Chapter 8

A POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF HUNTINGTON’S THESIS

8.1 Introduction

Huntington’s thesis has come under attack from various perspectives such as sociological, economic, Islamic, Asian, etc. But the greatest number of criticisms arises from the political perspectives. These political perspectives range from nationalist-statist on one hand, to ideological-leftist on the other hand. Most of these criticisms have been covered under the section ‘Critique of Huntington’s Thesis by Scholars’. However, the most scathing criticism has been that Huntington’s thesis is a politically motivated effort with a distinctly Western and American agenda. This has been by far the most vocal and consistent line of criticism against Huntington and his thesis. Authors and scholars, from John Petrovato to Asghar Ali Engineer, have pointed out that Huntington’s thesis has a political motive and an agenda, which promotes the interest of the Western countries, especially America. Though lately Huntington has apparently rescinded much of his ideas and has seemingly capitulated on the thesis, the theory of clash of civilisations itself has not died out because it has acquired a life of its own. The proposer of the thesis, Samuel Huntington has now become secondary and the thesis has attained primacy and currency in many quarters. Huntington’s theory as a narrative has become achieved some kind of invincibility and unassailibility. This is a very frightening scenario.

In this context the point made by Marc Howard Ross about narratives is very important that “Narratives can change but not necessarily when they are directly confronted. Simply telling people their story of events is wrong is rarely successful because there is often great emotional attachment to an account that is
defended from such frontal assaults. It is the images and organization of most narratives that explains their power, not the facts in them.” (1)

Therefore, it is necessary to view not just the motivational underpinnings of the proposed but also of the proposer, of the theory as well as its formulator Huntington because on one hand the two cannot be separated but on the other the thesis has become autonomous and has acquired an existence of its own apart from Huntington. Even if Huntington were to totally capitulate and deny his thesis, the thesis will not easily disappear because it has found acceptance and utility for the opponents in the struggle for supremacy. In short the thesis has become useful for some and they will continue to believe in it and use it, even if its maker discards it entirely. In such a case it is essential to disprove and therefore discredit both the product (thesis) and the producer (Huntington). Only a political perspective based on the power approach can best expose the underlying dynamics, discourse and narrative of Huntington and his thesis and thereby help to discredit both. This section looks at not only the ‘what’ but also the ‘why’. It looks at the overarching as well as the underpinning, at the superstructure as also the foundation.

8.2 Civilisation? Clashing?

The two central components of Huntington’s thesis have been the concept of civilisation and the notion of clash. The two have been joined by Huntington in an explosive mix with dangerous implications. The idea is not new and hence Lal Goel has stated that “The notion of a clash of civilizations has been with us for some time. British historian Arnold Toynbee used the term in a series of lectures he delivered in 1953. In an article published in 1990, Bernard Lewis wrote that the Muslim rage against the West is no less than a clash of civilizations. Samuel P. Huntington, a Harvard University political science professor, has given new currency to the notion of a clash of civilizations.” (2)
But the clash of civilisation idea by Huntington has come for all-round criticism by several scholars from various perspectives, in particular by those from sociological and anthropological perspectives. And most critics have focused on his misconstruing of the concept of civilisation. Most of these scholars have severely flayed Huntington's 'monolithic' conception of civilizations. Scholars like John L. Esposito (3), Shireen T. Hunter, (4) Robert Marks (5), Richard Rosecrance (6), John C. Raines (7) Mohammed Arkoun and John Bowden (8) have been in the forefront in challenging Huntington's conception of civilisation. These scholars have accused Huntington of deliberately ignoring intra-civilizational differences and domestic conflict. Moreover they have highlighted the presentation of polycentric structure of civilizations by Huntington and have criticized him for deliberately ignoring this reality.

Critics like Marc Gopin have suggested that Huntington's 'civilizational conflict paradigm' is reductionist and deterministic because conflict has multiple causes and holds that civilizational factors do not play a very significant role. (9). Fouad Ajami also expresses similar view. (10) Scholars like Shireen Hunter (11), Fouad Ajami (12), M.E Ahrari (13), Yuksel Sezgin (14), and many others have argued that more than the 'clash of civilisations' it is the 'clash of interests' which is the real causes of conflict.

Shireen T. Hunter in particular has argued that the strained relations between the West and the Muslim world arise less from civilizational differences and more from structural-political and economic- inequalities between the two unequal worlds, one of the 'haves' and the other of the 'have nots'. (15) Fouad Ajami, on the other hand says that Huntington has overestimated cultural differences between civilizations and grossly underestimated the influence of the West's hostile relations with the Muslim world. (16)
Engin I Erdem has similarly focused on the 'clash of interests' as the real cause of conflict between the West and Islamic world. He says "Keeping Huntington's confrontational vision in mind, the 9/11 might at first be seen as a case to validate the thesis. Yet, the reality is hardly like that because of the two major reasons First, American campaign against al-Quida terrorist organization has received full support from the Muslim World including Iran, which has the very hostile and problematic relations with the United States. Yet, it does not necessarily mean that the whole Muslim World supports the Bush administration's 'war against terrorism' and 'axis of evil' discourse. The criticisms, however, are hardly related with 'civilizational differences' but they are mostly about the Bush administration's unilateralism. Besides, as mentioned above, these criticisms are not restricted to the Muslim world. European elites and people have considerably criticized the Bush administration before and after September 11 too. In this respect, it is wrong to say that American campaign against al-Quida and the growing anti-American sentiments in the Muslim World after September 11 validates the clash of civilizations thesis. Second, the growing anti-Americanism in aftermath of September 11 is also significantly dealt with the US policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its policy of supporting authoritarian and repressive regimes for the sake of the 'strategic interests'. As many, including Huntington argue, that, the U.S may alleviate the negative sentiments if she revises its policy toward the region. In this respect, the Muslim anxiety towards the United States is deeply related to 'clash of policies-interests' not 'clash of civilizations'. This also seems to have remained a fact in post-9/11 period." (17)

In trying to understand the phrase 'clash of civilisations' Christopher Vasillopulous says "Attempting to explain to a colleague why I objected to the phrase, "clash of civilizations," I had to retreat from the definitions I employ below and ask the question: why not use, "clash of regimes" or "clash of empires"? Or, why not use another word for 'clash', like 'competition among states' or
"conflict of nations.' Or, to be more provocative, why not say, 'war of civilizations' or the 'crusade against the infidel'? Let it be said, the term "civilization' is what I most object to. The reason, I think, is that it suggests religious based conflict without having the candor to say so. In other words, "clash of civilizations" is academic code for one section of humanity's hatred, contempt and fear for another group of human beings who seem to be so different as to be qualitatively different from 'us,' all of which is intensified in the belief 'the other' sees us as we see them. When I began this analysis I had not yet heard, 'axis of evil,' but it captures my meaning and my concern. I believe it should concern all of us who believe peace is preferable to war, competition better than conflict, accommodation than discord. More parochially, but not less importantly, those of us who are academics, that is, those of us who carry the gentle cudgels of reason and semantic precision have an obligation to notice when our language and our concepts are being used pejoratively and duplicitously, especially by those who claim to be among our number. I do not have to remind the reader of the numbing and catastrophic effects of euphemisms, like 'transportation,' 'relocation,' or 'cleansing.' Duplicity is not limited to making the horrific palatable. It can make the merely different hateful, subject to annihilation, and so subject in the name of an ideal. What end is more worthy than the protection of 'our civilization'? I hardly know where to place the emphasis; on 'our' or 'civilization,' save in the end the 'our' always turns out to be controlling. So I am not about to embark on a semantic exercise, although it may seem so." (18)

Fred Halliday (19) and Mahmood Monshipouri (20) have similarly criticised Huntington for ignoring internal dynamics, plurality and 'myriad complexities' of the Muslim world. Late Edward W. Said (21) has also similarly argued that there is no such thing as a single Islamic culture as Huntington wants everyone to believe. Said, like many other scholars of Islam such as John Esposito, points to the multiplicity, variety, multifacetedness and plurality within the Islamic
world. Ibrahim Kalin, and John Esposito in their critique of Huntingtonian civilisational perspective call for the deconstruction of such monolithic perceptions, especially of civilizations and religion as they are fraught with great dangers. (22)

M.E Ahrari, (23), Shireen T. Hunter (24) and Engin I. Erdem (25) have all pointed to the ongoing conflicts within the Islamic world especially Kurdish which belie civilizational unity and coherence. According to Moshe Reiss "The Islamic world stretches from North Africa and the Middle East to Asia. While they have a common religious basis significant differences exist in language, geography, ethnicity, history and tradition. These are certainly not unimportant. There is no monolithic Islamic world" (26)

Scholars have consistently contested Huntington’s monolithic view of the West. Moshe Reiss has this to say “ Is the West a civilization? If so what is the Western Civilization? The West, including the United States and the European Union may be better described as foremost the paradigm of the modern industrial society.” (27) Moshe Reiss asks “Is Huntington’s conflict better described as a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ or a conflict between modernity and medievalism especially in the Arab Mid East” (28) Steve Smith says “This is not a clash between the West and Islam, it is not a clash of civilizations; indeed the main weakness in Huntington’s thesis is that neither states nor civilizations are anything like as united and monolithic as his account logically requires. The current conflict pits members of the same civilization against one another, in both the Muslim and the non-Muslim worlds.” (29)

Brian Whitaker says “Trying to carve up the modern world in this way is problematic, to say the least. We can talk historically of civilisations - the ancient Greeks or the Incas of South American, for example - but the term “civilisation” not only implies a distinctive culture but also a fairly self-contained and
homogenous form of social organisation within geographical boundaries. Whatever civilisations may have existed in the past, globalisation, air travel and instant international communications make the concept of separate cultural entities far less meaningful today". (30) Luis Rubio takes a similar stand when he says "Huntington’s thesis is extremely powerful and attractive and, at first sight, would in fact seem to be confirmed. Despite appearances, however, the events of September eleven tend to weaken his argument. The nature of those attacks and the multiplicity of reactions that they have produced around the world suggest that the clash and confrontation is less among civilizations than within them. Just as there are profound differences in the West, the Islamic world is besieged by conflict about the past and about the future. Although the specifics might be different, including the language, the disputes in the Muslim world, as in Europe or Latin America, are about the same things: about capitalism and globalization, the environment and industry, democracy and freedom, regulation and free markets. The contrasts and contradictions between a modern and progressive vision and a medieval one are not a privilege of the West Does this restatement of Huntington’s thesis change the debate? In a way it does." (31)

Also in sharp opposition to Huntington, several scholars have argued that the United States and Europe are themselves divided. Robert Kagan has said ‘it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world’. Similarly Timothy Garton Ash, Director of European Studies Center at Oxford University presents two views of Europe and America as two "strongly contrasting civilizations," (32) and each thinking it is better; and America and most of Europe as belonging to a wider family of liberal democracies, and one is better in some ways, the other in other ways. He considers the second as his preference.
Niall Ferguson has argued that "the problems of the Middle East have nothing to do with a clash of civilizations, and everything to do with the Arab world's "civilisation of clashes" - the propensity of its political culture to resolve disputes by violence rather than negotiation. The same applies a fortiori to sub-Saharan Africa. That isn't to suggest that "the West" doesn't also have its internal fissures. The antagonism between Bible Belt conservatives and secularised liberals is now the most important cleavage in American society. China, too, is far from being a monolithic civilisation; there, the most important division of our time is the exponentially widening rift between rich apparatchiks and rural poor. In neither case, however, do the conflicts seem likely to spill over into outright civil war. The future therefore looks more likely to bring multiple local wars - most of them ethnic conflicts in Africa, South Asia and the Middle East - than a global collision of value-systems. Indeed, my prediction would be that precisely these centrifugal tendencies, most clearly apparent in Iraq today, will increasingly tear apart the very civilisations identified by Samuel Huntington. In short, for "the clash of civilisations", read "the crash of civilisations". (33)

Evidently, Huntington's monolithic conceptualization of the civilizations and particularly of Islam, has no takers in the scholarly world as it does not correspond to the ground reality. The undeniable fact is that the world is a world of dynamic civilizations which exhibit much diversity within them and this diversity, leading to intra-civilisational differences is often so strong that it causes serious conflicts within each civilization. James Kurth, brings this out in one way. Kurth in "The Real Clash", his critique of Huntington, has tried to shift the focus from civilisational clash to a clash between multiculturalism and Americanization. According to him the 'real clash'.is not a 'clash of civilizations' but a 'clash of multiculturism vs Americanism' (34) According to Kurth the future clash will be between pro-Western conservatives (neo cons) and post-Western liberal multiculturalists in the U.S and the West. (35)
The New Delhi Declaration adopted at the International Ministerial Conference on the Dialogue among Civilizations stated "that all civilizations celebrate the unity in diversity of humankind and are enriched and have evolved through dialogue with other civilizations." (36) Even UNESCO has stated in similar fashion "All civilizations celebrate the unity in diversity of humankind. The dialogue among civilizations has blurred the frontiers of different civilizations and led to an overlapping of cultures, which while rich in diversity preserves the uniqueness of identities. The term "civilization" can only denote a universal, plural and non-hierarchical phenomenon that is also interactive. It certainly does not separate civilizations in such a way that some are ranked above others and some are set in opposition to others" (37)

Sylo Taraku has said about Huntington’s idea of civilisation "The concept of civilisation is an abstract theoretical construction that simplifies reality in an almost dangerous way. It looks like it is an almost impossible task to give a sustainable objective basis for concepts of civilisations, no matter whether one uses a universalistic or pluralistic approach. Huntington’s starting-point for splitting the world into eight big cultures seems to be very questionable." (38) Sylo Taraku has pointed out "If one looks at cultural alliances, one sees that both during the first and the second Gulf War, the invasion of Afghanistan and the ongoing war against global terrorism, there have been international alliances that crosscut Huntington’s civilisation lines. In addition the West with NATO in the nineties intervened militarily both in Bosnia and Kosovo in defence of the Muslims “(39)

Edward Said, lambasting Huntington for ignoring the dynamics and plurality of the different civilisations, has said "...the major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagogy and downright ignorance
is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilisation”. (40) Ryan Thornton has said “Following the argument of political scientist Samuel Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, they have adopted the view of a West defined by its Christian tradition and heritage, established and conducting itself as a single, coherent Christian entity. Moreover, many have begun to speak of a war pitting 21st century Christendom against a league of Muslim states as inevitable. Yet such a worldview is an exceedingly narrow one, failing to acknowledge that Christianity is no more a united religion than the West is a united continent. Rather, 500 years of interdenominational discord and disunity have bred religious hatred among Christians as potent as that toward Muslims. One need only look at the violence that has ravaged Northern Ireland and the former republics of Yugoslavia in the last century to see that religious hate among Christians has not subsided in many corners of the world”. (41)

Marc Howard Ross has tried to explain the dilemma about unity and divisiveness within a group or a community. He says ”There are times when conditions move a group to apparent unity, but in many others, where internal differences are highly significant often our language implies that opposing parties are unified, while in fact, when we speak about virtually any conflict, we should recognize the considerable diversity within each side” (42). This certainly applies to Huntington’s idea about monolithic civilizations.

One of the most accomplished critique of Huntington’s civilisational narrative and idea of clash of civilisations has come from John Voll. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to improve on his critical analysis of Huntington’s main argument which centres on the concept of civilisations which are said to be clashing. Hence it becomes imperative to reproduce in Voll’s own words the critique of Huntington’s main proposition. John Voll articulates
Analyses and narratives based on the concept of separate, clearly identifiable civilizations are no longer adequate, if they ever were. In fact, the "civilizational narrative" may now be an integral part of the problem rather than a part of the explanation. This is not a call to choose sides for a great battle of paradigms. I am not saying that we must now choose between Samuel Huntington or Fouad Ajami, Bernard Lewis or Edward Said, Daniel Pipes or John Esposito. We are all seriously engaged in the same task of finding ways to understand and resolve the great conflicts of our day." (43)

He sets out to understand the problem of the civilizational narrative by stating "A major difficulty with the civilizational explanatory narrative is that it assumes the existence of entities that do not exist as independent units. It might be useful for purposes of some types of analysis to think of "civilizations" as "ideal types," but most people who utilize civilizational narratives in the current debates do not treat "civilizations" in this way. In the premodern eras of world history, the relative spatial separation of large-scale, citied societies gives validity to talking about the great "civilizations." However, even in this context, there are difficulties with "civilization" as the basic unit of analysis. Arnold Toynbee presents perhaps the most comprehensive civilization-based narrative available. In writing his massive study of world history, he began by defining the most effective "intelligible unit of historical study" as being "neither a nation-state nor (at the other end of the scale) mankind as a whole but a certain grouping of humanity which we have called a society." He then identified twenty-one such societies as "civilizations," and set out to present an immense comparative study of these civilizations. However, at the end of his long study, he expressed reservations about "civilizations" as intelligible fields of study, especially in terms of understanding human religions. He concluded that "we may venture to propound a 'law' to the effect that, for a study of the higher religions, the minimum intelligible field must be larger than the domain of any single civilization." In a similar way,
Marshall Hodgson used the term "civilization" and spoke of Islam as a "world civilization." Yet, when he undertook the task of defining civilizations, he clearly understood them to be units which interacted within a larger historically-meaningful whole. "If we arrange societies merely according to their stock of cultural notions, institutions, and techniques, then a great many dividing lines among pre-Modern civilized societies makes some sense, and no dividing line within the Eastern Hemisphere makes final sense," and one needs to perceive "the unity of the whole Afro-Eurasian citied zone." When one looks at the vast networks of interactions in the Eastern Hemisphere even in premodern times, it is difficult to maintain that the "civilizations" are free-standing, clearly independent units. The interactions, for example, in religious terms between India and China or the Middle East and the West are profound and shape the very foundations of the cultural orders. By the time of the twelfth century, it would be difficult to extract Buddhism (a worldview originating in India) from even the most xenophobic definition of "Chinese Civilization," or Middle Eastern traditions of ethical monotheism from the fundamental definitions of medieval Western civilization. In modern times, the profound interconnections among "civilizations" are even more striking. In this context, it is possible that neither "Islam" nor "The West" are civilizations in the contemporary globalized world, if they ever were. In the sense that the term "civilization" is used by contemporary scholars across a broad spectrum of scholarly positions, it is difficult to maintain that Islam is a "civilization."" (44)

Voll like Amartya Sen argues that "Islam cannot be called a civilization, even within these relatively standard definitions. It is a multi-civilizational unit that has significant elements and participation in more than one civilization. In premodern times, Islam was an important part of societies which could not be identified as "civilized" as well as citied societies. In both modern and premodern times, there were people who were legitimately "Chinese Muslims," "Malay
Muslims,” “Fulani Muslims,” “Bengali Muslims” and many other such combinations of societal identities with Islam. In modern times, one must also mention “American Muslims.” All of these people show that it is possible to be both authentically Muslim and authentically local.” (45) He further contends that “Civilizational explanatory narratives simply are not useful in discussing the dynamics of the lives of Muslims in many societies of which Muslims are a part. If “Islam” refers to an identity or a unit, that unit is not a civilization by any of the widely-used definitions of that term. In premodern world history, the Islamic world is a unit that is multi-civilizational and includes both citied and non-citied societies. In the modern global village, Muslims are legitimate parts of many of the different units that have been identified by some scholars as civilizations. "The West" also has difficulty fitting into the standard definitions of civilization. It does not have the clear and distinctive cultural unity that seems to be implied by the definitions in presentations like Huntington's. The definition and map included in Huntington's presentation would lead to the conclusion that Greece is not a part of Western Civilization since orthodox Christianity and long-term historic control by the Ottoman Empire must mean that the Greeks "were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe." Because of the major contributions to the West by Jews and the significant differences between Protestants and Catholics, the religious diversity of the West should also raise questions about whether or not the West fits within Huntington's definition of a civilization. The medieval West tends to fit the standard definitions of civilization so it may be that the first "traditional" civilization to be destroyed by the processes of modernization was Western Civilization. What we now call "Western Civilization" is identified with modernity and this is something strikingly different from the society and life style of the Europe of the medieval papacy, the great Gothic cathedrals, the Crusades, the Magna Carta and other pillars of traditional Western Civilization.” (46)
John Voll continues arguing that “We may need to recognize that “civilizations” and “civilizational forms” are a phase of world history which we have now gone past. It is possible that the attempt to understand the interactions between Islam and the West as interaction between two civilizations will be profoundly misleading because neither are “civilizations” in terms of the definitions of the discussions. Huntington’s question of “if not civilizations, what?” takes on a whole new meaning in the context of an analysis where the definition of civilization used in the “civilization paradigm” does not fit either Islam or the West. The civilization paradigm, as defined by Huntington, does not, for most practical analytical purposes provide a way for talking about the interactions between two immense and complex human units which are not civilizations. The civilizational explanatory narrative can be, in this context, a source of conflict and may exacerbate already difficult situations. The civilizational narrative defines dividing lines between peoples that may not exist or may give a more cosmic frame of reference to existing differences. The perception of a great separation may have the effect of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and increase existing but possibly minor gaps between peoples. A major source of conflict in the current post-cold war world is the growing conflict resulting from ever-smaller units demanding separate recognition. Mini nationalisms provide the basis for dangerous confrontations. However, clashes between smaller and smaller groups do not represent, by themselves, conflicts between civilizations. Protestant-Catholic fighting in Ireland, Basque separatism, intra-black tensions in South Africa, and other such situations present the potential for conflict, but by themselves are not clashes between civilizations. Nationalisms produced by fragmentation of larger units are potential danger points in contemporary world affairs but none threaten global war.” (47)

Voll makes a very profound observation “Conflict on a global scale would be the product of what was called "hyper-nationalism" in an imaginative
discussion which appeared in *The Economist* as the chapter on the 21st century from a future world history text. Hypernationalism appeared when "nationalism," the "desire to create a sense of identity by marking oneself off from others -- by separating us from them -- had spread from single countries to whole regions." Those who attempt to see civilizations in conflict where civilizations do not exist may be assisting in the process of creating hypernationalist attitudes and perceptions. Considerations of this type provide the urgency behind the debate over "the Islamic threat." The perception by people in the West of Islam as a categoric threat to "Western civilization" may create the conditions for self-fulfilling prophecies of conflict between the United States and various Muslim groups and movements. There are many conflicts in the contemporary world. There are many tensions and dangers. However, in the modern world with its high levels of interaction and dissolution of old boundaries, such conflicts are not between "civilizations." The civilizational narrative, in this context, increases tensions rather than explaining them." (48)

Putting forth an insightful understanding Voll states "The perceptual problems of the civilizational approach to general education noted by Michael Geyer apply more broadly to the whole issue of utilizing a civilizational narrative to analyze the contemporary world. Geyer notes that the civilizational approach "focuses, if not on empire, at least on regionally bounded, territorially integrated settlements." It "pits settlement against unsettlement, the city against nomads, the *Volk* against migrants." It "cherishes the idea of culture as an autonomous and indigenous process of unfolding norms and values, grounded in the unity of language, society, and territory ... and is at a loss in explaining a syncretistic world. It is unable to explain an international configuration that is anchored in many local worlds with their own and discrete processes of socialization that are nonetheless tightly connected. It is unable even to depict the multiplication of
radically different worlds, forged from a mélange of elements from all parts of the world."" (49)

He then goes to demolish the common error made by many including Huntington by saying “The world in which we now live is particularist and universalist. This is a paradox and difficult to cope with but it is a reality. Insisting that the world is either particularist or universalist misses the point of the profound complexity of the contemporary human situation. Civilizational narrators like Huntington can assert that the “one world” paradigm is an “unreal alternative,” and they are correct if the “one-world” approach is a Pollyanna-like presentation of a “universal civilization” which somehow brings peace to all humans. However, if this means that somehow we must assert that Malcolm X was either not a Muslim or not a part of Western civilization, if we must see the World Beat music as not reflecting a significant reality, if we must ignore the globalization of popular culture as well as of the financial world, then it is the civilizational narrative that is “the unreal alternative”” (50) Using a poetic allegory Voll says “The Greek poet C.P. Cavafy wrote a poem called “Waiting for the Barbarians,” in which the people of a great city prepare for the arrival of the barbarians, who ultimately never come because they no longer exist. In the end, the people say: “Now what’s going to happen to us without them? The barbarians were a kind of solution.” The civilizational narrative relies on conceiving of the world as divided into large warring units which are culturally and religiously defined. Like the “barbarians,” “civilizations” are a kind of solution to problems of social identity, but one which may intensify or even create conflict. We may be living at “the end of civilization as we know it.” If we recognize this situation and try honestly to cope with its paradoxes and conflicts, we may discover that the end of civilization is not so bad.” (51)
Given the severity of criticism about his idea of civilisation, Huntington has been compelled to admit that "I'm aware that there's an inherent ambiguity in the term "clash of civilizations." Are we talking about simply differing views, different types of cultures and customs, different religions? Or are we talking about violent conflict? What we want to aim for is to prevent these differences in culture and civilization from leading to violent conflict. In the conclusion of my book I suggest some ways in which we might move in that direction." (52) Huntington therefore concedes the flawed nature of his contention that civilisations are compact, integrated or unified entities and consequently that the idea of clash of civilisations is weakly grounded.

Irrespective of Huntington's above cited admission, his monolithic conceptualization of civilizations, in which at no time he provides a clear-cut definition of civilization, but deliberately hides behind the assumption that all know what a civilization is, raises the question as to the motives of Huntington for undertaking such an enterprise- Is there politics behind raising the bogey of civilisational clash? The question merits detailed investigation.

8.3 Clash of Scholarships?

The post Cold War period has been characterized by renewed attempts of orientalist and neoconservative supporters to present Islam in negative and dark terms. On the one hand works by scholars like Bernard Lewis (53) attempted to villainize and demonize the Muslims in general. But others attempted a different course, one of trying to understand deeper issues involved in the West-Islam debate.

Among the notable ones of the second kind have been Fred Halliday (54), Mahmood Monshipouri (55) and Mohammed Arkoun (56), Gudrun Kramer (57), John L. Esposito and John O. Voll (58), Yahya Sadowsky (59), John C. Raines
The post 9/11 period, once again saw even greater focus on both Islam and the West-Islam relations and the 'clash of civilizations' discourse came to occupy centre stage in this renewed interest. The period, saw a virtual avalanche of publications expressing unrestrained animosity against Islam as a religion and Muslims as a people. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart had said that "In seeking to understand the root causes of the events of 9/11 many popular commentators have turned to Samuel P. Huntington’s provocative and controversial thesis of a ‘clash of civilisations’" (82) But they also have made a very pertinent observation that "Not surprisingly, Samuel P. Huntington’s 'thought-provoking' and/or provocative 'Clash of Civilizations?' essay has attracted voluminous attention all over the world and it has resulted in a 'clash of scholarship' (83)"

But scholars did not merely focus on Huntington’s thesis but attempted to develop other schools of thought, mostly the ones they were already attached to, such as leftist, neoconservative, orientalist, communal, ethnicist, anti-orientalist, and so on. Thus, the post Cold War debate revolved round two contending currents. One group took up the cudgels against Islam and this was glaringly visible in the works of scholars like Steven Emerson (84), and Daniel Pipes (85) who apart from their general hostility to Islam, attempted to brand all American Muslims who are critical of American policies as potential terrorist threats. The
other side, sought to break new ground by trying to understand Islam and the evolving West-Islam relations. Scholars and analysts like Muqtedar Khan (86), Shireen T. Hunter (87), Huma Malik (88), Tariq Ali (89), Gilles Kepel (90), and others attempted to look at other, mostly positive aspects of Islam.

Both the contending camps of scholarship tried to understand the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the relations between the Muslim World and the West/America. Concerns about perceptions of Islam and the Muslims in the mind of Western elites and people became increasingly important. New debates raged. Huntingtonian culturists and orientalist made common cause in projecting a particular kind of understanding of Islam in which Islam-'the other' came to be depicted as a threat and an enemy of the West. Stereotyping of Muslims and Islam became prominent part of scholastic endeavour. But there also emerged more sobre scholarship of Islam, which tried to expose the neo-conservative and orientalists enterprise. The 'enemy' discourse of the orientalists and necons came under blistering attack. This abstemious scholarship challenged the 'epistemology of othering' and the depiction of Islam as a threat to the West. These scholars sought to put Islam in the proper historical perspective and expose the deliberate attempts at painting Islam as 'enemy'. This somber camp highlighted the history of peaceful co-existence between Islam and the West and also Islam's tolerant past. To restore the balance, these scholars and particularly, Noam Chomsky attempted to expose the history of intolerance by the West. Monolithic interpretations of civilisations and of Islam came to be challenged and demolished. Islamic scholars like John Esposito highlighted the diversity and plurality in the Islamic World and exploded the myth of Islamic threat to the West. The debate about the compatibility having raged for quite long climaxed in the conclusion that Islam was not incompatible as was projected by the orientalists, neocons and Huntingtonian culturists. The balance has definitively tilted against the neoconservative, orientalist and culturist perspectives about the world in general
and about Islam in particular, though no corresponding change has occurred in the policies of the West, particularly of America.

In this period though the clash of civilizations thesis, with its considerably negative implications for Islam-the West relations created a great setback for the West to recognize diversity and plurality of the Muslim World and various interpretations of Islam, it could not close all avenues for dialogue with Islam, the 'other'. Moreover, it's very pessimistic outlook for the future of the relations between the Islam and the West and the belief that the two were bound for an inevitable clash came to be seriously challenged and finally discredited.

