CHAPTER-III

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

1. A NOTE ON EPISTEMOLOGY

Most of the philosophical schools deal with three important aspects, viz., epistemology, metaphysics or ontology and ethics. Epistemology means the theory of knowledge. The term ‘Epistemology’ has been derived from ‘Episteme’ meaning knowledge and ‘Logos’ meaning science or theory. It is called a science because it enquires into the origin, the nature and the conditions of knowledge are made here. The study of pramāṇa comes under epistemology.

Epistemology has acquired much importance in western philosophy. According to Kant, theory of knowledge may be broadly divided into two classes, viz., conceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge.¹ In Indian philosophy, it is considered as an essential part of philosophy. In the course of development of Indian schools the interest in epistemology has been increased and it began to claim a large share in the philosophical discussion of almost every school of Indian philosophy.² The Indian epistemology involves four basic factors, viz., pramāṇa (cogniser of valid knowledge), prameya (the knowable), pramāṇa (source of knowledge) and pramā or pramiti (the valid knowledge of the object).³ With the help of these factors of epistemology, different schools of Indian philosophy try to determine the methods of

1. Kant, Immanul, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 41
3. pramāṇaṁ pramātā prameyaṁ pramitirītī caturvargenaiva vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate. cf. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭika*, p.16
arriving at the conclusions. The Nyāya epistemology deals with the conditions of valid knowledge and means of valid knowledge. The reality of Nyāya depends on the Nyāya theory of knowledge. The issues like nature of knowledge means of acquiring knowledge and criteria for determining the truth of knowledge etc. comprise the subject matter of the epistemological queries that lead to the formation of a theory of knowledge. The basic of all practical activities is knowledge. The function of knowledge is to illuminate things other than itself. Knowledge refers to an object that is known and it always belongs to a subject that knows. It is the property of the self. There can be no knowledge existing independently by itself without implying a knower and a thing known.

Different schools of Indian philosophy have adopted different views on the theory of knowledge. The Nyāya theory of knowledge is an important aspect in Indian epistemology. According to Nyāya, knowledge is the apprehension of objects. Naiyāyikas maintain that knowledge is the manifestation of objects to a subject. This manifestation is a property which essentially belongs to the soul-substance but it is not the essence of the self. In its pure essence, the self is devoid of worldly knowledge. The Nyāya holds that an object is the cause of knowledge. For example, in case of the knowledge of blue objects, the blue object is the cause of blue cognition. In the absence of blue object, it can not be produced. Gautama refers to knowledge with the term buddhi and contends that the term upalabdhi and jñāna are its synonyms.

4. pratitiḥ vāstvāntara prakāśasvabhāva. Nyāyaratnakāra on Ślokavārtika, p. 44
5. arthoprakāśako buddhi. Tarkabhāṣāprakāśa, p. 218
6. buddhirupalabdhirjñānamityanarthāntaram. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.15
Kaṇāda includes *buddhi* in the list of qualities. Praśastapāda adds one more word i.e., *pratyaya* to the list of synonyms of *buddhi* as stated by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*.\(^7\) Annaṁbhaṭṭa opines that *buddhi* is knowledge itself and not an instrument of knowledge.\(^8\) According to the Advaita Vedānta, knowledge is very stuff of the self. There is no difference between self and knowledge. Self is called knowledge. Therefore, Saṅkara rejects the distinction between the substance and attribute. Substance and quality are identical in the same as fire and its heat one. Hence, self and knowledge are identical. The Jainas hold that the nature of the knowledge is self-revealing as well as object-revealing.\(^9\)

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga has maintained knowledge as a mode of *buddhi*. According to them, *Puruṣa* is immutable and conscious. Pleasure and pain etc. belong to *buddhi* which is an evolute of *pakṛti*. *Buddhi* or knowledge transforms itself into the shape of the object that is cognizing. Though *Puruṣa* is inactive, due to the indiscrimination with *buddhi*, activity of the *Puruṣa* takes place and as a result the phenomenon of cognition arises.

**2. MEANING OF THE TERM JÑĀNA AND PRAMĀ**

Indian epistemology or the theory of knowledge in Indian philosophy deals with the two particular terms, viz., *jñāna* and *pramā*. *Jñāna* includes all kinds of knowledge, e.g., true and false. Naiyāyikas maintain that the term *jñāna* or knowledge can only be understood as cognition of objective reality. External objects are endowed

\(^7\) buddhirupalabdhijñānaṁ pratyaya iti paryāyaḥ. *Vedānta Priyabhaṣā*, p. 136  
\(^8\) *Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 21  
with forms and are manifested by knowledge. According to Nyāya, knowledge (jñāna) involves of three factors, viz., the object (viṣaya), the subject (viṣayi) and the self linking relation (svarūpasāmbandha). Knowledge can be obtained after the self linking relation between the object and the subject. In case of knowledge, the object is related to knowledge by itself. The cognized reality (jñeya) and the cognizing reality (jñāna) are brought together. The knowledge arises out of three kinds of relations. These are: samyoga (conjunction), i.e., the relation between the sense and its objects, samavāya (inherence), i.e., the relation between the knowledge and self and svarūpa (self-linking), i.e., the relation between the object and its knowledge.

Thus, it has been proved that knowledge is a manifestation of objects. It always refers to an object which may be present or past. On this basis, knowledge is divided into two-fold divisions, viz., smṛti and anubhava. If knowledge refers to a past object, it is known as smṛti. It is the reproduction of the past experience. On the other hand, if knowledge refers to a present object it is called anubhava. It is a present experience. Both of these are divided into valid and non-valid depending on the real nature of object. Anubhava is first divided into two, viz., true (valid) and false (non-valid). The first is called pramā and the later is called apramā. The term pramā is derived from the root śma with a prefix pra and adding suffix tāp. It means valid knowledge. Indian logicians generally use the term pramā for referring to valid knowledge, while the term jñāna refers to both valid and invalid knowledge. The word pramā is defined as the right apprehension of an object.10 Regarding the nature of pramā different systems of philosophy put forward different views. A brief resume of the view of valid knowledge upheld by different philosophies is given here.

10. yathārthānubhava pramā. Tarkasaṅgraha, p. 4
3. BAUDDHA VIEW OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

According to the Bauddhas, the truth of knowledge consists in its practical value. They define pramāṇa as the knowledge which reveals an object that is capable to successful volition.11 Dharmakīrti states that knowledge should correspond to object. Dharmottara, the commentator of the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti defines valid knowledge as the knowledge of an object not known previously.12 The knowledge of an already known object can not be taken as valid because the function of knowledge is prompt activity in relation to an object which is presented it.

Hence, according to him, smṛti or remembrance is not valid knowledge.13 Dharmottara maintains that the object of valid knowledge is of two types, viz., grāhya and adhyāvaseya.14 Thus, in view of Dharmottara, valid knowledge is an invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man wants to have. At the time of proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any knowledge, we get an object or thing as presented by it. Then, we call it a valid knowledge.

4. JAINA VIEW OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

The Jaina logicians define valid knowledge as the knowledge which is not contradicted. According to them, definiteness is the essential mark of valid

11. pramāṇamavisarṇvādijñānaṁ, a visarṇvādaña ca śabdani友ktiiḥ.
   arthakriyāsthitiḥ. Pramāṇavārtika, 1.2
12. a visarṇvādakaṁ jñānaṁ sarṇyajñānaṁ ataeva cānadhigataviṣayarṁ
   pramāṇaṁ, Nyāyabindusūkta on Nyāyabindu, 1.1
13. na tāvadavisarṇvādī pramāṇaṁ. smṛṭerapi tathābhāvaprasakteḥ.
   Prakaraṇapaṁcikā, p. 113
14. dvividho hi pramāṇasya viṣayogrāhya’dhyāvaseyaśca.
   Nyāyabindusūkta, p. 16
knowledge. Invalid knowledge (apramā) is the wrong cognition of an object. It includes remembrance (smṛtī), doubt (saṃśaya), error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka). These are apprehension of false cognition in which the qualifier is not appropriately related to the qualificant (viśaya). Vādidevasūri defines valid means of knowledge as a definite knowledge which reveals itself and the other objects.¹⁵ Siddhasena considers non-contradictoriness in place of definiteness as a mark of pramā.¹⁶

5. SĀṂKHYA-YOGA VIEW OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

The Sāṁkhyaśtras hold that the validity of knowledge consists in certainty (undoubtness), correspondence to the object and novelty as marks of the validity of knowledge. The Sāṁkhyaśutra, defines valid knowledge as determination (paricchitti) of an object which is not previously cognized.¹⁷

Vācaspati Miśra defines pramā as the cittavrūti (modification of citta) which apprehends an object that is undoubted, real and unknown.¹⁸ Sāṁkhyaśtras hold that buddhi or cognition takes the form of the object and so the truth of cognition consists in its being a faithful copy of the object. Valid knowledge has correspondence to its object in the sense in which a true copy has it to its original. Vijñānabhikṣu opines that buddhivrūti may also be taken as pramā. He defines pramā as the reflection of buddhi on puruṣa having the form of object.¹⁹

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¹⁵. svaparavyavasāyi jñānaṁ pramāṇarāṁ. Pramāṇanyāyatattvāloka, 1.2
¹⁶. pramāṇarāṁ svaparābhāsi bādhavivarjitaṁ. Nyāyavatāravārtikavrūti, 1.2
¹⁷. Sāṁkhyaśutra, 1.87
¹⁸. tacchasandidhaviparitanādhigataviśaya cittavrūṭī. Tattvavaiśāradī on Yogasūtra, 1.5
¹⁹. Sāṁkhya-pravacanabhāṣya on Sāṁkhya-kārikā, 1.87
6. VEDÂNTA VIEW OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

Advaita Vedântins hold that the uncontradicted knowledge of an object is called pramā. They maintain that the knowledge is valid where it has for its object something which is not contradicted (abādhita)20 Dharmarājādhvarindra has defined pramā or valid knowledge as a cognition which is not previously known (anadhigata) and is not also contradicted (abādhita).21

As such, he gives two alternative definitions of valid knowledge, viz., valid knowledge is that knowledge which is not known previously i.e., the knowledge which apprehends an object that is not already known. Secondly, valid knowledge is that knowledge which is an uncontradicted knowledge i.e., the validity of knowledge consists in non-contradictoriness. Thus, he defines pramā with and without novelty as mark of pramā.22 Dharmarājādhvarindra also states that time enters as an element in all perceptions and since the successive moments of a continuous perception remain previously unknown and unperceived the perception may be said to be anadhigata.23 The followers of Vedânta philosophy do not accept the novelty as an essential factor for valid knowledge nor do they oppose the view of considering novelty as a mark of pramā. Vācaspati Miśra, in his Bhāmatī, says that the pramā is that knowledge the object of which is not known before, which is free of doubt and which is uncontradicted. That means, in his view, validity of knowledge depends on

20. smṛtisādhāraṇaṁ tu abādhitartha viśaya jñāṇaṁ. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 4
21. anadhigatābādhitarthaviśayakā jñāṇatvaṁ pramātvaṁ.

Vedânta Paribhāśā, p. 9
22. tatra smṛty/ayāvṛttāṁ pramātvaṁ anadhigatābādhitaviśayajñāṇatvaṁ. Ibid.
23. nirūpasyāpi kālaśya indriyavedyatvābhyupagamena dhārāvahika buddherapi pūrva pūrva jñānaviśayatattāt kṣānāviśeṣa viśayakatvena na tatravyāptiḥ. Ibid., p. 10
uncontradictedness, novelty and undoubtness. The term *anadhigata* is used to exclude *smṛti* (memory) from the scope of valid knowledge as *smṛti* is already known, while, the term *abādhita* (not contradicted) is used to exclude wrong knowledge as it always contradicted. However, it may be said that some Advaita Vedāntins do not exclude *smṛti* (memory) from the scope of valid knowledge.

7. MĪMĀṂŚĀ VIEW OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā considers the correspondence to the object, novelty and non-contradictoriness as the test of validity. Pārthasārathi Miśra defines it as the knowledge which represents the real nature of an object which was not attained earlier and which is not contradicted by a subsequent knowledge. Šālikanātha Miśra of Prabhākara Mīmāṃśā School refutes Bhāṭṭa’s definition of valid knowledge as the definition is not tenable in respect of continuous cognitions. Šālikanātha Miśra defines valid knowledge as experience totally different from remembrance which is not valid in as much as it stands in need of a previous knowledge, as it is a knowledge which is produced only by the impressions left by some previous experience. The view of Mīmāṃsākas of Prabhākara school is the same as that the later Naiyāyikas except that Prabhākara does not include the term *yathārtha* in the definition.

