Chapter 3

THE MAIN FEATURES OF HUNTINGTON’S THEORY

3.1 Profile of Samuel Huntington

Samuel Huntington was born on April 18, 1927, in New York City. He completed his B.A. from Yale University in 1946 and his Masters from the University of Chicago in 1948. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1951. He was involved in teaching at Harvard from 1950 through 1958, and was Associate Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University from 1959 to 1962. He was Chairman of the Harvard Department of Government from 1967 to 1969 and from 1970 to 1971. He served as Associate Director of the Center for International Affairs in 1973 and was its Director from 1978 to 1989. During 1977 and 1978 he served at the US White House as Coordinator of Security Planning for the National Security Council. In 1970 he jointly founded the quarterly journal, Foreign Policy, and was its co-editor until 1977.

He has served as a Research Associate at the Brookings Institution, a Faculty Fellow of the Social Science Research Council, a John Simon Guggenheim Fellow, a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study of the Behavioral Sciences, a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford, a Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., and Senior Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. He was a member of the Council of the American Political Science Association (1969-1971), was Vice President (1984-1985), and the President (1986-1987) of the Association. He was a member of the Presidential Task Force on International Development (1969-1970), a member of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations (1974-1976), chairman of the Defense and Arms Control Study Group of the Democratic Advisory Council (1974-1976), and a member of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1986-1988).
and member of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (1995-1997). He has been the recipient of the Olin, Bradley, and Smith Richardson foundations grants between 1985 and 1999 totalling more than $5 million. Samuel P. Huntington has been the Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard University and he became Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies in 1989, and Chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies in 1996. He has been a policy adviser to U.S. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter and was the Director of Security Planning for the National Security Council in the Carter Administration. He lives in Boston, Massachusetts, USA.

Samuel Huntington is the author of several books and scholarly articles and has also edited over a dozen books and ninety scholarly articles. He has studied, taught, and written widely in three important areas, namely, Military politics, strategy, and civil-military relations, American and comparative politics and Political development and the politics of less developed countries. He has written voraciously and some of his well known books and writings are: *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* 1957; *The Common Defense: Strategy Programs in National Politics*, 1961; *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (editor), 1962; *USA/USSR* (co-author), 1964; *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1968; *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (co-editor), 1970; *The Crisis of Democracy* (co-author), 1975; *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (co-author), 1976; *American Politics: The Power of Disharmony*, 1981 (winner of the Association of American Publishers Social Science Award); *The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security* (editor), 1982; *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (co-author), 1983; and *Reorganizing America's Defense* (co-editor), 1985; *Global Dilemmas* (co-editor), 1985; *Understanding Political Development* (co-editor), 1986; *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, 1991 (winner of the Grawemeyer...
Award for Ideas Improving World Order); 'Clash of Civilisations?' (article), 1993 and the, "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" (book, translated into 22 other languages), 1996 and Who Are We, Challenges to America's National Identity, 2004. He has many articles to his credit. He has delivered many lectures and speeches and given many interviews. He has travelled to many parts of the world and has been to India in 1998 as an invitee for the 50th anniversary celebrations of India's Independence.

Conclusion

Evidently, Huntington is a scholar of great international repute whose prolific writings have left a deep impact in the academic as well as non academic circles.

3.2 Huntington's Thesis

Introduction:

The basis of Huntington's thesis is that in the post Cold War period the fundamental reason for conflict will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic, but will be cultural or civilisational. Huntington who adopted the terminology "clash of civilisations", from Bernard Lewis' article "The Roots of Muslim Rage" published in The Atlantic Monthly in September 1990, developed this idea into a full-fledged thesis. As discussed earlier, Huntington's thesis regarding the core dynamics of post-Cold War international politics was is sharp contrast to the one expressed by Francis Fukuyama in his work "The End of History" (1989)

Huntington surmised that to understand conflict in post Cold War era and in the future, cultural divisions must be understood, and culture and civilisation must be accepted as the cause of war, not politics of state or economics. To a great extent Huntington's theory on civilization, apart from many others, has been strongly influenced by writings of scholars like Arnold J Toynbee and Carroll
Quigley who had for long undertaken extensive analyses of religion and civilisation.

The Article:

Huntington's original thesis "The Clash of Civilizations?" expressed in the *Foreign Affairs* article of 1993 had a limited expanse. This original article expounding the thesis of the “Clash of Civilisations” (1) was presented with nine sections and can be stated as under:

*The Next Pattern of Conflict:*

Huntington began by stating that the “World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be - - the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.”

He then went on to hypothesize that the “fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic” but “will be cultural.” And while he accepted that the nation states will continue to be powerful actors in the world affairs, he ventured the argument that “the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.” He contended that the “clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” He opined that “Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase of the evolution of conflict in the modern world.” Using historical data he sought to establish that since the emergence of the modern international system of the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes, nation-states and ideologies and that they were primarily conflicts within Western civilization. This, according to him “was as true of the Cold War as it
was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and
teneteenth centuries.” But then he argues that “With the end of the Cold War,
international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its center-piece becomes
the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-
Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the people and governments
of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of
Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.”