Thus the post 9/11 has also been characterized by a challenge to orientalist-civilisational-neo-conservative scholarship of the West from the anti-orientalist - realist-neo-third worldist scholarship of Islamic and non-Western world. While one scholarship, a belligerent one, seeking reasons to precipitate conflict and war has made every attempt to make the world incendiary, the other a pacifist one has been largely succeeding in exposing the ruse of the other. Dialogue and peaceful coexistence, at least in the battle of the scholarships seems to be winning, though the global reality has not indicated much improvement. One, which stands for monolithism, 'unilateralism, uniformity, unipolarity and dominance has continuously been challenged by the other, which stands for multiplicity, multilateralism, diversity, plurality and democracy. On one side stand with Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, Phillip Jenkins, Daniel Pipes, Steven Emerson and the like and on the other are Noam Chomsky, John Esposito, Gilbert Achcar, Edward Said, Shireen Hunter and many more. Evidently power politics and power struggle characterizes world of scholarship as much as it does world of nations. ...

One of the best examples that can be cited of intellectual polarisation over 'The Clash' thesis, albeit a benign one, is seen in the interaction between Amartya Sen and Robert Kagan. Amartya Sens's clear stand is that the theories such as the
'clash of civilisations' are exercises in historical revisionism, because they completely overlook the rich tradition of linkages between cultures. Amartya Sen has insisted that to interpret the present era as a "clash of civilizations" is both mistaken and dangerous and that it is important to view people not by a single identity—as Muslim, "Western," or Asian—but as a bundle of identities. (91) Both the scholars, Amartya Sen, a leftist and Robert Kagan, a rightist, opened a debate between them on their respective positions on The Clash thesis. Sen's position is clearly against Huntington's thesis which is evident in his book 'Identity and Violence' as well as the correspondence he had with Kagan.

Sen says "As you know, my book is very concerned not only with the multiplicity of our identities, but also with the way the illusion of a solitary identity, increasingly defined in terms only of religion, has been used to cultivate violence in the world. The so-called Islamic terrorists have used this weapon with great effectiveness. But to interpret that effectiveness as proof that there really is an inescapable clash of civilizations would be like constructing a thesis of an irresistible "clash of nationalities" on the basis of the observation of the ground reality of the two huge world wars of the 20th century. To consider another analogy, to see in the supremely bloody Hutu-Tutsi violence of a decade ago the "proof" of the inescapability of a "Hutu-Tutsi clash" would be to ignore not only how that violence was deliberately cultivated, and also ways that, with appropriate development of political interactions and civil society, such fostered violence can be resisted and overcome, as it increasingly is. Similarly, the ground reality of the Holocaust is no evidence that the gentile Germans are doomed to be inescapably Nazi. Indeed, Western parochialists and Islamic extremists have, I fear, an implicitly shared involvement in arguing for the primacy of a person's religious identity, leaving a person no room for entertaining the demands of other affiliations and associations. And yet other commitments have flourished." (92)
Sen then adds "The theory of an overarching "clash of civilizations" not only has to face the difficult problem of explaining so many different types of movements in the world today, it would not be able to provide much of an explanation for some of the most prominent political developments in contemporary history, such as the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, which happened despite the fact that they shared the same religious identity" (93)

To Sen’s rejection of Huntington’s thesis Kagan replies “Certainly, one problem we face is that there often seems to be so little evidence to contradict the "clash of civilizations" explanation of our era. (94) And again Sen replies “And on the general subject of a supposed "clash of civilizations," while you accept my rejection of that thesis (I am very encouraged by your support on this), you also make the extremely interesting point that "there often seems to be so little evidence to contradict the 'clash of civilizations' explanation of our era." I agree that it does "often seem" that the general thesis of "civilizational clash" fits the ground reality very well. But does it really? (95)

Finally Kagan in reply says “But I reiterate my concern that at least in that part of the Muslim world, the self-identification of most community leaders as Islamic rather than as democratic is quite troubling and certainly fuels the idea that we are in a clash of civilizations. The elected leaders in Palestine seem to be interested in identifying themselves only as Islamists and not at all interested in declaring themselves adherents to and proponents of the democratic ideal. (96) Thus in the post 9/11 period the impact of Huntington’s thesis has led to polarisation among scholars. A very telling situation indeed!

Engin Erdein has therefore rightly concluded “First of all, Islam-the West relations have gained an increasing attention after September 11. Even though many in the West have rightly reiterated that Islam is religion of peace and Al-Quida cannot be considered as representative of Islam, Islam vs. terror debate has frequently come into agenda. Not unexpectedly, the Western media looked at
'Islamic roots' of the terrible attacks. Thereafter, 'Islam', 'Islamism', 'political Islam' and 'Islamic fundamentalism' became the most frequently used terms in the media.” (97)

In view of all of this debate, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart have appropriately remarked that “The thesis of a ‘clash of civilisation’ has triggered something of a ‘clash’ of scholarship’ among those seeking to understand the causes and consequences of ethnic-religious conflict. This task has long been of interest to academe but it has received fresh impetus by the dramatic events and aftermath of 9/11” (98) Engin I. Erdem has also repeated the same view and concluded that “the 'clash of civilizations' has resulted in a 'clash of scholarship' in the fields of international relations, American foreign and security policy as well as in dealing with Islam-the West relations.” (99)

James Kurth has also remarked that “Samuel Huntington, whose concept of "the clash of civilizations" has provoked its own major clash of authors.” (100) But while the post 9/11 period has been characterized by attempts to understand the implications of the 'clash of civilisations' discourse, there has been not only a strong effort on the part of many scholars to criticise this discourse but some have tried to move away from the Huntingtonian discourse, and some like Noam Chomsky have attempted to render Huntington's discourse irrelevant by simply not considering it as worthy of being given a thought. In this context Engin Erdem's statement is very apt “In this respect, ignoring the different political perspectives within the 'Western' civilization and talking about 'clash of civilizations' is considerably questionable.” (101)

All in all scholarship has been polarised but that is not new. Only the intensity is. And this is because every scholar wants to influence the policy in a particular way having a particular personal or group agenda. The conflict among
scholars is thus inherent and inevitable, following the same dynamics of the societies or interests they represent.

8.4 A ‘New Paradigm’?

Huntington, by affirming that the dominant Cold War paradigm of state-centric realist model can no longer be useful tool to understand or explain the post-Cold War era and that “civilizational differences will be primary” (102) source of regional and global conflicts makes a case for a new paradigm, a paradigm based on the civilizational perspective) He therefore calls for a paradigm shift in understanding the post Cold War world.

Scholars like Marc Gopin (103) and Fouad Ajami (104) have severely criticised Huntington's call for paradigm shift and have termed his 'paradigm' as being reductionist and deterministic. These scholars hold that conflict has multiple causes and civilizational factors play a very insignificant role. Scholars like Shireen Hunter (105), Fouad Ajami, M.E.Ahrari, (106) and Yuksel Sezgin(107) have argued that 'clash of interests' rather than 'clash of civilizations' is and will be real cause of conflicts in the world.) Most of these scholars assert that problematic relations between the West and the Muslim World hardly arise from civilizational differences. According to Hunter (108) it is the structural-political and economic- inequalities between the two worlds of 'have' and 'have nots' which are responsible for the conflicts between the West and Islamic world. Fouad Ajami has particularly argued that Huntington has overestimated the cultural differences between the West and the Muslim World. (109) According to these scholars Huntington’s paradigm is a false paradigm.

Following the perspective of political realism scholars like Rubeinstein, Croker (110) and Hans Kung (111), have refused to concede that Huntington has posited a new paradigm to explain the conflict in the post Cold War era.Ryan
Thornton questions the paradigm itself "While politicians, political theorists, and the media may speculate about the inevitable clash of civilizations, the history of Ireland illustrates that religious hatred among fellow Christians shows no sign of waning. Furthermore, as the former Yugoslavia shows, even in the presence of Muslims, Christians are so preoccupied with centuries-old religious differences that the possibility of their unification against another faith, even a religion as theologically different as Islam, is unrealistic. Thus, any crusade of the 21st century will go the way of the medieval Crusades, during which not even Christian hatred of Muslims could dampen Christian hatred of fellow Christians" (112)

These scholars argue that Huntington’s clash of civilizations paradigm is not something new but it can be explained within the bounds of political realism.

Hans Kung, for instance, has argued that Huntington follows bloc based Cold War mentality when he posits a world divided by civilizational blocs and like in the Cold War period wishes that West must maintain its technological and military superiority. (113) And Mahmood Monshipouri and Gina Petonito, in *Constructing The Enemy in the Post-Cold War Era* have highlighted the same ‘enemy’ and ‘two camps’ dynamics being pursued. According to Seifudein Adem Hussien Huntington’s suggestions of divide and rule to exploit the differences between Islamic and Confucian civilizations in order to gain advantage for the West smacks of ‘Machiavellian’ politics. (114) G. John Ikenberry argues that what actually Huntington is calling for is a ‘new Cold War’ (115) Rubenstein and Crocker also argue that Huntington proclaims; ‘long live the new Cold War’ paradigm and not any ‘new paradigm’ and thus is within ‘realist’ perspective. Engin I. Erdem says "it is hard to accept that Huntington's clash of civilizations model offers a 'new paradigm'.” He holds that “Premises of classical realism- 'balance of power' 'interest' and 'alliances' essentially circumscribe the clash thesis". (116)
Hence these scholars are of the view that Huntington’s thesis does not qualify to be called as a new paradigm. The judgment of the majority of the scholarship, even in the Western world, is that neither does the clash of civilisation thesis appropriately explain the world reality nor does it serve as a reliable tool to analyse the events, especially conflicts, in the world. Most scholars opine that political perspective continues to be the best and valid tool for analysis of international events and conflicts.

8.5 The Politics of Paradigms: Setting an Agenda? ‘Clash’ as Ideology?

So if Huntington’s thesis does not qualify to be a useful tool to explain or analyse world events and conflicts, why has it still continued to hold sway and has been debated the world over. Why, in spite of expert opinion, and even after Huntington’s climb-down, is the theory of Huntington still causing uproar in the academic and political domain? A thorough critique of Huntington’s thesis, by looking at the underlying discourse is an imperative need for any study such as this. Seeking to critique a thesis such as Huntington’s, which has been clearly termed as pernicious by most scholars is an unavoidable task of a study as this. What’s been missing to some extent, has been a critique of Huntington’s thesis from a realist perspective, particular from the perspective of power, that is, a truly political critique. Such an endeavour is undertaken here and many of Huntington’s ideas and arguments have been subjected to a critique from power perspective in order to shed more light on the politics of paradigms and on the agenda setting enterprise.

Huntington in his defensive response in *Foreign Affairs*, instead of showing openness and accommodation to the critical and dissenting views presented by other scholars, launched a derisive, vitriolic and vituperative diatribe against these early detractors of his civilisational thesis. It is a response, not of a scientifically and intellectually honest scholar, but an angry outburst of pall-bearer of a political agenda, who is being obstructed in his scholastically veiled enterprise.
Huntington, not only proudly wallows in his own delusion that his thesis explains much and that no other paradigm has done better, but also fails to realise that in saying that, "A civilisational approach explains much and orders much of the "bloomin' buzzin' confusion" of the post Cold War world....", (117) Thus he has unknowingly laid bare the truth of his attempt to set the agenda for America and the West by using the term 'order'!

Huntington says that "What ultimately counts for the people is not political ideology or economic interest. Faith and Family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for. And that is why the clash of civilisations is replacing the Cold War as a central phenomenon of global politics, and why a civilisational paradigm provides, better than any alternative, a useful starting point for understanding and coping with the changes going on in the world". (118) But what truly counts for the people is far more subtle, deeper and fundamental than the shell of civilisation. It is a core. It stems from the deepest ground of human nature. It is not of civilisational nature but of a political nature. It pertains to survival through dominance and could take any form or myriads of forms, and not necessarily civilisational, a category which is too diffusive and ambiguous to be subjected to any kind of meaningful scientific scrutiny from a realist perspective.

When Huntington argues that the wide spread criticism of his thesis justifies the relevance and reliability of his civilisational paradigm his defence becomes truly a masterpiece of contorted logic. To brazenly conclude that a scathing condemnation or a bitterly hostile debate is a vindication of the truth of something is the height of intellectual diabolicalness. When Huntington says that "global politics are now too complex to be stuffed into two pigeon holes" he fails to realise or may be ignores, that the previous paradigm, as also his paradigm, and for that matter all paradigms are not merely attempts to explain or simplify the understanding of reality or new phenomenon, but are also convenient tools or useful apparatus that suit the needs and interests of the involved parties. A
paradigm is as much an attempt to explain reality or state of affairs, as also a tool to order and structure reality, so as to assist the domination of that reality or state of affairs, in this case, the post Cold War era and the new world order.

Huntington's paradigm of 'clash of civilisations' is not an explanation of what is actually happening or is likely to happen, but is a tool, an idea and an attempt to deliberately and consciously precipitate a situation so that something like the 'clash of civilisations' ensues and thereby gives the dominating Western powers, particularly, America, reason to prepare in that direction and finally mount an attack and dominate the world and ensure the perpetuation of the existing order and scheme of things, which essentially means maintaining the status quo of Western and American domination of the world, its politics and its economics. This view has been expressed by many scholars across the world ranging from the western scholars like Noam Chomsky, to Indian scholars like Fakrudin H Bennur, Asghar Ali Engineer, and others.

To begin with, Chomsky put it thus “Remember the context of Huntington’s thesis, the context in which it was put forth. This was after the end of the Cold War. For fifty years, both the US and the Soviet Union had used the pretext of the Cold War as a justification for any atrocities that they wanted to carry out. So if the Russians wanted to send tanks to East Berlin, that was because of the Cold War. And if the US wanted to invade South Vietnam and wipe out Indo-China, that was because of the Cold War. If you look over the history of this period, the pretext had nothing to do with the reasons. The reasons for the atrocities were based in domestic power interests, but the Cold War gave an excuse.” (119)

Chomsky then states “After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the pretext is gone. The policies remain the same, with slight changes in tactics, but you need a new pretext. And in fact there's been a search for pretexts for quite a long time.
Actually, it started twenty years ago. When the Reagan Administration came in, it was already pretty clear that appeal to the pretext of the Russian threat was not going to work for very long. So they came into office saying that the focus of their foreign policy would be to combat the plague of international terrorism.” (120) Chomsky further adds “Remember, one of the tasks of intellectuals, the solemn task, is to prevent people from understanding what’s going on.” (121) He says that the new agenda setting exercise arises from the demise of the old excuse to militarise such as “The Russians are coming, so we need this monstrous military budget.” (122) He then explains the dilemma of politicians and scholars “The question that anyone who is interested in international affairs should have been asking himself or herself is, what are they going to say in March 1990? That was the first presentation to Congress after the Russians clearly weren’t coming – they were not around any more.” (123) He asserts that under these circumstances the policy makers “have to ensure that the public pays the costs of high-tech industry by funnelling it through the military system under the pretext of defence.” (124) Thus he says that a new pretext had to be invented. “So it was exactly the same as before. The only difference was the reasons. It turned out that the reasons we needed all this was not because the Russians were coming, but – I’m quoting – because of the ‘technological sophistication of Third World powers.’ That’s why we need the huge military budget”(125). He then goes on to add “Remember, it couldn’t be laid at Iraq’s door either, because at that time Saddam Hussein was a great friend and ally of the United States. He had already carried out his worst atrocities, like gassing Kurds and everything else, but he remained a fine guy, who hadn’t disobeyed orders yet – the one crime that matters. So nothing could be laid at Iraq’s door, or at the Kremlin’s door”. (126)

Then very accurately Chomsky points out that “The real threat, as always, was that the region (Middle East) might take control of its own destiny, including its own resources. And that can’t be tolerated, obviously. So that’s why we need a
huge military budget. Other than that, the story is the same.” (Noam Chomsky, “Clash of Civilisations?” Delhi School of Economics, New Delhi, online, 5 Nov. 2001.) Coming back to Huntington, he exposes the real reasons for Huntington’s thesis. He almost sarcastically says “What does this have to do with Huntington? Well, he’s a respected intellectual. He can’t say this. He can’t say, look, the method by which the rich run the world is exactly the same as before, and the major confrontation remains what it has always been: small concentrated sectors of wealth and power versus everybody else. You can’t say that. And in fact if you look at those passages on the clash of civilizations, he says that in the future the conflict will not be on economic grounds. So let’s put that out of our minds. You can’t think about rich powers and corporations exploiting people, that can’t be the conflict. It’s got to be something else. So it will be the ‘clash of civilizations’ – the western civilization and Islam and Confucianism.” (127)

Chomsky says “Coming back to the beginning, just where is the clash of civilizations? I mean, there is a clash alright. There is a clash with those who are adopting the preferential option for the poor no matter who they are. They can be Catholics, they can be Communists, they can be anything else. They can be white, black, green, anything. Western terror is totally ecumenical. It’s not really racist – they’ll kill anybody who takes the wrong stand on the major issues. But if you’re an intellectual, you can’t say that. Because it’s too obviously true. And you can’t let people understand what is obviously true. You have to create deep theories that can be understood only if you have a PhD from Harvard or something. So we have a clash of civilizations, and we’re supposed to worship that. But it makes absolutely no sense.” (128)

Esposito has similarly pointed out that “For more than four decades governments formulated policy in the midst of a superpower rivalry that defined the globe and the future in terms of the visible ideological and military threat
posed by the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the cold war, the fall of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of communism have created a "threat vacuum" that has given rise to a search for new enemies. For some Americans the enemy is the economic challenge, the Japanese or the European Community represents. For others it is an Islamic world whose 1 billion Muslims form a majority in more than 48 countries and a rapidly growing minority in Europe and America. Some view Islam as the only ideological alternative to the West that can cut across national boundaries, and perceiving it as politically and culturally at odds with Western society, fear it; others consider it more a basic demographic threat" (129)

A.J.Bacevich has expressed the agenda orientation of Huntington's thesis thus "The Clash of Civilizations offers a radically different prism through which to view world politics. As such, the policy implications of the book loom large. For this reason, Professor Huntington's book may also be the most significant and potentially mischievous volume to appear in recent memory" and then had gone to add that "The Clash of Civilizations is prescriptive as well as descriptive. Huntington's purpose is not to foretell an inevitable blow-up but to posit civilizations as the essential building blocs of a new approach to strategy. "The world will be ordered on the basis of civilizations," he asserts, "or not at all." To achieve a modicum of stability, a world ordered on the basis of competing civilizations will be a world that respects spheres of influence.". (130)

Jonathan Cook has discussed how Israelis have attempted to engineer a clash of civilizations by talking about a new wave of anti-Semitism. He says "The fresh claims about a new anti-Semitism began life in the spring of 2002, with the English-language website of Israel's respected liberal daily newspaper, Haaretz, flagging for many months a special online supplement of articles on the "New anti-Semitism", warning that the "age-old hatred" was being revived in Europe and America. The refrain was soon taken up the Jerusalem Post, a rightwing English-language newspaper regularly used by the Israeli establishment to shore up support for its policies among Diaspora Jews." (131) He explains that anti
Semitism was not so much real as manufactured by Israelis themselves and fits in with the agenda setting paradigm of clash of civilizations pursued in the USA. He asserts that "It tied the rise of a new anti-Semitism with the increase of Islamic fundamentalism in the West, implying that Muslim extremists were asserting an ideological control over Western thinking. It chimed well with the post 9-11 atmosphere." He adds that "This final goal of the proponents of "the new anti-Semitism" was so successful because it could be easily conflated with other ideas associated with America's war on terror, such as the clash of civilisations." (132) This argument holds equally good in case of the West and America.

Ismael Hossein-zadeh says "Huntington's theory of "the clash of civilizations" is essentially a subtle version of Richard Perle's strategy of "de-contextualization." Perle, a leading neoconservative militarist (and a prominent advisor of the Likud party, the hard-line Zionist party of Prime Minister Arial Sharon of Israel) coined the term "de-contextualization" as a way to explain both the desperate acts of terrorism in general and the violent tactics of the Palestinian resistance to occupation in particular. He argued that in order to blunt the widespread global criticism of the Israeli treatment of Palestinians, their resistance to occupation must be de-contextualized; that is, we must stop trying to understand the territorial, geopolitical and historical reasons that some groups turn to terrorism. Instead, he suggested, the reasons for the violent reactions of such groups must be sought in the arenas of culture and/or religion—in the Islamic way of thinking. Like the "clash of civilisations" theory, de-contextualization strategy has been part of a well-orchestrated effort to divert attention from the root causes of terrorism and attribute it to "pathological problems of the Muslim mind." (133)

He then adds "Neoconservative militarists in and around the Bush administration, and beneficiaries of war dividends in general, have found—indeed, also promoted—this sinister strategy of obfuscation quite useful for the purposes
of justifying their military adventures in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world" (134)

Further he states “Ever since the collapse of the Berlin Wall beneficiaries of war and militarism have been searching for substitutes for the “communist threat” of the Cold War era in order to maintain and justify their lion’s share of national resources, or tax dollars. The view that Western civilization is threatened by militant Islam has provided these beneficiaries with a “perfect” substitute for the communist threat of the Cold War era. The view has gained additional strength as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. President Bush’s explanation that those atrocious attacks were prompted by a “hatred of our way of life” can be better understood in this context that it was only after more than a century and a half of imperialistic pursuits and a series of humiliating policies in the region that the popular masses of the Muslim world turned to religion and the conservative religious leaders as sources of defiance, mobilization, and self-respect. In other words, for many Muslims the recent turn to religion often represents not so much a rejection of Western values and achievements as it is a way to resist or defy the oppressive policies and alliances of Western powers in the Muslim world” (135)

Hossein zadeh laments “Instead of calling the 9/11 attacks mass murder criminal acts, the administration does not seem to have been able to resist the politically expedient temptation of calling them acts of “war on America, on our way of life, or on our civilization.” Accordingly, instead of responding to those criminal acts through coordinated international investigative police and/or intelligence work, as many suggested both at home and abroad, the trigger-happy administration launched its own wars on Afghanistan and Iraq that have claimed many more innocent lives than those claimed by the 9/11 atrocities, thereby drastically increasing acts of terror and violence.” (136)

Hossein zadeh also avers “The Bush administration’s drive to war is a logical policy prescription based on its own diagnosis of terrorism as being driven
by a "hatred of our way of life," as President Bush and his militarist advisors have repeatedly stated. This is essentially a popularized version of the theory of "the clash of civilisations" which implies that Islam is inherently incompatible with modernization and Western values." (137)

Interestingly both Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis have close ties with the American administration. Lewis who coined the terminology of 'clash of civilisations,' has been known to be in personal contact with the political strategists of President Bush, such as. Karl Rove, with Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and with Vice President, Dick Cheney. These two are men who are not merely academics but close associates of the political establishment and are expectedly agenda men who exercise strong influence on US foreign policy. In the Wall Street Journal David Frum, who was earlier a speech writer for President Bush has stated that the President has been seen "carrying a marked-up article by Mr. Lewis among his briefing papers". The closeness of the civilisational clash proponents like Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington to the American establishment is a well known fact which has also been pointed out by several scholars like, Hans Kung (138) Moreover Huntington has been the recipient of the Olin, Bradley, and Smith Richardson foundations grants between 1985 and 1999 totalling more than $5 million and this money comes with certain expectations or strings tied to say the least. These connections lend credence to the possible nexus between scholars like Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington espousing agenda setting theses and the political rulers and administration of USA.

Huntington's real intentions of American dominance are also evident when he says "the efforts by the Bush administration to build a coalition against terrorism are very important, because the countries it is trying to get in that coalition are precisely the major regional powers with which we have been having difficult relations at times because of a natural conflict of interest. I think the Administration deserves credit for handling this so well—for getting Russia to cooperate, and having some forms of cooperation with China, and even Iran, in
addition to the cooperation of the Europeans". (139) Here Huntington is seen in the act of supporting American Administration's foreign policy exposing the underlying nexus between the scholars and the rulers. Such linkage has probably led K.P.S. Gill, a well known Indian personality from security field to remark "Clearly, Samuel Huntington's thesis of the "clash of civilisations" continues to exert very significant influence on the imagination of American strategic planners and intelligence analysts" (140)

Huntington's rabidly pro American stance also stands out by his statement "One would be to simply restructure the UN Security Council, adding countries like India, Japan and Brazil as permanent members, and doing away with veto power for everyone except the US. That, it seems to me, would create a Security Council that more or less reflects the power structure in the world today." (141) These are certainly the words of an arrogant Americanist intent on perpetuating American dominance. Such men cannot refrain from undertaking the agenda setting exercise and orchestrating clashes and wars that will benefit their mentors and masters.

On the behalf of the nation and national elite, American scholars setting agenda for an age, has been an old practice. As already pointed out previously it was seen in George F. Kennan's article 'X' (142). Today it is a common knowledge that Kennan did not simply pioneer the U.S. policy of communist containment for the Cold War period but also framed the agenda for international relations for the Cold War period. The concept of 'Cold War' having its roots in Kennan's 'X' article is an example of these kinds of scholar-politician nexus attempts which are nothing new in the world of nation-states and elsewhere many others have also pursued them. Huntington's thesis set out in his 1993 article 'The Clash of Civilizations?' has sought to do the Kennan act for the post Cold War era. A theory, a paradigm or a model is not merely an explanation which has the most descriptive, explanatory, and predictive power
but that which has the power to be prescriptive. Kennan, Huntington and the like have been always around to undertake this prescriptive activity, to bestow their rulers, societies and nations with power in an attempt to survive through dominance in each age.

Amina R Chaudhary said about Huntington "One wouldn't imagine that behind such a controversial and combative theory is someone so quiet and soft-spoken" (143) ) Surely, it is very difficult to imagine that behind some of the most controversial and combative theories and agenda setting endeavours there are persons who are extremely quiet and soft-spoken and yet very often this is the stark fact. Agenda setting need not be a job of a boisterous and a vociferous personality. It is generally effected more successfully by soft spoken agenda makers. Scholars like Kennan or Huntington setting the agenda for an age, are men engaged in the game of 'soft power' determining the 'hard power' and what better way to do it than to do it 'softly', But one must not mistake this 'softness' for 'humility' or 'weakness'. It is that 'softness' which drives the 'hardness'. After all, nature has willed it that the mind will drive the body.

Albert Einstein is reported to have said that "If the facts don't fit the theory, change the facts" Truthfully, it should be the other way around. If the theory does not fit the facts, change the theory. But all theory building and all paradigms, being exercises in empowering the proponents of theories or thought systems, selecting facts, changing facts, manipulating facts and even manufacturing facts is part of the game of power, may it be religion, politics or science. How one interprets facts in order to encompass them into a theory depends on the power relations that underline that field of activity. Huntington is clearly involved in this power exercise on the behalf of the society and nation whose worldview he partakes and shares. Huntington's contribution, through the propounding of the thesis of "the clash of civilization" has not helped the
development of genuine theoretical discussions or theory building but has certainly exposed the power underpinnings of theory-making and theory-building exercise undertaken by scholars who belong to specific world views or socially constructed realities.

Edward Said has probably understood this truth much better and hence he has been encouraging to look into other facts and states as a starting point in the search for a reflected understanding and has warned against the misleading simplification of the harsh reality that human beings live in. His understanding is telling if one goes by his following statement “These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed analysis.” The Clash of civilizations" thesis is a gimmick like "The War of the Worlds," better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time.” (144)

A paradigmatic change is as much a ‘reality’ as change is in history. Conflicts and contradictions invariably arise in society and history and lead to new situations calling for new paradigms to explain the emerging new phenomena. Thus after a paradigm has explained a situation, there is a beginning of the new, a transition to the new and this leads to a paradigm crises but soon paradigmatic shift takes places to explain the change and a new paradigm or set of paradigms arise. (However, this paradigmatic change is expected to be correlated to the real situation or facts.) All paradigms are thus constructions, attempts by man to understand the existing or emerging reality or situation. But constructions are much more. They are motivated and agenda driven enterprises. Paradigms as constructions are inevitably rooted in agenda of those who construct those
paradigms. Hence a paradigm is not just an attempt to understand and explain a situation but more. A paradigm is an attempt to respond, to direct, to orient or reorient, to pre-empt or co-opt or order or do whatever that would carry forward the intended agenda and empower the proponents, both individually and collectively. The theoreticians of an agenda give birth to (construct) a paradigm and its practitioners ensure its victory. Thus paradigm is constructed for the purpose of application, not merely to understand but to order, dictate, control or dominate situation. Moreover no paradigm, which serves the purpose of its practitioners, is stagnant or constant. A paradigm which has found acceptance and currency is constantly revised and improved as the situation, which it professes to explain and control, is also constantly changing, brimming out of the paradigmatic mould, transcending the framework made to contain and hold it. The demise of a paradigm, of a construction, comes when the situation has gone beyond its stretched framework and a need arises for, not revision of the existing paradigm, framework or construction, but proposing an entirely new paradigm, a fresh framework or a novel construction. Thus emerges, through construction, another paradigm, a new framework! And thus continues the paradigm construction enterprise! The paradigms change, the constructions improve but the underlying agenda and motives remain constant and continue to persist. Hence it is much less important to know what the paradigm is saying about the old or changing or new situation and more important to know what is the underlying agenda of that paradigm. Several paradigms, through a battle of paradigms, and a power struggle among paradigms, simultaneously seek to explain the same situation though these paradigms may share the same agenda or pursue different agendas. Hence there is a clash of paradigms which in essence is a clash of underlying agendas. There is a battle for supremacy among the contending paradigms and their proponents, The clash, between Fukuyama’s thesis and that of Huntington’s is but a clash of paradigms and must be understood as such. The underlying motive of both, of
course is the same, and their commitment to the same master, the same community and the same worldview.

