Chapter III

INDIA AND TURKEY, 1911-13 : THE TRIPOLITANIAN AND BALKAN WARS

In 1908 the problems of Turkey were by no means resolved simply because of the Young Turk revolution. So long as Sultan Abdul Hamid had been there, there existed an equilibrium in the Middle East. He often utilized the rivalry of Great Powers to maintain the status quo. The Young Turks though they appeared to be able and promising, were 'several persons and not one with supreme authority'. 1 Consequently the new regime was plagued with rivalries and differences. The Committee of Union and Progress, as a whole, pursued the policy of centralization and stood for Ottoman nationalism based on Turkish hegemony. Such a policy aroused opposition from all the non-Turkish nationalities, including Albanians, 2 Arabs, Greeks, and Bulgarians. Their hostility to the new regime was exploited by the other powers; and a new round of spoliation of the Ottoman Empire began.

The first move was made by Ferdinand of Bulgaria who proclaimed Bulgarian independence on 5 October 1908, followed by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary on 7 October 1908. These provinces, which Austria had been

administering under the Treaty of Berlin, included a million Serbs, and inflamed Serbian nationalist sentiments against Austria. Both these events were breaches of the Treaty of Berlin. Crete, whose autonomy under Turkish suzerainty had been guaranteed by the Powers, announced its decision to unite with Greece. The Powers refused to intervene and compelled Turkey to accept compensation in money for her loss of suzerainty.

The second development was the Italian seizure of Tripoli on 29 September 1911, through an unprovoked and unjustified aggression on Turkey. Although the Turks were aware of Italian designs, they were compelled after a short war to cede Tripoli and make peace with Italy.

Then came the Balkan War of 1912-13. The Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins and Bulgars organised a Balkan League; they were encouraged to do so by Russian diplomacy in its reaction to the Bosnian affair. There was also opposition to the Young Turk policy of Turkification. Balkan subjects of the Ottoman Empire were antagonised and resented the introduction of


3. First Balkan League was organized by Prince Michael of Serbia in 1860s. In the present instance it was the Second Balkan League. See Stavrinos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York, 1958), p. 395.
a common law, a national language, and compulsory military service. For long Macedonia had been a bone of contention among them. In the name of the Powers, Austria-Hungary and Russia were entrusted with the task of warning the Balkan states that no change of the status quo would be permitted. Yet, on 8 October 1912, Montenegro declared war on Turkey followed by Bulgaria, Greece and Servia. The Turks suffered defeats and were left in Europe with only Adrianople, Scutari and Janina, besides Constantinople itself. The victory of the Balkan League produced a volte face on the part of each Power. On 3 December 1912 the Balkan Allies concluded an armistice and a Peace Conference met in London under the chairmanship of Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary.

Bulgaria insisted on the cession of Adrianople which she had not been able to seize. On the other hand, the Turks were determined to retain all the cities. But by 22 January 1913 they agreed to relinquish all territories west of a line from Midia on the Black Sea to Enos at the mouth of Marista on the Aegean. They were left with just a narrow strip of territory along the straits and Constantinople.

These developments resulted in a coup d'etat in Constantinople and Kianil Pasha was overthrown. The Young Turk

3. See Appendix A for biographical notes.
leader Enver Bey came into power and refused to give up the territories they had been forced to cede. On 30 January 1913 the war was resumed. The Turks again suffered defeats. On 6 March Janina fell to the Greeks and on 26 March Adrianople to the Bulgarians. Peace negotiations were reopened in London and on 30 May 1913, the Treaty of London was signed, ending the first Balkan war. But the Balkan league now broke up over the division of spoils.

In June 1913 the Second Balkan War started. Enver Bey, taking advantage of the division among Turkey's opponents, re-captured Adrianople. On 10 August the war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest. But it was not submitted for approval to the Great Powers. The two Balkan Wars practically ended Turkish rule in Europe.