The Nature of Civilizations:

Huntington held that Cold War divisions of the world into the First, Second
and Third Worlds remained no longer relevant and that “It is far more meaningful
now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in
terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture
and civilization.” He then goes on to explain that “A civilization is a cultural
entity.” in which “Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups,
all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity.” But then he
argues that cultures of certain communities distinguishes them from other
communities and hence says that “Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are
not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations.” He goes on
to state that “A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the
broader level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes
humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such
as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-
identification of people.” And he argues that while people have levels of identity
with varying degrees of intensity such “as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a
Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the
broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and
do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change.”

He further says that “civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China or a very small number of people, such as in the case of Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include sub-civilizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall; they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are buried in the sands of time.” He challenges the western belief that nation states are the principal actors in global affairs and argues that “The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations.” To support this argument he cites the work of Arnold Toynbee ‘A Study of History” where Toynbee has identified 21 major civilizations; only six of which, Huntington says continues to exist in the contemporary world.

*Why Civilizations will Clash:*

Huntington strongly suggested that “the civilisational identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations.” According to Huntington these major civilizations can be said to be “Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization.”
He then goes on to state that "The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another." And he says that this will be the case because "First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts."

According to Huntington "(T)he world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations." He then says that "The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history."

He contends that "the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist."" He believes that the revival of religion being
witnessed the world over "provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations."

Huntington cites another reason for ensuing clash "A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways." And this he says occurs because "the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture" while their elite was westernized through western education. Other reason for the clash according to Huntington is that "cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones." For instance he says that "more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim." And herein he says lie the questions of true identity and fundamental differences.

The rise of economic regionalism, he argues, will "reinforce civilization-consciousness" leading to setting the stage for clash among the civilizations. He asserts that "As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion." And in absence of identity defined by ideology the "governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity." For Huntington "The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values."
The Fault Lines Between Civilizations:

Huntington contends that "The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War" in the post Cold War era. He asserts that with the end of Cold War the ideological divisions have disappeared and cultural divisions have reemerged. According to Huntington, for instance "The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe." He then extends this argument to the religious civilisational level by stating that "Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years." He goes on to say that "This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent." He cites various examples and occurrences of clashes among Christian and Muslim religious groups in West European countries like France, Italy, and Germany to substantiate his arguments and confidently states that "On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations." To further strengthen this argument Huntington quotes an Indian Muslim author, M. J. Akbar that the West's "next confrontation, is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin." For the same reason, he also cites Bernard Lewis (from whom he borrowed the core idea for his thesis) "We are facing a need and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations -- the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both."

He then goes further to give his thesis a much broader sweep, transcending Europe and seeks to make it a thesis which has a truly global relevance. He states
that “The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now not only is the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's substantial Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In East Asia, China has outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has pursued a ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of Tibet, and it is pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy toward its Turkic-Muslim minority. With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate. A "new cold war," Deng Xioping reportedly asserted in 1991, “is under way between China and America. The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States.”

His, another, important argument is that “The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which they are likely to be characterized by violence.” He then goes on to single out the Islamic civilization as the one which is at the centre of the clash among civilizations. In his own words “Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.”

Civilization Rallying:

Taking the idea of 'kin-country syndrome' from H.D.S Greenway, Huntington posits that “The kin-country syndrome groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own
civilization." He further asserts that as the post-Cold War world evolves, civilization commonality, "is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions." He says that this is evident from "the post-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia." Basing himself on these conflicts he states that "None of these was a full-scale war between civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilization rallying, which seemed to become more important as the conflict continued and which may provide a foretaste of the future." According to him this has become particularly visible in the Arab and Muslim world.

Accepting the fact that there are conflicts of all sorts in the world arising out of all kinds of situations and for many different reasons, he still persists that "Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur." And though he concedes that civilization rallying has been limited, he asserts that "it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential to spread much further." He strongly contends that "In the coming years, the local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations."

**The West Versus the Rest:**

One of the most prominent attention area in his thesis is that the West and the Rest will be ranged against each other in the post cold war world. According to him "The central axis of world politics in the future" is likely to be the conflict between "the West and the Rest" This is an idea he borrows from Kishore Mahbubani, an intellectual from Singapore, and places it within the framework of
his "clash" thesis. Huntington holds that this is because "The West is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations." And also because "Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate." He says that "The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values." For him Western domination of the U.N. Security Council, West's use of force especially against Iraq, and many such other acts, has resulted in the Rest ranging against the West.

