The hardships which the workers faced in their homes and mills brought them into confrontation with their employers. But, at the same time, it also gave rise to sectarian feelings in them in their defensive bid to cope with their new lives. Feelings along the lines of caste, region and religion were prevalent. Their continuing links with the countryside also helped in maintaining their old-world loyalties. Religion was a major factor in their lives. It provided them refuge from hostile atmosphere, consoled them in adverse conditions, also gave them a hope for the future. At the same time, however, it provided an opportunity for the communalists to channelise these deep religious feelings into communal ones. That was precisely what happened in Bombay in 1893 when cow-protection propaganda and communal speeches and counter-speeches played on the religious sentiments of the people and led to a major conflagration involving a large section of city's population and the large majority of the textile workers. In the following account, we shall deal with the riot of 1893, its causes and effects on the psyche of the people.

Hindu-Muslim Breakdown in the Population:

The two main religious groups in Bombay were Hindus and Muslims. The Parsis and Christians, though signifi-

1 In the following account I shall use the term Hindu and Muslim. It is not because these identities are
cant formed very small minorities; and Jews and Jains and Buddhists were numerically insignificant. The percentages of the Hindus and Muslims in the total population of Bombay were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Hindus</th>
<th>Percentage of Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>773,196</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>821,764</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>776,006</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>979,445</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,175,914</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This shows that the Muslims were never more than one-fifth of the total population of Bombay. But their distribution was not even and there were localities in which exclusively and permanently valid.; they could never be. The people had to several identities, e.g., Marathas, Kamathis, Bhayyas, Seedis, Pathans, Juhals, mill workers, dock labourers, etc. These terms are also not used as academically convenient categories; that would be presumptuous. But at that moment, during the riots, all identities tended to get dissolved into two forms - Hindus and Muslims, i.e., along communal lines. It is in this sense that the use of these terms are justified.

Cont'd.. f.n. 1

2 Sometimes the religious groups like Jains and Buddhists registered themselves as Hindus.

3 Census, 1921, Cities of Bombay Presidency, pt. I. For locality-wise breakdown, see Appendix XI.
Muslims tended to congregate while there were some other localities in which the Hindus formed as much as 90 per cent of the population.

The Muslim population was preponderant in four sections—Chakla, Umarkhadi, Khara Talao and second Nagpada—where they formed more than sixty per cent of the population while in all the other sections the Hindu population was more numerous. The following table shows the percentage of Muslim population to the total population of these four sections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2 Percentage of Muslim Population to the Total Population in Muslim-Dominated Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umarkhadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khara Talao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Nagpada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(For absolute figures see Appendix-XI)

There was further concentration within each section, and hence the emergence of some Muslim "mohollas".

4 Calculated from various Censuses.
5 Jim Wassen, "Power in the Bombay "Moholla", 1904–15; An Initial Exploration into the World of the Indian Urban Muslim", in South Asia, 1976, Vol. VI: "Three of the nine circles in Chakla in 1901, for example, had very low Muslim percentages of 7.8,
The majority of the Muslims were as much immigrants to the city as the majority of the Hindus, as is shown by the relatively less number of women to the men:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because segregations had occurred in other areas the percentages of Muslims to the total population of the mill areas were lower than over-all city average as is shown below:

6 Census, 1921, o.cit., p. 15.
7 Calculated from various Censuses. Comparable figures for 1891 are not available.
Table 4.4
The Percentage of Muslims to the total Population in the Mill Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Byculla</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadwadi</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazagaon</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parel</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewri</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sion</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahim</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worli</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average percentage in the mill areas: 9.8 9.9 10.4 10.1

Though very small, these figures were not less than the relative proportion of Muslims in the total workforce. In 1881, for example, Muslims constituted only 8.13 per cent of the total number of cotton mill workers and by 1921 this had gone down to 5.15 per cent. (Table 4.5).

The Muslim workers could be found in all departments of the mill and there was "little trouble getting Hindu and Muslim weavers to work together".\(^8\) So generally, there was at least no overt tension between the Hindu and Muslim workers in the mill. The situation, however, became diffe-

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\(^8\) Morris, ibid., p. 79.
Table 4.5
Cotton Mill Workers According to Religion
Ratio of the Muslim Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total No. of cotton mill workers</th>
<th>Total No. of Hindu workers</th>
<th>Ratio of Hindu workers to total workers (%)</th>
<th>Total No. of Muslim workers</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>25,241</td>
<td>22,821</td>
<td>90.41</td>
<td>2,053</td>
<td>8.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>118,512</td>
<td>104,400</td>
<td>88.09</td>
<td>12,575</td>
<td>10.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>117,110</td>
<td>110,065</td>
<td>93.98</td>
<td>6,032</td>
<td>5.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During these riots community identities took precedence over all the other identities leading to conflicts along communal lines.

9 Computed from Censuses. Comparable figures for 1891 and 1901 are not available.

The Gazetteer, op.cit., p. 226, says that "of the mill operative population about three-quarters are Hindus". These figures are impressionistic and not based on any data. There are, however, another piece of evidence which supports my statistical conclusion. Morris, quoting a BMOA Survey in 1940, says that "Muslims, the only other large group distinguished, made up 5.2 per cent of total mill workers". Morris, op.cit., p. 75. This figure is almost equal to the above figure for 1921 for all the workers.

