

## CHAPTER TWO

## CHAPTER II

### SUPPRESSION OF "REBELS": US ALLIANCE WITH THE FILIPINO UPPER CRUST

#### ISSUE OF INDEPENDENCE VERSUS IMPERIALISM

The establishment of American rule over the Philippines was not accomplished automatically with the ratification of the Paris Peace Treaty. The Filipino people had been struggling for independence and not for a change of colonial masters. Filipino freedom fighters immediately took up arms against their "liberators", the United States, when they saw the latter seeking to consolidate its own control over the Philippines. The leader of the Filipino guerilla forces, Emilio Aguinaldo, claimed that American representatives had given him a solemn promise that after the defeat of Spain, the Philippines would be an independent country. He charged that Washington's course constituted a betrayal and the cruel breaking of the pledged word. The United States denied that independence was ever promised to the Filipino leader and set about the task of crushing the "rebels".

Dean C. Worcester, who had served as member of the Philippine Commission and Secretary of the Interior during 1901-1903, published a book in 1914, in which he denied

that any American official had promised independence for the Philippines with a view to gaining Aguinaldo's support in the war against Spain. According to Worcester, a Spanish-speaking Englishman named Bray, was the interpreter during the meeting between Aguinaldo and the US Consul-General in Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt. Pratt was supposed to transmit the minute of the conversation to Commodore George Dewey. Could Pratt have possibly promised independence for the Philippines? Worcester argued that the British interpreter had deliberately misinterpreted Pratt's words to Aguinaldo. He wrote:

Aguinaldo knew but little english, Pratt knew no Spanish, so in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter who is interested in the subject of the discussion is a dangerous man. It is impossible to say what he told Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did not know; but whatever was said during these conversations it is within the limits of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by the interpreter more than he intended, and that his statements of what would probably be granted by the United States Government and his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independence may have been translated as assurances and promises.<sup>1</sup>

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1 Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines: Past and Present (New York, 1914), vol.1, pp.25-26. Bray was a former member of the civil service in India and then residing in the Philippines and engaged in writing letters to the Singapore Free Press on the archipelago.

One point that should be borne in mind is that Worcester himself did not know what exactly transpired during the meeting. He was not present on the occasion. His use of the words "may", "possibility", and "probably" can legitimately lead to an inference that he was by no means certain of his ground. Hence Aguinaldo's charge cannot be summarily rejected on the basis of American denials. Worcester himself quoted Aguinaldo as saying:

...we again took up the matter, Consul Pratt saying that the admiral had answered my inquiry by saying that the United States would at least recognize the independence of the Philippine Government under a naval protectorate, but that there was no necessity to put it in writing, as the words of the admiral and the American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled.<sup>2</sup>

According to accounts published in 1969 by American scholars based on comprehensive records, Aguinaldo, almost invariably when he met an American officer, specifically asked what the United States intended to do with the Philippines once Spain was defeated. When the American gave assurances, Aguinaldo would demand a written reply. But he never succeeded in getting a written reply.<sup>3</sup>

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2 Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.27.

3 For a detailed account see Henry F. Graff, ed., American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston, 1969).

The American General, Thomas M. Anderson, wrote in North American Review (February 1900): "Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildhan, and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino Government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather than from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as "I did subsequently at his request".<sup>4</sup> Thus we do not as of now have an authentic written document confirming Aguinaldo's claim that American officials had given a solemn promise of freedom for the Philippines. In such a situation the issue has to be appraised from the commonsense point of view. Is it conceivable that an anti-colonial freedom fighters like Aguinaldo would not have asked American officials what exactly that country's intentions were in regard to freedom for his country? In case the American response had been negative or even very vague, would he have thrown himself into the fray vigorously? If he and his associates had not believed that Washington had violated a solemn pledge, would their resistance to American control have been so immediate and so ferocious?

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4 Quoted in James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912 (Reprint, Quezn City, 1968), p.43.