24. abādhita anadhigatāsandigdhobhbhacanatvai̊niḥ pramoṣṭvai pramoṣṭvai
    tacca svata ityupapaditam. Bhāmaś on Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya, 1.1.4

25. kāraṇa doṣabādhakajñānarahitamagrhitagrāhi jñānaiḥ pramoṣṭamiti.
    Šāstradiplika, p.123

26. nāpi dṛḍhamavaisavādyagṛhitārtham gṛthagrahaikaiḥ pramoṣṭam
    iti pramoṣṭalaikanamupapadyate. Prakaraṇapaṇcikā. p. 119

27. anubhūtiḥ pramoṣṭam sa smṛteranya smṛtīḥ puṇāḥ.
    pūrvabhijñānasasaiśkāramatraiṁ jñānamucyate. na pramoṣṭaiṁ smṛtīḥ
    pūrvapratipattirapekṣanāt. Ibid., pp. 5 ,1-2
8. VALID KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING TO LATER NAÎYÂYIKAS

The nature of pramâ is of true knowledge which is distinct from false knowledge such as memory, doubt, error and hypothetical argument. It is defined by the Naïyâyikas as the knowledge which informs of the existence of something in a place where it actually exists or, in other words, pramâ is the knowledge which predicates of something a property really possessed by it.²⁸ Annaînbhâṭṭa also clarifies that valid experience (yathârthânubhava) is called pramâ in scriptures.²⁹ For example, this is a pot (ayaî ghatâ). Keśava Miśra in his Tarkabhâṣâ states that pramâ means valid experience, i.e., an apprehension which accords with the true character of the object or thing apprehended.³⁰ He excludes the remembrance in the definition of pramâ because it depends on previous experience. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the author of Nyâyamañjarî opines that smrti is not valid knowledge and that is why it is excluded from valid knowledge by the inclusion of the word arthopalabdhi in the definition. He holds that valid knowledge is an apprehension produced by an object. Śivâditya maintains that pramâ is the experience of the real nature of things.³¹ Gaṅgeśa maintains that pramâ is that which informs us of experience of something in a place where it really exist.³² Vaiśeṣikas also agrees with the Nyâya theory of valid knowledge. According to Prof. D. M. Datta, pramâ is generally defined as the cognition having two fold characteristics of truth and novelty (abâdhâhitva or

²⁸ tadvati tatprakârakânubhavo yathârthaḥ saiva prametyuccyate. Tarkasângrahâ, p. 34
²⁹ yathârthânubhava eva śâstre prametyu syata. Dîpikâ onIbid.
³⁰ yathârthânubhava pramâ. Tarkabhâṣâ, p.8
³¹ tattvânubhavah pramâ. Saptapâdaârthi, p.101
³² atha tadvitatatprakârakajñânatvarî prâmânyam. Tattvacintâmaṇî, p. 232
yathārthatva and anadhigatavā), and that as regards the first characteristics of truth of all schools of Indian philosophy are unanimous.\(^{33}\)

**9. NATURE OF PRAMĀṆA**

Pramāṇa is the first category accepted by Naiyāyikas. The reality of Nyāya depends on the theory of knowledge. Valid knowledge is called pramāṇa and the means through which this valid knowledge is arrived at is called the instrument or means of valid knowledge. The word pramāṇa is derived from the root ṛmā with the prefix pra and adding the suffix lyut. The root ṛmā with the prefix pra means to know rightly and the suffix lyut being in the instrumental, the word, pramāṇa means the instrument by which something is rightly known.

In the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama has not defined pramāṇa. He simply enumerates four means of knowledge and leaves the term pramāṇa unexplained. But Vātsyāyana, in his commentary has given a general definition of pramāṇa. In his view, that is called pramāṇa which is the instrument of valid knowledge.\(^{34}\) Uddyotakara repeats Vātsyāyana’s view in somewhat clarifying manner and has not added anything substantial in the already existing etymology based definition of pramāṇa given by Vātsyāyana. Hence, he says pramāṇa denotes instrumentality and means instrument of valid knowledge.\(^{35}\) Uddyotakara further states that pramāṇa is the cause of cognition (upalabdhihetu).\(^{36}\) The definition of Uddyotakara is actually

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33. Datta, D.M., *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 20
34. pramīyate’neneti karaṇārthābhidhāno hi pramāṇāsabdah. *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.3
35. pramīyate’neneti pramāṇam. *Nyāyavārtika*, p.27
based on the etymological meaning of the term *pramāṇa.* Vācaspati Miśra also does not provide us with a comprehensive definition of *pramāṇa.* He has followed his predecessors in defining *pramāṇa* as the instrument of valid knowledge, but he clarifies that *pramāṇa* is valid knowledge which is different from remembrance. He attempts to give Vātsyāyana’s definition of *pramāṇa* a logical form refuting the rival views. Vācaspati refers to some other views regarding the nature of *pramāṇa.* According to some *pramāṇa* is that which cognizes something that is not cognized before. Some others (that is the Buddhists) say that the similarity of the object with the knowledge having form. Another set of philosophers say that *pramāṇa* is the capability of cognition which is devoid of form to illuminate all these views are not accepted by Vācaspati. He accepts the definition given by the author of *Vārtika* in this respect and says that *pramāṇa* is the cause of cognition. Vācaspati also points out that this definition has the defect of over pervasion to the causes of *saṁśaya* (doubt) and *viparyāsa* (error). *Saṁśaya* and *viparyāsa* are also cognitions and as such *pramāṇa* may include all causes of this invalid knowledge. To counter this Vācaspati says that the word *arthavat* is to be added to the definition. *Arthavat* means in consonance with the real nature of the object which amounts to mean valid.

37. *Nyāyavārtika,* p. 427
38. *pramāṇaḥ* hi *pramāṇaṁ,* na ca *smṛtiḥ* *pramāṇaḥ.* *Nyāyavārtika* *tātparyādikā,* p. 21
40. *upalabdhiḥ* *pramāṇaṁ.* *Ibid.,* p. 20

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Another objection raised by Vācaspati Miśra is that the above definition of pramāṇa will be applicable to the cause of smṛti also. Smṛti is cognition and such the cause of smṛti will also be pramāṇa. Even with the word artha, this problem remains. Because, saṃskāra which is the cause of smṛti also has consonance with the real object and as such saṃskāra will also have to be regarded as pramāṇa. Vācaspati replies that this objection is not tenable since pramāṇa means instrument of pramā, while smṛti is not pramā.\textsuperscript{42}

The definition of pramāṇa, as that which cognizes something not cognized before is also not acceptable to Vācaspati Miśra, since this definition is not applicable to continuous knowledge. In case of continuous knowledge, the object of the second moment is already known. Hence, here, there is the absence of the adjective ‘previously unknown’, which will make the object of continuous knowledge as apramā. It can not be also said that the knowledge of the later moments have not validity, because knowledge always reveals objects.

Hence, as knowledge of the later moment also can reveal object, so their validity can be rejected.\textsuperscript{43} Vācaspati then concludes that the word pramā denotes any presentational cognition which is not opposed to its object and which is different from memory. The instrument of such pramā is pramāṇa.\textsuperscript{44}

In case of the definition of pramāṇa as upalabdhirhetu is given by the Bhāṣya and the Vārtika, there arises another objection which is shown by Uddyotakara.

\textsuperscript{42} na ca smṛṭiḥ pramā, lokārdhāṇāvadhāraṇo hi śabdārthasaṁbandhaḥ. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 21
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{44} upalabdhimātrasyārtbhāvabhirināḥ smṛṭeranyasya pramā-śabdenābhidhānāt. \textit{Ibid.}
Uddyotakara says that this definition cannot be the right one because it is applicable in common to other things also. That means the *pramāṭṛ* (cogniser) and *prameya* (object of cognition) are also causes of cognition. Hence, these would also be regarded as *pramāṇam*. To this, Uddyotakara replies that the cogniser and the cognized object have their function to fulfill elsewhere. The function of the cogniser and the object is fulfilled by the insisting of the *pramāṇa* into activity. But, the *pramāṇa* does not have its function fulfill. That is why *pramāṇa* is regarded as the real cause of cognition.\(^{45}\) Vācaspati here clarifies that the operating of the instrument and not directly bringing about the ultimate result. In his view, the instrument is of two kinds,\(^ {46}\) viz., i) that which already exists like sense organ etc. and ii) that which has to be brought into existence, e.g., the contact of the object without organ.\(^ {47}\) The cogniser only sets into activity these two kinds of instruments.

The *pramāṇa*, on the other hand, has no other function but to bring about the cognition.\(^ {48}\) The object cognized is regarded as a cause in case of sense perception only. In the case of sense perception also all that the object does is to bring about

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45. samānatvādalaṅkaṇaṁāmi cet? ........upalabdhihetutvāt pramāṇatvaṁ prasajyet……..pramāṇe pramāṭrprameyaṁaṅgaṁcarīrthatvaṁ………… acarīrthamāṁ tu pramāṇaṁ. atastadevupalabdhisādhanamāmi. *Nyāyavārtika*, p.5

46. sarvaḥ kartā kāraṇagocaravyāpāro na śākṣāṭphale vyāpiyate. karaṇaṁ ca dvidhā siddhamasiddhaṁ. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā*, p.22


sense-contact necessary for the cognition. It also does not operate directly in bringing about the cognition. Hence, only pramāṇa is the cause or instrument of pramāṇa.49

Hence, according to Vācaspāti Miśra knowledge is true only when it is not contradicted by its object.50 He opines that knowledge is said to be true when it reveals the object with the nature and attribute possesses by it in spite of changes of time, place and other conditions.51 Thus, in the view of Naiyāyikas the valid knowledge consists in its correspondence to objects.

10. NUMBER OF SOURCES OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

Indian schools of philosophy are not unanimous in their choice of the pramāṇa. Different schools maintain different types of sources of valid knowledge. Regarding the number of pramāṇas, different schools of philosophy differs from one to eight. Čārvākas accept only one pramāṇa, i.e., only perception (pratyakṣa), Vaiśeṣika and Baudhā accept two pramāṇas, viz., perception and inference (anumāṇa), Sāṅkhya believes three pramāṇas, namely, perception, inference and verbal testimony (śabda). These three pramāṇas are accepted by Naiyāyikas along with comparision (upamāṇa). Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā has add one more called postulation (arthāpatī) to this four. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsākas and Advaitins recognize the above five with the addition of non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) to them.

49. tadidaṁ pramāṭprameyayoḥ pramāṇe caritārthatvamacaritārthatvair ca pramāṇasya, tasmāt tadeva phalaehetuh. Ibid.
50. arthavyabhicārenānarthakattvāt. Ibid., p. 20
51. Cf. no khalu vikalpyamānaṁ vastvasti arthakriyāsu vopayujyate. Ibid.
The Paurānikas admit above six with the addition of possibilities (saṁbhavas) and tradition (aितिहya).\textsuperscript{52} Some Trāntrikas recognize cेझा (indication) also in addition to the above as the source of valid knowledge to the list and thus the total numbers of pramāṇas are ten. The Nyāya school of Indian philosophy aims at providing the knowledge of the object.\textsuperscript{53} The knowledge is acquired through the means or sources of knowledge. Gautama enumerates four pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.\textsuperscript{54} The pramāṇas are discussed by Sūtrakāra in his second chapter of Nyāyasūtra. The Bhāṣyakāra and the Vārtikakāra have illustrated the definitions. Vācaspati Miśra has made significant contribution in the elucidation of these definitions.

11. NATURE OF PRATYAKṢA OR PERCEPTION

Perception is the primary source of valid knowledge accepted by almost all the philosophical schools both Vedic and non-Vedic. The Naiyāyikas hold that all other pramāṇas depend on perception.\textsuperscript{55} It is the final test of all knowledge. Inference, verbal testimony requires confirmation by perception, while perception does not require any such confirmation.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{52} pratyakṣamekaṁ cārvākāḥ kaṇādasugatau puṇaḥ.
anumānaṁ taccatha sāṁkhyāḥ sabdaṁca to ubhe
nyāyaikadesinopyevair upamānaca kecana.
arthāpattyaṁ sahaitāṁ catvāryāhuḥ prabhākaraḥ
abhāvaḥ saṣṭhānyetāni bhāṭṭaḥ vedāntina stathā
saṁbhavaitihyayuktāni aṣṭau purāṇikāḥ jaguḥ.
Tār̥kikaraṁ quoted in Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 260

\textsuperscript{53} Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.1

\textsuperscript{54} pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdaḥ pramāṇam. \textit{Ibid.},1.1.3

\textsuperscript{55} Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, 1.1.5; Nyāyabhāṣya on \textit{Ibid.}, 1.1.6-7

\textsuperscript{56} Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, 1.1.3
Vācaspāti Miśra says that *pratyakṣa* is the first and the foremost of all the instruments of valid knowledge as it is the most powerful, most fundamental and roots of all other sources. The Sanskrit term *pratyakṣa* etymologically means the function of any sense-organ with respect to its object. The term *pratyakṣa* is derived from *prati* meaning near or before and *akṣi* meaning eye. Thus, it means the process with the help of which immediate knowledge of an object arises or it means the instrument by which the object is cognized. The word *pratyakṣa* is used in two senses, viz., a noun which stands for perceptual knowledge and as an adjective which qualifies knowledge. Knowledge is produced by the contact of a sense-organ with an object. In this regard perception gives a direct knowledge of reality because by it we directly apprehend the reality, whereas other sources of cognition give knowledge indirectly. For example, the knowledge of a jar comes after in contact with the sense-organ, i.e., eye directly. Hence, it arise a perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa jñāṇa*) and the source of perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*).

