CHAPTER ONE

THE NATURE OF ARTIFICIAL REALITY (REALITY)
Chapter

The Nature of Ultimate Reality (Brahman)

The philosophy of Advaita is based on the Brahmānātma - the triple canon of the Vedānta, that is, the Upaniṣads, the Śaṅkara-vāda, and the Brāhma-sūtra. Its central teaching may be briefly stated thus: God (Īśvara), soul (Īśa), and the world (prakṛti) which are distinct realities according to the pluralistic and theistic schools of Indian thought are only the appearances of a transcendental entity called brahman or ātman through Śaṅkara-Ātman is the ultimate reality and it is truth, existence, consciousness, bliss, and non-dual. Owing to Śaṅkara-Ātman, it appears as God, soul, and the world. Śaṅkara-Ātman and the world are indeterminable (nirūpa) as either real (rat) or an absolute nothing (samāt). Īśvara is a complex of brahman and āvidyā, and Īśa is a complex of brahman and āvidyā and its product the physical and the subtle body. The essential nature of Īśvara and Īśa is brahman. Īśvara is always aware of his identity with brahman, and is, therefore, ever-released. Īśa, on the other hand, falsely identifies itself with the gross and the subtle body, loses sight of its identity with brahman, and undergoes transmigration. The realization of its identity with brahman and remaining as brahman is the
ultimate goal, that is, Īśvara. This is possible only by transcending avidyā. The Upaniṣads draw upon as its content (vidyā) and hence it could be realized only by the direct experience of brahman; and in order to attain this direct experience, the Upaniṣadic texts are studied in whose imprints is required into.

From the above it follows that according to Advaita there are only two categories - ātma and ātman or spirit and matter. The former is three-fold as brahman, Īśvara, and ātman while the latter is two-fold as ātma-vidyā and the phenomenal world.

We shall now deal with the nature of brahman-ātman - the ultimate reality.

The Upaniṣadic texts such as tat, tyāga, brahmeṣā, etc., refer to the knowledge of the transcendental entity. Tat is sometimes referred to as the all-pervading principle and is designated as brahman; and, at other times, it is referred to as the inner consciousness of the individual soul and is designated as ātman. The term tat or brahman gives us the knowledge of brahman, while the term tyāga or ātman gives us the knowledge of ātman. And, the Upaniṣadic text as a whole signifies the identity of brahman
and ātman, that is, a spiritual reality which is in and beyond all particular facts and which explains all that is in the universe including the individual soul. It may be added here that the Ṛgvedic texts like tuk tuvā uci, śravān brahman, etc., are characterized as major texts or maha-vāyasas, because they convey, as Śadasivaśāna Jarasvati states, the identity of brahman and ātman which is the supreme human end (purusa-purusārtha).

We shall now examine how the major text tuk tuvā uci conveys the identity of brahman and ātman. Śadasivaśāna Jarasvati points out that a serious, in order that it may give to the knowledge of its import, requires the knowledge of the meanings of the words constituting it. Words convey the meaning through two kinds of signification known as primary signification and secondary signification.

The primary signification is that power which is present in a word and which enables the latter to convey a sense through one of the following media, namely, a relation, a quality, a activity, a class characteristic, and customary or tradition usage. For example, the word 'one who has a stick' signifies a person having a stick through the medium - the relation of contact between stick and the man. The word 'white' in the expression 'white cloth' conveys the sense of cloth through
the medium—the quality of whiteness. The word 'sacrificer' signifies a person who performs sacrifices through the medium—the act of performing a sacrifice. The word 'cow' signifies the object 'cow' through the medium 'cowness' which is a class characteristic. The word 'cloud' conveys the sense of cloud through customary or traditional usage.

Thus the power through which words convey their senses in the above manner is known as primary signification.

The secondary signification is the power that is present in a word through which the latter conveys a sense which is different from but invariably connected with its primary sense.

The above is of three kinds:

(i) ḫaballaksana or exclusive secondary signification;
(ii) ḫ-ḥaballaksana or non-exclusive secondary signification; and,
(iii) ḫh-ḥaballaksana or exclusive-own-non-exclusive secondary signification.

These three are defined and illustrated by Śrī Jñānātma as follows:

gressor is that power through which a word complex leaves out its primary sense and signifies some other sense it is invariably connected with its primary sense. This kind is
notions in the case of the sentence 'The hamlet is on the Ganges'. The literal meaning of the text is the presence of the hamlet on the current of the river Ganges; and, it is opposed to perception. The word 'Ganges', therefore, leaves out its primary sense and conveys the sense of bank which is invariably connected with current of the Ganges — the primary sense.

*a-bali-bala* is that power through which a word retains its primary sense and further conveys some other sense connected with its primary sense. This kind is noticed in the case of sentence 'the red (horse) runs'. The literal meaning of the latter is 'the quality of redness runs'. This is opposed to perception and hence the word 'red' retains its primary sense redness and conveys the sense of horse to which redness belong.

*bada-a-bali-bal* is that power through which a word leaves out a part of its primary sense and conveys another part. This kind is operative in the case of sentence such as 'This is that drabian'. The word 'that' conveys primarily a drabian, related to past time and a different place. The word 'this' conveys primarily a drabian related to present time and a particular place. The sentence as a whole should convey the identity between the meanings of the two words constituting it. Here the meanings of the two words are opposed to each other.
and hence identity between the two is impossible. Hence the two words leave out a part of their primary senses, namely, the spatial and temporal relation. The one conveys another part, namely, the person himself.

We shall now consider what kind of significations is adopted by the words तत् and त्येऽ in conveying brahman and आत्म, respectively. These words cannot convey brahman and आत्म through primary significations because of the absence of media through which words could convey their senses through primary significations. We pointed out earlier that a word could convey through primary significations a sense by means of a relation, or quality, or action or class characteristic or customary usage. None of these is possible in the case of brahman. In former four, namely, relation, quality, action, and class characteristic, in order that they may be viewed as existing in a part of the object, must be related to that object and the relation in which they are related to the object is known as inherence (अस्तित्व). It comes to this that if the above four factors are to be viewed as present in brahman, it must be admitted that they are related to brahman through the relation of inherence.

The Upanisadic text, however, states that the ultimate reality is supra-relational. Hence none of the above four
factors could be present in Brahman; and, so the words of the Upanisads cannot convey Brahman through primary signification.

In the same way, custom and usage also cannot serve as the medium for the words of the Upanisads to convey Brahman through primary signification. For, it holds good only in those cases where the sense that is conveyed by a word could be comprehended by perception or proofs other than verbal testimony. The object ‘cloud’ is the conventional sense of the word ‘cloud’. In this case the object — cloud is known through perception and the significative relation between the word — cloud and the object — cloud is known from the usage of the elders. If Brahman should be conveyed in the above manner by the words of the Upanisads, then it must come within the range of perception and the significative relation between the words of the Upanisads and Brahman should be comprehended. As Brahman, in order that it may come within the range of perception, must first come within the range of mind. The Upanisadi text, however, states that mind does not function in respect of Brahman. This is because Brahman is that which manifests mind and other factors and it is not reasonable to hold that what is manifested, namely, mind should comprehend its manifesting reality, namely, Brahman. It follows from this that mind does not come within the range of perception. And, in view of this, the significative relation between the words of
and avidyā - the inactive element. This point we shall discuss in detail in the sequel. The primary meaning of the word ṛta, therefore, is śiva, is omniscient, and is known mediately.

