Chapter IV

INDIAN POLITICS AND BRITISH POLICY DURING THE TRIPOLITAN AND BALKAN WARS IN INDIA

The defeat of Turkey in the Tripolitan and Balkan wars did not by any means persuade the supporters of Turkey in India of the helplessness of their cause. On the contrary, pan-Islamic ideas continued to be expressed with greater vigour. Just then the Aga Khan broke his silence and wrote an article addressed to Indian Muslims as well as to the British policy makers. 1

The Aga Khan's thesis was that Turkey, Persia and other Muslim countries should be brought into the orbit of the British empire; reposing genuine trust in England, Turkey should reconcile herself to the loss of her territories in the Balkans; and stay contented as an Asiatic power. At the same time he deprecated the exhortations of the Indian supporters of the Turks calling upon the latter to continue fighting in spite of adverse circumstances and defeats in the war. He advised the Indian Muslims to accept the faît accompli with regard to Turkey and concentrate on their own affairs in India.

The views of the Aga Khan raised a storm of protest in the Muslim press. With few exceptions the Aga Khan thesis

1. See The Times of India (Bombay), 14 February 1913.

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aroused uniformly hostile criticisms.¹ Conspicuously, Muhammad Ali seems to have taken no notice of it. The Aga Khan was even charged with having written his views on British promptings; he was dubbed as a protege of Edward Grey;² and a traitor of the community, supporting only the Anglo-Indian interests.³ It was sarcastically said that the views of the Aga Khan would greatly endear him to the Anglo-Indian community.

On the other hand, the Tribune of Lahore took exception to the criticism of the Aga Khan's views in the Muslim press.⁴ The Panjabee of Lahore found his advice to

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1. For example, Mazharul Haq in a speech at the Town Hall, Calcutta on 16 February 1913, characterised the Aga Khan's arguments as anti-Muslim and remarked that the fall of Turkey meant the fall of Islam and the loss of Turkish prestige as that of Asia. Commenting on this meeting the Bengalee (Calcutta), 18 February 1913, stressed that it was an index of Indian Muslim opinion which emphatically repudiated the views of the Aga Khan. See also Musalman (Calcutta), 18 and 21 February 1913, RONNP-Bengal; Oudh Akhbar ( Lucknow), 20 February 1913, Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 25 February 1913, Al-Bashir (Etawah), 25 February 1913, Aligarh Institute Gazette, 26 February 1913, while the Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 26 February 1913, published letters disapproving of the views of the Aga Khan, RONNP-UP.

2. Vakil (Amritsar), 5 April 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

3. Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 4 June 1913, Kaiser-i Hind (Faizabad), 24 July 1913, RONNP-UP, also Panjabee (Lahore), 22 May 1913.

4. Tribune (Lahore), 26 February 1913.
Indian Muslims as sound and prudent and statesmanlike. The paper had anticipated resentment from the pro-Turkish elements, described as the 'forward section' of Indian Muslims, and observed that "Turkey in Asia is all that can be conserved if Muhammadans are united."¹

However, the views of the Aga Khan brought to surface the cleavage that existed among Indian Muslims as a consequence of Turkish developments and his leadership was repudiated.² The Aga Khan wrote:

"Knowing full well how bitterly it would be attacked simply no body else would do it --- But it was time some one should speak and when I saw that none would, I had to do so, though I knew it would put an end even to the fiction of my leadership the ground of which had been destroyed by Persia, Tripoli and Morocco and the Balkans ---"³

The exit of the Aga Khan from the leadership of Indian Muslims evoked disappointment from Valentine Chirol which was illustra-

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1. *Panjabee* (Lahore), 18 February 1913, similar view was expressed by the *Paisa Akhbar* (Lahore), 1 May 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

2. *Oudh Akhbar* (Lucknow), 21 February 1913, RONNP-UP.

3. Aga Khan to Butler, 2 March 1913, Butler Papers - 116/71, IOL.
tive of the official British attitude. The feeling was shared by Hardinge, the Viceroy. Sydenham, the Governor of Bombay, even eulogised the Aga Khan's worth as a political leader at a reception given by some Muslims of Bombay, and advised them to retain him as their leader. The Al-Bashir of Etawah took exception to this and observed that the Muslims themselves should judge their leaders.

The Aga Khan persisted in his views and argued his thesis in his correspondence with Butler. The latter was more concerned with the question of Muslim leadership in India rather than with his views on the Turkish question. Butler advised him as a friend "to take a strong line and stick to it." He disapproved of his departure from India at this juncture: "If you want to lead again, they would be ripe for it about the cold weather - don't see who else can.

1. Chirol was convinced that the Aga Khan's departure was due to nothing "but blue funk" Chirol to Hardinge, 26 March 1913, Hardinge Papers-70, (original file) CUL.

2. Again that his "moderation and loyalty was after all, no mean asset for the Raj" Chirol to Hardinge, 18 April 1913, Hardinge Papers-71 (original file) CUL.

3. Al-Bashir (Etawah), 8 April 1913, also Medina (Bijnore), 8 April 1913, RONNP-UP.

4. Butler to Aga Khan, 26 March 1913, Butler Papers-116/71, IOL.
My dear friend Mahmudabad is more disposed to feed them, than to lead his co-religionists. 1

The Aga Khan in his reply, dealt with the circumstances and the way the Muslim press ridiculed him - "whose political and public ideas and their ways of attack and criticism are so primitive" that he could not go on with them. 2 However, he requested Butler to exert his influence on the British Government in favour of Turkey and Persia: "Believe me their existence and their existence within the British orbit is more than a source of strength, it will be a pillar of strength to the Empire." 3 The Aga Khan believed that Hardinge was sympathetic to such ideas but he was not sure about Grey and the Liberal Party. Butler told him that for Britain to enter into any such arrangement would be difficult; rather Britain was doing what it could in the delicate and complex European situation to help the Turks. 4 The Aga Khan nevertheless, continued to emphasize

1. Ibid., 30 April 1913.


3. Ibid.

4. Butler to Aga Khan, 29 May 1913, Butler Papers - 116/71, IOL. Similar views had been expressed by Churchill, see above Chapter III.
that "the larger the Moslem element in the Empire the better for both England and Islam."¹ Unmindful of the reaction of Turkey, he said:

"I have reason to believe that in view of all that has happened in recent years Turkey is not merely willing but anxious to come more fully within the orbit of British influence, whatever weight the Indian Moslems may possess in the Islamic world should be used for bringing Turkey and other Mohammedan countries into an attitude of genuine trust in Great Britain."²

The Aga Khan's presumption about Turkish anxiety to be admitted into the British Empire was unrealistic; and he also failed to notice the changes that had come about in the British public opinion and the Liberal Party towards Turkey. Later on, the nationalists in Turkey suspected him to be an agent of the British imperialism; and the publication of his and Syed Ameer Ali's letter in the Turkish newspapers was to precipitate the crisis leading to the ultimate abolition of the Khilafat itself.

1. Aga Khan to Butler, 16 July 1913, Butler Papers-116/71, IOL.

2. See his speech at the fifth Annual General Meeting of the London All India Muslim League, 14 July 1913, enclosure to Ibid.
The Aga Khan's thesis was also rejected by W.S. Blunt. The latter had advocated similar views three decades earlier. Since then his views had changed. In response to a request from Syed Mahmud he wrote a long letter; he characterized as containing his last words of an advice on Eastern matters.

Blunt had come to the conclusion that his long advocacy for a pro-Turkish attitude on the part of Britain had been a complete failure. The British could be converted back to their former friendly attitude towards Turkey by making it evident that "the continued loyalty of Indian Moslems can only be had by the exercise of active friendliness and help given to the sultan." He regretted that Indian Muslim opinion was most feebly represented by its leaders. Blunt observed that Europe and the Ottoman Turkey

2. W.S. Blunt to Syed Mahmud, 24 July 1913, File No. 24, pp. 112-15, Syed Mahmud Papers, NMML.
3. Ibid. 5 January 1913.
4. Syed Mahmud, however, informed him about the changes that had taken place in Muslim politics in India and wrote a reassuring letter to him. In his diary on 22 February 1913, Blunt recorded that Syed Mahmud writes to him "you say your advocacy has ceased to exercise any influence even on the Mohammedans, I say it has just begun. They now realise the true meaning of what you told them years ago, because they are shaking off a bit of their slavishness developed since the Mutiny of 1857." My Diaries, 1900-1914, Part II (London 1919-20), p. 409.
were now confronting each other; in these circumstances to rely on England was a "dangerous illusion." The Aga Khan had deluded himself, when he regarded England in 1913 as the England of 1854 and 1878 which had rescued Turkey from Russia. Politically England had till thirty-five years ago kept aloof from all share in the "spoliation of the Caliphate" and had entered into treaty obligations guaranteeing Turkish integrity. However, British policy had undergone a change during the last ten years. Blunt attributed this to a racial factor. A group began to conduct British affairs and held stronger hold over its international action and opinion; this was the Jewish element.