Huntington’s challenging of the ‘endism’ idea of Fukuyama by saying that “The more extensive formulations of the endist argument, however, suffer from two basic fallacies. First, endism overemphasizes the predictability of history and the permanence of the moment. Second, endism tends to ignore the weakness and irrationality of human nature. Human beings are at times rational, generous, creative, and wise, but they are also often stupid, selfish, cruel, and sinful. The struggle that is history began with the eating of the forbidden fruit and is rooted in human nature. In history there may be total defeats, but there are no final solutions. So long as human beings exist, there is no exit from the traumas of history. To hope for the benign end of history is human. To expect it to happen is unrealistic. To plan on it happening is disastrous.” (145) falls in the category of battle of paradigms. And very interestingly this criticism of Fukuyama by Huntington, in the hindsight fits equally well for Huntington who undertook the same task (albeit at a different level and with a different perspective) that he blamed on Fukuyama and others. Huntington’s critique of Fukuyama’s ‘endism’, which paved the way for Huntington to put forward his own thesis of the clash of civilizations has the same underpinnings but with far more serious implications of a ‘pogrom’ that could be organized or realized by any side using his paradigm.

Guo Jiemin has articulated well this fact “After the Cold War, some Western scholars have actively cooperated with U.S.-led Western countries in pushing cultural power on developing countries and put forward in succession such theories as “the end of history”, “the clash of civilizations” and “post-colonialism”. They have attempted to create theoretical foundations for their cultural infiltration and expansion under the cloak of rationality and legality.
Among these views, the “clash of civilizations” theory has had the most extensive influence.” (146) Guo Jiemin has explained this activity by stating “In the Cold War period hegemonic countries confronted each other as enemies. Since then geopolitical enemies no longer existed, but by habit and out of their political and economic needs, countries accustomed to the Cold War shifted their struggles to the more extensive field of civilization and culture, and extended their target to the whole Third World. They vowed to conduct “a war without gun smoke” with all non-Western civilizations and attempted to use their value standards to unify the world; they have raised civilizational and cultural issues as a new excuse for interfering in other countries’ internal affairs. Its motive in pushing cultural power and making Cold War noises is all too clear: the Cold War has passed away as an era, but its habits remain.” (147) According to Guo Jiemin, “After the Cold War, some Western scholars have actively cooperated with U.S.-led Western countries in pushing cultural power on developing countries and put forward in succession such theories as “the end of history”, “the clash of civilizations” and “post-colonialism”. They have attempted to create theoretical foundations for their cultural infiltration and expansion under the cloak of rationality and legality. Among these views, the “clash of civilizations” theory has had the most extensive influence”. (148) Jiemin says that “In essence, this is entirely a cultural power theory that regards Western civilization as the orthodox one which embodies the “absolute spirit”, to which other civilizations should be subjected. Once non-Western civilizations have an independent spirit and move from being “objects” to “actors”, there will be a deluge of rebellion which should be “contained” and struck down. This thinking represents the aspirations of some Western centralists. For instance, an article in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung said that the clash of civilizations between Islam and the West is obvious and that political Islam seeks to replace Western civilization so that Islamic civilization occupies the world’s leading position. An article in German Die Welt also held that Oriental culture is weakening the infiltration of Western ideology. It pointed
out that with the end of the Cold War various civilized societies outside the West seem to emit a new radiant force, which is crippling the imported principles of Western life and strengthening local cultural awareness.” (149)

Stanley Kurtz has brought out the politics of paradigms quite well by stating “This is Samuel P. Huntington’s moment. The world of cultural and religious strife anticipated by Huntington in his much-discussed (and widely excoriated) book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, has unquestionably arrived. Yet whether we might also someday see an alternative world — the global triumph of democracy envisioned in Francis Fukuyama’s brilliant work, *The End of History and the Last Man* — is also a question that seems very much before us as we contemplate what it would mean to “win” the war in which we are engaged. The question of our time may now be whether Huntington’s culture clash or Fukuyama’s *pax democratia* is the world’s most plausible future. This is a question with policy implications, of course, and both *The Clash of Civilizations* and *The End of History* are, in part, books about policy — what the United States government should do. Ultimately, however, to choose between Fukuyama and Huntington is to articulate a vision of human social life. What are the mainsprings of human action? How salient is religion as a cultural force? Is democracy the most civilized and natural way of life? Questions like these are at the heart of the contest between Huntington and Fukuyama, and we can take the measure of the concomitant policy disputes only by moving through these larger problems, not around them. Philosophically and spiritually, *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* could hardly be more different (although each book can fairly be called “conservative”). Read closely, unexpected areas of convergence emerge. Nonetheless, ultimately, neither Huntington nor Fukuyama tells us what we need to know in order to synthesize their perspectives — or to finally decide between them. The books are at once complementary and irreconcilable. Taken together, they frame our current perplexity.” (150)
Therefore, while it can be argued that paradigms are essential to explain emerging situation, one should not lose sight of the fact that paradigms are not simply explanations of reality or situation. Their inherent agendas can have a dangerous potential. Beyond their superficial explanatory role, paradigms have a hidden agenda of structuring, directing and ordering the reality to the benefit and empowerment of its proponents. And in this sense all paradigms are inherently conflictive and divisive and consequently political. This does not mean that paradigms and constructions should be done away with. What is required is for its constructionists is to honestly state their agenda, which of course is a tall order to expect. This task, of course, is left to a few scholars who specialize in looking beyond the paradigms, and expose the hidden agendas of the paradigms. They are scholars who do not go about constructing new paradigms of reality but go about deconstructing the existing paradigms and expose their underlying motives and agendas. Such an endeavour will, much better serve the cause of reducing conflict and establishing a mutually acceptable order for all, then one of constructing a new paradigm.

Firas Ahmad makes a very pertinent point in saying "Language is powerful. It is often the case that the words one uses to describe or frame an event are more important than the event itself. The examples of this reality abound in our present day. Maybe word choice has never been so provocative as it was when Professor Samuel Huntington penned his seminal essay "The Clash of Civilisations?" (151) To add to this Dan Smith has said that the conflict in short "is about American power in the Middle East". (Smith, Dan: Clash of Civilisations, Interview published in 2001 www.liberal.org ) Ahmet Akgündüz says "thinkers are worrying about the "threat" Islam poses to "the West". That seems to be the conclusion of cold warriors like Samuel Huntington, who describes and seems at points to encourage "The Coming Clash of Civilizations" (152) Huntington's thesis as a paradigm fits the bill perfectly!
Said Shirazi underscores Huntington’s true agenda “Huntington is implicitly of the preventive war school, which advocates early action to prevent conflicts from spreading into world wars. His work is in line with the new Bush mentality of attacking countries that are not currently a threat but could potentially be one in the future. This is the logic of tragedy, in which we create a circumstance thinking to avoid it.” (153)

Thus, in the eyes of many scholars, neither Huntington’s paradigm nor his paradigm argument is an honest attempt to explain post cold War world order or emerging scenario, but is rather a cleverly concealed attempt at perpetuating the supremacy of the Western nations in general and of United States in particular. To achieve this end, Huntington is prepared to go to any extent, twisted arguments, contorted logic, contradictory language, anecdotal examples, intellectual dishonesty, and such other techniques and methods to prop up his thesis, as it is in the best interests of the interests he represents and wants to perpetuate. With all its academic arguments, intellectual acumen, statistical props and what not, the dominance and hegemony of the West is the ultimate objective of his theoretical construction. His thesis is an enterprise at fabricating a new context and constructing a new enemy to rekindle the kinetics of the world politics in which the same old powers continue to dominate. It is, in short, a manufacturing of the future events.

This is and has been an on going preoccupation of Huntington, visible in his repeated attempts ranging from his original article of 1993, subsequent article of 1993, his elaborate book of 1996, to his latest major work of 2004 and many media interviews through 1996 to 2007. Through convenient linking of the past with the latest statistics, current happenings and recent events, easily enabled by the present information age tools and funding foundations, Huntington has continued to endeavour to prop up his thesis, add more teeth to his arguments, lest his original contentions and implicit intentions are laid bare or demolished, leading
to the ‘end of his story and a lost cause’. This is but expected, given the high stakes involved. His pretentious concessions, such as “Does a clash of civilisations perspective account for everything of significance in the world affairs during the past few months? Of course not” apart, Huntington has never openly conceded that his thesis may be fundamentally flawed, nor abandoned the main tenets of his thesis. And he has not done this, not because he cannot see the weakness or untruthfulness of his arguments or fickleness of his position, but simply because he cannot abandon an agenda which is not merely his alone, but a collective agenda of the clan he belongs to and seeks to represent. To do otherwise would not only tantamount to personal suicide of intellectual kind but traitorous destruction of Western and American interests! Thus the exercise goes on, ever strengthening the original idea with newer and better arguments, conveniently made possible by the incessant capacity of the human mind to conceal the most distorted illogic using tools of language construction.

The belief of ‘conservatives’ like Huntington in the inevitability of conflict in the human society on account of the very nature of humankind, goaded by the desire of the rulers to seek domination abroad, leads them to proposing paradigms with an inbuilt agenda for achieving dominance, paradigms such as the ‘clash of civilisations’, to orchestrate that which is signified by the paradigm. After all it is a well known fact that when logic and language are elegantly packaged, they have the power of conditioning human mind to not only believe in what is being proposed but to wish and seek its realisation, though of course, at the same time, human mind on a much smaller scale, has the contrary tendency to also oppose it. Though conflict in human society is real, being grounded in human nature, conflict as arising out of a clash of civilisations, is indefensible, the thesis being premised on a false foundation, that of civilisation. Many scholars have rightly pointed that civilisation; an ambiguous, diffusive and nebulous concept cannot form the basis for explaining conflict. Rather conflict, even international conflict, can be better explained by linking it to power relations or power seeking between more
definable groups and in the battle for supremacy among groups politics of paradigms means a battle for supremacy of the contending paradigms subserving the interest of respective groups or worldviews. Hence, the seeds for dominance of an age, through a paradigm, at the outset lie in the battle of the paradigms itself.

One of the most interesting features of Huntington’s thesis is that it is oriented towards policy recommendations based on a re-interpretation of post-Cold War international scenario. Edward Said has focused on the agenda setting orientation of Huntington’s enterprise. But Naz Wasim has also discussed this aspect of Huntington’s thesis. (154) Scholars have therefore termed the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis as ‘purposeful thesis’ with a clear cut agenda for the West, the United States and the world at large. It is pointed out by many scholars that Huntington’s thesis is not only an intentional attempt to continue to polarize the world into contending and antagonistic nations and groups of nations but also to actually precipitate a clash or a conflict on the pretext of civilisational pride and superiority. Usage of terms like ‘prescient’, ‘predictive’ by the theory’s supporters is as far from truth as it can be, and is yet propagated, almost impelling and compelling it to becoming a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. Many scholars have criticized this intentionality at precipitating the ‘clash of civilisations’.

Several scholars have attempted to study how an event gets realized after it has been first expressed as a possibility. John Hertz (155) who spoke about the ‘security dilemma’, was one of the earliest scholars who worked in this line, followed by several others like Robert Jervis (156) and Charles L. Glasser (157), who analysed it further. More recently others like Stephen L. Spiegel and Fred L. Wehling, (158) have continued to understand the applicability of this approach at understanding conflict. Robert Jervis has explained the ‘security dilemma’ thus "The anarchic nature of world politics leads to a situation known as the security dilemma. The security dilemma arises when a state feels insecure and decides that
its best policy is to increase its military strength. Its objective in doing so is not necessarily to enhance its aggressive power, but only to increase its ability to defend against attack. Unfortunately, a neighboring country may then feel threatened by this increase of aggressive potential. The second state might then pursue its own military build-up. An unintended spiral thus occurs, where every nation grows more and more insecure and seeks to stay as defended as possible". (159)

John Ikenberry has likened Huntington's thesis as a civilizational equivalent of 'security dilemma', where distorted notions about 'the Other' lead to rise of tensions and become a cause for conflict. He argues that the clash of civilizations thesis could pose great dangerous to the world if its proponents succeed in making leaders, policy makers and others to accept their thesis. (160) Similarly Kishore Mahbubani has pointed out the dangers of accepting such a theory as the clash of civilizations. (161), Japanese Political Scientist, Seizaburo Sato also expresses the same view. (162)

In the post 9/11 period Graham Fuller speaks about a 'vicious circle'. He says "Under such conditions, it should not be surprising that these frustrated populations perceive the current war against terrorism as functionally a war against Islam. Muslim countries are the chief target, they contend, Muslims everywhere are singled out for censure and police attention, and U.S power works its will across the region with little regard for deeper Muslim concerns. A vicious circle exists: dissatisfaction leads to anti-regime action, which leads to repression, which in turn leads to terrorism, U.S military intervention, and finally further dissatisfaction. Samuel Huntington's theory of a "clash of civilizations" is seemingly vindicated before the Muslim world's eyes". (163)

Khaled Abou El-Fadl has expressed the American agenda based on clash of civilizations much more succinctly. He says "In many ways, the concept of
clashing civilisations is one that cannot be explicitly endorsed by political forces in the United States. President George W. Bush has emphasised that his administration is not launching a war against Islam, because Islam is a religion of peace. But quite aside from the graceful declarations of the US administration intended to maintain the appearance of religious impartiality and political propriety, various governmental policies and discourses easily feed into the paradigm of the clash of civilisations. Aspects of US counter-terrorism measures either reveal the influence of this paradigm upon American politicians or lend support to its proponents. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September, President Bush and his administration have consistently claimed that they are engaged in a battle between good and evil. Although such language is employed to galvanise political support, the symbolism is significant. In the political symbolisms of President Bush, the good is to be equated with civilisation and, naturally, the evil is not. President Bush invited the world to choose sides: one had either to join the forces of good in the world, the upholders of civilisation and civility, or conversely, be counted among the evildoers, the dwellers in the darkness of barbarity. Having adopted this dichotomous worldview, the logical next step was to sort through the nations of the world and categorise them accordingly. Bush was perpetuating an old and well-established colonial habit. Colonialism divided the world into the civilised and the uncivilised, and declared that the white man's burden was to civilise the world, by force if necessary. It projected the exact same paradigm upon Islam.” (164)

Emad El Din Aysha says “The clash of civilizations thesis's true origins lie partly in problems Samuel Huntington sees brewing in his own country. His thesis is to a considerable extent an externalization of these troubles an attempt to solve them through international means, while serving U.S. national interests in tandem. As a scholar of American exceptionalism Huntington is explicitly and openly concerned about the political unity and cultural homogeneity of his country in the
absence of the existential threat of world Communism. He sees "multiculturalism" and excessive immigration threatening America's dominant Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, English culture and its libertarian political values. Right-wing "anti-federalism" is threatening the authority and very existence of the federal government, while "commercialism," the elevation of commercial interests above all else among economic and political elites, intensifies the class conflict roots of much anti-federalism. The solution to these myriad problems is a foreign threat, whether real or perceived; hence, the clash of civilizations." (165) His message is clear, that Huntington's thesis has its roots in the domestic agenda, which is logically and intentionally extended to the outside world.

Two Indian scholars have also made a similar point in their writings. Chandra Muzzaffar says "It is important that people in the West and the Muslim world take cognisance of this and refuse to be drawn into a false, artificial inter-civilisational feud. The real threat to our well-being emanates from vested interests that are determined to perpetuate their global military, political, economic and cultural hegemony." (166) Ram Puniyani says "This thesis forms the cover for US ambitions for its aggressions in West Asia." (167)

In the context of the visit of George W. Bush to India Ram Puniyani said "The deeper issue of the imperialist lust for oil and political hegemony has been cleverly put under the carpet by the propaganda machinery, ever willing and capable of Manufacturing Consent or doctoring mass consciousness." (168)

Tim Gorringe makes a very pertinent point when he says "The agenda of global capital is dominance, and this carries with it cultural dominance which rides roughshod over civilizational difference. Huntington's account of the clash of civilizations obscures the real facts of the matter which is that global capital creates an increasingly borderless and homogenised world. It also flies in the face of the reality of recent global politics as Chomsky points out, in a world where
Bush senior described the Muslim Suharto as 'our kind of guy', and where US regimes for forty years have attacked, and been complicit in the murder of, socialist priests in Latin America." (169) He further says that "The religious revival is an urban phenomenon and appeals to people who are modern-oriented, well educated, and pursue careers in the professions, government, and commerce. It is not just a Muslim phenomenon, but is true in India, in South Korea, in Russia and Latin America. Hinduism, Islam, but also Christianity are once again major political facts." (170) He concludes that "The thesis, then is, we can say, a classic piece of false consciousness, an ideological intervention which obscures the real facts of power." (171)

Said Shirazi dissects Huntingtonian formulation even further and concludes that "Huntington is not a historian or an economist: he traffics in buzzwords and speaking engagements, the Washington equivalent of a corporate motivational speaker, a Tony Robbins of political power. He offers not a narrative or a specific analysis but a paradigm, a deliberate oversimplification, an effort to find some facts to fit a pattern rather than finding the patterns in a wider range of facts. The problem is even with a decent paradigm, you wouldn't know when it applies and when it doesn't. His work's success is partly owed to being a book of fancy-talk that has the virtue of telling the hardheaded what they think they already know; it gains much by not being read. His secret seems to be that he predicts things that are already happening: warning about a conflict with China, for example, which is hardly a replacement for the Cold War mentality; it is nothing more than an extension of it. Essentially Huntington has written another perennially disposable policy book about the coming war with the East, a work of fortune-telling that will seem prescient at times depending on how things turn out and is pernicious to the extent that it can blind us or limit our expectations." (172) An excellent understanding indeed.
Nuzhat Khurshid has further said “Writers such as Edward Said and Noam Chomsky are quick to point out the errors in Huntington’s line of thinking. Both emphasize that Huntington’s ‘revolutionary’ thesis is only a carry over of the Cold War mentality, clothed in different terms, which allows the U.S. to continue its self-interested, unilateral foreign policy. (173)

Osama bin Laden has remarked that “It is crystal clear who benefits from igniting the fire of this war and this bloodshed: They are the merchants of war, the bloodsuckers who run the policy of the world from behind the scenes.” (174) His description fits well for the agenda setters like Huntington.

In the backdrop of the cartoons issue Ehsan Ahrari (175) has commented on Asiatimes that “The post-September 11 era, as with the preceding ones, has its own collection of heroes and villains. What seems to be notably different about the era after the terror attacks in 2001 is that no subject, and nothing, is sacred in the West, especially when it comes to Muslims and Islam. The escalating controversy about publishing a series of cartoons - first in some Scandinavian papers, and then in a number of newspapers from other countries of the European Union - of the Prophet Mohammed is the most recent example of that development. In Austria, it is against the law to make any statements denying the occurrence of the Holocaust. But one can say anything about Islam and get away with it. Aren't Muslims right when they take the position that there is an open season against their religion, and that the exercise of freedom of expression is used only as a "civilized" excuse for insulting them?” (176) Implying that there is a deliberate attempt or agenda to confront the Muslims he says “On this issue, the long-standing chasm between the West and the world of Islam is not only getting wider, but might also be heading toward a "civilizational war" that Samuel Huntington wrongly described as occurring in the early 1990s in his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”. (177)
Khaled El Fadl highlights the underlying prejudice being propagated through Huntington's thesis. He says "The "clash of civilizations" approach assumes, in deeply prejudiced fashion, that puritanism and terrorism are somehow authentic expressions of the predominant values of the Islamic tradition, and hence is a dangerous interpretation of the present moment". (178) Sylo Taraku then highlights the ramifications of such agenda setting activity thus "The American President George W. Bush, though emphasizing that this is not a war between civilizations has spoken about a crusade against terrorism, words which have connotations of clash between the West and the Muslim world. In similar vein Tony Blair has emphasized that the terror attack was a war against "civilisation", against "democracy", against "our way of living", and so forth. This kind of rhetoric from politicians and particularly Western leaders, as well as the media has contributed to presenting Islam as the big threat against the West and Western values on one hand and inducing the people from the Muslim world to seeing this conflict as a Western war against Islam. The result has been as wished, a conflict between the West and the Muslim world, epitomised by the Al Qaeda attacks on America and America's invasion and war on Muslim countries" (179)

M. Shahid Alam highlights the economic angle in explaining the reason for Huntington's theory. He first observes that "Huntington's thesis has dominated public discourse since it was first launched in 1993" (180) Then he asks "Why has The Clash dominated public discourse in the West despite its flawed theory, lack of empirical support, and its espousal of hatred as the necessary foundation of cultural identity?" (181) Alam emphatically answers "This is social science at its political best-as ideology. The Clash obfuscates the realities of unequal power: in this case, the deepest, most enduring, and widening divisions between rich and poor countries. It is carelessly constructed, ahistorical and contradictory; it is also contradicted by historical evidence". (182) He then adds "Apparently, ideologies succeed by appealing to interests, not logic or evidence." (183) Alam argues "Our
capacity to believe narratives, even quite ridiculous ones, depends on how well they serve our individual and collective interests. Many of the stories social scientists weave about race, culture, economic development; free markets and free trade are implausible, even farcical, once they are seen in their true colors. But they endure so long as they serve powerful interests. They endure because these powerful interests can employ a legion of scholars who willingly—though often unknowingly—trade the prestige of their scholarship for good jobs, good pay, and the accolades of bosses.” (184)

He explains “The post-Cold War period marked a new intensification in the reach of global capitalism. The communist challenge had forced the Core countries to unite, to forge multilateral institutions to manage their global interests: when the Cold War ended, the Core countries moved decisively, with the multilateral institutions in the lead, to create a global economic regime which allowed Core capital to freely penetrate every segment of the Periphery. The bywords of this new regime are: free trade, liberal exchange markets, privatization, national treatment of foreign capital, and globalization of intellectual property rights. This has produced rapid immiseration of large parts of the Periphery, the erosion of indigenous capital in much of the Periphery, and widening disparities between the Core and Periphery. Not surprisingly, this more transparent, overbearing and invasive imperialism deepened the demand for ideologies that would obfuscate the growing divisions between, as well as inside, the rich and poor countries. *The Clash* answers to this demand by giving primacy to religious, racial and civilizational conflicts, thus deflecting attention from the looming battles over the world's economic divide.” (185)

Ram Puniyani similarly exposes the motive behind the thesis thus “Today the ideological cover of ‘defending Freedom in the World’ is no more adequate for its expansionist goals. The resistance of the weak has to be dubbed in a more
scathing manner to justify the Terror of the Mighty, and so the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. The Ideology of the imperialism in the times of Oil hunger, ideology of the hegemonic powers to crush the resistance in places where they want direct and indirect control over the resources of the World. So the ‘backward Islamic civilization’ is clashing with the Modern West, say the new ideologues of imperialists. White Man’s burden thesis came up with the colonization, Defending freedom came up while suppressing the rising Nationalisms and now the clash of civilization is being put forward when US is trying to control the taps of oil resources” (186) Ram Puniyani further states “Post 9/11 the demonization of Muslims has gone several notches up. As such the demonization of Islam, Islam being presented as the new threat coincided; on one hand with the decline of Soviet states, and on the other with the coming to power of Ayatollah Khomeini, who succeeded in coming to power on the crest of the revolution which threw away the US stooge, Raza Shah Pehlavi. The phenomenon overlapped in time to pave the way for US media and other propaganda mechanisms to project ‘Islam as the new threat’, the earlier threat as per the US was Communism” (187)

Nuzhat Khurshid enlightens by saying “In conclusion, the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory is not a valid or useful tool in analyzing international relations. It encourages divisive and parochial thinking that alienates those from different cultures as ‘The Other’ and implies a kind of moral imperialism of one culture over the other. In practice, the theory can serve as justification for transgressions such as unilateral intervention and self-interested foreign policy. Upon objective and rational consideration, the roots for the conflict can be seen to originate in economic and political frustrations, rather than abstract self-identification with a ‘civilization. If we allow the oversimplification of Huntington’s theory to lure us and cause us to lose sight of the complexity that comprises human interactions, we tread the dangerous path leading to racial hatred” (188)
Christopher Vasillopulos has given an excellent explanation of how a paradigm or thesis ultimately is an ideological tool. After citing empirical facts about the much higher openness of Islam to the world than Christianity he states "I mention these empirical questions only to indicate the limitations of the "clash of civilizations" as an analytical concept. Even if, as I believe, the concept were bankrupt, this would say nothing regarding its value as part of an ideology or a movement. Most scholars believe racism is a bankrupt analytical concept, yet how would one understand a racist ideology like Nazism without understanding its function? Belief in a divine figure who acts in history may be a relic of a tribal past or the product of an underdeveloped psyche, yet how could one hope to understand Christianity, Judaism or Islam without appreciating its value in these monotheisms? Yet great care must be taken. The concept cannot be taken as an analytical given, for the reasons stated, an unquestioned assumption or a premise upon which inferences can be drawn. What then? It can be studied as a rhetorical device. In my view Western scholars who believe or pretend to believe they are being analytical have used the "clash of civilizations" in some instances as a 'secular' version of 'holy war.' It can be studied as a key concept in an ideology. Here it serves to separate the 'enemy' from normal discourse, rivalry, and conflict. Even war becomes transformed, no longer politics by other means, but a fight to exterminate an alien presence. In this instance the very existence of the 'other' is a deadly provocation that by itself justifies the most extreme measures including annihilation. A concept's shallowness as an analytical device may allow it to be more formidable as a rhetorical or ideological one, for while seeming scholarly, it is elastic enough to mean anything that is demagogically useful. This elasticity can go so far as to corrupt long struggled for legal and philosophical concepts which are the basis of any modern society. Note that this tendency to push a concept to its rhetorical extremes is considered primitive and uncivilized. Modern societies (read European) and sophisticated cultures are moderate by their very nature. They are democratic in politics and free market in economics, both expressions of
middle class prudence and practicality. Customers and neighbors are preferable to antagonists. Competitive markets and athletics are preferable to war. By and large this generalization is true. But it has limits. The acid test is what happens when such societies are under pressure or attack. Do they act in accordance with their central tendencies or do they revert to precisely the primitivism they ordinarily ridicule? The events of 11 September do not bode well. Could President Bush's rhetoric in the wake of the World Trade Center disaster sound more unsophisticated? We are engaged in a war between "good and evil." "You are either with us or against us" or "Wanted dead or alive" to cite but two of many overly simplistic and gratuitously pugnacious statements emanating from the White House and the Pentagon." (189)

Daniel Chirot, in his aptly titled 'A clash of civilisations or of paradigms'(190) has dwelt upon the role of paradigms to guide policies to effect social change. His contention is that conflict is produced by the uneven and unbalanced modernisation in the world and not due to any inevitability of a clash of civilisations. He links conflict to the imbalance in modernisation of societies, which, he contends, is directly linked to theories constructed by the social scientists. His argument is that poor social theory retards modernisation while strong one helps that society to prosper and emerge strong and powerful. Thus though the conflict on the face lies in the difference in levels of modernisation, in the ultimate analysis it boils down to the underlying theories and paradigms that set the agenda for the respective societies and countries. His argument is that conflict superficially is on account of differing levels of modernisation, but fundamentally on account of theories and paradigms constructed, adopted and followed by different societies and which give different modernisation results. The analysis and argument of Chirot is very much valid in case of the role of theories and paradigms in general and most certainly applies to Huntington's paradigm as well. Chirot has concluded that some theories and paradigms, especially the
'classical functionalist-evolutionary ones are much more effective in explaining conflict and change than those proposed by Huntington, by world system theorists, or by postmodernists. The fact that Huntington's thesis or paradigm is an agenda setting exercise competing in a race for paradigmatic dominance becomes plain from analysis of Chirot who has focused on the clash of paradigms in the context of modernisation and conflict.