12. **NYĀYA VIEW OF PRATYAKṢA**

According to Naiyayikas, perception denotes a *pramāṇa* that leads to direct and valid knowledge. They hold that the valid knowledge arises out of the sense-object-contact (indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ). In other words, sense-object-contact is the specific cause of perception. This specific cause is the distinguishing feature of

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57. sarvapramāṇāṁ pratyakṣapūrvvакватत. *Nyāyavārtikaṭātparyāśikā*, p.21
58. akṣasyā’kṣasya prativiṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam. *Nyāyabhaṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.3
perception. It distinguishes perception from the other means of valid knowledge like inference etc. Sense-object-contact gives an immediate knowledge of an object. Hence, sense-object-contact is the distinguishing property of perception.

Gautama defines perception as \textit{indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānaṁ avyapadeśyaṁ avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam.} That means that cognition which is produced by the contact of the objects with the sense-organs, which indescribable, which is not erroneous and which is well defined is called perception. Vātsyāyana also says that perception consists in the action of each sense-organ on a particular object.\textsuperscript{61} Uddyotakara takes the literary meaning of perception as that which is related to the senses.\textsuperscript{62} Later Naiyāyikas like Viśvanātha and Annaṁ Bhatta defines \textit{pratyakṣa} as the knowledge resulting from sense-object-contact.\textsuperscript{63} Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, the founder of Navya-nyāya school states that perception is the immediate awareness.\textsuperscript{64} Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana points out that the perceptual cognition is the knowledge to which no other knowledge is instrumental.\textsuperscript{65} Keśava Miśra holds the term \textit{sākṣātākāra} to denote the perceptual knowledge and reserve the term \textit{pratyakṣa} for the means of perceptual knowledge.\textsuperscript{66}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[60.] Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4
\item[61.] indriyasyārthena sannikarṣādutpadyaṭe yaj jñānaṁ tat pratyakṣaṁ. \textit{Nyāyabhāṣya} on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4
\item[62.] indriyenārthasannikarṣād jadutpadyaṭe jñānaṁ tat pratyakṣaṁmiti. \textit{Nyāyavārtika}, p. 28
\item[63.] indriyajanyaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ. Bhāṣāapariccheda, p. 121
\item[64.] pratyakṣaṁya sākṣātākāritvaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ. Tattvacintāmani, p. 249
\item[65.] jñānakaraṇaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktaṁvalī, p. 122
\item[66.] sākṣātākāri pramākaraṇaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ. Tarkabhāṣā, p. 5
\end{footnotes}
The definition of perception given by Gautama has been explained threadbare by the subsequent logicians. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspāti Miśra and later on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa have discussed the different terms involved in the definition at great length. Interpreting the attributes in the definition of perception given by Gautama, Vācaspāti Miśra faces a problem. Gautama does not differentiate between pratyakṣa as pramāṇa and as pramiti. But, Vācaspāti Miśra differentiates between the source of knowledge (pramāṇa) and knowledge (pramā). He tried to overcome the difficulty by supplying an additional word yataḥ and thus interpreted the aphorism as: pratyakṣapramāṇa is that form which the knowledge based upon the sense object contact arises.67 The commentators of Nyāyasūtra interpreted this definition in different ways. Some of them maintain that- indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jiññam avyabhicāri pratyakṣam forms the definition and the term avyapadesīyaṁ and vyavasāyātmakam refer to the indeterminate and determinate types of perception.

According to Gautama, pratyakṣa is brought about by the sense-object-contact. Analyzing this term Vātsyāyana points out that the sense-object-contact is not the only cause of perception. All perception pre-supposes the sense organs, the objects, the manas and the self and their mutual contact. The self comes in contact with the mind, and then the mind with the sense organs and the sense organ with the object and then only perception arises.68 Perceptual knowledge is not possible unless the manas comes into contact with the sense organs. But the manas being unconscious can not act unless the self comes into contact with the manas. The manas is thus, the

67. Nyāyavārtkatātparyāṭikā, p. 108
68. ātmā mānasā yuyate mana indriyeṇa indriyamārtheneti.

Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4
mediator between the self and the sense organ. Vātsyāyana also points out that whereas the self-mind-contact is common to perception, inference etc., and the sense-object-contact is the peculiar characteristic of perception. Uddyotakara also explains the cause of perception elaborately. According to him also, perception is that knowledge which is brought about by sense-object-contact. He has also explained the term *sannikarṣa* (contact) involved in the definition and enumerates six kinds of sannikarṣas which are accepted by all the later Naiyāyikas. These are: *saṁyoga* (conjunction), *saṁyukta samavāya* (inherence in what is conjoined), *saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāyah* (inherence in what inheres in what conjoined), *samavāya* (inherence), *samaveta samavāya* (inherence in what inheres) and *viśeṣya-viśeṣañatā* (the relation of qualification and qualified).

Vācaspati Miśra first of all justifies the term *sannikarṣa* found in the definition. He says that the Śūtrakāra has included the term *sannikarṣa* instead of *saṁyoga* or *samavāya* in order to include all types of relation. If *saṁyoga* had been included *samavāya* would have been precluded, and similarly in the case of adoption of *samavāya, saṁyoga* would have been excluded. Vācaspati also points out that the term *artha* (object) is also quite purposeful. By the term *artha* the Śūtrakāra means


70. *indriyenārthasyasanikarṣād jadutpadyate jñānaṁ tat prayakṣamiti.*

    *Nyāyavārttika, p. 28*

71. *sannikarṣaḥ puṇāḥ śoḍhā bhidyate, saṁyogaḥ saṁyukta samavāyaḥ saṁyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ samavāyaḥ samavetasamavāyo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaścetī. Ibid, pp.28-29*

72. *saṁyogapadopādāne hi na samavāyo labhyate samavāyapadopādāne vā na saṁyogāḥ. sannikarṣapadopādānetvabhimatalābhāḥ.*

    *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā, p.109*
that the object of perception should be knowable in their nature. In case of \textit{paramāṇu} (atom) and \textit{ākāśa} (ether) though \textit{saṁyoga} etc, is possible, they are not knowable as such and hence are not perceptible.\footnote{artha
grahaṇentārtham
arthaśīyapatā
darśīta,
na
cāsāva
vākāśād
in
masti
sāt
api
saṁyogādau
nāsāvartha
sannikarṣa
iti
tadyudāsaḥ. \textit{Ibid.}} Regarding the term \textit{utpanna}, Vācspati Miśra is of the view that it is indicative of the fact that the contact of sense with the object is instrumental in bringing about perceptual knowledge.\footnote{utpanna
grahaṇena
cā
sannikarṣasyotpā
dakatva
sā
cita.
\textit{Ibid.}} As such that which is conjoined with a conjunction is not perceptible. Otherwise a cloth etc which is behind a wall but is conjoined with the eye will be perceived.\footnote{anyat
du
ku
yuk
denendriye
a
divya
vahitsya
tatsa
yuktasya
pa
deh
tatsamavetasya
c
rūpāderapi
grahaṇaprasaṁgah. \textit{Ibid.}} Vācspati Miśra then proceeds to explain the different types of \textit{sannikarṣa} involved in perception. He also provided us example of these sannikarṣas.

In Gautama’s definition of perception, the last three attributes viz., \textit{avyapadeśyaṁ} (which is indescribable), \textit{avyabhicāri} (which is not contradicted) and \textit{vyavasāyātmakāṁ} (which is definite) receive a lot of attention from the commentators. The term \textit{avyapadeśyaṁ} means that knowledge which is unnameable. The commentators like Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācspati Miśra have discussed the meaning of this attribute elaborately. Vātsyāyana explained it as non-expressible in words and pleads for its justified inclusion in the definition. He holds that every knowledge of an object arising from the sense object contact is qualified by words denoting the qualities like colour, taste etc. Hence, as these cognitions are denoted by such words, they may be taken as produced by verbal testimony. In order
to refute that possibility, the attribute *avyapadeśa* has been added to qualify perceptual knowledge. Vātsyāyana attempted to differentiate perception from verbal testimony by maintaining that the perceived things become nameable only at the time of its being spoken of or communicated to other persons. The Bhāsyakāra established that the apprehension of objects produced by the contact of the sense organs with them is not verbal.\textsuperscript{76} Uddyotakara also adopts the term *avyapadeśyaṁ* for unnameable but he has left it unexplained.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the part of Gautama’s aphorism, viz., \textit{indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānaṁ avyabhicāri} meaning the uncontradicted cognition produced by the sense-object-contact is the definition of perception\textsuperscript{77} and the other parts viz., *avyapadeśyaṁ* and *vyavasāyātmakāṁ* indicates two types of perception as *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate). The term *avyabhicāri* (non-erroneous) is the definition of perception which means the uncontradicted knowledge produced by sense-object-contact. Vātsyāyana states that the term *avyabhicāra* has been included in the śūra to exclude erroneous perception from the domain of perception. Uddyotakara takes the term *avyabhicāra* in the same sense in which the Bhāsyakāra takes it.\textsuperscript{78} Vācaspati has given three alternative justifications for the inclusion of the term *avyabhicāra* in the Gautama’s Śūtra.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the erroneous cognitions are excluded from the domain of perception on the basis of the general characteristics. However, epithet

\textsuperscript{76} nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyamānaṁ sat śabdam prasajyate, ata āha avyapadeśyamiti. \textit{Nyāyabhāṣya} on \textit{Nyāyasūtra}, 1.1.4

\textsuperscript{77} Cf. pratyakṣasya rūpamādārṣayitumavyabhicāripadopādānam. \textit{Nyāyavārtikātītparyāṭikā}, p.131

\textsuperscript{78} Cf. \textit{Nyāyavārtika}, p. 34
avyabhicāri is mentioned to assign an authoritative sanction to it. Moreover, it is essential for other means of knowledge like anumāna etc. also that they should be non-erroneous. Pratyakṣa being the basis of other forms of knowledge, the term avyabhicāri is included to establish the fact that perception by nature must be non-erroneous. The qualification avyabhicāri is necessary in the case of perception because of the non-erroneous nature of perception to the cause of non-erroneousness of other forms of knowledge.

According to Vātsyāyana, the term vyavasāyātmaka in the definition is given in order to exclude doubtful apprehension from the scope of perception. When a man sees something arising from the earth from a distance, he has a doubtful cognition in the form ‘is the smoke or is this dust?’ Here, the cognition arises from the contact of the sense-organ with the object. Hence, this may also be deemed as pratyakṣa. In order to safeguard against this view the term vyavasāyātmaka is given in the definition. It can not be said that doubtful apprehension is produced only by the contact of soul with mind and not by the sense-object-contact. Uddyotakara says that both the ‘mind-soul-contact’ and the ‘sense-object-contact’ can be regarded equally responsible for producing a doubtful apprehension. He opines that the mind is distinct from other sense organs. He states that the difference of the mind and the sense organs does not depend upon their being non-material or material since the mind in fact, is neither material nor non-material.

79. siddhe satyārambho niyamārthaḥ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā, p. 131
80. atha vā pratyakṣāvyabhicāra evānumāṇādyavyabhicāre kāraṇam. Ibid.
81. kāryadharmāvetau bhautikatvamabhautikatvārṇ ca. na ca kāryāṁ mananā, tasmānna bhautikam nāpyabhautikamiti. Nyāyavārtika, p. 36
Vācaspati Miśra contradicts this view. In this view, the doubtful cognition is already excluded by the qualification ‘non-erroneous’ and therefore, we should regard the term *vyavasāyātmaka* to suggest that it includes *savikalpaka* (determinate) type of perception. Vācaspati holds that the Bhāsyakāra and the Vārtikakāra have not mentioned it since this interpretation, being very simple, does not need any explanation.\(^{82}\)

Actually, however, according to the explanation of Vātsyayana and Uddyotakara, the definition of *pratyakṣa* cannot include *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The definition would be applicable to *nirvikalpaka* perception only. And in that case, the definition of perception will uphold the view of the Bauddhas only. To avoid this Vācaspati has categorically said that by the term *vyavasāyātmaka* Gautama has included *savikalpaka* perception. The credit goes to Vācaspati to argue in favour of perception. But, Vācaspati gives the credit to his guru Trilochana by whose in thence he has explained it thus. Thus, things being inseparable from their names, the perception of things must always involve the perception of the name also. Hence, there can not be perception devoid of verbal expression.\(^{83}\)

An objection is raised regarding the definition of perception of Gautama. It is stated by the opponents that perception of an object composed of parts, like a tree, is nothing but an inference. For in that case, perception of the tree follows from the contact of the sense organ with a part of a tree. Hence, it is a case of cognition

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82. *vyavasāyātmaka padaṁ sākṣatvikalpakasya vācakāṁ…………sa evātmā rūpaṁ yasya tatsavikalpakaṁ pratyakṣaṁ……………eveti bhāsyavārtikakārbhyāmavyākhyātam. Nyāyavārtikatārtparyāṭikā, p.133*

83. Cf. Ranganath, S., *Contributiion of Vācaspati Miśra to Indian Philosophy*, p. 17
resulting from the cognition of the parts, just like an inference where the condition of fire follows from the cognition of smoke. Vācaspati Miśra makes a very important observation in this case. He mentions that there is no question of considering pratyakṣa as an anumāṇa at all. It is said that the object like tree cognized through perception may give rise to the proposition that pratyakṣa is anumāṇa is nullified by the hetu in the form of ekadeśagrahaṇaṁupalabdhi. Certainly, perception and inference are different because perception brought about by the contact of the sense organ with the object and inference does not proceed from any such contact of the sense organ with the object. From this reason, he concludes that perception can not be regarded as inference.

