II

CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS: HUNTINGTON’S POSITION
Chapter 2
THE CONTEXT

2.1 Introduction.

There have been many criticisms of Huntington’s thesis from various quarters, but there have also been those who have endorsed his views, leading to a persistent controversy in the field of International Relations for more than a decade now. A clear articulation of the main features and tenets of Huntington’s ‘clash’ thesis becomes extremely essential, not just to understand his actual thesis but also to check the veracity of his arguments and the validity of criticisms against his thesis. But before embarking on this journey it is essential to consider the context in which Huntington’s thesis came to be propounded.

2.2 The Context for Huntington’s Theory

Everything has a context, it is said, and hence theories and paradigms, like many other events and occurrences arise from a context, which is generally quite complex. The beginning of 1990s can be considered as a watershed in global politics, as, least expected but breathtaking events had unfolded - reunification of Germany, collapse of Soviet Union, fall of Communism, rise of ethnicism, outbreaks of many communal unrests and conflicts, and so on, leaving the leaders and intellectuals floundering for answers. The two questions that most preoccupied the scholars and leaders at this juncture were – ‘What kind of a new world order is likely to emerge?’ and ‘What kind of new conflicts will be witnessed in this new world?’ These two questions led to a flurry of intellectual search for answers and resulted, on one hand, in revival of some old theories to explain the unfolding international situation, and on the other, positing of new ideas, theories and paradigms towards the same end. Therefore it is imperative to take a detailed look at the context and setting, which resulted in several explanations, theories, theses and paradigms, including that of Huntington’s. The concerns at the end of
Cold War, namely about a New World order and conflict in the new order merit substantial attention.

2.2.1 Concerns at the End of Cold War

A) New World Order

The term "new world order" refers to a new period of history in the world politics on account of dramatic changes in patterns of political thinking and balance of power. The vocabulary of new world order has been particularly present in America for most part of the twentieth century. In 1915 Nicholas Murray said "The old world order died with the setting of that day's sun and a new world order is being born " (1) M.C. Alexander in 1919 said, "upon these decisions will rest the stability of the new world order and the future peace of the world.(2) The phrase "new world" was used by Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I during the efforts to form the League of Nations. He had spoken of "the new world in which we now live"(3) He wanted to make the world safer and hence argued for a new world order in which peace and order would be the main focus, but, as the League did not make much headway in this direction, the term went out of use and was not used much until well after the World War II and the formation of the United Nations.Augustus Thomas said" there are those who think we are to jump immediately into a new world order"(4) H.G.Wells, a well known writer, in 1939 wrote a book titled The New World Order, in which he outlined a world without war, where law and order and peace would prevail. He had said "... when the struggle seems to be drifting definitely towards a world social democracy, there may still be very great delays and disappointments before it becomes an efficient and beneficent world system. Countless people will hate the new world order and will die protesting against it. When we attempt to evaluate its promise, we have to bear in mind the distress of a generation or so of malcontents, many of them quite gallant and graceful-looking people." (5) The term remained
in circulation as is evident by this statement "The World Government plan is being advocated under such alluring names as the 'New International Order,' 'The New World Order" (6) Articles also continued to appear which spoke thus "... when victory was achieved an effort would be made to found a new world order based on the ideals of justice and peace." (7) The trend continued "If democracy wins, the nations of the earth will be united in a commonwealth of free peoples, and individuals, wherever found, will be the sovereign units of the new world order." (8) It began to become more manifest through demands like "New World Order Needed for Peace:" (9) and "the setting up of a new world order on a permanent basis." (10) and even that "the spiritual teachings of religion must become the foundation for the new world order" (11) It became increasingly political in its tone "A constitution for a new world order is never like a blueprint for a skyscraper." (12) and "...champion of a strong and definite new world order." (13) or like "The new world order that will answer economic, military, and political problems" (14) Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York, in an article entitled "Rockefeller Bids Free Lands Unite: Calls at Harvard for Drive to Build New World Order" (15)

In 1967 Robert Kennedy, former U.S. Attorney-General, said "All of us will ultimately be judged on the effort we have contributed to building a new world order" (16) and Nixon spoke of "...the evolution of a new world order." (17) In an article it was reported that "He [President Nixon] spoke of the talks as a beginning, saying nothing more about the prospects for future contacts and merely reiterating the belief he brought to China that both nations share an interest in peace and building 'a new world order.'" (18) Richard Falk said "The existing order is breaking down at a very rapid rate, and the main uncertainty is whether mankind can exert a positive role in shaping a new world order or is doomed to await collapse in a passive posture. We believe a new order will be born no later than early in the next century and that the death throes of the old and
the birth pangs of the new will be a testing time for the human species."(19) Henry Kissinger stated "Let us fashion together a new world order." (20) An article said "Nelson Rockefeller was in the forefront of the struggle to establish not only an American system of political and economic security but a new world order."(21) An article by Hubert Humphrey was titled "A New World Order" way back in 1977(22)