1. Blunt explained that England was no longer what she was in 1883, the sole arbiter of events in the Eastern Mediterranean. Now no longer could she protect the sultan from his many enemies. Her Naval Supremacy was gone and just impossible for her to regain it. Even the British character had undergone change; this augured the decline of British Imperial Power - "The day that has gone by and will hardly be renewed; for nations are seldom arrested in their decay, empires never." (Blunt to Syed Mahmud, 24 January 1913, Syed Mahmud Papers-24, NML).

2. Blunt stressed that Grey owed his political education to Lord Rosebery who was closely connected by family ties with the Rothschilds. Blunt wrote "the class which has usurped the conduct of our affairs --- ever stronger hold over our international action --- over our opinions." Ibid. also see Lord Lytton, Wilfred Scawen Blunt (1961), pp. 182-8.
Edward Grey was the "worse enemy" of Islam. He was restrained by certain of his colleagues in the British Cabinet and from the fear of Muslims joining Hindus actively against the Government of India. Blunt believed that Grey's policy was based on fear; and made himself an associate of Russia, France and Italy in their anti-Islamic policy, because of his fear of Germany. Such a policy in his view, was nothing but "throwing the children to the wolves"; Grey was sacrificing "one Islamic people after another in order to secure English immunity from attack at home." Blunt even introduced an anti-Semitic note in his letter, saying:

"The British Empire is run at present moment not by Englishmen on English principles or even in English interests but by an international gang of rogues. This is the major premise of warning I address to you in answer to the Aga Khan's too naive confidence in England's goodwill towards Islam."  

1. Blunt stressed he betrayed Persia to Russia, Bosnia to Austria, Morocco to France, Tripoli to Italy and Roumelia to the European Concert. Ibid.

2. Ibid., Blunt was delighted over the fall of Kiamil Pasha in Turkey; in his view he was certainly playing into the hands of "Islam's worst enemies, partly through weakness, partly through ignorance, partly through perversity." He considered his fall a "severe slap in the face for Grey"; even if Grey resented the event, he would not be allowed by his colleagues in the cabinet to act against Turkey in view of the indignation in India. Blunt to Syed Mahmud, 28 January 1912, Syed Mahmud Papers-24, NMML.
Blunt found that everyone in England spoke the language of imperialism, yet the will to defend the empire was altogether lacking. On the other hand, he saw vigorous efforts had been made by Muslim 'patriotism' possibly referring to the Young Turks and Egyptian nationalists, to renew themselves. He predicted if their efforts failed: "it is hardly to England that the inheritance of the Caliphate lands will pass." Under such circumstances any suggestion to bring the Muslim states into the "orbit of English influence" would prove "a fatal snare and invite a new betrayal." Therefore Blunt thought that for the Muslims to count on England "as a permanent factor in the Ottoman affairs" would be incorrect. Instead the Indian Muslims had to be courageous and let the British Government know that their sympathy on this question was very strong and that they would not agree to any further British participation in attack on them. Indian Muslims should denounce British complicity and make no "milk and water" appeals to the government as they had done two years earlier, when Grey was an accomplice of France and Italy in the invasion of Morocco and Tripoli. Grey had treated the London Muslim League's protest with contempt. Blunt held Aga Khan and Syed Ameer Ali answerable for this. He much

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2. Ibid., 24 July 1913.
regretted the return of Syed Mahmud to India since Syed Ameer Ali was now left to represent Muslim opinion in England according to his own wishes.¹

Blunt did not, of course, represent any influential segment of British official opinion; and his basic sympathies were with the Turks. The importance of his assessment lies in his clear perception that British policy was now fundamentally anti-Turkish, a situation which was inevitably to determine Turkey's position in the coming World War. If the Indian Muslims could help Turkey, that was only by way of clouding, rather than protesting their loyalty to Britain. Blunt would thus essentially set their role in a pan-Islamic framework. He pronounced his "opinion that it is only in the Pan-Islamic Movement that you (Indian Muslims) can hope to regain an independent position in Northern India."²

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In April 1911, just before the beginning of the Tripolitan war, the Secretary of State for India enquired from the Viceroy about the attitude of Indian Muslims in case of a rupture with Turkey. At the same time he assured him that

1. Ibid., 5 January 1913.

2. Blunt to Syed Mahmud, 12 April 1914, Syed Mahmud Papers-24, NMML. He repeated his views again in his letter of 12 April 1914, Ibid.
nothing definite about Turkey had been contemplated by Whitehall. ¹

The Viceroy replied that Britain's active hostility would certainly disquieten Indian Muslims. Such an expression would be on the frontier as was seen during the Greco-Turkish war in 1897, and the ulema would attempt to inspire religious fanaticism. Nevertheless, he suggested that a "sharp rebuff to Turkey" was necessary in order to show British power of retaliation in defence of her interests. Such a step, in his opinion, outweighed immediate risks. He wrote:

"I foresee much greater danger from future and cumulative effect of our allowing fear of an Islamic movement to deter us from taking vigorous action when necessary in defence of our legitimate rights and interests."²

Obviously the Viceroy's reply greatly reassured the London policy makers. Three days later Hardinge continued to argue in the same strain:

1. Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, Secret Telegram, 5 April 1911, Grey Papers-800/98, PRO.

2. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Telegram, 8 April 1911, Ibid.
"To disturb Mohammedan feeling in India is the last thing I desire during my term of office — but I feel that one must look a little ahead and put the future local situation before you, upon which you and the Foreign Office are better able to decide than I, in accordance with the lines of general European policy." ¹

Hardinge thus gave preference to Imperial interests in the Mediterranean and singularly failed to assess the possible threat to Britain's own prestige in India.

However, in October 1911 even he was surprised to discover that the British War Office had been directly corresponding with the Indian General Staff regarding the dispatch of troops to Europe in the event of a crisis. ² Even the secretary of state for India also had no knowledge about

1. Hardinge to Morley, 11 April 1911, No. 30, Hardinge Papers-117, CUL.

2. In September 1911 the Government of India reviewed the military policy of India. Except the Commander-in-Chief the entire Governor General's Council favoured a revision of the army recruitment policy, in view of the changes that had taken place in internal and external situation during the last few years. They considered it hardly necessary to discuss possible eventualities connected with Germany, Turkey and other powers which the General Staff emphasized "may necessitate in the future an increase of Army in India." Hardinge to Crewe, 21 September 1911, No. 62, Hardinge Papers-117, CUL.
it. Crewe tried to assuage Hardinge's feelings by assuring him that the cabinet had not assented to any such plan, and that he along with Asquith and Grey would never agree to it.  

Any way the British authorities remained worried about Indian Muslim opinion. The British alliance with Russia had increased the anxieties of Indian Muslims; the effect of the alliance was evident in Persia, a similar fate seemed to await Turkey. British apprehensions now were mainly that Germany might exploit this situation. Hardinge was concerned

1. Ibid., 19 October 1911, No. 65.
4. Of Marshall Von Bieberstein, the German ambassador at Constantinople (1897-1912), Admiral Sir John Fisher wrote: "For years now I have been trying to make people in authority realise that he is the greatest man in Europe --- He understands that Islam is the key of the British Empire" Fisher to Arnold, 21 May 1912, quoted in A.J. Marder, _Fear, God and Dread Nought: the correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher Kilverstone_ (London, 1952-9), Vol. II, p. 129n.
over the developing situation in the Mediterranean, and regarded the Italian aggression on Tripoli "a purely land grabbing concern."1 He wrote to his successor in the Foreign Office: "Were we squared by Italy? - how Italy could dare to move in the Mediterranean, as her commitments are entirely at the mercy of our fleet. I never heard of a worse case of brigandage than the seizure of Tripoli by Italy."2 He even suspected British connivance in the Italian action.3 The way British foreign policy was being conducted was "flabby"; and Hardinge regretted his absence from the Foreign Office.4

Placed as he was in India Hardinge's problem was how to quieten down the excited feelings and doubts of Indian Muslims. At the closing session of the Imperial Legislative Council he made conciliatory remarks on British policy and Turkey. He made use of information given to him that on 21 March 1912 the sultan of Turkey sent an autographed letter to the British King and conferred on him the Order of the

1. Hardinge to Clarke, 30 September 1911, No. 171, Hardinge Papers-83, CUL.
2. Hardinge to Arthur Nicholson, 15 October 1911, No. 98, Hardinge Papers-92, CUL.
3. Hardinge to Hoos Keppel, 14 October 1911, No. 188, Hardinge Papers-83, CUL.
4. Hardinge to Clarke, 30 September 1911, No. 171, Hardinge Papers-83, CUL.
Hamdan-al-Osman and the Order of the Intizaz. However, this was an example and proof of the Turkish desire to strengthen ties with Britain and hardly one of Britain's goodwill towards Turkey. Hardinge expected that his remarks would get wide publicity in the native press. He stated his belief that Britain was being made to suffer for events over which they had no control. This was essentially because Muslims were uneducated. Another cause of worry for him was that the events of Turkey and Persia gave "impetus to the Pan-Islamic movement in India."

