

## CHAPTER SIX

## Chapter Six

### IMPLICATIONS OF ONE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP

America's relationship with the Republic of the Philippines has been a delicate one. Washington knew that Asians watched American policies and programmes in the Philippines "as an index" of what could be expected of America elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> American success or failure in the Philippines would affect Washington's overall policy toward Asia. Keeping its strategic objective in mind, the United States Government channeled, about two billion dollars of economic assistance to the Philippines in its first five years of independence. Out of this total aid, \$400 million was paid for private war damage claims, \$118 million for reconstruction of public services, \$822 million as back pay for Filipinos who had served in the armed forces, and for missing persons benefit etc., and \$181 million as compensation to Filipino veterans. Washington also made an arrangement for the transfer of surplus property

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1 Secret, Report on the Philippines, Joint MDA Survey Mission in Southeast Asia, 13 October 1950, FMACC D-33/9, Papers of John F. Melby, Truman Library.

to the Philippines estimated at a "fair" value of \$100 million. In addition, other kinds of equipment, material and technical assistance amounted to \$200 million.<sup>2</sup> It is important to mention that all these assistance was in the form of goods and services and payments to individuals. The number of individuals to receive the benefits was sizeable and expectation of some payment inevitably make this rather important segment of Filipino population favourable to the concept of their country maintaining friendly relationship with the United States. Departing imperial masters are not generally in the habit of bestowing benefits on their subjects. The French are not known to have made special budgetary allocations for war damage and Japanese occupation to individual Vietnamese or Laotians nor were the British known to have engaged in any such exercise to compensate the victims of the Great Bengal Famine which was largely the result of war time conditions and constraints. That the United States came forth with assistance for the Phillipines

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2 Report by Myron M. Cowen, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines on Program and Developments in the Philippines, 15 June 1951, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents (Prepared by the Historical Division of the State Department, 1957).

was due not only to the fact that the people and the Congress were willing to undertake the burden but also because the top policymakers saw the programme as a means of promoting goodwill in the Philippines and an instrument of influence with the Government of the Philippines. The anticipated long-term need for bases and facilities in the Philippines was regarded by the policymakers as fully justifying such a modest investment. At the same time, however, there was no desire on the part of the US policymakers to make any sort of massive grants to the Filipino Government aimed at launching it on a strong footing enabling it to develop rapidly its industrial and agriculture infrastructure. The Philippine Government received direct financial aid only in the form of a RFC budgetary loan of \$60 million and an additional \$89.5 million representing taxes that had been collected by Washington on behalf of the Philippine Commonwealth.<sup>3</sup> These and subsequent programmes of economic and technical assistance that were to be extended by the United States to the Philippines were intended to enable the United States to have the desired level of influence in the Philippines. Despite profe-

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3 Ibid.

ssion to the contrary on the part of any country that offers grants and loans to any other country, the motives of the aid and loan given are likely to be the same. In the case of the United States it is easier to find, because of the openness of the society and greater availability of materials relating to American policies, "evidence" of a selfish motivation. The evidence may even be found in documents printed, published and sold by the United States Government itself in the Foreign Relations of the United States. According to Allen Griffin, Far Eastern Programme Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration, economic assistance to the Philippines was in the nature of a "bribe" to enable the United States to more effectively participate in "Philippine affairs".<sup>4</sup> Important officials in the U.S. Government sometimes recommended budgetary grants to the Philippines that would be "palatable" to Congress and at the same time

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4 Secret, Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Shohan) to the Director of that Office (Lacy), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 (Washington, D.C., 1977), vol.6, part-2, p.1495.

"would permit the United States to have extra control over the Philippine military establishment".<sup>5</sup> Such assistance was aimed also at inducing Manila to support positions taken by the U.S. in international forums.

#### Support in International Forums

On most of the issues coming before the United Nations that the United States considered important, the Philippines sided with the United States during debates and in voting except on such issues as the "colonial questions", South African racial discrimination and matters involving the interests of "small nations".<sup>6</sup> Manila always espoused the Indonesian cause whenever the question of Dutch military action against the Indonesian freedom fighters came up in the United Nations.<sup>7</sup> Washington understood that just as

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5 Ibid.

6 Secret, Background Information About the Philippines, DRF Information Paper No.410, 14 June 1951, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Papers of John F. Melby, Truman Library.