But it wasn't until almost the end of the Cold War that the term saw its strongest revival ever, especially in the political discourse of leading political figures of the world. One of the earliest uses of the term in recent times was by India's then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at a Press Conference in November 1988 in the context of Indo-Russian relations. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi spoke about a new world order in which non-violence and the principles of peaceful coexistence would prevail. Around the same time in 1988, when meeting Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had said "Two things have to be done at the same time. One is to establish a new international political order; the other is to establish a new international economic order."(23) Mikhail Gorbachev’s statement in the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988 (24) made the concept more meaningful as he attempted a fundamental redefinition of international relationships, which he claimed was for independence, democracy, social justice, pluralism, tolerance, and cooperation. Gorbachev said "Further global progress is now possible only through a quest for universal consensus in the movement towards a new world order."(25) Subsequently, on May 12, 1989 President Bush responded by inviting the Soviets to join World Order by saying that the United States is ready to welcome the Soviet Union "back into the world order."(26) The Malta Conference held between US, Russia and others in December 1989 gave further impetus to the discussions on the new world order (27) In a document A World Transformed, presented by Scowcroft(28) and reflecting the ideas of Bush Administration on the 'new world order', the
expectations of the United States were laid out at the Malta gathering. In September 1990, while addressing a joint session of the Congress, President Bush gave a speech entitled "Toward a New World Order"(29) and spelt out a plan for the US to follow in order to establish a new world order. Scowcroft said "We believe we are creating the beginning of a new world order coming out of the collapse of the U.S.-Soviet antagonisms."(30) Gorbachev had said that "For a new type of progress throughout the world to become a reality, everyone must change. Tolerance is the alpha and omega of a new world order."(31) George Bush calling the Gulf War an opportunity for the new world order said "The crisis in the Persian Gulf offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times... a new world order can emerge in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony. Today the new world is struggling to be born."(32) In response to Bush's remarks during the address to the U.N., Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze called Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as "an act of terrorism [that] has been perpetrated against the emerging New World Order."(33) On December 31, Gorbachev declared that the New World Order would be brought about by the Gulf Crisis. In his U.N. address, President Bush said: "... collective strength of the world community expressed by the U.N. ... an historic movement towards a new world order... a new partnership of nations... a time when humankind came into its own... to bring about a revolution of the spirit and the mind and begin a journey into a... new age."(34)

The term gained greater currency when, both, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and US President George H.W. Bush used the term to define the nature of the post Cold War world. Bush said "If we do not follow the dictates of our inner moral compass and stand up for human life, then his lawlessness will threaten the peace and democracy of the emerging new world order we now see, this long dreamed-of vision we've all worked toward for so long."(35) In 1991
President George Bush praised the New World Order in a State of the Union Message by saying “What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea - a new world order... to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind... based on shared principles and the rule of law... The illumination of a thousand points of light... The winds of change are with us now.” President Bush also said “My vision of a new world order foresees a United Nations with a revitalized peacekeeping function.”(36) Later that year President Gorbachev at the Middle East Peace Talks in Madrid stated: “We are beginning to see practical support. And this is a very significant sign of the movement towards a new era, a new age... We see both in our country and elsewhere... ghosts of the old thinking... when we rid ourselves of their presence, we will be better able to move toward a new world order... relying on the relevant mechanisms of the United Nations.”(37) These two leaders tried to present to the world a new vision of the world and though their views on the new world were not very clear or similar, it set in motion the search for a new world order, both among scholars and the political leaders of the world. And this is evident from a news report “But it became clear as time went on that in Mr. Bush’s mind the New World Order was founded on a convergence of goals and interests between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, so strong and permanent that they would work as a team through the U.N. Security Council.”(38) It has been reported that after the fall of Soviet Union George Bush used the term “new world order” forty-two times between the summer of 1990 and March 1991. Subsequently, US President Bill Clinton also continued to endorse the idea of a "new world order". All these developments soon caught the imagination of media as well as the people and ‘new world order’ became a common epithet. Important personages used the term frequently in the subsequent years. George McGovern called "for a comprehensive Middle East settlement and for a 'new world order' based not on Pax Americana but on peace through law with a stronger U.N. and World Court.”(39) Bidden wrote an article "How I Learned to Love the New World Order" in 1992(40) Henry Kissinger wrote “What Congress will have
before it is not a conventional trade agreement but the architecture of a new international system...a first step toward a new world order.”(41) Henry Kissinger who has been one of the greatest proponents of the new world order believed that new world order must be created by the US "[The New World Order] cannot happen without U.S. participation, as we are the most significant single component. Yes, there will be a New World Order, and it will force the United States to change its perceptions.”(42) David Rockefeller in 1994 remarked: “This present window of opportunity, during which a truly peaceful and interdependent world order might be built, will not be open for too long... We are on the verge of a global transformation. All we need is the right major crisis, and the nations will accept the New World Order.”(43)

In Morocco an advertisement said "The Final Act of the Uruguay Round, marking the conclusion of the most ambitious trade negotiation of our century, will give birth - in Morocco - to the World Trade Organization, the third pillar of the New World Order, along with the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund."(44) Japanese Political reformer Kenichi Ohmae wrote an article "New World Order: The Rise of the Region-State"(45) Even Nelson Mandela wrote about it and said "new world order that is in the making must focus on the creation of a world of democracy, peace and prosperity for all."(46) Hosni Mubarak of Egypt described the renewal of the non-proliferation treaty as important "for the welfare of the whole world and the new world order."(47) Stephen Stedman wrote an article "Alchemy for a New World Order"(48) Arthur Schlesinger also stated "We are not going to achieve a new world order without paying for it in blood as well as in words and money."(49)

