunification of Germany, if at all, it took place within the broader context of European unity. Also according to the American perception, even if Germany got reunited Germany, of course, within the framework of the Western perspective of European security, Germans would remain relatively so weak vis-a-vis Soviet Union's predominance in Eastern Europe that they would never prove menace to Europe. Secondly, the reunification thus achieved would certainly change the balance of power in Europe to the advantage of the US and to the obvious disadvantage of the Soviet Union. Also, because of the very fact of being altogether a distant continent and a country, the US had less reason to be concerned about the post-reunification repercussions in Europe.

As regarding the Soviet Union's attitude towards the German Question, there had been two schools of opinion. One school visualized the USSR as a revisionist power "bent on changing the political map of Europe"43 in the postwar period, thereby forcing West Germany to forego its's allegiance to the Western alliance. The other school considered the Soviet Union as a status-quo power not only "happy to settle for a divided Europe"44 for all times to come but also to manipulate European division in its own favour as Germany divided geographically and Europe politically best suited the Soviet strategic interests

42. William E. Griffith, "The American View", in Moreton. n.36, p.51.
43. Moreton, n.36, p.8.
44. Ibid.
because in such a situation neither of the two could pose a challenge to the Soviet security. According to this school, therefore, the Soviet Union had, in fact, long given up its support for the reunification of Germany. Rather it had now been interested more in undermining West German security by causing dissension in the West and coercing America to withdraw from Europe.

Interestingly, the Western powers, the US in particular, stood against the revisionist Russia as and when it tried to alter the status-quo in Europe but at the same time, they felt a sigh of relief whenever the Soviet Union showed its willingness to live with the reality of the divided Germany in a divided Europe. But then West Germany stood consistently "reluctant to accept the status-quo in divided Germany".45

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, time and again, did try to find answer to the German Question keeping primarily its national interests in view. The Soviet policy, it seems, had been "the policy of a status-quo power with the intent to maintain and consolidate its sphere of interest"46 in Europe in particular. Moreover, in the postwar period the Soviet Union did never explicitly intend to strive for any territorial gain in Europe. On the contrary the Soviet leaders seemed to be interested more in preservation than expansion. However, the Soviet Union had perpetually been faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, the politically, geographically and psychologically unsettled Germans were proving to be a constant nightmare for the Soviet leadership and on the other, the Soviets

45. Ibid.

46. Schmidt, n.40, p.16.
were covertly reluctant to disturb the status-quo unless and until changes so engineered suited the Soviet security and strategic designs the most. This Soviet dilemma, indeed, forms one of the most important parts of this study.

3. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY

For the common man, there remained no 'German Question' after the defeat of the 'Third Reich'. Apparently it does sound logical as in 1945 there was virtually no German Legislation, no German Government and also there was no German Wehremarcht. If at all there was anything left in Germany that was the Germans' shared glory of their past and a dream shattered though not totally eliminated 'We shall overcome some day' - so much so that the Constitution (Basic Law) of West Germany in 1949 was designated as the 'provisional document'\textsuperscript{47} for transition period, thus, making the reunification a tryst with destiny but, of course, "as an equal partner in a united Europe"\textsuperscript{48}

Admittedly, though the Germans as a defeated party were a subject of despise among the people of the victorious side but the problems associated with Germany as a question still remained unresolved. In fact, the German Question was one of the main issues which divided the victors not only ideologically as

\textsuperscript{47} The Preamble of the West German Constitution aims at providing "a new order to political life for a transition period," acting also "on behalf of those Germans whom participation was denied" -- S.E. Finer, (ed), "Preamble of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949," \textit{Five Constitution} (New York : Penguin Books, 1979), P.197.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

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the socialist Soviet Union and the liberal Western countries but also amongst the liberals there prevailed differences of perceptions about the solution of the Germans Question. Interestingly, each one of the victorious allies had nourished a vision of Germany of its own choice but none of them was able to impose the Germany of its own choice on others.