From Hardinge's correspondence Crewe concluded that the Turkish and Persian affairs in effect neutralised the good

1. Hardinge to Crewe, 27 March 1912, No. 12, Hardinge Papers-119, also Secretary of State to Viceroy, Telegram, 23 March 1912, No. 131, Hardinge Papers-96, CUL.

2. Hardinge to Crewe, 24 July 1912, No. 36, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.

3. Seeing this the Government of India decided to disseminate information and news about British policy and Britain's duties and responsibilities in Europe, among Indian Muslims. For this purpose they considered the Journal The Near East published from London to be quite suitable. Having consulted the local governments they sought the permission of the India Office for distributing 1000 copies in India. The approval was received for a year as an experiment. For the same purpose the government subsidised some Indian newspapers as well, for example, the Sulabh Samachar. Viceroy to India Office, 2 July 1912, No. 227, Hardinge Papers-96, CUL.

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done by the King's visit to India. Hardinge was worried about the spread of pan-Islamic ideas among Indian Muslims. Nor could he visualise an early termination of the Tripolitan war. Thus in spite of his stout reply to the Secretary of State's telegram in April 1911, Hardinge was soon regretting a policy which could go so much farther in alienating Muslim opinion from the British Government.

The pro-Turkish agitation that now began in India, Hardinge attributed it to Muhammad Ali, describing him contemptuously as that "dangerous malcontent", the "poisonous fellow" and "miserable creature". For a while he even comforted himself with the thought that since Muslims had been too much occupied with their hostility to the Hindus

1. Crewe to Hardinge, 15 August 1912, No. 32, Hardinge Papers-96, CUL.

2. Hardinge to Lord Sanderson, 5 October 1912, No. 221, Hardinge Papers-92, CUL.

3. Hardinge to Nicholson, 30 November 1912, No. 113, Hardinge Papers-92, CUL.


5. Hardinge to Chirol, 28 August 1913, No. 72, Hardinge Papers-92, CUL.

6. Hardinge to O'Dwyer, 13 August 1913, No. 88, Hardinge Papers-86, CUL.
they were unable to devote their energies fully to the
Turkish question: "This rivalry between two religions is a
blessing at the present moment."¹ He assured Whitehall that
the Muslim agitation in India had not "yet come to a head",
and "we shall keep them in hand."²

Hardinge received confidential information that a
certain Hindu leader, whose name was not disclosed to him was
trying to obtain a telegram from the Sheikh ul Islam for the
Indian National Congress thanking the Hindus for their sympathy
towards Turkey. The Viceroy believed such a telegram if sent
"would be an unfortunate thing."³ However, no such telegram
was received by the Indian National Congress which was holding
its annual session about that time.⁴ Any signs of rapproach-

1. Hardinge to Nicholson, 30 November 1912, No. 113,
Hardinge Papers-92, CUL.

2. Ibid., 29 October 1912, No. 233.

3. It was the Aga Khan who gave this information to
Chirol and the latter passed it on to Hardinge.
Chirol to Hardinge, 22 December 1912, No. 417.
Hardinge Papers. The Viceroy advised the Secretary
of State for India to ascertain this fact from
Gerard Lowther, the British ambassador in Turkey and
Edward Grey the Foreign Secretary. Viceroy to
Secretary of State for India, Telegram, 28 December
1912, No. 561, Hardinge Papers-96; also see Pro. No.
387 and 391, F.D. Extl. B, April 1913, Nos. 342-428,
NAI.

4. Lowther gathered from the son of the Sheikh-ul-Islam
that no such proposal was received and assured him
that nor any request would be entertained. Secretary
of State for India to Viceroy, Telegram, 9 January
1913, No. 23, Hardinge Papers-97, CUL.

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ment between the Hindus and Muslims could thus prove a grave embarrassment to the British Government.¹

As for the Indian Muslims, Hardinge professed to be in a dilemma as to what they specifically wanted: "What they want us to do it is difficult to know, but they want us to do something, and of course there is nothing for us to do."² And yet he admitted that: "They cannot understand why we do not intervene to stop the war - as they very rightly say it would be easy for us to do so."³ He therefore keenly looked for an early end of the Balkan wars. Strangely he expected that the agitation in India would subside with the fall of Adrianople. After the war Hardinge decided he would do "a little straight talking with them"; to the effect mainly that the policy of "Great Britain in Europe cannot be conducted on the lines of sentiment of any class of His Majesty's subjects in India." He also intended to tell them that the Sultan of Turkey was not the Khalifa of Indian Muslims and that Turkey in times of

1. Gopal Krishna Gokhle had told Montagu of the improvement in the relations between the two communities during the Balkan war agitation. Chirol was shocked to learn that Gokhle looked at "Turkey as the champion of Asia." He remarked "I wish one could get this rubbed into Gokhle's radical friend in this country." Chirol to Hardinge, 25 July 1913, Hardinge Papers-71 (original file), CUL.

2. Hardinge to Nicholson, 7 August 1912, No. 194, Hardinge Papers-92, CUL.

3. Ibid., 30 November 1912, No.
distress and famine in India had never helped its co-
religionists. ¹ Hardinge wrote to Nicholson that "in all
these wars against Turkey it is we only in India who in
reality have to pay the piper." ²

Hardinge was embarrassed over the Mansion House
speech of Asquith, the Prime Minister and to his dismay he was
the first European statesman to announce that the victors
would not be deprived of their spoils. He understood this to
have been made for the supporters of Gladostonian "bag and
baggage" policy at home. ³ Hardinge wrote to Montagu that "it
has just touched our Mahommedans on the raw as they are very
sensitive over the Turkish defeats." ⁴ Equally annoying was
the Asquith speech about Adrianople, calling it the gate
through which Christianity entered Europe. When Turkey re-
captured Adrianople, Asquith assumed a threatening posture
against her. Hardinge felt so embarrassed that he wrote to
Lord Sanderson:

1. Hardinge to Tyrrel, 19 March 1913, Grey Papers-800/
   94, PRO.

2. Hardinge to Nicholson, 2 November 1912, No. 102,
   Hardinge Papers-92, CUL.

3. Hardinge to Butler, 13 November 1912, Butler Papers-
   116/40, IOL.

4. Hardinge to Montagu, 5 December 1912, No. 272,
   Hardinge Papers-92, CUL.
"It is very well for the Foreign Office at home, who feel no pressure from a single Mahommedan; I have eighty million of them on my back — all in an excitable condition looking out for trouble and ready to agitate on any matter."¹

Hardinge could not hide his anguish over the utterances of British ministers against Turkey. "Why cannot, he wrote "these ministers hold their tongues, and why should there be a different standard of morality in the case of Turkey and the Balkan states."²

The situation in the Punjab and United Provinces was vexatious. Lord Sydenham, the Governor of Bombay, advised Hardinge to issue a statement on the European situation in a "true perspective." The object of such a statement would be to indicate the impossibility of British intervention on behalf of Turkey without a risk of a European war; it could also refute the criticism of the pan-Islamic press. Sydenham expected that unless the prestige of the government had sunk too low, the weighty statement would have the desired effect on Indian Muslims.³

1. Hardinge to Sanderson, 30 July 1913, No. 59, Hardinge Papers-93, CUL.
2. Ibid. 4 September 1913, No. 77.
3. Sydenham to Hardinge, 18 March 1913, No. 154, Hardinge Papers-93, CUL.
In the meanwhile, Muhammad Ali, as editor of the Comrade (Delhi), wrote to the Viceroy that the British foreign policy towards Muslim states presented a regrettable impression on Indian Muslims. Therefore, he sought an assurance from the British Government that it would not take part in coercing Turkey. To this Hardinge gave a cold reply, asserting that he knew "a good deal about British foreign policy." At the same time, he told the Secretary of State for India that it was desirable to make a statement without any delay.

Hardinge thanked Chirol for impressing upon Grey the importance of Indian Muslim opinion on the Turkish question. He regretted his own failure in this connection. He was shocked when Whitehall empowered him only to say to Indian Muslims that the arrangements of London had left Turke in no disadvantageous position. Hardinge confided to Chirol: "Of course, I could no say such a thing, as people in India would laugh at me."

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1. Muhammad Ali to Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 22 July 1913, No. 46, Hardinge Papers - CUL.

2. Private Secretary to the Viceroy to Editor of the Comrade, 2 July 1913, No. 2, Hardinge Papers-86, CUL.

3. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 23 July 1913, No. 460, Hardinge Papers-97, CUL.

4. Hardinge to Chirol, 30 July 1913, No. 58, Hardinge Papers-93, CUL.
When the Turks reoccupied Adrianople, the Government of India advised the home government against coercing Turkey and further. Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, after consultations with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary refused to grant the desired permission to the Government of India for expressing sympathy with Turkey: "We do not think it possible for your Government to express more marked sympathy with Turkey than can be stated here." Crewe had in fact already urged caution on the matter. Subsequently, in a similar situation when Montagu allowed the Government of India to express such sympathy, he had to resign from the Cabinet.