Also according to him "Differences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict." Taking on Indian origin writer, V. S. Naipaul's argument, that Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men.", Huntington tries to challenge this by stating that "Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures." This according to him sets West apart from the Rest.

**The Torn Countries:**

In his thesis, Huntington introduces the idea of torn countries. He explains thus "Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another. These are torn countries." He puts forward the example of Turkey in particular as a torn country as it is torn between the Western and the Islamic. Also Mexico, Russia and Australia qualify to be called as torn countries, contends Huntington.
The Confucian-Islamic Connection:

Huntington postulates the idea that there is a close Confucian-Islamic connection and that these are cooperating to challenge Western interests, values and power. Huntington believes that Islamic civilization and the Chinese (Sinic) civilisation will forge a common front against their common enemy, the West and would pose a serious long term threat to the West, particularly because of their rapid economic and demographic growth. He envisions a future world which would be more multipolar and multicivilizational. He says that the West is under a political and demographic decline, is disunited and experiencing a moral decadence, which will lead to significant dangers to it in the future. He sees Islam as the greatest threat to the West and argues that civilizational conflicts are particularly “prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims”. He avers that “The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal.” He contends that while the “West promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm” the non-Western nations, “assert their right to acquire and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security.” Huntington concludes that “A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military powers of the West.” This, he argues, sets the two on a path to confrontation and conflict and argues that “A new form of arms competition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the West.”

Implications for the West:

Huntington’s greatest worry seems to be that the Cold War is likely to be succeeded with Civilisatonal War which will have serious implications for the
Western civilisation. In his own words, he states that his “article does not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization will not conflict with and even fight each other” but he does to seek to put “forth the hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest"; the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.”

And while Huntington explicitly states that he does not advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations, he expresses a need “to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be like.” What is interesting is that he considers his hypotheses as being plausible hypotheses, which leads him “to consider their implications for Western policy.” He believes that the short-term implications for the West is “to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization”, “to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia
and Japan; to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major 
inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian 
and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of counter military capabilities and 
maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences 
and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations 
groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen international 
institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote 
the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions."

As a long term measure, he holds that "the West will increasingly have to 
accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches 
that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of 
the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power 
necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, 
however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic 
religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the 
ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an 
effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other 
civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but 
instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to 
coexist with the others."

The Book:

The "Clash" thesis of Huntington originally presented as an article, having 
achieved a controversial status, igniting a burning debate and having come under 
scathing attack by many scholars, led to Huntington expanding the original thesis 
into a full length book entitled The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the 
World Order.(2) Consequently, the book has much more elaborate and ambitious 
layout and this meticulous effort was not only meant to explain the thesis better
but also to refute the many criticisms that were heaped on his thesis after its first publication as an article in the journal Foreign Affairs.

In this book he does not depart from his original thesis set out in the article in Foreign Affairs, but seeks to strengthen and substantiate his thesis by mustering more statistical data and sharpening the earlier arguments. Hence, though the book has very little that can be said to be new or different from the original article in terms of articulation of his "clash of the civilisation" thesis, except that the original question mark has disappeared signalling a greater conviction of Huntington in his originally cautiously proposed thesis, the book does have a different layout and scheme. While the rendering of chapters has been changed, the same thesis is being articulated with many more arguments, examples, statistics and citations. A closer look at the expanded version of the "clash" thesis, makes it amply clear that Huntington's original position has not only remained unchanged but has actually hardened. A brief review of his major work will help in clarifying his position further.

The book is divided into five main sections covering 12 chapters. In first Section, Huntington delves into the world of civilisations. In Chapter 1, Huntington begins with the setting of the 1990s going backwards into the phases of evolution in the world politics of the past. He then goes on to describe the world which is multipolar and also multicivilisational. He actually started his thinking by having a look at the different theories that have tried to explain the nature of global politics in the post-Cold War period, especially in relation to the world order. During this period some scholars argued that liberalism, liberal democracy and Western values were the only remaining ideological alternative for the nations after the collapse of communism. Thus they trumpeted the end of ideologically divided world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama had argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' and that in this new world there would not be any major conflict as Western liberalism having triumphed will reign supreme for all time and peace will prevail. But Huntington believed that, while the age of
ideology had ended, the world had only reverted back to the old state of affairs in which conflict existed on account of cultural differences. He therefore insisted that these, like Fukuyama’s new idea of “One World” or others, like “Realist” or “Statist” theories which still persisted, did not sufficiently explain the new world order or conflict in the world. He proposed a thesis, which argued that future conflict in the world would be along cultural, religious and civilisational lines. Civilizations, for Huntington were the highest level of cultural identity, and he believed that in the newly emerging world, cultural and civilisational differences will become increasingly useful way of analysing conflict in the world.