The Upaniṣadic texts such as 'Brahman is truth consciousness, and absolute', 'Brahman is consciousness and bliss', 'The one who is released becomes released (as it were)', 'Pure and untouched by evil', 'Brahman is eternal, all-pervasive, the underlying reality (of every being), and extremely subtle', 'The world, prior to its creation, remained as existence, one only without a second', and the like convey the secondary sense of the word ṛta to be eternal, pure, consciousness, ever-released existence, subtle, truth, all-pervasive, non-dual, and of the nature of bliss. These texts convey in an affirmative manner the secondary sense of the term ṛta to be eternal, pure, etc.

There are certain Upaniṣadic texts which convey are by negating all phenomenal elements. These texts also are known as subsidiary sentences. The texts such as "Free from sound, touch, form", etc., 'Not this, not this', 'It is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long..., it is neither air nor aetheric space,... it is without taste or smell, without eyes
er ears, without tongue or mind, etc., convey the secondary sense of the word \textit{bha}\text{\textk{}} to be free from all phenomenal elements. The subsidiary sentences that are affirmative in character convey Brahma to be non-dual. Its non-dual nature cannot be ascertained unless there is the knowledge of the negation of all phenomenal elements. The subsidiary sentences that are negative in character negate all phenomenal elements and thereby confirm that brahman is non-dual. The negative texts, therefore, are not to be understood in isolation, but along with the affirmative ones.

The secondary sense of the term \textit{bha}, therefore, is Brahma which is eternal, pure, consciousness, ever-released, existent, subtle, truth, all-pervasive, non-dual and of the nature of bliss. It must be noted here that eternal nature, pure nature, etc., go together. Sri Sankara in his commentary on the \textit{Brahma-sutra} states that 'existence and consciousness go together.' This means that brahman cannot be existence if it is not of the nature of consciousness. And, brahman cannot be of the nature of consciousness if it is not existence.

We can extend this line of explanation to the eternal nature, pure nature, etc.

So far the discussion regarding the primary and the secondary senses of the word \textit{bha}. Now we shall consider the
Upanişadic texts which give us the knowledge of the primary and secondary sense of the word \textit{tva}. The Upanişadic texts 'As a large fish swims alternately on both banks (of a river) - the east and the west - so does the infinite being move to both those states: dreaming and waking', and 'As a hawk or falcon roaming in the sky becomes tired, folds its wings, and rushes for its nest, so does this infinite entity \textit{purusa} hasten for this state, where fallen asleep, he cherishes no more desires and dreams no more dreams', state that the \textit{purusa} or the self experiences the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. The self as the experient of the three states is \textit{jīva} who is ignorant, finite, and immediate \textit{(ātman)}. It is \textit{jīva}, and it is the primary sense of the word \textit{tva}.

The Upanişadic texts such as 'The self-luminous and formless self is eternal, and it exists both within and without. It is free from vital airs and mind. It is pure and it transcends \textit{ātman}: 'The self is (transparent) like water; it is self-luminous consciousness, one and free from any duality; you cannot see the seer of seeing (that is, the witness of the mental states) ... . This is your self (\textit{ātman}) that is within all...!' and the like give us the knowledge of the secondary sense of the term \textit{tva}. These texts convey the self to be self-luminous consciousness, and non-dual; and, it is termed
Atman. The secondary sense of the term Ṣvám is, therefore, Ṣvám which is self-luminous consciousness.

This part of the discussion may summed up by saying that the primary sense of the term bad is Īśvara who is Brahman associated with avidyā and who is omniscient, absolute, and immediate. The primary sense of the term Ṣvám is Īśva which is Brahman associated with avidyā and its products and who is ignorant, finite, and immediate. The secondary sense of the term ṭat is pure consciousness which is bliss, non-dual, truth, etc. The secondary sense of the term Ṣvám also is self-luminous consciousness.

Now we shall examine the process through which there arises the knowledge of the import of the text ṭat Ṣvám asai. The latter arises at the end of a series of stages which are as follows:

I. In the first stage, there arises the knowledge that since the two terms ṭat and Ṣvám have similar case-endings and are juxtaposed there exists co-ordinate relation between the two, and hence they are to convey the identity of their senses.

II. In the second stage, there arises the recollection of the primary meanings of the terms ṭat and Ṣvám, namely, Īśvara and Īśva which are already known from the subsidiary Upanisadic texts.
III. In the third stage, there arises the knowledge in the form ‘Ijya is identical with Iśvara’, on the strength of the knowledge that the terms tat and ātman must convey the identity of their senses, as they stand in coordinate relation to each other.

IV. In the fourth stage there arises the knowledge that Ijya and Iśvara cannot be identical in view of the mutually contradictory attributes present in them.

V. In the fifth stage, secondary signification is resorted to in respect of the terms tat and ātman. The latter, through secondary signification, respectively give rise to the recollection of the senses of brahman and ātman the non-dual consciousness, and self-luminous consciousness — which are already known from the subsidiary Upanisadic texts.

VI. In the sixth stage, there arises the knowledge of identity of the secondary senses of the terms tat and ātman.

It would be clear from the above that secondary signification should be adopted in respect of the terms tat and ātman.

How the question arises as to the specific kind of secondary signification that should be adopted, this requires a discussion regarding the nature Ijya and Iśvara — the primary meanings of tat and ātman.
Darvajñatman in his Ānubhūtisvarūpa in his Prakāśa-ināra, and Vidyārāga in the first section of his Padmini maintain the view that both Jiva and Iśvara are reflected images. According to Darvajñatman, Brahman when reflected in Bīṣma is Iśvara and when reflected in mind is Jiva. According to Ānubhūtisvarūpa and Vidyārāga, Brahman reflected in Bīṣma is Iśvara and when reflected in avidyā is Jiva. Bīṣma and avidyā are two aspects of one prakṛti.

Prakāśa-ināra maintains the view that the reflected image of Brahman in Bīṣma–avidyā, mind, etc., is Jiva, and Brahman which thereby remains as the prototype or original is Iśvara.

According to the above preceptors, the reflected image consists of two parts, namely, the sentient element of Brahman and the insentient element of Bīṣma–avidyā, mind, and their characteristics. The prototype too consists of the sentient element of Brahman and the insentient element of the characteristic of being a prototype. The sentient element is real and the insentient element is indeterminate.

Vācaspatimīśa in his Abhūtānta maintains the view that Brahman delimited by mind is Jiva and Brahman which is not so delimited by which is the content of Bīṣma–avidyā is Iśvara.
The limiting adjunct-mind and its characteristics in the case of jīva and īśā and its characteristics in the case of īśāvā are indeterminable, while the sentient part of brahman in jīva and īśāvā is real.

According to the views set forth in the foregoing paragraphs, the primary meaning of tat is īśāvā which is a blend of brahman and ēvā-avidyā and its characteristics; and, the primary meaning of tvan, is jīva which is a blend of brahman and ēvā-avidyā, mind, and their characteristics. The words tat and tvan, through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification, discard a part of their primary senses, namely, the sentient part of ēvā-avidyā, mind, and their characteristics respectively, and give rise to the recollection of the other part, namely, the sentient element of brahman which is pure consciousness and which is known from the subsidiary Upaniṣadic texts.