Hardinge endeavoured hard to impress upon Crewe the need for a reconsideration of his government's request and an urgent effort to allay the doubts of Indien Muslims. He wrote:

"I have not seen it publicly stated anywhere that any of the other Powers, who form the Concert of Europe have warned the Turks to clear out of Adrianople, but we who have 80 millions of Mahomedans, have

1. Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, Telegram, 25 July 1913, No. 418, Hardinge Papers-97; also see Hardinge to Crewe, 31 July 1913, No. 37, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.

2. Crewe feared parliamentary difficulties had he allowed Hardinge to express sympathy for Turkey, Crewe to Hardinge, 25 July 1913, No. 34, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.
openly stated in Parliament that we have addressed a warning to the Turks. Even if we had done so, surely it was very unnecessary to have announced this publicly. One cannot help feeling that the interests of the Balkan Committee carry more weight than those of the Mahommedans in India—am ready to state in most public manner in India that British Policy in Europe cannot be deflected on account of the views of Indian Moslems, but I cannot see the necessity of so openly announcing our attitude when it happens to be in opposition to the sentiments of those Moslems. No other Power does it, and why should we? —I do not think that the difficulties that we have out here with the Mahommedans, who have hitherto been most loyal supporters of the British Raj, are sufficiently appreciated at the Foreign Office."

Evidently the differences between the Government of India and home government were becoming sharp. Crewe retorted to Hardinge's urgings: "you will agree that it is a

1. Hardinge was anxious over the formation of the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i-Kaaba, the Kanpur Mosque Riots (between the Government and Muslime), and the changes that were taking place in Muslim politics. In order to reinforce his arguments he had enclosed a letter of Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. Hardinge to Crewe, 14 August 1913, No. 39, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL, see also his letter of 23 July 1913, No. 36, Ibid.
dangerous precedent for the Government of India to acquire merit at the expense of the government at home.  

Hardinge argued that he had also espoused the cause of the South African Indians. Crewe asserted there could be no analogy between the two; the Cape and Natal Indians had been our own people and "not merely coreligionists like the Turkish Mahommedans." He promised that he would speak to Grey, but was not hopeful.

Since Germany declined to take part in any joint proceedings against Turkey, the Great Powers could not intervene. Since nothing happened, the situation eased a little for the Government of India.

Hardinge was not alone in questioning British policy among British statesmen. Chirol and Mallet, the British ambassador at Constantinople also shared his views. Mallet lamented:

1. Crewe to Hardinge, 21 August 1913, No. 38, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.

2. Ibid., 31 October 1913, No. 51.

3. Crewe to Hardinge, 4 September 1913, No. 41, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL. Crewe sent the extract of Hardinge's letter of 14th August to Grey with the remark that "This may not be very serious in itself, though it will seem so to those whose only scheme of control (in India) is divide et empera." Grey passed it on to the Prime Minister Asquith who noted on the letter "Lord Hardinge has lost his head over this fussiness." See Crewe to Grey, 6 September 1913, Grey Papers-800/98, PRO.
"I wish I were clearer as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Turkey. To judge by the P.M.'s speech when the Turks returned to Adrianople and by the leaders in the Times one would think that the re-occupation --- was a grave British misfortune, but I confess I can't see why we should take the lead against the Turks."¹

Mallet believed that Hardinge's telegram about the feeling of Indian Muslims had a great impact in London. He was himself against the break up of the Ottoman empire. In his view, it was in British political and commercial interest that the Turks should hold Adrianople. He told Hardinge:

"You can really exercise more influence than anyone in the formation of a policy towards Turkey. If the break up of the Asiatic dominion of Turkey is formally to be avoided, and I imagine that it would be a great misfortune for India to see Russia in the six Vilayets, Germany in Asia Minor and France in Syria, a consistent policy of maintaining and strengthening the Ottoman Empire (coupled with reforms) should be pursued and might be insisted on by India."²

¹. Mallet to Hardinge, 11 August 1913, No. 65, Hardinge Papers-93, CUL.
². Ibid.
Such could have been the case, but Hardinge had already committed the initial mistake, by giving a blank cheque to British policy makers in April 1911. He now admitted to Chirol that he had purposely refrained from writing home on the feelings of Indian Muslims during the last winter. What was that purpose he did not explain. Possibly he was horrified at the thought that Indian Muslims should dictate the British foreign policy. Like Mallet even Chirol had advised Hardinge to warn Whitehall their actions would "estrange the loyalty of Indian Muslims."¹

Considering the exigencies stressed by the Government of India, Grey authorised only a declaration regarding the Holy Places in order to allay the feelings of Indian Muslims.²

The Viceroy informed the India Office that such a declaration had been made six weeks earlier it would have had effect on Indian Muslims. After the recapture of Adrianople by the Turks their excitement had subsided; any assurance under these circumstances would be superfluous.

The Government of India closely followed the negotiations between the powers concerning Turkey. It stressed

¹ Chirol to Hardinge, 4 July 1913, No. 51, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.
² Grey to Crewe, 7 October 1913, F.O. 800/98, Grey Papers, PRO.
upon the Home Government "the necessity for preventing the dismemberment" of Turkey. The Viceroy argued that the partition of Turkey would have serious consequences for India and increase its responsibilities. And urged that "all measures likely to contribute to the partition of Asiatic Turkey either at the present time or hereafter" had to be avoided; instead, Britain should "pursue a consistent policy of reforming, strengthening and maintaining the Turkish Empire". Hardinge had even come across certain references in a Foreign Office print indicating plans of a possible partition of Turkey. He demanded the prompt abandonment of any such idea as it would provoke a serious rising among Indian Muslims.

II

Under the stress of successive events in India and abroad a rupture occurred in Indian Muslim leadership. The

1. Viceroy to India Office, Telegram, 8 September 1913, No. 558, Hardinge Papers-97, CUL.

2. Hardinge contended "that a strong, friendly and reformed Turkey in Asia will act as a safeguard to India from interference on the part of Foreign Powers from the west, and might even in an indirect manner result in the maintenance of Persian integrity." Viceroy to India Office, Telegram, 8 September 1913, No. 558, Hardinge Papers-97, CUL.

3. According to which Germany and Russia were to divide Asia Minor, France would get Syria and England Mesopotamia. Hardinge to Crewe, 23 July 1913, No.36, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.
basic division was between the conservative and liberal elements, respectively styled the 'Old Party' and the 'Young Party'. During this period the 'Young Party' being more militant had forged ahead under the impetus of the indignation against the attacks on Turks; 'Old Party', which adopted a less vocal attitude, correspondingly lost ground. Even Nawab Vigar ul Mulk had been compelled to advise Muslims not to place much reliance on the government.¹

The 'Young Party' professed to see a basic hostility towards Islam in British policy. Muhammad Ali urged the freest resort to agitational politics which was "acknowledged by the Government to be the only effective method of converting them."² Shibli Nomani enlarged the anti-British position into a national platform. He criticized the Muslim League which, he contended, discussed only communal questions and avoided issues concerning the country as a whole. He considered that it was now time for the League to be purged of its feudal elements the Zamindars and Taluqdars, and to improve relations with

¹. Cf. A.H. Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India (Lahore, 1950), p. 110. See Appendix A for biographical sketch.

². Comrade (Calcutta), 3 February 1912.
their compatriots. The Zaminder (Lahore) condemned the Muslim League because it was voicing the views of the conservative Muslims only. The Liberals were called upon to sever their connections with the Muslim League and establish a body of their own. The conservatives responded by arguing that the Muslim's aim could not be self-government, and that they should continue to adhere to the policy laid down by Syed Ahmad Khan and shun the politics of agitation.

Syed Ameer Ali who was to preside over the Muslim League session at Lucknow in December 1912, became anxious about the growing influence of the militants which might be reflected at the League session. Joining with the Aga Khan he got the session postponed allegedly in view of the Turkish crisis, and as a token of mourning the grave peril to

1. Shibli wrote a number of articles on Muslim politics and published them in the Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 9 October 1912, RONNP-UP., Shibli's views were criticized by the Millet (Lahore), 25 October 1912, RONNP-Punjab. In the official circles it was believed that 'The probability is that any movement that Shibli is connected with has a political complexion and has an eye to the recognition of the Khalifate of the Sultan' LAS Porter, Lieutenant-governor of U.P. to DuBoulay, 25 July 1911, No. 104, Hardinge Papers-92, CUL. On Shibli see Appendix A.

2. Zaminder (Lahore), 9 April 1912, RONNP-Punjab.

3. The Observer (Lahore), 31 July 1912 (RONNP-Punjab) published a communication from one Yusuf of Lucknow dated 26 July 1912.
Islam. Syed Wazir Hasan who became Secretary of the Muslim League issued a circular to different persons and invited their opinions on the objectives of the League. He proposed a revision of the League constitution and undertook a tour of the country to mobilise opinion and give the League a nationalist direction. On 31 December 1912, at Bankipur the Council of the All India Muslim League recommended changes in the Constitution; it set the goal of "self-Government suitable to India" as its ideal. Equally significant was the change which aimed at expanding the social base of the Muslim League.