On the whole, the Western powers were interested in reorganizing the German state on the liberal-democratic model granting full freedom and democracy but, at the same time, they wanted it to be fully integrated within the European community. On the other hand, the Soviet aim was to reorganize Germany on the model of a socialist state within the framework of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The clash was but obvious. And it was this clash of the Western Wilsonian dream of making the postwar world safe for democracy and the Soviet longing for getting realized the Leninist hope of making Germany suitable for socialism that resulted into the ultimate division of Germany.

The division of Germany facilitated the division of Europe. And the division of Europe symbolized the end of the age old 'European System' paving the way, thus, for the entry of the United States into the thick of European politics. Thus, immediately after the War the world politics was clearly bipolarized.

Interestingly, although the division was clearly imposed on them, the Germans themselves hardly resisted. Initially, rather, they seemed to be the willing collaborators in the postwar political arrangements. The German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, preferred to align the fate of the West Germans
with the West by establishing a liberal capitalist welfare state and Ulbricht decided to tie the fate of the East Germans with the Soviet Union by accepting to go along with a chartered socialist order. Thus began the struggle for mastery over Europe.

The war of the German succession in central Europe acquired the name of the 'Cold War'. Interestingly, the Cold War offered Germans a unique opportunity of changing their role more of a subject than that of an object of the contemporary European politics. Germany, West Germany in particular, became logical beneficiary of the "double containment" policy of the West. The West now had to contain both the Soviet expansionism and the German nationalism. Ironically, the Soviet expansionism could not be halted without voluntary utilization of German territory and manpower and at the same time the Germans could not be kept silent any longer for asking the definitive answer to the German-Question lest they got assimilated in the main stream of the bipolar structure of the postwar European politics.

Thus as a vanquished state of the World War II Germany did lose its claim to be a government but it was very much there as a 'politics', a 'question' and as a policy. The crude Cold War calculations of the immediate postwar Europe forced the Western occupying powers to readmit Germany into the power game of the hotly contested Cold War in Europe. It remained at the centre stage throughout the Cold War period. Interestingly, the Cold War cooled down only when the Germany got reunited despite much discomfort to the major European powers, the US and the Soviet Union.
Thus, the occupation gave way to alliance and alliance in turn strengthened the division of Europe which again in turn brought the German Question at the top of the agenda of European politics.

By 1946, tension between Western powers and the USSR was evidently discernible. The Truman Doctrine of March 1947, and Marshall Plan of June 1947 made USSR all the more hostile. On March 20, 1948 the Soviet Union stormed out of the Allied Control Council. Berlin Blockade began on April 1, 1948 producing first visible international crisis in connection with the German Question in the postwar era. The East-West divide now was almost complete.

In 1952, Stalin unilaterally offered the reunification of the West and East Germany in a democratic but natural state. Since then the USSR made German-neutrality an article of faith for any meaningful move for solving the German-Question.

The year 1953 proved to be a watershed in the East-West approach to German Question. On January 20, 1953 Eisenhower became the new President of the United States. He, along with his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, launched a diplomatic offensive against the Soviet Union and its communist allies. They went a step ahead of the Truman Doctrine and adopted the much publicized "Roll-Back" policy of pushing the USSR to the pre-War status.

Meanwhile, Stalin died on 5 March 1953. Taking advantage of the situation the Western powers proposed for the reunification of Germany through free and democratic elections. Although the USSR did agree in principle but reiterated Stalin's position that the reunited Germany had to be neutral having no pact or alliance with anyone.
Two important events took place in 1954 which had direct bearing on the evolving complexion of the German Question. First, FRG joined NATO, thus, becoming the integral part of the Western European security system. Secondly, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with GDR thereby acquiring a legal say in the German Question. On 14 May 1955, the Warsaw Pact was concluded. The manifest basis of this Soviet led Pact was the "collective security in Europe". Henceforth the Soviet Union put forth one more condition that it would be ready for solving the German Question in conjunction with the problems of European security.