7 United Nations Weekly Bulletin, vol.7, no.12, December 1949, pp.702-03. Also see, Milton Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic (Hawaii, 1965).

its vital West European connection imposed constraints on its behaviour in the United Nations debates on colonial and related issues, Manila would also have to reckon with its position as a newly independent Asian nation. Washington did not regard Filipino behaviour on such issues as an act of defiance; on the other hand, it perceived a certain usefulness in Manila sustaining and developing its image as an Asian country fully alive to the concerns of new nations.

Unlike almost all of the newly independent countries, the Philippines did not embrace the concept of non-alignment. The concept probably had strong appeal among Filipino intellectuals but found no favour with political and government leaders who subscribed to the concept of alignment with the United States and expected both economic and military aid to flow therefrom. They could see clearly that the Truman administration had little enthusiasm for the very idea of non-alignment in the context of cold war with the Soviet Union and of the shooting war in Korea. Clear indication that any Filipino move towards non-alignment would evoke serious strain in relation with Washington foreclosed any effort by the Filipino Government and successive

Filipino Presidents during the period under review from even giving the appearance of interest in joining the Non-Aligned. When Filipino representatives did participate in conferences on Asian issues, they were cautious in their statements and also quick to take issue with any serious criticism of the United States.

The Philippine Government was not attracted by the non-aligned movement and sought to defend its close relations with the United States in every possible way. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India convened an Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947. Anastacio de Castro was the Filipino delegate to the Conference. In the course of his speech he mentioned that his country's attitude toward the United States was one of "affection and gratitude" and then went on to defend the U.S.-Philippine Trade Agreement which had been criticized by the Indian press as "dollar imperialism".<sup>8</sup> Carlos P. Romulo represented the Philippines in

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<sup>8</sup> New York Times, 3 April 1947. President Roxas, who had diligently worked to persuade his countrymen to accept the "parity" rights, pointed out that without good relations with the United States and the latter's support and assistance "our prospects (of growth) would be bleak and grim". See, Important Speeches, Messages and Pronouncements of President Manuel Roxas (Manila, 1947), p.121.

another New Delhi Conference of Asian countries that was held in January 1949 to discuss the Indonesian situation. During the proceedings Nehru floated a suggestion for establishing a machinery for regional cooperation. Nehru's critical views on Western countries and their policies and programmes were well-known. Filipino participation in a regional association under India's leadership was bound to affect Manila's relationship with Washington. Perhaps to prevent Nehru from taking the leading role in the formation of regional association Romulo came up with his own suggestion for the creation of an "Asiatic Organization". There was no meeting of minds in the Conference and the idea of forming a regional organisation could not materialise.

#### Pan-Asiatic Tendencies

Washington suspected the development of Pan-Asiatic tendencies in the New Delhi Conferences of late 1940s. The American policymakers did not seem to have been convinced by Nehru's assertion that the purpose of the Conference was not to launch an anti-Western movement.<sup>9</sup>

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9 Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches, September 1946 to May 1949 (Delhi, 1949), vol.1, p.303.

Washington wanted that some of its Asian allies should exert a moderating influence on the proceedings that were likely to be dominated by speeches on colonialism and imperialism. The Filipino delegate did not disappoint Washington. Washington's concern emanated from the fact that Asian nationalism was directed primarily against its European allies, and not against its principal adversary, the Soviet Union. Washington's concerns and the Filipino responsiveness were to persist for several years beyond the period covered in the present work. When Djakarta convened a conference of Afro-Asian countries at Bandung in 1955, the United States took some positive steps to "influence" the proceedings of the Bandung Conference for "free world" causes.<sup>10</sup> Only seven months ago some members of the "free world" including the United States and its two Asian allies, the Philippines and Thailand, had concluded a Treaty that had given birth to South East Asia Treaty Organization or SEATO. Included in the Treaty was a Pacific Charter on insistence of the Philippines and

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10 Secret, Progress Report on US Policy Toward Southeast Asia by the Operations Coordinating Board, 24 August 1955, National Security Council Report (14), Declassified Documents of the US Government, BLPES Library, London.

backing of the United States. The Charter mentioned, among other things, the right of peoples to "self-determination". American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was later proud to declare that it was clear that the United States and its allies were seeking the welfare of the Asian people and that they were not promoting "colonialism".<sup>11</sup> Washington gave the green signal to Manila and Bangkok at the SEATO meeting of 26 February 1955 indicating that there would be no objection to their participation in the Bandung Conference.<sup>12</sup> And then Dulles asked the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Foreign Ministers of the Philippines and Thailand to take a "nice little message" to Bandung. The message was: "...we are all dedicated to this principle of independence and self-determination ...and we want you to back us".<sup>13</sup> According to M.S. Venkataramani the "three wise men" of SEATO promptly

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11 Department of State Bulletin, 27 September 1954, vol.31, no.796, p.432.