Until now the Young Turks had leaned on England more than any other Power. Privately and officially they had invited British intervention. Djavid Bey had approached Churchill on 29 October 1911 and suggested a political alliance between Turkey and England.¹

Yet the British press and public had remained hostile to the Turks. Under these conditions Churchill believed that "no foreign policy based on special relations with Turkey could have

¹ Kiamil Pasha to Grey, 7 November 19 , FO 800/79
stood for a day in a liberal House of Commons." Apart from these political consideration, Grey was not prepared to estrange Italy over Tripoli and authorised Churchill to give the following reply to Djavid Bey:

"We have definitely declared our Neutrality, and it is not to be expected that we shall alter a policy so gravely declared ... at present we cannot enter upon new political relations." ¹

With Russia entering Balkan politics, with ill-concealed ambitions to control the Straits, England still stood aloof. The Turks had no choice but to turn to the Germans; and thereafter, German influence was strengthened at Constantinople. ² England made no efforts to counteract these developments. ³ In May 1913, the Turks invited a German Military Mission to help them reorganize the Turkish Army. ⁴


2. Many of the Young Turks who came into power after the coup d'etat of 23 January 1913, were pro-German. Enver Bey had been Military Attaché in Berlin, and Izzet Pasha, the War Minister was trained in Germany.


4. General Liman Von Sanders led a Mission to Turkey and was given the command of the Turkish First Army Corps, which provided garrison to the Constantinople area. This was resented by the Entente Powers.
With Europe lost, the Turks had anxieties about the future of Asiatic Turkey. Grey thought of a comprehensive reform scheme for Asiatic Turkey to be discussed by the Powers. He informed the German Chancellor that there existed no arrangement between the Triple Entente Powers regarding Asiatic Turkey. 1

The Tripolitan and Balkan wars shattered the policy of Ottomanism as a viable ideology for preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; it now increasingly gave place to Pan-Islamism which was combined with Turkish nationalism. 2 The Young Turks also turned to Pan-Turanism, which was directed against the Russian colonization of the Turkish peoples of Central Asia. Their defeats were taken by many Turks to be a spur to national regeneration rather than religious revivalism. 3 But Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism, however cohesive for attaching non-Turkish Muslim nationalities and intensifying Turkish loyalties, were bound to antagonise further both Britain and Russia.

2. Feroz Ahmad, op.cit., p. 154.
Impact in India of the Tripolitanian War

The Young Turk had undoubtedly a 'Herculean' task to perform. But they hardly got any time to initiate reforms and progress, owing to the series of crises faced by Turkey since they came to power. Internal revolts further aggravated the situation. A rebellion in Yemen was followed by an Albanian uprising. These difficulties created for the Young Turks considerable sympathy among Indian Muslims. Muhammad Ali's Comrade (Calcutta) wrote that "The sympathies of all right minded men must be with the heroes of one of the most successful revolutions of the world." It was suspected that some secret agency fomented trouble in Turkey and the Young Turks were expected to deal strongly with the situation.

In September 1911, Italian aggression on Tripoli, the last outpost of the Ottoman Empire on the African Continent, aroused considerable indignation among Muslim as well as nationalist circles. Syed Ameer Ali, President of the London Branch of the All India Muslim League, recorded his protest in a letter published in the Times of London. He pointed out that the Italian example would provoke a war of creeds and races for the

1. Comrade (Calcutta), 10 June 1911.
2. Comrade (Calcutta), 10 June 1911.
3. Musulman (Calcutta), 7 April 1911, RONNP-Bengal.
spoliation of Turkey, and the process of reconciliation, presumably between Christians and Muslims, would be thrown back by centuries.¹

The Bengalee of Calcutta voiced a protest against the Italian attack, showing that the indignation was not confined to Muslims alone.² In other papers too, the attack was characterized as an act of plunder, organised selfishness,³ and an encroachment on Turkish territories.⁴ No civilised nation had abused power so shamelessly; and the language of the ultimatum exceeded all limits of propriety. There was anxiety to know whether International law would not prevent such an unjust war.⁵ The Powers were asked to pronounce on the Modus operandi of Italy.⁶

The Bengalee expressed deep sympathy for Turkey. The paper remarked that when she was rapidly assimilating Western methods of government, a European nation embarked upon