Thus the phrase "new world order" came to be used as the signifier of the post-Cold War period, and both, the leaders as well as the public, began to use it much more frequently. The scholars, especially in political science and
international relations field, followed suit. The term at this time did not have a clear-cut and comprehensive definition. The political leaders, the public and the scholars began to give their own interpretations of what is meant by a “new world order”. This led to an explosion of writings on the subject of “new world order” as almost every well established scholar of international politics wanted to articulate his or her views on the matter. The idea of the new world encompassed theories ranging from death of ideology, nuclear disarmament, unipolarity to one world. Thus from the beginning of international turmoil in 1988 to the end of the Cold War there arose a serious concern for a new world order, both among political leaders as well as scholars. But not all leaders and all scholars agreed that there was truly a new world order in the making. This led to the debate on the very idea of new world order and even, its open questioning.

John Lewis Gaddis(50) one of the earliest scholars who subscribed to the idea of the new world order, concluded that the most important feature of the new world order was the almost unchallenged supremacy of America and increasing global integration on one hand, and, the rise of resurgence of religious fundamentalism, nationalism and threats to international security on the other. For him, the primary and fundamental challenge in the new world order was that of integration versus fragmentation, and the implications arising from it. Gaddis also believed that peace, democracy and liberalism would finally come to prevail. Strobe Talbott (51), on the other hand spoke of the new world order with globalist concerns and David Gergen(52) felt economic recession during the early nineties had a direct impact on the euphoria about the new world order. In the same period, Joseph S. Nye, Jr(53). disagreed that anything like new world order was in the offing. Rather, he suggested that the post World War II ideology of liberalism had reappeared in the post Cold War period in a more assertive manner. This argument was also supported by several others like G. John Ikenberry(54) In 1992, Hans Köchler on the other hand described the new world order “as an ideological
tool of legitimation of the global exercise of power by the US in a unipolar environment”(55)

In sharp contrast to them, Anne-Marie Slaughter(56) stated that the new order was not about liberal triumph but one where state had its authority eroded and decentralized on account of globalization. Thus by the mid 1990s, this trend of speaking about ‘the new world order’ saw a decline and other competing ideas as to how the post-Cold War order would develop began to emerge and were focused more on "Era of Globalization" the "Unipolar Moment", the "Clash of Civilizations", the "Age of Terror", etc.

**Conclusion**

Despite the many criticisms of the concept of “new world order”, some focusing on its impracticality, others on its unworkability, and yet some others on its theoretical ambiguity and untenability, the idea had struck deep roots in the academic and political circles and it had become a fashion to speak about the new world order particularly in the post Cold War era. This impact is still visible today to some extent.

**B) Nature of Conflict**

That international order is characterised by conflict is an undeniable fact. That the world has witnessed all kinds of conflicts, ranging from brief wars to protracted conflicts, is also an unassailable reality. But questions about the reasons for rise or existence of conflict have for decades, dogged both scholars and leaders. What is an appropriate explanation for conflict in general and international conflict in particular? What is the nature of conflict? Why do some conflicts persist while others dissipate quickly? These and many such questions have preoccupied scholars for a long time. A brief exploration about conflict, its nature and theoretical foundations is essential to see if there are appropriate and
acceptable answers. It needs no stating that there is a large volume of literature on
the nature and theory of conflict, particularly as regards warfare at international
scale. Scholars have not been able to arrive at any consensus about the reasons for
existence of human conflict. Whatever literature is available, suffers from serious
flaws, with the result that there are many contradictions and this makes it difficult
to arrive at a widely acceptable paradigm or theory of conflict.

According to James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, the biggest
difficulty is about the nature of conflict itself. They state that "Social scientists are
divided on the question whether social conflict should be regarded as something
rational, constructive, and socially functional or something irrational, pathological,
and socially dysfunctional." (57) Among the scholars, there is a wide difference
about the theoretical approaches they adopt to understand and explain conflict.
Essentially there are two approaches: the classical and the behaviourist. In the
classical approach the focus is on the macro analysis of conflict, that is, conflict
among major societal groups which could be national, ethnic, class, caste,
religious, racial, ideological, and so on. This approach, analyses group interactions
and considers implications of such interactions to the rise of conflict. In the
behaviourist approach the focus shifts to the micro analysis of conflict, that is, at
the individual level. The most note-worthy assumption of the behaviourist
approach is that the root cause of conflict lies in human nature and behaviour. It
holds that intrapersonal conflict and conflict in the external social order are
directly related. This approach thus, tries to find out if human beings have
inherent biological or psychological predisposition towards aggression and
conflict. This approach believes in looking at individuals in their environmental
setting and find out the reasons that can trigger conflict and aggression. Many
micro theories of conflict have been proposed, such as, animal behaviour theory,
instinct or innate theory of aggression, frustration-aggression theory, social
learning theory, social identity theory, and so on. And while the micro theories of
conflict have helped us understand the nature of conflict better, by providing workable models for complex situations, they suffer from severe limitations when trying to explain large scale inter-group conflicts as witnessed in the world.