Thus it is clear that many scholars have argued that the clash of civilizations thesis as presented by Huntington is essentially an ideological and strategic theory aimed at setting an agenda for the US foreign policy and defense policy. The judgment of these scholars is unequivocal- Huntington's clash of civilisations thesis is an covert exercise in agenda setting to ensure continuing American dominance and hegemony all over the world- for various reasons such as domestic problems, resource grabbing and so on. Essentially the agenda, through Huntington's thesis, is for the survival of America through the dominance of the world. And dominance entails conflict. Huntington thus belongs to the dangerous clan of 'treacherous' intellectuals who use their talents, knowledge, skill and intellectual abilities for ideological purposes and to subserve a specific agenda. Julien Benda has aptly stated about the dangerous and treacherous tendency and nature of scholars and intellectuals, thus "And then they teach men that to accept which is of service to them--the 'myth'--is an undertaking that does them honor, while it shameful to admit a truth which harms them." (191)

Christopher Vasilopoulos has lain his finger squarely on the role of scholars "The role of all honest scholars is clear. They have a duty to unmask any concept's epistemological pretensions, revealing its inherently pejorative or rhetorical usages, especially when the concept in question has genocidal implications. Any effort in this direction in this time of virtual panic in the West over the assumed Islamic penchant for jihad and terrorism would perform a great service for the
universal values of reason, rationality, understanding and moderation. Exposing the "clash of civilizations" might therefore prevent a fallacious concept from becoming a true prophecy." (192) He has further articulated "Some of us have more girls and blessings than we know what to do with. Each of us has the gift of reason, of logical inquiry, of a capacity to gather and array facts, of an ability to separate justifications from rationales, of the ability to distance ourselves from our passionate concerns, if only temporarily. We are called upon to use these gifts not merely to achieve positions of influence, honor, prestige and material security. We have a responsibility to use these unearned blessings for the benefit of those ordinary, decent, hardworking millions of people who populate our countries. We have to do what they cannot do: inoculate them against the diseases of fear, hatred and retribution. We have to do or try to do what their leaders fail to do. We have to create the rational grounds for civilized behavior. We have to listen to the screams of frightened children, all children, as if they were our own. Dare we call ourselves civilized if we lack the courage to try?" (192)

The final questions that arises is whether it is at all possible for individuals, whether they are scholars or leaders or ordinary members of specific communities or worldviews, even a plurality of worldviews or identities to break free from their ideological and political attachments to their worldviews and chart a truly independent, neutral and honest course. Probably not for most of them. May be a few are capable to rise above this crass behaviour and state the truth, which is that power underlines not only the behaviour and activity of elites and masses but also of the scholars who simultaneously belong to the elite and masses of a given worldview and a socially constructed reality. Huntington fits the bill perfectly. Steve Smith expressed it very well "States are not actors, humans are; interests clearly influence behavior but they have to be mediated through identity; and discourse and language are crucially important in constructing identity and framing interests. That is why the future of world order depends on the choices our
leaders make and the values we think they should promote. World orders always reflect dominant values, are always partial and may well hinder the search for global justice and peace. They are not given, they are not natural - they reflect our conscious or unconscious choices." (193)

Moreover, in the field of theory building, dominant values, politics, power and ideology play a crucial albeit a hidden role. This has been nowhere more glaringly evident than in the case of Huntington’s theory of clash of civilizations. Rajiv Bhargavea has articulated the linkage exceptionally well. He says that in any context, including in case of critiques of America, “it is hard to deny the presence of prejudice, rhetoric and the sledge hammer of ideology” and then goes on to explain that “And even harder to accept the view of the skeptic that denies the very distinction between rhetoric and argument, between ideology and reasoned political theory. It is true of course that both reasoned political argument and ideology seek to win over others, but they do so in dramatically opposite ways. One, steadfastly committed to transparency, provides every conceivable reason for its principles and value-based conclusions, the other short-circuits moral values, reduces principles to formulae, almost always privileges the use of rhetoric over reason and permits half-truths, even lies. Yet, for all the validity and usefulness of the distinction between reasoned political argument and ideology, we must try not to seal them off altogether or wholly overlook what they have in common. For a start, the world of the political theorist is not entirely devoid of rhetoric and emotion, nor is the universe of the ideologist completely lacking in reflexiveness, internal coherence or rational thought. Likewise, no matter how well justified, a rationally defended belief system still contains an element of extra-rational preference and some prejudice. For all the justified complaints against ideology, in the end, we must also acknowledge the grain of truth it might contain about us and our world. No matter how exasperating its form and how crude its technique, we must attend to its content. At any rate, ideologies are shaped by their practical
function, by the inherent logic of what they are meant to deliver, i.e., a broad conceptual map of the social and political world without which a political agent can not think; decide or act. Ideologies are necessarily gestural, uncertain steps in the dark that may lead to invaluable and indispensable insights about the social and political world. Surely, it must be admitted that reasoned political argument is not always necessary for this purpose and never sufficient. Reason may fine tune some ideologies or help defeat others but it cannot replace them. Alas, even those of us who loath the form of ideology must closely attend to its content.” (194)

Much of what Bhargava says can be said to apply to Huntington’s theory building effort. Fakruddin H Bennur is therefore right in stating that “Theory of Huntington is used by Americans to portray the Islamic people and countries as a threat and seek their subjugation. Huntington has himself emphasised on Islamic fundamentalism and projected it as threat to the West. Huntington is an American agent who is carrying forward American agenda. The present policy of George Bush is nothing but implementation of the design by Huntington which itself reflects the American agenda for the world. Even now Huntington is regularly consulted by American Administration because after all he has been closely associated and advisor to the earlier American Administrations and has been holding important postions in the Harvard University’s School of Governement. Whatever America is now doing is wished previously by Huntington in his theory of clash of civilisations. After the WTC attacks Bush started speaking of crusades and particularly the psychology of crusades all the while pervades the Western mind and Huntington is no exception to it” (195). Thus it would not be wrong to believe that Huntington’s ideology is evident in his theoretical enterprise. His ‘clash of civilisations’ is less of a theory and more an ideology. Or to put it in differently Huntington’s thesis is ideology expressed through ‘reasoned political theory’.
And finally at the end of such an effort an important question needs to be asked. What really is happening? In 1989 Francis Fukuyama wrote 'The End of History' in critical response to which his contemporary, Samuel Huntington wrote 'Clash of Civilizations?'. In response to Huntington's article, his former student James Kurth wrote a critical piece 'The Real Clash'. But Robert George in his article 'Clash of Orthodoxies' critiqued James Kurth. Stanley Kurtz critiqued Fukuyama and Huntington together in his work 'The Future of History'. During the post Cold War period more than ever before the world of scholarship as Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart and other have stated, witnessed the 'clash of scholarships'. Stanley Kurtz has spoken of 'clash of paradigms'. On the surface of it evidently, there is a 'clash of scholarship' and a 'clash of paradigms' and it seems to perfectly reflect the age of 'clashings' in keeping with the Huntingtonian discourse. However, there is a deeper reality that underscores all these 'clashings', a reality which is directly contingent upon something very fundamental to human nature itself, the political ground of human nature, which is itself an inherent part of human evolutionary process. The clash of scholarships and paradigms is a natural corollary. It is a part of the larger and underlying dynamics of power struggle within the scholarly world made up mostly of intellectual elites, a battle for survival through dominance which is being waged at the level of minds at all times. This is essentially the politics of paradigms taking place all the while, sometimes consciously, mostly unconsciously, and Huntington's discourse, narrative and paradigm has to be understood in this context.

8.6 Constructing an Enemy?

The narrative of conflict is incomplete without conceiving an enemy. While Huntington does not explicitly emphasise the term 'enemy', in his thesis, in essence what he is doing is creating an enemy. What does the idea of 'enemy' signify? Latin inimicus means an adversary or an opponent. It signifies hostility
and has connotations of war. The 'enemy' is always the 'other' ranged against self. The language of 'us' and 'them' or 'self' and 'other' is the language of opposing camps, language of hostility. In essence it is language of politics and a language of opposing camps. And Huntington speaks this language extremely eloquently through his clash of civilizations theory.

The 'enemy' discourse or narrative is nothing new in human history. It has been a consistent theme of human societies. In the Jewish context, the Bible has reported rhetoric based on the notion of 'enemy' especially when the Israelites returned from Egypt to reclaim the land of Canaan which was inhabited by other peoples. Jacob Katz, an Israeli scholar has highlighted this slaughter of the infidels by his statement "Joshua's war of annihilation against the people of Canaan—in accordance with a divine command to Moses—had been justified in Jewish and Christian traditions, both of which denied the rights of idolatrous peoples to exist. Joshua served as an example for Cromwell and his soldiers in the war against the Irish and for the white settlers in America in their struggle with the Indians."(195a) Maimonides said: "Some of the Turks and the nomads in the North, and the Blacks and the nomads of the South, and those who resemble them in our climates ... their nature is like the nature of mute animals, and according to my opinion they are not on the level of human beings, and their level among existing things is below that of man and above that of a monkey, because they have the image and the resemblance of a man more than a monkey does." (196) Adolf Hitler and his Nazis used this terminology, of 'us' and 'them', of 'Aryans' and 'non Aryans', of 'superior Germans' and 'inferior Jews'. The Communists in Russia and China used it by speaking of 'workers versus capitalists' and the Capitalist spoke of the same as 'free individuals versus communists' or 'democracy versus dictatorship'. Vasillopolus has therefore fittingly remarked "Unfortunately, one could multiply examples without number. Every so-called civilization has committed atrocities against its enemies which it portrayed as sub-
human threats to its existence. Of course there were always rationales, even for the most aggressive and atrocious acts, some of which might have been justified by a reasonable, even civilized, interpretation of events, perhaps if they were truly defensive or truly pre-emptive.” (197)

Marc Howard Ross has given a very enlightening account of ‘enemy’ narrative thus “Defending civilization against terrorism requires hunting down the supporters and perpetrators of terror and the regimes that support them. For many the truth of this narrative is self-evident. Anyone denying or even questioning it is either an enemy or delusional (or both). The link between the events themselves and the conclusions is seamless to those who accept it.” (198) Having explained the two narratives at work in the Islamic and Western worlds, in the context of 9/11 attacks, Ross states “One could view the two narratives as support for the view that the world can be neatly dichotomized into two groups—those who are for us and those who are against us and that therefore further explosive and escalating conflict is inevitable. It is further possible to attribute the attitudes and behaviors of those involved solely to their culture and religion. However, to do so would be a serious oversimplification” (199)

Many scholar were quick to see this concealed war and political rhetoric underlying Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis and they therefore mounted stringent criticism of this language of ‘us’ and ‘them’ used by Huntington. In one of the most well known works ‘The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy’, (200), several authors, make a case that there is really no Muslim enemy but rather a construction of a Muslim enemy by the West. This work offers a severe critique of parochial, xenophobic, and a simplistic approach by the Western world to the Muslim world. The authors in this work have critically responded to the writings of Bernard Lewis., V.S. Naipaul, Robert Kaplan and Samuel Huntington advocating civilisational perspective and have exposed the dangers of
self-fulfilling prophesies like the "clash of civilizations". These scholars have focused on the Western enterprise of ‘Constructing a Muslim Enemy’ to perpetuate the dominance of the West and of America. Qureshi and Sells have also noted that "Those who proclaim such a clash of civilizations, speaking for the West or for Islam, exhibit the characteristics of fundamentalism: the assumption of a static essence, knowable immediately, of each civilization, the ability to ignore history and tradition, and the desire to lead the ideological battle on behalf of one of the clashing civilizations". (201)

Fakruddin Bennur has this to say "One very interesting thing was that Spain was the most tolerant place when it was ruled by Muslims. All religious communities were living happily in this Muslim ruled Spain and were enlightened communities. The Islamic rulers gave freedom to all. There were no tortures or persecutions. There was no discrimination practised. On account of all this gradually, Islam was spreading into Europe, though initially Muslim armies did invade and establish their rule in Southern Europe, particularly Spain and Portugal. There were wars mostly between rulers, between Muslim and non Muslim rulers in Europe. At that time the Christian leaders felt the threat to Christianity from the tolerant Islam. They feared Christianity would decline on account of Islam becoming tolerant. Thus the seeds of the crusades were sown. Crusades came to be planned and launched to evict Muslims from Europe and so called 'Holy Land'. Esposito has exposed the designs of Huntington and has said there was never any Islamic threat to the West. Once again the West and America wants to dominate the entire world and now only thing they need is an enemy, a target to attack in order to establish their supremacy and dominance. In order to achieve this end they are propagating the threat of Islam and Islamic civilisation. They have first invaded Afghanistan and then Iraq and have installed their puppet rulers and their next target is Iran." (202)
A.J. Bacevich also underscores the 'enemy' discourse of Huntington's thesis by stating "At the same time, the imagery of clashing civilizations does possess real and potentially explosive emotional resonance. From his scholarly perch at Harvard, Professor Huntington gives credence to apprehensions that the less erudite and articulate have until now quietly nursed. He examines the tendency of plain folk to identify with "their own kind" and to view with suspicion those from alien tribes. In their instinctive capacity to distinguish friend from foe, he finds much to commend. After all, "we know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are up against." Thus does Huntington legitimize those anxieties and unwittingly encourage them. His analysis connects with the dark side of human nature that is too willing to interpret difference as inferiority or evidence of malign intent. He puts the stamp of respectability on fears all too easily twisted into bigotry. To the extent that it finds a wide audience and persuades its readers, The Clash of Civilizations could inadvertently serve the cause of intolerance, racism, and xenophobia. (203)

Giandomenico Picco (204) says that "At the beginning of the 1990s, world leaders were confronted with the loss of "the enemy," a fundamental tool in their management of power. For some, this meant the collapse of the Soviet Union; for others, it meant an end to a long-running confrontation with the West. Regardless of the definition, leaders on both sides were left feeling orphaned and, unconsciously perhaps, began looking for a replacement. It was not surprising, therefore, that an intellectual rush began in earnest to identify new adversaries in the context of a changing world. This was the setting in 1993, when Samuel Huntington, a professor at Harvard University, published his famous article, "The Clash of Civilizations?"" (205) He pointedly states that "In this work, Professor Huntington looked at a world searching for new sources of vilification, and he found them to exist in terms of history, culture, and religion. He saw a world in which future wars would "occur along the cultural fault lines separating
civilizations." (206) Tetsuya Kataoka, (207) has similarly stated "having conceded the disappearance of an enemy, Huntington now wants to find a new one."

According to Mahmood Monshipouri (208) and Gina Petonito orientalist understanding of Islam such as that of Huntington, views Islam as a threat, as the other, as an enemy to be confronted and subdued. Orientalism is built on the idea of the 'other', the antithetical, literally the 'enemy' and hence critics of orientalism like Edward Said had launched a scathing attack on Huntington. Late Said's appropriately titled work 'Clash of Ignorance' is not only a stringent critic of orientalist tendencies in general but Huntington's thesis in particular. Huntington's thesis is based on orientalist backdrop, and according to Edward Said, West not only ignores Islam, which is the 'other' but seeks its own triumph and dominance. For Said the ignorance of the West, as regards Islam stems from the very antithetical idea of the 'other' and hence for him it is a 'clash of ignorance' rather than 'clash of civilizations'. According to Said the West is not likely to have any critical understanding of Islam, the 'other' because it is not interested in it. And it is not interested in it because it considers it as not in its interest. For the West, Islam, the 'other' is a problem and a threat who must be subdued. (209) Ibrahim Kalin, has focused on the embedded epistemology of 'othering' in Huntington's thesis. According to him the depiction of 'the other', in this case Islam, makes it easy to look upon others or Muslims, as a threat and an enemy to be vanquished and only serves to pre-empt any possibility of understanding, dialogue and peaceful coexistence. (210) For Ibrahim Kalin, West perceives Islam as the 'other' more as a 'threat' than as a 'challenge'. According to him such perceptions of the Muslims by the West fosters negative images and stereotypes of Muslims by labelling them as 'violent, terroristic, backward, and immoral' helps acquire a license to hunt them down and kill them (211)
Mahmood Mamdani in highlighting the traditional competition between Islam and Christianity brings out the clash within each, whereby each feels superior to the others. He says "After all, is there not less and less talk of the clash of civilizations, and more and more talk of the clash inside civilizations? Here is one version of the argument that the clash is inside – and not between – civilizations. It is my own construction, but it is not a fabrication. I think of it as an enlightened version, because it does not just speak of the other, but also of self. It has little trace of ethnocentrism. This is how it goes. Islam and Christianity have one thing in common. Both share a deeply messianic orientation. Each has a conviction that it possesses the truth. Both have a sense of mission to civilize the world. Both consider the world beyond a sea of ignorance, one that needs to be redeemed. Think, for example, of the Arabic word *al-Jahaliya*, which I have always known to mean the domain of ignorance. This conviction is so deep-seated that it is even found in its secular version, as in the old colonial notion of "a civilizing mission," or in its more racialized version, "the White Man's Burden." Or simply, in the 19th century American conviction of a "manifest destiny." In both cultures, Christian and Muslim, these notions have been the subject of prolonged debates" (212)

Christopher Vasillopulos takes the argument even further. He says "If therefore one is to speak of a clash between Islam and Christianity or Islam and the West or Islam and modernity, one must assign 'civilization' to only one side of the dichotomy. In many of the centuries of rivalry of Islam and Christian Europe, this is precisely what each side did, portraying the other as barbaric and in the process provoking the barbarism each claimed to reject. It should be remembered that European Protestants and Catholics engaged in precisely the same sort of barbarities with the same justifications." (213)
Christopher Vasillopulos highlights the possibility of the link between the wars based on 'enemy' discourse in the Twentieth century and ‘enemy’ in Huntington’s thesis. “I believe race-based imperialism was the most destructive concept of the Twentieth century. I hope that the cultural and religious differences that are enshrouded in the concept of the "clash of civilizations" do not become its counterpart in the Twenty-first century. If the concept refers to the purported incompatibility of states with a predominantly Islamic population with modernity, by which is meant Western civilization, then the ground may be laid for a war of annihilation to protect the West from the barbarian East. If the concept suggests, most often without argumentation, that there must be something in Islamic culture that is inherently anti-Western, that is, anti-modern, not in the sense of divergent cultures, but in the sense of the values which separate civilized men from hominid beasts inappropriately enthralled by a fanatic spiritualism, then several more steps towards the justification of annihilation will have been prepared. If the "clash of civilizations" means that the West assumes that states with predominately Islamic citizens are evil because they wish to engage in jihads, not merely against Coca-Cola, loose women, and rock and roll, but against freedom, truth and god, or the American way of life, then the future looks bleak indeed. If the White House were bombed, would that justify the slaughter of every man, woman and child in Iraq?”

Esposito has expressed it thus “For more than four decades governments formulated policy in the midst of a superpower rivalry that defined the globe and the future in terms of the visible ideological and military threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the cold war, the fall of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of communism have created a "threat vacuum" that has given rise to a search for new enemies. For some Americans the enemy is the economic challenge the Japanese or the European Community represent. For others it is an Islamic world whose 1 billion Muslims form a majority in more than 48 countries.
and a rapidly growing minority in Europe and America. Some view Islam as the only ideological alternative to the West that can cut across national boundaries, and perceiving it as politically and culturally at odds with Western society, fear it; others consider it more a basic demographic threat.”. (215)

Manochehr Dorraj, says that Huntington’s thesis seeks to distort, and dehumanize Muslims so as to help it to mount an attack. (216) For Kishore Mahbubani the fear of the Rest by the West leads it to the siege mentality which in turn gives rise to the thesis such as Huntington’s (217) Michael W. Suleiman (218) has looked at the complexity of this issue. It is because of this that Engin I. Erdem has said “Samuel P. Huntington’s clash of civilizations paradigm unquestionably has menacing implications for Islam-the West relations” (218) Edward Said (2001) has also decried Huntington’s ‘Clash’ thesis as an attempt to revive the old ‘enemy’ discourse based on race (‘black-white’), duality (‘us-them’) or (religion)‘good-evil’. Said believes that Huntington has revived world dichotomy prevalent during the Cold War, but by substituting the old threats from the ‘communist spies’ with those from the ‘Islamic terrorists’. (219)

John Petrovato has opined “The Clash of Civilization rhetoric suggests that the world will always be at war. As opposed to the Cold War with the Soviet Union (a country only in existence for less than a century), Islam is an old religion spread throughout the world. The framework of the Cold war between the Communist “east” and the capitalist “west” did prove useful in making this theory. The new war is between the rational, democratic, secular, and tolerant “west” and the irrational, fundamentalist, and violent “east”. Orwell could have predicted this well: the new enemy created on the morning after the old enemies fell. It almost seems that for the “west” to feel at home with itself, it needs to be at constant war with some “other”. Perhaps it provides some guidance to what we are and what we are not - we are simply not the “other”. Perhaps Chomsky and others who have
suggested that a major reason that states fight wars is for domestic reasons and for the disciplining of a nation’s own population are right. Not according to the “clash theorists” like Bernard Lewis, who claim that the clash will continue as long as Islam exists. He believes that the radical Islamic militants are not deviants from Islam, but actually have a more correct view of it. They will therefore likely become more influential over the years. But if such a clash really existed, why then do western nations continue to support both financially and militarily such Islamic groups and nations?” (220) Petrovato then points out like many other scholars the reciprocity of the ‘enemy’ discourse. He says “Interestingly anti-western Islamic militants use the same kind of “absolute conflict” to frame their war with the West. They say the conflict is between the hedonistic, degenerate, repressive, soulless West and the just, truthful, and moral center of Islam” (221)

Khaled Abou El Fadl has spelt out this much better “President Bush's colourful language about the "axis of evil" and the "crusade" against terrorists has highlighted the markedly absolutist character of American conceptions of the "other". The absolutist and polarising policies of the US administration post-11 September have led some commentators to speak of a "clash of fundamentalisms" - the fundamentalism of bin Laden against that of Bush. They hold that the current war against terrorism is being waged by two equally reactionary and fanatical forces, each labouring under a dogmatic and essentialised worldview. This argument, however, is flawed because it is inaccurate to equate the morality of bin Laden's and Bush's worldviews. Regardless of how some aspects of the war against terrorism might be reminiscent of colonialism, the type of theology that drives bin Laden is founded on a total disregard of any standards of civility or principles of humanity. Nevertheless, in some important respects, the rhetoric we employ in the war against terrorism, when coupled with a paradigm of clashing civilisations, does have the effect of perpetuating religious bigotry and of dehumanising the "other", however that "other" is defined.” (222)
El Fadl brings out well the intimate link between Huntington's thesis and practice of policy by America. "There are several aspects of our anti-terrorism policies that contribute to a symbolic leap from a declared "war against terrorism" to a "war against Islam". Initially, it is important to keep in mind that the moment we intimate that we in the West are civilised and Islam is barbaric, we effectively equate Islam and terrorism. The civilised West and uncivilised "other" is a frame of mind that is inherent in the very idea of the clash of civilisations because no one, not even Huntington and his supporters, truly believes the claim that the purportedly "clashing civilisations" are equal in moral merit or ethical value. Logically, it is possible for the good to clash with the good, but the socially constructed imagination will find this a theoretical possibility difficult to accept. If two civilisations are clashing, the natural assumption will be that one is good and the other is bad, and that we, whoever the "we" might be, are necessarily the good. In social psychology, this is often referred to as the binary instinct of "us" versus "them". In the current conflict, this is especially pertinent because the US administration has solidified a dichotomous view of the world by intimating that the world can be divided into good or evil, without nuances or in-betweens. Since the US administration has asserted our goodness, then, by definition, whomever we clash with must necessarily be evil" (223)

Huang Ping says "The issue is not only about how to define war and civilization, but to examine our deeply rooted political unconsciousness. Not only politicians, but also journalists, academics, and ordinary citizens have some very biased notions of "the Other." We frequently refer to the attacks as proof of the "Clash of Civilizations," to the counterattacks as "crusades," and, even more, reduce the problem to a battle between Good and Evil! Are these the schemes deeply but unconsciously cultivated in our thinking? (224)
In revisiting the thesis of Huntington in post 9/11 era Picco says "This is an opportunity to look at the true nature of recent conflicts—conflicts fought on the grounds of politics, not history or religion. It is also a chance to view the United Nations Dialogue among Civilizations as a critique of any philosophy that would divide the world along such exclusive lines. The terrorist groups responsible for the September 11 attacks are not so unlike those leaders facing the end of the Cold War. These are groups that could not exist without an enemy, and while this behavior exemplifies the saddest state of the human soul, it also marks today’s political reality." (225) For Puniyani it is no different and he says "The inference is that any attempt to demonize Islam, civilization in Muslim countries is basically motivated by politics and has nothing to do with the norms of civilization or religion as such" (226)

Picco has stated that "Ironically, Professor Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations went into print at a time when the facts were already disproving it. But that did not seem to matter. At a glance, the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia seemed to fit so well into the theory. After all, “Christian” Armenia was in conflict with “Muslim” Azerbaijan. This was the façade. In looking a bit deeper, one would have quickly discovered that one of the greatest supporters of Armenia was actually the Islamic Republic of Iran—not a very Christian country. In addition, the West and Israel were quite supportive of the new Azerbaijan. As always, the war was not a civilizational war, but one based on differing objectives and interests. Unfortunately, the world press and public opinion were not familiar with these aspects, and few used this example to disprove the clash of civilizations theory. As a result, the theory began to carry the flavor of a self-fulfilling prophecy." (227)

Picco expresses some hope and says that "The new emerging system may also be shaped by the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11. Whether this
will be the excuse to finally prove the theory of the clash of civilizations right, or whether it will be used to prove it wrong, only time will tell. Those who launched the attacks surely would like to see Professor Huntington's theory fulfilled: It would be their ultimate success. They are the last product of the old paradigm of an eye for an eye, of exclusion, prejudice, and bigotry, and of the perception of diversity as a threat. The aftermath of September 11 will also make it more difficult to "sit on the fence," or to use "ifs" and "buts" in the struggle against those who have elevated intolerance and the killing of innocent people to an ideology. The idea of a superior civilization has led to disaster. The idea of a superior religion has not fared any better. To some, the idea of a dialogue among civilizations may seem naïve, idealistic, or just a slogan. For me, it is a way to begin a change of mindset—from perceiving diversity as a threat to perceiving diversity as an element of betterment and growth. It is a way, perhaps, to go beyond the culture of the enemy" (228)

Engin Erdem has said "Huntington's thesis basically depends on orientalist understandings of Islam, in which Islam-the 'other'- is perceived as culturally inferior to the West and identified as threat and even enemy. This understanding ignores the diversity, plurality and various dynamics of Islam/the Muslim World as well as that of 'Islamism' and 'Islamic fundamentalism'. This approach, however, closes the avenues for mutual understanding and dialogue as well as it leads to 'clash of misunderstandings'" (229)

Talking about the 'enemy' discourse Said Shirazi develops the analysis quite well "Enemies can be more useful rhetorically than allies. Islamic fundamentalists wage war on the U.S. not in the hopes of actually destroying it but in order to prevent the spread of Western freedoms among their people. War is a means of controlling your own population, as is a cult of martyrs and heroes. This cuts both ways. There are undeniably fanatics who may kill you for no greater
purpose than insulting your leaders, but following those leaders might not go very far towards saving you. It’s odd that such a heavily researched policy work is at heart dumber than the administration in office, but Huntington overlooks what Bush’s team knows by instinct, that their enemies are not united and can be bought off and played against each other. Even Bush knows there is no real axis of evil, he is merely fishing for an “evil empire” catchphrase. Bush knows that the U.S.’s war is not against Islam but against terrorism; Huntington for all his efforts at scholarship does not.” (230)

Huntington’s pro-American pro-war rhetoric as well as hidden motivation to effect a clash of civilizations or religions is clearly evident when he says “Hence it seems to me a high priority for Europe and America is to recognize what they have in common and to try to work out a common strategy for dealing with the threats to their society and security from militant Islam. I would add that a strategy which allows for preemptive war against urgent, immediate and serious threats is absolutely essential for the US and other Western powers in this period. Our enemies—primarily the militant Islam, but also other groups—cannot be deterred, that much is obvious, so it is essential—if they are preparing an attack against us—that we attack first.” (231)

This Huntingtonian language of hate and the obsession with the ‘enemy’ has taken hold of the West as well as the Islamic world. In June 1999 Bin Laden spoke the language of religious war on enemy “God willing engage in jihad against the enemies of Islam, particularly, the external archenemy, the Crusader-Jewish alliance”. (232) In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 attacks President Bush declared “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”. And then he said “Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.” (233) And then “You’re with us or you’re with them” said George Bush. (234)
Thus George Bush announced the enemy discourse strongly in September 2001. Bush during the war on Afghanistan said “Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can, and will, do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to achieve their political goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia” (235)

In February 2003 Osama bin Laden called West the “international alliance of evil” (236) In March 2003 Bin Laden exhorts “Hence, a Muslim who is unable to engage in Jihad with his hand or tongue must engage in Jihad in his heart. This means that he should incessantly hate Allah's enemies and curse them, [just] as he should constantly be loyal to the Believers and the Mujahideen; he should pray for them and feel the brotherhood of belief that binds him to all Muslims everywhere in the world, in both east and west. He should feel that the Believers are in one tent and that the infidels are in another, until Allah bestows on the [Islamic] Nation one government which will unite all Muslims under its banner, God willing. He [who engages in Jihad in his heart] should [at least] urge himself to engage in Jihad with his hand and his tongue. This [Jihad of the mind] is the weakest kind of Islamic faith. He should boycott products [manufactured by] the Americans and their allies (237) In September 2003, after the launch of war on Iraq Bush said “We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength; they are invited by the perception of weakness. And the surest way to avoid attacks on our own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans. We are fighting that enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan today so that we do not meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities.” (238) Eric McGlinchey has reported “Islamist opposition. Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Party of Liberation), for example, an Islamist movement active across much of Central Asia, advises its
followers: "The clash of civilisations is an inevitable matter. Make the preparations required for the conflict, since the Capitalist Western civilisation has knocked you down militarily, politically and economically; however they will never defeat you intellectually." (239)

Asghar Ali Engineer has explained the development well: "Each religious or ethnic group wants to establish its own domination in a particular area and wants to cleanse it of other 'polluting' groups. And to mobilise members of their own group, religious or cultural discourse is used thus creating strong prejudices in the minds of the other religious or cultural groups." (240)

Elazar Barkan has also very eloquently said: "How we understand the past and in particular the belief systems that incite contemporary conflicts has great impact on public life, but receives little attention in public discussion. This is particularly true as far as the clash of civilizations goes. This dispute is animated by reciprocal myths from both sides. What are these myths? Much of these myths seem to be background noise to war mongering, with little efforts at conducting a conversation." (241)