In Chapter 2, Huntington explores the nature and history of civilisations in the world. He seeks to not only define what is meant by civilisation, but also tries to distinguish between singular and plural civilisations. He states that his thesis concerns civilisations in the plural. Using religion as the main criterion, but also using various studies of history, geographical proximity and linguistic similarities, and relying on a number of references and citations from several scholars who have written on the subject of civilisation, Huntington proposed an eightfold classification of civilisations, which according to him were Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Orthodox, Latin American and African. The Western civilization covered Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. The Latin American civilisation was made up of the Latin American countries. The Orthodox world consisted of Eastern Europe and Russia. The Muslim civilisation extended over the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, the northwest of South Asia (Pakistan), Bangladesh, parts of India, Malaysia, Indonesia and some parts of South-eastern Europe. Hindu civilization is found chiefly in India, Nepal, and Indian diaspora. The Sinic civilization consisted of China, Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, including the Chinese diaspora. The African civilization, generally in the African continent and Japan, has been considered as an independent civilization confined only to Japan. Following a long and winding
course through human history, he attempts to explain the impact, the relations and the interactions among various civilisations.

In Chapter 3, he discusses the question of universal civilisation and concludes that "The concept of a universal civilisation is a distinctive product of Western civilisation"(3) and that "The more fundamental divisions of humanity in terms of ethnicity, religion, and civilisations remain and spawn new conflicts."(4) He also goes into the question of modernization, which he analyses with reference to Western and Non-Western societies. Huntington questions the claim that to modernize necessarily means to become westernized. He contends that modernisation is not only desired by other civilisations but is being attained sans accepting westernisation, that is, without adopting the values and attitudes of Western culture. Hence, he concludes that "Modernisation, in short, does not necessarily mean Westernisation. Non-Western societies can modernise and have modernised without abandoning their own cultures and adopting whole sale Western values, institutions, and practices."(5)

In the second Section, Huntington focuses on the shifting balance of civilisations. In Chapter 4, he speaks about the fading of the West, thus "It is of a civilisation in decline, its share of world political, economic, and military power
going down relative to that of other civilisations”(6) He concludes that “The West is overwhelmingly dominant now and will remain number one in terms of power and influence well into the twenty-first century. Gradual, inexorable and fundamental changes, however, are also occurring in the balances of power among civilisations, and the power of the West relative to that of other civilisations will continue to decline.”(7) And the main reason for this decline of the West according to Huntington is the resurgence of the Non-Western cultures through the process of indigenisation. In his words “The erosion of Western culture follows, as indigenous, historically rooted mores, languages, beliefs, and institutions reassert themselves.”(8) He also attributes this resurgence to revival of religion and religious fundamentalism sweeping the world and goes on to add that “The renewal of religion throughout the world far transcends the activities of fundamentalist extremists” because, apart from providing “the emotional and social needs of the uprooted”(9) “Religion, indigenous or imported, provides meaning and direction for the rising elites in modernising societies.”(10)

In Chapter 5, Huntington speaks about “the cultural assertiveness and challenges to the West that have come from Asia and from Islam” (11) (and concludes that “Related but different causes lie behind these challenges. Asian assertiveness is rooted in economic growth; Muslim assertiveness stems from social mobilisation and population growth. Each of these challenges is having and will have into the twenty-first century a highly destabilising impact on global politics” (12) In short, Huntington attributes the challenge to the West from Asian and Muslim societies primarily on account of economic and demographic growth in those societies. Islamic resurgence draws greater attention of Huntington and this is evident when he states “This Islamic Resurgence, in its extent and profundity is the latest phase in the adjustment of Islamic civilisation to the West, an effort to find the “solution” not in Western ideologies but in Islam.” (13) In
this section, Huntington dedicates much attention, time and space to discuss Islamic Resurgence and its challenge to the West.

In Section III, Huntington seeks to spell out the emerging order of the civilisation. In Chapter 6, Huntington begins by saying that "global politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines" (14) due to the force of modernisation. His contention is that "Peoples and countries with similar cultures are coming together. Peoples and countries with different cultures are coming apart. Alignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are giving way to alignments defined by culture and civilisations. Political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: ethnic, religious, and civilisational. Cultural communities are replacing Cold War blocs, and the fault lines between civilisations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics." (15) Thus, according to Huntington, the landscape of international politics is undergoing dramatic change and he attributes it to "the eruption of a global identity crisis" (16) He also tries to link economic cooperation to cultural homogeneity: "The end of the Cold War stimulated efforts to create new and to revive old regional economic organisations. The success of these efforts has depended overwhelmingly on the cultural homogeneity of the states involved." (17)