12 Ibid., 7 March 1955, vol.32, no.819, p.373.

13 Quoted in M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan (New Delhi, 1982), p.355.

said that it was a "pretty smart idea".<sup>14</sup> The administration of Ramon Magsaysay instructed its delegation to oppose any move in the Conference that would endorse Communist China's admission to the United Nations, call for renouncing the military agreements with Western Powers and adopt Nehru's Panch Sheel -- the famous five formula for peaceful co-existence among nations.<sup>15</sup> During the course of the conference the Philippine delegation did what was expected of it. It vehemently criticised communism and openly supported the policies of the United States Government.<sup>16</sup> As has been argued earlier this was exactly the sort of performance which Washington had expected of every Filipino administration since 1946 and what it had assiduously trained them for. In re-appraising the issue one hopes Filipino scholars will pose the question of whether vital and long-term interests of their country and its dignity as a sovereign nation were promoted by the record of performances.

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14 Ibid., p.356.

15 For details see, J.L. Vellut, The Asian Policy of the Philippines, 1954-61 (Canberra, 1965).

16 For details see, George McTurman Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, New York, 1956).

The writings of American commentators on this era indicate their general satisfaction over the gains accrued to their country as a result of Washington's policies towards the Philippines.

### "Me-too" Reaction

A couple of months after the New Delhi conference of 1949 a secret Policy Planning Staff Paper on South-east Asia laid down a clear-cut policy to deal with emerging proposals of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. It stated:

We should avoid at the outset urging an area organization, our effort should initially be directed toward collaboration on joint or parallel action and then, only as a pragmatic and desirable basis for intimate association appears, should we encourage the area to move step by step toward formal organization, we should not give the impression of attempting to thwart such a move but should go along with them while exerting a cautiously moderating influence....

In order to minimize suggestions of American imperialist intervention, we should encourage the Indians, Filipinos and other Asian states to take the public lead in political matters. Our role should be the offering of discreet

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support and guidance....<sup>17</sup>

The idea of offering "discreet support and guidance" to Asian initiatives for regional cooperation continued to be mentioned in government agency reports, official memoranda and in the reports prepared on the subject by the National Security Council in years to come. However, when Filipino President Elpidio Quirino showed considerable enthusiasm to form a Pacific Pact on the line of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Washington was not happy over his taking such an initiative. Washington particularly did not like Quirino's inclusion of President Chiang Kai-shek of Taiwan and President Syngman Rhee of South Korea in his proposed pact. Quirino's proposal was interpreted by American officials as an instinctive "me-too" reaction to the formation of NATO in April 1949.<sup>18</sup> At no point did they even remotely contemplate an Asian NATO. Washington had no

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17 Lot 64 D563, PPS 51, Policy Planning Staff Paper on US Policy Toward Southeast Asia, 29 March 1949, Files of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol.6, part-2.

18 820. 20/7-1549, Secret, Memorandum by the Policy Information Officer of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Director of the Office, 15 July 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, part-2.

interest in promoting any sort of pan-Asiatic tendencies. It was interested to move cautiously towards a regional organisation in which it could hold the strings and which could enhance its ability to advance its objectives in the region concerned. In the face of American coldness, Quirino soon dropped the proposal and advocated the formation of a Pacific Union in a speech delivered before the US Senate on 19 August 1949. Nobody paid any attention to Quirino. The propensity on the part of the Filipino President to put forth such proposals before receiving advance clearance and/or instruction from Washington was regarded as additional evidence of Quirino's unreliability. As has been detailed in Chapter Five, Quirino was dumped by Washington in 1953 and Magsaysay was helped to win the presidential election. The lesson was probably not lost on Quirino's successors.

A detailed discussion on SEATO is outside the scope of the present work, but it may be mentioned here that in sharp contrast to Washington's cold response to Quirino's proposals for regional cooperation, Magsaysay, Quirino's successor, was only too willing to sign the US-sponsored Treaty that led to the establishment of SEATO in 1954.<sup>19</sup>

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19 For details see Venkataramani, n.13. Also see, George Modelski, ed., SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne and Sydney, 1962).