In this way, we find that Vācaspati Miśra has given the definition of pratyakṣa forwarded by Gautama to a final shape by refuting the opponents’ charges. Vācaspati’s explanation has paved the way for the Naiyāyikas to refute every objection raised against the nature of pratyakṣa.

13. DIFFERENT TYPES OF PRATYAKṢA OR PERCEPTION

Generally, perception is divided into two types, viz., laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extra-ordinary). Both of these, laukika and alaukika pratyakṣa are based on the way in which the sense organ come in contact with their object.

(i) Laukika Pratyakṣa or Ordinary Perception

Laukika pratyakṣa is called that in which there is direct contact of the sense-organ with objects. It is caused by ordinary sannikarṣa or sense-object-contact with objects. According to the Naiyāyikas, the sense-object-contact with the object is regarded as of six kinds. These are: saṁyoga, saṁyukta saṁavāyah, saṁyukta
This type of perception is again divided into two types, viz., **savikalpaka** and **nirvikalpaka**.

**(ii) Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa**

Most of the schools of Indian philosophy recognize two types of **pratyakṣa**, viz., **savikalpaka** and **nirvikalpaka**. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta system uphold the difference between these two types of perception. However, there is much difference of opinion among these philosophers regarding the exact nature of these two. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, perception is said to be of two types i.e., **savikalpaka** (determinate) and **nirvikalpaka** (indeterminate).

Though, the **Bhāṣya** and **Vārtika** do not take note of these two types of perception, Vācaspati Miśra has categorically said that it is Gautama who has introduced these two types of perception in the very **sūtra** defining perception. He says that the two terms of **avyapadeśyāṁ** and **vyavasāyātmakāṁ** contained in the **sūtra** signify respectively the **nirvikalpaka** and **savikalpaka** perception. Later Naiyāyikas follow Vācaspati in this regard and interpret Gautama **Sūtra** accordingly.

According to Vātsyāyana the word **avyapadeśyāṁ** (not expressible in words) is included in the definition of **pratyakṣa** by Gautama in order to preclude the contention that sense-object-contact is verbal testimony. Vātsyāyana states that cognition produced by the sense-object-contact is denoted by words such as colour, taste etc. Hence, as it is denoted by words, so the cognition may be taken as verbal

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84. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭkā*, p. 109
testimony. The term *avyapadeśyaṁ* safeguards it from such apprehension. He maintains that the name of perceived thing becomes operative only at the time of its usage or being communicated to others and not at the time of its being produced.\(^8\)\(^5\)

But according to Vācaspati Miśra the term *avyapadeśyaṁ* in the definition refers to *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. In his view *vyapadeśa* means adjective or characteristic like name, genus etc. Hence, *vyapadeśya* means the objective qualified by such adjectives.\(^8\)\(^6\) As for example, ‘this is *dīthā’,*this is cow’, this is white’, he has *kamaṇḍalu’, ‘he goes’ etc. All there are *savikalpaka* cognitions where the substantive adjective relation exists. Where this relation does not exist, that is called *nirvikapaka*. Here the universal etc. are cognized, but they are not brought under the substantive-adjective-relation.\(^8\)\(^7\) That is in *nirvikalpaka* perception these are cognized, as unrelated units. It is argued by some that *nirvikalpaka* perception is a myth, as there can not be any cognition, where the object is not expressed by a word. Vācaspati here says that this objection is repudiated by Vātsyāyana while explaining the significance of the word *avyapadeśyaṁ*.\(^8\)\(^8\) In the perception of children and deaf and dumb persons words do not appear but objects appear.\(^8\)\(^9\) “The first stage of perception

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85. *yadā tu so’arthā grhyate tadā tat pūrvasmādārthajñānānāna………….na
cā’pratiyamānena vyavahāraḥ………….saṅgāśabdāna itikāraṇayuktena
nirdiṣyate. Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4
86. *tatra vyapadeśo viśeṣamupalakṣaṇāṁ vā nāmajātyādi, tat karma- vyapadeśyaṁ
viśeṣyamiti yāvat. Nyāyavārttikātātparyāṭikā, p. 125
87. *avidyamānaṁ vyapadeśyaṁ Yasmin stadvapadeśyaṁ jātyādīsvarūpāvagāḥ,
na tu jātyādīnāṁ mitho viṣeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvāvagāhī yāvat. Ibid.
88. *tadasya nirākaraṇarūlaṇaṇaḥ ghatenālocanajñānāvarodhārthena- vyapadeśyapadena
sūcitamiti. Ibid., p.127
89. *bālaṁukādīnāmapi vijñānaṁ śabdānuvyādhavadevānādiśabdabhāvanāvasāt.
Ibid., p.126
is a sensory cognition arising just with the contact between sense and object. Like the perception of the child or the dumb person, it does not require and has not the time to develop into verbal judgment. The verbal expression of sensory cognitions is a later stage of perception, which serves the purpose of social intercourse and communication.”\(^{90}\) It is admitted that all objects are invariably related with the words, then, a blind may perceive colour and a dumb may perceive sound even when they perceive the object.\(^{91}\) Hence, a previous nirvikalpaka perception enables one to recall the words with which an object is connected. Thus, nirvikalpaka is a real stage of perception.

The savikalpaka perception is the next stage where an object is cognized as qualified by certain attributes. It is of the form of a perceptual judgement as ‘this is a cow’. In the case of such perception, at first the sense comes in contact with the object and there arises nirvikalpaka cognition of the object as something indefinite. This indefinite object then revives the word image being related with a certain genus in the past experience. Then the class, name of the perceived object is remembered and the object is perceived as qualified by certain attributes. This is the stage of savikalpaka perception.\(^{92}\)

\(^{90}\) Chatterjee, S.C., *Nyāya theory of Knowledge*, p. 198; *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭikā*, p.129

\(^{91}\) api ca śrūyamāṇaśabdādīnāṁ, teśāmapi ……………rūpāṁ gṛhtubhīyāt. asti hi……badhiropi śabdaṁ gṛhtubhīyāt. *Ibid*.

\(^{92}\) tadgrhītasaṅketaḥ sa prathamamindriyārthasya śabdabhedaḥ sambandhāca śabdaviśayasaḥ saṁskāraḥ prabodhyate. sa prabuddhaḥ śabdasmṛtir niḥ jānaye. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭikā*. p.128
Vācaspati says that the word vyavasāyātmaka directly denotes savikalpaka pratyakṣa. Vyavasāya means well defined (viniścaya) or determination (vikalpa). Hence, the perception which has the form of determination i.e., which is qualified by certain attributes, is called savikalpaka (determinate perception).

Vācaspati also asserts that as this type of perception is too simple to need any explanation, the Bhāṣya and the Vārtika have not mentioned this. However, he has put forward this interpretation following his guru Trilocana.

The Buddhists deny the savikalpaka perception as valid. Vācaspati Miśra alludes to the view of the Buddhists say that savikalpaka cognition cannot be called perception; since it involves imaginative construction by the mind through which names etc. are added words refer to universals which are not real. The real objects are only particulars from which only sense-perception arises. Recollection of words brings about a break in the relation of the senses and the object. Recollection reveals a past object. If it is said that recollection is only an accessory and not an obstacle to perception, then it must be admitted that a blind person can also see colour through memory. Thus, determinate perception is not real perception as it involves imaginative construction of name, genus, quality, action etc.

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93. vyavasāyātmakaṁ padaṁ sākṣātsavikalpakasya vācakarīṁ. Ibid., p.133
94. tathāhi vyavasāya viniścayo vikalpa ityarthāntaraṁ. sa evātmā rūpaṁ yasya tat savikalpakaṁ pratyakṣam. Ibid.
95. tadadatisphuṭattvāt śiṣyārgamya eveti bhāsyavārtikakārābhāyāmvyākhyātamapi asmābhīḥ, ...............asmābhīḥ trilocanagūruniṁtamārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ. Ibid.
96. Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā. pp. 133-134
97. na ca smṛtirātvasayā'nanubhūtapūrvaṁ vartamānaṁ gocarayitumarhati tadagocaratve cāndhānāmapi rūpasākṣātkāraprasaṅgā. Ibid., p. 137
98. tadevaṁ nāmajātigunakarmakalpanā ca pratyakṣatvena parāstā. Ibid.
Vācaspati refutes the above view saying that adding of names etc. is not always imaginative construction. There is no error in the *savikalpaka* perception as qualified by certain attributes and having a name. Universals are stable and durable objects. “Recollection of the previous state of the object grasped at the time of learning its name helps to determine the present state of the object, and thus it becomes an accessory in producing the propositional judgement. Recollection of the name, however, is an accidental factor which happens along with it; the name is certainly not an essential factor in the constructive perception, nor is it an impediment to such a perception.”

14. **SANNIKARŚA AND ITS DIVISIONS**

The term *sannikarśa* occurs in the definition of *pratyakṣa*, i.e., *indriyārthasannikarōtpannāṁ jñānam avyapadesyāṁ avyabhicārī vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣaṁ* as given by Gautama. According to him, the knowledge of perception is produce by the contact of an object with a sense organ. Hence, the Naiyāyikas maintain the sense-object-contact as the specific cause of perception. Vācaspati Miśra first of all justifies the term *sannikarśa* found in the definition of perception. He states that the Śūtrakāra has included the term *sannikarśa* instead of *saṁyoga* or *saṁavāya* in order to include all types of relation. If *saṁyoga* had been included, *saṁavāya* would have been excluded and similarly in the case of adoption of *saṁavāya, saṁyoga* would have been excluded.

100. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.4
101. *saṁyogapadopādāne hi na saṁavāyo labhyate saṁavāyapadopādāne vā na saṁyogah. sannikarōtapadopādānetvabhimatalābhaḥ, Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, p. 109
The Naiyāyikas state that a sense-object-contact is a dynamic communication between an object and a sense organ. The contact of senses with the objects is regarded by Uddyotakara as of six kinds. These are: *saṁyoga* (conjunction), *saṁyuktasamavāya* (inheritance in what is conjoined), *saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya* (inheritance in what inheres in what is conjoined), *samavāya* (inheritence), *samavetasamavāya* (inheritence in what inheres) and *vīsēya-vīsēsanatā* (the relation of qualification and qualified).¹⁰² Vācaspäti also maintains this variety of sense-object-contact.¹⁰³ These six types of contact are responsible for the perception of the following six kinds of objects, namely, i) of substance, ii) of quality, iii) of quality universal, iv) of sound, v) of soundness and vi) of non-existence etc.

(i) *Saṁyoga Sannikarṣa*: *Saṁyoga sannikarṣa* or conjunction is the contact of the object with the sense organ. This contact is necessary for the perception of substance (*dravya*). For example, in case of perception of substance, e.g., pot, the substance is related with the sense-organ, e.g., the eye in the relation of conjunction as both are substances.¹⁰⁴

(ii) *Saṁyukta-samavāya Sannikarṣa*: *Saṁyukta samavāya* or inherence in what is conjoined is that in which the perception of a quality or an action is due to its inherence in a substance. For example, we perceive the blue colour of the jar. Here,

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102. sannikarṣaḥ puṇaḥ śoḍhā bhidyate. saṁyogaḥ saṁyuktasamavāyaḥ
saṁyukta-samavetasamvāyaḥ samavāyaḥ sarṣnasamavetasamvāyo
vīsēṣaṁvāyabhāvaśceti. *Nyāyavārtika*, pp. 28-29

103. sannikarṣagrahaṇalabhyam prakārabhedam parisarāṇeṣu.
*Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā*, p. 109

104. tatra caksurindriyāṁ rūpavāṁ ghaṭādīrathāṁ tena sannikarṣaḥ saṁyogaḥ
tayordravyasyabhāvatvāt. *Nyāyavārtika*, p. 29
the colour is inherently related with the jar which is in contact with the eye. Uddyotakara states that in the perception of the colour (of the pot) the contact of the eye with the colour which is not a substance, is of the nature of inherence in that is in conjunction; because the colour subsists in the pot which is in conjunction with the eye. The substance is here of the nature of inherence.\textsuperscript{105}

(iii) \textit{Samyuktasamavetasamavāya Sannikarṣa:} \textit{Samyuktasamavetasamavāya} or inherence in what inheres in what is conjoined is an indirect contact mediated by two intermediatory relations. For example, the perception of the universal genus colourness of colour is inherently related with the jar that is conjoint with the eye and the colourness is inherently united therewith. Uddyotakara states that in the perception of the genus subsisting in the colour, the contact is in the form of inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction; similarly, in the case of perception by means of olfactory organ, there is conjunction with the odorous substance. Odour is inherent in the odourous substances which is conjoined with the organ. In case of the genus subsisting in the odour, there is inherence of that genus in the odour which again inheres in that (substance), which is in conjunction (with the organ).\textsuperscript{106}