10 During these riots community identities took precedence over all the other identities leading to conflicts along communal lines.
test hesitation in ascribing "the origin of the ill-feeling between the two races to the anti-cow-killing agitation of Hindus".\(^{11}\)

But, on 22nd August, 1893, after the riot was over, one P.B. Joshi wrote to the Secretary that the "real cause of the riot is ... not the cow-killing agitation, but the Probhas Pattan affair".\(^{12}\) And the British Government, acting diplomatically, "observed" that "while the cow-protection movement has undoubtedly been pushed of late with growing vigour, the movement itself is not a new one". It also wanted "to avoid gratuitously wounding the feelings of Hindus", and so "the Governor in Council hesitates to adopt the opinion that the cow-protection movement is the principal cause of these riots", The Governor in Council therefore decided that the main cause of "the outbreak was the infection spread by the riots which had broken out in other parts of India, and especially those at Prabhas Pattan, and the uneasy feeling generated through them amongst Muhammedans that Muhammadanism and the followers of that faith generally were suffering at the hands of the Hindus".\(^{13}\)

It is true that the cow-protection movement was not

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11 J.D., vol. 281/94 (henceforth referred to as Police Report or PR), p. 2. MSA.

12 J.D., vol. 194, p. 155. MSA.

13 Telegram from Her Majesty's Secretary of State of India, dated, November 17, 1893. in PR, p. 21.
a new one. But whenever and wherever it was pushed with "growing vigour" it started a process of communalisation which culminated into a single or multiple riots. 14

In Bombay, the society for preservation of cows and buffaloes, named Gaurakshak Sabha, was first established on 28th July, 1887. Its President was not a Hindu but a very prominent Parsi millowner, Sir Dinshaw Maneckji Petit, who had been awarded the Knighthood previously. Of two Secretaries, one was Parsi and another Hindu. 15

The intent and purpose of this society, apart from the protection of cow, are not known. Most probably they did not have any other motives. The presence of the persons who were very "honourable" in government records, 16 seemed to prove that. This society held meetings in different parts of the Presidency, like Ahmedabad, Poona etc., apart from Bombay, in which speeches were made to mobilise support to stop the killing of the cows. In the beginning the nature of the movement was not communal as was shown by the support given to it by newspapers like Kathiawar Times which was edited by a Muslim, in its issue of April

14 See Gyan Pandey, "Rallying Around the Cow: The Sectarian Strifes in Bhojpuri Region", in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies II.
16 Ibid. The report says that "amongst prominent supporters are Mr Kavasji M. Shroff, Mr Javerilal, Mr Malabari, Dr Deshmukh" etc.
Whether the nationalists found it as an already existing base to mobilise support for their cause, or whether some of them tried to use this religious symbol for their anti-government propaganda, like Tilak's Ganapati and Shivaji festivals later on, is not known. But sometimes anti-British sentiments did appear. One Shriram Swami went about lecturing in Poona, Sholapur and Bombay from the platform of this movement and it was reported that, on 14th July 1889 in Sholapur, he said that "from want of the unity between Hindus and Muhammadans the whole wealth of the country is carried to England". He, however, ended his speech "making an appeal" to stop the kine-killing. It cannot be ascertained whether this "appeal" was just a postscript or genuine feeling. The fact remains that he was also making anti-British propaganda through this medium.

One Police report goes to the absurd extent of stating that the entire cow-protection movement was the handiwork of the young generation of Hindus who visited Europe and "imbibe their hatred for the British from the foreigners" and "their vanity is equal to their political cheek and they look upon the British as aliens who feed upon and keep them from their birth-right". It asserted that the "cow-protection movement was only a means to an end."
This movement worked the other way also. While some nationalists took advantage of it to disseminate nationalist thinking, there were also some zealots who carried on their propaganda for cow-protection from the nationalist platform. In a meeting of representatives of Indian National Congress held at Jalgaon on 28th July 1889, Chintamanro Vakil of Bhusaval, gave a lecture on the protection of cow.  

In another instance, during the convention of the Congress in Bombay in December, 1889, the Nagpur Cow-Protection Association distributed thousands of pamphlets entitled "Prarthana" exhorting the people to agitate against cow-killing. In fact, sometimes the cow-protection and anti-British propaganda got so mixed up that there were some who blamed the Congress for the riots.  

Though sometimes Hindu nationalist and religious sentiments merged, the nationalists failed to dominate this particular movement. In fact, there is no evidence that they even tried that. The more religious and fanatic elements took over the movement in later years. There were no more talks of the drain of wealth or the birth-right. Now the cow became the centre of everything. It was not a "means to an end" but an end in itself.  

20 Home (Spl.), op.cit., p. 374.  
21 Ibid., p. 375.  
22 Letter by Ameer Mahomed Khan to Bombay Gazette, p. 42. (This volume of BG is kept in the J.D. files, op.cit., the letter appears at the end of it).
There were much wider links of these cow-protection bodies all over India. So we learn that one Shriram Swami Alanangi was sent from Allahabad to lecture about cow-protection in Bombay on December 18 and 28, 1889. Similarly, one Jairam was sent by Bombay Gaurakshak Sabha to lecture in Ahmedabad on January 27, 1892. Such instances were very common during this period.