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1. Letter quoted by Comrade (Calcutta), 7 October 1911.
2. Bengalee (Calcutta), 6 October 1911, RONNP-Bengal.
3. Hitavartta (Calcutta), 19 October 1911, RONNP-Bengal.
5. Tripura Hitaishi, 31 October 1911, RONNP-Bengal.
6. Charu Mihir (Hymen Singh), 7 November 1911, RONNP-Bengal.
a war of spoliation against her.\(^1\) It was believed that since the Sultan of Turkey was the Khalifa of Muslims the prospects of the destruction of the Turkish Empire would naturally agitate Indian Muslims.\(^2\)

On 4 October 1911, Britain declared its Neutrality in the war between Turkey and Italy.\(^3\) In spite of this, the Indian Muslims demanded British intervention to safeguard the integrity of the Turkish Empire.\(^4\)

Meetings were held at several places in India to express sympathy for the Turks. A private meeting claimed to be representative of Indian Muslims was held in Calcutta and resolved to start a movement to collect funds for the Ottoman Red Crescent Society. For this a Central Committee was formed, and it was proposed to set up similar committees throughout India.\(^5\)

1. Bengalee (Calcutta), 6 October 1911, RONNP-Bengal.
2. Navak (Calcutta), 11 October 1911, RONNP-Bengal.
4. Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 4 October 1911, Aligarh Institute, 4 and 25 October 1911, RONNP-UP.
5. This meeting was held at the house of Moidul Islam Agha Syed Jalaluddin. It expressed satisfaction over the unanimous condemnation of Italian aggression by the British and European Press, and resolved to communicate with all important centres in India, requesting them to form local committees on the lines of the Central Committee of which Ghulam Hossein Ariff was President, Haji Ahmad Abdul Latif, Treasurer, and Agha Moidul Islam and Dr. A.M. Suhrawardy, Secretaries. The Committee was called 'Aid to Ottoman Red Crescent Society' i.e. the Indian Red Crescent Society'. Comrade (Calcutta), 7 October 1911.
The Council of the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution voicing the feelings of Indian Muslims against Italian aggression and advised Muslims to boycott Italian goods of all kinds. The Government of India received numerous representations and resolutions from individuals and Muslim organisations, mostly passed at public meetings after Friday prayers in mosques.

The Committee headed by Golam Hossein Ariff held a mass meeting of Muslims on 22 October 1911 in the Federation Hall grounds, Calcutta. The Public meeting resolved to stand by the Khilafat, and boycott Italian goods; it requested Britain to intervene as a great ‘Muslim power’ to check Italy in her aggression on Tripoli.

1. Maulvi Muhammad Aziz Mirza, Hony. Secy. All India Muslim League to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 8 October 1911, Lucknow Enclosure to No. 283, F.D. Sec. 1., February 1912, Nos. 265-317, NAI.

2. From Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Lahore, Karachi, Lucknow, Allahabad, Gorakhpur, Kanpur, Bareilly, Aligarh, Moradabad etc. See F.D. Sec. 1., February 1912, Nos. 265-317, NAI.

3. The Meeting was presided over by Golam Hossein Ariff. An Urdu pamphlet and its translation in Bengali were distributed calling upon Muslims to pray for the victory of the Sultan of Turkey in the present war. It was believed to have been issued by Mr. Suhrawardy. The meeting was attended by 30 to 40 thousand Muslims. Police arrangements were made at the request of the organisers. It was addressed by Mr. Suhrawardy, Syed Jalal, editor of the Jalalul Matin, and Abdul Falam Azad. The meeting passed resolutions unanimously.
Pan-Islamic sentiments were clearly articulated by Abul Kalam Azad at this meeting:

He pointed out that the king of Turkey was the only Muslim King, that it must be borne in mind that the bullets that pierce the bodies of the Turks, pierce the hearts of the Muslims. No one in the world can prevent the Muslim from sympathising with the Turks.¹

It was argued that British intervention would not only safeguard the independence of Muslim States, but would insure for herself a solid phalanx of Muslim support.² In reply to the appeals for British intervention in the Tripolitan war, the Viceroy asked the Secretary of State whether he should express Majesty's Government's regret and inability to intervene in the war.³ The Secretary of State instructed him to express regret

(Previous Footnote Continued)

(i) 'That appeal should be made to all Muslims nations to unite and rally round the 'khilafat' at this supreme hour of trial in the History of Islam, and to give practical proof of sympathy and unity'.