By now the two German states were facts of European life and the question of reunification must be negotiated mutually. In other words, the creation of a united Germany was to be achieved only through mutual negotiations between the two German states on equal footing. This also meant formal Western recognition of the GDR and of the 1945 frontiers in and around Germany. By inviting West German Chancellor Adenauer to Moscow in September 1955, for discussing the opening up of diplomatic relations, the Soviet leadership wished to codify the existence of two separate German states. Also, from now on Khrushchev consistently insisted that the German Question must be solved by the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states.

Thus, while the Soviet Union was willing to discuss the possibility of a reunited but neutral German state, the Western powers were unwilling to see a reunited Germany under a government not completely loyal to and supportive of the Western alliance. Here Chancellor Adenauer lacked confidence in his people.
and decided to tie up the fate of the West German people with the West at the cost of a reunited and neutral German state.

The reunification prospect was further restricted in 1956 when Adenauer's government decided to follow the 'Hallstein-doctrine' in accordance with which the establishment of diplomatic relations with GDR by any country was to be considered an unfriendly act as the GDR was not considered a sovereign country in the normal sense of the term. Adenauer was quite hostile to the idea of a united but neutral Germany. When in 1957, George F. Kennan made such a suggestion by arguing that this would satisfy Soviet security needs and might encourage the Soviet Union to withdraw militarily from East Europe, Adenauer reacted sharply by saying that unification could not be obtained by the neutralization of Germany.

Apart from earlier attempts of bracketing the European security question with that of German reunification, the Soviet Union by 1957 came to float the new idea of confederation of the two German states as an alternative to the reunification. But FRG outrightly rejected this proposal, too.

On 28 February 1958, Soviet Union put forth a fresh proposal for German Peace Treaty at an international conference with the participation of FRG and GDR. West Germany together with Western powers turned a deaf ear to this call, too.

Then began the Soviet offensive against the West and West Germany. During 1958-1959 they made a series of moves. On 10 November 1958, Khrushchev sharply criticized the Western powers by saying that the Western imperialists were bent upon turning the German Question into a perpetual source
of tension in Europe. On 27 November 1957, he issued an ultimatum against Western powers demanding demilitarization of Berlin and creation of a 'Free-city'. But this ultimatum too went off unheeded. On 10 January 1959, the Soviet Union presented a modified draft proposal for a German Peace Treaty with a provision for turning West Berlin into a free demilitarized city with dependable international guarantees. At this time, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan did respond positively and took a trip to Moscow. And thus, the Soviet Union partially succeeded in creating a temporary division in Western alliance.

In April 1960, Khrushchev visited France and apprised President de Gaulle of Soviet position with regard to the existing crisis about the German Question. On his return from the French tour Khrushchev declared that Western presence in Berlin must end. The "four power" must sign a peace treaty with both the German states. Otherwise, the Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with GDR alone which would automatically mean end of the Western powers' claim over West Berlin. Khrushchev again reiterated the Soviet stand when he met President Kennedy in June 1961 in Vienna. Kennedy, however, did not yield to his threat. On the contrary, he called back Dean Acheson from retirement and instructed him to prepare plans to use force in case the Soviets chose to go for direct military confrontation.

On 13 August 1961, construction of Berlin wall began. On the following day Willy Brandt sent a letter to President Kennedy who refused to oblige him with a military action against the USSR. Brandt was completely disillusioned.
Berlin Wall was erected. And, thus, building of this Wall redefined the German Question as it was set in 1945.

After the Berlin crisis, the Soviet attitude towards the German question became somewhat more pronounced. Khrushchev, by now, was convinced that the best way of solving the German Question was the elimination of capitalism in West Germany and creation of a united socialist German state.