Frantic activities were going on in the entire Bombay Presidency on behalf of cow-protection movement. Similar bodies had sprung up in various places like Sholapur, Nagpur, Poona, Kolhapur, Satara, Khandesh etc., either on their own initiative or fostered by emissaries from other places. And although these activities had not "gained much hold" as yet, the official circles were worried about the "feeling of unrest and religious antagonism" which this agitation was causing and had started talking about "watchfulness" and "precautionary measures".

The meetings and propaganda of the Bombay Gaurakshak Sabha went on as before. On April 25, 1890, a big meeting of the Sabha was held at the Mulji Jaitha Market. It announced that the subscriptions collected from 2nd August, 1887 to 30th June 1888 was Rs. 11,932. The firm of Morarji Gokuldas presented 83,000 sq. yards of land in Chembur for

23 Home (Spl.), op.cit., p. 375.
24 Ibid., p. 378.
25 Ibid., p. 171.
construction of cattle sheds. Again on September, 1890, a public meeting was organised in which Swami Achutanand gave lecture on the protection of cows.

Though not much evidence is available, it is perhaps about this time that the cow-protection agitation was undergoing an imperceptible change. Its meetings became more frequent. Cooperation from societies in the other parts of the Presidency was sought and given. Money was collected from wealthy people. A change in the method also came about. Earlier this society had satisfied itself with holding the meetings and distributing the pamphlets and handbills. But now it started somewhat more active mass contact programme by collecting signatures and selling and distributing pictures which made more appeal to the illiterate masses. The religious movement now acquired a communal overtone. The cow was no longer an end in itself. It again became a means to an end. But now the end was different.

In January 1891, pictures and illustrations of cow "supplicating for protection were on sale at a pice a piece in Bombay". 26 R.H. Vincent, the Commissioner of Police, wrote that "pictures and pamphlets illustrating the sanctity of cow and the sin of slaughtering it were also sold and distributed in thousands all over the Presidency, but chiefly in Bombay". 27

26 Ibid., p. 376.
27 PR, p. 8.
Another more sinister picture was that of a "cow looking quite "gharib" ... being milched by a handsome matron (in the dress ... of a Dakshini Brahmini). A plump healthy child ... playing near. In the background a Brahmin in a reverent posture, worshipping the cow, with on the other side a Mahomedan "Mlechcha" of a butcher, with a hangdog, villainous face, brandishing a long knife and looking sinisterly at the cow".28

Such pictures and posters would obviously do the intended work. In August 1891, one Abdul Rahman of Bombay distributed a Urdu pamphlet in Ahmedabad "strongly attacking the Gaurakshak Sabha and stating that the agitation was only meant to excite the Muhammadans and to cause ill-will throughout the country".29

The cow-protection propaganda, however, went on apace. On November 1891, one Jivraj Jetha collected about 3,000 signatures to be presented to the Hindu Council members.30 On 7th November, 1891, the Secretary of the Gaurakshak Sabha asked the Police Commissioner for the permission to parade the cows on the roads in Bombay after the general meeting to be held on 8th November. The Commissioner declined to grant the permission. The meeting, however, was held before an audience of about 4,000 people and some cows were brought to the meeting.31

28 J.D., op.cit., p. 158.
29 Home (Spl.), op.cit., p. 377.
30 Ibid., p. 377.
31 Ibid., pp. 377-8.
In March 1892, six persons from Sholapur arrived in Bombay "to solicit funds for the purchase of cows which had fallen into the hands of butchers in consequence of famine in that district". By the end of September 1892, the Nagpur Gorakshak Mandali sent four delegates to Bombay to collect "Rs. 60,000 in aid of the Nagpur Fund". Pandit Keshav Narain Vaidya from Kolhapur published 25,000 copies of four pamphlets on cow-protection and distributed most of them in Bombay in September. A meeting of the Bombay Sabha, held on 29th October, 1892, circulated a printed appeal which exhorted the people to contribute to the Nagpur Fund.

In April, 1893, the Sabha again wanted to take a procession of thousands of cows through the streets of Bombay, but again the Police Commissioner did not permitted. Despite that, big meetings were held on 15th and 16th April. "On the former date", the Police Report says, "there was an immense procession, about 12,000 people of Hindus, chiefly Kachis, with a sprinkling of Parsis, in the quarter of the town inhabited by them. Houses were covered with flags & c. Some 200 milch cows gaily decorated were collected in Madhav Bagh, and a great many speeches were made in favour of the movement. On the 16th

32 Ibid., p. 378.
33 Ibid., p. 378.
34 Ibid., p. 378.
35 FR, p. 3.
a sort of regular meeting was held in Madhav Bagh, which was attended by some 20 delegates and about 15,000 persons. Addresses were delivered and prizes were bestowed on the owners of the best-fed cows. Medals were also given to the lecturers who had worked zealously in the cause. Many Hindu shops were closed in the honour of the event, and a theatrical performance took place in the New Alfred theatre in the aid of Gorakshak Mandal. The principal movers in the matter wanted very much to parade all the cows they could get hold of in procession through the streets, but they allowed themselves to be persuaded that it would be better not to do so in the town, where there were so many people not in favour of the cow-protection society. 36