### Prolonged Filipino Resistance

Under the leadership of Aguinaldo the Filipino guerilla units fought a tenacious war against the formidable American forces. It was more prolonged and sanguinary than Washington had expected. The Spanish-American war continued only for one hundred days, but the Philippine-American war dragged on for several years.<sup>5</sup> The United States Government called it "insurrection" and sent in more forces to suppress and "civilize" the "insurrectionaries", so that American civil administration over the Philippines could be established.<sup>6</sup> The aim of "civilizing" the "insurrectionaries" was meant for domestic public consumption. Some Americans who directly came into contact with the Filipinos believed that the claim was spurious. In any event, the Filipinos did not ask for being "civilized" by American masters. For instance, General Charles King, a nobleman who was also a "volunteer" in the Philippines, wrote after his return from the Philippines:

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5 For detailed account of the war see, Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven, 1982).

6 The army song of the Philippines under General Arthur McArthur was:  
 Damn, damn, damn the Filipino,  
 Pock-marked khekiao ladrone;  
 Underneath the starrY flag  
 civilize him with a krag,  
 And return us to our own beloved home.

The capability of the Filipinos for self-government can not (sic) be doubted. Such men as Rellano, Aguinaldo, and many others whom I might name are highly educated; nine-tenths of the people read and write, all are skilled artisans in one way or the other....In my opinion they rank far higher than the Cubans or the uneducated negroes to whom we have given the right of suffrage.<sup>7</sup>

Admiral George Dewey in a telegram to the Navy Department put forth the similar views. He wrote: "In my opinion these people are superior in intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races".<sup>8</sup>

During the military operations conducted by US forces, thousands of Filipino guerrillas were killed. The American command concluded that resistance could not be suppressed until the leader Emilio Aguinaldo was captured. To achieve that objective, a suitable "native" had to be found who could be set on a course of betrayal. The man chosen was Hilario Tal Placido who headed an organization called Macabebe Scouts, and his task was to enable an unsuspecting Aguinaldo to be ambushed and captured. The dark deed was accomplished and the leader of Filipino resistance was a

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7 Quoted in Miller, n.5, p.41.

8 Quoted in Blount, n.4, p.41.

prisoner in the hands of the colonial rulers. What was promised to Placido as a reward to his assistance in successfully arresting Aguinaldo is not clear. But the use of trickery in capturing the leader of the freedom struggle is no longer disputed. A frank acknowledgement was made by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1958 during an exchange of toasts with the Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia. Eisenhower stated: "Aguinaldo led some very ragged, badly armed bands with no weapons and less food. He gave the American Army a very bad time, until he was captured - even then, let me add, by trickery".<sup>9</sup>

When the Philippine-American war was going on, people in the United States were basking in the glory of Dewey's victory. The expansionists orated on the opportunities that would open up for the United States as a Pacific power. The Pacific Ocean was described as "destined to bear on its bosom a larger commerce than the Atlantic. As the countries in the Far East and Australia develop their resources the commerce of the United States with them will assume proportions greater in their directness and scope, than over commerce with

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9 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1958), p.476.

Europe".<sup>10</sup> The American people were hardly made aware of the systematic and ruthless suppression of the Philippine freedom fighters and the tactics that were employed in the process. The people and the politicians had their attention concentrated on the presidential election of 1900. William McKinley was to be a candidate for re-election. The American people who but a few years earlier during the term of McKinley's predecessor, had enthusiastically celebrated the installation of the Statue of Liberty remained oblivious of the suppression of the Filipinos who sought freedom for their country.

The American media tended to go along with the Administration's course of providing the citizens with substantially white-washed accounts of developments in the Philippines.<sup>11</sup> An Associated Press reporter revealed

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10 Letter, Charles Denby to John Sherman, January 31, 1898 in Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations (New York, 1950), p.408.