Suraśāvā and others in their line of thinking advocate the view that brahman reflected in ēvā-avidyā is īśāvā and brahman reflected in mind is jīva. The reflected images, unlike in the earlier view, are totally indeterminable as either real (sat) or an absolute nothing (asat). jīva and īśāvā, being images, are indeterminable. Yet they are falsely identified with the original consciousness, namely, brahman and hence they are respectively viewed as the agent of actions, and the source of the universe.
The primary sense of the terms *tāk* and *tyaṁ* are thus *Iśvara* and *īśva* which are indeterminate. The terms *tāk* and *tyaṁ*, through exclusive secondary signification (*lahallakṣaṇa*) totally abandon their primary meaning, *Iśvara* and *īśva* and give rise to the recollection of *Brahman* - the original consciousness with which their primary meanings are falsely identified.

It follows from the above discussion that the words *tāk* and *tyaṁ*, either through exclusive-non-exclusive secondary signification or through exclusive secondary signification give rise to the recollection of the pure consciousness which is already known from the subsidiary Śaṅkaraṇīya texts. The text *tāk tvaṁ eva* as a whole gives rise to the valid knowledge of the identity of the two senses which is unknown hitherto from any other source. The logical significance of the text *tāk tvaṁ eva*, according to Śuresvara, Jñāvalītātan, Vaisnavāntas, Prakāśāntan, Advaitavidyārāṇya, and others in their line of thinking is the identity of the essential nature of *Iśvara* and *īśva*.

Vidyārāṇya in a later section of his *Paṇḍitaśastra* gives up the three-fold classification of the ultimate reality into *Brahman*, *Iśvara*, and *īśva* and advocates a four-fold classification of it into *kāśita*, *Brahman*, *Iśvara*, and *īśva*. Of these, the reality when conditioned by the gross and the subtle body
is īśaśānta and the reality that transcends the subtle and
the gross body is Brahman. Īśvara is the reality that is
reflected in Īśā which is present in Brahman and īśa is
the reality that is reflected in Īśā which is the predominant
factor in the subtle body and which is present in the īśaśānta.

According to Vidyārāgga, reflected images are indeter-
mizable. Hence, īśa and Īśā also are indeterminable. The
terms īśa and īśā in the text īśaśānta īśa primarily convey
Īśā and īśa. The term īśa through exclusive secondary
signification gives rise to the re-collection of the sense of
īśaśānta. The term īśā is taken in its primary sense of īśa
who is indeterminable.

The text īśa īśā īśa is to be interpreted like the state-
ment 'what was mistaken for) a post, is a man'. Here there is
co-ordinate relation between the words post and man, as they
have similar case-endings. But the co-ordinate relation here
is not in the view of identity, but in the view of sublation.
The import of the statement, therefore, is this: what appeared
to be a post is only a man and there was really no post.' In
the same manner, the text īśa īśā īśa īśa would mean that what
appears to be īśa is only īśaśānta and there is really no
entity as īśa. In other words, the import of the text īśa
īśā īśa īśa is the absence of īśa in īśaśānta. This sense is
Technically known as भाव्य and the co-ordinate relation that exists between तत्क and त्वम is in the view of भाव्य or sublation.

In another work entitled भाव्यानविवेक attributed to Vidyārāgya by Appayya Dīksita, the four-fold classification of the reality referred to above is given up, and the three-fold classification of the reality into ब्रह्म, ज्ञा, and इवारा is admitted. The ज्ञा is distinguished into three as absolute, empirical, and apparent. The reality that is conditioned by the subtle and the gross body is the ज्ञा; the reality that is reflected in निद्र which is the important factor in the subtle body is the ज्ञा that is empirically real. This continues to exist till there arises the knowledge of ब्रह्म; and, being a reflected image, it is indeterminable. The reality that is reflected in निद्र created illusorily in the dream state in the ज्ञा that is apparently real. It continues to exist till the dream state comes to an end.

According to the view presented now, the term तत्क through primary signification conveys इवारा who, by being a reflected image, is an indeterminable entity. The term त्वम through primary signification conveys the empirically real ज्ञा who also is indeterminable. And the term तत्क through exclusive secondary signification totally abandons its primary sense - इवारा and conveys ब्रह्म with which it is falsely identified.
The term \textit{iva} also through exclusive secondary signification abandons its primary sense - the empirically real \textit{jiva}, and conveys the absolutely real \textit{Jiva}. The latter is real although its limiting adjuncts are indeterminable, and the text as a whole conveys the identity of brahman and the consciousness conditioned by the subtle and gross body.

It must be added here that the view advocated in the \textit{Upa-sadhana-viveka} presents the following difficulty. The word \textit{Jiva}, it is admitted, conveys, through exclusive secondary signification, the absolutely real \textit{Jiva}. The latter is, however, conditioned; and, as a conditioned entity it cannot be identical with brahman - the unconditioned one which is signified secondarily by the word \textit{brahman}.

It may be argued: what is conditioned is pure consciousness only, although the limiting adjuncts are indeterminable. And the pure consciousness in the conditioned entity, that is, absolutely real \textit{Jiva} is identical with brahman - the pure consciousness.

But this contention is wrong, because the word \textit{Jiva} through exclusive secondary signification conveys the absolutely real \textit{Jiva} which is a conditioned entity. And, in order that the element of pure consciousness in the conditioned entity may be signified by term \textit{Jiva}, we must admit that the term
functions for the second time. And, a word uttered once cannot function for a second time. Hence the view that the term tāt conveys through exclusive secondary signification the absolutely real Īśvara, and it is identical with Brahman—the secondary sense of the word tāt does not seem to be sound.

To sum up this part of the discussion, Brahman which is eternal, pure, consciousness, ever-released, truth, subtle, existence, all-pervasive, non-dual, and bliss, is identical with Ātman or more strictly not distinct from Ātman. This is the logical significance of the major texts such as tāt ēva asi and the like. And, this is prevalent view in Advaita.

According to Suresvara, Viṣṇu-Śarada, and others in their line of thinking, the logical significance of the text tāt ēva asi may be considered as Brahman which is eternal, non-dual, etc., and which is free from any relation to Īśvara or the empirical self.

An objection is raised as regards the conclusion that Brahman is non-dual. Brahman is said to be non-dual in the sense that there is no second entity apart from it. But perception gives up the knowledge of the existence of the world. Hence Brahman cannot be non-dual.
Adwaitins answer the above objection by saying that the non-dual nature of Brahman would be contradicted only when the world that is perceived is real. But it is not so. The Upanisadic texts such as 'Objects ... sely referred to by names such a pot, etc.' affirms that the world in indeterminable or avidyā. They are, therefore, known as avidyā-sātuḥ. The existence of an indeterminable world does not in any way contradict the non-dual nature of the world.

Now it is objected that one cannot conclude that the world is indeterminable, as it is opposed to erection. The latter in form like 'The pot is real' (matsyāya mān) comprehends the reality of objects of the world like pot, etc.

The above objection is answered in five ways which we shall explain successively:

1) Nāgārjuna in his 2a Brahmatattva-sādhanā and Jñāna-ghanapāda in his 2b Tattva-sādhanā argue that perception comprehends neither the objects nor reality in respect of them, but only sat or Brahman which is associated with avidyā and which is constant in objects as their substratum. The perceptual cognition of objects is only illusory. This theory they explain in the following manner: after the rise of the knowledge of an object (say) pot, through the functioning of sense of sight which is perce-
ption or praṇamāṇa-pramāṇa, there does not arise any doubt whether this is pot or not, or contrary notion that this is not a pot. This means that the notion is cognized through the sense of sight is cognized as different from everything else. In other words, the cognition of pot cannot be explained without the cognition of the difference of pot from everything else.