It was in April, 1893 that the Police Commissioner thought that riot would take place because "feelings were running very high indeed". 37

In July, another cow-protection society named Gau Palan Updeshak Mandal, with Lakhmidas Khimji as its President, came into being. It took even more extreme position and its "leader and members displayed still greater virulence in the dissemination of their views". It also brought out a paper named Gau Updeshak. 38

Now both the societies started competing with each other in taking more active step to stop the killing of

36 Home (Spl.), op. cit., p. 380.
37 PR, op. cit., p. 3.
38 Ibid., p. 3.
the cows. So while the "agents of the Gorakshak Mandali (or Sabha) and their friends took occasion on the night before the Bakr-Id to go about the town and ascertain in what places the Muhammadans intended on the following morning to kill cows" in order to prevent it, the Gau Palan Updehsak Mandal "obtained a large plot of land at Lonavala, where they intended to keep all cattle intercepted and purchased by their agents enroute to Bombay." The societies also tried "to enlist the sympathies of several Hindu constables" and sometimes succeeded. In such atmosphere even minor incidents had potential for disturbance. So, when a restive cow, which was being escorted to the cattlehouse by a Muslim constable fell into a ditch and died, "there was every likelihood of a disturbance". People gathered and accused the constable of maliciously murdering the cow and did not allow the carcass to be removed for 16 hours.

Such activities and incidents were bound to have their impact sooner or later. In the minds of the middle-class Muslims in Bombay, some sort of sectarian sentiment was already injected during the late 1870s and 1880s by the Anjuman-i-Islam, a "non-religious yet communal body".

39 Home (Spl.), op.cit., p. 380.
40 PR, p. 3.
41 Ibid., p. 3; (Home (Spl.), op.cit., pp. 380-1.
42 Home (Spl.), p. 381.
The issues centred around Turkey and Khilafat had started to create Pan-Islamic sentiments. But these things were mainly limited to the middle-class Muslims. The cow-protection propaganda, however, reached down to the lower class Muslims that they would be deprived of their cheap and chief article of food. Some zealots of the Sabha also went into the Muslim-dominated areas and preached their creed, despite warning from several quarters. All this was slowly preparing the ground for a conflagration by alienating both communities from each other and creating tension between them. In such an atmosphere came the news of the riots at Prabhas Pattan.

It is true that the news of riots from Rangoon, Bareilley, Azamgarh etc. had already been reaching the city and people's feelings were getting divided on them. But the physical proximity of Prabhas Pattan made it more possible for both the sides to carry on active propaganda and to arouse sectarian feelings. The riot in Prabhas Pattan (in the Muslim-ruled state of Junagarh) had occurred by the end of July, 1893, on the Muharrum Day in which many Hindus were said to be killed. Immediately after agitation had started in Bombay. On 30th July, 1893, Javerilal Yajnik spoke in a meeting of Hindus demanding "condign punishment for the offenders" and talked of

43 PR, p. 3.
44 Reported in Pioneer Quoted in BG, op. cit., p. 48.
"avenging justice." He said that "not only one of the most sacred temples dear to the Hindus had been defiled, but the holy Bithal of the god Shree Krishna was only polluted, innocent monks and religious ascetics... were, in violation of inter-communal laws, ruthlessly massacred."\(^{45}\)

The Muslims were not far behind. Aga Khan, at a counter meeting, talked about the killing of their co-religionists, desecration and destruction of their mosques by the Hindus. The atmosphere had become suddenly surcharged with passion.

Another campaign started in Bombay. The Hindus went around asking for subscriptions to get the punishment for the offenders, while the Muslims did the same thing among their co-religionists for the defence of the "innocents" who were said to be suffering at the "hands of the local (Hindu) authorities".\(^{46}\)

Both the cow-protection societies started propaganda work against the Muslims and collected money to get "the offenders punished". Dr Deshmukh of Gorakshak Sabha organised a public meeting at Thakurdwar of Maratha Hindus on this issue. Many others went around making inflammatory speeches. One Shivram Sudhale and Namyan Trimbak Vaidya went on one Sunday "from house to house

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45 Quoted by Pioneer; given in BG, p. 48.
46 PR, p. 3.
to urge people to sympathise with Prabhas Pattan sufferers". 47

There were many such instances. Thousands of rupees were collected, speeches were made denouncing Muslims, and exhortations were made to support the afflicted Hindus in Prabhas Pattan. Such meetings were held almost every day. In one meeting by Gau Palan Updeback Mandali, Lohanas, Banias and Bhattias "outbid each other in their subscriptions". 48

There were attempts to hold meetings among the mill workers also. We have evidence of one such meeting by Gau Palan Updeback Mandali. But when questioned by the authorities, Lakhimdas Khimji, Society's President, denied this. 49 But judging by the pace of propaganda, it was not unlikely that such meetings were held.