Ram Puniyani therefore adds: "The matters have gone too far. The targeted hate against the Muslims, the construction of phobia against Islam has crossed the threshold. While it served the US to attack many a countries for the sake of oil wealth, while it has helped the Hindu right to appropriate the social privileges, at the same time it has played and more so now than anytime before; is playing a counterproductive role to those states/societies and communities themselves. The schism between communities is acting on the nerves of democracies and weakening them as the process of societal development is getting retarded." (241a)

He further states that the post 9/11 period in the West "has resulted in a broad social common sense which sees Muslims as the 'other', their demonisation, the consequent violence at different places even on the smallest of pretexts, the fear
and insecurity leading to their ghettoisation. At global level the US has been resorting to War against terror which is a ploy to attack the areas in oil rich countries and to create a global Islamophobia. World-wide this hate against Muslims is on the rise. In India the problem is more confounded as the US goals worldwide and RSS goals at home match and worsen the problem. In many a Muslim majority countries similar processes are going on against the other religious minorities” (242)

KPS Gill considers this a much broader phenomenon “Today, radical and sometimes violent orthodoxies are gaining strength among most of the other major Faiths of the world as well - Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism, even pacifist Buddhism (for instance, in Sri Lanka) have created radicalised minorities who seek to impose their intolerant and exclusionary vision on reluctant others.” (243) KPS Gill points out that “What is not sufficiently appreciated among those who are analysing contemporary conflicts is the fact that all great reformist Faiths of the world - including Islam - have been infinitely subversive in their origins. They destroyed prevailing orthodoxies long before they were themselves corrupted to be transformed, in turn, into a new orthodoxy. This truth contains the seeds of the inevitable destruction of the contemporary fundamentalist reassertion. Even as fundamentalist violence - both against "external enemies" and against their own communities - escalates, their agenda and actions are coming under increasing scrutiny and increasingly from members of their own Faith.” (244) And then he goes on to state “the current conflict is essentially a contest of ideas” (245)

Amartya Sen eloquently articulates the incumbent situation “While religious categories have received much airing in recent years, they cannot be presumed to obliterate other distinctions, and even less can they be seen as the only relevant system of classifying people across the globe. In partitioning the population of the world into those belonging to "the Islamic world," "the Western
world," "the Hindu world," "the Buddhist world," the divisive power of
classificatory priority is implicitly used to place people firmly inside a unique set
of rigid boxes. Other divisions (say, between the rich and the poor, between
members of different classes and occupations, between people of different politics,
between distinct nationalities and residential locations, between language groups,
etc.) are all submerged by this allegedly primal way of seeing the differences
between people." (246)

Sen makes a very important point when he says "Similarly, there is no
empirical reason at all why champions of the Muslim past, or for that matter of the
Arab heritage, have to concentrate specifically on religious beliefs only and not
also on science and mathematics, to which Arab and Muslim societies have
contributed so much, and which can also be part of a Muslim or an Arab identity.
Despite the importance of this heritage, crude classifications have tended to put
science and mathematics in the basket of "Western science," leaving other people
to mine their pride in religious depths. If the disaffected Arab activist today can
take pride only in the purity of Islam, rather than in the many-sided richness of
Arab history, the unique prioritization of religion, shared by warriors on both
sides, plays a major part in incarcerating people within the enclosure of a singular
identity." (247) He says "The insistence, if only implicitly, on a choiceless
singularity of human identity not only diminishes us all, it also makes the world
much more flammable. The alternative to the divisiveness of one pre-eminent
categorization is not any unreal claim that we are all much the same. Rather, the
main hope of harmony in our troubled world lies in the plurality of our identities,
which cut across each other and work against sharp divisions around one single
hardened line of vehement division that allegedly cannot be resisted. Our shared
humanity gets savagely challenged when our differences are narrowed into one
devised system of uniquely powerful categorization" (248)
In a reply to Kagan, Sen says "Indeed, Western parochialists and Islamic extremists have, I fear, an implicitly shared involvement in arguing for the primacy of a person's religious identity, leaving a person no room for entertaining the demands of other affiliations and associations. And yet other commitments have flourished". (249)

The recent conflict in the Middle East, with Israel at war with Hezbollah in Lebanon was tacitly supported by US as it considers Hezbollah a terror outfit on par with Al Qaeda. Hezbollah fits into US 'axis of evil' doctrine as the mentors of Hezbollah are Iran and Syria, two of the members of the "Axis of Evil". The terminology of "Axis of Evil" is concomitant with the terminology of "The Great Satan" employed by Islamist against US. The terminology patently reflects communal tones but in the ultimate analysis may not prove to be more than the language of warring opposite camps and hence is difficult to be construed as purely religious and civilisational as Huntington would have us believe. Clash of civilisations, essentially an attempt at political engineering, advocates the language of war, but not necessarily based on civilisational differences.

Evidently, many critics have exposed underlying 'enemy' discourse, in Huntington's thesis where Islamic and Confucian civilizations are perceived as a danger to the West. These scholars unanimously agree that Huntington’s thesis is an attempt to find new enemies, which can replace those of the Cold War. The idea of 'enemy' jelled with the Cold War paradigm and provided the necessary motivation and impetus for military-industrial development and arms race. The end of Cold War meant the end of hostility ( as Fukuyama wanted the world to believe). The demise of the Soviet Union, the collapse of Communism and the end of Cold War essentially entailed the end of enemy and this would mean the collapse of the capitalist bastion built on the military-industrial complex. An enemy was necessary for the survival of the Western capitalist system and continuing political dominance of the world. Hence an enemy had to be created.
Thus Huntington launched himself into the exercise of constructing this enemy. To start with, it was the Muslim enemy, and then an Islamic-Confucian combine and finally anyone who dared to challenge the dominance of the West. In Huntington's endeavour to construct the 'enemy' through the clash of civilizations thesis, power politics is at its best! Interestingly, Huntington had said “People are always tempted to divide people into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilization and those barbarians.” (250) and himself succumbed to this temptation and practised it most effectively in his thesis! But of course he has consistently refused to accept this as being true.

The consequences of 'enemy' discourse are horrific to say the least. The development of the 'enemy' discourse by both sides, but particularly by Bush has been expressed best by James Carroll. Carroll begins the analysis by stating “But if a vast throng experienced the terrible events of 9/11 as one, only one man, the President of the United States, bore a unique responsibility for finding a way to respond to them. George W. Bush plumbed the deepest place in himself, looking for a simple expression of what the assaults of September 11 required. It was his role to lead the nation, and the very world. The President, at a moment of crisis, defines the communal response. A few days after the assault, George W. Bush did this. Speaking spontaneously, without the aid of advisers or speechwriters, he put a word on the new American purpose that both shaped it and gave it meaning. "This crusade," he said, "this war on terrorism." (251) He says the talk of crusade was the beginning of meticulous planning for holy war which came to be euphemistically termed as 'war on terror'. He says of ‘crusades’ which in Arabic translates as ‘war of the cross’ as “a set of world historic crimes” (252)

Carroll highlights how it was a two way process “Osama bin Laden was already understood to be trying to spark a "clash of civilizations" that would set the West against the whole House of Islam. After 9/11, agitated voices on all sides
insisted that no such clash was inevitable. But crusade was a match for jihad, and such words threatened nothing less than apocalyptic conflict between irreconcilable cultures. Indeed, the President's reference flashed through the Arab news media. Its resonance went deeper, even, than the embarrassed aides expected—and not only among Muslims. After all, the word refers to a long series of military campaigns, which, taken together, were the defining event in the shaping of what we call Western civilization. A coherent set of political, economic, social and even mythological traditions of the Eurasian continent, from the British Isles to the far side of Arabia, grew out of the transformations wrought by the Crusades. And it is far from incidental still, both that those campaigns were conducted by Christians against Muslims, and that they, too, were attached to the irrationalities of millennial fever.” (253)

Carroll very ably draws the historical parallels “If the American President was the person carrying the main burden of shaping a response to the catastrophe of September 11, his predecessor in such a grave role, nearly a thousand years earlier, was the Catholic pope. Seeking to overcome the century-long dislocations of a postmillennial Christendom, he rallied both its leaders and commoners with a rousing call to holy war. Muslims were the infidel people who had taken the Holy Land hundreds of years before. Now, that occupation was defined as an intolerable blasphemy. The Holy Land must be redeemed. Within months of the pope's call, 100,000 people had "taken the cross" to reclaim the Holy Land for Christ.” (254) And now history is being repeated a millennium later. Here William Faulkner's statement becomes very relevant "The past is never dead, it isn't even past."

He points out that “With the Crusades, the violent theology of the killer God came into its own. To save the world, in this understanding, God willed the violent death of God's only beloved son. Here is the relevance of that mental map, for the crusaders were going to war to rescue the site of the salvific death of Jesus,
and they displayed their devotion to the cross on which Jesus died by wearing it on their breasts. When Bush's remark was translated into Arabic for broadcast throughout the Middle East, the word "crusade" was rendered as "war of the cross."" (255)

He goes on to relevantly add "But sacred violence, once unleashed in 1096, as in 2001, had a momentum of its own. The urgent purpose of war against the "enemy outside"-what some today call the "clash of civilizations"-led quickly to the discovery of an "enemy inside." The crusaders, en route from northwestern Europe to attack the infidel far away, first fell upon, as they said, "the infidel near at hand"-Jews. For the first time in Europe, large numbers of Jews were murdered for being Jews. A crucifixion-obsessed theology saw God as willing the death of Jesus, but in the bifurcated evangelical imagination, Jews could be blamed for it, and the offense the crusaders took was mortal. The same dynamic-war against an enemy outside leading to war against an enemy inside-can be seen at work today. It is a more complex dynamic now, with immigrant Muslims and people of Arabic descent coming under heavy pressure in the West. In Europe, Muslims are routinely demonized. In America, they are "profiled," even to the point of being deprived of basic rights." (256)

He makes a very pertinent observation when he says "That such a dark, seething religious history of sacred violence remains largely unspoken in our world does not defuse it as an explosive force in the human unconscious. In the world of Islam, of course, its meaning could not be more explicit, or closer to consciousness. The full historical and cultural significance of "crusade" is instantly obvious, which is why a howl of protest from the Middle East drove Bush into instant verbal retreat. Yet the very inadvertence of his use of the word is the revelation: Americans do not know what fire they are playing with. Osama bin
Laden, however, knows all too well, and in his periodic pronouncements, he uses the word "crusade" to this day, as a flamethrower." (257)

Carroll charts out the dangerous implications of the latest global 'enemy' discourse thus "In waging such a "war," the enemy is to be engaged everywhere and nowhere, not just because the actual nihilists who threaten the social order are faceless and deracinated but because each fanatical suicide-bomber is only an instance of the transcendent enemy-and so the other face of us. Each terrorist is, in effect, a sacrament of the larger reality, which is "terrorism." Instead of perceiving unconnected centers of inhuman violence-tribal warlords, Mafia chieftains, nationalist fighters, xenophobic Luddites-President Bush projects the grandest and most interlocking strategies of conspiracy, belief and organization. By the canonization of the war on terrorism, petty nihilists are elevated to the status of world-historic warriors, exactly the fate they might have wished for. This is why the conflict readily bleeds from one locus to another-Afghanistan then, Iraq now, Iran or some other land of evil soon-and why, for that matter, the targeted enemies are entirely interchangeable-here Osama bin Laden, there Saddam Hussein, here the leader of Iran, there of North Korea. They are all essentially one enemy-one "axis"-despite their differences from one another, or even hatred of one another." (258) An extremely penetrating insight indeed.

Carroll underscores the real underlying American motives and the consequences of it to the world "So, to put the best face on the Bush agenda (leaving aside questions of oil, global market control and economic or military hegemony), a humane project of antiproliferation can be seen at its core. Yet a nation that was trying to promote the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, would behave precisely as the Bush Administration has behaved over the past three years. The Pentagon's chest-thumping concept of "full spectrum dominance" itself motivates other nations to seek sources of
countervailing power, and when the United States actually goes to war to impose its widely disputed notion of order on some states, but not others, nations-friendly as well as unfriendly-find themselves with an urgent reason to acquire some means of deterring such intervention. The odd and tragic thing is that the world before Bush was actually nearing consensus on how to manage the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and had begun to put in place promising structures designed to prevent such spread. Centrally embodied in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, which had successfully and amazingly kept the number of nuclear powers, actual as well as admitted, relatively low, that consensus gave primacy to treaty, obligations, international cooperation and a serious commitment by existing nuclear powers to move toward ultimate nuclear abolition. All of that has been trashed by Bush. "International law?" he smirked in December 2003. "I better call my lawyer." Now indications are that nations all over the globe-Japan, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Brazil, Australia-have begun re-evaluating their rejections of nukes, and some are positively rushing to acquire them. Iran and North Korea are likely to be only the tip of this radioactive iceberg. Nuclear-armed Pakistan and India are a grim forecast of the future on every continent. And the Bush Administration-by declaring its own nuclear arsenal permanent, by threatening nuclear first-strikes against other nations, by "warehousing" treaty-defused warheads instead of destroying them, by developing a new line of "usable" nukes, by moving to weaponize the "high frontier" of outer space, by doing little to help Russia get rid of its rotting nuclear stockpile, by embracing "preventive war"-is enabling this trend instead of discouraging it. How can this be? The problem has its roots in a long-term American forgetfulness, going back to the acid fog in which the United States ended World War II. There was never a complete moral reckoning with the harsh momentum of that conflict's denouement-how American leaders embraced a strategy of terror bombing, slaughtering whole urban populations, and how, finally, they ushered in the atomic age with the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." (259) Carroll puts the
usefulness of Huntington’s paradigm for America in a proper perspective when he says “Memory is a political act. Forgetfulness is the handmaiden of tyranny. The Bush Administration is fully committed to maintaining what the historian Marc Trachtenberg calls our "nuclear amnesia" even as the Administration seeks to impose a unilateral structure of control on the world. As it pursues a world-threatening campaign against other people’s weapons of mass destruction, that is, the Bush Administration refuses to confront the moral meaning of America's own weapons of mass destruction, not to mention their viral character, as other nations seek smaller versions of the American arsenal, if only to deter Bush's next "preventive" war.” (260)

Carroll again highlights a very pertinent point when he says “Meanwhile, intra-Christian crusades, wars against heresy, only made permanent the East-West split between Latin Catholicism and "schismatic" Eastern Orthodoxy, and made inevitable the eventual break, in the Reformation, between a Protestant north and a Catholic south. The Crusades, one could argue, established basic structures of Western civilization, while undermining the possibility that their grandest ideals would ever be realized.” (261) Clearly such wars as ‘crusades’ are the harbingers of further divisiveness in human society. And hence James Carroll is compelled to ask “Will such consequences-new global structures of an American imperium, hollowed-out hopes for a humane and just internationalism-follow in the train of George W. Bush's crusade? This question will be answered in smaller part by anonymous, ad hoc armies of on-the-ground human beings in foreign lands, many of whom will resist Washington to the death.” (262) The end of the ‘enemy’ discourse is clear for all to see.

8.7 Marshalling Evidence? Empirical facts or Anecdotal data?

One of the serious criticisms levelled against Huntington’s thesis is that instead of being based on hard empirical facts, it rests mostly on anecdotal data.
Huntington has been criticised for the lack of consistencies in his arguments, methodological flaws, extreme generalizations, opportunistic interpretations, selective perception and distortion of history.

Scholars have pointed out several glaring inconsistencies in Huntington’s thesis. From the perspective of the scholars, presentation of data in scientific and honest manner is a prerequisite for theory building. Most scholars have pointed out that Huntington’s thesis is dangerously flawed because it is based to a large measure on anecdotal statistics and dubious facts. Robert Marks, while reviewing Huntington’s book, has stated that Huntington has mostly relied on secondary sources in his book and that he has a weak scholarship of Islam, China and Japan (263)

Many like Fouad Ajami, have pointed out that many instances cited by Huntington to prop up his thesis are of dubious nature or origin. According to Ajami the Gulf War is a case for 'clash of state interests' and not a case for 'clash of civilizations' as Huntington would want every one to believe. (264) Seizaburo Sato has also pointed out Huntington’s volte face over Japan as potential ally in the civilisational wars while earlier considering Japan as a great threat to the West and to the US. (265) Others like Noam Chomsky (266) have pointed out the American closeness to Indonesia which is the largest Muslim nation. In his recommendations Huntington’s advice to get Russia (a core state of Slavic-Orthodox civilization and possible challenger civilisation) into the European Union underscores his inconsistencies and confusions. He uses specific terms very loosely. For instance he speaks about the Islamic as well as Arabic civilizations without going into a proper analysis or explaining whether the two are the same or different.

Many have also pointed out that Huntington’s theory is methodologically flawed because there are many overgeneralizations, sweeping statements,
unsubstantiated arguments especially in the analysis of civilizations. Robert Marks has pointedly argued that Huntington's thesis is methodologically flawed because of the repeated overgeneralizations in the analysis of civilizations. Shireen Hunter has pointed out that in sharp contrast to what Huntington says about the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict as civilizational clash, 'Muslim' Iran had more friendly relations with 'Christian' Armenia than with 'Muslim' Azerbaijan. (267)

Huntington's inconsistencies, methodological flaws, overgeneralizations, opportunistic interpretations, selective perception, distortion of historical facts raise serious doubt about his scholarship and integrity. It smacks of an intellectual dishonesty subserving a political end. To many scholars this is too obvious and needs no spelling out or further elaboration.

One of the strongest criticisms of Huntington has been his ignoring the history and the role of Western colonialism in the world and particularly US hegemony in the Muslim world. Huntington, instead of stating true facts of history, prefers to read into it. He is accused of distorting, bending, misreporting, misreading and misinterpreting history to suit the requirements of his thesis.

Referring to the methodological flaws in Huntington's thesis, especially about use of historical facts Khaled Abou El Fadl says "Nevertheless, the fact that this paradigm might have unfavourable implications or have been exploited by some does not address the coherence of the theory itself. Regardless of its implications, the theory could be historically grounded in facts that, unpleasant as they may be, must be acknowledged. There is already a large body of literature on the historical validity of this paradigm, and I am not going to analyse this literature here. But there are several methodological difficulties that ought to be considered when thinking about cultural values and the role they purportedly play" (268) He then list four areas which are pertinent in this context and which he calls as "claims of lineage", "claims about the other", "the enterprise of
meaning" and "competence". He says that "Proponents of the notion of the clash of civilisations seem to rely on an unfounded claim about the specificity and purity of particular values. Accordingly, they are willing to classify particular values as squarely Judaeo-Christian while others are Islamic. It is as if values have a genealogy that can be clearly and precisely ascertained, which then can be utilised in classifying what properly belongs to the West and what belongs to the Islamic "other". But the origin and lineage of values are as much a socio-historical construct as are claims about racial genealogical purity. Considering the numerous cultural interactions and cross-intellectual transmissions between the Muslim world and Europe, it highly likely that every significant Western value has a measure of Muslim blood in it. Like racial categories, civilisational categories ought to be recognised as artificial political constructs that do not necessarily fit comfortably with socio-historical realities." (269)

Further he adds "Often the attempt to identify one's own civilisation and distinguish it from the "other" has much more to do with one's own aspirations than the reality of the "other". Put differently, descriptions of the "other", whoever the "other" may be, often tell us much more about the author of the description than the subject of the description" (270) His contention is that in the othering process. "there is a real risk that the constructed image of the civilisation will only reflect the aspirations and anxieties of those" who make it, which in this case happen to be the Westerners. Westerners, to overcome their own weaknesses, he says "it is likely that they will invent an image of the Muslim "other" as the exact antithesis of their own aspirations. By constructing the other as the exact antithesis, one is then able to be more satisfied and secure about one's own cultural achievements." (271) He then asserts that "There is a further problem with approaches that focus on civilisational paradigms and conflicts. Values, and their meaning in culture, are not constant or stable. They are continually shifting, evolving and mutating in response to a variety of influences and motivators". He
pertinently adds "And when commentators speak of a civilisational conflict between the West and Islam, there is a further creative and inventive process engaged in by the commentators themselves. Since meaning is the product of cumulative enterprises that generate communities of meaning, a student of Huntington, for instance, cannot speak in terms of an Islamic notion of justice or an Islamic notion of human liberty." (272)

He then poses a very important question "Put simply, who is competent to say which of the competing communities of meaning becomes the legitimate and credible representative of the values of a civilisation? Here, I am not interested in the problem of the dynamics of power and authority within a particular system of thought. Rather, my concern now takes us back to the question of the invention and construction of the "other". It is imperative to keep in mind that when students of Huntington claim that Islamic civilisation stands for a particular proposition, they are effectively endowing a certain interpretive community with the power of representation. They are engaging in choice-making by selecting what, in their minds, is the community that best represents Islamic civilisation." (273) Here he highlights the making of choice about representation by those involved in the enterprise of construction that which is constructed has hardly anything to do with "the actual dynamics" of those 'others' about whom the construction is made.

He argues that making of choice about representation and based on them making "claims of civilisational conflict are fraught with conceptual pitfalls. Such claims must necessarily reduce complex social and historical dynamics into essentialised and artificially coherent categories. They are also likely to degenerate into powerful vehicles for the expression of prejudice. As such, they tend to promote misunderstandings and conflict. It is no wonder that when one examines the arguments of Western proponents of the clash of civilisations, one finds that these proponents invariably ascribe most of what they perceive to be
good and desirable to the West, and most what of they find distasteful or objectionable to Islam or Islamic civilisation. As a means of maintaining an air of impartiality and objectivity, these proponents often condescendingly assert that the values of the "other", foreign and unacceptable as they might be for Westerners ought to be respected.” (274)

El Fadl points out that “The effect of the doctrinal commitment to the paradigm of clashing civilisations only serves to obfuscate the real dynamics that are, in fact, taking place in Islam. There are significant tensions within contemporary Islam that are bound to impact materially upon the world today. Bin Laden's terrorism is not simply the product of a system of thought that he single-handedly invented. Rather, his violence is an integral part of the struggle between interpretive communities over who gets to speak for Islam and how” El Fadl in his criticism does not spare the Islamists either. He says “Despite the practice of waving the banner of Islamic authenticity and legitimacy, Muslims such as the Taliban and bin Laden are far more anti-Western than they are pro-Islamic. Their primary concern is not to explore or investigate the parameters of Islamic values or the historical experience of Islamic civilisation, but to oppose the West. As such, Islam is simply the symbolic universe in which they function. Their protest is framed in Islamic terms because they are Muslim, but it is not the case that they protest because they are Muslims.” (275)

In essence what he is implying is that the clash between the West and the self proclaimed leaders of Islam (such as Al Qaeda, Taliban, etc) is less about civilisational differences and more about politics of power and dominance. And this is probably the whole truth. Historical facts and truth has very little to do with thesis such as ‘clash of civilisations’ or epithets like ‘Axis of Evil’ or ‘The Great Satan’. These ideas, notions and constructs are as far removed from history and reality as ever can be. Huntington is certainly in the vortex of such activity
according to many and probably they are not much wrong in believing so. That marshalling of facts and manufacturing of evidence is an ever present temptation in the scholastic field needs no convincing. The use of anecdotal data, sketchy details and undependable statistics is the stuff manufactured theories are made of. That some scholars are extremely adept at such work also needs no proving. Human mind and ingenuity has the ability of constructing such convincing theories and other mental constructs that hardly require any historical or factual basis and this is nowhere more glaringly visible than in the fields of philosophy, religion and theory building. Many scholars have meticulously highlighted Huntington's selective amnesia about some very important historical facts and opportunistic and convenient piecing together of unconnected facts, particularly in case of Islam, to give support and building blocks for his thesis. One such idea which Huntington has constantly harped upon is about "Islam's bloody borders" which Chomsky has so effectively challenged and demolished by citing the bloody history of America.

Engin Erdem has pertinently indicated "Huntington has a selective perception in choosing cases in order to enforce his argument. For instance, he probably should know that the Gulf War is dealt with 'clash of interests', yet he exemplifies the War as a case for 'clash of civilizations'. Furthermore, Huntington underestimates probability of cooperation and dialogue among civilizations and between states, which come from different civilizations. Besides, as one of the most problematic points is that Huntington ignores the role of Western colonialism and hegemony in Muslim anxiety towards the West. However, as James Scott rightly suggests that 'wherever there is domination one also finds resistance'. (276)

8.8 Legitimisation of the Paradigm?

While, the scholars have battled it out, since the publication of the thesis in 1993, contesting the veracity of Huntington's arguments and contentions, the
views of leaders and politicians in the West and in the Islamic world have quietly and gradually coalesced towards adopting the clash of civilizations discourse as a way to express their idiom and to carry forward their policies, especially of attacks and war. In this process, more than the contesting scholars, the battling leaders have adopted the civilisational clash rhetoric, which is a frightening reality with serious portents for the future. The sequence of this development is very unsettling but must be faced.

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack, George W. Bush spontaneously reacted "This crusade, this war on terrorism." (277) President George W Bush in spelling out his security strategy in the light of the 9/11 attacks on June 1, 2002 at West Point, New York said “And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror — because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.” (278) Unable to overcome the temptation to refer to Huntington’s thesis President Bush said “History is once again witnessing a great clash. This is not a clash of civilizations. The civilization of Islam, with its humane traditions of learning and tolerance, has no place for this violent sect of killers and aspiring tyrants. This is not a clash of religions. The faith of Islam teaches moral responsibility that enobles men and women, and forbids the shedding of innocent blood. Instead, this is a clash of political visions.” (279) President Bush in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly at the United Nations Headquarters New York, September 21, 2004 said “All civilized nations are in this struggle together, and all must fight the murderers.” He once again could not resist alluding to Huntington’s theory. He said “When it comes to the desire for liberty and justice, there is no clash of civilizations.” (280) Evidently, though quite guarded, he cannot resist his impetuousness to allude to the clash discourse. But then two years down the line he totally abandons his inhibition and declares in no uncertain terms his ‘war on terror’ as a clash of civilizations. On the fifth anniversary of 9/11 George Bush referred to the clash of civilization thesis
"This struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization. We are fighting to maintain the way of life enjoyed by free nations."

(281) Tony Blair, Prime Minister of United Kingdom in an elaborate speech has added his civilisational interpretation ""We" is not the West. "We" are as much Muslim as Christian or Jew or Hindu." We" are those who believe in religious tolerance, openness to others, to democracy, liberty and human rights administered by secular courts. This is not a clash between civilisations. It is a clash about civilisation. It is the age-old battle between progress and reaction, between those who embrace and see opportunity in the modern world and those who reject its existence; between optimism and hope on the one hand; and pessimism and fear on the other. And in the era of globalisation where nations depend on each other and where our security is held in common or not at all, the outcome of this clash between extremism and progress is utterly determinative of our future here in Britain. We can no more opt out of this struggle than we can opt out of the climate changing around us". (282) Blair's layout of the words is different but the language is the same as that of George Bush. They are both adhering to Huntingtonian narrative.

In an interview aired on Al Jazeera television channel on June 10, 1999 Bin Laden alludes to the idea of new world order indicating that he is following the Western discourse. He says "Nonetheless, they fled in the heart of darkness, frustrated, after they had caused great commotion about the new world order." (283) Osama bin Laden, long before 9/11, had already adopted the line of thinking that Huntington espoused in1993 -of religious wars "Let us say that there are two parties to the conflict: The first party is world Christianity, which is allied with Zionist Jewry and led by the United States, Britain, and Israel; while the second party is the Muslim world. In such a conflict, it is unacceptable to see the
first party mount attacks, desecrate my lands and holy shrines, and plunder the Muslims' oil. When it is met by any resistance on the part of the Muslims, this party brands the Muslims as terrorists. This is stupidity". (284)

During 2004 bin Laden was faltering in clarifying the nature of the West-Islam conflict and mostly called it a religious conflict. He said "In truth, this is a religious-economic war. The occupation of Iraq is a link in the Zionist-crusader chain of evil. Then comes the full occupation of the rest of the Gulf states to set the stage for controlling and dominating the whole world." (285) In an audio-cassette tape released on December 16, 2004, Osama bin Laden while criticizing Arab rulers reiterated the same idea "The conflict is a conflict between two ways, and a deep struggle between two beliefs: a conflict between the divine, perfect way, submitting full authority to Allah in all matters ... and the grossly secular way..."(286)

On another occasion Laden said that the conflict with the West is "a fateful war between unbelief and Islam, between the army of Muhammad, the army of belief, and the people of the cross..." and goes on to add that "The important, tremendous, and dangerous issue today in the entire world is this Third World War, started by the Crusader-Zionist coalition against the Islamic nation." (287) In this December 2004 statement, Bin Laden has termed the conflict between West and Islam as "a war of destiny between infidelity and Islam" and a "Third World War," (288)

Addressing the initiative for dialogue advanced by the West, in 2006 Bin Laden clearly adopts the Huntingtonian discourse. "While your planes and tanks are destroying houses in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Pakistan, you smile at our faces and tell us that you do not aggress Islam but the Terrorists and that you call for peaceful coexistence and dialogue instead of the clash of civilization" He further adds. "Reality exposes them, for Western politicians seek
dialogue only to paralyze us and gain time. They want a truce from our side only. We recently saw their response to our offer for truce through polls taken among them. We’ve offered them a truce between us after the withdrawal of their armies and ceasing their hostilities against us. But they refused that and are insisting on pursuing their Crusader campaign against our Umma and occupy our resources and enslave us. So do not be fooled by their sayings or the saying of the apostates from our race (ethnicity) or the sayings of the depraved whose voices have lately risen.” (289) And finally he says “Right and Evil are enemies till the end of days. Their civilization is attacking ours” (290) Thus if, Bin Laden’s statement is considered as a whole, it clearly seeks to draw the sharpest possible case for the existence of a "clash of civilizations...[that] has been carried out by their civilization [the West] against our civilization," as a reviewer has put it.