The focus of this study has been limited in one sense. It deals with the political, strategic and ideological status and role of the two Germanys in the most momentous phase of the postwar era, i.e., 1945-1961 and the Soviet policy towards them. Hence, this study has excluded from its scope the status and problems of ethnic Germans living in various countries of Central and Eastern Europe which, from a different point of view, might also be considered as forming the part of the broader 'German Question'. The central point of investigation in this study has been to determine as to how the Soviet Union projected its security perceptions in Europe in the specific context of the two German states and what policies did it adopt in different circumstances.

It is against this background, this study examines in detail the following questions:

Did the Soviet attitude towards the German Question remain static throughout the postwar period or did it undergo changes with the change in its leadership?

What was Stalin's main objective with regard to German Question: reunification of Germany or communization of it?

Did the death of Stalin in 1953 and entry of FRG into NATO military alliance in 1954 bring about any significant change in the Soviet attitude towards the German Question?

What were the factors responsible for the gradual shift, if any, in the
Soviet attitude towards the German Question?

Why was it that every serious move by the USSR for solving the German Question made the Western powers apprehensive and panicky?

These and many more related questions regarding Soviet attitude towards the German Question have been examined in this study.

4. NEED AND IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY

In the aftermath of Soviet disintegration and the reunification of Germany it sometimes sounds logical to ask as to why study a problem which no longer exists? Our objective in this section of the chapter is not to give a straight answer to this question but to reiterate that "the German Question is one of those perennial problems with a life almost of their own that are never solved but only change appearance". 49

The German Question has, indeed, been instrumental in setting the tone and texture of European politics right since the seventeenth century despite the fact that Germany had never been united under one ruler except for the period between 1870 and 1945. Nonetheless, the lack of the German political culture of oneness has fantastically been compensated by its strategic geographical location. Geographically, "Germany is situated where all the European peninsulas meet and where one power holds the other in check" 50 Therefore, it is mainly its geography that makes the German Question appear and reappear on the

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50. Ibid.
European and global agenda like the mythical Phoenix which, as it is believed, reappears from its ashes.\(^{51}\) The perenniality of the German Question made itself felt again during the postwar period when it proved to be instrumental, as we have seen in the preceding pages, not only in fueling the Cold War but also remained one of the most important factor in its continuation throughout the period under discussion and beyond despite the fact that at the end of the World War II "Germany itself was reduced to a geographical term of uncertain dimensions".\(^{52}\)

Moreover, in the post-reunification period the frequent neo-Nazi attacks on non-Germans in Germany makes such a study all the more important. Such rising neo-Nazi movements in Germany also underline the fact that the reunification is not an ultimate answer to the German Question. This is, in actual reality, one of the steps in that direction. In fact, as we shall see in the subsequent chapters, it was not the question of reunification of Germany that caused disagreement among the victors of the World War II, but the differing perceptions of the repercussion of such reunification. In retrospect it seems they were genuine in their apprehensions.

Moreover, it is, perhaps, one of the first studies of this kind which makes an exclusive, systematic and relatively comprehensive investigation of the Soviet policy towards the German Question. Most of the works, which this researcher


\(^{52}\) Sturmer, n.49, p.21.
has come across, deal with the general problems of the German Question. Also most of such writings suffer from a subtle systemic biases. Therefore, while going through such writings one has to read between the lines and also, sometimes, the blank space therein.

This study merits attention from the Indian angle too. There seems to be a striking similarity between the German political culture and that of the Indian one. Both of us are, to some extent, inclined to 'hero worshiping'. Most of the times we long for a deliverer in times of crisis. And in crisis we sometimes don't distinguish between a Hitler and a Hanuman. This study may provide an insight as to how to avoid going for extreme kind of the mode of political mobilization based on race, religion, caste or creed.

Finally, this researcher wishes to add through this study one more drop of information into the vast ocean of collective wisdom of the mankind.

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53. For that matter most of the source material utilized in this study have been in English language published mostly in Western countries which at times have been found having a subtle slant against the Soviet Union. Such slants are there for two simple reasons: first, till the Soviet Union was finally disintegrated most of the authentic information about the socialist Soviet system was withheld for, as they used to justify, strategic and tactical reasons.