In Chapter 7, Huntington attempts to explain the civilisational ordering in post Cold War period by positing the concept of 'core states' at the centre of each major civilisation. He says that "In these cases civilisational groupings are emerging involving core, member states, culturally similar minority populations in adjoining states, and, more controversially, peoples of other cultures in neighbouring states." (18) Furthermore he adds, "States in these civilisational blocs often tend to be distributed in concentric circles around the core state or states, reflecting their degree of identification with and integration into that bloc." (19) He says that while most major civilisational blocs have a core state, the Islamic civilisation is characterised by absence of such a core state and is hence
more problematic because, “When civilisations lack core states, the problems of creating order within civilisations or negotiating order between civilisations become more difficult.” (20) In this same chapter he tries to demarcate the boundaries of the West and says that they are co-extensive with Western-Christendom. He says that bounding of civilisations is underway on a global scale and is becoming increasingly evident and is throwing up civilisation fault lines along which the future conflicts will take place. According to him already this bounding of civilisation can be seen in case of Western, Orthodox and Sinic civilisations but says the same is not true of the Islamic civilisation, which he contends is a civilisation “divided among competing power centres each attempting to capitalise on Muslim identification with the ummah in order to promote Islamic cohesion under its leadership” (21)

In Section IV, Huntington takes up his main thesis of “Clash of Civilisations”. In Chapter 8, he first looks at the inter-civilisational issues, that is of the “West and the Rest”. He examines the question of Western Universalism and explains that the collapse of communism “reinforced in the West the view that its ideology of democratic liberalism had triumphed globally and hence was universally valid” (22) This fallacious belief in universalism of Western model, which according to him, is nothing but “universalist pretensions” (23) of the West and is likely to bring the West in direct conflict with the Rest, especially those which he terms as the “challenger civilisations”. He thus questions the very notion of a universal civilisation and says that Western civilisation is not the universal civilisation. He argues that the concept of a universal civilisation is itself a product of Western thinking and is not acceptable to the other peoples of the world. He insists that the belief among the Westerners of the universality of the values and political systems of the West is totally misplaced and that such ideas feed the antagonisms between the West and other civilizations Huntington believes that the greatest threat to the Western civilisation comes from the Islamic-Sinic
cooperation. One reason for this cooperation, according to Huntington, is “Islam and China embody great cultural traditions very different from and in their eyes infinitely superior to that of the West.” And then he says that “Islamic and Sinic societies, which see the West as their antagonist thus, have reason to cooperate with each other against the West, even as the Allies and Stalin did against Hitler.” (24) Thus, his main inference is that “The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance and Sinic assertiveness.” (25) With regard to the other civilisations from among the “Rest” Huntington, considers African and Latin American civilisations as “weaker civilisations which have in some measure been dependent on the West” (26) and hence “will involve much lower level of conflict” and thus pose no great threat to the West. As regards the remaining three civilisations, Russian, Japanese and Indian, Huntington introduces the concept of “swing civilisations”. Having put the West on one side and the Sinic-Islamic combine on the other, Huntington says the Orthodox, Hindu, and Japanese civilizations will behave as "swing" civilizations, shifting sides depending on their interests, by swinging to the West at one time and to the Sinic-Islamic side at other times. He explains it thus “The relations of Russia, Japan and India to the West are likely to fall between those of the other two groups, involving elements of cooperation and conflict, as these three core states at times line up with the challenger civilisations and at times side with the West. They are the “swing” civilisations between the West, on the one hand, and Islam and Sinic civilisations, on the other.” (27) The remaining two civilisations of Latin America and Africa, he contends, will be weak and hence pro-West civilisations and therefore pose no threat to the West. He believes that the post Cold War period is already exhibiting a changing of balance of power among civilisations and contends that “The changing balance of power among civilisations makes it more and more difficult for the West to achieve its goal with respect to weapons proliferation, human rights, immigration, and other issues.” (28)
In Chapter 9, Huntington further discusses the global politics of civilisations and puts it thus "Civilisations are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of civilisations is tribal conflict on a global scale." (29) He believes that the fault lines between the civilisations is likely to be the focus of future conflicts: "The dynamism of Islam is the ongoing source of many relatively small fault line wars; the rise of China is the potential source of a big intercivilisational war of core states" (30) In this chapter Huntington specifically highlights the factors that have increased the conflict between the West and Islam. These aggravating factors, according to Huntington are historical (Crusades/Jihad), demographic, economic, technological and intensity of religious commitment. He lays much emphasis on the increased level of "conflict between Islam and the West in the late twentieth century." (31) He says that "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation, whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power." (32) Similarly, he says that "The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defence. It is the West, a different civilisation, whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world." (33) Thus for Huntington "These are the basic ingredients that fuel conflict between Islam and the West." (34) In the context of the impending civilisational conflict, Huntington explores the possibilities of civilisational bandwagoning, accommodation, balancing, containment and war. And concludes that there is more likelihood that "states could attempt some mixture of balancing and bandwagoning" (35) and that this "bandwagoning and balancing propensities may vary between civilisations because the levels of trust among their members differ." (36)