11 The Statue of Liberty that was presented by France and dedicated by President Cleveland in 1886 was originally known as Liberty Enlightening the World. It was placed to face down the harbour "as a symbol to arriving voyagers of the freedom and opportunity that were offered by the United States".

subsequently that General Elwell S. Otis had told him: "My instructions are to let nothing go that can hurt the administration".<sup>12</sup> According to the reporter the censor's comment was:

...of course we all know that we are in a terrible mess out here, but we don't want the people to get excited about it. If you fellows will only keep quiet now we will pull through in time without any fuss at home.<sup>13</sup>

W. Morgan Shuster, who had served as a member of the Philippine Commission, wrote thus in 1914 in an article in the Century Magazine:

The records of our Congressional committees and the War Department are filled with reports, speeches, letters, testimony and statistics going to show what the party in power wanted the American people to think about the Filipinos...<sup>14</sup>

Until recent years, the saga of Filipino resistance and the ruthless violence unleashed by the United States to smash it received scant notice in textbooks of American history. Colonial subservience resulted in

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12 Quoted in Blount, n.4, pp.221-222.

13 Ibid., p.222.

14 Quoted in Moorfield Storey and Marcial P. Lichauco, The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925 (New York, 1971), pp.30-31.

Filipino historian Renalto Constantino comments that official history, influenced by colonial scholarship, has presented the struggle against the Americans as a short one. It has honoured the collaborators and all but ignored the resistance of the people".<sup>15</sup>

### The Collaborators

A section of the Filipino elite class did indeed collaborate with the Americans and made the task of the latter easier. Even as military operations against the "rebels" was under way, the United States despatched a commission to Manila. The American people would tend to believe that the despatch of a commission would mean that the Filipinos would be assured of getting a fair hearing and a just decision. The gesture was also meant to mollify international public opinion, such as it was, at that time. Jacob Gould Schurman, of Cornell University who headed the Commission, talked of peace amidst the rattle of the rifles. Fearful of the implications of insurgency and the militancy of large sections of

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15 Renato Constantino, A History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War (New York, 1975), p.237.

"ordinary" people, elements of the wealthy land-owning and trading Filipino elites were content to accept the professions of the Commission. As early as May 1898 the US Consul General at Manila had informed the State Department that wealthy and powerful families in Manila such as, D. Cortes, M. Cortes, A. Rosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and Jose Maria Basa "desired to tender their allegiance" to the United States.<sup>16</sup> A group of affluent Filipinos, who had long been domiciled in Hong Kong, also lent their support to the United States during its war against Spain. Benito Legarda, a staunch collaborator, went to the extent of telling the Schurman Commission that he had "never heard this word 'independence' spoken (by the "insurrectionists"), nor do I think they are capable of understanding it, even up to this time".<sup>17</sup> The Commissioners were willing to believe him and to present the views of those who testified in similar terms as proof that the Filipino people desired to remain under American rule and approved the suppression of the freedom fighters.

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16 Worcester, n.1, p.23.

17 Constantiho, n.15, p.237.

Formalization of the Colonial Administration:

After quelling the "insurrection" and winning the support of well-to-do local elements, Washington embarked upon a programme to gain popular support by efforts to organize an efficient civil administration and to launch various civil ameliorative works.<sup>18</sup> There was a desire on the part of Washington to show the world that American rule would be benevolent. William Howard Taft, head of the second Philippine Commission and first Governor General of the Philippines, followed a policy which he termed the "policy of attraction".<sup>19</sup> Raul S. Manglaupaus, a Filipino political leader, describes in a play the transformation of the American destroyer of freedom fighters into a benevolent administrator offering to engage in good work. He puts Theodore Roosevelt as a character in his historical play "Manifest Destiny" and depicts Teddy as singing:

The Will! The Will! The Will to go and fight!  
 The Will! The Will! to set the world aright!  
 In India the great Asoka  
 Who wasn't a bit mediocre  
 Destroyed his foes and then communed in silence;

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18 For details see Lewis E. Gleek, Jr., American Institutions in the Philippines, 1898-1941 (Quezon City, 1976).

19 For more information on American Governor Generals and High Commissioners see George A. Malcolm, American Colonial Careerist (Boston, 1957).