Therefore, this researcher had to examine and cross examine most of the useful facts and figures for this study. Also one had to extract a balanced view from the two extreme views available in print.

54. Hanuman in Indian religious myth is a Monkey-God who has been depicted in some of the Hindu religious texts as a trouble-shooter and an extremely faithful to his master.
5. HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses have been tested during the course of the study:

I. In order to undermine its military and strategic positions, none of the four War-time allied powers wanted Germany to be united.

II. The Soviet attitude towards German-question had largely been guided by its military and strategic consideration and not so much by its ideological commitment.

III. The Soviet Union was consistently opposed to any idea of the reunited Germany becoming a part of the Western military alliance system.

IV. In view of the fact that the neutrality of Germany was an article of faith for the Soviet policy makers, any possible Soviet flexibility about German reunification was contingent upon such a Soviet demand.

V. In principle the USSR was never opposed to the idea of German-unity but was fearful of the revival of its militarist past. A divided Germany was thought to be a better guarantee against the revival of a powerful united Germany hostile to the Soviet Union.

VI. The entry of Federal Republic of Germany into the Western security alliance system precipitated the formation of Warsaw Pact. Although the Soviet Union did demonstrate a considerable degree of flexibility, at a regular intervals, which was aimed at solving the German question, it failed to secure necessary response from the Western powers. AS a result, the Soviet attitude towards the German question, became quite reactive to Western policies and initiatives.

VII. Apart from a possibly reunited Germany being looked upon as a direct source of security threat to both the Soviet Union and the West, the German question was also indirectly used to strengthen the military, political and ideological positions of the rival power blocs.

VIII. Creation of Berlin Wall in August 1961 was a symbolic expression of the Soviet conviction that by now it had lost almost all hopes and given up all plans for neutralization and reunification of Germany outside East-West divide.
6. METHODOLOGY

As this study involves one of the most exciting periods in European history, it is the historical method of analysis that has been adopted here for the obvious reasons that "the source of our knowledge about the range and potentialities of human nature", asserts W. Dilthey, "is the record of what man has done and thought". 55 History is the store house of the records of human action and inaction, construction and destruction, success and failure, sorrow and laughter, life and death, and so on and so forth. Therefore, "we can not know what man is by introspection alone", further maintains Dilthey, "but only through history". 56

Moreover, the historical approach has a very wide canvass and can be applied to all phenomena 57 Material of history can be utilized not only as an instrument of analysis of historical events but also the scientific analysis. Marxism begins with this assertion because historical elements are present in all sciences, 58 so much so that even science has become historical in spirit. 59

56. Ibid.
Moreover, international politics is, indeed, a dynamic discipline of study. Here everything is in flux always. Here rulers are ruthlessly and rapidly replaced; policies are perfidiously phrased. It has, therefore, been thought pertinent to treat the given period of history through the analysis of the cause and effect relationship in time and space.60

In all, this is how this study has primarily been approached.

7. RATIONALE BEHIND SCHEME OF CHAPTERS

The timeframe (1945-1961) of this study has purposefully been earmarked. This is the period of time during which the Soviet policy towards the German Question had mercilessly been put on anvil because of the prevalence of an extraordinary situation during and immediately after the World War II.

The whole period of the study has been divided into six chapters. The last chapter makes concluding observations. Excepting introduction and conclusion, each chapter deals with the analysis of events either arising out of extraordinary circumstances or because of the presence of extraordinary political personalities. However, most chapters are the issue based ones. At the same time each chapter covers a definite historical period of time. Nonetheless, an open-ended approach has been adopted to facilitate entry and exist of prominent political actors for the period under investigation. Also, care has been taken to avoid confusion arising out of the obvious overlapping of events and issues.

60. Trygve Mathisen, Methodology in the Study of International Relations (New York: Macmillan, 1959), pp.189-190