Huntington also explores the question of emerging alignments among the core states in the context of a civilisational world. First of all he says that "The
post Cold War, multipolar, multicivilisational world lacks an overwhelmingly dominant cleavage, such as existed in the Cold War. So long as the Muslim demographic and Asian economic surges continue, however, the conflicts between the West and the challenger civilisations will be more central to global politics than other lines of cleavage.” (37) He then sets out to develop the theme of cooperation and alignments that are likely to emerge in the context of a world of civilisations. He says that “The relatively simple bipolarity of the Cold War is giving way to the much more complex relationships of a multipolar, multicivilisational world.” And yet he believes that “broad trends are evident and plausible generalisations can be made about what seem to be the emerging alignments and antagonisms among civilisations and core states” He explains the complexity and nature of these relations using a figure, in which thicker lines represent more conflictual relationships while thinner lines denote less conflictual relations. He cites many examples of wars, such as, in erstwhile Yugoslavia (Bosnia) and Soviet Union (Chechnya), and between India and Pakistan as essentially intercivilisational conflicts.
In Chapter 10, Huntington presents a picture of future wars, which he believes, will shift from transitional type of wars to the civilisational fault line wars. He cites the Afghan war and the Gulf war as the initial transition wars. He states thus “Both wars began as straightforward invasions of one country by another but were transformed into and in large part redefined as civilisation wars. They were, in effect, transition wars to an era dominated by ethnic conflict and fault line wars between different civilisations.” (38) Huntington further says that “The Gulf War was the first post Cold War resource war between civilisations” (39) As for the characteristics of these civilisational fault line wars Huntington has the following to say “Fault line conflicts are communal conflicts between states or groups from different civilisations. Fault line wars are conflicts that have become violent. Such wars may occur between states, between nongovernmental groups and between states and nongovernmental groups.”(40) He further adds that “Fault line conflicts sometimes are struggles for control over people. More frequently the issue is control of territory.” (41) Huntington says that “Fault line wars share some but not all of the characteristics of communal wars generally. They are protracted wars.” He, however also points out that “While fault line wars share the prolonged duration, high levels of violence and ideological ambivalence of other communal wars, they also differ from them in two ways. First, communal wars may occur between ethnic, religious, racial, or linguistic groups. Since religion, however, is the principal defining characteristic of civilisations, fault line wars are almost always between peoples of different religions.”(42) “Second, other communal wars tend to be particularistic, and hence are relatively unlikely to spread and involve additional participants. Fault line wars, in contrast, are by definition between groups which are part of larger cultural entities.” (43) Once again Huntington focuses on the Islamic civilisation and terms it as having bloody borders and as the most violent one. He says that “Wherever one looks along the perimeter of Islam, Muslims have problems living peaceably with their neighbours.” (44) For him “The Muslim propensity towards violent conflict is
also suggested by the degree to which Muslim societies are militarised." (45) According to Huntington the causes for the Muslim violence lie in history, politics, and demographic explosion. As regards the historical factors Huntington states that "Militarism, indigestibility, and proximity to non-Muslim groups are continuing features of Islam and could explain Muslim conflict propensity through out history, if that is the case" (46) With regard to politics, according to Huntington "A more persuasive factor possibly explaining both intra- and extra-Islamic conflict is the absence of one or more core states in Islam" (47) But for Huntington "Finally, and most important, the demographic explosion in Muslim societies and the availability of large number of often unemployed males between the age of fifteen and thirty is a natural source of instability and violence, both within Islam and against non-Muslims." (48)

In Chapter 11, speaking about the dynamics of fault line wars, Huntington turns to the questions of identity crisis in the world and explains the rise of civilisational consciousness in terms of identity. He says that the civilisational or communal wars are essentially identity wars and holds that "In the course of the war, multiple identities fade away and the identity most meaningful in relation to the conflict comes to dominate." (49) He also adds that "The strengthening of civilisational identities has occurred among fault line war participants from other civilisations but was particularly prevalent among Muslims." (50) In this chapter, Huntington also takes up his original theme of civilisation rallying by the kin-countries or countries belonging to the same cultural-civilisational family by giving detailed accounts of how kin countries have rallied behind their coreligionists in the Orthodox and Muslim worlds. Huntington, then shifts his attention to the question how fault line wars could be stopped. He wonders if, like all wars, the fault line wars among the civilisations can come to an end. He answers it by saying "Fault line violence may stop entirely for a period of time, but it rarely ends permanently. Fault line wars are marked by frequent truces, cease-fires, armistices, but not by comprehensive peace treaties that resolve central
political issues. They have this off-again-on-again quality because they are rooted in deep fault line conflict involving sustained antagonistic relations between groups of different civilisations." (51) He feels that the civilisational 'conflict may disappear quickly"(52) and "brutally if one group exterminates the other." (53)