The CRS Report for Congress prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress also admits this fact “Following his declaration of jihad on the United States, Bin Laden released a series of statements that expanded the vision and scope of his self-declared conflict with the United States and specified his political prescriptions for the reformation of Islamic societies. Echoing U.S. academic Samuel Huntington’s theory on the impending clash of civilisations Bin Laden repeated his characterization of a so-called “new crusade led by America against the Islamic nations,” and emphasized his belief that an emerging conflict between Islam and the West would be fought “between the Islamic world and the Americans and their allies.” Bin Laden argued that the Islamic world should see itself as one seamless community, or umma, and that Muslims were obliged to unite and defend themselves”. (291)

Huntington has himself admitted to the gradual legitimisation of his thesis and this as evident from his reply to the question 'Is this the clash of civilisations you have been warning about for nearly a decade?' when he says “Clearly, Osama bin Laden wants it to be a clash of civilisations between Islam and the West. The first priority for our government is to try to prevent it from becoming
one. But there is a danger it could move in that direction. The administration has acted exactly the right way in attempting to rally support among Muslim governments. But there are pressures here in the US to attack other terrorist groups and states that support terrorist groups. And that, it seems to me, could broaden it into a clash of civilizations" (292)

Attaching enormous importance to Huntington's civilizational clash thesis Jack Miles, who has been a senior advisor to the President at the J. Paul Getty Trust and a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, has said "In the 1990s, the most important foreign policy intellectual in the United States may yet prove to have been Samuel P. Huntington. The second-most-popular article in the history of Foreign Affairs has been his controversial 1993 "The Clash of Civilizations," an attempt to see what lay beyond the end of Kennan's Cold War". " (293) He has then added "And secretaries of state may have to learn some theology if the current clash between Western and Muslim civilization is to yield to disengagement and peaceful coexistence, to say nothing of more fruitful kinds of relationship" " (294) Miles, himself a strong believer in the thesis of Huntington, has stated "If Osama bin Ladin's goal was to poison relations between Islam and the West, and any conversation between them, he has succeeded quite dramatically. Therefore, I think that the idea of an inevitable clash of civilizations is growing, both in the West and among many Muslims, because that's what's happening" (295)

Ryan Thornton, a Senior Editor at the Harvard International Review has pointed out "From Pope John Paul II to US President George Bush, from liberal political theorists to conservative journalists, many have warned of a world divided along religious lines in a "clash of civilizations." Following the argument of political scientist Samuel Huntington's book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, they have adopted the view of a West defined by its Christian tradition and heritage, established and conducting itself as a single,
coherent Christian entity. Moreover, many have begun to speak of a war pitting 21st century Christendom against a league of Muslim states as inevitable.” (296) Ryan Thornton has further argued “The generally restrained reaction of the mainstream public, however, was overshadowed by inflammatory statements from isolated extremists, further provoking fear of a civilizational war. In September 2002, the Reverend Jerry Falwell called the Prophet Mohammed “a terrorist” on the US television show 60 Minutes, provoking severe rioting in India that killed five people and injured dozens. Additionally, the Reverend Franklin Graham, son of Reverend Billy Graham, called Islam “a wicked and evil religion,” while fellow conservative Reverend Pat Robertson denounced Muslims as “worse than the Nazis.”” (297)

Thornton stated “As a result, the media has increasingly portrayed world events under a dualistic framework of Christians versus Muslims. In a November 2002 New York Times editorial, Thomas Friedman wrote in a satirical letter to the “Leaders of the Muslim world” from Bush, “Unless you have a war within your civilization, there is going to be a war between our civilizations.” Similar references to a future clash between Muslims and Christians have entered the language of world figures, including Pope John Paul II, who in a recent speech instructed Christians “to be people of dialogue [with Muslims] in order to resist that clash of civilizations that at times seems inevitable.” With both the media and world leaders referring to a future clash of civilizations, a religious war between Christians and Muslims can indeed appear unpreventable.” (298)

Huntington’s thesis has increasingly become a frame of reference and Amartya Sen has highlighted this fact well. He says “And its power to befuddle can trap not only those who would like to support the thesis of a clash (varying from Western chauvinists to Islamic fundamentalists), but also those who would like to dispute it and yet try to respond within the straitjacket of its prespecified terms of reference. The limitations of such civilization-based thinking can prove just as treacherous for programs of "dialogue among civilizations" (much in vogue
these days) as they are for theories of a clash of civilizations. The noble and elevating search for amity among people seen as amity between civilizations speedily reduces many-sided human beings to one dimension each and muzzles the variety of involvements that have provided rich and diverse grounds for cross-border interactions over many centuries, including the arts, literature, science, mathematics, games, trade, politics, and other arenas of shared human interest. Well-meaning attempts at pursuing global peace can have very counterproductive consequences when these attempts are founded on a fundamentally illusory understanding of the world of human beings.” (299)

Amartya Sen has pointed out how the “Reports of clash get priority over positive civil engagements, despite the immensely larger number of people who are involved in construction rather than in destruction” (300)

Robert Kagan too has said “The metaphor of a "clash of civilizations" has taken hold of the popular imagination, and once such metaphors take hold they are easily reinforced by events—the fracas over the cartoons of Mohammed in Europe, for instance, or the violence in Iraq—and even, as you argue, by well-meaning efforts to ameliorate the confrontation by "building bridges" between the cultures. (301) The fact that Huntington’s thesis has been gradually acquiring legitimacy as a paradigm to explain the post Cold War period and the post 9/11 world is evident in statements like “Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations will give us food for thought in the wake of the 11th of September. The book is a challenge and an inspiration. It cannot justify, explain or alleviate the terror. But it places the terror in the context of an increasingly aggressive cultural conflict. Huntington is a revelation and a provocation. He is here to stay.” (302)

Gradually, many in the West as well as in the Islamic world have veered towards adopting the ‘clash of civilizations’ as a frame of reference. But while many have succumbed to the appeal of the clash of civilizations thesis and the
civilisational discourse, a few like Noam Chomsky have refused to be drawn into it and have shown their rejection of it by refusing to be baited by it and even refusing to allude to it while analyzing the world events and conflicts. In 'Perilous Power', a collaborative effort of Chomsky and Achcar, (302a). This book is based on 14 hours of dialogue they had with each other over three days in January, 2006. The work was updated six months later in July 2006 and published. Among several vital issues this book covers key issues are terrorism, fundamentalism, oil, democracy, possible war against Iran and much more. The dialogue was moderated by Stephen Shalom, Professor of Political Science at William Paterson University who posed the questions.) the two scholars discussed a range of issues. What is interesting is that when these two great scholars came together in a dialogue they discussed many issues facing the world from terrorism on one hand to oil politics on the other but the clash of civilization idea did not even figure, clearly indicating the irrelevance of the clash of civilizations perspective. Even though both the scholars spoke at length on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict they did not even remotely embark on the Huntingtonian discourse. Rather by refusing to subscribe to the Huntingtonian analysis, these two scholarly intellectuals have clearly established the irrelevancy of the clash of civilizations paradigm in understanding the world and nations within it. They focused on the role of power in shaping the world and the actions of the nations. What occupied them more was the neoconservative ideological perspective which has gained a stranglehold over the US Administration and policy. At the final instance when Chomsky was asked what he thought of Western civilization Chomsky quoted Gandhi's words "I think it would be a very good idea" as a fitting ending (303)

But in spite of the rebuke and disregard by several scholars the incipient legitimization of Huntingtonian frame of reference is already evident and it signals dangerous portents for the future causing many sober-minded scholars and world leaders to initiate efforts to prevent the precipitation of such an eventuality as a
clash of civilisations. And the fact that the 'clash of civilisations' as a frame of reference has been accepted by many is boasted by none other than Huntington himself. He proudly says "This relates to a more general criticism, I guess, of my argument. People say that it's a self-fulfilling prophecy. That's nonsense; no prophecy or forecast is inherently self-fulfilling. It depends on how people react to it. I said in my book, look, there's a real possibility of local conflict between groups of different civilizations, and there's a possibility that these local conflicts can escalate into much broader sorts of conflicts. There has been some movement in that direction in the wars of Yugoslavia and elsewhere. But it all depends on how people react. Back in the late 1950s and early '60s, all sorts of extremely well informed, intelligent people were saying that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union was virtually inevitable. Well, that didn't happen, in part because people took the prediction seriously. They established hotlines between the Pentagon and the Kremlin, engaged in arms-control negotiations, developed informal understandings between the United States and Soviet Union of just what the rules of the game were. I'm very pleased that what I said about the "clash of civilizations" stimulated a lot of talk, maybe some action, about dialogue between civilizations. I've been invited to conference after conference involving people from different civilizations to try to promote a dialogue between them. The government of Iran sponsored a resolution in the U.N. General Assembly declaring 2001 "the year for dialogue between civilizations." I think that's great! That's the sort of thinking I would like to encourage. This is what we're trying to do at my research institute at Harvard." (304)

The dynamics of narrative legitimization and acceptance has been extremely well articulated by Marc Howard Ross. Huntington's thesis is essentially a narrative and hence the explanation by Marc Howard Ross certainly applies to Huntington's paradigm. According to Ross "Narratives are explanations for events (large and small) in the form of short, common sense
accounts (stories) that often seem simple. However, the powerful images they contain and the judgments they make about the motivations and actions of their own group, and others, are emotionally significant for groups and individuals. Narratives are not always internally consistent. For example, they often alternate between portraying one’s own group, as well as an opponent, as strong and portraying them as vulnerable. Narratives meet a number of different needs people have. They are especially relevant in times of high uncertainty and high stress. Just at the moments when people are most disoriented, such as the period following September 11, we struggle to make sense of events, and shared narratives which are reinforced within groups help people find reassurance and to cope with high anxiety. Groups with divergent beliefs and experiences construct different narratives of the same event. However, it is crucial to understand that narratives are not made from whole cloth but are grounded in selectively remembered and interpreted experiences and projections from them. Finally it is important to understand that all cultural traditions have access to multiple pre-existing narratives that provide support for diverse actions in times of stress, as we can see in the many varied citations from the Koran and the Bible to justify responses to September 11. Within communities, high social stress and anxiety produce pressures towards conformity once a narrative emerges, although as new events unfold there can be questioning and conflict around, and change in, a narrative. Political leaders intuitively know that building consensus using the key elements in a narrative is crucial in mustering support for their actions, which they present as “naturally” following from shared understandings. In short, we can understand agreement on narratives as public opinion formation that is both an effort by individuals to reduce uncertainty and the stress accompanying it, and by leaders to mobilize public support. Deep threats to identity are among the strongest feelings people have in bitter conflicts. Usually these involve perceived denigration and humiliation. In violent conflicts, the fears also include concern for physical security and fears of extinction of self, family, and the group and its culture,
including its sacred icons and sites. In times of high stress, narratives connect individual and group identity producing a sense of linked fate among people that is likely to inhibit social and political dissent. Disagreement quickly becomes disloyalty and often those holding dissenting views are careful not to express them in public settings or even in private ones." (305) Thus, arises a situation ripe to accept a narrative or a paradigm by both the elites and the masses. The power of the paradigms and narrative is truly awesome and the rewards to its formulator are tremendous. In the post 9/11 period the legitimization of Huntington’s paradigm seems to be underway and obviously Huntington has been reaping its benefits.

8.9 Engineering a Clash?

Having acquired a certain amount of authenticity and standing, Huntington’s theory now poses even greater portent. Amartya Sen has articulated “The increasing tendency to overlook the many identities that any human being has and to try to classify individuals according to a single allegedly pre-eminent religious identity is an intellectual confusion that can animate dangerous divisiveness” (306) Amartya Sen has also pointed out “Religious or civilizational classification can be a source of belligerent distortion as well.” (307)

Tim Soutphommasane blames the Islamist as well “It is, of course, not surprising at all that the champions of Islamic fundamentalism would like to suppress all other identities of Muslims in favor of being only Islamic. But it is extremely odd that those who want to overcome the tensions and conflicts linked with Islamic fundamentalism also seem unable to see Muslim people in any form other than their being just Islamic”. Tim Soutphommasane has expressed “At a time when the concept of a ‘clash of civilisations’ conditions much of our debate, there seems little prospect of finding a formula for understanding across cultures.” (308) The situation is obviously pregnant with dangerous possibilities and is ripe for eruption of conflict and triggering a real conflict.
In the context of the issue of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, Amartya Sen had highlighted "the evident power of determined agitators to generate the kind of anger that leads immediately to violence." (309) Sen says "The world is made much more incendiary by the advocacy and popularity of single-dimensional categorization of human beings, which combines haziness of vision with increased scope for the exploitation of that haze by the champions of violence." (310) to actually trigger a clash. Amartya Sen has opined that "To interpret the cultivated—and potentially resistible—violence as evidence of an inescapable clash of civilizations would be, I have argued, a mistake, just as it would be wrong to deduce from the history of the Holocaust that Germans are doomed to be Nazis." (311)

Saarah Shivji has put it differently. She states "What educators have failed to realize is that our children can no longer afford to live in ignorance of the rest of the world. There are over one billion Muslims on this planet. They are diverse, and differ in their cultural traditions as well as their interpretations of Islam. Muslims have jobs, families, and aspirations for the future. And Muslims are just as likely as Westerners to react adversely if they feel targeted or demonized as a group. Therefore the danger exists that Huntington's clash of civilizations theory may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. When those on both sides begin to believe that a clash is inevitable, they begin to dehumanize one another, making a clash ever more likely. But it is not too late. We are not experiencing a clash of civilizations, so much as a "clash of ignorances." Proffered by His Highness the Aga Khan, Spiritual Leader of the Shia Ismaili branch of Islam, the term refers to the clash of peoples who are not so different, yet know little of one another. With more education, open-mindedness, and dialogue on all sides, I believe that the world can move beyond this apocalyptic obsession with clashing civilizations. There is simply no need for any such conflict. (312)
In 'Islam and the West: Clash of Civilisations?' Francis Robinson, having conceded that in reality there is no clash of civilizations, could not stop asking if there could be a clash of civilisations in future? His answer is that, it all depends on the Westerners themselves and how much they are keen to address the many issues of injustice towards the Muslims, from Palestine onwards, which cause young Muslims to get so alienated, so as to precipitate a real clash of civilizations. This fear is not just notional but real.

Steve Smith has opined "My overwhelming worry about Huntington's argument follows from my view that the social world is something that we constitute by our theories, and it is that Huntington's language is self-fulfilling since the analysis creates exactly the kinds of identities and ultimately the very foreign policy mindsets that bring such world orders into existence." (313)

Brian Whitaker has said "'Clash of civilisations' is a catchy phrase but also a dangerous myth. As a political idea it doesn't stand up to much scrutiny but it does have a certain appeal to those who like simplistic explanations for the world's problems. The danger comes when people start to believe it and build politics around it." (314)

KPS Gill, the well known security expert from India has put it even more poignantly by saying "Clearly, Samuel Huntington's thesis of the "clash of civilisations" continues to exert very significant influence on the imagination of American strategic planners and intelligence analysts. The danger here is that, if as crucial a player in the international arena as the US continues to be driven by this paradigm, it could well produce the circumstances for its partial and devastating realisation. The "clash of civilisations" thesis has elements of a self-fulfilling prophecy - the more we believe in it, the greater the probabilities of its realisation. (315)"
Conversion of sufficiently large number of people on both side of the divide to the belief that clash of civilizations is a real possibility makes it likely that the clash will actually occur. Organizing, orchestrating, engineering and precipitating a clash is possible only when human minds have been sufficiently brainwashed and conditioned about the possibility. In most cases, the condition simply follows and hence there is always the nagging possibility that a real clash could simply follow.

8.10 Clash of Civilisations in the Post 9/11 period?

The debate over the 'clash of civilizations' became more prominent and sharp in the post-September 11 and scholars have strongly reacted to this development. Edward Said for instance pointed out that "The carefully planned and horrendous, pathologically motivated suicide attack and mass slaughter by a small group of deranged militants has been turned into proof of Huntington's thesis,". (316) Similarly Engin Erdem has stated "The debate, on the other hand, has come back into world agenda in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. The debate over Samuel P. Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis has frequently taken place in post-September 11 period". (317) Mark Gaffney also responds in similar fashion when he says "After 911, America became obsessed with security. Huntington's descriptive analysis became a cause celebre. The new perceived enemy, Islamic fundamentalism, seemed to threaten everything we hold dear, including western democratic values. At any event, this has been the rationalization for the increasing use of U.S. military power abroad. The argument is dubious, however, because, one need not look abroad to Islam to discover the basis for "the clash." There is a crisis, yes. But, in my view, it is not primarily a clash of civilizations. That is secondary. The primary problem can be found right here at home. And it is the continuing impoverishment of our own Judeo-Christian
tradition. We in the West have lost contact with our own spiritual origins. Which is why we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” (318)

Akbar Ahmed had this to say “If the United States is able to understand this equation, maybe it will change its policy and help Islam regain its balance, which will calm the Muslim world and, therefore, the rest of the world. If that doesn't happen, if we see the continuation of the clash of civilizations theory and its implementation, we will almost certainly see the emergence and consolidation of the exclusionists. Then, we will all be in for a violent, troublesome and uncertain future in the 21st century. So we really need to ask: Has the clash theory, which has so far dominated foreign policy in the United States, really succeeded? Has it gotten us what we wanted or should we now explore an alternative paradigm?” (319)

Ram Puniyani also takes a similar line “The 9/11 events, resulted in the death of close to three thousand people of all religions. Along with this came the thesis that current time is the one of clash of civilizations, the backward Islamic civilisation is out to destroy the advanced Western civilization. One can see the underlining element of the attempt to relate the violence and religion in some form or the other. Along with this came the misunderstanding about other religions. This misunderstanding has assumed mammoth proportions today and it provides the base for the violence and the policy of aggressions/acts of violence and terror. (320)

Saarah Shivji said “After 9/11, life changed. The masses were desperate for an explanation, and the media were in a frenzy. News stories began pouring out, decrying the "Muslim threat." The articles bandied Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations book like gospel. They explained that a war between the Western and Islamic civilizations was inevitable, and that Muslims hated everything good, meaning everything that the West stood for – freedom, justice, and equality. Every
Islamophobic misconception and stereotype was suddenly front-page news. Words like "jihad" and "terrorist" began to be thrown about, fed to the frightened and confused". (321)

El Fadl has stated “Some commentators have viewed the underpinnings of the recent attacks as part of a "clash of civilizations" between Western values and Islamic culture. According to these commentators, the issue is not religious fundamentalism or political Islam, but an essential conflict between competing visions of morality and ethics”. (322)

The clash of civilization discourse continued to hold sway much beyond 9/11 and has characterized the debate during and after the recent Iraq war. Dilip Hiro before the Iraq war had expressed "George W. Bush could succeed where Osama bin Laden failed in provoking a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West by launching a 'pre-emptive' attack on Iraq." (Dilip Hiro, "Iraq: In the Eye of the Storm" Islamist 2002) Dilip Hiro in another article had said “If, rejecting the advice of such friends as President Mubarak, Crown Prince Abdullah and, lately, General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, the Bush administration invades Iraq, it would push the world inexorably toward the much-dreaded clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world, with grave consequences for us all”. (323)

Thus increasing reference to Huntington’s theory of clash of civilizations has been noted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Many scholars revisited the clash of civilizations thesis and attempted to repudiate it. Sylo Taraku said “The terror attacks on September 11th and USA reactions in terms of the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the war against international terrorism was by many seen as a confirmation of Huntington’s thesis as well as his prophecies of future conflicts. At the same time Huntington has been met with much criticism from academics and others”. (324)
Shivji for one said "But it is not too late. We are not experiencing a clash of civilizations, so much as a "clash of ignorances." Proffered by His Highness the Aga Khan, Spiritual Leader of the Shia Ismaili branch of Islam, the term refers to the clash of peoples who are not so different, yet know little of one another. With more education, open-mindedness, and dialogue on all sides, I believe that the world can move beyond this apocalyptic obsession with clashing civilizations. There is simply no need for any such conflict. (325)

Edward Said makes an even more pertinent observation. Edward Said states "The basic paradigm of West versus the rest (the cold war opposition reformulated) remained untouched, and this is what has persisted, often insidiously and implicitly, in discussion since the terrible events of September 11." (326) He goes on to add "This is the problem with unedifying labels like Islam and the West: They mislead and confuse the mind, which is trying to make sense of a disorderly reality that won't be pigeonholed or strapped down as easily as all that." (327) Said believes that "These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed analysis. "The Clash of Civilizations" thesis is a gimmick like "The War of the Worlds," better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time." (328)

Achcar examines the reasons for the September 11 attacks, which he attributes to the pursuit of power and pursuit of interests by United States without regard for international law or rights. Achcar main assertion is that the world is living through a "clash of barbarisms". Achcar the barbarism of the West spearheaded by the US clashes with the barbarism of the East practiced by Islamic fundamentalists. Achcar's conclusion is that Huntington's thesis is wrong because cultured societies or civilisations don't clash but barbaric societies or
barbarisms clash. He argues that civilisations create their own barbarisms, and that the "richer and more powerful a civilisation the deadlier its barbarism" and avers that these barbarisms are not irrational accidents but the creations of the civilizations themselves. Achcar undertakes a close anatomy of the sources of two barbarisms, namely the 'failure of Islam to evolve a modern socio-political form' and 'the failure of the West to evolve a credible progressive alternative to neoliberal capitalism'. These failures he contends are instrumental in causing the 'clash of barbarisms'.

In an interview to David Barsamian, Achcar says "I mean that in a certain sense civilizations could not clash. The process of civilization is described as a historical process of pacification of human relations, overcoming aggressiveness and the rule of law. And what we are seeing in this kind of clash is not, therefore, a clash of civilizations or features of civilizations clashing, but a clash of those kinds of barbaric potentials that every civilization include, whether Islamic or Western. These are barbarian forms which are potentially included in every kind of civilization and which can take over in periods of crisis or some specific historical periods." (329) In the same interview he further adds "I would say this is all the more, let's say, ridiculous, that kind of explanation -- that one should definitely agree on the fact that Osama bin Laden is not a representative of Islamic civilization. On that you have a kind of broad consensus, even in Washington and even on the part of Samuel Huntington, whom you just quoted and who is the author of this thesis about the clash of civilizations. All of them said, it is not the clash of civilizations in the sense that these people, bin Laden and his cohorts, are not representatives of Islamic civilizations and the United States is not fighting Islam. If we take this explanation as granted -- and I would certainly not dispute that, because I certainly do not, as I said, consider bin Laden as a representative of Islamic civilization but as a kind of barbaric degeneration -- I also definitely do
not consider that the present U.S. administration is representative of Western values". (330)

Evidently, the 9/11 attacks ignited anew the debate on West and its relations with the rest, particularly the Islamic world. Also Islam and more particularly Political Islam became the focus for many studies especially by scholars like John Esposito (331), Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand (332), Shibley Telhami (333) and others. The debate has also veered towards the non resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as the cause for hatred of the West and attacks on America. The subsequent wars by America on Afghanistan and Iraq and its latest threats to Iran have all topped the regional and global agenda resulting in continuation and acceleration in the debate over 'clash of civilizations'.

Most scholars and leaders have opined that the post-September 11 world does not fit into to the clash of civilisations thesis and focus has shifted to the neoconservative ideology's agenda for the world and in particular the U.S's Mid-east policy. Most scholars have pointed out that the increased anti-Americanism in the post 9/11 period is not on account of differences in civilizational values but because of wrong and hostile policies followed by the US towards other nations. But in spite of these other perspectives gaining strong ground, the debate over 'clash of civilisations' has continued to rage in the post 9/11 period. Akbar Ahmed has correctly pointed out that "After 9/11, the right wing in the U.S. and the media have made Huntington's thesis popular, and now, all over the world, people are talking about the clash of civilizations — Huntington's clash" (334)

Khaled Abou El-Fadl says "Some commentators, most notably the students of Samuel Huntington, have argued that 11 September represented an episode in the long and protracted struggle between two different and distinct civilisations- the Western and the Islamic. Some have even confused civilisational supremacy and superiority, arguing that Western civilisation is credible and influential in the
modern age because it is superior to Islamic civilisation. These commentators treat
civilisational paradigms and conflicts like beauty competitions, in which we
engage in the presumptuous act of crowning those of superior beauty” (334a) He
says that “Contrary to such assertions, 11 September is not a symptom of a clash
of civilisations, and that the very paradigm of the clash of civilisations is fraught
with methodological errors which make it a particularly unhelpful way of
understanding the current conflict.” (335)

In spite of some proponents’ advocacy of the clash of civilizations thesis
there are really not too many takers in the post 9/11 period to term American
campaign or ‘war on terror’ against Al Qaeda and Muslim countries like
Afghanistan, Iraq and now Iran as validating the clash of civilizations thesis.
Huntington’s vision of civilisational confrontation and conflict has not been
realized in the post 9/11 period and this is the biggest blow to its validity. 9/11.
Sid-Ahmed says “The main argument used to validate Huntington’s theory is that
he was the first to predict that civilisations will eventually come to clash, ten years
before this became evident in the eyes of most observers. This was interpreted as
proof that his theory is credible and should be taken seriously. Actually, this
argument is faulty (336)

8.11 The Underlying Motivation: A Mindset at Work?

In order to understand Huntington’s mindset and his underlying motivations,
it is imperative to look at his ‘clash’ perspective in the larger context of his other
major works, both before and after the expounding of his ‘clash of civilisations’
thesis. The three main works which shed light on the core thinking of Huntington
are Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), Clash of Civilizations? (1993,
1996) and Who Are We? Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004). A brief
review of his works of 1957, 1968 and 1981 and a much substantial analysis of his

*Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) was Huntington's first major work, which is almost considered a classic in Political Science. In this work he argues that order is the most important characteristic of states and that order is threatened the moment the level of mobilization exceeds the level of institutionalization within a society. According to Huntington economic development will cause political mobilization, which in turn will lead to instability, as the appropriate institutions will not be able to keep pace in ensuring societal stability. He advocates institution building in development, especially the establishment of stable party systems, as a solution to maintain stability in societies. This work came under much criticism by the students who were trying to politically mobilise and protest in the US during the sixties. Huntington did not approve of these less institutionalised political mobilisations and protests and this clearly indicated Huntington's preference for status quo and his aversion for any kind of disruption of existing order. This thinking was further elaborated in his 'clash of civilisations' thesis where he warned the Western nations that they may lose their predominant position in the world if they fail to quell the new threat to the global order, which has been so far in favour of the West. Huntington main contention was that economic progress could not be delinked from political liberty. And this argument came to be hotly debated, and which Huntington seems to have gradually retracted.

His other two important works — *The Soldier and the State* (1957), *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981) and many articles in reputed journals are endeavours by Huntington which reflect the same underlying mindset of an adherent of Americanism and Westernism. By his admission "All these books have their origins in my moral concern with major political and social problems, which often have been neglected". (337) Huntington first book, *The
Soldier and the State (1957), which focused on civil-military relations analysed the tensions between civilian control and military strategy. This work had a tremendous impact in the Cold War period which was fraught with dangers of Nuclear War and once again became important during the post-Cold War era due to various conflicts that emerged, where the clash of interest between the two major wings of the State, the civilian and the military has continued to dominate the scene. His book American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (1981) brought to the fore his interest in the question of ethnicity and national identity. His contention was that there was a distinct Americans have distinct creed based

Huntington in an article in the Foreign Policy Magazine entitled 'The Hispanic Challenge' expressed his concerns about the 'hispanization' of the United States. He asks 'Will the United States remain a country with a single national language and a core Anglo-Protestant culture? By ignoring this question, Americans acquiesce to their eventual transformation into two peoples with two cultures (Anglo and Hispanic) and two languages (English and Spanish).’ (337a) Huntington, here, as in his previous article exposes his civilisational clash discourse. He says. 'It is quite different to argue that Americans should know a non-English language in order to communicate with their fellow citizens. Yet that is what the Spanish-language advocates have in mind. Strengthened by the growth of Hispanic numbers and influence, Hispanic leaders are actively seeking to transform the United States into a bilingual society.' (338) Huntington cautions that "If this trend continues, the cultural division between Hispanics and Anglos could replace the racial division between blacks and whites as the most serious cleavage in U.S. society.” (338a) He finally argues “Such a transformation would not only revolutionize the United States, but it would also have serious consequences for Hispanics, who will be in the United States but not of it” (339) In the same year 2004, Huntington published an elaborate work Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity(340)
This book by Huntington, which came a decade after his earlier major work, 'Clash of Civilisations', focused on the issue of identity. In his "Who Are We?" he states that "all societies face threats to their existence from time to time" and "that America is one of those societies that are capable of postponing their demise by halting and reversing the processes of decline and renewing their vitality and identity". This assertion clearly reveals the underlying theme and agenda of all Huntingtonian endeavours. Progressing in the theme of Americanism, and Westernism, (to the exclusion of Latin – Americans and all others) this work in his latest attempt at salvaging, preserving and propagating his fundamental thesis of American identity and American triumph. His greatest concern is "America's future" and his analysis centers around the possible alternatives that may come to shape it.- “multicultural America united only by the principles of the American creed; bilingual, bicultural and probably bi-creedal Anglo-Protestant and Hispanic America; an exclusivist America in which renewed white nativism makes race and ethnicity again central to American identity; and a culturally revitalized America in which Americans reinvigorate their Anglo-Protestant culture, religious faith, and creed.” Huntington's obsession is with protection and revitalization of American culture, which he terms as Anglo-Protestantism, or in his own words "America's founding Anglo-Protestant culture". Throughout this new book, an obvious sequel to his previous work, with the underlying civilisational theme consciously maintained, Huntington has laboured to restate his same old civilisational arguments in stark bi-cultural or bi-civilisational terms. Either he fails to see or simply ignores the fact, that this work contradicts his contention that there is not much threat to the West or America from the Latino civilisation.