(iv)\textit{Samavāya Sannikarṣa:} Uddyotakara states that in the case of the perception of sound, the contact is in the form of inherence.\textsuperscript{107} The sound inheres in ether (ākāśa) of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105} adravyena tu tadgaṭarūpādīnā samyuktasamavāyaḥ yasmāt cakṣusā sarīnyuktedravye rūpādi vartata iti. vr̥ttiśca samavāyaḥ. \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{106} evaṁ rūpādi-vṛttiṁ sāmānyena sarīnyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ sannikarṣaḥ.
evaṁ ghrāṇādiṣu gandhavādādridravyena sarīnyogāḥ. tatasamaveteṣu gandhādiṣu sarīnyuktasamavāyaḥ tadvṛttiṣu ca sāmānyeṣu sarīnyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ.
\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{107} ṣabde ca samavāyaḥ. \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
the auditory organ. Hence, the relation of sound with the auditory organ by which it is apprehended is inherence.\textsuperscript{108}

(v) \textit{Samavetasamavāya Sannikarṣa}: \textit{Samavetasamavāya} or inherent inherence is an inherence in that which inheres in a sense organ. In the case of the perception of the genus or class character belonging to these sounds, the contact is in the form of inherence of the inherent. In the case of perception of the genus soundness, there is the relation of inherence of soundness with sound which is inherent in the ether determined by the auditory organ.\textsuperscript{109}

(vi) \textit{Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva Sannikarṣa}: The conjunction of the qualifier and the qualified is the conjunction in the perception of negation and inherence. For example, in the perception of the absence of the jar on the ground, the eye is in contact with the ground which is qualified by the absence of the jar. There is a contact of the eye with the ground which is qualified by the absence of the pot. According to Naiyāyikas, perception of \textit{samavāya} (inherence) and \textit{abhāva} (non-existence) is explained through this kind of perception. Uddyotakara states that in the perception of inherence and non-existence, the contact bringing about that perception is in the form of the relation of the qualification.\textsuperscript{110}

Thus, we may conclude that all object of perception must depend on any kinds of sense-object-contact. In this \textit{sūtra} of perception, Gautama has made use of this

\textsuperscript{108} ayaṁ khalu śabdaḥ saṁyogavibhāga-vornirādayah……ākāśa-vaṇatvāt
śabdasyākāśavṛttih saṁyogah kāraṇaṁ. \textsc{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{109} yaḥ karṣuṣkulīmatyākāśadeśe samavaiti sa samavāyādupalabhyate.
tadgateṣu ca sāmānyeṣu samaveta samavāyāditi. \textsc{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{110} so’yāṁ sannikarṣaśabdaḥ saṁyogasamavāyaviśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva-
vāyāpakatvādāppa iti. \textsc{Ibid.}
word *sannikarṣa* (contact) which includes all those conditions that give rise to perception, viz., conjunction, inherence and qualification-qualified relationship. This contact is regarded as the distinguishing feature of perception.

15. **ANUMĀṆA OR INFERENCE**

*Anumāṇa* is the second kind of valid knowledge. The term *anumāṇa* is generally translated in English as inference. The word *anumāṇa* consists of two parts, viz., *anu* and *māna* which mean after and cognition respectively. Thus, simply, *anumāṇa* means the cognition coming into being after some other cognition e.g., perception. According to Chandradhar Sharma, the literal meaning of *anumāṇa* is- “it is knowledge (*māna*) which arises after (*anu*) other knowledge”. Hence, *anumāṇa* is defined as the cognition which is preceded by perception. Inference is defined as knowledge arising through *parāmarṣa*. *Parāmarṣa* is knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in minor (*pakṣadharma*) and is invariably associated with the major (*vyāpti*). Here, the major, minor and middle are called *sāddhya*, *pakṣa* and *liṅga* or *hetu* respectively. We know that smoke is invariably associated with fire (*vyāpti*). If we find smoke in a hill then we conclude that there must be fire in that hill. Here, hill is *pakṣa*, fire is *sāddhya* and smoke is *liṅga* or *hetu*. From the presence of smoke in this hill as qualified by the knowledge that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, we proceed to infer the presence of fire in the hill. This is called inference.

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111. Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p. 197
112. paramaṁ sajanāṁ jñānamanumitiḥ vyāptivṛtiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñānaṁ parāmarṣaḥ. *Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 28
In Indian philosophy, inference is maintained as one of the important source of valid knowledge accepted by all the systems except Cārvāka. Inference is the process of knowing something not by observation, but through the medium of a mark that is invariably related to it. Except Cārvāka, all the systems of Indian philosophy agree in accepting that inference is a acquiring the true knowledge not by direct observation but by the means of natural relation between two things. It is defined by different thinkers at different stages of development of logical thinking in Indian philosophy. Gautama maintains that inference is that knowledge which is preceded by perception and is of three types. These three types of inference are: pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodrṣṭam. \[113\] Vātsyāyana gives an etymological definition of inference as that cognition of an object as probandum (liṅga) which arises after the cognition of the proban (liṅga) rightly ascertained. \[114\] Vātsyāyana holds that inference is a specific form of knowledge preceded by perception. \[115\] The relation between the probans (hetu) and the probandum (sādhyā) of perception refers to a previous perception of such a relation somewhere else. For example, in the inference of fire from smoke, smoke is the proban and fire is the probandum. There can not be smoke in the absence of fire. Because of the invariable relation between fire and smoke, the existence of fire is necessarily to be admitted in every case of smoke.

It may also be pointed out that all inferences do not presuppose such a previous perception. The knowledge of probans and of its concomitance with the

113. atha tatpūrvakaṁ trividhamanumānaṁ. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.5
114. liṅgaliṅginoh saṁbandha yodarśanena liṅgi

smṛtirabhisaṁbadhyate. smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena cā’pratyakṣo’rtho’nunmīyate.

Nyāyabhāṣya on Ibid.
115. mitena liṅgenā’rthasya paścanmānaṁ anumānam. Ibid., 1.1.3
probandum may in some cases be derived through another inference, verbal testimony etc. Then, how it can be claimed that inference is knowledge proceeded by perception only? Uddyotakara replies that the word tat in the expression tat pūrvakām in the Gautama’s Śūtra 1.1.3 may be grammatically be constructed to mean tāni i.e., all the four instruments of valid knowledge. Vārtikākāra interprets the meaning of the compound tatpūrvakām in three ways, viz., i) tani pūrvakām, where inference may presuppose all the pramāṇas, like pratyakṣa, upamāṇa etc., ii) tatpūrvakām, in which it presupposes perception only and iii) te pūrvakām, implying that it presupposes perception, i.e., perception of the invariable relation between liṅga and liṅgin and perception of liṅga in the present case.116 Uddyotakara holds that anumāṇa is the liṅga-parāmarṣa as aided by remembrance or the knowledge which is preceded by the perception of the middle term and remembrance of its invariable concomitance with major term.117

Thus, it means that inference is preceded by perception and any one of the sources of pramāṇa. The stock example of inference is: the hill is fiery, because it smokes and whatever smokes is fiery. Here, we pass from the perception of smoke in the hill to the knowledge of the existence of fire in it, through the previous knowledge of the universal relation (vyāpti) between smoke and fire. Thus, we can arrive at the knowledge of an object through the relation of two acts of knowledge or propositions. Vācaspati Miśra supports the view of Uddyotakara. He maintains that the word atha

116. tatpūrvakāṁ anumāṇaṁ ityanena samāṇāsamāṇa jātiyebhyau’numānaṁ vyavacchidyata iti. tāni te tatpūrvāṁ yasya tadidaṁ tatpūrvakāṁ.
Nyāyavārtika, p.41
117. tasmāt smṛtyunugryamāṇo liṅgaparāmarśo’bhīśṭārthapratipādako bhavafītī.
Ibid., p. 42
in the sūtra is used in the sense of ānantarya which means after perception. It proceeds as the hetu for the anumāna. He makes an observation on the explanation of the term tatpūrvakāṁ given by Uddyotakara. Vācaspati makes objection to defining anumāna as pratyakṣapūrvaka. He holds that āgama, smṛti, saṃśaya and viparyaya can be pratyakṣa pūrvaka which will have to be considered as anumāna. Thus, Vācaspati points out that there are defects of ativyāpti and avyāpti in the view of Vārtikakāra.

The first vigraha of tatpūrvakāṁ is tāni pūrvakaṁ yasya tat. There will be no defect of avyāpti because by tāni are meant pratyakṣa etc. Here, a question may be raised that the explanation given here would be against the Bhāsyā. Then, Vācaspati takes the Vārtika to stall this objection. Because, according to Vārtika, anumāna is pratyakṣa pūrvakatva by succession (pāramparya).

In the interpretation te pūrve yasya (that which is preceded by the two perceptions), inference is defined as that cognition which is preceded by two perceptions. Here, the two perceptions are the perception of the relation between the probans and the probandum and the perception of the probans. In this way ativyāpti is avoided because it is only anumāna which is preceded by two perception of lingaparāmarśa and the vyāpti. Inference happens thus; when a man perceives the probans a second time after having perceived it previously as con-committing with the probandum, this perception arouses the impression left in his mind by the previous perception. This leads him to remember the relation between the probans and the probandum. After this remembrance when he

118. pāramparyeṇa hi pratyakṣapūrvakatvamuktāṁ bhāsyakṛtā, tasmāna virodha iti. 
Nyāyavārtikaṭātparyāṭikā, p. 157

119. ativyāpti nirāśaya dvītyaṁ vigrahaṁ vivṛṇoti., Ibid.
perceives again the probans this last perception becomes the \textit{anumāna} i.e., the means of inferential cognition. Because, \textit{anumāna} means the instrument of \textit{anumiti}, that by which something is inferred.\textsuperscript{120} When the compound means \textit{tatpūruvavat yasya} (that which is preceded by a perception), the perception of the \textit{parāmarśa} is implied.\textsuperscript{121}

16. \textbf{TYPES OF ANUMĀNA}

The philosophers have classified \textit{anumāna} into different varieties and sub-varieties. The Naiyayikas hold that there are three classifications of inference. According to the first classification logically an inference is of three kinds. Gautama accepts these three types of inference, viz., \textit{pūrvavat, śeṣavat} and \textit{sāmānyatodṛṣṭa}.\textsuperscript{122}

(i) \textit{Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat and Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa Anumāna}

It is called \textit{pūrvavat} inference, when there is inference of the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. For example, future rain is inferred by us from dark clouds in the sky. It is \textit{pūrvavat anumāna}. Vātsyāyana states that \textit{pūrvavat} inference is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause, e.g., when we see clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain.\textsuperscript{123} He holds that the term \textit{pūrva} denotes a cause and the word \textit{pūrvavat} denotes an effect, since it has a cause. Hence, this type of inference is illustrated as the inference of a cause by means of an effect. According to Uddyotakara, in the word \textit{pūrvavat}, the term \textit{pūrva} refers to the probandum, hence,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{120} \textit{anumāyate’neneti karaṇārthaḥ}. \textit{Nyāyavārttika}, p. 41
  \item \textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ibid} p. 42
  \item \textsuperscript{122} \textit{atha tatpūruvavat trividham anumānaṁ
  pūrvvacchesavatsāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ ca. Nyāyasūtra}, 1.1.5
  \item \textsuperscript{123} \textit{pūrvavatī yatra kāraṇena kāryamanumāyate yathā meghonātayā bhavisyati drśṭirītī. Nyāyabhaṣya on Nyāyasūtra}, 1.1.5
\end{itemize}
the pūrvavat, (having the pūrva) is that which has the probandum for its substrate. As such, Uddyotakara maintained the same explanation as given by the Bhāsyakāra.\textsuperscript{124}

Here, an objection is raised that what is meant by the assertion that the effect is inferred from the causes? If it means that one cognizes the presence of the effect on seeing the cause, then that is not true. No one cognizes the effect on seeing the cause. On the other hand if it is meant that where there is the cause, there is the effect, then that is also not true. The cause and the effect always occupy different points in space, inhering in different substances e.g., the yarns which are the cause of cloth inhere in the fibres, while the cloth inheres in the yarns.\textsuperscript{125}

Uddyotakara here replies that there is no force in the above reasoning. What the sūtra here actually means is that the effect as the qualifying adjunct of the cause is inferred. The cause is already known. What is inferred is only an adjunct of the cause. Hence, there is no running counter to the essence of inference.\textsuperscript{126}

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the pūrvavat is that which is not sublated and which is not neutralized and which is con-comitant with the probandum.\textsuperscript{127} The second type of inference is śeṣavat inference. e.g., past rain is inferred from the swift muddy flooded water of a river. According to Vātsyāyana, when the cause is inferred from the effect, it would be a śeṣavat inference. For example, on perceiving the water of the river as different from what it had been before and also the fullness of the river

\textsuperscript{124} tat pūrvavannāma yatra kāraṇena kāryamanumīyata iti bhāṣyaṁ. Nyāyavārttika, p. 43

\textsuperscript{125} Cf. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} kāryaṁ tu kāraṇaviśeṣatvenopayuktam guṇabhūtamanumīyata iti sūtrārthaḥ. Ibid., p. 44

\textsuperscript{127} pūrveṇa tulyaṁ vartate iti pūrvavat. Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā, p. 179
and swiftness of the current, it is inferred that there had been rain. Uddyotakara holds that in the śesavat inference, what is inferred is the cause as the adjunct of the effect. Here, the word śesa means effect. Both cause and effect have been indicated as the instrument of inferential cognition and the instrumentality of the cause has been already utilized in the pūrvavat inference. Hence, the effect is the only factor that remains behind as the one whose instrumentality has not yet been utilized. Thus, the effect comes to be said of as śesa. An example is cited by the Bhāṣyakāra that there will be rain is inferred from the sight of the rising clouds. Here, Uddyotakara states that the clouds will bring rain, because they are rising, being, as they are accompanied by deep rumbling, having many lines of cranes flying through them, flashing with lightning just like other rain clouds perceived in the past. According to Vācaspati Miśra, this type of inference is also known as pariśēṣa (residual) inference.