Despite the contributions of the behaviourist school of thought to understanding conflict, it still does not appropriately explain all aspects of conflict, especially conflict at a societal or mass or international level. It is here that the classical or macro theory of conflict has stepped in to provide some answers. This theory looks at the interaction of groups, particularly on the conscious level. This theory focuses on the role of power in generating conflict. The advocates of this theory assert that power in its various forms like economic, political, military, religious, cultural, is at the core of all conflict. These classical theories attribute conflict to group competition and their pursuit of power and resources. The classical or macro theorists of conflict generally rely on historical or case study methods to substantiate their arguments. The results of this theory are visible in concepts like ‘balance of power’ and in decision-making approach, communication theory, and game theories. This approach focuses on the inter-group dynamics and looks at in-groups and out-groups, that is, two contending groups, out to gain power and ascendancy. One of the most important analyses undertaken by these theorists is about the ethnic and ethno-national conflicts between opposing groups having different ethnic, religious or national identities. These groups are engaged in conflict to secure political power and control. The behaviour of the participants in such conflicts is not necessarily driven by leaders, but stems from the masses themselves and this is what makes it intriguing. Investigations by several scholars like Walker Connor(58) have established that exercise of power, conflict, and use of force can be and very often is, mass driven, by one group against another.

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, the classical approach is concerned with the conscious aspects while the behaviourist one, with the
unconscious. Conflict is said to be stronger than competition. However, according to Thomas Schelling, conflict, competition, and cooperation are inherently interdependent, but says that conflict occurs when goals, objectives, needs and values of competing groups clash. He, of course does not hold that such clash will necessarily result in violence or open warfare.

There have been scores of theories churned out during last few decades trying to explain the causes of conflict in general and inter-group and international conflict in particular. The problem with all these theories is that, none of them sufficiently explain the intractable conflicts seen in the world at inter-group level. Hence, a constant search for newer and better paradigms or theories has always existed and this need became even more acute during the early 1990s when the world witnessed a sudden upsurge in mass group conflicts in different parts of the world. Several new theories were put forward during the 1990s to fill this void and some notable ones are Enemy System Theory (EST), the Human Needs Theory (HNT), Conflict Resolution Theory (CRT). The stream of theories to explain, particularly inter-group conflict has continued unabated in the new millennium years. There have been several other theories which have been put forward to explain the existence of mass-scale group violence or conflicts as well as international conflicts. Some of these theories have been around for quite some time such as the Bargaining Theory of international conflict which has been worked upon by many scholars, the Diversionary Theory of international conflict of T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, the Expected Utility Theory of international conflict of Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, and similar others.

The problem has been that none of these theories are cohesive and comprehensive enough to explain conflict in human society, especially at the inter-group level and no grand theory of conflict has been anywhere in sight. This situation has led to contending approaches being offered by many scholars, but
none seem to have been able to address the complexity of human conflict. Though, some theories like the Enemy System Theory and Human Needs Theory seem to offer very good explanations for conflict, they are in no way comprehensive and this leaves enough room for many others to venture newer explanations of conflict in the world and many have chosen to take that path, one among them being Samuel Huntington. That Huntington has consciously undertaken such an effort is admitted by him by saying "Clash of Civilizations deals with international relations, with the sources of conflict in global politics" (59).

Conclusion

As most of the theories about conflict and world order have several or some loopholes and as there is no comprehensive theory that can explain appropriately the conflict in human society and human history, and as there is always room to improve, by venturing newer ideas or repackaging known facts, new theses and theories continue to see the light of the day. Thus the ongoing search for answers to understand conflict in human society in general and at international level in particular has led to proposing of many theories of conflict one of them being the theory of Clash of Civilisations.

2.2.2 Responses by Scholars

One of the earliest attempts to interpret the new global scenario in the post Cold War period was made by none other than Francis Fukuyama through the publication of his article 'The End of History' in The National Interest in 1989. This opened the floodgates of intellectual enquiry and debate in the academic world on the questions of new world order and nature of conflict in this new world. Some of the other early attempts that followed were: Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War by John J Mearsheimer (1990), After the Victory in the Cold War: The Global Village or Tribal Warfare by Hans Mark (1990), Toward the Post Cold War World by John Lewis Gladdis (1991),
Continuity and Change in World Politics: The Clash of Perspectives by _, Hughes (1991), A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era by James M. Goldgeier and Michael Faul (1992), The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses by James L. Richardson (1993), The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil by Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky (1993), Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century by Zbignew Brzezinski (1993), and many more. It is at this stage that Huntington too joined in, to articulate his ideas, through the publication of his article, 'Clash of Civilisations?' in the journal Foreign Affairs. This trend continued beyond early nineties, churning out many new ideas and explanations and many works in this line have seen the light of the day such as The Coming Anarchy by Robert Kaplan (1994). Thus at the end of Cold War, academic literature on the post Cold War scenario had proliferated and the primary effort was not so much to analyse the actual unravelling of events, but to order the future, that is, to construct in thought, before beginning its practice. It was the age of building new security architecture for the West in general and US in particular. An era of setting the new agenda, a new programme for the next stage.