In Who Are We? Challenges to America's National Identity (2004) Huntington, explores the subject of immigration and sounds the siren of threat posed by it to the American national identity, especially by the large-scale Latino or Hispanic
immigration, which according to Huntington will "divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages". This book has also stirred controversy, just like the 'Clash' book, and Huntington has been accused of disparaging peoples from other countries and encouraging xenophobia among the Americans. Many scholars and critics have pointed out that the underlying discourse of both 'Clash of Civilisations?' and 'Who Are We?' is one and the same. His book charts out the march of American identity through the paths of race (whites) ethnicity (British-European) to the latest multiracial, multi-ethnic society in the twentieth century. This he calls as a "highly realistic portrayal of American identity- an America and all sorts of Americas, until the recent mass, and threatening immigration, having their Americanism defined in terms of Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding fathers". For Huntington, the core elements of this Anglo-Protestant American cultural identity are – the English language; Christianity; religious commitments; English concepts of the rule of law; the responsibility of rulers, and the rights of individuals; and dissenting protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have the ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth, 'a city on a hill'".

This new book, just like his previous work 'Clash of Civilizations' is not only polemical, but a hysterical attempt at trumpeting, like a doomsday prophet, the dangers to Americanism – a war cry to galvanize the Americans and Americanists to brace for a fight with the world. The underlying fear of Huntington, in both, his 'Clash of Civilisations?' and 'Who Are We?' is that Americanism and American supremacy, is in danger of being de-throned from the high pedestal of global rule. Evidently, the first work focuses on the threat from outside – challenge from non-Western civilizations and the second centres on the threat from within – the challenge posed by immigration, especially from Mexico. Two sides of the same coin!

Also, in both the instances, Huntington takes refuge in polemics and admonishes his critics for misunderstanding him. He criticizes his critics for
misrepresenting his arguments and is unwilling to accept any other line of argument, to the point of arrogance. He also rejects all serious and irrefutable criticisms by disparaging them as irrelevant, and actually refutes all criticisms as untenable or simply consigns them to the dustbin of nonsense. And if all this fails, he argues that a criticism is already answered in his response article and expanded work, namely, the book. He, at times goes even to extent of incorporating the criticisms, in a convoluted manner, in his responses or subsequent writings. Samuel Huntington certainly proves to be an arch polemist of Americanism! He brooks no criticisms when it comes to the supremacy and superiority of America. He only seeks followers, not critics! No one can accuse Huntington of writing "total nonsense" but his views and thesis can certainly be characterized as aiding and abetting a particular line, as upholding a particular agenda, that of Americanism and American supremacy, much to the detriment and neglect of so much that is good and laudable outside this misplaced and narrowly parochial Americanism. Huntington, though adept as he is, especially at using epithets to belittle his critics, from a truly scholarly perspective, fails to defend himself and his thesis convincingly and rather reveals beneath the mask of a realist analyst, an Americanist elite who has "set aside dispassionate analysis in favour of embittered polemic". Most of the scholars, particularly those of the leftist thinking, have always accused Huntington of "complicity with the powers that be".

Prior to his publications about the hispanic challenge to America, Huntington in 1999, while re-emphasising 'The Clash' thesis had already hinted about the next stage in his continuing enterprise to further American dominance "The central argument of my book on the clash of civilizations is that in this post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Everywhere peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans face: "Who are we?" And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define
themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. Global politics in the twenty-first century is being shaped along cultural and civilizational lines."

(341)

Another of Huntington's statements made in 1999 had announced his upcoming venture "The question of the conflict or convergence of cultures is a central issue confronting American society. Are we a country with one culture or many? If we are a country of many cultures, what then is the basis of national unity? Historically, America has had a single predominant culture, the product of the original British settlers, and successive waves of immigrants have assimilated into that culture, while also modifying it. Its key elements have been a European heritage, the English language, the Christian religion, and Protestant values. Ethnic, racial, regional, and other subcultures existed within this overarching dominant culture in which virtually all groups shared. America is obviously a multiethnic and multiracial society. If it also becomes a multicultural society, lacking a common core culture, what will hold it together?" He argues that "The standard answer is that Americans are united in their commitment to the political principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and other documents, and often referred to as the American Creed: liberty, equality, individualism, democracy, the rule of law, private enterprise. Most Americans do adhere to these values. Those values are, however, the product of the original unifying culture, and if that culture disappears, can a set of abstract political principles hold this society together?" (342)

He again sought to set the agenda for America when he said "The issue for Americans is whether we will renew and strengthen the culture which has historically defined us as a nation or whether this country will be torn apart and fractured by those determined to undermine and destroy the European, Christian, Protestant, English culture that has been the source of our national wealth and
power and the great principles of liberty, equality, and democracy that have made this country the hope for people all over the world. That is the challenge confronting us in the first years of the twenty-first century.” (343)

It is easier said that Huntington through his thesis of clash of civilizations is involved in the exercise of setting an agenda. Without adducing evidence it would be unfair to blame or accuse Huntington of such a serious charge. But is there evidence that Huntington is actually involved in an agenda setting exercise? Are there any such indications in his actions? Where would one search for evidence in case of a scholar if not in his writings. After all no scholar can conceal his real motives as they become plainly visible if one only knows where to look for them. Huntington is a prolific writer and his writings must hold the answer to the question whether he is consciously or unconsciously setting an agenda. Many of Huntington’s detractors have accused of such a commission but have not sufficiently analysed and adduced evidence to support their accusation. Hence it becomes imperative to undertake such an exercise here.

In order to understand the basis for Huntington’s thesis one needs to look at Huntington’s concerns and underlying thought processes which emerge from his many writings. This work accepts the accusation of the many scholars that Huntington’s thesis is directed towards setting an agenda. The logic for setting an agenda lies in the very concept of American nation. Huntington says “In the eyes of most Americans not only should their foreign-policy institutions be structured and function so as to reflect liberal values, but American foreign policy should also be substantively directed to the promotion of those values in the external environment. This gives a distinctive cast to the American role in the world. In a famous phrase Viscount Palmerston once said that Britain did not have permanent friends or enemies, it only had permanent interests. Like Britain and other countries, the United States also has interests, defined in terms of power, wealth, and security, some of which are sufficiently enduring as to be thought of as permanent. As a founded society, however, the United States also has distinctive
political principles and values that define its national identity. These principles provide a second set of goals and a second set of standards - in addition to those of national interest - by which to shape the goals and judge the success of American foreign policy. This heritage, this transposition of the ideals-versus-institutions gap into foreign policy, again distinguishes the United States from other societies.” (344)

He says “For most Americans, however, foreign-policy goals should reflect not only the security interests of the nation and the economic interests of key groups within the nation but also the political values and principles that define American identity.” (345) And this applies to him as well. His another statement is very telling “If these values do define foreign-policy goals, then that policy is morally justified, the opponents of that policy at home and abroad are morally illegitimate, and all efforts must be directed toward overcoming the opponents and achieving the goals.” (346)

He also highlights that “To Americans, achieving this convergence between self-interest and morality has appeared as no easy task. Hence the recurring tendencies in American history, either to retreat to minimum relations with the rest of the world and thus avoid the problem of reconciling the pursuit of self-interest with the adherence to principle in a corrupt and hostile environment, or the opposite solution, to set forth on a crusade to purify the world, to bring it into accordance with American principles and in the process to expand American power and thus protect the national interest.” (347) Huntington, on the one hand does an extremely penetrating analysis of how the American foreign policy is formulated, and on the other, is also involved in shaping the American policy in the same manner. It becomes extremely difficult to say whether his policy-making-agenda-setting effort stems from his analysis of American basis for policy making or vice versa. The latter is more likely.

According to Huntington “By the mid-1970s the ability of the United States to influence what was going on in other societies was but a pale shadow of
what it had been a quarter-century earlier. When it had an effect, however, the overall effect of American power on other societies was to further liberty, pluralism, and democracy. The conflict between American power and American principles virtually disappears when it is applied to the American impact on other societies. In that case, the very factors that give rise to the consciousness of a gap between ideal and reality also limit in practice the extent of that gap. The United States is in practice the freest, most liberal, most democratic country in the world, with far better institutionalized protections for the rights of its citizens than any other society. As a consequence, any increase in the power or influence of the United States in world affairs generally results - not inevitably, but far more often than not - in the promotion of liberty and human rights in the world.” (348)

Huntington is clearly of the view that “The expansion of American power is not synonymous with the expansion of liberty, but a significant correlation exists between the rise and fall of American power in the world and the rise and fall of liberty and democracy in the world.” (349) Here he is justifying America’s hegemony and involvement in the world, which is also a clear justification for maintaining the status quo in the unipolar world.

Huntington highlights the reality of American foreign policy “The positive impact of American power on liberty in other societies is in part the result of the conscious choices by presidents such as Kennedy and Carter to give high priority to the promotion of democracy and human rights. Even without such conscious choice, however, the presence or exercise of American power in a foreign area usually has a similar thrust.” (350) His rabid Americanism is evident when he says “The nature of the United States has left it little or no choice but to stand out among nations as the proponent of liberty and democracy, Clearly, the impact of no other country in world affairs has been as heavily weighted in favor of liberty and democracy as has that of the United States. Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. American power is no exception; clearly it has been used for good purposes and bad in terms of liberty, democracy, and
human rights. But also in terms of these values, American power is far less likely to be misused or corrupted than the power of any other major government". (351)

He says "The impact that the state of liberty in other societies has on liberty in the United States depends upon the power of those other societies and their ability to exercise that power with respect to the United States." (352)

And hence for him no other country, must, wield greater power than the United States. Even in the post Cold War world the United States must dominate and decide the destiny. Probably, in view of its declining power, for Huntington the best way to do this is by United States forming an alliance with the like minded countries and what better category can he employ to achieve alliance than civilization and civilizational rallying! Huntington's positing of the clash of civilizations argument is based not on the reality of the world situation, but on the peculiar need of America to continue to dominate the world, and this is clearly evident in his words "What happens in Chile or even Czechoslovakia does not affect the state of liberty in the United States because those are small, weak, and distant countries. But the disappearance of liberty in Britain or France or Japan would have consequences for the health of liberty in the United States, because they are large and important countries intimately involved with the United States. Conversely, the impact of the state of liberty in the United States on other societies depends not upon changes in American liberty (which foreigners will inevitably view as marginal) but rather upon the power and immediacy of the United States to the country in question. The power of example works only when it is an example of power. If the United States plays a strong, confident, preeminent role on the world stage, other nations will be impressed by its power and will attempt to emulate its liberty in the belief that liberty may be the source of power." (353)

He says "In short, no one copies a loser. The future of liberty in the world is thus intimately linked to the future of American Power" Thus, Huntington's thesis is not so much about facing an emerging situation as it is of creating a situation in which America will continue to dominate the world and influence
world events to exhibit its power. His argument is "The promotion of liberty abroad thus requires the expansion of American power; the operation of liberty at home involves the limitation of American power." And to this he adds "The new moralism of the 1970s coincided with the relative decline in American power and the concomitant erosion of liberty and democracy around the globe. By limiting American power the new moralism promoted that decline. In some measure, too, the new moralism was a consequence of the decline." He says "Paradoxically, the United States thus became more preoccupied with ways of defending human rights as its power to defend human rights diminished." and adds that "Congress found it necessary to write more and more explicit conditions and requirements into legislation. These legislative provisions were in effect an effort to compensate for the decline of American power." For Huntington these efforts "were no substitute for the presence of American power". (354)

Further he seeks to link the question of American identity to its dominance when he says "The United States has no meaning, no identity, no political culture or even history apart from its ideals of liberty and democracy and the continuing efforts of Americans to realize those ideals". His desire is to "support life maintenance of American power necessary to protect and promote liberal ideals and institutions in the world arena" Huntington's motivation to do something is clearly evident when he says "Critics say that America is a lie because its reality falls so far short of its ideals. They are wrong. America is not a lie; it is a disappointment. But it can be a disappointment only because it is also a hope." (355)

The Huntington's clash of civilization discourse has achieved such importance according to Moshe Reiss that it can be compared with Cold War paradigm. He says "Islam as a civilization is under siege. It took more than forty years from George F. Kennon's famous article in the Journal of Foreign Affairs (1947) on the Cold War and his prescription of a containment policy until it succeeded. It may take forty years from 9/11 until we discover the truth or
falseness of Huntington’s prescription and the success or failure of the war against Islamic terror.” (356)

Huntington’s underlying motivations and rabid Americanism are best seen in his own statement when he talks about the emergence of USA as a global power and the need to hold on to this position of dominance. Huntington’s agenda setting desire on the behalf of USA is evident when he says situation was different “until the close of the 19th century when America emerged as a world power. At that time the Nation consigned the Indian-fighting Army and the commerce-protecting Navy to history and in their stead created an Army designed for big wars and a Navy for big battles. That system served us well throughout two world wars. But by the late 1940s with the advent of the Cold War we needed a new Defense Establishment. Now that conflict is over, and once again the Nation must debate the nature of our national interests and the roles of the Armed Forces, just as earlier generations did in 1784, 1815, 1898, and 1946. In effect, we have to move on to a fifth phase of American defense policy.” (357)

Alan Wolfe in Native Son – Samuel Huntington Defends the Homeland has very ably critiqued this Huntington’s latest American agenda setting adventure. (358) According to Wolfe, Huntington, in his latest book Who Are We?, not only highlights the threats to the distinctly American ideals but seeks to make a case for more stringent American nationalism, bringing into conflict and contraction, the great American promise of freedom, to those who seek it in US and exclusion of those trying to enter US (immigrants) on the grounds that they pose a serious threat to American ideals. Thus, Huntington, who never was an internationalist, presents himself as an ultra-nationalist and calls himself a patriot. Huntington has been criticized by many scholars as being an anti-multiculturist for his scathing attacks on multiculturism.

Much of the debate and criticism about his latest book is whether Americanism is a cultural or creedal phenomenon and he provides no clear position, which only goes to compound the issue further. Huntington is criticized for saying that
American identity stems from Anglo-Protestantism, which critics hold is not a single religion but made of many sects. The argument of the critics, in this case, of religion (Anglo-Protestantism), as in the case of civilization (Western) is that "if religion shapes identity, the United States has had many identities because it has had so many religions", an argument that holds equally good to the question of civilization. There is no such thing as a single monolithic frozen religion and similarly no single compact civilization. In such a scenario it is ridiculous to talk of identities based on a specific few big religions or civilizations. There are many religions and sub-religions (sects), many civilizations and sub-civilizations, there are many cultures and sub-cultures and hence there are many identities, overlapping identities and identities within identities! Moreover religions, cultures and civilizations, are constantly changing, even fragmenting and so are the identities that arise from them. Amartya Sen's book has brought this out most concisely.

Hence Huntington's claim that, there exists a common Anglo-Protestant religion, or a single American culture, or a compact Western civilization, stands defeated by the yard stick of realist analysis, the same one on which he claims to build his thesis of clash of civilizations. The underlying fact is and will always remain that no identity is shaped by a single factor. Every identity is a result of a mix of complex factors which include race, religion, language, culture, history, politics and much more. Hence, Huntington's thesis does not withstand the test of empirical reality and slides down into the murky world of ultra-nationalism and exclusionism, admittedly the biggest obstacle to human development and world peace. Huntington, more than trying to find the roots of conflict among the peoples and nations in the world, through his thesis, is actually involved in an enterprise of perpetuating and precipitating conflict among nations and peoples and through this divide an rule strategy to ensure the perpetuation of American dominance. This is amply clear in the kind of partisan stand that Huntington takes (which a true realist analyst would never do).
Through his thesis of ‘clash of civilisations’, Huntington endorses the supremacy of the Western civilization, and wants it to triumph and continue to dominate the world. As a logical corollary to his desire for dominance by West, Huntington’s goes on to endorse the dominance by American Anglo-Protestants – “white nativist movements are a possible and plausible response to these trends and in situations of serious economic downturn and hardship could be highly probable”, within America. Alan Wolfe has aptly criticized this by stating that, “the word ‘plausible’ catches the eye. To say that something is possible or probable is to make a prediction; to call it plausible is to endorse it.” (359)

Ram Puniyani seeks to draw a parallel between RSS ideology and Huntington’s thesis thus “One such sectarian nationalism was propounded by RSS chief, Golwalkar, (We, or Our Nationhood defined), where he asserts that Indians are basically Hindus, so others have not to be given equal citizenship. This proposition put forward in 1938, has made a strong social and political impact during last two decades. On similar lines, one does not know if there is an inspirational connection, the current US ideologue Samuel Huntington, in ‘Who are we?’ argues that US is essentially Anglo Saxon and others are a threat to the American ethos. While Golwalkar is the local sectarian ideologue Huntington is currently playing the similar divisive tunes at global level. The similarity between these two ideologues is striking on one hand and the coincidence of the latter coming precisely in the decades of nineties with Hindutva, Gowalkars ideology, picking up nineties, is not just coincidental”. (360) Drawing the parallel further, Puniyani adds “One does not know whether Huntington, the ideologue of ”Clash of Civilizations”, ’backward’ Islam versus advanced West, has read Golwlalkar or not, but surely he will be ‘delighted’ to see the similar wave length of the thought process.No wonder Huntington happens to be favorite of the Hindu right!” (361)

In yet another instance Puniyani has said “On one hand we have the process of Globalization breaking the barriers between nations at economic level, though it is highly loaded in favor of the rich nations. At the same time in different states
the sectarian concepts of nationalism are coming up in a serious way. Even in U.S. the Nation is being identified as an Anglo Protestant English speaking country. Samuel Huntington the one to give ideological veneer to the US imperialist designs, has come out with a book, 'Who are we'? (362)

In the ultimate analysis it can be inferred that through all these works Huntington, without changing underlying discourse, journeys from the universal to the particular. His world of discourse can be best explained as made up of three concentric circles, the outer one constitutes the West, the middle one America and the central one Anglo-Protestantism. Evidently in these three levels of dominance there is a clear hierarchy of communities within communities and worldviews within worldviews, (Westernism, Americanism and Anglo-Protestantis) the ultimate and most supreme, according to Huntington, is the Anglo-Protestantism of which he is ultimately the member. Huntington has reached the rock bottom or to put it in another way, the pinnacle of his enterprise. He can go no further. He can only refine his presentation. His mindset and deep line of thinking and the agenda based on it stands exposed. No more evidence is necessary.

8.12 Masquerading Conservative?

Huntington, during an a speech had stated “I am a Democrat” (363) which implies that he is more liberally disposed. An analysis of Huntington’s writing ‘Robust Nationalism’ gives an insight into his mind and motives as also the roots of his ideas about conflict and desire for American domination of the world. Huntington begins with the Cold War period and says “The Cold War proved kind to conservatives and difficult for liberals” Then he adds “In contrast, the end of the Cold War discombobulated conservatives. They lost their central unifying purpose” because, he says “The absence of an identifiable major foreign threat to American society and institutions seemed to remove any rationale or need for classic conservatism.” (363a) Then he states that “The end of the Soviet Union
enabled neoconservatives to join their ideological siblings in efforts to reform the world in their image of the good society.” (364)

He says that “Like liberals, neoconservatives wish to use American power to promote the American dream abroad”. Then he highlights the alliance of American ideological disparates “They unite, however, in assigning the United States the global mission of promoting good abroad, in contrast to the classic conservative emphasis on preserving good at home.” (365) Huntington through his last two works, of course does both! Hence he is a syncretic union of the quintessential neoconservative and of the quintessential classic conservative. A pure and eternal conservative!

The proof of Huntington’s conservatism lies in his endorsement of American Anglo-Protestantism which for him is an eternal creed. He says “In conservatism, man is not the measure of all things. A Supreme Being and a supreme law, natural or divine, exist that are outside the control of human beings. Religion is the source of conservative concepts of human nature and human relations.” Hence his thesis of ‘The Clash’ can be attributed to his conservative belief which he spells out thus “Conservatism thus views conflict and even violent conflict as an inherent aspect of the human condition. Real conflicts of interest exist among groups and societies. These are not the result of misunderstanding, faulty communications or short-sightedness, but are rooted in the human condition, self-interest, and the struggle for wealth, security and power. While mutual gains are possible, in almost every relationship there are winners and losers, or at least those who win or lose more and those who win or lose less” (366) Thus one can easily understand where Huntington’s focus on the religions as the basis for clash in the world and his obsession to protect Anglo-Protestantism comes from.

All his important ideas, especially about conflict arise from conservative ideology because according to his own admission “Conservatives believe that both
sides equally desire victory and attempt to achieve it. They live in a Hobbesian, not a Lockean, world". He says "Conservatives are dubious." and basing himself on Robin Fox (367) he says that "Conservatives know that the end of one conflict creates the basis for another one. They agree with Robin Fox that wars are not a disease to be cured, but part of the normal human condition. They stem from what we are, not from some contingencies of what we do from time to time ('history'). They are, like religion and prostitution, basic responses to basic human fears and hopes." (368) Is Huntington speaking for some anonymous conservative or is he articulating about himself? The unconscious mind can really play strange tricks on the person and let the cat out of the bag.

Huntington, very self-revealingly states "Given the nature of the world, conservatives rank devotion to country along with devotion to God. Patriotism is a—perhaps the—prime conservative virtue. Conservatives give their highest loyalty to their country, its values, culture and institutions. Unlike most liberals, they see international institutions not as good in themselves but good only insofar as they contribute to furthering the well-being of the American nation. Non-conservatives tend to degrade national identity either in favor of ethnic, racial, gender or other sub-national identities, or in favor of identity with supranational institutions and ideals. Conservatives believe that foreign policy should promote the national interest, although they may differ as to exactly how that interest should be defined. They also resist intrusions on national sovereignty by international organizations, courts or regimes. Liberals are more likely to see, as Martha Nussbaum does, "national pride" as "morally dangerous" and to promote cosmopolitanism over patriotism. The conservative, on the other hand, would agree with Coleridge that cosmopolitanism not rooted in nationality is "a spurious and rotten growth", and that the true patriot will scorn "the false philosophy or mistaken religion which would persuade him that cosmopolitanism is nobler than nationality, and the human race a sublimer object of love than a people." (369) For those who have
analysed Huntington’s last two books (Clash of Civilisations? and Who Are We?)
the connections are plain.

Huntington’s rabid Americanism and motive to protect American interest at
all costs, is also evident when he says “American wealth and power are at their
peak. The national unity, economic equity and cultural integrity of America are
not. In the broadest sense, American national identity is under challenge from a
multiculturalism that subverts it from below and a cosmopolitanism that erodes it
from above. Patriotism is passe among large sectors of American elites.
Conceivably, in the future serious external threats to America could arise from
China, Russia, Islam or some combination of hostile states. At present, however,
the principal threats to American unity, culture and power are closer to home. The
appropriate response of both classic conservatives and neoconservatives is to come
together in support of a robust nationalism that reaffirms some basic truths.
America is a religious country. Patriotism is a virtue, Universalism is not
Americanism. Nationalism is not isolationism.” (370) Clearly for a discerning
mind Huntington is not talking about just other conservatives. It concerns him!!
To this he adds “These truths resonate with the American people. In their
commitment to God and country, conservatives differ from many liberal elites, but
they are at one with the American people. America was in large part created for
religious reasons, and throughout American history foreign observers have
identified the intense commitment to and extensive practice of religion as
distinguishing characteristics of the American people. This is as true, and perhaps
even more true, today than it has been in the past. By every conceivable measure,
America stands apart among wealthy countries in its high degree of religiosity. In
cross-national polls, Americans also are almost always more patriotic and take
greater pride in their country than people of other nations. Patriotism and religion
are central elements of American identity.” (371)
He seeks to draw the legitimacy to the enterprise of the conservatives from the American people. He says "The American public, unlike many American elites, is also robustly nationalistic in many of its views on particular foreign policy issues. The 1998 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey on public opinion and foreign affairs revealed significant, and in many respects growing, differences between the views of the public and those of foreign policy leaders on many key issues. The public holds a highly conservative view of the future, 53 percent believing the twenty-first century will be more violent than the twentieth century, in contrast to only 23 percent of the leaders, 40 percent of whom believe it will be less violent. Overwhelming majorities of both the public and the leaders believe that preventing nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, and maintaining American military superiority should be "very important" goals of American foreign policy. Far more than the leaders, however, the public strongly supports curtailing the flow of illegal drugs into the country, reducing illegal immigration, and protecting the jobs of American workers." (372) Huntington not only identifies with the creed of American values which he claims is held by the descendants of original American settlers, but also tries to give credence to this, through expounding his thesis of clash of civilizations.

He therefore suggests "Robust nationalism is an alternative to divisive multiculturalism, xenophobic isolationism and wimpy universalism. It is a foundation on which conservatives could unite to promote American national interests abroad and national unity at home" (373) His insinuation is clear. He has provided the framework in The Clash thesis and others need to only subscribe to it and act accordingly.

Huntington originally wrote about the nature of conservative ideology almost fifty years ago in an article 'Conservatism as an Ideology'. (374) and has practised it for even longer. More recently, Huntington has reiterated "In contrast
to liberalism and socialism, classic conservatism is not directed to realizing a particular vision of the good society. It embodies instead a general attitude toward order and change, defending the former and constraining the latter. The goal of conservatism is to "preserve, protect and defend" existing social, economic and political culture and institutions. Conservatives, however, may well support modest changes in the existing order so as to maintain it against revolutionary change or collapse. Bourgeois middle-class liberalism and working-class socialism oppose each other, but "the true antithesis of conservatism", as the editor of this journal has put it, "is not liberalism or socialism but radicalism, which also is best defined in terms of an attitude towards change-in its case one of uncritical approval." (375) Thus, Huntington, in spite of all his pretensions, fits perfectly into the image of a conservative that he seems to carve out for others. And nowhere is this more evident than in his last two major works, 'The Clash of Civilisations?' and 'Who Are We?' There are two faces of Huntington- one which is a soft spoken highly accomplished scholar who is erudite enough to write on any topic in a seemingly dispassionate manner and the other a man, who is simultaneously a scholar, who belonging a particular worldview, unceasingly espouses the agenda of his constituency and seeks to secure it’s victory and dominance. His statement “Significant intellectual and political conservative movements appear only when serious threats exist to the established order. Since it is a response to specific threats to specific cultures and institutions, one manifestation of conservatism has little or no relation to other manifestations, and the proponents of conservatism in one time and situation may well be its opponents in another. Conservatism is thus a positional ideology.” (376) is very telling in this regard. Is not Huntington a part of what he is speaking about here?

Thus Huntington both signifies and desires the triumph of the conservative enterprise for America. The only difference between him and others is that, he is a master of sophistication and camouflage unlike most professed conservatives.
Huntington, masquerading as a social scientist, is the epitome of the syncretism of the everything that subserves the American agenda, both externally (signified by The Clash of Civilisations?) and internally (signified by Who Are We?) Huntington’s formulations encompass any ideology, conservative, neoconservative or liberal, that helps in upholding the American dominance—internally, against the non-white non Anglo-Protestant immigrants and externally, against all others. In his view, America can, enter into opportunistic alliances as long as it serves the American agenda for dominance. Just as a criminal, consciously or unconsciously, tends to visit the site of his crime and establish his link with it, a theorist and an ideologist, consciously or unconsciously, tends to visit the site of his theoretical and ideological moorings and establish his links with it. Huntington, in writing ‘Robust Nationalism’ seems to be engaged in this inherent and inevitable human tendency, exposing his intimate bond with the conservative ideology.

Jacob Heilbrunn has pointed out the slipperiness of Huntington “Huntington has always been a Democrat, but never a liberal or a neoconservative. Instead, he is something different—a conservative realist. Realism has always held that in an anarchic world, states must ruthlessly pursue their national interest or face extinction. But defining the national interest has always been a slippery task and realism a mutable doctrine. Now Huntington appears to have mutated along with it. While he attacks the United States as a decadent society, he apparently views Asian authoritarianism as superior to the American model of democracy. This amounts to a refurbished critique of the charges leveled against American intervention abroad by the 1960s left. Thus Huntington's intellectual odyssey is not just a story of how one of America's leading foreign policy thinkers has repudiated the democratic universalism he once espoused. It is also an example of how the right has begun to attack the country it used to defend: America." (377)
Jacob Heilbrunn has put it well "The Clash of Civilizations is brilliant, provocative, and utterly unconvincing. Like so many previous efforts to devise grand theories of history and politics—from Spengler to Toynbee to Fukuyama—Huntington's collapses under the weight of its own assumptions. In fact Huntington's form of theorizing suffers from its own kind of malady. Though he stresses that he has written a popular book rather than a political science text, The Clash can be properly understood only in the context of conservative realist and neorealist theory.” (378)

In keeping with the same argument Jacob Heilbrunn says "The weakness of "realist" theory had always been its assumption that a balance of power should be maintained among nations. Neorealism held that the nature of a regime was largely irrelevant to its behavior Huntington's book moves beyond these increasingly sterile debates. He attempts to integrate an analysis of cultural and civilizational distinctiveness into traditional realism. In arguing that ethnicity stands at the heart of international relations, Huntington turns realism on its head. The nature of regimes becomes the most important factor in what he sees as a battle of rival civilizations jockeying for advantage. But in the end, Huntington himself succumbs to the flaws of the grand theory. For in his attempt to refurbish traditional, conservative realism with culture, Huntington has produced a profoundly illiberal book.” (379)

Huntington has declared “I am a Democrat” (380) but he has shown less affinity to the policies of America’s liberal Democratic Administration of Bill Clinton and more appreciation of the conservative Republican Administration of George W Bush. He says “Now, however, the existence and the legitimacy of that core culture is under challenge by devotees of multiculturalism, by some minority group and immigrant group leaders, and by political figures, including the President and Vice President. President Clinton has explicitly stated that we need a
"great revolution ... to prove that we literally can live without having a dominant European culture." Vice President Gore has, despite his Harvard education, mistranslated our national motto, *e pluribus unum*, to mean "from one, many.""