The Muslims were not sitting silent either. It was reported that "a large number of respectable Musalmans from Kalyan" arrived in Bombay during the Muharrum festival "complaining to their co-religionists and afterwards to (the Police Commissioner) that they had not received fair treatment at the hands of the local (Hindu) authorities". 50 Many Muslims in Bombay were also holding

48 PR, p. 3.
49 BG, op. cit., p. ii.
50 PR, p. 3.
meetings and collecting money to help the arrested Muslims in Prabhas Pattan. Their opinion was that "Hindus had circulated exaggerated reports, and succeeded in exciting the sympathies of their co-religionists in Bombay and subscribed large sume of money which would enable them to trump up charges against the Mahommedans".\textsuperscript{51} There were rumours that the Muslims were discussing this issue "at different mosques in the city", but the Police report denies any such happenings.\textsuperscript{52} On 10th August, however, there are definite reports of a large meeting convened "to arrange for the legal defence of the accused, and Rs. 12,000 were subscribed on the spot".\textsuperscript{53} On the morning of 11th also there was "a large meeting of Mahomedans especially (lower classes) ... at the house of Haji Kasam Haji Ismail .... About 1,000 persons who could not accommodated were standing from 7 to 8 in the streets, and it is rumoured that they were paid for the riot".\textsuperscript{54}

And in the afternoon of the 11th, the riot started.

\textbf{Events:}

It was city's third communal riot in the nineteenth

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{51} Pioneer; given in BG, p. 49.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{52} Home (Spl.), op.cit., p. 383.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{53} BG, p. 11; P2, p. 3.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{54} J.D., op.cit., p. 156.}
century. The first one was in 1851, when a Parsi journalist named Byramjee Ghandi had given a portrait of prophet Muhammad in his journal and the mobs were incited to a riot against the Parsis.\(^55\) The second one took place in 1874, again between Muslims and Parsis, when a Parsi named Rustomjee Jalbhoy made a reference to the prophet in his translation of the works of Washington Irving.\(^56\) But in none of the above two the magnitude and intensity of the riot was similar to that of 1893. It was because the Parsis were few in number and were limited in a few areas, while Hindus and Muslims were spread all over the city.

When the riot started, the Police was not exactly caught unawares. Since weeks past, rumours were afloat about the possibility of such a riot. The administration did not take much precautionary measures and "as Bakr-Id, Muharram and several Fridays passed without any disturbances",\(^57\) it was lulled into a false sense of security and order. Although there were strong rumours that the riot might start on the 11th August,\(^58\) not much arrange-

\(^{55}\) \textit{TOI}, August 12, 1893, reprinted in the J.D. vol. \textit{Ibid.}
\(^{56}\) \textit{Ibid.}
\(^{57}\) \textit{PR}, p. 1.
\(^{58}\) \textit{PR}, p. 3. On 10th August, in a meeting of Gau Palan Upeshak Mandali in Madhav Bagh, many speakers asked the Hindus to be prepared as the Muslims would create disturbances on 11th.
ments were made to meet such a contingency. And although some Policemen were posted near Juma Masjid, their number was grossly inadequate given the enormity of the problem.

When the worshippers went into the Masjid for prayers, they were not carrying any sticks or weapons. The only thing observed was that "the attendance of worshippers exceeded the usual number by about a thousand souls". But when the worshipper came out of the Masjid after prayer, many of them were carrying sticks etc. which lends credence to the opinion that the riot was pre-arranged.

Coming out of the Masjid at around 1.45 p.m. the Muslim mob, "despite the endeavours of the respectable members of their community", started shouting "Deen", and rushed towards the Hindu temple situated in the nearby Hanuman Lane. The Policemen posted there tried to restrict them and a fight ensued in which stones and other missiles were freely used. Some of the Policemen got injured. But, finally, with the arrival of the reinforcements, the rioters were repulsed.

As soon as they were driven away from this area, they spread out in various areas and along with many others started rioting there. Thus rioters could be seen

59 PR, p. 4. The following narrative is based on the Police Report (PR), Bombay Gazette (BG) and Times of India (TOI); all these were collected in Judicial Department, vol. 194, 1893.
in Bhendi Bazaar, all along Erskine Road, Null Bazaar Market, Falkland Road, Duncan Road, Jagjivan Keeka Street and Cowasjee Patel Tank Road. They attacked the passing Hindus and sometimes the others. Passing vehicles and tramcars were pelted with stones and "Infuriated mobs of Musalmans surged from street to street, carrying havoc and destruction in all directions. To trace the course of the tumult is beyond my powers, for the rioters seemed to be in every place at once". 60

The military was called. Many companies from Marine Battalion, 5th Bombay Infantry, Bombay Light Horse etc. were ordered. But even this did not prove much effective because when the rioters were "driven back and dispersed by the Police and Military from one locality, it was only to unite again in another and wreak their wanton rage on the hated Hindus and any who sought to hinder them. Wherever they went, their tactics were the same. Sticks and bludgeons were the weapons generally employed, and only too frequently with fatal results. Volleys of stones, broken files and other missiles were flung both from the streets and from the windows and tops of houses". 61

Many Hindus temples in Nissanpada, near Kumbharuda and other localities were desecrated. The rioters "broke
the idols and hurled them on to the roads, to be trodden under foot."\(^6\)

To the killing and desecration of religious places, another motive was soon added— that of loot. One pay clerk in the employment of G.I.F. Railway Company was assaulted and robbed of about Rs. 4,000 of Government money.\(^6\) Many shops in Bhendi Bazaar and other places were looted and their property destroyed.