### The Japanese Peace Treaty

Washington accustomed itself to act as though the stated status of a Filipino President had not really changed when the Philippines shed its status as Commonwealth and assumed the role of an independent republic. This meant that Washington could not suffer, as indicated earlier, a Filipino President making an initiative in respect of any issue that the United States considered important. Such issues were to be "out of bounds" for a mere President of the Philippines. Thus Washington was greatly displeased <sup>when</sup> Quirino in his inaugural address on 30 December 1949 implied that he might consider according recognition to the People's Republic of China. He said: "We respect the right of our neighbours to choose freely their own system of government".<sup>20</sup> It was obviously made clear to him that such a thought ought not to be entertained by any Filipino and Quirino never again mentioned it.

When Washington decided to reverse its course and proceeded rapidly towards a Japanese Peace Treaty, it

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20 Man Mohini Kaul, The Philippines and Southeast Asia (New Delhi, 1978), p.48. Carlos P. Romulo told the author (M.M. Kaul) in an interview that Quirino was already thinking of extending recognition to China.

found Quirino and the Filipino people, in the words of a senior official of the State Department, "to take their medicine as little men". One of the major differences on political issues between the White House and the Malacanang Palace was the question of concluding a peace treaty with Japan. On account of its terrible experiences during the Japanese occupation the Philippine Government and people desired, understandably, that eventual peace treaty with Japan should not only ensure its security against future aggression but also provide for an equitable indemnity from Japan as war repatriations. At one point, the Quirino Government was said to have suggested that other allies should waive their claims against Japan to enable Tokyo to pay the claimed amount first to the Filipinos.<sup>21</sup> Washington however wanted Japan should "survive" and prosper as a member of the "free world". Nations should learn lessons taught by the Treaty of Versailles. The United States was "concerned with the wrongs done by Japan" during the war years, but it thought of "future"

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21 Secret, Memorandum for the President, by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 7 August 1951, White House Central File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library. This Memorandum was approved by the President on the day of its submission.

as well.<sup>22</sup> A peaceful Japan cooperating with the United States will be to the advantage of the Philippines. In essence, the United States wanted the Philippines to agree to participate and sign the peace treaty. Washington, however, had switched to a policy of a "soft" peace treaty with Japan to be concluded with the minimum possible delay. Washington's course was influenced by the outbreak of the Korean War and calculations of future security requirements in the Pacific for which the cooperation of a rejuvenated Japan was deemed important. American policymakers now had little patience with the persistent Filipino questions relating to their indemnity claims. The rationalizations were offered in profusion to the Filipino President and Government. Quirino chafed at the situation in which he found himself; if he were to meekly go along with what Washington demanded, he would undoubtedly disappoint or even antagonize large section of the Filipino population who still remembered the horrors of Japanese invasion and occupation. The only recourse open to him was to break out of the secrecy in which the discussion with the United States had been concluded. The Philippine

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22 Ibid.

Embassy in Washington, leaked the full text of the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty in July 1951. It generated intense emotional reaction among the Filipino people. Dulles, the Chief architect of the treaty, was "furious".<sup>23</sup> The Deputy Director of the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Affairs, John F. Melby, wrote to Ambassador Myron Cowen:

...somehow the Philippines must understand that however unfair and unjust this (Treaty) may seem to them...their own interests will best be served by taking their medicine like little men.<sup>24</sup> (Emphasis added).

The medicine was duly administered and the Government of the Philippines was made to swallow it. One phrase in Melby's letter gives a clue to Washington's behaviour in this as in several other issues. Melby had no doubt that the Filipino people should "in their own interest" take the medicine represented by the Treaty. This represented the intriguing conviction on the part of many US policymakers at this time that they knew much better than the concerned natives what the real interests of the nation were.

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23 Secret, Personal Letter from John F. Melby to Ambassador Myron Cowen, 13 July 1951, Papers of John F. Melby, Philippine File, Cowen-Melby Correspondence, (June-July) 1951, Box 8, Truman Library.

24 Ibid.

Under American pressure the Quirino administration signed the Japanese Peace Treaty on 8 September 1951. However, the controversy over the reparation question continued until 1956 when the Philippine Senate ratified the Japanese Reparation Agreement and the Peace Treaty.