Difference is invariably cognized along with its counter-correlate. That is, the perceptual cognition of difference is dependent upon the perceptual cognition of the counter-correlate of difference. In the present case, the objects of the world other than pot constitute the counter-correlate of difference. One, however, cannot have the perceptual cognition of all the objects of the world—the counter-correlate of difference, because some objects such as erit and the like, do not come within the range of perception, while some other objects are remote in space and time and thus cannot be perceived. The perceptual cognition of the counter-correlate of difference is thus impossible. Consequently, the perceptual cognition of difference which depends upon the perceptual cognition of the counter-correlate of difference is impossible. And in the absence of the perceptual cognition of difference, there cannot be the perceptual cognition of pot etc., as
as associated with difference. It is the very incapacity of objects such as pot and the like to be perceived that led Nagajana and Jñanagahanapāda to conclude that pot, etc., are presented erroneously.

Now, if pot, etc., are not cognised by sense of sight or perception (pratyakṣa-prāpati), then the question arises as to the role of sense of sight, etc., in respect of perceptual cognition. Appayya Vidyāpati explains this by making a reference to the perceptual cognition of silver that appears in a shell. The 'this-element' of shell - the substratum of silver is comprehended by sense of sight or perception (pratyakṣa-prāpati). The functioning of the latter is in respect of the 'this-element' alone. The silver-element is presented illusorily. In the same way, the functioning of the sense-organs is in respect of bare-reality or sat or Brahman associated with avidrā only; and, the things like pot, etc., are presented erroneously.

It follows from the above that the content of perceptual cognition is neither the objects of the world nor reality in respect of them but only sat or Brahman associated with avidrā. The content of the knowledge arising from the sāṁstavya-Śruti is indeterminability of the objects of the world. The scope of the two - perception and the sāṁstavya-Śruti differs so vastly that there could be no room for any conflict between the two.
2) The author of the work entitled *Nyāya-sāraḥ* explains the non-conflict between perception and the *mithrāyā-gruti* in the following way: in accordance with the ordinary experience that sense of sight, etc., comprehend their respective objects, it must be admitted that the objects of the world do come within the range of sense-organs, that is, perception. And the perceptual cognition is of the form 'The pot is real' (*shajāh man*). It refers to the relation of reality that constitutes the essential nature of the substratum, that is, Brahman, to the object - pot. In other words, the above perceptual cognition does not point to any independent reality in respect of pot, but only points to the reality which constitutes the essential nature of its substratum - Brahman, and which is presented upon the pot owing to the false identification of Brahman and the pot.

It might be objected: if reality that is cognized in respect of pot is admitted to be the reality that is present in the substratum - Brahman, then the blue colour that is cognized in respect of pot in the form 'The pot is blue' must be admitted to be the blue colour that is present in the substratum - Brahman. The result of this argument is that Brahman must be endowed with attributes like blue colour, etc. Thus the above answer that perception points to the reality of the
substratum - Brahman in the object amounts to admitting that Brahman is endowed with attributes which is opposed to the scriptural teaching that Brahman is free from all attributes.

Appayya Dig'ita answers the above objection by saying that there is difference between the two cases of the perceptual cognition of reality and of blue colour in respect of pot. It is known from the scriptural texts that Brahman or sat is the material cause of the world. It is the material cause of the world in the sense that it is the substratum of sāya whose transformation the world is. Hence it is known as the transfigurative material cause (vivarte-pādāna) of the world. In other words, the world is superimposed on Brahman or sat. Hence it is proper to say that the sat element which is the substratum is presented upon the object which is its effect, owing to the mutual identification of the cause and the effect. Moreover, when it is intelligible to hold that the sat element is presented upon the superimposed entity, there would be proximity in the assumption of an independent reality in respect of pot too.

Thus the perceptual cognition of reality in respect of pot is explained as referring to the reality which constitutes the essential nature of the substratum and which is presented upon the object owing to the false identification of the substratum - the cause, and the object - the effect. And this
explanation is made on the basis of the Upanisadic text which speaks of Brahman or sat as the cause of the world. But there is no Upanisadic text which speaks of Brahman as endowed with qualities like blue colour, etc. On the other hand, there are texts which speak of Brahman as free from all qualities. Since Brahman or sat does not possess any colour, the perceptual cognition 'The pot is blue' must be explained as referring to the blue colour that is present in the pot itself.

It follows that the perceptual cognition 'The pot is real' refers to the reality which is the essential nature of the substratum — Brahman and which is falsely presented upon the object. In other words, perceptual cognition points out that objects like pot, etc., do not possess any independent reality. Mithyātva-āruti too conveys that the objects of the world are indeterminate. There would be conflict between perception and the mithyātva-āruti only if perception gives the knowledge that the objects of the world are indeterminately real. Since is it not so, there is no conflict between perception and mithyātva-āruti.

3) Sarvajñānātman is of the view that the discussion regarding the conflict between perception and the mithyātva-āruti is based on the assumption that perception too, like the mithyātva-āruti is a pramanā or proof. It is not so. A proof is that
which makes known an unknown object, that is, an object veiled by avidya. This definition is applicable only to the Upanisads whose content is Brahman. It is because the latter alone, by being self-luminous, can be veiled, everything apart from it is inert and needs no cause for being veiled. It follows from this that the Upanisads alone give the knowledge of the unknown entity - Brahman, that is, an entity veiled by avidya. Hence they alone can be termed pranapaha in the strict sense of the term.

Perception, on the other hand, has a semblance of a pranapaha. Its object (say) pot cannot be concealed by avidya as it is inert by nature. But the consciousness delimited by pot which could manifest the pot is veiled by tulyavidya or modal ignorance which is derivative of avidya - the primal negligence and which is identical with māya. This we shall discuss in detail in the second chapter. The consciousness delimited by pot, thus seen; veiled by tulyavidya, could not manifest the pot. Perception gives rise to a mental state in the form of pot, and removes the tulyavidya. The consciousness delimited by pot manifests itself then, and manifests the pot too, and it is this function of perception that answers to its validity in ordinary experience. Since perception does not manifest pot, etc., directly in the manner in which the Upanisads manifest Brahman, it is called pranapahāsa, that is,
one which has a semblance of a prajñā, and, a praṇāṇabhūta...

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...can never contradict a praṇāṇa.

4) Some other predecessors hold that pot, etc., are
directly concealed by tālāvidyā. Hence perception which makes
...known the pot gives the knowledge of the pot which is unknown
hitherto. The definition of a proof is thus applicable to
perception also. The latter, therefore, is as valid as
the Upaniṣads.

Perception which is a proof in the strict sense of the
term gives rise to the knowledge - chaṭāb sam, or 'The pot is
sat'. The sat element here does not stand for the reality of
pot. On the other hand, it stands for the genus or universal
(satā-liṭi) or spatial and temporal relation, or the essential
nature of the object itself. These can be explained as follows:

1) The sat element is constant in the cognitions such as
chaṭāb sam, rājāb sam, etc., while the objects vary. And, on
this ground it can be said that sat element is the genus or
the universal satā-liṭi, present invariably in all the objects.

2) The perceptual cognition in the form 'The pot is here and
now' (the idāla chaṭāb sati) has for its content the relation
of a particular place and time to the pot. And it is exactly
this spatial and temporal relation of the pot that is referred
to by the word sati which stands for the word sat.
3) The cognition and the corresponding usage 'The pot does not exist' (schatak na seti) have for their content the absence of pot. The expression na refers to absence, while the word seti which stands for sat refers to the essential nature of the object concerned.