It was only to be expected that the Hindus, among whom religious propaganda had been going on for some time and who were so preponderant in number, seeing their temples desecrated and destroyed, their co-religionists attack and their property looted, would retaliate. The retaliation came right on the first day. Within an hour of the original outbreak by Muslims, one Muslim conveyance driver was "brutally assaulted."\(^6\) On Falkland Road, Jagjivan Keeka Street and Duncan Road, the Hindu-tallimwallas fought pitched battle with the Muslim tallimwallas wounding many of the latter.\(^6\) Similarly in Arthur Road and Grant Road, several mobs of Hindus committed "retaliatory acts of violence."\(^6\) At Kamathipura, a large body of

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62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., BG, p. 2.
64 PR, p. 6.
65 BG, pp. 2-3.
66 PR, p. 6.
Hindus attacked the mosque in that area and intense fighting ensued. In Umarkhadi Road and neighbouring areas many mobs of Hindus attacked solitary Muslims and at Chinch Bandar, both parties fought pitched battles.

The mill-workers were also brought into the fray right on the first day, though their participation was still limited. In Chinpoogly, the Hindu mill-workers attacked the Muslim weavers only to be dispersed by the military, and "towards midnight of the 11th 300 Hindu mill-hands came out, bent on revenge, at the Arthur Road; but were kept back in their chawls with great difficulty."

While people from both communities attacked each other, desecrated temples and mosques, looted property, both of them "turned upon European and native Police and Military". Little regard was shown for the authority and the military fired in several instances killing many people. These incidents continued till midnight without stop. The Military Report says:

"No sooner was one district reduced to comparative quiet by the presence of troops, than fresh riots broke out beyond the spheres of existing patrols; and as darkness came on, the difficulty of watching long lines of streets with innumerable intersecting gullies increased."

67 BG, p. 5.
68 PR, p. 6; BG, p. 5.
69 PR, p. 6.
enormously. It was felt, therefore, that the force employed was insufficient, and urgent orders were despatched to Colaba for four field guns and the loyal North Lancashire Regiment to parade at once and proceed to Paydhuni.\(^{70}\)

This was on the first day. The second day, that is, Saturday, 12th August, brought the mill workers into the vortex of the riot. Though they were influenced by cow-protection propaganda and the Prabhas Pattan riot, the immediate cause of their participation seemed to be the riot in Bombay itself. On Saturday, the workers left their mills and threw stones at other mills to bring other workers out. This way, after sometime, all the mills were closed and more than one lakh workers were on the street. The majority being Maratha Hindus, they naturally took the side of the Hindus and started attacking and killing the Muslims. They did not pay the least heed to the persuasion of their employers to remain at work and dispersed in most of the northern parts of the city. While many of them were "carrying generally pieces of firewood, and attacked the Musalmans at Chinchpokli, Arthur and Parel Roads, Siwri, Mazagaon and the Vicinity, killing and wounding many",\(^{71}\) some of them went towards Mama Hajani, a mosque very sacred to the Muslims, situated on the rocks surrounded by water. They attacked the people

\(^{70}\) Quoted in PR, p. 13.

\(^{71}\) PR, p. 7.
inside the mosque with stones and "brought down a portion of it by means of thick long bamboo sticks".\footnote{72}{TOI, 14th August.}

On this day, most of the northern area were ruled by the workers. The \textit{TOI} reports: "Early in the morning at about 8 o'clock, they (the mill workers) took possession of the whole of the Girgaum Road, the Girgaum Block Road, and their adjacent localities, and ran about like mad fanatics, raving and crying out "Mahadev Ki Jeh", and belabouring, and in some cases murdering stray Mahomedans who happened to meet them in the streets. They attacked every shop owned by Mahomedans in these localities, and robbed and plundered right and left.... A strong party of mill-hands then attacked the mosque of the Borees in a by-lane called Mangalwady on the main Girgaum Road, and having brought out the doors and windows and furnitures, including even the cooking pots, of the mosque into the street, set fire to them, causing a great panic to the inhabitants of the locality".\footnote{73}{Ibid.}

When confronted by the Police or Military, the workers sometimes fought and at other times laid down their sticks only to pick them up after the withdrawal of the military. In one instance, being cornered by the military, a large body of mill workers laid down their
sticks and bludgeons. But as soon as the military withdrew, they picked them up and attacked the Pathans in a neighbouring locality. 74