He also considers the possibility of the underlying conflict and antagonism evaporating over a long period of time. But his clear conclusion is that "Fault line wars are intermittent, fault line conflicts are interminable." (54) Apparently Huntington paints a very frightening picture of the emerging world and the conflict in it. And though he admits that such conflict can end temporarily on account of "exhaustion of the primary participants" and when "moderates reassert themselves and reach some sort of agreement for a halt to the carnage." (55) the lull is deceptive as "They enable both sides to rest and replenish their resources. Then when one side sees the opportunity for gain, the war is renewed." (56) Huntington also rules out any negotiated settlements to such conflicts when he states that "Fault line wars are almost never halted by direct negotiations between primary parties alone and only rarely by the mediation of disinterested parties. The cultural distance, intense hatreds, and mutual violence they have inflicted on each other make it extremely difficult for primary parties to sit down and engage in productive discussion looking toward some form of cease-fire." (57) But then he himself adds that "In conflicts between groups from different civilisations, however, there are no disinterested parties. Finding an individual, institution, or state whom both parties think trustworthy is extremely difficult." (58) According to Huntington, civilisational wars can be stopped by secondary and tertiary ralliers because "Secondary and tertiary ralliers usually do not want to be transformed into primary level fighters and hence try to keep the war under control. Hence at some point they are likely to see it in their interest to stop the fighting because they have rallied behind their kin, they have leverage over their kin. Ralliers thus become restrainers and halters."(59) He, therefore concludes that "An agreement to halt a
fault line war will be successful, even if only temporarily, to the extent that it reflects the local balance of power among the primary parties and the interests of the tertiary and secondary parties.” (60)

In the final Section and the last Chapter of his book, Huntington takes a serious look at the future of the civilizations and various implications to the West in general and United States in particular. Picking up his initial critic of the ‘end of history’ thesis, Huntington says that adherents of a particular civilisation “become blinded by what Toynbee called ‘the mirage of immortality’ and convinced that theirs is the final form of human society.” (61) He goes on to add that “Societies that assume that their history has ended, however are usually societies whose history is about to decline.” (62) Huntington then poses a question “Is the West an exception to this pattern?” (63) and seems to answer it in the affirmative when he says “The West obviously differs from all other civilisations that have existed in that it has had an overwhelming impact on all other civilisations that have existed since 1500.” (64) However, Huntington also denies this when he states that “The development of the West to date has not deviated significantly from the evolutionary pattern common to civilisations throughout history.” (65) He tries to overcome this apparent dilemma by positing the idea of civilisational revival and renewal. He says “The overriding lesson of the history of civilisation, however, is that many things are probable but nothing is inevitable. Civilisations can and have reformed and renewed themselves.” (66) In arriving at many of his ideas to bolster his thesis of clash of civilizations, Huntington heavily relies on the analyses of Carroll Quigley spelt out in her work *The Evolution of Civilisations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis* (1979)

He points out that apart from the challenge from the Muslims and Asians, “Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies.” (67) The question of demographic and immigration threat
to the West has preoccupied Huntington tremendously which has finally culminated in his recently producing a major work *Who Are We?* (2004) He also feels that "The erosion of Christianity among Westerners is likely to be at worst only a very long term threat to the health of Western civilisation." (68) Another threat to the Western civilisation, according to Huntington, is from multiculturalism being propagated by some in the West. He accuses the American multiculturist by saying "they wish to create a country of many civilisations, which is to say a country not belonging to any civilisation and lacking a cultural core." (69) He believes this will cause the collapse of the Western domination or fall of liberal domino. He fears this will lead to the decline or fall of the United States as is evident from his these words "Rejection of the Creed and of Western civilisation means the end of the United States of America as we have known it. It also means effectively the end of Western civilisation. "(70) His statement "The futures of the United States and of the West depend upon Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilisation." (71) Hence, Huntington's concern is not only to preserve the Western civilisation, but also the United States, which, according to him, is the backbone of the Western civilisation. However he also expresses some doubt about the role of United States when he says "Whether the West comes together politically and economically, however, depends overwhelmingly on whether the United States reaffirms its identity as Western nation and defines its global role as the leader of the Western civilisation." (72) Clearly Huntington what Huntington is saying in so many words is that the United States must continue to be the bulwark of the Western civilisation and he wants the United States to not only assume this role more forcefully but to work towards the reassertion of the West in the world. Having declared that the "Western belief in the universality of Western culture" (73) is false, immoral and dangerous, Huntington seeks to qualify the role of the West and the United States in the world thus "Western civilisation is valuable not because it s universal but because it is unique. The principal responsibility of western leaders, consequently, is not to
attempt to reshape other civilisations in the image of the West, which is beyond their declining power, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilisation. Because it is the most powerful Western country, that responsibility falls overwhelmingly on the United States of America.” (74) Huntington therefore spells out the specific role for the United States, as the leader of the West, thus “In this era, however, the United States can neither dominate nor escape the world. Neither internationalism nor isolationism, neither multilateralism nor unilateralism, will best serve its interests. Those will best be advanced by eschewing these opposing extremes and instead adopting an Atlanticist policy of close cooperation with its European partners to protect and advance the interests and values of the unique civilisation they share.” (75)