### The Korean War

The Korean War started on 25 June 1950. President Harry S. Truman ordered U.S. air and naval forces on 27 June to help defend South Korea from the North Korean communist aggression. On the same day the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution, proposed by the United States, asking the member nations to provide South Korea with "all necessary assistance to repel the armed invasion and restore international peace and safety in the region".<sup>25</sup> In response to the resolution, sixteen member countries of the United Nations contributed their troops and forty-one countries sent military equipment and other supplies to South Korea. While the American

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25 Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War (Seoul, 1973), p.343.

contribution constituted about 90 per cent of the troops, military equipment and other supplies,<sup>26</sup> Washington saw great importance in having the war viewed as a UN operation. Since Washington justified its involvement in the war to the American people on the ground of the danger of communist expansionism in Asia, it faced the uncomfortable task of responding to likely questions from its own citizenry on the participation in the war effort of the Asian countries themselves that supposedly faced imminent danger from the communists. The only Asian countries that could be persuaded to respond to Washington's call for military participation in the war against the communists in Korea were the Philippines and Thailand. The Philippines and Thailand were the only Asian countries to send a modest number of troops to fight the war.<sup>27</sup> The U.S. Eighth Army provided

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26 For details see Norman D. Levin and Richard L. Sneider, Korea in Post-War U.S. Security Policy, in Sung-joo Han, ed., After One Hundred Years: Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations (Seoul, 1982).

27 Manila sent 1,369 soldiers to Seoul in September 1950. The number of Filipino soldiers came down to 1,143 in 1951 and further increased to 1,494 in 1952. The soldiers returned to their country in 1955. See, US Senate, 91st Congress, Session Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments, Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: The Republic of the Philippines (Washington, D.C., 1969), p.36.

"logistical support" to the Philippine troops at a total cost of \$47,907,630.40.<sup>28</sup> The Philippines was thus involved in a war several thousands mile away from its territory and suffered some casualties. Its contribution of troops did not give it any voice in the conduct of the war or in the formulation of policies on the timings and circumstances under which the war would be ended. The Filipino people had not demanded any right to participating in such a war. They were led into it by their leaders who were amenable to external pressure. The pattern thus established was to be repeated again with the Philippines becoming a participant in America's war in Vietnam.

#### Melby-Erskine Mission

As has already been pointed out in the previous chapter, the Korean war brought about a drastic change in the American perception of and policy toward Southeast Asia as a whole. Immediate attention was given to the problem of communist insurgency in friendly Asian countries including that of in the Philippines.

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28 Ibid.

Washington despatched a Joint State Defence MDAP Survey Mission to Southeast Asia which reached Manila on 16 September 1950. It was headed by John F. Melby and Major General G.B. Erskine. The purpose of the mission was to recommend measures in order to deal with the deteriorating law and order situation which was aggravated by the Hukbalahap insurgency in Central Luzon and other areas. According to the Philippine military sources there were about 9,980 active Huks and that there were plans to recruit about 55,000 more members for the active units.<sup>29</sup>

The Mission attributed the difficulty in dealing with the Huks to the existence of a "woefully inefficient" Philippine Constabulary and a considerable amount of corruption in the government machinery and to some extent in the "armed forces".<sup>30</sup> Melby and Erskine also felt that the military problems in the Philippines were "complementary to the other problems" such as poor economic conditions and believed that the Bell Economic

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29 Secret, Summary Report No.4, by Military Group Joint MDAP Mission to Southeast Asia, 27 September 1950, Melby-Chow File, Papers of John F. Melby, Truman Library.

30 Ibid.

Survey Mission (which also visited the Philippines around the same time) would "recommend appropriately" measures to remedy the economic ills of the country and financial problems of the Government.<sup>31</sup> General Erskine while recommending military assistance in the form of providing appropriate equipment and other necessary supplies to the Philippines to tackle the insurgency problem, also suggested the necessity of "a thorough revamping in the entire approach of the Philippine Army toward its own problem".<sup>32</sup> Since the mission's visit was to be followed by the initiation of a military assistance programme, Manila tended to regard the implementation of its recommendations as solemn obligations. If Washington desired reorganization of the police and the military--key components in any developing country--Manila was willing to bring about the changes under US guidance and with US advisors supervising the changes. In his study on the American Role in Pakistan, M.S. Venkataramani

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31 Secret, Letter from John F. Melby (Chairman of the Joint State-Defence MDAP Mission to Southeast Asia) to Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee, 13 October 1950, Melby-Chow File, Papers of John F. Melby, Box 10, Truman Library.