Thus the term sat cognized through perception stands for the universal satita or spatial and temporal relation of an object, or the essential nature of an object. And none of these is in conflict with the indeterminable nature of an object conveyed by the atithvâtya-gruti. Those who advocate that objects of the world are indeterminable on the basis of the atithvâtya-gruti do not deny in the case of pot, for example, its generality, or its spatial and temporal relations, or its essential nature. What they deny is unsublatedness in respect of objects. If the sat element cognized in perception stands for unsublatedness, then there will be conflict with atithvâtya-gruti which conveys that objects of the world are subject to sublation. Since it is not so, there is no conflict between perception and the atithvâtya-gruti.

4) Another view is that perception comprehends the objects as sat or unsublated. Yet, there is no conflict with atithvâtya-gruti. It is because that unsublatedness is two-fold as unsublatedness for all time, and unsublatedness till there
arises the knowledge of Brahma. The former is opposed to
prāṇāya and it pertains to Brahma only. The latter is
not opposed to prāṇāya and it pertains to the objects of
the world.

Advaitins make the above two-fold distinction as
unsublatedness for all time and unsublatedness till there
arises the knowledge of Brahma on the basis of the Upaniṣad
text - 'The prāṇas are real; of these, the self is the reality.'
Here the word - prāṇas stands for the world. This text conveys
that reality of unsublatedness in Brahma is superior and that
in the world is inferior. And superiority and inferiority in
respect of unsublatedness can be explained only as unsublated-
ness for all time and unsublatedness for a little while respect-
ively. The former pertains to Brahma and the latter, to the
world. In accordance with the Upaniṣadic text 'One who has
realized Brahma transcends name and form' which speaks of
the sublation of the world by the knowledge of Brahma, it is
concluded that unsublatedness in respect of the world is unsub-
latedness till there arises the knowledge of Brahma.

Thus perception cognizes the objects of the world to
be sat or unsublated till there arises the knowledge of Brahma.
Nithvāṇa-śūna, on the other hand, conveys that the objects
of the world do not have unsublatedness for all time. And,
hence there is no conflict between the two.
To sum up this part of the discussion: the preceptors of Advaita have explained the context of the perceptual cognitions such as jagati and the like in such a way as to have no conflict with the import of the svayatva-sruti.

Adhering for the moment to the stand-point that perception comprehends the objects of the world as unswayed for all time, it is admitted that perception and the svayatva-sruti are in conflict with each other. But, just as the subsequent knowledge revealing the true nature of a barren land arises only by invalidating the knowledge of mirage which arose earlier, so also the knowledge from the svayatva-sruti arises only by invalidating the perceptual cognition, which arose earlier. This principle of the subsequent one depriving the earlier one of validity is known as anucchada-vyaya which is arrived at in the section known as anucchodadhikarana in the Purva-mimamsa. The latter discusses the scriptural text 'Should the Udgātya let go, the sacrifice should be concluded without any fee and the same sacrifice should be recommended; and, should the Pratihartya let go, the entire wealth of the sacrificer must be given as the sacrificial fee'. This can be explained as follows:

In the yajñistoma sacrifice, the priests should go around the sacrificial fire by holding the waist cloth of the priest
in front. If the Udgātṛ - the priest who chants the hymns of the Śaṃvaraṇa - lets go the waist cloth of the priest in front of him, then to expiate this, the sacrifice should be completed without giving any sacrificial fee to the priests. If the Pratihārtṛ - the priest who chants the hymns of the Śa-veda - does so, then the sacrifice should be completed by giving the entire wealth of the sacrificer as the sacrificial fee. If the two let go the waist cloth successively, then, since the expiatory rites relating to both cannot be performed simultaneously, the sacrificer should conclude the sacrifice by performing that occasioned rite which relates to the subsequent loss of grip. The point that is of importance here is that the subsequent one is more powerful than the antecedent one.

Appayya Jñāpita explains the above position as follows: when the Udgātṛ lets go the waist cloth first, then there arises the knowledge of an obligation to perform an expiatory rite occasioned by the Udgātṛ letting go. Later, if the Pratihārtṛ lets go, then the earlier cognition of the obligation to perform the expiatory rite relating to the letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgātṛ, is deprived of validity by the later cognition of the obligation to perform the expiatory rite relating to the letting go of the waist cloth by the Pratihārtṛ.
It follows from the above, that if the jyotisṭoma sacrifice is characterized by two acts of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgātṛ and the Pratihāṛṭṛ successively, then the obligation to perform the expiatory rite occasioned by the earlier act taught by the scriptural text does not really exist and the knowledge of that obligation is not valid. It is because that the knowledge of that obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the earlier event is deprived of validity by the cognition of another obligation to perform the expiatory rite occasioned by the subsequent event.

Appayya Śākyita states that the maxims we derive from the anaschādaśhikaṇya is that the subsequent one deprives the earlier one of validity. The maxim is known as anaschāda-sāvāma. And, on the basis of this maxim we can say that the knowledge of the reality of world which arises from perception first is deprived of validity by the knowledge of the indeterminability of the world which arises subsequently from the Brahma-śruti.

Vyāsatīrtha in his āyāyaṇa states that the anaschādasāvāma is not an example of the subsequent cognition depriving the earlier one of validity. On the other hand, it consists of statements of what are real at different times. In the jyotisṭoma sacrifice, when the act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgātṛ arises first, then the obligation to perform
the occasioned rite relating to it arises. And if the act of
letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgâty arises subse-
quently, then the obligation to perform the occasioned rite
relating to it arises by destroying the earlier obligation.
Thereby the earlier obligation does not become unreal or indeter-
mizable, and the two cognitions of obligation are certainly
valid. This Vyâsatirtha explains by making a reference to the
black and red colours that originate in succession in a cherry
fruit. In the latter, black colour arises first, and then, by
destroying that colour red colour arises. The cognitions of
the two colours are certainly valid. And, the latter cognition
of red colour does not invalidate the earlier cognition of black
colour. The result of this argument is that in the Istrajjna
sacrifice when two events occur in sequence, the knowledge of
the obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the
subsequent event does not invalidate the knowledge of the obli-
gation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the antecedent
one. In the same way the knowledge arising from the Gihtrâya-
fruits, which is subsequent does not invalidate the knowledge
arising from perception which is antecedent.

It must be noted here that Advaitins are of the view
that if the Istrajjna sacrifice is characterized by only one
event of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgâty, then the
obligation to perform the rite occasioned by it does really
exist and its knowledge is valid. If, on the other hand, the sacrifice is characterized by two events occurring in sequence, namely, the act of lettining of the vaisit cloth by the Uṣṇīṣa and the act of lettining of the vaisit cloth by the Pratiharī, then the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the first event does not really exist and its knowledge is not valid.

Vyāsatīrtha also is of the opinion that if in the śrāddhā sacrifice only one event occurs, then the obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to it does exist really and the knowledge of such obligation is valid. And if the sacrifice is characterized by two events, then the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the earlier event is destroyed by the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the subsequent event. But the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the earlier event really existed and its knowledge is therefore valid. This is totally opposed to the advaitins' view that such obligation does not really exist and its knowledge is, therefore, not valid.

Vyāsatīrtha reads his above view into the text of the ābradālīka of Pārthaśārathī Miśra which is as follows:

'pārthaśārathī śastra hi eva arthap, simittraśeṣabahy eva
aṁrathā kartāraṁ ca evaṁ prati śiśaṁ citām caṁ aṁrathā kartāraṁ.'
This text is interpreted by Vyāsatīrtha thus: the sacrifice which must be completed in a different way, that is, without giving any sacrificial cloth to the priests (anyathā kartavyo'ni kṛatuh) prior to the act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Pratihārtya (nīmittevaśanamānāt prak), should be completed in a different manner, that is, giving the entire wealth of the sacrificer as the sacrificial fee (anyathā kartavyātyayah), when the act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Pratihārtya arises (nīmitte cauli).