The third kind of inference is sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna. When an inference is based not on causation but on uniformity of co-existence, it is called sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna. Vātsyāyana holds that it is an inference in which the relation between the probans and the probandum being imperceptible, the imperceptible probandum is

128. tad yatra kāryena kāraṇa-anumāya pūrvadakaviparītamanumāna nadyāḥ
    pūrnatvāṁ śīghratvāṁ ca dṛṣṭvā srotasānaṁ yāte bhūtā dṛṣṭirīti.
    Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.5
129. tatrāpi kāraṇaṁ kāryayāṅ-gabhūtamanumāya iti. Nyāyavārtika, p. 44
130. dvayoranumānaṁ gabhūtamanumāya iti. Nyāyavārtika, p. 44
131. vṛṣṭimanta ete meghāḥ gabhūradvānāvattve sati……………unnatavat
    tadanyavṛṣṭimmane gabhāvaditī. Ibid.
132. śesavannāma pariśēṣaḥ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭīkā, p. 182
inferred from the similarity of the probans to something else. For example, the self or ātman is inferred from desire. Desire is a quality and qualities always inhere in substance, hence, in which desire inheres is the self.¹³³ Uddyotakara states that sāmānyatodṛśta is that in which an object is cognized as qualified by a character which is an invariable and concomitant of a well known character of that object, the former character being independent of the notion of cause and effect. For example, the presence of water is inferred from the presence of cranes.¹³⁴

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the future, i.e., that which is not sublated, which is not neutralized and which is concomitant with the probandum are common to all inferences. These inferences are classed under three heads, viz., (i) śeṣavat, (ii) sāmānyatodṛśta and (iii) śeṣavatsāmānyatodṛśta. The first two have four features. That which subsists in the probandum and things akin to it is called śeṣavat. Sāmānyatodṛśta is that which is not seen anywhere else except in the subject. The śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛśta combines the features of the previous two. Hence, it has five features.¹³⁵

(ii) Kevalānvai, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki Anumāna

According to the second type of classification of inference is divided in to kevalānvai, kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki. This classification of inference is

¹³³. sāmānyatodṛśtaṁ nāma yatra’pratyakṣe .......... sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī
gamyate ..........yadesāṁ sthānāṁ sa ātmeti.  
Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.5

¹³⁴. sāmānyatodṛśtaṁ nāma akāryakāraṇaḥbhutena yatrāviniḥbhāviṇā..............
Gamyate, tat sāmānyatorśtaṁ ......salilānumānam. Nyāyavārtika, p. 44

¹³⁵. Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā. P. 174
more logical in as much as it depends on the nature of the induction by which we get
the knowledge of vyāpti. These are based on the nature of vyāpti and on the different
methods of establishing it. Gautama has not discussed about this type of anumāṇa.
Uddyotakara, is the first logician to introduce these three types of anumāṇa.136 (i) He
states that if a middle term is only positively related to the major term it is called
kevalānvayi. Here, the proban exists in the subject and similar instances and there is
no object in which the probandum is known to be absent.137 (ii) According to
Uddyotakara, if the middle term is negatively related to the major term it is called
kevala-vyatireki. In this case vyāpti is a purely negative proposition, when the middle
term is the differential of the minor term and is always negatively related to the major
term.138 It is an inference in which the reason exists in the subject, but does not exist
in dissimilar instances. For example, the living body is not soulness, if it were
soulness, it would be lifeless.139 (iii) It is called anvaya-vyatireki inference in which
the middle term is positively and negatively related to the major term in an inference.
In this inference the proban exists in the subject and in all similar instances but does
not exist in dissimilar instances. For example, sound is non-eternal, because while
having a generality and specified individuality, it is perceived by eternal organ of us
like a jar.140 The inference of fire from smoke is also of this kind of inference. For
example, all things, which have smoke, have fire. This hill has fire, as it has smoke.

136. trividhamiti. anvaya vyatirekī anvayīvyatirekī cetiḥ. Nyāyavārtika, p.43
137. anvayī vivakṣita tajjātīyaṃvṛttītve satī vipakṣahīnāḥ., Ibīd.,
138. vyatirekī vivakṣitavyāptītve satī sapakṣābhāve satī vipakṣāvṛttīḥ. Ibīd.
139. yathā nedaṁ jīvaccharīraṁ nirātmakam, aprāṇādīmattvaprasarāṅgādīti. Ibīd.
140. tatrānvayavyatirekī vivakṣitatajātīyopapattau vipakṣāvṛtīḥ, yathā anityaḥ
śabdaḥ sāmānyavīṣeṣavatve satyasmadādibāhyakaraṇapratyakṣatvād
ghaṭādvadītī. Ibīd.
Vācaspati Miśra has followed Uddyotakara in this respect and accepts this division as given in the *Vārtika*.

(iii) **Śvārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna**

The third type of classification of inference is psychological which has in view the use or purpose. It is of two kinds, viz., *svārthānumāna* (the inference for one self) and *parārthānumāna* (the inference for others). Though this division of *anumāna* is not found in *Nyāyasūtra* or *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, but its history differently goes back to Praśaṭapāda who has mentioned it in his *Bhāṣya* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. Buddhists accept this division of *anumāna*. Later Naiyāyikas like Annapūrṇabhaṭṭa, Keśava Miśra also accepted it.

*Śvārthānumāna* is meant for the acquisition of new knowledge on the part of the observer. Here, a person infers something after perceiving the *liṅga* and remembering its concomitance with the *sādhyā*, when the person reaches to the conclusion only for himself. If a person wants to infer something for himself, it is called *svārthānumāna*. For example a person can make out the relation of invariable concomitance between smoke and the fire and arrive at the universal proposition that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. From the observations in the hearth and kitchen etc. he ascertains the *vyāpti* between smoke and fire. Then, he arrives in a hill. He may have doubt as to the presence of fire in the hill. He perceives smoke there and remembers the generalization ‘wherever there is smoke there is fire’. Then, he perceives the smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire. After this *parāmarśa*, there arises the inference ‘the hill has fire’. This is, thus, an inference for oneself. Hence, this inference is called *svārtha*. 

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An inference is called *parārthānumāna*, when it aims at demonstrating the truth of the conclusion to others. It is the logical type of inference. Therefore, it has to be expressed in language. When the *parārthānumāna* or the inference for others is expressed in language, it is called syllogism. *parārthānumāna* consists of five members. These are: i) *pratijñā*, ii) *hetu*, iii) *udāharaṇa* iv) *upanaya* and v) *nigamana*. Praśastapāda holds that *parārthānumāna* is that which operates through the help of these five members.

17. PAÑCĀVAYAVAS

The five members of syllogism are known as *pañcāvayava*. The first is called *pratijñā* or proposition which denotes the proposition set down for establishing something. Gautam holds that a proposition the logical statement which is to be proved. Vātsyāyana opines that the *pratijñā* is the assertion of a subject as possessing the attribute which is going to be proved. Uddyotakara’s view conforms to that of Vātsyāyana. *Hetu* or reason is the second which states reason for the establishment of the proposition. Gautama states that *hetu* is the means for establishing the *sādhyā* through an affirmative or negative example. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara also support the view of Sūtrakāra. The third syllogism is called

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142. sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.33
144. udāharaṇasādharmyātsādhanāṁ hetuḥ. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.34; tathā vaidharmyā. *Ibid.*, 1.1.35
145. *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Ibid.*; *Nyāyavārtika*, pp. 113-115
udāharana. It gives the universal concomitance together with an example. Gautam refers to two types of examples, namely, sādharmya and vaidharmya.\textsuperscript{146} The fourth is upanay or the application of the universal concomitance to the present case.\textsuperscript{147} When the udāharana indicates that there is a universal relation between the hetu and sādhya, it states that the hetu abides in the pakṣa. Upanaya is not a mere repetition of reason. It removes all doubts as to the presence of the reason in the subject without which there can be no conclusion. The fifth is nigamana or conclusion. The declaration of the subject along with the thing to be proved and reason is the conclusion.\textsuperscript{148} It differs from pratijñā in that it has a conclusive assertion, whereas the later has only a tentative one. The stock example of the Nyāya inference can be represented in this syllogistic form in the following way.\textsuperscript{149}

i) The Mountain is fiery (pratijñā)

ii) Because it has smoke (hetu)

iii) Whatever has smoke is fiery, as for example, a kitchen (udāharana)

iv) The Mountain has smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire (upanaya)

v) Hence, the Mountain is fiery (nigamana)

18. **VYĀPTI**

Vyāpti or universal relation is the logical ground of inference. All the system of Indian philosophy except the Cārvāka accepts anumāna as an importance source of knowledge. An inferential knowledge is based on invariable relation between the hetu

\textsuperscript{146} sādhyasādharmyaūttaddharmabhāvīḍṛṣṭānta udāharanaṁ. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.36

\textsuperscript{147} udāharanāpekṣastathetyupasamsāṁhāro na tatheti vā sādhyaṁ upanaya.

Ibid., 1.1.38

\textsuperscript{148} hetvapadeśātpratijñāyāḥ punarvacanāṁ nigamanāṁ. Ibid., 1.1.39

\textsuperscript{149} Cf. Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p. 200
and sādhya. The nature of this relation is technically called vyāpti. The term vyāpti literally means extension, range, field or area. It is used in the sense of invariable relation between the proban (vyāpya) and the probandum (vyāpakaṁ). In the inference, ‘this hill has fire because it has smoke,’ conclusion depends on the recollection of the invariable relation between smoke and fire. As there are different definitions, the invariable relation is referred to by various seemingly synonymous words like, liṅga-liṅgi saṁbandha, gamya-gamaka, prasiddhi, pratibandha, (Sāmkhya -Yoga), vyāpti (Nyāya) etc. But the term vyāpti has gained much more currency as compared to other terms probably due to its easy comprehension and structural compactness.\(^{150}\)

Gautama and Vātsyāyana do not mention vyāpti by name. The Sūtrakāra however, refers to niyama and aniyama in the sense of invariable concomitance and variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate. Gautama’s awareness of this logical basis can be drawn from his definition of anaikāntika, hetu and jāti. He defines jāti as an invalid counter argument put forth by an opponent to reasoning on the basis of mere similarity or dissimilarity of the subject with an example.\(^{151}\) This implies that the opponents counter arguments becomes invalid because it is unaccompanied by invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate, whereas the argument put forth by the disputant is valid because it is based on concomitance. Though, the Bhāsyakāra does not use the term vyāpti, but adopting the term niyama for vyāpti, he refers to an inseparable relation holding between liṅga and liṅgin and he states that on account of the recollection of a previous perception of smoke and fire

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150. Bijalwan, C.D., Indian Theory of knowledge, p.146
151. sādharmyavaidharmyābhyaṁ pratyavasthānaṁ jātiḥ. Nyāyasūtra, 1.2.18
together one can infer fire on the basis of perceiving smoke. Vātsyāyana, makes use of *avinabhāva* in his *Bhāṣya* on the sūtras 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.71 of *Nyāyasūtra*. Phanibhūṣana Tarkavāgīśa, in his elucidation of Vātsyāyana’s *Bhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* states that the perception of invariable relation between probans and probandum is clearly stated in the *Bhāṣya*. Uddyotakara rejects the theory of *avinabhāva*. He criticizes those who use the term *avinabhāva* and states that its connotation does not fit in explaining the immediate cause of inference. He refers to three alternative interpretations of *avinābhāva* such as *kārya-kāraṇa sambandha*, *ekārthasamavāya* and *sambandhamātra* and holds that none of these alternative interpretations make *avinābhāva* to be the immediately preceding cause of inference. Thus, Uddyotakara refutes the Buddhists theory of inference and holds *vyāpti* as at the most useful to ascertain *dharma* subsisting between the *hetu* and *sādhyā*. Vācaspati also refers to *avinābhāva* and *vyāpti* but he refrains from defining *vyāpti* elaborately. His exposition of the natural relationship of *sādhana* with *sādhyā*, however, is in a way the exposition of the nature of *vyāpti*. According to him, a natural relation is that which is devoid of conditions, e.g., the relation of smoke and fire. On the other hand, the relation of fire with smoke is conditioned because it depends upon the presence of wet fuel. Therefore, it may be implied that according to Vācaspati Miśra *vyāpti* is an unconditional and natural relationship between the *sādhana* and *sādhyā*. It also implies that a conditional *sādhana* becomes *sādhanābhāṣa* whereas a *sādhana* devoid of condition invariably becomes a *gamaka* in inferential knowledge. Thus,

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152. tasmādudpādhiṁ prayatnenaṁviṣyanto’nupalabhamānā. nāṣṭītyavagamyasvābhāvikatvam sambandhasya niścitum. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā*, p. 165
Vācaspati’s account of vyāpti conforms to the later development of the concept in Nyāya system.