4. For the membership of the Muslim League the annual subscription was reduced from Rupees twenty to Rupees six and the minimum educational qualification was set at 'literate' only. The size of the League's Council was increased from forty to three hundred. It also assumed the right to affiliate any Muslim association inside or outside India. Significantly students were barred from its membership. See the Revised Constitution and Rules of the All India Muslim League in Home Poli. A. February 1913, Nos. 85-6, NAI.
All these changes were ratified at the Muslim League session held in Lucknow on 22-23 March 1913. This marked the singular success of the 'Young Party' over the 'Old Party'. However, some sceptics continued to nourish apprehensions. The Mashriq of Gorakhpur considered the changes "premature".1 The Observer of Lahore argued that "the ideal will long remain outside the pale of practical politics. In practical politics the Muslims hold their moorings and continue to believe that the existence of the British Government --- is an indispensable necessity."2 The Akhbar-i-Am of Lahore remarked that the ideal would not be attained by "dreaming continually of Arabia and Turkey."3

The Panjabee of Lahore advised Indian Muslims to adhere to the examples of Turkey and Persia; and adopt a rational ideal based on sound foundations for success. The extension of the League's goals to securing 'self-government' in India could not help in persuading Britain to offer better treatment for Turkey and Persia.4 The Paise Akhbar of Lahore,

1. Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 11 February 1913, RONNP-UP.
2. Observer (Lahore), 11 January 1913, RONNP-Punjab.
3. Akhbar-i-Am (Lahore), 18 January 1913, RONNP-Punjab.
4. Panjabee (Lahore), 29 March 1913.
apprehended that it might harden the British attitude and the cry of pan-Islamism might lead to severe measures against Turkey and Islam. On the other hand, the shift in the direction of the League's politics was greatly welcomed in nationalist circles supporting the Congress.

Nawab Fateh Ali Khan Qizilbash, a Talugdar of Gonda had attempted to oppose the changes, speaking on behalf the aristocratic classes who according to him constituted the stable and conservative element among Muslims. But he felt that the changes were an inevitable response to the British indifference to Muslim sentiments on Turkey and Persia:

"Rightly or wrongly the idea has gone forth that this resolution is a protest of Indian Muslims against the Neutrality observed by the statesmen of England in regard to the action of Italy, Russia and the Balkan Allies against Turkey and Persia."  

The turn in the League's politics caused great anguish to the Viceroy and his colleagues. For the first

3. Fateh Ali Khan Qizilbash to Meston, 7 July 1913, Meston Papers-136/6, IOL. For Qizilbash see Appendix A.  

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time Indian Muslim opinion was so well organised and at variance with the official world. Though Hardinge dubbed the changes as "mere pretence"; yet he was seriously concerned over the state of Muslim feelings. ¹ He was unhappy with the Local governments for failing to "grapple with it". ² The Muslim League had become "sheep without a shepherd". ³ He hoped, however, that once the war in Turkey would be over, Muslim agitation in India would subside; the return of the Medical Mission would also be of "help to show the hollowness of the Turkish cause." ⁴ In the same way Hardinge had expected that some moderate leader would emerge to lead Muslims that such a possibility could not be visualised before the end of the Turkish wars. ⁵

As a consequence of Turkish developments the Muslim leaders on whom the British Indian administration had hitherto relied upon lost their influence. The Aga Khan's fall was greatly regretted. Hardinge had admired the Aga Khan's thesis

1. Hardinge to Crewe, 3 April 1913, No. 15, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.
2. Hardinge to Butler, 8 March 1913, No. 110a, Hardinge Papers-85, CUL.
3. Hardinge to Sydenham, 27 March 1913, No. 152, Hardinge Papers-95, CUL.
4. Hardinge to Butler, 8 March 1913, No. 110a, Hardinge Papers-85, CUL.
5. Hardinge to Sydenham, 27 March 1913, No. 152, Hardinge Papers-85, CUL.
as a statesman like declaration but disapproved of his lack of courage and decision to retire from India. Butler's analysis of the conservative Muslim leadership in personal terms was as follows:

"The trouble is that they have no leaders. The Aga Khan is clever, but a weather-cock. Mahmudabad is weak as water; so is Rampur and unreliable to boot. The Nawab of Dacca hates Aligarh and all its work as much as he hates Aga Khan. The Secretary of the Muslim League Wazir Hasan is a born intriguer and a mischievous fellow. He is a Shia and plays on Mahmudabad's weakness, and at present has great influence with him. --- Nawab Abdul Majid is much concerned at the follies of the young men and wants to start a rival body to the League."¹

Aligarh which had been the sheet anchor of the imperialists had drifted from the chosen path, and fallen in disgrace. Butler reflected on its position in 1913, thus:

"(1) The Frontier and East Bengal Mahomedans have little sympathy with the Turks and dislike Aligarh.

(2) The Punjab Mahomedans are strongly Provincial --- the Western Punjab people dislike Aligarh.

¹. Ibid.

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The Bombay Mahommedans are of old jealous of Aligarh and want to have a College of their own.

There is not nearly so much excitement among Mahommedans now as there was in 1898 after the Graceo-Turkish war and at the time of the Tirah Campaign.

Butler concluded that: "There is a tendency to isolate Aligarh, and I think that we should be wise to foster this." Hardinge was in full agreement with Butler about Aligarh and Muslim affairs. He gave his approval to the plan to isolate Aligarh. With this end in view the Government extended patronage to the Islamia Colleges at Peshawar and Lahore, and the projected colleges at Bombay and Dacca, as possible rival institutions. Hardinge also agreed that Butler should visit Bombay, Lucknow, and other places to ascertain Muslim feelings. After his visits to these places Butler was convinced that the situation was more acute than what he had actually thought. The leading Muslims of Bombay and Lucknow disliked the young Muslim leaders and held that Aligarh was the seat of trouble. Therefore, he called for report from the Local Government, and suggested the adoption of a firm and strong attitude against Aligarh.

1. Ibid.
2. Hardinge to Butler, 9 April 1913, No. 183, Hardinge Papers-85, CUL.
3. Butler to Hardinge, 30 April 1913, No. 247, Hardinge Papers-85, CUL.
Curiously in his analysis of Muslim leaders, Butler made no mention of Syed Ameer Ali. Instead, he had written to Morley that some "level headed" Muslims were annoyed with him for giving encouragement to anti-Christian emotions during the Turkish wars. The Viceroy also in a telegram to the India Office stated: "Much of this agitation is being stirred up by Ameer Ali from London --- Could he not absolutely be forbidden to take part in a political movement of this kind by the Lord Chancellor?" ¹

Haldane, the Lord Chancellor and some officials of the India Office met Syed Ameer Ali, who denied the allegations of inciting the Indian Muslims by exaggerating the accounts of atrocities on Turks by Christian troops. ² Ameer Ali met Crewe and complained to him that it was not he, but Muhammad Ali, who had reported such things in his paper; it was actually the Comrade Medical Mission which had been sending reports to this effect to India. ³

Syed Ameer Ali in anguish wrote to the Lord Chancellor that his "life's work should be so little appreciated or under-

1. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 28 February 1913, Telegram, No. 139, Hardinge Papers-97, CUL.

2. Ameer Ali to Lord Chancellor, 7 March 1913, enclosure in Crewe to Hardinge, 13 March 1913, No. 12, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.

3. Crewe to Hardinge, 3 April 1913, No. 15, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.

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stood;" and asserted that "the well being and development of the Mussulmans of India were bound up with British rule." Yet he also took care to say: "Within the nine years that I have been away from India new thoughts and feelings have sprung up among the younger generation of which, I am told, I have no knowledge, and that my views are regarded as antiquated."¹

On the advice of Crewe the Viceroy asked Butler to look into the files and report any "injudicious activity" on the part of Syed Ameer Ali.² Nothing specific was found against him except that a report in the Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore) of 7 August 1912 that as President of the Muslim League he had sent a telegram advising Muslims to have rapprochement with Hindus.³

Hardinge's enquiry and Lord Chancellor's intervention greatly depressed Ameer Ali. Butler thought that he was frightened and was now urging saner views. In militant circles he was even alleged to have embezzled Red Crescent Funds. On this Butler sneered: "No Mahommedan can collect funds apparently without this imputation. This is Pan-Islamism."⁴

¹. Ameer Ali to Lord Chancellor, 7 March 1913, enclosure in Crewe to Hardinge, 13 March 1913, No. 12, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.
². Hardinge to Butler, 9 April 1913, No. 183, Hardinge Papers-85, CUL
³. Hughes Buller, Director Criminal Intelligence to Butler, 16 April 1913, Butler Papers-71, IOL.
⁴. Butler to Hardinge, 30 April 1913, No. 247, Hardinge Papers-85, CUL.
A significant development of the period under review was the coming closer of the western educated young Muslims and the ulama of different shades of opinion upon a more militant platform. This was to reach its climax in the Khilafat Movement.