He then preached peaceful living  
 And brotherly forgiving;  
 You see, we must have war before non-violence!<sup>20</sup>

Machiavelli centuries ago had prescribed a similar course of action when he wrote that "on seizing a state, the usurper should make haste to inflict what injuries he must, at a stroke, that he may not have to renew them daily, but be enabled by their discontinuance to reassure men's minds, and afterwards win them over by benefits".<sup>21</sup>

### Militant Nationalism

While the upper class Filipinos collaborated and colluded with the new colonial administrators, uprisings against the local bosses as well as the alien rulers took place intermittently, bringing about serious instability in the Philippines. One among many was by the Muslims known as Moros in the Mindanao region of the southern Philippines. Earlier the Moros had successfully resisted the Spanish rulers' effort to bring them under their administration. When the United States created the Moro

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20 Raul S. Manglapaus, Philippines: The Silenced Democracy (New York, 1976), p.95. The play is part of this book.

21 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, translated, The Harvard Classics (New York, 1965), p.32.

Province in 1903 and appointed General Leonard Wood as the military governor of the province, the Muslims rose in revolt. Fighting continued till 1906 when the agitation was put down after a short battle with much bloodshed.

Mark Twain commented:

The official report stated that the battle was fought with prodigious energy on both sides during a day and a half, and that it ended with a complete victory for the American arms. The completeness of the victory is established by this fact: That of the six hundred Moros not one was left alive. The brilliancy of the victory is established by this other fact, to wit: that of over six hundred (American) heroes only fifteen lost their lives.

General Wood was present and was looking on. His order had been, "kill or capture those savages". Apparently our little army considered that the "or" left them authorized to kill or capture according to taste, and that their taste had remained what it has been for eight years, in our army out there - the taste of Christian butchers.

The official report quite properly extolled and magnified the "heroism" and "gallantry" of our troops, lamented the loss of the fifteen who perished and elaborated the wounds of thirty-two of our men who suffered injury, and even minutely and faithfully described the nature of the wounds, in the interest of future historians of the United States....<sup>22</sup>

Apart from their brief battle with the Moros in Mindanao, there were many sub-regional and regional movements of

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22 Maxwell Geismer, ed., Mark Twain and the Three R's: Race, Religion, Revolution and Related Matters (Indianapolis (NY), 1973), p.21.

different kinds with various degrees of intensity. Artemio Ricarte Y Garcia, for instance, led the "Ricartista movement" for almost fifteen years against the colonial rulers. He was the only prominent nationalist leader who never compromised his "spirit of '96" and continued to remain the embodiment of selfless patriotism till his death.<sup>23</sup>

### Peasant Uprisings

Peasant revolts in the Philippines have a considerably long history. It took root in the Spanish colonial policy of giving special political, economic and social privileges to Filipino caciques or the aristocracy of the community. The Spaniards governed the great majority of the Filipino serfs through the native aristocracy. Oppression of the serfs by the landed aristocracy is a universal feature in feudal societies and the Philippines was no exception to this. Members of the peasantry constituted the bulk of the army which fought against the Spaniards and later against the American occupation forces. Soon after the

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23 More detailed account can be found in David R. Stuartevant, Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, 1840-1940 (Ithaca, NY, 1976).

establishment of colonial rule, a violent peasant revolt broke out and came to be known as "Bloody Samar" in Manila. Ever since then there had been many "egoteric societies" and "conspiratorial sects" along with other peasant groups prolonging the heritage of disgruntled peasants' resistance to foreign rule.

Since the relations between the American rulers and much of the Filipino landed upper crust was Cozy and mutually beneficial, popular discontent against the rapacity of the latter had to run up against the determination of the American colonial administration to maintain "civil order".