19. HETVĀBHĀSA OR FALLACY

Generally, the word hetvābhāsa means fallacy. In Western logic it is understood as a defective conclusion or interpretation resulting from a defective process of thinking. The Naiyāyikas hold that hetvābhāsa is a fallacious reason or defective reason. The real function of a reason or hetu is to prove a sādhya and the defects which violate a reason or hetu is called hetvābhāsa.

Gautama has not given any definition of hetvābhāsa but, he mentions five kinds of hetvābhāsa. These are: i) savyabhicāra, ii) viruddha, iii) prakaraṇa, iv) sādhyasama and v) kālāṭīta.153 The Bhāṣyakāra explains hetvābhāsa as those that does not possesses all the characteristics of the true hetu and that are sufficiently similar to the hetu.154 Uddyotakara has simply explained the view of Vātsyāyana while admitting his view. Regarding the similarity with the probans Uddyotakara gives two types of similarity. To put forward after the proposition, so also the fallacious hetu is put forward after the proposition. Possessing any one of the characteristics of the proban is the second similarity. A true hetu is endowed with three characteristics of the hetu are: (i) It is con-comitant with the probandum, (ii) it exists in a substratum where the probandum is known to be exist, and (iii) it does not exist in the substratum where the probandum is known to be absent. If any one of

153. savyabhicāraviruddhapraκaraṇasamasādhyasamakālāṭītā hetvābhāṣaḥ.
Nyāyasūtra, 1.2.4
154. hetulakṣanābhāvadahetavo hetusāmānyād hetuvādabhāsamānāḥ.
Nyāyabhāṣya on Ibid.
these three conditions is present in the fallacious hetu, then that constitutes its similarity with the true hetu. Vācaspati Miśra endorses this explanation of the Vārtika. He simply adds that it is immaterial whether two or three conditions are mentioned. What is meant here is that the fallacious probans should fulfill some conditions and not all conditions of the true probans.

(i) Savyabhicāra: The fallacy of savyabhicāra or irregular reason is the first kind of hetvābhāsa. The word savyabhicāra means inconstancy. It is inconclusive which leads to more than one conclusion and also proves opposite conclusion. It is also known as anaikāntika. Gautama defines it as that which is vitiated by indecision. The term anaikāntika and savyabhicāra are literally synonymous and mean the same thing. Hence, the meaning of the term anaikāntika is that which does not stick to one thing, but strays in different ways. Vātsyāyana holds that savyabhicāra (inconclusive) is that which is indecisive. For example, sound is eternal, because it is intangible. The jar which is tangible has been found to be non-eternal. Sound is not tangible. Hence, being intangible, sound must be eternal. Here in this example tangibility is put forward as the reason for proving non-eternity. But tangibility and non-eternity do not have the relation of proban and probandum, for atom is tangible but eternal. Again buddhi is intangible, but non-eternal. Thus, intangibility is pervaded neither by

155. yad vā yatsādhakasya liṅgasya trailakṣanyāṁ dharmastatraikatama-dharmānvidhānaṁ, dvilakṣaṇasyānyataradharmānvidhānaṁ vā vivakṣitaṁ.
Nyāyavārtika, p. 156
156. abādhita viṣayatvāsatpratipākṣitave satī api vivakṣitvātrailakṣaṇyad-vailakṣaṇyābhidhānaṁ draṣṭavyaṁ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā, p. 330
157. anaikāntikāḥ savyabhicāraḥ. Nyāyasūtra, 1.2.5
158. nityaḥ śabdo’parśatvāt, parśavān kumbho’nityaodṛṣṭo na ca tathā parśavān śabdastasmāt aparśatvāt nityaḥ śabda iti. Nyāyabhāsyā on Ibid.
eternal, nor by non-eternal. Hence, this is not a true *hetu*.\(^{159}\) Vācaspati supports the view of Vātsyāyana. He explains the example in the *Tātparyāṭikā* very clearly. He holds that it can not be said that all non-eternal things are tangible.\(^{160}\) The Naiyāyikas hold that the fallacy of *savyabhicāra* is of three kinds, viz., *sādhārana savyabhicāra*, *asādhāraṇasavyabhicāra* and *anupasainihāri*.

(ii) **Viruddha:** The fallacy of *viruddha* or contradictory reason is that which has invariable concomitance with the negation of the probandum. For example, sound is eternal because it is produced. Here, the reason or *hetu* is produced and proves the non-eternality of sound, the opposite of eternality. Hence, it is contradictory thing i.e., non-eternality of sound. Gautama defines *viruddha* as that *hetu* which is contrary to conclusion desired to be drown.\(^{161}\) Vātsyāyana states that the contradictory is the mark which contradicts very tenet on which it rests. As for example, a modification loses its identity as it can not be eternal, though it loses its identity; it still exists as it can not be destroyed. Here the reason that a modification can not be entered is contradicted by the speaker’s own tenet that the modification still exists. Thus, existence and loss of identity are contradictory attributes and can not abide together.\(^{162}\) Regarding this point of view, Later Naiyāyikas are different from earlier Naiyāyikas. They state that *viruddha* as that *hetu* which proves the contrary of proposition which is put forward to prove. Vācaspati also has given an alternative

\(^{159}\) asparśatvādī heturnityatvarī vyabhicarati asparśābuddhirnityā ceti. *Ibid.*

\(^{160}\) nahi yad nityaṁ tat sarvāṁ sparśavād buddhyādibhirvayabhicārāt.

*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, p. 337

\(^{161}\) siddhāntamabhupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.2.6

\(^{162}\) tam viruṇaddhiṁ tadvirodhī……..ityanena svasiddhāntena viruddhyate.

explanation on the later conception of viruddha. He refutes the opponents’ view that argued the refuting reason which is contradictory. He states that this type of hetu happens to prove a conclusion contrary to what it is meant to prove.\textsuperscript{163}

(iii) Prakaraṇasama: Prakaraṇasama or counteracted reason is that when it is opposed or counterbalanced by another reason and both are equally strong. For example, sound is non-eternal because it is devoid of all qualities of eternal things. It is opposed by sound is eternal because it is devoid of all qualities of eternal things. Here, the first reason is counterbalanced by the second reason or hetu and both are of equal force.

It is defined by Gautama as that proban which being put forward to establish a definite conclusion gives rise to suspense with regard to the point at issue.\textsuperscript{164} Vātsyāyana regards Prakaraṇasama as that which is always remaining in the state of an uncompleted argument. According to Vātsyāyana, the term prakarana means the two opposite views on a doubtful question, neither of which is ascertained. The cintā or suspense of this consists in the desire to ascertain the truth. Vātsyāyana also holds that the main cause of doubt is that the real truth on the point is not known. For example, sound is non-eternal, because we do not find in it the properties of the eternal thing. This reasoning gives rise to suspense in the mind of the hearer.\textsuperscript{165} Vācaspati tries to enquire and investigate in such

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} athaiva sādhyaṁ abhyupeta vā uddiśya tatsādhhanāya prayukto yo vastugatayā sādhyābhāvavyāpyo hetuḥ.\textit{Nyāyavārttikatātparyātiṅkā}, p. 339
\item \textsuperscript{164} yasmāt prakaraṇa cintā sa nirṇayārthamapadiṣṭaḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ. \textit{Nyāyasūtra}, 1.2.7
\item \textsuperscript{165} anityaḥ śabdo nityadharmānupalabdheḥ. \textit{Nyāyabhāṣya} on \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
type of suspense. Thus, the advancement of hetu like, nityadhammānupalabdhi to prove the eternality leads only to a doubt regarding the eternality and non-eternity. According to him, the constitution of fallacies is called Prakaraṇasama, nityadhammānupalabdhi and anityadhammānupalabdhi would be equal, which is the way of beginning out the etymological significance.

(iv) Sādhyasama: This fallacy is also called an unproved reason which is an unestablished reason. This sādhyā is a character which we want to prove in relation to pakṣa. It is called sādhyasama if the reason is found as unestablished as the sādhyā. Gautama defines it as that which is not different from the probandum because of its being still to be proved. Vātsyāyana holds that it can be called as asiddha. According to him, the mark which itself stands in need of proof equally as the subject is called identical with the subject. For example, shadow is a substance, because it has notion. This hetu, i.e., having motion does not differ from the probandum, as it is not yet proved that shadow has motion. This is of three three types according to Vācaspati Miśra. Vācaspati has also mentioned that the above example serves a common instance of sarūpasiddha, āśrayasiddha and anyathāsiddha. Thus,

166. na khalu ayaṁ nityadhammān nitytvāvinābhāvino’nityadhammān vā anityatvāvinābhāvina upalabdhamānastatra saṁsadigdhe, tacca jijñāsate. Nyāyavārttikatātparyātikā, pp. 341-342
167. saiva nityadhammānupalabdhiranityadhammānupalabdhirvā vicitṛabhisaṅdhitayā vadiṁāṁ nirṇayayāpadiśyamāna prakaraṇasamo hetvābhāṣaḥ. Ibid., p. 342
168. sādhyāviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyatvāḥ sādhyasamaḥ. Nyāyasūtra,1.2.8
169. ayamapi asiddhyatvāḥ sādhyatvat prajñāpayitavyaḥ. Nyāyabhāṣya on Ibid.
170. atra bhāṣyakāraṇa svarūpasiddhāśrayāśiddhanyāsiddhyānāṁ sādharanamudāharanamuktaṁ, dravyaṁ cchaṛyāḥ gatimattvāditi. Nyāyavārttikatātparyātikā, p. 344
Vācaspati Miśra also states that the definition of *asiddha* of Gautama is meant to include its four divisions. These are: *svarūpasiddha, ekadeśasiddha, āśrayāsiddha,* and *anyathāsiddha.*

**(v)kālāṭīta:** Gautama defines *kālāṭīta* as that *hetu* which is adduced as behind time.*

Vātsyāyana states that when one factor of the proban is found to be vitiated by lapse of time, it is said to be adduced behind time. For example, the proposition, ‘sound is eternal, because it is manifested by the conjunction, like colour.’ Here, the colour of a thing which manifested when the thing (i.e., a jar) comes in contact with light, was in existence before and after the manifestation similarly, it is proposed that sound, which is manifested by the contact between two things must be durable, i.e., in existence before and after its manifestation. Vātsyāyana here says that this argument is fallacious, since the proban here, when adduced, is behind time. In case of colour, the manifestation takes place just at the time of the contact with light. But the manifestation of sound does not take place at time when a drum comes in contact with a rod, but at a subsequent moment when the contact ceases]. As the time of their manifestation is different, the similarity between colour and sound is incongruous and therefore, the proban is mistimed.*

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171. tadanena svarūpasiddhaikadeśāsiddhāśrayāsiddhānyathāsiddhānāṁ saṁgrahaḥ.


172. kālātyāpadiṣṭāḥ kālāṭīṭāḥ. *Nyāyasūtra,* 1.2.9

173. yukto yasyārthayaikadeśo’padiṣṭyo'pamānasya sa kālāṭiṭypadiṣṭaḥ.


174. nityaḥ śabdaḥ saṁyogavyaṅgatyatvād rūpavat, ………tathā ca śabdopya-vasthito

According to Vācaspati Miśra, when the reason or proban is contradicted by some other source of knowledge, that is also called kālāṭita. Here, the reason asserts something opposite of which is known by some other source of knowledge. For example, fire is not hot, because it substance. Here, the proban ‘because it is a substance’ is contradicted because heat is already known to exist in fire through perception. Hence, the reasons are contradicted by other sources of knowledge.175

This type of hetvābhāsa is called as bāḍhita by other logicians. However, Vācaspati has also supported Vātsyāyana in interpreting the fallacy of kālāṭita.176

20. UPAMĀNA OR COMPARIISON

Upamāna is the third source of valid knowledge accepted by Nyāya philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta also accept upamāna as an independent source of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Buddhists do not accept upamāna as a separate pramāna but include it under inference. The word upamāna has been translated variously as comparison, analogy or identification, knowledge by similarity or knowledge by assimilation. Generally, the term upamāna means the knowledge of similarity. The derivative structure of upamānas is up- √ma+ lyut. Here, the prefix upa means contiguity or similarity (sādrśya) māna means knowledge or cognition. Hence, upamāna is the knowledge of contiguity or the knowledge of similarity between two things.