Vyāsatīrtha concludes that the anavahedā-avyaya is thus an example of a subsequent event destroying its antecedent one. Both events are real and their cognitions also are valid. This means that the subsequent event does not deprive the earlier one of validity. Hence the Advaitins cannot say that the anavahedāavyaya is an example of the knowledge arising from the nīthāvyā-ārtti which is subsequent, invalidating its antecedent, namely, the knowledge arising from perception.

Appayya Bāṣaṇa is of the view that the above interpretation of the anavahedā-avyaya is not correct. He argues that the obligation to perform belongs to a rite which is a subsidiary in a sacrifice. And in the śrutiṣṭopa sacrifice which is characterized by two acts of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgātā and the Pratihārtya which occur in sequence,
the occasional rite relating to the earlier event of the letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāta is not a subsidiary. Hence, the obligation to perform such occasional rite does not really exist, and the text that teaches such an obligation is not valid. But the same text is certainly valid in the Āyatiṣṭhāna sacrifice which characterized by only one event of the letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāta. And this view is specifically stated by Sāṅkaracarī Mārā in his Brāhavarṇaṇāla.

It will be remembered that Vyāsātīrtha has made a reference to the statement in the śāstraśāstra of Sāṅkaracarī Mārā, which he interprets to mean that in the Āyatiṣṭhāna sacrifice which is characterized by two events of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāta and the Pratihātṛ, the obligations to perform the occasional rites relating to the two events are real and the cognitions of the two obligations are valid. But the statement which he has referred to states toward the end of a passage which declares that the knowledge of the obligation relating to the subsequent event invalidates the knowledge of the obligation relating to the antecedent event, and that passage is:

"ubhayādayanti pūrvatāmpī ṛṣabha-gāṇa śīvī bharati  
śāditastvān uttaraṣa tu na kīsye bhāṣyakamastu"
This means: "the knowledge of the obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the earlier event, although originated, is false because it is inconsistent with the knowledge of the obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the subsequent event. For the latter, however, there is no such conflict."

Now, the text referred to by Vyāsatīrtha really means: the sacrifice which would have to be performed in a different manner if the subsequent event has not arisen, has to be performed in another way since the subsequent event has arisen. It does not mean that prior to the occurrence of the subsequent event, the obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the earlier event did exist in fact. Appayya Dīkṣita therefore concludes that the annahada-nānava is an example of the latter cognition depriving the earlier one of validity.

Appayya Dīkṣita further states that the characteristic of obligation which is said to belong to the performance of the rite occasioned by the earlier event in the jnatipūpa sacrifice and which is said to be removed by the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the subsequent event cannot be explained satisfactorily. The characteristic of obligation may stand for one of the following:
(i) that the rite occasioned by the earlier event is capable of being accomplished by volition;

(ii) that the rite occasioned by the earlier event has been accomplished by volition;

(iii) that the non-performance of the rite occasioned by the earlier event would lead to some defect in the sacrifice;

(iv) that the rite occasioned by the earlier event is a subsidiary in the sacrifice.

AppayyaDigambarastates that one of the above alternatives would hold good on the following grounds:

II. The first alternative that obligation consists in the capacity of the rite occasioned by the earlier event to be accomplished by volition is wrong, because such a capacity would exist even after the subsequent event has arisen. Śvāyam-bhūtacannot say that the obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the earlier event is destroyed by the obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the subsequent event.

II. The second alternative that the obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the earlier event consists in the accomplishment of that occasioned rite by volition is also wrong, because that occasioned rite has not been accomplished by volition even prior to the rise of the subsequent event.
This means that the knowledge of obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the earlier event is not valid. And, that obligation is not an object of valid knowledge; it is only indeterminate.

III) The third alternative that the obligation to perform the occasioned rite relating to the earlier event consists in this that the non-performance of that rite would lead to some defect in the āpastigama sacrifice is also wrong. Ayutyan-gṛhyapāndatīlakī makes this position clear thus: when it is said that the non-performance of the above rite would lead to some defect in the sacrifice, it may mean that the non-performance of the above rite is the productive factor of some defect; or, it may mean that whenever there is the non-performance of the above rite, there would result some defect in this sacrifice.

Defect is a positive entity and it cannot be caused by absence of ahīṃsa in the form of the non-performance of the rite occasioned by the earlier event. Hence the view that the non-performance of the latter is the productive factor of some defect in the sacrifice does not hold good.

In the same way, the second view also is wrong. According to this, non-performance of the rite occasioned by the earlier event must be viewed as the cause and defect in the sacrifice, as the effect. In a sacrifice which is characterized
by the earlier act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty and the subsequent act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Pratiharty, the non-performance of the occasioned rite relating to the earlier event does not lead to any defect in the sacrifice, because the sacrifice is completed by performing the occasioned rite relating to the subsequent event. Hence, in order that that non-performance of the occasioned rite relating to the act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty may be held as the cause of a defect in the sacrifice, it must be admitted that this rule is applicable in the case of a sacrifice which is characterized only by the act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty and not in the case of a sacrifice which is characterized by two acts of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty and the Pratiharty which occur in sequence. This the advaitins do admit: what they do not admit is that the non-performance of the occasioned rite relating to the act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty leads to some defect in a jyatiṣṭha sacrifice which is characterized by two acts of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty and the Pratiharty occurring successively. It is because that in the case of such a jyatiṣṭha sacrifice, the latter is completed by the performance of the occasioned rite relating to the subsequent event of the letting go of the waist cloth by the Pratiharty. Thus it is
not possible for the non-performance of the rite occasioned by the earlier act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udāty to be the cause of a defect in the sacrifice.

It follows that the third alternative, namely, the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the earlier act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udāty consists in this that the non-performance of rite occasioned by the earlier act would lead to some defect in the sacrifice is wrong.

IV) The fourth alternative is that the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udāty means that the above occasioned rite is a subsidiary in the sacrifice. This, however, is wrong, because a rite is a subsidiary in a sacrifice if it contributes to the invisible result of the main sacrifice or if it contributes to the accomplishment of the sacrifice itself. Here in a sacrifice characterized by two events of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udāty and the Pratiharty which occur successively, the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the earlier event is admitted by Vyāsatīrtha to have been destroyed by the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the subsequent event. And, the sacrifice is completed by performing the rite occasioned by the subsequent event. Hence the rite occasioned by the earlier event of letting go of the
waist cloth by the Udgāty contributes neither to the invisible result of the main sacrifice nor to the accomplishment of the sacrifice itself, and so it cannot be a subsidiary in the sacrifice. It could, however, contribute to the invisible result of the main sacrifice or to the accomplishment of the sacrifice itself, and thus be a subsidiary in the sacrifice, if the sacrifice is characterized by only one act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty.

It follows that the rite occasioned by the earlier event of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty is not a subsidiary in the sacrifice which is characterized by two events of letting go of the waist cloth by Udgāty and the Pratiharya occurring successively. Hence the fourth alternative that the obligation to perform the rite occasioned by the earlier event of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty consists in the above occasioned rite being a subsidiary in the sacrifice is wrong.