The necessity of arriving at an understanding between the traditional and modern elements was realised by the ulama of Deoband, in particular Maulana Mahmud Hasan.\(^1\) He tried particularly to bridge the gulf that had existed between Aligarh and Deoband.\(^2\) Obeidullah Sindhi, a disciple of Mahmud Hasan, also played an active role in bringing the two elements together.\(^3\) He found the traditional religious elite was unwilling to make the break with their past modes in order to lead the general masses of Muslims, while the educated classes had been coming up to do so. He was of the view that the ulama should not obstruct the aspirations of the educated classes, which on their part should be persuaded by the actions of the ulama, to see the real value of the latter. It was indeed Obeidullah Sindhi who had converted

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2. See Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, p. 56.
3. For Obeidullah Sindhi see Appendix A.
Mahmud Hasan, rather easily, to these broad views.¹

During this period when Muhammad Ali visited Deoband Mahmud Hasan went to meet him thus signifying his willingness to acknowledge him as his leader.² The Ali Brothers were closer still to Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal and accepted him as their pir. Such an alliance between the modern and medieval was effected in the face of the 'temporal misfortune of Islam' when 'the men of light and leading' had to come together.³ Shibli Nomani personified with his Aligarh background, liberal views and deep conventional learning personified this union.⁴

With these developments in mind, Muhammad Ali could claim: "Once more Muslim society in India presented a level of uniformity and the bitterest opponents of a generation ago stood shoulder to shoulder working together with zeal and with

2. Ibid.
4. See Faruqi, op.cit., p. 51, Shibli inspired a number of the students of the Aligarh College who became prominent journalists, e.g., Muhammad Ali of the Comrade (Delhi), Zafar Ali Khan of the Zamindar (Lahore), Hesrat Mohani of the Urdu-i-Mualla (Aligarh) and Wahiduddin Salim of the Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), see My Life : A Fragment, p. 27.
a mutual appreciation of the good points which each lacked himself, but which the other possessed."  

Muhammad Ali acquired a unique position in this new consolidation of the community. The first issue on which he could exhibit his leadership of the new combination was that of the Kanpur Mosque which he enlarged into a general grievance of the Indian Muslims. It was a domestic grievance which the Muslim leadership sought to combine with the external one of Turkey.

A portion of the Mechhli Bazar Mosque at Kanpur which was used for the purposes of ablution, was demolished by the Municipal authorities under a town improvement scheme to straighten the road. The mutwalis were satisfied with a compromise offer. Muhammad Ali however urged Meston the Lieutenant-governor of the United Provinces, to reverse the

1. Muhammad Ali, My Life: A Fragment, p. 47. The Nazarat-ul-Maarif, Delhi was founded in 1913. Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr M.A. Ansari extended their patronage to this organization. Obeidullah Sindhi was shifted from Deoband to this organization, which brought Mahmud Hasan and Nawab Vigar ul Mulk together at one place. See Madni, op. cit., p. 156, also Muhammad Mian, Ulma-i-Haqq, Vol. I, p. 135.


3. The editor of the Al-Bashir (Etawah), 8 July 1913, RONNP-UP., was in favour of the exchange of land on the north of the Mosque.
decision of the local authorities. The authorities' insistence upon demolishing the disputed structure led to a clash with the police which resorted to firing.

Abdul Qadir Azad Subhani, a teacher in a madrasa and shaidai of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba on 3 August 1913, addressed a meeting at the Idgah in Kanpur arousing religious passions and invoking the Turkish parallels: "Today we have our Karbala --- and our children sobbing like the orphans of Tripoli --- if the Christian Government is our protector, why does it come to your mosque with bayonets --- I tell you that this protected land is not like Italy and Turkey to sheath its sword --- Caunpore will become a second Tripoli." The Paisa Akhbar of Lahore quoted an Urdu verse meaning "after all we have burst out like a boil; you should not have meddled with us, for we were ripe for bursting." The remark of the Zamindar of Lahore was that the ruin of Turkey and the atrocities committed on them in the Balkans had hurt the Indian Muslims, but the Kanpur Mosque had inflicted a wound

1. Comrade (Delhi), 6 July 1913, published all his correspondence on the issue held between May and July 1913.

2. Speech cited in the Minute by the Lieutenant-governor on the Kanpur Mosque and Riot, Part II, events after 1 July 1913, Home Poll, A, October 1913, Nos. 100-18, NAI, See also in Meston Papers-136/15, IOL.

3. Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 6 August 1913, RONNP-Punjab.
that had no comparison. ¹

Meston informed Hardinge that the 'Young Party' and "their so-called leaders are like querulous children just now ready to fly into temper at any grievance, real or imaginary." But he was sure that: "Neither their washy Pan-Islamism nor their ludicrous advances to the forward Hindu Party can possibly do us any harm."² Any surrender to them would mean "great and permanent embarrassment to Government."³

But even the 'Old Party' leaders, led by Raja of Mahmudabad submitted a memorandum to Meston on the Kanpur Mosque issue⁴ Seeing the nature of the agitation, even Hardinge became concerned for it was "no longer provincial, but had

1. Zamindar (Lahore), 14 & 15 July and 6 August 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

2. Meston to Hardinge, 12 July 1913, No. 24, Hardinge Papers-86, CUL.

3. Meston to Hardinge, 16 September 1913, Ibid.

4. It was signed by Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal, Raja of Jehangirabad, Raja of Pirpur, Nawab Ishaq Khan, Nawab Muzammilullah Khan, Syed Abdur Rauf, Syed Raza Ali, Syed Nabiullah, Maulvi Muhammad Habibur Rahman, Muhammad Nasim and Munshi Enthiham Ali, see Comrade (Delhi), 9 August 1913. A Kanpur Mosque Fund was opened and Rupees 80,000 were made available to Mazhar ul Haq (See History Sheet of Mazhar ul Haq, Home Poll. A, July 1917, Nos. 408-10, NAI), who reached Kanpur with a team of lawyers including Syed Ross Masud, Khwaja Abdul Majid, T.A.K. Sherwani, Dr Syed Mahmud, Syed Nabiullah, Mian Muhammad Shafi and Aftab Ahmad Khan, Comrade (Delhi), 20 September 1913.

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assumed an Imperial aspect.¹

Meston continued to argue with Hardinge over the impolicy of any concessions. The "demagogues who aspire to lead the Musalman community" wanted to show them that they "can defeat the Government and wring concessions from it." Concessions would thus greatly strengthen "the false leaders who are gradually paralysing the best instincts of the Indian Musalmans; and the traditional reliance of the community on the British Government." In view of the Muslim leader's criticism of the utterances of British Ministers on Turkish affairs a conflict was in any case inevitable - "If the outburst had not come at Cawnpore, it would have not been long delayed somewhere else."²

Hardinge, however, took a different view, and having arranged matters through Butler and Raja of Mahmudabad, he went to Kanpur in order to pacify the Muslims.³ This was

1. Hardinge to Crew, 6 August 1913, No. 38, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL. The pan-Islamic papers claimed that it was a national and religious issue which concerned the whole Islamic world. Hablul Matin (Calcutta), 5 August 1913, RONNP-Bengal; Zamindar (Lahore), 23 September 1913, RONNP-Punjab; Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 17 August 1913. The Zamindar published the views of the Turkish and Arabic newspapers e.g. Tanin and Shoab which claimed that the agitation was organised to demand the British Government that it should allow Adrianople to remain with Turkey. See Zamindar (Lahore), 26 September 1913, RONNP-Punjab.


3. Hardinge obtained an expression of regret from the leaders and a declaration of loyalty to the government. See Hardinge to Butler, 7 October 1913, No. 199, Hardinge Papers-86, CUL.
seen as a great success of the new combination of the educated Muslims and the ulema, exactly as Meston had predicted. At this stage the Kanpur Mosque agitation marked the growth of a certain Muslim communal awareness.

Meston indeed noted the real change in the composition and quality of Muslim leadership. The source lay in Turkey: "The troubles of Turkey have, among other unfortunate consequences, brought to the front a type of Young Muhammadan in India who will always be a problem to us" They thrived on excitement and "agitation provides (them) a congenial and frequently remunerative employment."1

As for the methods of the new leadership Meston had these unflattering remarks to offer:

"By invective they beat down the attempts of the older fashioned, moderate but extremely sensitive leaders of the community to resist their domination. By racial grievances they hope to unite the Muhammadans in allegiance to themselves. By opposition to the Government they believe, that they will eventually wring out concessions which will prove to their community that they and not the loyalists

1. See Minutes by Lieutenant-governor of U.P., on the Kanpur Mosque and Riot, Part III, General Consideration, 21 August 1913, Home Poll, A, October 1913, Nos. 100-18, NAI, also in Meston Papers-136/15, IOL.
are the leaders who may profitably be followed."¹

Just a few weeks before this *Millat* a pro-government and conservative paper of Lahore wrote in similar vein:

"our bogus patriots found in the Tripolitan War an opportunity to collect funds and live luxuriously on them—now we see that those very people are now raising such an out cry—attempting to incite Muslims in the name of religion."²

Meaton had referred to the "unforgiving religious bigot", "who draws from the Turkish defeats a revival of his smouldering dislike of Christians and of the British ascendancy in India."³

These judgements on the militancy and inherently anti-British attitude of the new leadership were not very wide off the mark. Later, these very elements were to declare India a *darul harb* and advocate *hijrat* in 1920.