Both the scholars and the political personalities of America joined this enterprise. Thus, while Francis Fukuyama heralded the “End of History”, President George H.W Bush announced the “New World Order” and Huntington made a forceful impact with his thesis of clash of civilisations. In the academic world Fukuyama and Huntington, in essence set the ball rolling, by launching the search for creation of a new international landscape, in which the old Western world would continue to dominate. The American scholars from the radical left movement – Noam Chomsky, Richard Barnet, Gar Alperovitz, and others and from centre right school of thought – Ronald Steel, Raymond Garthoff, Arthur Schlesinger, Samuel Welles, John Lewis Gaddis, and others set out on a journey to either understand or to spell out the new American mission in the post Cold War era.
In contrast to the more optimistic views put forth by scholars such as Francis Fukuyama in *End of History*, (1989) and Kenichi Ohmae in *The Borderless World* (1990) others embarked upon different adventures. Michael J. Hogan's 'The End of the Cold War: Its meaning and implications (1992)' (60), show-cased some of these new ideas. Paul Kennedy's *Preparing for the Twenty first Century* (1993) (60a) was yet another work in the line of finding a new sense of national direction, a work in the line of setting the goals for America. Kennedy also expressed his desire for the continuing dominance by West and by America even in the face of rapid demographic reversals against the West. He banked on the western dominance and control over technology as its saving grace and as an instrument it can use to dominate the world in the future, in spite of the challenge of demographic swell of the non-West. While criticising the decline and weaknesses of the West and America, in his work he clearly wishes for the continuing dominance by 'America Incorporated' over the rest of the world in the future. Kennedy, like many others at the end of the Cold War, and on the eve of the new millennium, had thrown himself into the debate and discussion about the American national purpose, aims and strategic objectives for the coming period. In conclusion, like several others, Kennedy not only got involved in towing the American line but setting the future agenda for the United States and the West.

Linda Miller's *The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign Policy* (1994) (61) was one of the earliest articles in that period, focusing on agenda setting exercise by votaries of West and the United States. The persistent efforts at agenda-setting at the global level, by states, on grounds of national interest is but the macro expression of agenda-setting by leading individuals and groups throughout human history to gain ascendancy, currency and dominance. As before, even during the course of the twentieth century America, through its votaries, ideologues and elites, has been constantly attempting to create successive new world orders, each of which it has sought to dominate. Americans, scholars and politicians, have collectively endeavoured to set the agenda for each new
order whenever they realised that a new order was in the offing. They have sought to give direction and orientation to the evolving changes in international politics and consequent new orders, in a manner that would ensure America’s dominance. They have endeavoured to set the terms and framework for the emergent, in order to subdue and dominate it.

Michael Dunne in his review article *Hemisphere and Globe, the Terms of American Foreign Relations* (1994) has aptly remarked “The Americanisation of the globe is an old, generic wine, decanted into new bottles periodically over the centuries”. The argument that elites and special interests determine US foreign policy is not only held by many like Michael Dunne, Warren I Cohen and others but was also spelt out much earlier by C. Wright Mills in *The Power Elite* (63) and Gabriel Kolko in *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose*. This trend of setting the agenda for the coming era had become an open competition during the early 1990s and many scholars had taken the plunge, either towing the line of their established schools of thought or putting forth their own perspectives.

Lawrence Freedman in *Order and Disorder in the New World* (1992) had said “The United States has attained an international pre-eminence beyond challenge. As leader of the West during the years of confrontation with the Soviet bloc and most recently, of the international coalition ranged against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, it is now well placed to define both the character of this new stage in international history and the west’s role within it. Yet that task is proving to be extremely difficult and perplexing. Events since the conclusion of Gulf War have qualified confidence in the ability of the United States and its allies to shape the future accordingly to their values and interests. The task has become too frustrating and unrewarding. It has to be justified by a sense of responsibility as much as strategic necessity, but the nature of the responsibility still lacks clarity.” (65) It was this need that Huntington sought to fulfil by venturing his thesis of ‘Clash of Civilisation’.
Strobe Talbott in *Post Victory Blues* (1992) said “This (end of Cold War) left him (President Bush) and the country he was trying to lead with a dilemma: the United States had, in the past always needed on overarching rationale for its engagement aboard, and it would almost certainly need one in the future”(66) and then he goes on to add “More important, he (President Bush) gave his countrymen no coherent or compelling alternative. He left them in confusion over exactly what they had been fighting for in the Persian Gulf, hence over what America’s role should be in the post Cold War world.”(67) Evidently, this indicates that the situation was ripe for inventing new rationale for US engagement abroad. This provided an opportunity for academics, like Huntington to initially venture new “doomsday” thesis and later for political elites to propose new doctrines such as “intervention”, “pre-emptive strikes”, “rogue states”, “axis of evil”, “war on terror”, and the like to give effect to war and conflict rhetoric.

Thus the attempts to interpret and explain the emerging new world order by these scholars ranged from the revival of old theories such as polarist, statist, ethnicist, anarchist to a new range of theses such as imperialist, globalist, civilisational, religious and cultural. Interestingly, as far as the issue of conflict was concerned, while few like Fukuyama, trumpeted the coming of the age of peace and prosperity by propounding the Democratic Peace Theory, most preferred to highlight not only the existence of conflict in the newly emerging world, but also the rise of new forms of conflict, such as ethnic, terroristic, sectarian, communal, cultural, and civilisational.