(ii) 'That the Indian Red Crescent Society to take necessary steps to efficiently proclaim a boycott of Italian goods'.

F.L. Halliday, Commissioner of Police, Calcutta to C.J. Stevenson Moore, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 23 October 1911, Incl. to Pro. No. 298, Ibid.

1. Ibid.

2. Observer (Lahore), 22 May 1912, H.P.N. Punjab.

3. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Telegram, 7 October 1911, Pro. No. 267, F. Sec. 2. February 1912, Nos. 265-317, H.P.
on the ground that 'they do not find the present moment opportune.'¹

ailing to get Britain to intervene, the Muslim press feared the worst² and saw the event as a prelude to a gigantic struggle.³ The proclamation of British neutrality was deemed a political mistake and a political blunder of Edward Grey,⁴ which would be of advantage only to Italy.⁵

Non-Muslim opinion, though less excited, was hardly different. The bengalee of Calcutta, contended that a "strong and settled" Turkey would be a best guarantee to European peace; whereas a weak 'dismembered and disintegrated' Turkey would be a prey to her strong neighbours and a menace to European peace. The paper argued that in the present instance it was Italy tomorrow it could be Austria and day after Russia, because "the strong are never in want of excuse to attack the weak." In its view, it

1. Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, Telegram, 20 October 1911, Pro. No. 288, Ibid.

2. Nama-i Musaddas Hablul Qatin (Calcutta), 2 October 1911, koNN-'Bengal.

3. Nayak (Calcutta), 11 October 1911, koNN-'Bengal.

4. Nama-i Musaddas Hablul Qatin (Calcutta), 9 and 23 October 1911, koNN-'Bengal.

5. Urdu-i Mualla (Allahabad), Jan. 1912, koNN-UR.
would be a shortsighted policy of England to allow them to fight.\textsuperscript{1} It was also apprehended that the Italian occupation of Tripoli might make the partition of Persia inevitable between England and Russia.\textsuperscript{2}

It was suspected that Britain had secretly pledged support to Italy in Tripoli. Though unprepared Turkey stoutly resisted the Italian aggression. Italy thereupon extended the sphere of war by seizing Rhodes and other Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea, and even threatened the Dardanelless, later on it also blockaded the Red Sea ports in the neighbourhood of Hodeidah. Obviously all this could not have taken place without some element of implicit support by Britain which was traditionally opposed to armed action by other powers in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{3} Grey did not see any objection to making strong representation to the Italian government, whereas the Government of India had sought an authoritative statement on the Red Sea blockade.\textsuperscript{4}

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1. 10 October 1911.

2. Kayak (Calcutta), 15 November 1911, Kolihi-Bengal.

3. Francis Bertie wrote: 'It was an essential principle of British policy that no Great Power should alter the status quo in the Mediterranean by occupation of an island in the Aegean Sea. Bertie to Grey, Paris, 6 November 1913, Pro. No. 136, Ext. 6, June 1914, Nos. 106-149, NA.

4. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Leley, 17 April 1912, Pro. No. 430, Ext. Sec. 2, July 1917, Nos. 479-552, NA.
There were other reasons to suspect secret British support to Italy.\(^1\) The \textit{Nama-i Pugadgas Nabul Katin} of Calcutta strongly believed that England instigated Italy with a view to break the Triple Alliance, and overawe the Turks so that they might not give concessions to the Baghdad railway on the Gulf section. The paper's apprehension were confirmed by the declaration of neutrality.\(^2\) The \textit{comrade} of Calcutta held similar view and cited authorities to convince its readers.\(^3\)

It was argued that the Tripolitan war would deepen the pan-Islamic sentiment which had begun to make itself felt all over the world.\(^4\) Britain refused to allow the Turkish troops, and reinforcements passing through Egypt to Tripoli, caused further

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1. On the declaration of war Britain assumed the protection of Italian interests in Turkey during the hostilities. This confirmed British acquiescence to Italian action in Tripoli. Encl. to Pro. No. 206, P. 1, extl. B, February 1912, Nos. 194-211, N.I.

2. 2 October 1911, KONRF-Bengal; the London All India Muslim League protested against this extension of war. Mirza Kazim Husain, Hon. Secretary to Foreign Office, 10 May 1912, Pro. No. 546, P. w. Sec. I, July 1912, Nos. 479-552, N.I.

