CHAPTER-VIII

CONCLUSION

The philosophy of Nyāya is a philosophy of atomistic pluralism and logical realism which is very useful in developing the power of logical thinking and rigorous criticism in its students. The Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, the Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin, the Nyāyavr̥tika of Uddyotakara, the Nyāyavr̥tikatātparyāṭikā of Vācaspati Miśra and Nyāyavr̥tikatātparyāṭikā-prisuddhi of Udayanācārya are together called pañcaprastāhānanyāyatarka. These works are regarded as the most authoritative texts of the ancient school of Indian logic. Vācaspati Miśra belonged to the old school of logic and his expositions followed Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. Later on, a large number of works were written for the development of the Nyāya system of Indian philosophy.

In our foregoing study Nyāyavr̥tikatātparyāṭikā is taken for showing Vācaspati Miśra’s contribution to Nyāya philosophy. Vācaspati’s refutations of the opponents’views like Dignāga etc. on various philosophical doctrines of Indian philosophy are also highlighted in our study.

Now, in the following lines we are going to collect together our findings:

1. Nyāyavr̥tikatātparyāṭikā is a very lucid commentary of Vācaspati Miśra on Nyāya philosophy. Vācaspati Miśra tried to re-establish the Nyāya doctrines propounded by Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara through his authoritative commentary. VācaspatiMiśrahimself states that the aim of
writing this work was to acquire merit, by restoring the very old teachings
of Uddyotakra which had been overwhelmed by the unassailable wrong
reasoning of the Buddhists.

2. Regarding the exact date of Vācaspati Miśra, there is some confusion.
   Though Vācaspati has himself mentioned the date of one of his works as
   898, the confusion arises regarding the era of the above date-whether it is
   Śāka era or it Vikrama Saṁvat. On the basis of internal and external data it
   is established that the above date belongs to Vikrama era which
   corresponds to 841 A.D.

3. Vācaspati Miśra has established the existence of the self on the basis of
   remembrance and desire. Following Uddyotakara he has also pointed out
   that desire, aversion etc. can not be the qualities of any substance other than
   the self.

4. Regarding artha, which is one of the prameyas Vācaspati’s view differs
   from the Bhāsyakāra. Interpreting the sūtra which defines artha Vācaspati
   states that arthas are those which, when pondered upon as things cognized
   by the sense-organs, lead to the attainment of liberation and which, when
   wrongly apprehended, become the cause of transmigration. Vātsyāyana
   maintains that only the qualities of prthivī etc. are the arthas. According to
   Vācaspati earth, water, air etc. and smell, taste, colour etc. are all arthas.

5. Regarding doubt Vācaspati’s view differs from the Sūtra or Bhāṣya.
   According to Vātsyāyana, there are five kinds of doubt depending on the
   cause of its origin. But according to Vācaspati Miśra, doubt is only of three
   types.
6. As regards other categories of Nyāyasūtra, Vācaspati Miśra does not differ from his predecessors and he follows the Bhāṣya and Vārtika in interpreting these padārthas.

7. The Vaiśeṣikas accept seven categories, viz., dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānyā, viṣeṣa, samavāya and abhāva. Though these categories are not found in Nyāyasūtra, Vātsyāyana maintains that these are also in accord with the Nyāya system. Clarifying this point Vācaspati has shown that these seven categories come under the prameya called artha.

8. Pramāṇa and its varieties are examined in detail by Vācaspati Miśra. He has also refuted the Bauddha view in this respect. Vācaspati has followed his predecessors in defining Pramāṇa as the instrument of valid knowledge. He has referred to some other definitions of Pramāṇa provided by other scholars and has refuted them. Another definition of Pramāṇa accepted by Vācaspati is upalabdhiḥetu (cause of cognition).

9. According to Vācaspati Miśra knowledge is true only when it is not contradicted by its object. He opines that knowledge is said to be true when it reveals the object with the nature and attribute possesses by it in spite of changes of time, place and other conditions.

10. Gautama defines perception as indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpānamjñānaṁ avyapadeśyaṁ avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyaksam. The definition of perception given by Gautama has been explained threadbare by Vācaspati Miśra. Vācaspati Miśra differentiates between the sources of knowledge (Pramāṇa) and knowledge. He adds a word yataḥ with Gautama’s definition and thus mares this differentiation.
11. Vācaspati Miśra explains the term *sannikarṣa* in the definition. He says that the Śūtrakāra has included the term *sannikarṣa* instead of *saṁyoga* or *samavāya* in order to include all types of relation. Vācaspati also points out that the term *artha* (object) is also quite purposeful. By the term *artha* the Śūtrakāra means that the object of perception should be knowable in their nature. In case of *paramāṇu* (atom) and *ākāśa* (ether) though *saṁyoga* etc, is possible, they are not knowable as such and hence are not perceptible.

12. According to Vācaspati Miśra, the part of Gautama’s aphorism, viz., *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannamāññānaṁvyabhicāri* meaning the uncontradicted cognition produced by the sense-object-contact is the definition of perception and the other parts viz., *avyapadeśyaṁ* and *vyavasāyātmakaṁ* indicates two types of perception as *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate). Vācaspati has given three alternative justifications for the inclusion of the term *avyabhicāra* in the Gautama’s Śūtra. The qualification *avyabhicāri* is necessary in the case of perception because of the non-erroneous nature of perception to the cause of non-erroneousness of other forms of knowledge. Vācaspati has also refuted Vātsyāyana’s interpretation of the term *vyavasāyātmaka* and asserts that it refers to *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*.