During the years 1923 and 1929 a group known as "Colorums" went on a rampage attacking the constabulary and government buildings in the Mindanao and Luzon areas. The colonial administrators doubted the motives of agrarian dissenters, but no one "in authority sought a fundamental explanation of the upheaval". It was identified with "fanaticism and criminality" and was regarded as an isolated event, whereas it constituted a "form of hamlet nationalism".<sup>24</sup> It was, nonetheless, quelled with

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24 Ibid., p.157.

a heavy hand. The recurrent peasant revolts did not, however, represent a serious threat to the status quo, partly because the first target was the local oligarchy and also because these were not well organized or unified enough to pose any challenge to the American Raj. A Filipino newspaper, the Independent, wrote on 11 October 1923:

The Government and the Americans may rest assured that no armed disturbance threatens them. Here, at present, no one thinks of an armed revolution against them or against the established institutions. The ire of the people is directed against certain oligarchical Filipinos, hated to death by the whole country...<sup>25</sup>

The testimony of a former Vice Governor-General of the Philippines on the motivations of the rulers and their collaborators is revealing. He said that "the Philippine government officials were most anxious to prevent the investigation of this uprising on the part of the American Governor General's staff of advisers because such an inquiry would inevitably be pushed into the whole realm of the oppression of the poor peasant by the local boss (cacique), the usurer, the Constabulary, and the local

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25 Quoted in D.R. Williams, The United States and the Philippines (New York, 1926), pp.235-36.

official".<sup>26</sup>

The essentially feudal structure of the Philippine society remained practically unchanged during American rule. The colonial administrators did little to bring about a change in the social structure. A few half-hearted attempts to provide bits of land to the needy never matured and, as one of America's most fervent Filipino friends put it, "deeper resentment was born".<sup>27</sup>

#### The Time of Great Depression

The general economic crisis that gripped the world in the aftermath of the first World War and then during the Great Depression beginning from 1929 had their effects on this American colony. Local uprisings and militant organizations proliferated in the archipelago. In 1929 a distinguished lawyer, Pedro Abbad Santos, organized a socialist party in Pampanga province in the Philippines.

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- 26 Unpublished article written in 1947 by V.G. Lava, "The Democratic Movement in the Philippines", Central Intelligence Agency Information Report, 3 February 1949, Melby Papers, Truman Library. It was rated "probably true" by the CIA.
- 27 Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia: Philippine Victory (New York, 1955), p.94.

In 1930 Crisanto Evangelista founded the Communist party (PKP) with the aid and advice of American and Indonesian communists as well as the Comintern.<sup>28</sup> However, the communist movement in the Philippines never assumed such dimensions as to constitute a threat during the colonial era.<sup>29</sup> The PKP was banned in 1931 in the wake of strikes and agitations and the founder of the party, Evangelista, was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment.

Tangulan and Bagong were two other revolutionary organizations of the 1930s. The most militant and effective organization was, however, the Sakdal party which included both the rural and urban elements in its membership. The Sakdal platform called for absolute and immediate independence and "establishment of a national government of the poor, for the poor and by the poor".<sup>30</sup> A captured Sakdal once remarked: "I want independence. I want our country to be free...I am opposed to the present leaders because they put us in the Commonwealth...."<sup>31</sup> In May 1935

28 Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy (Washington, 1977), p.14.

29 "Background Information About the Philippines", DRF Information Paper No.410, 14 June 1951, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, Melby Papers, Truman Library.

30 Joseph R. Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York, 1942), p.13.

31 Quoted in Sturtevant, n.23, p.242.

the members of the Sakdal party attacked government buildings in fourteen towns. But the disorganized rebellion was quickly put down by the government forces.

#### The "Peaceful" and "Democratic" Struggle for Independence

The constitutional struggle for greater Filipino control and ultimate independence constituted another aspect of Philippine nationalism. It began with the establishment of the Nacionalista Party in 1907. The only previous party of the twentieth century Philippines was the Federalista Party which had been formed by the caciques to accept America's political authority. The Nacionalist party had a revolutionary programme of working for the eventual achievement of Philippine independence. But the spirit for independence soon died down, as the party came to be dominated by a new Filipino class that emerged after the First World War and that profited tremendously from the export-import business. Gradually the semi-feudal landlord class also left the caciques and joined the Nacionalista party. As a result duplicity and dishonesty on the issue of independence crept into the party leadership so much so that in the 1930s a "movement