Yet the objectives of the politics of religion and pan-Islamism could not make an alliance with Indian nationalism

1. Ibid.

2. *Millat* (Lahore), 8 August 1913, ROHNP-Punjab.

3. See Minute by Lieutenant-governor of U.P. 21 August 1913, Home Poll. A, October 1913, Nos. 100-18, NAI.
an easy task. Muhammad Ali, in particular, had great reservations on this. He had even given an assurance to the Private Secretary of the Viceroy that he would divert the minds of the Muslims from the boycott movement which Hasrat Mohani had made popular among the students of the Aligarh College and in the United Provinces.\(^1\) Muhammad Ali ridiculed the advice of the London Muslim League to make a common cause with the Hindus and the Congress.\(^2\) He did not also like the 'self-Government' resolution adopted by the Muslim League.\(^3\) Essentially, during this period, Muhammad Ali thought in terms of short term Muslim interests, as he saw them, and was not averse to make an approach to British imperialism if this could win concessions that might go to his credit.

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1. Du-Bouley (Private Secretary) wrote: "Mohamed Ali came to see me the other day. He tells me he is taking a pull and attacking the boycott movement hotly --- He is anxious to divert Moslem excitement into other channels, and the channel he contemplates is Turkish Bonds." Du-Bouley to McMahon, 14 March 1913, No. 126, Hardinge Papers-86, CUL.


3. Theodore Morrison in his 'Note on the Muhammadan situation' wrote that Muhammad Ali told him and what he had heard from other quarters that he did not like the resolution about self-Government. See Enclosure in Viceroy to Lieutenant-governor of U.P. Meston Papers-136/6 (p. 113), IOL.
Muhammad Ali was hopeful of such an alliance, but realised this could not be attained by talking to the Government of India. The matter had to be raised directly with the British Government and British public. The Calcutta newspaper, Hablul Matin was also of the view that the centre of Muslim activities should be shifted from India to England; and an attempt be made to win over the British press on their side which exercised a powerful influence over the British Government.\(^1\) In September 1913, Muhammad Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan, Secretary of the Muslim League, left secretly for England.\(^2\) Zafar Ali Khan, editor of the Zamindar (Lahore) also left for England with a view to joining them: "in the great task of explaining to the British public the Moslem point of view in respect of problems affecting the destinies of Musalmans within the British Empire and the exact nature of the so called Islamic solidarity."\(^3\)

The mission of Muhammad Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan had gone over and above the Government of India and the officially recognized 'Old Party' Muslim leadership. This was not to be countenanced by either. Hardinge promptly telegraphed to

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1. Hablul Matin (Calcutta), 11 September 1913, RONNP-Bengal.


3. Zamindar (Lahore), 29 September 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

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Crewe, the Secretary of State for India that "both fire brands and agitators" had no representative status within the Muslim community. He advised Crewe that they should not be given any interviews by the India Office and the Foreign Office.

Crewe acceded to Hardinge's wishes and did not give interview to Syed Wazir Hasan and Muhammad Ali despite their persistent efforts and recommendations made to this effect from various quarters. Crewe had also passed hints to certain leading members of the British press so as to deny them publicity and the satisfaction of presenting their case before the British

1. The Raja of Mahmudabad told to Hardinge that Muhammad Ali was not their representative and regarded him "a mischievous person who could only do harm to Mohammedan cause." Hardinge to Crewe, 11 September 1913, No. 45, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.

2. Not content with this, Hardinge sent a similar message to Holderness in the India Office. Hardinge to Holderness, 11 September 1913, No. 46, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.

3. The Aga Khan had in a letter called them the representatives of "the growing class" amongst the Muslims of India. See Muhammad Ali to Crewe, 20 November 1913, Muhammad Ali Papers-MOH/L-1200. Sir Henry Cotton wrote to Crewe that he should receive Jinnah, Syed Wazir Hasan and Muhammad Ali who would merely talk about the Press Act and its amendments. At the same time he urged Crewe to take advantage of the chance of discussing "Mohammedan unrest" with the people of such influence. Crewe believed that it was easy to dismiss the two 'fire brands' but "not so simple to get out of Jinnah (Jinnah)" a member of the Legislative Council. Crewe to Hardinge, 9 October 1913, No. 47, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.

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Hardinge was greatly satisfied with this and impressed upon Crewe that "the moment is propitious for bringing forward the Mahommedans of Moderate opinion." He was sorry that the loyalists had no leader as clever as Muhammad Ali. He wished to consolidate the position of Moderate elements without which he thought "the Aligarh College will continue to go wrong as at present."  

Seeing that their credentials were doubted, Syed Wazir Hasan and Muhammad Ali sought the cooperation of the Aga Khan who had not only written recommendatory letters but proposed a public dinner in their honour. Syed Ameer Ali refused to attend the dinner on the excuse that their would be political speeches and he would have to take permission from the Lord Chancellor. On this Syed Wazir Hasan sent a letter of protest to Syed Ameer Ali, as a consequence of which the latter

1. See Crewe to Hardinge, 2 October 1913, No. 46, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL. The Times (London), described them "as extremists of the Tilak school" and as "mad political pan-Islamists" see Muhammad Ali to Crewe, London, 20 November 1913, Muhammad Ali Papers-MOH/L-1200. The Zamindar (Lahore), 4 November 1913, published a note entitled "The Times Muslim-offending attitude" and refuted the charge of their being extremists (RONNP-Punjab).

2. Hardinge to Crewe, 6 November 1913, No. 56, Hardinge Papers-119, CUL.
resigned from the Muslim League. The Aga Khan also resigned from the Presidentship of the Muslim League. This in fact amounted to the Moderates totally surrendering the leadership to the militants. Personal relations had already soured between Muhammad Ali and Syed Ameer Ali on the question of the Medical Missions. Muhammad Ali was accused to have indulged in back biting and libel against Syed Ameer Ali. Muhammad Ali retorted by slighting Syed Ameer Ali that what he had been writing in the Comrade was not mere petty jealousy but because—"If I can expose Edward Grey or the Tsar of Russia or something else in the world for the benefit of the public: why (then) should I not expose Mr Amir Ali"?

1. This incident was played up by the British press and the conservative press in India. The Observer (Lahore) characterized it as the "proverbial bolt from the blue" and nothing short of a "communal calamity". (5 November, 1913, RONNP-Punjab).

2. Observer (Lahore) 5 and 8 November 1913, Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 5 November 1913, RONNP-Punjab. The Moslem Hitaishi (Calcutta), compared them with the Young Turks whom the paper accused of ruining Turkey (21 November 1913, RONNP-Bengal). On the other hand the Zamindar (Lahore) 12 December 1913 (RONNP-Punjab) and Mohammadi (Calcutta) 14 November 1913, (RONNP-Bengal), felt gratified over the resignation. In Bengal it was expected that Syed Ameer Ali's exit would help improve relations between Hindus and Muslims Hitavadi (Calcutta) 14 November 1913, Basumat (Calcutta), 15 November 1913, RONNP-Bengal.

3. See Comrade (Delhi), 15 November 1913, Hamdard (Delhi), 6, 7 and 8 November 1913.

While refusing Muhammad Ali an interview Crewe made division among Muslim leadership (brought about by English themselves!) as the ground for refusal: "Those of your co-religionists with whom you are not in accord, (who) claim equally with you to represent the political attitude and temper of Musalman community in India." Muhammad Ali, accordingly suspected Syed Ameer Ali for engineering the rebuff. He never realised that it was Hardinge who was really responsible for this. Meston ever glad to have Muslim militants put in their place thanked Hardinge for sending the timely warning to Crewe.

The rebuff given to Muhammad Ali and his two colleagues could not obscure the basic fact. The old 'respectable' Muslim leadership was now on the sidelines. The Aga Khan noted that apart from the religious sentiments they had undergone the same

1. Minute by Crewe, India Office, 14 November 1913, L/P&J/6/3616-1913, IOR. See also Comrade (Delhi), 15 November 1913.


3. Meston to Hardinge, 6 January 1914, No. 6, Hardinge Papers-87, CUL.

4. Musalmen (Calcutta), 18 October 1913, RONNP-Bengal.
education and training as young Hindus of the same social classes.¹

Theodore Morrison advised Hardinge that no reliance could now be placed on the "Old fashioned aristocracy" because they were distrusted by the Muslims. Such men should not be given any honours until a genuine conservative leader emerged. Morrison saw no other suitable leader beside Aftab Ahmed Khan, a barrister and Trustee of the Aligarh College. As for militants, Morrison urged a total avoidance of dealings with Muhammad Ali because these would disconcert the Muslim Moderates still further.²

Meston noticed certain similarities between the agitation of the young Muslims and the agitation of '1907' by the Congress:

"In the latter case a national sentiment was stirred, or rather created by Curzon's highhanded action over the Partition of Bengal; in the case of Muhammadans, religious (which is their only national) sentiment has been roused by the disas-

¹. He expressed his view in an article published in the Edinburgh Review, cited in the Bengalee (Calcutta), 16 January 1914.