175. yatra ca pratyakṣaṁumāgamavirodhaḥ…..kapālaṁ prāṇyaṅgatvāditi ca, sarvaḥ pramāṇato………… sandehaviśiṣtaṁ kālamatipataṭiti…

…………kālāṭita iti. Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā, p.347

176. bāḍhvinābhāvayoh sahasambhava iti………evaṁ vyavasthite bhāṣyakāraḥ sūtraṁ svaparamataśliṣṭaṁ vyācaṣte. Ibid.
Gautama defines *upamāna* as the means of cognizing some unknown object through its similarity to another which is previously well known.\(^{177}\) Vātsyāyana holds that *upamāna* is definite knowledge of an object sought to be definitely known through its similarity with an object already well known. For example, the *gavaya* is like the cow.\(^{178}\) The Sūtrakāra does not state anything about the nature of *upamiti* or resultant knowledge. But Vātsyāyana gives a clear cut exposition of the resultant knowledge. He has clearly stated that the resultant knowledge through *upamāna* is the knowledge of the relation of a particular name with its object.\(^{179}\) The example of *upamāna* is more elaborately explained by Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and others. A man heard from a trustworthy person that ‘a *gavaya* is like a cow’. This is called *atidesavākya* (authoritative statement). Afterwards when he sees the *gavaya* and perceives its similarity to the cow, he remembers the *atidesavākya*. And then he comes to have the cognition ‘this is *gavaya*’, where he cognizes the connection of the animal with the name *gavaya*.\(^{180}\) Thus, Uddyotakara clearly differentiates between the means of knowledge (*upamāna*) and the resultant knowledge (*upamiti*). According to him, the term *prasiddhāsādharmya*, denotes the object having well known similarity or which has got the similarity with a well-known object. On the other hand, *upamiti*

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\(^{177}\) prasiddhāsādharmyaḥ sādhyanāsādhanamupamānaṁ. *Nyāyāsūtra*, 1.1.6

\(^{178}\) prajñātena sāmānyāt prajñāpanīyasya prajñāpanamupamānamiti


\(^{180}\) yadā hyanena śrūtaṁ bhavati yathā gaurevaṁ *gavaya* iti, prasiddhe gaugavayasādharme punargavayasādharmyaṁ paśyati pratyakṣaṁ.

*Nyāyavārtika*, p. 54
is the knowledge through that.\textsuperscript{181} Here, the perception of a \textit{gavaya} is the \textit{upamāna}. Uddyotakara also maintains that the object of \textit{upamāna} is the knowledge of the name and its denotation.\textsuperscript{182}

Uddyotakara feels that the mere knowledge of assimilation can not lead to the knowledge of the relation of the name with the particular class of objects. So, he adds that it is not merely the knowledge of similarity which leads to the knowledge of the name and the named but this knowledge should be associated with the revival of the impression caused by the sense of the authoritative statement.\textsuperscript{183} In this way Vārtikakāra correlates the authoritative statement and the knowledge of similarity.

Gautama seems to be aware of the opponents view that \textit{upamāna} is not a distinct means of knowledge as it can not be established either through complete or considerable or partial similarity.\textsuperscript{184} He states that \textit{upamāna} does not depend upon the quality or degree of similarity.\textsuperscript{185} Vātsyāyana holds that \textit{upamāna} is the knowledge of unknown object by means of its resemblance to a known object. According to him the effect of similarity does not depend upon its degrees e.g., perfect, great and partial but, based upon its familiarity.\textsuperscript{186} Uddyotakara introduces the element of \textit{vaidharmya} as a basis of \textit{upamāna} in addition of \textit{sādharmya}. According to him, the term

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\textsuperscript{181} prasiddhyarān sādharmyarān yaśya, prasiddhena vā sādharmyarān yaśya so’yaṁ prasiddhyasādharmyō gavayaḥ. tasmāt sādhya sādhanamiti. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 53-54
\textsuperscript{182} samākhyāsaṁbhandhapratipattīrūpamānārthaḥ. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 54
\textsuperscript{183} āgamahitasarīnśkJārasmṛtyapekṣaṁ sārūpyajñānamupamānam. \textit{Ibid} ; \textit{Nyāyavārtikatāparyāṭikā}, p. 197
\textsuperscript{184} atyantapraikadeśāsādharmanyādupamānāsiddhiḥ. \textit{Nyāyasūtra}, 2.1.45
\textsuperscript{185} prasiddhhasādharmanyādupamānasidheryathokta doṣānupapattiḥ. \textit{Ibid.}, 2.1.46
\textsuperscript{186} Cf. \textit{Nyāyabhāṣya} on \textit{Nyāyasūtra}, 2.1.45
sādharmya in the sūtra of Gautama is symbolic and it comprehends vaidharmya as well.\footnote{187}

Vācaspati Miśra is particular in understanding the upamāna strictly in the sense of instrument (karana) of upamiti. He mentions the word yataḥ should be inserted in the aphorism making the definition of upamāna. So that it should be applicable to the means (karana) only.\footnote{188} He also points out that merely the term sādhyasādhanam cannot form the definition because it would apply to the other means of knowledge and also the means of pleasure, pain etc. Hence, the term prasiddhyasādharmyāt is the essential part of the definition.\footnote{189} Hence, Gautama has defined it as prasiddhasādharmyupamāna and the word sādhyasādhana is used in the definition to exclude upamānabhāsa.

Vācaspati says that the term sādhyasādhana means making known (prajñānaṁ) what is to be made known (prajñapaniyasya).\footnote{190} For the cognition that ‘this animal is what is denoted as gavaya’, it is necessary that the cognizer should know and remember the authoritative sentence ‘the gavaya is similar to the cow’ and also he should perceive the similarity to the cow in the animal concerned. Hence, upamāna is the perceived similarity being aided by the remembrance of the similarity

\footnote{187. prasidhasādharmyasya vaidharmasya ca upamānabhetvāt. Nyāyavārtika, p. 243}
\footnote{188. atrāpi yat ityadhyāhāryāṁ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā, p. 196}
\footnote{189. sādhyasādhanamityusyamāne pratyakṣaṅdisādhane sukhādisādhane ghaṭe prasaṁgaḥ, ata uktaṁ prasiddhasādharmyāditi. Ibid., p.197}
\footnote{190. sādhyasādhanapadyavākhyānaṁ prajñāpanīyasya gavayaśabdavācyatayā pratyakṣāṅḍrṣyamāgānasāṅḍṛṣyasya gavayatvasāmānya viśeṣavataḥ pīḍṣya prajñāpanamupamānarāṁ. Ibid.p.196}
expressed in the sentence ‘the gavaya is like the cow’.\textsuperscript{191} However, according to the 
\textit{Bhāṣya}, \textit{upamāṇa} is the similarity as expressed in the assertion ‘the gavaya is like the cow’. Hence, the view of Vācaspati differs from Vātsyāyana in this respect. Vācaspati actually follows Uddyotakara. The later logicians have accepted the view of the 
\textit{Vārtika} and Vācaspati regarding \textit{upamāṇa}.

21. \textbf{ŚABDA OR VERBAL TESTIMONY}

Śabda or verbal testimony is the fourth kind of valid knowledge. Etymologically, the term \textit{śabda} signifies sound (\textit{dhvani}), literally it stands for word and epistemology it means to a source of knowledge. According to Gautama, verbal testimony is an instruction of a reliable person āptopadeśa.\textsuperscript{192} The reliability of the person making a statement is a condition ensuring the validity of the knowledge derived in this way. The term āptopadeśa means a communication from or assertion of an āptapurūṣa (trustworthy person). Vātsyāyana points out that a reliable person is one who possesses the direct and right knowledge of things, who is willing to communicate his knowledge and who speaks about it.\textsuperscript{193} He further says that the word āpta is derived from āpti which means immediate right cognition of things (sāksatkāraṇamārthasya). One who acts or proceeds through the direct right cognition of things is called āpta.\textsuperscript{194} This definition of a reliable person is equally applicable to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{191} tasmādāgamaprayākṣābhyyāmanyadevedamāgamamārtisasihitaṁ
  sādṛṣyajñānapupamānakhyāṁ pramāṇamāstheyāṁ. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 198
  \item \textsuperscript{192} āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ. \textit{Nyāyasūtra}, 1.1.7
  \item \textsuperscript{193} āptaḥ khalu sāksātktatadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cīkhyāpāyiṣayā prayukta upadeśtā. \textit{Nyāyabhāṣya} on \textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{194} āptistayā pravartate ityāptaḥ. \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
the seer (*ṛsi*), noble (*ārya*) and barbarian (*mleccha* person without Vedic practices).
The activity of all these people is carried on through such word.

In this way, the activities of God (*deva*), man (*manusya*), and animal (*tiryac*) are mentioned with the help of instruments of valid knowledge and not otherwise.¹⁹⁵ Uddyotakara introduces a controversy over the interpretation of the of the compound *āptopadeśa* in order to refute the contention of Dignāga that verbal testimony is to be included either in inference or in perception. He clarifies that it is the element of verbalization which is important in this source of knowledge and which separates it from inference and perception. The Bhāṣyakāra say that in the sūtra of Gautam, if the word *āptopadeśa* means that the person making the assertion is truthful, then that is inference only. If, on the other hand, it means that the fact asserted here is true, then that is known by perception. Uddyotakara refutes this view saying that the meaning of the above sentence is not correctly grasped by the opponents. It means the cognition of things connected with the senses as also not connected with them which is expressed by words.¹⁹⁶

Though Vācaspati has not deviated from the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* regarding the concept of *śabda*, he has elaborately explained the sūtra and clarified its meaning. He says that in the definition, *āptodeśa, upadeśa* means the words uttered. It means the

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¹⁹⁶. nāyaṁ sūtrārthaḥ āptopadeśaḥ śabda iti, api tu indriyaśaṁbandhā- sanibaddhesvartheṣu yā śabdollekhena pratipattiḥ sā’gamasyārthaḥ. *Nyāyavārtika*, p.57
knowledge of sentences as well as the knowledge of the meaning of sentences.\textsuperscript{197}

When the knowledge of the sentence is the pramâna, the knowledge of its meaning is the fruit or the resultant cognition. When the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence is the pramâna, then the idea of accepting or discarding the thing is the fruit.

Although the Vedic sentence like sadeva saumyedamagra āśīd\textsuperscript{198} etc. do not engage or refrain anybody to anything, even they are upadeśas as they denote the final beatitude of men.\textsuperscript{199}

Vācaspati then proceeds to explain the meaning of the term āpta. He follows Bhāṣya and Vārtika in this respect. He reiterates that the assertion of the reliable person such as the rṣis, mlecchas etc. is sabda and not of those thinkers who are pervaded by delusion like Buddha, Rśabha (i.e., Jaina) etc.\textsuperscript{200} Vācaspati also asserts that even a mleccha can be on āpta if he torus out to be reliable. He gives an example. When a robber, who has stolen everything from a traveler, is asked to point out the path, indicates what torus out to be a right path, then that person is an āpta.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{197} upadiśyate’neneti upadeśo vākyajñānaṁ tadarthajñānaṁ vā abhidhīyate. Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 201

\textsuperscript{198} chāndogyopaniṣad, 6.2.1

\textsuperscript{199} yadyapi sadeva somyedamagra āśīd ityādi vacanaṁ kvasit na pravartayati, kutascid vā na nivartayati puruṣaṁ tathāpi puruṣaśreyo’bhitta ityupadeśa ityucyate. Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 201

\textsuperscript{200} āptānāṁ rśyāryamlecchānāmupadeśaḥ śabdo na tvanāptānāṁ māyāmohanirmitānāṁ buddharśabhādānāṁ pramāṇaviruddhakṣanikasarva dharmanairātmyāvadāṇāni. Ibid.p.202

\textsuperscript{201} mlecchā’pi hi pratipathamavasthitāḥ pāṇthānāmapahṛtasarvasvā- mārgākhyāne hetudarśanasūnyā bhavantyāptā iti. Ibid.
In this way Vācaspati maintains that for being āpta it is not necessary that he should be free from all defects.

22. TYPES OF VERBAL TESTIMONY

According to Gautama, word or verbal testimony is of two kinds- one having perceptible objects i.e., dṛṣṭārtha and another having imperceptible objects i.e., adṛṣṭārtha.²⁰² Vātsyāyana states that the object of which is attainable in this world and having perceptible object is called dṛṣṭārtha. It relates to the sensible objects of the world, e.g., the reliable statements of ordinary persons, sages and scriptures. Another is the object of which is attainable in the other world and having imperceptible objects is called adṛṣṭārtha.

It relates to imperceptible objects, e.g., the reliable assertions of religious teacher, prophets and God etc.²⁰³ According to him, only the word having perceptible object of reliable person is pramāṇa, since its object is ascertained by inference, the word having imperceptible object is also pramāṇa.²⁰⁴ Here, the both kinds of testimony are pramāṇa, the former is based on actual experience and the later is based on inference. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra also maintain the same view of Bhāsyakāra and uphold these two kinds of words, viz., dṛṣṭārtha and adṛṣṭārtha.²⁰⁵

²⁰². sa dvividho dṛṣṭā’drṣṭārthatvāt. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.8
²⁰³. yasyeha dṛṣṭāyate’ṛthaḥ sa dṛṣṭārthaḥ yasyā’mutra pratīyate so’dṛṣṭārtha
evamṛṣilaukikavākyānāṁ vibhāga iti. Nyāyabhāṣya on Ibid.
²⁰⁴. dṛṣṭārtha evāptopadesaḥ pramāṇaṁ arthasyāvadhāranāt iti,
adṛṣṭārthopi pramāṇaṁ arthasyānumānāditi. Ibid.
²⁰⁵. Cf. Nyāyavārttika, p. 57; dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvādī bhāsyamatena vyācaṣṭhe.
pratyakṣeti. Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā. p.207