The Soviet fear of Germany as military power had been deep rooted in history. By comparison, while Germany was a great power in Central Europe in the post-Napoleonic era, Russia remained a large empire in the East despite its social, cultural and technological backwardness. Time and again Russian expansionism had been checkmated by the German Empire by virtue of its industrial and military superiority. Thus, the Germans always rivalled the Russian ambition of predominance in Europe. Even, till the time World War-II broke out, the Soviet Union either tried to contain or appease Germany. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 was a point in question. Thus, Germany was consistently looked upon by the Soviet Union as a potential source of threat to its security. The Soviet policy towards the German Question, therefore, seemed to be guided by Lenin's dictum: "whoever has Germans on his side owns Europe."

The prime focus of this study, therefore, is to investigate and analyze as to how the Soviet Union articulated, professed and put in practice its policy towards the German Question since the end of the Second World War till the Berlin Crisis of 1961. The study tries to find out whether it was the crude national interests or the loud profession to Marxist Leninist ideology that used to determine the Soviet policy towards the German Question. Was the Soviet leadership at any point of time interested in solving the German Question? Was the Soviet attitude static? Answers to these and many such questions have been tried to find out in this work.

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There are six chapters in all. The first chapter deals with the introduction of the study. The second chapter traces the historical roots of the German Question and Russian/Soviet policy towards it at a given point of time. The third chapter analyzes the policies of the war-time allies in general and the Soviet Union in particular. The formation of NATO and Warsaw Pact and its repercussions vis-a-vis the German Question forms the part of the chapter fourth. Chapter fifth exclusively deals with the building of the Berlin Wall and its impact on the issue of the German Question. Chapter sixth carries conclusions.

This study is primarily based on primary and secondary source material available mainly in English language. Efforts have been made to avoid logically inherent linguistic and systemic biases prevalent in such source material while investigating the issue.

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