**Conclusion**

The collapse of the bipolar world order leading to the end of the Cold War caused the leaders, intellectuals and scholars to seek explanations, paradigms and theories to explain the emerging world, especially in relation to conflicts and wherever possible set objectives and goals particularly for America.
2.2.3 Response by Samuel Huntington

Opportunity

James Kurth has expressed in clear terms not only the predicament of any new age and opportunism of scholars in naming and defining an era but Huntington's role in it. He says "In the first few years after the Second World War, it was common for people to refer to the time that they were living through as the post-war period. But a post-war or post anything period cannot last long, and eventually an era will assume a characteristic name of its own. This began to happen as early as 1947 and was largely completed by 1949. The post-war period had become the Cold War era. There has been no such development yet in our time of transition. Until recently, it was common to speak of the post-Cold-War era, but to continue to refer to the current period in this way--fully five years after the end of the Cold War--does seem to be stretching things a bit. To speak of the current period as the post-post-Cold-War era, however, clearly would sound ridiculous. And yet there is just as clearly no commonly accepted designation for this indisputably new era that we are now in. The lack of a common term for the era is an outer manifestation of the lack of a common interpretation of the international situation and a common basis for foreign policies, as is every day illustrated by the vacillating and reckless foreign policies of the Clinton administration, the first completely post-post-Cold-War presidency. The problem is not that there are no reasonable contending definitions of the new era but rather that there are too many of them. Indeed, by 1993, there had developed at least four major candidates for the definition of the post-Cold War central axis of international conflict. Analogous to the war-centered definitions of past eras, these were: (1) trade wars, particularly between the United States, Japan, and Western Europe; (2) religious wars, particularly involving Islam; (3) ethnic wars, particularly within the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and the
"failed states" of Africa; and (4) renewed cold wars, particularly involving Russia or China. And then along came Samuel Huntington, who published a now-famous article, which in large measure subsumed the four different kinds of wars into "the clash of civilizations."(68)

Thus, Huntington, through his article and subsequently the book, tried to define the "character of this new stage in international history and the West's role within it". Huntington set out to provide "clarity" that Freedman and Talbott said was lacking to explain the new world emerging on the death of Cold War. Freedman, in developing President Bush's slogan of "new world order", had talked of confused interests, confused principles and confused instruments, and had called for a "globalist approach" or "globalist perspective" to conflict. He had stated that "Any relevant framework must reflect the creative opportunities as well as the dangers inherent in perpetual instability"(69) By stating this, Freedman, like several others such as Williams G. Hyland, Strobe Talbott, John Lewis Gaddis, Stansfield Turner and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, had set the stage for new paradigms to emerge and Samuel Huntington was one of those who quickly, almost hastily, ventured an explanation to the "new world order".

Evidently, Huntington, like many of his contemporary scholars such as Francis Fukuyama, felt the compelling urge to articulate his views on the issues of the period. Huntington has admitted that "I was part of a wave of thinking"(70) in the order to find an explanation for the new world order.

In the history of America and in the scholastic domain, a similar instance arose once earlier when George F. Kennan published his article X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct(71) in the same journal towards the same purpose and goal. Kennan framed the policy of U.S. for containment of Communism during the Cold War and thereby also provided the framework for the international relations. Kennan's thesis of 'Cold War' and his 'X' article came to be one of the
most cited studies in the field of international relations thereafter. Now Samuel Huntington has been similarly poised to publish another article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" article, in the same Foreign Affairs journal and thereby attempt to significantly shape the post-Cold War agenda and the policy for the US and a framework or discourse for international politics.

Disagreeing with the grand vision of 'One World' of scholars like Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington wrote critically about the "new world order" and while he accepted the notion of a new world, he vehemently opposed the grandiose vision painted by many, especially by Fukuyama. His perception radically differed from at least those, who sought the revival of old ideas or those who trumpeted the victory of liberalism and American supremacy. He set out to blaze a seemingly new trail in the international arena about the world order and existence of conflict. Huntington simultaneously touched upon the two most sensitive issues of the time, linking the question of the new world order to the question of conflict in the world and packaged it into an apparently intelligent and provocative thesis which he called as the 'Clash of the Civilisations'.

This thesis actually came as a response to the emerging viewpoints to explain the end of cold war era. Huntington wrote in 1989 "The major issue in 1989 is very different. The theory of declinism has been displaced by the theory of endism. Its central element is that bad things are coming to an end. Endism manifests itself in at least three ways. At its most specific level, endism hails the end of the Cold War. In the spring of 1989 the New York Times and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, George Kennan and George Bush, all set forth this proposition in one form or another. The end of the Cold War became the Foreign Policy Establishment's Established Truth. At a second level, endism manifested itself in the more academic and more general proposition that wars among nation states, or at least among some types of nation states, were coming to
an end. Many scholars pointed to the historical absence of wars between
democratic countries and saw the multiplication of democratic regimes since 1974
as evidence that the probability of war was declining. In a related but somewhat
different version of this proposition, Michael Doyle argued that wars were
impossible between liberal states. In a still more sweeping formulation, John
Mueller contended that the advance of civilization was making war obsolescent
and that it would disappear the same way that slavery and dueling had disappeared
in advanced societies. Wars still might occur among backward Third World
countries, but among developed countries, communist or capitalist, war was
unthinkable. The third and most extreme formulation of endism was advanced by
Francis Fukuyama in a brilliant essay called "The End of History?" in the Summer
issue of this journal. Fukuyama celebrates not just the end of the Cold War or the
end of wars among developed nation states, but instead "the end of history as
such." This results from the "unabashed victory of economic and political
liberalism" and the "exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives." Like Mueller,
Fukuyama concedes that wars may occur among Third World states still caught up
in the historical process. But for the developed countries, the Soviet Union, and
China, history is at an end."(72)