Huntington, in the last part of his work paints a picture of catastrophic global civilisational war in the near future (2010) in which “the centre of world politics moves south” (76) as big powers or the core states of the North will be devastated and decline in power. (His contention is also that countries like India and Indonesia, as well as the Latin American nations, which sat out the civilisational war, would become important players in the post civilisational war world.) Huntington says that such a civilisational war will be caused due to...

“intervention by the core state of one civilisation (the United States) in a dispute between the core state of another civilisation (China) with a member state of that civilisation (Vietnam).” (77)

Hence, in order to secure peace, he suggests that “In the coming era, in short, the avoidance of major intercivilisational wars requires core states to refrain from intervening in conflicts in other civilisations. This is a truth which some states, particularly the United States, will undoubtedly find difficult to accept. This abstention rule that core states abstain from intervention in conflicts in other civilisations is the first requirement of peace in a multivilisational, multipolar world. The second requirement is the joint mediation rule that core states negotiate with each other to contain or to halt fault line wars between states or groups from
their civilisations." (78) Huntington further suggests that the permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council must reflect the changed reality of power in the world. He therefore says that "In a multicivilisational world ideally each major civilisation should have at least one permanent seat on the Security Council." (79) He suggests that "From civilisational viewpoint, clearly Japan and India should be permanent members, and Africa, Latin America, and the Muslim world should have permanent seats, which could be occupied on a rotating basis by the leading states of those civilisations, selections being made by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Organisation of African Unity and the Organisation of American States (the United States abstaining)." (80) He also suggests that "It would be appropriate to consolidate the British and French seats into a single European Union. Seat, the rotating occupant of which would be selected by the Union. Seven civilisations would thus each have one permanent seat and the West would have two, an allocation broadly representative of the distribution of people, wealth, and power in the world." (81) Another way of ensuring peace in the world according to Huntington is by encouraging a multicultural world instead of a multicultural America. He says "The global monoculturalists want to make the world like America. The domestic multiculturists want to make America like the world. A multicultural America is impossible because a non-Western America is not America. A multicultural world is unavoidable because global empire is impossible. The preservation of the United States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity. The security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality." (82)

He also says that "Instead of promoting the supposedly universal features of one civilisation, the requisites for cultural coexistence demand a search for what is common to most civilisations. In a multicivilisational world, the constructive course is to renounce universalism, accept diversity and seek commonalities". (83) Citing the example of multicultural Singapore's idea of shared values and the need for its emulation by the world of civilisations, Huntington ventures that "This
effort would contribute not only to limiting the clash of civilisations but also to strengthening Civilisation in the singular" (84) Further, taking a cue from Lester Pearson's warning Huntington concludes that "The futures of both peace and Civilisation depend upon understanding and cooperation among the political, spiritual, and intellectual leaders of the world's major civilisations. In the clash of civilisations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately. In the greater clash, the global "real clash" between Civilisation and barbarism, the world's greatest civilisation, with their rich accomplishments in religion, art, literature, philosophy, science, technology, morality, and compassion, will also hang together or hang separately. In the emerging era, clash of civilisations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilisations is the surest safeguard against world war". (85)

Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis leads him to make several policy recommendations. To be followed by the West and USA in particular. These advices are primarily related to American politics and US foreign policy. He recommends that there must be tightening of immigration and assimilation of immigrants and minorities in order to increase the civilizational coherence so as to prevent the US becoming a 'cleft country'. He recommends that focus must shift from a policy favouring multiculturalism to one that pursues the policy of Americanization. He advises that West must maintain its technological and military superiority over other civilizations. He also calls for strengthening of Western unity by following an Atlanticist policy of working closely with the Western Europeans. He advises that West and USA must exploit any differences between Islamic and Confucian states to maintain its supremacy. He also advises the limiting the military and economic power of the non-Western states to thwart their challenge in the future. He also advises West to establish opportunistic alignment with Japan, Latin American states and Russia to counter the challenge posed by the Islamic-Confucian combine. On the more positive side he asks West
to abandon its universalist aspirations and act as a unique civilization, one among the other civilizations. He also says that West and USA must not intervene in the affairs of other civilizations in order to prevent a clash of civilizations.

Conclusion

Huntington's position is that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be ideological or economic but cultural and civilizational. To sum up this, in his words, "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future." In this battle of civilizations Huntington wishes for the continuing supremacy and dominance of the Western civilization.