². See 'Note on Muhammadan Situation' by Theodore Morrison in Viceroy to Lieutenant-governor, Meaton Papers-136/6, IOL.

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ters of Islam."¹

Humiliated Turkey thus seemed to play here the same role as partitioned Bengal in igniting material which has been prepared by totally independent factors.

IV

As we have seen more than once the misfortunes of Turkey had two simultaneous contradictory consequences: first, the growth of anti-British feelings which tended to put Muslim leadership essentially on the same platform as the nationalists, secondly, an intensification of pan-Islamic loyalties. The contradiction was dramatically visible in the great Urdu poet Iqbal, who shifted at this stage from an enthusiastic nationalist singing in praise of India to pan-Islamicist.² Muhammad Ali called him "the poet of Islam's reawakening in India" in the twentieth century.³

Indeed, the major aim of the militants at this time seems to have been to exert pressure on the British Government

¹ Heston to Ramsay MacDonald, 11 September 1913, Meston Papers-136/3, IOL.
and force her to act towards Turkey in a manner more in accordance with the wishes of Indian Muslims. Muhammed Ali had claimed that their voice would be heeded in the end. In January 1913, he had moved a resolution at the meeting of the Anjuman-i-Ziaul Islam, Bombay to this effect.¹ He could even argue for an identity between British and Muslim interests.

The British rejected this notion so far as it implied that in regulating foreign policy Britain could not pay much regard to the feelings of her Indian subjects. The Times claimed that "British policy with its manifold interests is liable to overlook their sentiments and claims but a deeper insight would assure them that British interests and theirs are inseparably intertwined."² The identity of interests seemed acceptable to the pan-Islamists: only they saw the interests differently. The Observer of Lahore expressed it thus:

"It is the heartfelt desire of every Indian Musalman that there should be an entente cordiale between England and the Khalifate, defensive alliance --- It is the subject of his thoughts by day and of his dreams by night."³

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2. The Times (London), in an article on 'Indian Muhammadans and Imperial Policy', reproduced with comments in the Observer (Lahore), 13 April 1912, and the Tribune (Lahore), 19 April 1912, RONNP-Punjab.

3. Observer (Lahore), 28 February 1914, RONNP-Punjab.
The cult of pan-Islamism gave preference to extraterritorial affiliations. In their zeal the Indian pan-Islamists even ignored the realities of political and religious situation obtaining in Muslim countries. Khwaja Ghulam-us-Saqlain, a Vakil and journalist of Meerut, after his return from Turkey and other Muslim countries stated at a meeting at Lucknow that wherever he had gone he was told by them that the Indian Muslims were pursuing a mistaken policy and their interests were bound up with their compatriots. The danger in the tactics pursued by Muhammad Ali was that a kind of hate-love relationship with Britain over the issue of Turkey would be the focal point of all Muslim politics to the exclusion of the problems as Indians. Syed Haza Ali, Secretary, District Muslim League, Moradabad, wrote to the Pioneer of Lucknow:

"We Indian Musalmans have been pursuing a definite and deliberate policy which has resulted in an almost total estrangement between our Hindu fellow subjects and ourselves --- (who) may have a legitimate grievance against us because we lavished on our co-religionists of Turkey and Persia the love that was the due of our neighbours, or because we lived for generations on the banks of the Ganges

1. Advocate (Lucknow), 24 March 1912, RONNP-UP; Tribune (Lahore), 29 March 1912, RONNP-Punjab.
and Jumna, yet we always dreamed
of the Euphrates and Tigris."

The growth of pan-Islamism became a matter of some concern for
the nationalist press who could support Muslims over Turkey and
yet deplore the basis of pan-Islamism. The Panjabee of Lahore
argued: "Why the Hindus cannot sympathise with Pan-Islamic
movement of the Muhammadans because it is a religious and not
a territorial organisation. It challenges all non-Moslems as
unfriendly and alien and all Musalmans though foreign as
friendly. That is a position which no modern citizen of the
world is prepared to recognise." One would sympathise with
any open and legitimate attempt to help Turkey and Persia; if
it was not confined to Muslims alone. Reflecting on the
developments of recent years, the paper observed:

"But the isolating tendencies of the
Muslims refuse all else who are not

1. Cited by Panjabee (Lahore), 20 January 1912.

2. The Times (London) had published articles on the
'Pan-Islamic Menace in India'. These articles gave
the impression that Britain was not menaced nor
anticipated any dangers. The Panjabee (Lahore)
considered the growth of pan-Islamism a matter for
deep reflection. Seeing the Times taking up this
position, the paper sarcastically remarked as such
then pan-Islamism menaces no nation in India and
endangers no empire in Asia or Europe, "but it under-
mines one thing. What shall become of the principle
of Divide and Rule' and where else can the adminis-
trative facilities of that policy be sought from?'
Panjabee (Lahore), 1 October 1912.
themselves Moslem. They are yet playing with the forgotten and rejected doctrine of Religious state. The shackles of the Church over the state have been broken everywhere except in the Islamic Kingdoms, and they pride themselves over a fancied virtue which in others is only considered as a failing."

The dangers inherent in such contradictions and developments had been anticipated: "Pan-Islamism, however, one may sympathise with it from the point of view of religion and culture is from the political point of view worse than a blunder."2

The Turkish question had brought the Hindus and Muslims closer to each other. Yet there was scepticism:

"the return of intercommunal cordiality arises from a feeling which is more Pan-Islamic than Pan-Indian --- the object is not so much to form a United Indian Nation --- as to serve the special Pan-Islamic purpose which the League has in view."3

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., 23 September 1913.
3. Cosmopolitan (Dehradun), 18 August 1912, RONNP-UP.
It was regretted that though the Muslims had a common experience with Hindus of imperialism in India, yet the Muslim League had been ignoring the internal forces making for unity in India. Bipin Chandra Pal was also of the view that the attitude of the Muslim League and pan-Islamists was not conducive to the growth of nationalism in India. He interpreted Indian sympathy for Turkey as the response of Indian nationalism to Turkish nationalism.

Politics for the Muslim leadership came to be closely associated with religious sentiments. Muhammad Ali wrote:

"The entire perspective had to be changed before Musalmans could realize the great life purpose and

1. Ibid.
2. See Weekly Report of the DCI, 12 November 1912, Home Poll. B., December 1912, Pro. No. 89, Nos. 88-91, NAI. Lajput Rai, on the other hand, recognized that the pan-Islamic party enjoyed greater influence among people than the Muslim League and called them the extreme wing of Muslim nationalists. See his Young India (New York, 1917, Delhi, 1968), pp. 237-38.
3. Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 4 November 1912, RONNP-
learn to live as true Muslims. This is what I had in my own way by now fully realized and here was Iqbal forcing the door of Muslim mentality, and securing once more an entry into it for the Theocracy of Islam.1

Such an attitude was bound to have its reaction on the other communities in India as well.2

The negative aspects of such a development could be foreseen by some: Abbas Tyabji, a High Court Judge in the Baroda State admitted to the representative of the French paper Le Temps: "We have got the blindest of politicians. The Musalman live with their eyes turned towards Constantinople in regarding the Caliph not only as the Commander of the believers, a role purely religious, but as a political leader of the world wide revival towards which we all must work." He found it confounding to see the Turkish case being presented as the cause of the Muslim faith. He could foresee the consequences of this


2. For example the Khalsa Advocate of Lahore, remarked: "Even the pan-Islamic movement has one noble lesson to teach, that religion is the first and foremost uniting bond. The Sikhs, who unmindful of the consequences boast of belonging to Manjha or to Malwa to Pothohar, Dhani or to main Doab --- to Punjab or to Sind --- may learn much from the noble example of the Moslems throughout the world." 8 March 1913, RONNP-Punjab.
development, and warned; "The Utopia of this conception brings on our ruin, as it deprives us of the only necessary strength which is the sense of nationality." Abbas Tyabji contended that Indian Muslims could not live in the dreams of the past; they should be Indians first because one cannot exist without a mother country.1

This was directly opposite to the approach of Muhammad Ali who claimed that he was a Muslim first and Indian afterwards. The Muslim Gazette of Lucknow joined issues with Abbas Tyabji.2

Seeing these developments, the advice of the nationalist papers was mainly that Indian Muslims might sympathise with Turks and others, yet their destiny lay in India and they should give up entertaining impractical theories of international duties of Indian Muslims.3

Denison Ross wrote to Butler that "Religious nationality had no place in this rational and practical age."4

2. Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 19 June 1912, RONNP-UP.
3. Panjabee (Lahore), 5 November 1912, Tribune (Lahore), 6 November 1912.
4. Denison Ross to Butler, 4 April 1913, Butler Papers-71, IOL.
Evidently this was not the trend in India. The subsequent Khilafat Movement and the idea of Indian Muslims constituting a separate nation could be traced to the consequences of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba and Muhammad Ali politics, originating at least partially in the problems of Turkey.