Appayya Dātipīta concludes that Vyāsātīrtha cannot satisfactorily explain the characteristic of obligation which, according to him, belongs to the performance of the rite occasioned by the earlier act of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty in a jyotistoma sacrifice which is characterized by two events of letting go of the waist cloth by the Udgāty.
and the Pratiharty occurring successively. The obligation
to perform the rite occasioned by the earlier event does
not really exist in a sacrifice where the latter is character-
ised by the above two events occurring successively. It is
indeterminable and its knowledge is not valid. In other words,
the knowledge of the obligation to perform the rite occasioned
by the subsequent event invalidates the knowledge of the obli-
gation to perform the rite occasioned by the earlier event
of validity. Thus the anapachada-prāya is an example of the
subsequent one, namely, the knowledge arising from the anuprā-
ityaśānti invalidating the antecedent one, namely, the know-
ledge arising from perception.

The application of the anapachada-prāya suggests that
scripture is more powerful than perception. This means that
a scriptural text must be taken in its literal sense even though
its text is in conflict with perception. But some scriptural texts
are interpreted in a figurative way in order to have no conflict
with perception. For example the vedic text 'The strew is the
sacrificer' which speaks of the identity between the strew
and the sacrificer is interpreted in a figurative way to mean
that the strew is as important as the sacrificer. It is because
that the primary sense of the above text, namely, the identity
of the strew and the sacrificer is opposed to perception which
clearly shows that the two are totally distinct. From this it
follows that perception is more powerful than scripture.

The result of this conclusion is that perception which gives rise to the knowledge of the reality of the world is more powerful than the scriptural text which gives rise to the knowledge that the objects of the world are indeterminable.

Vācaspatimisrā answers the above objection thus: not all scripture is of greater force than perception. It is only that scripture whose import lies in its literal sense that is more powerful than perception. The import of the scriptural text cited above lies in the condemnation of the strew and not in its literal sense, namely, the identity of the strew and the sacrificer. Hence in this case, perception is more powerful than scripture and the scriptural text is interpreted in a secondary way as to have no conflict with perception. In the case of nityānta-gratih its import in its primary sense, namely, the indeterminability of the objects of the world and hence it is more powerful than scripture.

Some followers of the Vivarana school do not favour the above view that the scripture whose import lies in its literal sense is more powerful than perception. They argue that there are certain Vedic texts whose import lies in their literal senses and yet they are interpreted in a secondary way so as to have no conflict with perception. For example, the
import of the vedic text 'Cook the golden grains' lies in its literal sense, namely, the golden grains must be cooked. But 'cooking' means an act which generates in the origination of a different form and taste in the object that is cooked. Such an act of cooking relating to golden grains conflicts with perception which shows that golden grains cannot be cooked in the above manner. According to the śivasī school, the above vedic text must be taken as more powerful than perception as its import lies in its primary sense. This means that although the meaning of the scriptural text is in conflict with perception, yet, in view of the powerful nature of scripture, the latter's conflict with perception should be disregarded and its literal sense must be retained.

The śivarājaśī school, however, does not retain the literal sense of the above text. It takes the word 'cook' in the text 'Cook the golden grains' in its secondary sense of mere heating, in order to have no conflict with perception, then the whole text would/mean 'in at the golden grains' which is in conformity with perception according to which mere heating of the golden grains is possible.

The point that is of importance here is that although the import of a particular scriptural text lies in its literal sense, yet that text is not considered to be more powerful than
perception because it is reinterpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with perception. Hence we have to give up the Bhāmatī view that scripture is more powerful than perception, if its import lies in its literal sense.

Having rejected the Bhāmatī view that scripture whose import lies in its literal sense is more powerful than perception, the followers of the Vivarāga school state that all scripture - irrespective of whether its import lies in its literal sense or not - is more powerful than perception. This, however, is a general rule. And, there is an exception to this general rule which is as follows: if there arises the contingency of the perceptual cognition becoming devoid of any content when contradicted by the knowledge arising from scripture, then, in that case, perception is more powerful than scripture and the latter should be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with perception. If, on the other hand, we could provide some content for the perceptual cognition, when the latter is contradicted by the knowledge arising from the scripture, then, in that case, the latter is more powerful than perception.

The followers of the Vivarāga school interpret the text 'the strew is the sacrificer' in the light of what has been said above. According to the general rule that all scripture
is more powerful than perception, the scriptural text 'The straw is the sacrificer' which conveys the identity of the straw and the sacrificer is more powerful than perception which clearly shows that straw and the sacrificer are totally different and hence it could contradict the perceptual cognition. But the latter when contradicted by scripture would become devoid of any content.

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It is thus: the difference between the straw and the sacrificer known through perception, when contradicted by the scripture which conveys the identity between the two cannot be considered as absolutely real: for if it were so, then there would be contradiction with the Upanishadic teaching that Brahma is the sole reality.

The difference between the two cannot be taken as apparently real like silver that appears in a shell. For, an object can be admitted to be apparently real, if it is sublated by a perceptual cognition prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahma. The silver that appears in a shell is sublated by the perceptual cognition of the form 'This is shell only' prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahma. The difference between the straw and the sacrificer is not at all sublated by a perceptual cognition prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahma. Hence it cannot be apparently real.
The difference between the strew and the sacrificer cannot be taken as empirically real. This requires a discussion regarding the nature of the strew and the sacrificer as implied by the scriptural text. The identity cannot be taken as absolutely real; for, if it were so, there would be contradiction with the Upanishadic teaching that Brahman is the sole reality. It cannot be a apparently real like silver that appears in a shell; for, unlike silver which is perceptually known to be identical with the 'this-element' of shell in the form 'This is silver', the sacrificer is not perceptually cognized as identical with the strew. Hence we have to maintain that the identity between the strew and the sacrificer conveyed by the Vedic text is empirically real. Thus when identity between the strew and the sacrificer conveyed by the Vedic text is to be taken as empirically real, difference between the two known through perception cannot be taken as empirically real; for, difference and identity possessing same level of reality cannot be predicated of all respect of two entities such as strew and the sacrificer.

It would be clear from the above that if perception which apprehends the difference of strew from the sacrificer is contradicted by the Vedic text which speaks of identity between the strew and the sacrificer, then the perceptual
cognition cannot be explained as having for its content
difference which is either absolutely real, or empirically
real, or apparently real. This means that perceptual cogni-
tion would become devoid of any content. This, however, is
improper because contentless cognition is a contradiction
in terms. Hence we must admit that in the present case per-
ception is more powerful than the scripture and the latter
should therefore be interpreted in such a way as not to have
any conflict with perception. That is why the text 'The straw
is the sacrificer' is interpreted in a secondary way to mean
that the straw is as important as the sacrificer.

In the same way, the scriptural text 'Cook the golden
grain' conveys the act of cooking in respect of the golden
grain. Perception, however, shows that golden grain cannot
be cooked. Following the general rule that scripture is more
powerful than perception, if it is held that perception which
shows absence of cooking in respect of golden grains conveys
the act of cooking in respect of golden grains, then the former
will become devoid of any content. It is thus, absence of
cooking which is known from perception cannot be absolutely
real in view of the fact that nothing apart from Brahman is
absolutely real. It cannot be empirically real; the act of
cooking conveyed in respect of the golden grains also is
empirically real and cooking as well as absence of cooking
having some level of reality cannot be admitted in one substratum - the golden grains. Absence of cooking cannot be apparently real also; for, prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahman, it is not contradicted. Hence, if the scriptural text which speaks of the act of cooking in respect of golden grains, contradicts perception which points to absence of cooking in respect of golden grains, then perceptual cognition cannot be explained as having for its content absence of cooking either as absolutely real, or empirically real, or apparently real. No other content also can be provided for the above perceptual cognition. Thus the perceptual cognition in the present case would become devoid of any content, if it is contradicted by scriptural text that conveys the act of cooking in respect of the golden grains. Hence perception is admitted to be more powerful than scripture in the present case, and the scriptural text is interpreted in a secondary way to mean that golden grains must be heated. And, this sense is not in conflict with perception which also points to the possibility of heating in respect of golden grains.