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32 Later the party became a "political tool of the Japanese fascists", changed its name to Ganap party and provided guidance as well as soldiers to the Japanese occupation forces. Also see, Melby Papers, n.26.

sprang up in the Philippines under the sponsorship of the Philippine Civic League, led by prominent Nacionalistas, whose object was to bring about a "re-examination" of the Philippine independence question".<sup>33</sup> In the second decade of the present century rebel elements of the Nacionalista party along with the American-educated student groups and the less influential middle class formed the Democrata party. But opportunism crept into the leadership of this party as well. The US officials, however, pointed out the lack of seriousness for independence of the Philippines on the part of the Nacionalista leaders from the very first election to the National Assembly in 1907. During the election, the then Governor General William Cameron Forbes asked a few leaders of the Nacionalista party if they would fight for independence should they win the elections. Forbes wrote that "they practically admitted to me that it was really a catchway of getting votes; that what they wanted was office, not independence ...."<sup>34</sup> Governor General Jacob H. Smith had similar views

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33 Ibid.

34 Quoted in Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (Quezon City, 1975), p.322.

about the depth of sentiment for freedom among party leaders. An office of power and profit was more dear to the hearts of these leaders than the independence of their country. Smith observed, in a letter to William Howard Taft, dated 7 October 1907:

...the first and only genuine political parties that have ever lived...are the Ins and the Outs. The Ins are generally conservative, the Outs are always radical--until they get in. The Ins are conservative from conviction, the Outs are radical for convenience.<sup>35</sup>

Secretary of War Jacob Dickinson who paid an official visit to the Philippines in 1910 entertained the same impression about the democratic nationalists. The demand for independence was a mere rhetoric to win elections year in and year out. Sergio Osmena and Manuel L. Quezon were the two leaders who virtually "monopolized the shared power during the duration of American rule" but they were "never serious about independence" for the Philippines.<sup>36</sup> The lack of seriousness was an outcome of the erosion of values caused by subservience to foreign rule and the fact that the Filipino elites had

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35 Quoted in Ibid.

36 Romeo V. Cruz, America's Colonial Desk and the Philippines, 1898-1934 (Quezon City, 1974), pp.15-16.

from the very beginning accepted American rule and had sided with the Americans against the Filipino guerrillas fighting for freedom.

However, in order to legitimize their leadership to preserve their social position and to bargain with American rulers, the Filipino leaders put up a show of demanding greater rights and eventual independence.

The nationalist leaders usually adopted two means to achieve their goal -- propaganda in the United States and lobbying in the US Congress. For propaganda purposes a "Philippine Press Bureau" was set up in 1919. It used to publish the Philippine Press Bulletin which was mailed to Congressmen, prominent citizens and editors of weekly and daily newspapers.<sup>37</sup> In addition, an "Executive Office on Independence" was established in Manila to "direct the work of information and propaganda" in favour of the Philippine independence both in the home country and abroad.

The second means was sending "independence missions" to Washington in order to lobby in the Congress to grant

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37 Williams, n.25, pp.279-81.

independence to the Philippines. The first such mission headed by the Philippine Senate President Manuel Quezon reached Washington in 1919. Other such missions in 1923, 1924, 1927, 1931 and 1934 were headed by the nationalist leaders, such as Manuel A. Roxas, Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena. None of them was, however, committed to seeking immediate independence. Governor General Forbes observed:

No less a person than the Speaker of the Assembly (i.e. Osmena) told me that the Filipinos wanted independence only while it seemed to be getting farther off and the minute it began to get very near they would begin to get very much frightened.<sup>38</sup>

Three years before the Filipino nationalist leaders reached Washington on their first ever mission to demand more Filipino participation in the affairs of the government leading to eventual independence of their country, the US Congress passed the Jones Act in 1916 which provided for an elective Senate in the Philippines replacing an appointive Commission and also made a reference to granting of complete independence to the Filipinos at an unspecified future date. As will be discussed in the following chapter the US Congress also enacted a few