13. Gautama has made use of the word *sannikarṣa* (contact) which includes all those conditions that give rise to perception, viz., conjunction, inherence and qualification-qualified relationship. This contact is regarded as the distinguishing feature of perception.
14. Gautama defines *anumāna* a *tatpūrvvakāṁ* which means that which is preceded by perception. Uddyotakara explains this term in three ways and holds that *anumāna* is the *liṅga-parāmarśa* as aided by remembrance or the knowledge which is preceded by the perception of the middle term and remembrance of its invariable concomitance with major term. Vācaspati Miśra supports Uddyotakara and explains the term accordingly. In his view, *anumāna* is that which is preceded by two perceptions of *liṅga-parāmarśa* and the *vyāpti*.

15. *Hetvābhāsa* or fallacy is an important topic of discussion in Nyāya philosophy which is discussed by Vācaspati Miśra elaborately. However, he has not shown any deviation from his predecessors in this respect.

16. Regarding *upamāna* Vācaspati shows his independence. His view differs from the Bhāṣyakāra. Vācaspati Miśra is particular in understanding the *upamāna* strictly in the sense of instrument (*kāraṇa*) of *upamiti*. He mentions the word *yatah* should be inserted in the aphorism making the definition of *upamāna*, so that it should be applicable to the means (*kāraṇa*) only. *Upamāna* is the perceived similarity being aided by the remembrance of the similarity expressed in the sentence ‘the *gavaya* is like the cow’.

17. Vācaspati Miśra follows Gautama and Vātsyāyana in his analysis of *śabda* or verbal testimony.

18. Following the *Sūtra, Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika*, Vācaspati Miśra has refuted different views of the opponents regarding the theory of causation. He has
refuted the Cārvāka, the Baudhha and the Vedānta view in his Nyāyavārtikatītparyatīkā.

19. Refuting the Vedāntic view that Brahman is the cause of the world, Vācaspati Miśra points out that transformation of Brahman, wholly or partially, is not possible.

20. The Naiyāyikas are asatkāryavādins, according to which, an effect is non-existent before it is produced. They refute satkāryavāda on the ground that if the effect is already existent there can be neither production nor destruction.

21. In the earlier works of Nyāya including Nyāyavārtikatītparyatīkā no discussion on the definition and types of cause is found. The latter works however, give a systematic definition of cause. It is Udayana who first defined cause as an invariable antecedent of an effect. This basic definition is accepted and elaborated by later Naiyāyikas.

22. Though Nyāyasūtra and its commentaries do not discuss about the different kinds of causes, Gautama has only indicated about material causality in one sūtra. Vācaspati Miśra has not provided any discussion on the three types of causes. But Uddyotakara and other Naiyāyikas accept three types of causes, viz., samavāyikāraṇa, asamavāyikāraṇa and nimittakāraṇa.

23. The Buddhists accept only avayavas, and not avayavin. But the Naiyāyikas maintain that the whole and the parts are separate substances which occupy same space in the relation of samavāya. The concept of substance underlines this idea of part and whole. For establishing the fact that the whole exists as something different from its parts Vācaspati has given a lot
of arguments. In this respect he follows Uddyotakara and mainly tries to clarify the points raised by the latter.

24. Buddhists maintain that substance is the combination of qualities and actions. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system does not accept this opinion. This system states that dravya is different from qualities and actions. Vācaspati has refuted the Buddhist view and established that there is something called substance distinct from its qualities.

25. The theory of atom is a unique theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. An atom is the smallest part of a composite thing which cannot be divided into smaller parts. Vācaspati points out that an atom is called to be an atom for its smallest size which cannot be divided into smaller parts.

26. The Naiyāyikas have a common view with other system of Indian philosophy that the world is full of pain and a little pleasure serves to intensify the force of sorrow. The Naiyāyika maintains that the false knowledge (mithyājñāna) is the root cause of bondage of the jīva. Liberation or mokṣa does not mean the annihilation of the soul. It consists in the severance of the bondage. In the state of liberation the self is totally indifferent about pleasure and pain. According to Naiyāyikas, true knowledge of the soul leads to liberation of the soul. After destruction of false knowledge or cessation of pain the soul attains the state of liberation or apavarga which is the state of absolute absence of pain.

27. Vācaspati Miśra holds that liberation is the absolute freedom from pain, i.e., desire, aversion etc. with the eternality and happiness of soul or ātman.
In this way, it is found that Vācaspati Miśra’s work occupied a prominent position among the Nyāya works and eclipsed many important treatise of the system. It is known that the works of logicians like Aviddhakarṇa, Saṅkara Prūticandra, Adhyayana, Trilocana and others preceded Vācaspati’s work. But all of them went into oblivion due to the overwhelming influence of Tātparyatīkā.

Vācaspati Miśra has established the supremacy of the Nyāya work on other systems by refuting the opponents’ view. It is also mentioned that in propounding the Nyāya doctrines, Vācaspati Miśra has not always followed his teacher whom he referred to as Triolocana. Vācaspati has examined the topics of Nyāyasūtra of Gautama elaborately. He also examined various philosophical doctrines and refuted the views of the opponents like Dignāga etc.

Thus, Vācaspati Miśra’s work Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā is very important work of Indian logic which is very useful to the advanced learners of Nyāya philosophy. Hence, the importance of Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā of Vācaspati Miśra in the field of Nyāya logic can never be over-estimated.