On the contrary Huntington is praise and admiration for the Bush Administration. He says "the efforts by the Bush administration to build a coalition against terrorism are very important, because the countries it is trying to get in that coalition are precisely the major regional powers with which we have been having difficult relations at times because of a natural conflict of interest. I think the Administration deserves credit for handling this so well—for getting Russia to cooperate, and having some forms of cooperation with China, and even Iran, in addition to the cooperation of the Europeans". (381) Here Huntington in appreciating and supporting Bush Administration clearly brings ot his conservative ideology though still calaiming to be a Democrat

In the year 2000 he said "I also recognize that I do not exactly fit the AEI (American Enterprise Institute) mould, which I conceive to be one of enlightened conservatism and responsible Republicanism. I do consider myself to be a conservative, but an old-fashioned Burkeian sort of conservative rather than a modern Reaganite conservative. In addition, on turning twenty-one in 1948, I registered as a Democrat and cast my first vote for Harry Truman. I remain a registered Democrat, perhaps more out of inertia more than anything else. In the memorable words of Senator David Hill after Bryan’s nomination in 1896, "I am a Democrat still—very still," and two years ago for the first time I voted for a Republican presidential candidate. So, I would like to express my appreciation to Chris and my other AEI friends for welcoming into their ranks this maverick Democrat and old-fashioned and unfashionable conservative" (382) The admission has finally come, unabashedly.

Said Shirazi has unmasked Huntington better than most others. He says "Perhaps what is most offensive about Huntington is the pseudo-liberal notes he occasionally sounds in his ultra-conservative symphony. For much of the book he
could pass for a multiculturalist with his talk of "multicivilizationalism," a confusion which is cleared up in the last chapter when he explains the internal threat the U.S. faces from Hispanics. He criticizes the West often in a way that sounds almost leftist, but what he turns out to be criticizing them for is their advocacy of individualism and freedom". (383)

The duality in Huntington has been well exposed by Jacob Heilbrunn "There is no multicultural clash, no uniquely Asian democracy, and no grand clash of civilizations. But there are two Huntingtons. And the real clash is between them. Will the real Samuel P. Huntington please stand up?" (384) In reality there is no real duality in Huntington. Huntington is through and through a die hard conservative, and probably the most successful conservative scholar who has been able to advance the conservative American enterprise through his many works, while openly projecting himself as a Democrat.

8.13 Deceptive Capitulation?

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Huntington agreed to revisit his thesis. He once again argued that "the makings exist for a clash of civilizations between Muslim and non-Muslims" and suggested that reactions to September 11 and the American response were 'strictly along civilizational lines' (384a). But then he began to gradually digress from some of his positions in the original thesis. Huntington changed his argument in his revisit and asserted that civilizational conflict is possible but not inevitable, a radical departure from his earlier position which considered it as inevitable. His new defensive argument about the wars among the Muslim groups was that 'the age of Muslim wars has roots in more general causes that do not include the inherent nature of Islamic doctrine or beliefs. The clash of contemporary Muslim wars lies in politics not the religious doctrines'. Evidently, Huntington is retracting from his earlier position that ontological differences in the Western and Islamic civilizations would be the cause
for a clash of civilizations and civilisational wars. Huntington's new argument is that people from the Islamic countries hate the West and its governments for supporting 'corrupt, ineffective, and repressive' governments in their own countries and not because of civilisational differences.

To blunt the stringent and sharp criticism of his thesis as an agenda setting exercise in favour of the West and America Huntington now advocates changes in US policy toward Israeli-Palestinian problem that would reduce hostility towards the West. Huntington is clearly watering down the possibility of a world characterized by civilisational conflict to one characterized by conflicts based primarily on politics. Gone is the 'differences in ontology' argument for conflict in the world in future. Evidently Huntington has realized the hollowness of his ontological-civilisational argument to explain conflict in the world among the nations and peoples. Huntington's capitulation seems complete as he now comes to accept the probability of a peaceful world politics in the future which could be free of 'clash of civilizations'. Whether this is a true capitulation or a deceptive one by Huntington is difficult to say particularly in the light of his latest work 'Who Are We?' But what is clear is that Huntington has come to realize the serious weaknesses in his original thesis and this is the beginning of the end of the 'clash of civilisations' thesis as far as he is concerned. Also while the specific attempt to set the agenda through the 'clash of civilisations' may have been artfully abandoned, whether agenda setting tendency itself has been give up is quite doubtful.

It is noteworthy that in the revisiting of the clash of civilizations thesis in the post 9/11 period Huntington, by making fundamental revisions to his original position, seems to have redeemed himself somewhat and thereby rendered the thesis quite irrelevant to the great chagrin of his many followers. According to Huntington, during the decade of the 1990s "global politics has changed
fundamentally” as “it has been substantially reconfigured along cultural and civilizational lines, as I have highlighted in the pages of this journal and documented at length in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”. (385) But writing in 1999 after facing severe criticism for ignoring the power dimension he now seeks to correct his lopsidedness by stating “global politics is also always about power and the struggle for power, and today international relations is changing along that crucial dimension. The global structure of power in the Cold War was basically bipolar; the emerging structure is very different.” (386) Huntington, who had refused to acknowledge the reality of the unipolar world by saying that there is nothing like unipolar world but only a multi-civilisational world now tries to reconcile the reality of the sole superpower on one hand and a non multicivilisational world on the other. The ground reality and the realization that no clash of civilizations is likely to occur in the way he had predicted, compelled Huntington to take up the issues which he had so arrogantly sidetracked in the expounding of ‘The Clash’ thesis.

He contends, though still attempting to qualify, that “There is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is unipolar. A unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result, the superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so. A bipolar system like the Cold War has two superpowers, and the relations between them are central to international politics. Each superpower dominates a coalition of allied states and competes with the other superpower for influence among non-aligned countries. A multipolar system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major states is necessary to resolve important international issues. European politics approximated this model for several centuries. Contemporary international politics does not fit any of these
three models. It is instead a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers. The settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of other states." (387)

He goes on to add "The superpower or hegemon in a unipolar system, lacking any major powers challenging it, is normally able to maintain its dominance over minor states for a long time until it is weakened by internal decay or by forces from outside the system, both of which happened to fifth-century Rome and nineteenth-century China. In a multipolar system, each state might prefer a unipolar system with itself as the single dominant power but the other major states will act to prevent that from happening, as was often the case in European politics. In the Cold War, each superpower quite explicitly preferred a unipolar system under its hegemony. However, the dynamics of the competition and their early awareness that an effort to create a unipolar system by armed force would be disastrous for both enabled bipolarity to endure for four decades until one state no longer could sustain the rivalry. In each of these systems, the most powerful actors had an interest in maintaining the system. In a uni-multipolar system, this is less true. The United States would clearly prefer a unipolar system in which it would be the hegemon and often acts as if such a system existed. The major powers, on the other hand, would prefer a multipolar system in which they could pursue their interests, unilaterally and collectively, without being subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the stronger super power. They feel threatened by what they see as the American pursuit of global hegemony. American officials feel frustrated by their failure to achieve that hegemony. None of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with the status quo. The superpower's efforts to create a unipolar system stimulate greater effort by the major powers to move toward a multipolar one. Virtually all major regional powers are increasingly asserting themselves to promote their own distinct
interests, which often conflict with those of the United States. Global politics has thus moved from the bipolar system of the Cold War through a unipolar moment—highlighted by the Gulf War—and is now passing through one or two unimultipolar decades before it enters a truly multipolar 21st century. The United States, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has said, will be the first, last, and only global superpower” (388) In saying all this Huntington seems to be involved in the process of effectively according an early burial to his thesis of clash of civilisations.

In an attempt to salvage his eminence as a scholar of international politics by presenting some kind of coherent explanation to the state of things in the world, by changing his stance, Huntington only compounds the confusion. First, Huntington moves from the idea of civilisational politics to power politics in which he speaks of America as a ‘benign hegemon’. Subsequently he focuses on the ‘hollow hegemon’ and finally ‘rogue hegemon’. He says “Addressing the problem of foreign perceptions of American "hegemonism," Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott set forth this rationale: "In a fashion and to an extent that is unique in the history of Great Powers, the United States defines its strength —indeed, its very greatness —not in terms of its ability to achieve or maintain dominance over others, but in terms of its ability to work with others in the interests of the international community as a whole. . . . American foreign policy is consciously intended to advance universal values [his italics].” The most concise statement of the "benign hegemon" syndrome was made by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence H. Summers when he called the United States the "first nonimperialist superpower" -- a claim that manages in three words to exalt American uniqueness, American virtue, and American power.” (389) He says “In the unipolar moment at the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was often able to impose its will on other countries. That moment has passed.” (390) But then he adds “However much foreign policy elites may ignore or deplore it, the United States lacks the domestic political base to
create a unipolar world. American leaders repeatedly make threats, promise action, and fail to deliver. The result is a foreign policy of "rhetoric and retreat" and a growing reputation as a "hollow hegemon." (391)

He says "In acting as if this were a unipolar world, the United States is also becoming increasingly alone in the world. On issue after issue, the United States has found itself increasingly alone, with one or a few partners, opposing most of the rest of the world's states and peoples. While the United States regularly denounces various countries as "rogue states," in the eyes of many countries it is becoming the rogue superpower. One of Japan's most distinguished diplomats, Ambassador Hisashi Owada, has argued that after World War II, the United States pursued a policy of "unilateral globalism," providing public goods in the form of security, opposition to communism, an open global economy, aid for economic development, and stronger international institutions. Now it is pursuing a policy of "global unilateralism," promoting its own particular interests with little reference to those of others. The United States is unlikely to become an isolationist country, withdrawing from the world. But it could become an isolated country, out of step with much of the world." (392)

He then shifts his attention to multipolarity. "Political and intellectual leaders in most countries strongly resist the prospect of a unipolar world and favor the emergence of true multipolarity. At a 1997 Harvard conference, scholars reported that the elites of countries comprising at least two-thirds of the world's people -- Chinese, Russians, Indians, Arabs, Muslims, and Africans -- see the United States as the single greatest external threat to their societies. They do not regard America as a military threat but as a menace to their integrity, autonomy, prosperity, and freedom of action. They view the United States as intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical, and applying double standards, engaging in what they label "financial imperialism" and "intellectual colonialism," with a foreign policy driven overwhelmingly by domestic politics. For Indian elites, an Indian scholar reported, "the United States
represents the major diplomatic and political threat. On virtually every issue of concern to India, the United States has 'veto' or mobilizational power, whether it is on nuclear, technological, economic, environmental, or political matters. That is, the United States can deny India its objectives and can rally others to join it in punishing India." Its sins are "power, hubris, and greed." From the Russian perspective, a Moscow participant said, the United States pursues a policy of "coercive cooperation." All Russians oppose "a world based on a dominant U.S. leadership which would border on hegemony." In similar terms, the Beijing participant said Chinese leaders believe that the principal threats to peace, stability, and China are "hegemonism and power politics," meaning U.S. policies, which they say are designed to undermine and create disunity in the socialist states and developing countries. Arab elites see the United States as an evil force in world affairs, while the Japanese public rated in 1997 the United States as a threat to Japan second only to North Korea."(392a) Suddenly the civilisational or cultural or religious tone has disappeared in Huntington's analysis and clearly a paradigm based on power politics among nation-states seems to have replaced his celebrated clash of civilisational thesis. The erudite but astute scholar is once again at his best at trying to wriggle out of the mess he had created for himself and the world. What is interesting to note is that while the underlying narrative is the same the superficial discourse has changed, which only goes to show how a clever scholar can present or explain the same situation in more than one way, some times in civilisational terms, at other times in political power terms! This is evidence of not just the hypocrisy of scholarly enterprises but also of the politics of paradigms that scholars like Huntington indulge in. How the same surface reality of international relations can be presented differently and in non civilisational, non cultural terms and non religious terms can be learnt from Huntington. This is indeed possible because reality is multifaceted and complex and it is the human beings who seek to interpret it in a way suitable to thems by positing paradigms. Reality is not a slave to any paradigm. No paradigm can
capture the multifaceted reality in all its complexity. Every reality exceeds and transcends every paradigm which seeks to capture and understand it. Huntington, knowingly or unknowingly is taking advantage of this undeniable fact of life and reality.

Consider for instance Huntington's following analysis "American leaders believe that the world's business is their business. Other countries believe that what happens in their part of the world is their business, not America's, and quite explicitly respond. As Nelson Mandela said, his country rejects another state's having "the arrogance to tell us where we should go or which countries should be our friends. . . . We cannot accept that a state assumes the role of the world's policeman." In a bipolar world, many countries welcomed the United States as their protector against the other superpower. In a uni-multipolar world, in contrast, the world's only superpower is automatically a threat to other major powers. One by one, the major regional powers are making it clear that they do not want the United States messing around in regions where their interests are predominant. Iran, for instance, strongly opposes the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. The current bad relations between the United States and Iran are the product of the Iranian revolution. If, however, the Shah or his son now ruled Iran, those relations would probably be deteriorating because Iran would see the American presence in the Gulf as a threat to its own hegemony there." (393) There is not much inkling of civilisational or cultural or communal discourse thus far. Its all national, statist and political talk!

He says "Countries respond in various ways to American superpowerdom. At a relatively low level are widespread feelings of fear, resentment, and envy. These ensure that when at some point the United States suffers a humiliating rebuff from a Saddam or a Milosevic, many countries will think, "They finally got what they had coming to them!" At a somewhat higher level, resentment may turn into dissent, with other countries, including allies, refusing to cooperate with the
United States on the Persian Gulf, Cuba, Libya, Iran, extraterritoriality, nuclear proliferation, human rights, trade policies, and other issues. In a few cases, dissent has turned into outright opposition as countries attempt to defeat U.S. policy. The highest level of response would be the formation of an antihegemonic coalition involving several major powers. Such a grouping is impossible in a unipolar world because the other states are too weak to mount it. It appears in a multipolar world only when one state begins to become strong and troublesome enough to provoke it. It would, however, appear to be a natural phenomenon in a uni-multipolar world. Throughout history, major powers have tended to balance against the attempted domination by the strongest among them. Some antihegemonic cooperation has occurred. Undoubtedly the single most important move toward an antihegemonic coalition, however, antedates the end of the Cold War: the formation of the European Union and the creation of a common European currency. As French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine has said, Europe must come together on its own and create a counterweight to stop the United States from dominating a multipolar world. Clearly the euro could pose an important challenge to the hegemony of the dollar in global finance.” (394) ‘Civilisational rallying’ and 'kin country syndrome' is being replaced by Huntington himself with antihegemonic coalition or simply multinational alliance and that too barely six years since his expounding of The Clash thesis.

In taking his cannily formulated alternative explanation further Huntington modifies the terminology from his civilisational discourse to suit the power politics discourse. Consider this “Each major regional power also has an interest in securing U.S. support in conflicts with other regional powers. Given the benefits that the United States can distribute, the sensible course for other countries may well be, in international-relations lingo, not to "balance" against the United States but to "bandwagon" with it.” (395) The ‘bandwagoning’ idea from The Clash thesis resurfaces in a different garb.
However for Huntington it is not so easy to make a complete break from his
civilisational discourse as he is probably fixated with it and hence after attempting
the metamorphosis of his original discourse into power narrative he returns to his
original thesis but without entirely abandoning the power paradigm. He cannot
help avoid saying “Cultural commonality and legal equality thus facilitated the
operation of a balance-of-power system to counter the emergence of a single
hegemon, and even then it often operated quite imperfectly. Global politics is now
multicivilizational. France, Russia, and China may well have common interests in
challenging U.S. hegemony, but their very different cultures are likely to make it
difficult for them to organize an effective coalition. In addition, the idea of the
sovereign legal equality of nation-states has not played a significant role in
relations among non-Western societies, which see hierarchy rather than equality as
the natural relation among peoples. Similarly, an obstacle to an anti-U.S. coalition
between China and Russia now is Russian reluctance to be the junior partner of a
much more populous and economically dynamic China. Cultural differences,
jealousies, and rivalries may thwart the major powers from coalescing against the
superpower” (396) Everyone knows now how untrue this is today with Russia,
India and China allying themselves as a counter balance to the US.

For the embattled Huntington of the pre 9/11 period it had become
imperative to say “The interplay of power and culture will decisively mold
patterns of alliance and antagonism among states in the coming years. In terms of
culture, cooperation is more likely between countries with cultural commonalities;
antagonism is more likely between countries with widely different cultures. In
terms of power, the United States and the secondary regional powers have
common interests in limiting the dominance of the major states in their regions.
Thus the United States has warned China by strengthening its military alliance
with Japan and supporting the modest extension of Japanese military capabilities.
The U.S. special relationship with Britain provides leverage against the emerging
power of a united Europe. America is working to develop close relations with Ukraine to counter any expansion of Russian power. With the emergence of Brazil as the dominant state in Latin America, U.S. relations with Argentina have greatly improved and the United States has designated Argentina a non-NATO military ally. The United States cooperates closely with Saudi Arabia to counter Iran's power in the Gulf and, less successfully, has worked with Pakistan to balance India in South Asia. In all these cases, cooperation serves mutual interests in containing the influence of the major regional power. This interplay of power and culture suggests that the United States is likely to have difficult relations with the major regional powers, though less so with the European Union and Brazil than with the others. On the other hand, the United States should have reasonably cooperative relations with all the secondary regional powers, but have closer relations with the secondary regional powers that have similar cultures (Britain, Argentina, and possibly Ukraine) than those that have different cultures (Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan). Finally, relations between major and secondary regional powers of the same civilization (the EU and Britain, Russia and Ukraine, Brazil and Argentina, Iran and Saudi Arabia) should be less antagonistic than those between countries of different civilizations (China and Japan; Japan and Korea; India and Pakistan; Israel and the Arab states).” (397) In the pre-9/11 period, Huntington is clearly seeking to prop up his crumbling civilisational thesis with power perspective. He makes the power-culture linkage even more clear when he says “The interaction of power and culture has special relevance for European-American relations. The dynamics of power encourage rivalry; cultural commonalities facilitate cooperation. The achievement of almost any major American goal depends on the triumph of the latter over the former”. (398) Though bad habits die hard, Huntington is still attempting a laboured salvaging operation. True to his quintessential nature Huntington is formulating a different paradigm which is essentially a Culture-Power paradigm. And he hopes to find takers to it and salvage his greatly weakened paradigm of civilisational
clash, and thereby salvage his position as a pre-eminent theorist of international politics.

Conceding a totally different kind of world order, almost entirely based on power politics instead of his preferred one, based on culture and civilisation, Huntington says “In the multipolar world of the 21st century, the major powers will inevitably compete, clash, and coalesce with each other in various permutations and combinations. Such a world, however, will lack the tension and conflict between the superpower and the major regional powers that are the defining characteristic of a uni-multipolar world. For that reason, the United States could find life as a major power in a multipolar world less demanding, less contentious, and more rewarding than it was as the world’s only superpower.” (399) Power discourse is now driving Huntington’s evolving culture paradigm.

In the year 2000 the insecure, diffident, defensive and apologetic Huntington continues with his endeavour of combining power perspective with the culture perspective. He says “Let me assure you, however, that I am not here today to reaffirm, to defend, or to elaborate the clash of civilizations thesis. Instead I would like to supplement it by setting forth a different perspective on world politics. I make the point repeatedly in my book that power as well as culture counts in international relations. Unlike culture, of course, power, always has counted. The importance of culture today distinguishes post-Cold War politics from Cold War politics, but power is the everlasting and omni-present constant of all politics. And this evening instead of looking at the distribution of cultures in the world I would like to focus on the distribution of power and on the perspectives states and peoples have on the distribution of power”. (400) In the lecture delivered at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Huntington goes on to emphasise the power perspective while not abandoning his civilisational clash thesis and attempts to talk in the polarity terms. “Ten years ago
as the Cold War was ending and the Soviet empire was imploding, almost
everyone saw the emergence of a single superpower world. Since then there has
been much debate over how to conceptualize the successor system to the bipolar
system of the Cold War. Is it unipolar, as Charles Krauthammer suggested,
multipolar as many have argued, or uni-multipolar, as I would suggest?” (401) For
most part of the lecture he goes on to define his new power based perspective “A
uni-multipolar world, on the other hand, is one in which resolution of key
international issues requires action by the single superpower plus some
combination of other major states and in which the single superpower is able to
veto action by a combination of other states. My central thesis this evening is that
global politics has now moved from a brief unipolar moment at the end of the
Cold War into one or perhaps more uni-multipolar decades on its way towards a
multipolar twenty-first century.” (402)

For the rest of the lecture he repeats much of his newly forming hybrid
ideas about the link between power and culture and about the new world order
called as uni-multipolar world. He says “In this uni-multipolar world the
superpower is driven to act unilaterally and to attempt to impose its will on other
countries, which creates tension and conflict, particularly with the major regional
powers. In this uni-multipolar world the central relationship is that between the
superpower and the major regional powers. Neither side is entirely happy with this
relationship. The superpower would prefer a unipolar world and is continually
tempted to act as if it were a unipolar world. The major powers would prefer a
multipolar world and believe global politics is moving in that direction. A uni-
multipolar world is stable only to the extent that these conflicting pulls can be
balanced. In the longer term, they probably cannot be balanced, and, if as seems
probable, the superpower cannot create a unipolar world, global politics will
gradually evolve in the direction of a multipolar system.” (403) But, either out of
sheer habit, personal obligation, or conservative compulsions, he again repeats
"Cultural commonality and legal equality facilitated the operation of a balance of power system, which still often operated quite imperfectly, to counter the emergence of a hegemonic power. Global politics now, however, is multiculturizational as well as multipolar. France, Russia, and China may well have common interests in challenging U.S. hegemony, but their very different cultures are likely to make it difficult for them to organize an effective coalition to do so" (404) He says that “in this uni-multipolar world American interests and the interests of the major regional powers often conflict, and the latter are increasingly likely to be assertive in defending and advancing their interests. Hence U.S. ability to secure their cooperation in the courses of action it proposes is declining.” (405)

It can be said that probably if it wasn’t for the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ leading to the language of ‘jihad’ and ‘crusades’, Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis would have met its natural demise and power paradigm could have come to occupy central stage by continuing to hold primacy and greater sway in the debates and discourses in the world, including in case of Huntington himself! In that sense Huntington himself would have been the provider of an alternative theory (based on a power perspective) to his own theory of clash of civilizations and would have gracefully abandoned his enterprise based on the civilisational paradigm without losing face or his eminence as a scholar. An ingenious plan which was thwarted by the unfolding of the 9/11 events but without affecting Huntington, the scholar in any way! Huntington had been attempting to resurrect himself through his new power based discourse after having been crucified by his detractors, but his salvation and the redemption of his thesis came due to the graciousness of Osama bin Laden who, probably unknowing to Huntington had already accepted Huntington’s ‘civilisational clash’ framework and mounted the catastrophic attack on America on September 11, 2001. Huntington, himself taken by the sudden surprise, subsequently responded on one hand by blaming Laden for the ‘clash of civilisation’ and on the other
trumpeting his prescience at anticipating such an eventuality. Only Huntington
knows the truth of this shock, reality and his immortalization that has visited him
due to the 9/11 events. From an ordinary mortal of a scholar, Huntington being
constantly crucified and searching for his own resurrection through a reformulated
culture-power paradigm, is given his life back. Huntington, the persecuted Jesus,
instead of resurrecting like Christ rose like Lazarus. His final crucifixion and
resurrection came to be deferred to after 9/11. He got a Lazarian life, not
Christian. He could not become Christ. He awaits his resurrection. He is still being
persecuted and maybe crucified. But now he has less chance of achieving
resurrection and more of going the Judas way.

Huntington, in the period immediately preceding 9/11, exhibited not only
calculated inconsistency in his perspectives to the international situation, such as
adapting the same beliefs held by him, first to a civilisational perspective and then
to a power perspective, but also seized the opportunity in the post 9/11 period to
expand and extend the civilisational perspective to the intra –American situation.
Just prior to the 9/11 incident Huntington is cautiously exploring the possibility of
using the civilisational perspective to explain the immigration situation in
America. This is not a fresh beginning because in his book The Clash of
Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order he had already taken up the
issue of immigration. He had said in 1996 “While the Muslims pose the immediate
problem to Europe, Mexicans pose the problem for the United States” (406)
Huntington at first takes up the issue of Mexican immigration from an implicitly
civilisational perspective in mostly brief writings such as Reconsidering
Immigration: Is Mexico a Special Case? (407) and The Special Case of Mexican
Immigration (408) But in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 Huntington and his
thesis of clash of civilizations returns with a vengeance because it gains
unexpected popularity and currency due to the opportunity it provides the
antagonistic camps to pursue their agendas for seeking survival through
dominance. The re-livened Huntington is emboldened and logically follows up with his book Who Are We? and many other articles like *Dead souls: the denationalization of the American elite* (409) and *One Nation, Out of Many* (410) which are explicitly based on the civilisational perspective.

Jacob Heilbrunn, in his excellent critique, has pointed out to this characteristic about Huntington in another instance. He says "Huntington may be America's most distinguished political scientist. He is certainly its most exasperating. In the October 1997 issue of the National Endowment for Democracy's *Journal of Democracy*, Huntington wrote: "The Comintern is dead. The time for a Demintem has arrived." But in the September-October 1997 *Foreign Affairs*, he delivered just the opposite message: American foreign power is in decline and its foreign policy is fractured by ethnic lobbies, each pursuing its own particular interests. "Instead of formulating unrealistic schemes for grand endeavors abroad," he wrote, "foreign policy elites might well devote their energies to designing plans for lowering American involvement in the world in ways that will safeguard possible future national interests." Whom are we to believe? Huntington I or Huntington II? One thing is certain: they can't both be right. Either a democratic international is a fool's errand or it is a sound strategy to safeguard future national interests. It can't be both. Foreign policy experts can, and often do, change their minds. But to produce two concurrent and flatly contradictory articles is an exceptional feat. These articles do, however, point to a deeper conflict in Huntington, one on display in his most recent books, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991) and *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996). Where Huntington I claimed that a third wave of democracy was washing across the globe, Huntington II now seems to argue that it never amounted to more than a momentary splash. *The Clash of Civilizations* holds that the United States is in decline, that democracy is limited to Western cultures, and that America must accept Asian authoritarianism as a good thing." (411) An
excellent insight into workings of the mind of Huntington indeed. And a clear exposition of the Huntingtonian quintessence in the world of scholarship, which in a more somber world of psychology would have been termed schizophrenia and confined to mental asylum.

Evidently, Huntington is not just an unsure or vacillating scholar in search of a clear niche for himself in the echelons of scholarship but an ever looming opportunist waiting for the next opportunity to launch another idea, alternative perspective or a new thesis that will lead to better polarization, greater bandwagoning or persistent controversy which will keep him in the global spotlight and subserve his goal of being a perpetual agenda setter for America by playing the game of paradigm politics, a game which will ensure the empowering and perpetuation of America as well as his self-empowerment and self-perpetuation. Is this a road to perdition or a journey of a holy pilgrim or simply another act of a master masquerader?

Conclusion

Scholars have consistently pointed out that Huntington’s last two books are the species of the same genre. In his ‘Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order’ (1996) and ‘Who Are We? Challenges to America’s National Identity’ (2004) Huntington, scholars hold, has incessantly pursued the same agenda-setting exercise, one for the world and the other for America. Even to many recent critics of Huntington, like Alan Wolfe, an American himself, Huntington comes across not only as confused and confounded in his arguments but also as an “exclusionist”, who is bent on preserving the so called timeless American identity of Anglo-Protestantism for all time to come. The latest criticism of Huntington by many scholars for propagating, in a new garb, the old idea of nativism only goes to further justify that there is a clear underlying motive in all Huntingtonian endeavours – an agenda revealed most blatantly in his work ‘Clash
of Civilizations'. The trend of setting the agenda for American dominance of the world is a peculiarly American syndrome glaringly evident since the end of World War I and Huntington is one of its consistent and able practitioners. In carrying forward this underlying motive Huntington can resort to any modus operandi. He can go to the schizophrenic lengths to simultaneously suggest more than one paradigms or indulge himself in the politics of paradigms or undertake deceptive capitulation to buy time for inventing or constructing something even better that will subserve the interest of America, the West and of course, himself. Huntington does not need to be tried and condemned. He has already exposed and condemned himself. His confessions are there for all to see. What will befall him time alone will tell.