These workers roamed around the railway lines attacking the Muslim employees at the stations, on the roads leading to Dadar desecrating mosques and at other places in the northern parts of the city all at once. They conducted these operations with much cleverness. The authorities found it hard to check them "for the rioters having learnt where the Military and Police guards were stationned, took advantage of this to select isolated spots for their operations and proceeded to murder and plunder such victims as they could find. The Police and troops were frequently unable to reach such places for some time; and the marauders were thus able to carry out their nefarious intentions with comparative impunity". 75 In one instance, when information was received that the workers "had attacked the Musjid situated in the compound of a bungalow known as the Nawaab of Beyla's house, now in the occupation of Mr Baji Cassum, 76 and a strong body of Police was despatched for the arrest of the offenders. Before the Police could get to the place, the mosque had been desecrated, and the Koran and other religious books and several

74 RG, pp. 7-8.
75 PR, p. 7.
76 He was the same person in whose building the meeting of Muslims was held on the morning of 11th.
odds and ends that were within the building were torn or broken to pieces".\footnote{TOI, August 14, 1893.}

Though, on Saturday, the field was held by the Hindus, the Muslims were not much far behind. In fact, in the early morning "a large band of Julhais, issuing from Madanpura, Ripon Road, with old knives, nails, razors and other weapon tied on the end of sticks, crossed the flats beyond the Byculla club, and severely injured a number of Hindus." They also created trouble at Duncan Road and Khoja Street, and "at the Junction of Don Tad and Paydhuni Roads they were throwing stones from three sides".\footnote{PR, p. 7.} In another instance, a Muslim burial party, consisting of 3 to 4 thousand men, turned violent and was fired upon by the military "killing half a dozen and wounding about forty or fifty".\footnote{PR, p. 8; BG, p. 6.} In yet another instance, the Julahas and others, in an attempt to rescue the arrested were fired upon and one got killed.\footnote{BG, p. 6.} In Khetwady and Girgaum, some of the Hindu temples were wrecked, in Arthur Crawford Market Hindu shopkeeper were attacked and at the Jackeria Masjid, the Police and military were attacked in which one Policeman got killed; two Hindu temples at Durga Devi and Falkland Road were destroyed.\footnote{BG, p. 7.}
At several places, both parties were engaged in desperate fightings. In Chinchpoogly, "a free fight had taken place between the two rival factions ... and there were eight men killed and about a hundred seriously injured."82 In Kamathipura and Northbrook Gardens "there were desperate contests between Kamathis and Julias".83 Several burial processions were attacked. In Islampura, fight took place between the "Chalee Chores" and the Hindu residents of that area in which many of the former were "mortally wounded".84

The mill workers were very active in these riots. They not only went to some other areas to attack the Muslims but also attacked their fellow workers who were Muslims. In one instance, there was a chawl on Parel Road, the upper storeys of which were occupied by poor Muslims. This whole row of houses "had been forced into a state of siege by the Hindoos all over the way, who armed with lathis, had come down in hundreds, driven the occupants into their quarters, and hurling volleys of stones at them to close every shutter, and hopelessly stand a siege".85 In another instance, many Muslim workers wanted to leave the mill areas and go to Nagpada which was dominated by Muslims and they had to be escorted by the Police

82 TOI, August 14.
83 FR, p. 7.
84 TOI, August 14.
85 Ibid.
through besieging Hindu workers. In another incident, one Abdul Aziz, carrying food for his relative at Kaiser-e-Hind Mill, was killed near the mill. Such incidents were quite common. Not only were the Hindu mill workers attacking and killing their fellow Muslim workers, but Muslim talimwallas were attacking to Hindu talimwallas, Julahas from U.P. were murdering their own Hindu countrymen and vice versa.

Loot was one main motive now induced into the riots. Property was looted from religious places, shops and private houses. Passers-by were also robbed and sometimes the loot became the principal motive transcending all the others. The Police report says that so "little regard was felt by the Budmash element for their religious principles ... that the shops of both Musalman and Hindu were robbed by members of their own race and creed." On August 13, some Hindu mill workers learnt that some Muslims had been given protection by a Parsi at Girgaum Road. They went to the Parsi and demanded some money "threatening that if it was not given they would force their way into the place and murder him." On this the Parsi paid them ten rupees. After some time, another batch of workers came demanding the same. In being refused, they broke open the gate and entered the house, but

86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 PR, p. 8.
finding nobody there, returned. 89

On Sunday, the mills remained closed and the assault, loot and desecration were taking place in most of the mill areas. In Worli, Matunga, Parel, Mazagaon, Lalwady etc. hordes of workers could be seen going around doing "mischief". 90 At Curry Road "four Musalmans were killed". 91

Although such incidents were still taking place, by the evening of 13th, Sunday, the worst was over. On 14th however, there were again some disturbances in Kamathipura. In Chinchpoogly, a mill area, two Muslims were murdered and in Worli, another mill locality, two dargahs were desecrated and demolished. 92

The mills remained closed on Monday, the 14th, because the workers refused to attend as they feared that in their absence their families would be attacked. 93 They caused some trouble also in Parel, Elphinstone Road and Fergusson Road, but when the military arrived, they put down their sticks and went away. 94

Even after a week since the beginning of the riot, the mill workers were refusing to join their work. It