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38 Quoted in Constantino, n.33, p.324.

more legislations gradually increasing Filipino participation in the governance of the Philippines and promising eventual independence. Mention may be made at this point of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act of 1933 and the Tydings,McDuffie Act of 1934. The Filipino leaders, while enthusiastically demanding the freedom of their country, were found to be less desirous of immediate independence and in a few cases secretly worked against it. For instance, Quezon, who led an independence mission in 1919, was working secretly against the Jones Bill in 1916.<sup>39</sup> Similarly in 1924 he had a hand in the "sabotage" of the Fairfield bill which stipulated some sort of "dominions" or a comparable status thus scheduling independence for the Philippine Islands.<sup>40</sup> The same leader, however, for public consumption exclaimed in 1926 that he preferred a "government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by Americans".

There were also instances of clash of personalities. One such event took place in 1933 when the

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39 Ibid.

40 Russell H. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia: The Roots of Commitment (New York, 1973), p.3.

nationalists were divided into two groups on the issue of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act repassed by the US Congress over a presidential veto. Those who supported this act, which contained a formula for independence, came to be known as the "pros" and were led by Osmena. Those who opposed the act were known as the "antis" and Quezon was their leader. The faction led by Quezon finally won the case when the Philippine legislature rejected the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. But how? Evett D. Hester, a shrewd observer of Philippine events, summed up the events of 1933 thus:

After manoeuvring like a drunken sailor all over the deck of Filipino politics...Don Marvel finally gathered behind him all the radicals (he led them to believe that he is in favour of a more immediate, more complete and more absolute independence than that provided in the H-H-C) and all the Conservatives, sugar barons and other propertied gentlemen (because he led them to believe that he is in favour of a less immediate, less complete and less absolute independence than...the H-H-C)...and he won in the legislature hands down.<sup>41</sup>

The following year Quezon headed for Washington to bring a better act than the H-H-C Act. After desperately trying to get a different independence Act from the

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41 Quoted in Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946 (Manila, 1969), pp.134-35.

Congress he came home with the Tydings-McDuffie Act. This new act was, however, identical in essentials, except for the removal of American Army bases from the provisions.<sup>42</sup> But it was not a victory for Quezon. When, in fact, Quezon met Millard Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, to ask for a new congressional act, the latter committed himself to striking Army bases from the old act and to making naval bases subject to negotiation at the time of independence. In return Quezon was to promise to support the changes at home. Tydings' suggestion was influenced by many Army officers' preference to contract the defence perimeter due to the exposed position of the US Army in the Philippines and the Navy officers' continuing interest in expanding the fleet and naval bases in the Philippines. The nationalist leaders' double-dealings, prompted by the need to satisfy the alien boss as well as to get associated with the nationalist movement for political survival, "was used to advantage by the US when it wished to delay the granting of independence".<sup>43</sup>

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42 For details on Quezon's manoeuver in Washington, see Ibid.

43 George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership (New York, 1964), p.66.

While the people at large in the Philippines were unaware of the double-dealings of their Janus-faced leaders, a section of the populace were perhaps acquainted with the nature of the people belonging to upper class of the Philippine society. It is perhaps exemplified by a letter to President Harry S. Truman written by an ordinary Filipino on 1 June 1945 expressing regret at the President's decision to grant independence to the Philippines and appealed to the President to reverse his decisions. He felt that if the President granted independence to the Philippines, "there will be a civil war among us Filipinos because each Filipino who is at the top wants to rule as he pleases and other Filipinos have the same idea about ruling us...."<sup>44</sup>

While the extremist and militant nationalist movements were disorganized, sporadic and intermittent, the so-called democratic nationalist leaders were not sincere in their efforts. But what was the American response to Philippine resistance? How did the United States meet the challenge to its rule in the Philippines? What were the perception of various US administrations toward the colonial issues?

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44 Letter to President Truman, 1 June 1945, Official File, File 400--Philippines-Misc, Truman Library, The signature of the sender is torn.