32 Ibid.

brings out the great importance that Washington attached to having a reliable man as defence secretary and also the right man as the commander-in-chief in that country. In the Philippines in the reorganization recommended by Melby-Erskine Mission was implemented. Ramon Magsaysay came to be appointed to the potentially crucial post of Defence Minister in Quirino's cabinet. The Secretary of State was then able to boast to the President of the United States in a confidential memorandum that Washington had "successfully expended some money and much time...to situate Magsaysay, both politically and militarily in a decisive position...." The Philippine Armed Forces were soon reorganized in December 1950. The Service Command was established. The remaining commands were named the Philippine Army, the Philippine Constabulary, the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. A General Staff Organisation took charge of all the commands. The chief military striking force was to be provided by the Army and the Constabulary was to assist the Army in dealing with insurgency and performing police functions.<sup>33</sup> President Quirino then appointed an American Air Force Officer, Edward Lansdale, as his military advisor. On Lansdale's suggestion, as has been pointed out earlier,

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33 DRF Information Paper No.410, n.6.

Ramon Magsaysay was made the Minister of Defence in 1951.

### Mutual Defence?

In addition to the steps taken to deal with internal security problems in the Philippines, the United States also signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with the latter with a view to warning the communists and assuring the Filipinos. The Philippines was the first country in Asia with which Washington signed such a treaty which was to remain in force indefinitely, unless either party would choose to terminate it one year after notice had been given to the other. In accordance with a provision in the Treaty an armed attack on either of the parties in the Pacific area would be dealt with according to their "constitutional processes" and would not call for automatic retaliatory measures as in the case of an attack on a member nation of NATO. The Quirino administration signed the treaty but remained apparently unhappy about the language and the essence of the treaty. The Philippine Government continued to insist on a more direct and clear American commitment to the security of the Philippine Islands. That wish was

never fulfilled. In the years that followed there were assurances given from time to time to the Filipinos, but there involved no constitutionally binding commitment on the United States.

However, during the period reviewed after the attainment of independence by the Philippines, that country did not encounter military aggression by any international source. That could be cited as a net plus for the sort of relationship that the Philippines had established with the United States. But the relationship also involved the looming presence of the United States' influence, sometime governing the actions of successive Filipino Governments. As one Filipino politician bewailed that American advisors "are present in every branch of the National administration. They prepare our budget, they make our economic planning. They even prepare the President's message to Congress dealing with economic policies".<sup>34</sup> It was the price paid by the Filipinos for the relationship that was rather high in terms of the benefits received.

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34 Quoted in Philippine Repression and Resistance (London, 1981), p.79. This paper was prepared by the KSP or Filipino People's Committee which was appointed by the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal.

The pathos and tragedy inherent in such a situation is graphically depicted by M.S. Venkataramani who also happens to be the teacher and mentor of the present researcher:

"It is a tough world for the poor man and for the weak country. Both must survive by their wits. Circumstances, real or imagined, may force one from time to time to fall into a state of dependence on another. Those on whom one has to depend may tend to view one as a pawn for their purposes. This is the ever-present danger in an unequal relationship. Leaders of weak countries are constantly confronted by the dilemmas posed by such a situation.

The quality of the leadership assumes critical importance. A weak country that has wise, able, shrewd, and far-sighted leaders--men who have the political skill to hold the willing support of their people--is able to go through such experiences without great damage to its dignity, integrity and vital interests. But where the leaders are deficient in such qualities, the country and its people may suffer gravously. If the leaders are self-serving and, therefore, manipulable by external forces, their actions may push the country to the ignominious position of being the pawn of the stronger, external element. Such leaders--upstarts having the mentality of pawns--can generally remain in power only by deceiving their people in the initial phase and resorting to authoritarian rule when the deception begins to wear off.

The leaders of the strong country are by no means unaware of the adverse implications of their course for the people of the distant country. They make no effort whatsoever to

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enlighten their own people concerning such possibilities even while filling the air with pious and high-sounding platitudes. Thus in the strong country too deception of the people takes place on a significant scale. They too pay a price--but it is often very small when compared with the heavy price paid by the people of the weak country."