Huntington states "Endism - the intellectual fad of 1989 - contrasts rather
dramatically with declinism - the intellectual fad of 1988. Declinism is
conditionally pessimistic. It is rooted in the study of history and draws on the
parallels between the United States in the late twentieth century, Britain in the late
nineteenth century, and France, Spain, and other powers in earlier centuries. Its
proponents and its critics debate the relevance of these parallels and argue over
detailed, historical data concerning economic growth, productivity, defense
spending, savings, and investment. Endism, on the other hand, is oriented to the
future rather than the past and is unabashedly optimistic. In its most developed
form, as with Fukuyama, it is rooted in philosophical speculation rather than
historical analysis. It is based not so much on evidence from history as on assumptions about history" (73)

Taking the discussion further, he goes on to say "The era of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis reminds us, has also been the era of the Long Peace, the longest period in history without hot war between major powers." and asks "Does the end of the Cold War mean the end of the Long Peace?" (74) The laying out of the ground for 'The Clash' thesis can be seen in the following statement of Huntington. "In the absence of the Kaiser, Hitler, Stalin, and Brezhnev, the American inclination may well be to relax and to assume that peace, goodwill, and international cooperation will prevail: that if the Cold War is over, American relations with the Soviet Union will be similar to its relations with Canada, France, or Japan. Americans tend to see competition and conflict as normal and even desirable features of their domestic economy and politics and yet perversely assume them to be abnormal and undesirable in relations among states. In fact, however, the history of the relations among great powers, when it has not been the history of hot wars, has usually been the history of cold wars. The end of the Cold War does not mean the end of political, ideological, diplomatic, economic, technological, or even military rivalry among nations. It does not mean the end of the struggle for power and influence. It very probably does mean increased instability, unpredictability, and violence in international affairs. It could mean the end of the Long Peace." (75) Huntington agrees that "The democratic "zone of peace" is a dramatic historical phenomenon. If that relationship continues to hold and if democracy continues to spread, wars should become less frequent in the future than they have been in the past. This is one endist argument that has a strong empirical base." (76) But then he quickly adds "The "democratic zone of peace" argument is thus valid as far as it goes, but it may not go all that far" (77).
The inspiration for the civilisational thesis becomes evident in Huntington's following statement "One trend in history is the amalgamation of smaller units into larger ones. The probability of war between the smaller units declines but the probability of war between the larger amalgamated units does not necessarily change. A united European community may end the possibility of France-German war; it does not end the possibility of war between that community and other political units."(78) Here Huntington only needs a name for the 'larger amalgamated unit' and what could have been better than the term 'civilisation' to signify this 'larger amalgamated unit' which can continue to go to war, a war which could be appropriately termed as a clash of civilizations?

Thus it is in his critique of the emerging viewpoints to explain the end of cold war era during the end of 1980s, that Huntington is led to search for an alternative viewpoint which finally results in his expounding a different viewpoint and is thus poised for a different kind of theorizing.

But there is also another possibility. Huntington's formulation of the clash of civilizations thesis and its presentation can be explained within the context of the emergence of the concept of the new world order and conflict, the Gulf War of 1990. Erica A Miller and Steve A Yetiv in a study entitled "The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview in Transition" had concluded that the purpose of consciously creating a framework by the conservative Bush Administration in 1990 particularly in the context of fall of the Soviet Union and the Gulf crisis was not for bringing about a new era of peace but rather to check the offensive use of force, promote collective security, and use great power cooperation. The concept of new world order which until the Gulf War was ambiguous, nascent and unproven was evolving as a policy setter for US to take up the role of a global leader using unilateralism to prevent aggression, protect oil supplies; and, further a world order which would serve...
American interests. But Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait challenged this American policy and the US was compelled to take action against Iraq and ensure the vacation of the aggression which had jeopardised American oil supplies, affected American interests and challenged American leadership. During the Gulf War Bush called the world’s countries to make a clear choice, as being for or against aggression. Bush wanted to reassert American dominance especially when its power seemed to be declining. According to the authors the concept of ‘new world order’ provided the Bush Administration the much needed excuse to dictate the terms to the world. But America faced one problem. While the U.S. had the strength and the resources to pursue its own interests, it felt it had a disproportionate responsibility to use its power for the common good, such as liberating a country like Kuwait which has been occupied by force. But to be dominant at the global level US needed committed partners who are also major powers, preferably the European powers. The conclusion of the authors was “seeking and obtaining great power cooperation was one of the major goals of the US through the new world order” (79).