89 BG, p. 9.
90 Ibid.
91 PR, p. 8.
92 BG, pp. 11-12.
93 Ibid., p. 11.
94 TOI, August 15.
was only on Saturday, August 19, that most of them went to their mills. But even then they did not feel quite calm as false alarms kept sounding time and again. In one instance, "The Hindu mill hands working in the mills at Kala Chowkey Road stopped work about midday on Saturday and turned out into the roads on hearing a report that the Mahomedans were coming to attack them. Having waited outside the mills about 10 minutes, and being assured that it was a false alarm, they resumed work".95

Events took a more serious turn on Sunday, the 20th, when again a false alarm was sounded at Fydhowni. This time the Hindus who had gathered to defend themselves did not go back even after learning that the alarm was false. They started attacking stray Muslims and it was only after the arrival of the military that they were dispersed.96 A similar alarm was raised at Bhuleshwar, Chokshi Bazaar and Bhoiwada and again several passers-by were attacked. A Muslim man attacked and injured near the Mulji Jaitha Market where he had gone to make some purchases.97

This situation was such that even after four weeks since the riots broke out, the Police Commission did not feel confident enough to conclude that "peace has been

95 BG, p. 20.
96 BG, p. 23; RR, p. 8.
97 BG, p. 23.
entirely restored".  

The actual rioting had taken place only on three day, but its intensity was such that 81 persons were killed, 700 injured and 1550 arrested; 60 temples and 33 mosques were damaged or destroyed; property worth lakhs of rupees was looted and destroyed.  

The aftermath of the riot saw another development and that was the shifting of quarters. Right since the beginning of the riot, people had started moving to the areas where their co-religionists dominated. During the riot, the police and military had to escort them and such escort parties were attacked in many instances. If the people ventured to move without escort they were doubtless assaulted and wounded or killed. Even after the riot was over we find people moving to safer areas. Bombay Gazette reported that "some Hindu residents in Bhendi Bazaar and surrounding streets had brought labour-carts to their doors, and were preparing to remove their goods and chattles to Hindu quarters". Such instances were

98 PR, p. 9.
99 PR, Appendix - A. These figures, particularly about the dead and injured, are an understatement because it was difficult to account for the casualties at the height of the riot and all the dead were not reported and most of the injured did not go the hospital.
100 EG, p. 13.
frequent. Many people had started leaving Bombay, at least for the time being. It was reported that "at least about ten thousand people, including men, women and children left Bombay on Wednesday". The events and developments showed that the communal feelings and the fear psychosis arising therefrom were getting rooted in the mind of the populace.

Conclusions:

Like in any other riot, the people who participated in this riot had a variety of motives. Though the cow-protection propaganda and the Prabhas Pattan riot might have started this, once the riot was on, it had a logic of its own. The feeling of communal revenge, of personal defence, of group rivalry and desire to loot kept it going on. In fact, the cow-protection propaganda could not have made so much impact on the Hindu mind because many of the participants like Mahars and Telugu Chamars were "not only cow-eating but cow carrion-eating". As for the mill workers, even though they were Marathas, they had little time for this cow-protection propaganda.

Another significant fact was that some of the rio-

101 Ibid., p. 28.
102 J.D., op.cit., p. 158.
ters on both sides were paid by their co-religionist patrons. The police report states that "the ten or fifteen Pardeshis who were near the Bhuleshwar temple on Saturday, the second day of riot, and Sunday have been paid by the shetias on Saturday morning". The report adds: "I saw about 70 Maratha Ghatis loitering about in Kandewadi, they were very much agitated and all had sticks. I asked them whether they were paid, promised payments, but they bitterly complained about the shetias, and on Sunday some of Malvanis threatened Mr Vizbookandass".103 Similarly we find that "cartloads of sweetmeats were supplied by wealthy Hindus to be distributed among their poor-co-religionists .... The Mahomedans also have been distributing nans and plantains to the poor of their community".104

However, payments were not very common. Only in a few instances the rioters were paid, but in most others they participated on their own. Loot, mostly though not invariably, on Communal lines was a stronger motive. But even looting did not form the primary motive on the whole. The desecration and destruction of small temples and dargahs were not motivated by the desire of loot.

The defensive reaction, though very prominent, could not account for the attacks committed either by the

103 J.D., p. 157.
104 TOI, August 15, 1893.
mill workers or by other groups. Going around murdering people could not be said to have been derived from the desire to defend themselves.

So, the conclusion which presents itself is that a variety of motives went into the making of the riots. The lines between "we" and "they" were drawn along communal lines. All the other motives and identities tended to get dissolved into communal identity at that point of time. Caste, class, occupation and region were subordinated to the communal identity.

However, this was only for the time being. The relative proportion of Muslims in the Hindu-dominated areas or the Hindus in the Muslim-dominated areas did not show a major decline over the years, despite a few migrations. Similarly, we find other loyalties taking over when the Sunnis attacked the Bohras in 1904 and the Julahas in 1908 during the Muharrum or in 1911, on Muharrum Day, Muslims and Hindus fought together against the police and in firing seven Hindus were killed and many injured along with the Muslims. 105

Among mill workers also Hindus started working and living amicably with the Muslims, even though immediately after the riot they had forced some of the millowners "to dispense with the services of most of their Musalman employees". 106

106 ITJ, August, 1893, p. 219.