In the case of nikhvātva-gruti the position is different. Perception which gives us the knowledge of the reality of the objects of the world, is contradicted by the nikhvātva-gruti which gives us the knowledge that objects of the world are
not real. But, when contradicted, there does not arise the contingency of the perceptual cognition becoming devoid of any content. It is because that objects having empirical reality are provided as the content of the perceptual cognition. Since perceptual cognition when contradicted by the nityātva-ārati does not become devoid of any content, nityātva-ārati is more powerful than perception.

To sum up: according to the saṃchāda-nyāya, scripture which is subsequent is more powerful than perception which is antecedent. And, the knowledge arising from the nityātva-ārati referring to the indeterminate character of the objects of world arises by invalidating the perceptual cognition which refers to the reality of the objects of the world.

Now Vṛṣasthīrtha argues that just as scripture is known to be of greater force than perception on the basis of the maxim arrived at in the saṃchāda-dhikaraṇa, so also perception is known to be of greater force than scripture on the basis of the maxim arrived at in the upakrama-dhikaraṇa. As a result of this, there is no stronger reason to decide that only saṃchāda-nyāya operates in the case of conflict of between perception and scripture.

The maxim arrived at in the upakrama-dhikaraṇa which is known as upakrama-nyāya is as follows: if a particular section
of a text conveys a unitary sense, and if there is noticed any apparent contradiction between the meaning of the initial passage and that of the concluding passage, then the concluding passage must be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with the meaning of the initial passage. It is because that the initial passage is of greater force than the concluding passage.

The above position is explained further by saying that at the time of the origination of knowledge of the meaning of the initial passage nothing is opposed to it, as the knowledge of the meaning of the concluding passage which is opposed to it has not arisen. And, the knowledge of the meaning of the concluding passage, at the time of its origination, has the knowledge of the meaning of the initial passage opposed to it. In other words, the former is asmiśta-virodhi, that is, has nothing opposed to it at the time of its origination, while the latter is anāśmiśta-virodhi, that is, has something opposed to it at the time of its origination itself. It is on the basis of this that the former is said to be of greater force than the latter, and the concluding passage must be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with the meaning of the initial passage.

The ānātha-gāmahā school explains the above maxim by making a reference to a particular section of the veda
which deals with a sacrifice that is to be offered to Varuna. The initial passage of that section of the Veda is: 'Prajapati gave a horse to Varuna and he performed four pot-sherd sacrifices as an offering to Varuna'. From this it is known that one who gives horses by way of gift must perform, as his duty consequent on the gift, a sacrifice as an offering to Varuna. The initial passage thus speaks of the performance of a sacrifice as an offering to Varuna by one who gives horses by way of gift.

The concluding passage is: 'As many horses as one receives by way of gift, so many pot-sherd sacrifices one has to perform as an offering to Varuna'. From this it is known that one who receives horses by way of gift has to perform a sacrifice as an offering to Varuna.

Thus the meanings of the initial and the concluding passages are contradictory to each other as the former speaks of a sacrifice to be offered to Varuna by one who gives horses by way of gift. The whole section of the Veda which deals with the sacrifice to be offered to Varuna cannot be taken to be valid, if the initial and the concluding passages convey that such a sacrifice is to be performed by persons possessing opposing characteristics such as giving horses by way of gift and receiving horses by way of gift. Hence one of the two
passages must be taken in its secondary sense to suit the meaning of the other. As we have said earlier, the initial passage is more powerful than the later one, and hence the must be interpreted in a secondary manner in order that it may have no conflict with the meaning of the initial passage. The śānkalita school, therefore, interprets the word 'receives' in the concluding passage in sense of 'causes to receive' by adding the causative suffix (pl). Now the concluding passage would mean 'as many horses as one causes to receive by way of gift, so many four potsherds sacrifices one has to perform as an offering to Varuṇa'. This is exactly the import of the initial passage. It is only when the latter passage is interpreted in conformity with the meaning of the initial passage, we can maintain that the whole section deals with a sacrifice to be offered to Varuṇa by persons having similar characteristic of giving horses by way of gift.

The point that is of importance here is: Vyāsatīrtha argues that the relation between perception and the svitvātva-śrutī must be viewed in the light of the above maxim. Perceptual cognition of the world arises earlier and it is not opposed to anything, because at the time of its origination, the knowledge arising from the svitvātva-śrutī which is opposed to it has not arisen. Hence it is asānīta-viśedhi. The knowledge arising from the svitvātva-śrutī, however, at the time of
erigation itself, has perceptual cognition opposed to it. Hence it is sañjata-virādhi, according to the maxims arrived at in the uṣṇikavādhaṅkaraga, the initial cognition, since it is sañjata-virādhi is more powerful than the latter cognition of athātvā-sūtpi which is sañjata-virādhi. Hence perceptual cognition invalidated the knowledge arising from athātvā-sūtpi.

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Appayya gjāsita that the above contention, namely, that perceptual cognition which arises earlier invalidates the subsequent cognition arising from the athātvā-sūtpi on the basis of the uṣṇikavādhaṅkaraga is wrong. It is because that uṣṇikavādhaṅkaraga is applicable only when there is contradiction between the initial passage and the concluding passage of a particular section of a text that conveys a unitary sense. This means that the contradiction that is to be resolved by the application of uṣṇikavādhaṅkaraga is between two sentence which come under a single prasāpa - verbal testimony. In other words, the uṣṇikavādhaṅkaraga is applicable only when there arises contradiction between two sentences. In the present case, the contradiction is between perception on the one hand, and the athātvā-sūtpi on the other. This means that the contradiction is not between two sentences but between two different prasāpas. Hence the uṣṇikavādhaṅkaraga does not apply here. The anupasade-

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alos applies; and, the subsequent cognition arising from the athātvā-sūtpi invalidates the earlier cognition arisen from perception.
One more objection is raised by Vyāsatīrtha; and, that is \textit{vāsīthya-virodha} – sublation of the sustaining factor. The \textit{sātvātva-āruti}, in order that it may give rise to the knowledge of indeterminability of objects and thereby sublates the perceptual cognition, requires the perceptual knowledge of the sentence consisting of words. Thus the \textit{sātvātva-āruti} does depend upon perceptual cognition. The latter, therefore, constitute the sustaining factor of the \textit{sātvātva-āruti}. If the knowledge arising from the latter sublates perceptual cognition, then it amounts to admitting that is sublates its sustaining factor, and this is not proper.

This objection is answered by saying that the sustaining factor of the \textit{sātvātva-āruti} is only the perceptual cognition of words constituting the \textit{sātvātva-āruti}. This aspect is not sublated. What is sublated is the absolute reality in respect of the perceptual cognition of the words. And it is not the sustaining factor of the \textit{sātvātva-āruti}.

To sum up: the Upanishads convey Brahman as eternal, pure, consciousness, ever-released, truth, subtle, existence, all-pervasive, non-dual, and bliss. Its non-dual nature is not contradicted by perception. And, it appears as God, soul, and the world through \textit{sāvā-avidā}. The concept of \textit{sāvā-avidā} is dealt with in the following chapter.