If this is true than this situation also provides an excellent backdrop for Huntington to put forth his thesis, which using a civilisational perspective is able to provide the US the great power cooperation it needs to dominate the world. This great power cooperation would now come to the US from the kin countries of the Western civilisation to which it belongs, if Huntington’s thesis is accepted. The dominance, because it necessarily needs opposing camps, would now come from a clash, a civilisational clash between enemies from other civilisations, the challenger Islamic-Sinic civilisations and the supporters from America’s own Western civilisation, the European powers. The stage is set for a paradigm, a paradigm of clash of civilisations. And Huntington provides it at the right time.
Influences

Prior to Huntington’s propounding of the ‘clash of civilisation’ thesis there has been a stream of literature churned out on the subject of cultures and civilisations throughout the last century, mostly by anthropologists, but also by sociologists, geographers and others. Some of these scholars were Oswald Sprengler, Albert Kolb, A.A.Knopf, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Arnold Toynbee, A.L.Kroeber, Pitirim Sorokin, Carroll Quigley, Mary Beard, Fernand Braudel, Adda B. Bozeman, Louis Hartz, Marcel Mauss, etc. During the early 1990s several authors were articulating ideas in cultural and civilisational terms. Some of these were Mary Bateson, Michael Lind, Barry Buzan, Robert Gilpin, William S. Lind, Michael Vlahos, Donald J. Puchala, Mahdi Elmandjra, Mathew Melko, Roland Robertson, William H. McNeill, and others. One of the contemporaries of Huntington, Johan Galtung came up with almost similar thoughts and ideas about the world of civilisations in 1992. Yet another scholar, Zsolt Rostovanyi, wrote a paper ‘Clash of Civilisations and Cultures; Unity and Disunity of World Order’ around the same time as the publication of Huntington’s article in March 1993. Similarly, others like Samuel Beer, V.S.Naipaul, Vaclav Havel and Emmanuel Wallerstein had around the same period also focused on civilisational analysis. This has been observed by many scholars as is evident from Lal Goel’s statement “The notion of a clash of civilizations has been with us for some time. British historian Arnold Toynbee used the term in a series of lectures he delivered in 1953. In an article published in 1990, Bernard Lewis wrote that the Muslim rage against the West is no less than a clash of civilizations”(80) (80.Lal Goel A Clash Of Civilizationsm A revised version of a speech delivered at the Unitarian Universalist Fellowship of Pensacola, University of West Florida Florida, June 30, 2002)
Much before Huntington's popularising 'the Clash of Civilizations?' through his article in Foreign Affairs of Summer 1993, Bernard Lewis, a well-known historian and scholar of Princeton University, had talked about the 'clash' in September 1990 in the following words “It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but equally irrational reaction against that rival.”

Thus it was Bernard Lewis, who in his essay "The Roots of Muslim Rage", had for the first time explicitly used the terminology of "clash of civilizations". But before Bernard Lewis, Hichem Djait had coined a somewhat similar term ‘confrontation of civilizations’(82) in 1978, while referring to Europe and Islam. Another work which was about the clash in the context of global politics was that of Barry B. Hughes who in his Continuity and Change in World Politics: The Clash of Perspectives,(83) focused on the clash thesis of perspectives, an idea not too removed from what Huntington would follow. Huntington has been in the know of much of this literature and certainly has been influenced by many of these writings, their vocabulary, their terminology, their ideas and their frameworks. Thus, his thesis is in no way original or novel. His achievement, however, lies in the formulation of an attention catching thesis and using loads of anecdotal data and examples trying to support his arguments and making it provocative enough to draw global attention.

Huntington had first tested his thesis at the American Enterprise Institute and he has stated this very openly “Six years ago Chris also invited me to deliver a Bradley Lecture and thus provided me with something for which I am profoundly grateful: my first opportunity to hold forth on the clash of civilizations before an
informed and critical audience. The article and the book that developed out of that lecture, needless to say, stimulated widespread and intense discussion and controversy"(84) He has mentioned the same in the Preface to his book as well.

**Competition**

Evidently, in an era of globalisation, extending the sphere of competition to the world of scholars, competition arises between scholars trying to make sense of the emerging world scenario. Each of these scholar explored different theoretical avenues, pursued different paths, adopted different perspectives, all trying to put forth an attractive and acceptable hypothesis. In this backdrop Sylo Taraku rightly points out “Fukuyama and Huntington have taken on different starting points and therefore they have come up with completely different hypothesis about future conflict lines after the Cold War. Both cannot be right. In fact many mean that they are both fundamentally wrong. Social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen holds the opinion that they cannot be taken seriously as theoreticians, but that they are interesting as a symptom. “Where Huntington represents conflict and fighting, Fukuyama represents a classical ethnocentric imperialism, a neo-colonial white man’s burden””(85) Engin I. Erdem has also pointed out that “In contrast to Fukayama’s optimistic vision of future, Huntington has called forth World War III that stems from clash of civilizations.”(86) Though there has been competition in the domain of scholarship to explain the newly emerging scenario, it has been fierce among the well established scholars like Fukuyama and Huntington

**Conclusion**

Huntington is one of the many scholars who joined the bandwagon of trying to explain the emerging world during the post Cold War era of 1990s and successfully presented a seemingly well formulated perspective and thesis about conflict in the emerging world order which has been able to capture the attention and imagination of the scholarly and political world alike.