3. It reproduced a letter of Vernon Lee written to the editor of the \textit{Nation} (24 Oct. 1911) in which he wrote that Italy was distinctly encouraged by England to seize Tripoli. It also cited the \textit{Spectator}, London, that the Triple Alliance became Dual Alliance. (\textit{Comrade} (Calcutta), 18 November 1911).

4. \textit{Bengalee} (Calcutta), 6 October 1911, KONRF-Bengal.

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resentment among Indian Muslims.\textsuperscript{1} The news of atrocities committed by Italian troops on Arabs in Tripoli caused more resentment and anger among Indian Muslims.\textsuperscript{2} Great concern was expressed when they learnt about the threat of Italy to bombard Mecca and the mausoleum of the Prophet at Medina if the Turks did not make peace. Nawab Viqar-ul Mulk observed that such acts would harden the spirit of the Muslims; and enquired whether under these circumstances the Muslims should not request the British Government to intervene.\textsuperscript{3}

There was much anxiety that the Turks would be compelled to accept unfavourable terms. When Anglo-Indian papers like the Statesman and Englishman of Calcutta suggested that Turkey should accept the indemnity and reconcile herself to her fate, this was greatly resented by the Muslim press.\textsuperscript{4} It was observed by another paper that the Turkish policy of concessions would result in increasing occupation of her territories.\textsuperscript{5} All her difficulties

1. *Aliqarh Institute Gazette*, 1 November 1911, KCONNP-UP.


3. See address by Maulvi Badruddin Haider Khan, Chairman of the Reception Committee, Fifth Session of the All India Muslim League, 3 March 1912, Calcutta; A.M. Zaidi (ed.) *From Syed to The Emergence of Jinnah - Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India* (New Delhi, 1975), Vol. 1, p.361; also Al Mushir (Bijnore), 4 January 1912, KCONNP-UP.

4. *Naiyar-i-Azam* (Moradabad), 26 March 1912, Al-Bashir (Etawah), 23 April 1912, Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 5 and 8 April 1912, KCONNP-UP.

5. *Naiyar-i-Azam* (Moradabad), 26 February 1912, KCONNP-UP.

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were due to her failure in foreign policy and undue reliance on Germany.\footnote{Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 28 June 1912, RONNP-UP.}

There was some concern lest the British government might take it ill that its policy was being criticised; but as loyal subjects, the protagonists of Turkey felt it their duty to express their feelings on the question.\footnote{Rohilkhand Gazette (Bareilly), 24 October 1911, Aligarh Institute Gazette, 1 November 1911, RONNP-UP.} This was countered by the argument that the sympathy of Indian Muslims for Turkey and Persia was incompatible with their citizenship of the British Empire. In the present day world it was argued by a Hindi journal, it is nationality and not religion that forms the basis of conducting world affairs. If religious considerations were to influence the shaping of public policies then there would be no religious toleration between peoples and nations of the world.\footnote{Saddharam Pracharak (Bijnor), 12 December 1911, RONNP-UP.} The \textit{Leader} of Allahabad observed that Indian Muslims have been wrongly led to believe that the Tripolitan war was conflict between Christianity and Islam. In fact, Italian motives in capturing Tripoli are political and not religious.\footnote{24 October 1911, RONNP-UP.}
As against this, it was argued that the war was not a simple struggle between Italy and Turkey. If Turkey surrendered today, it would be the turn of Persia and Afghanistan next. ¹

They were blamed for having sold Turkish sovereign rights over Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria, which example emboldened Italy to offer two and a half million liras to Turkey for Tripoli. Some conservative Muslim critics of the Young Turks, however, saw in these difficulties the outcome of their own measures. They were asked to desist from further surrenders; otherwise, there would be a demand for an Arab Khilafat in which the enemies of Turkey had long been interested. ²

Turkish failure was also ascribed to the administrative inexperience of Young Turks, and the weaknesses of the constitutional regime, as well as to their policy of political and racial equality. ³ The occasion was utilised to condemn the Young Turks and praise the qualities of the deposed Sultan

1. Urdu-i Mualla (Aligarh) November 1911, RONNP-UP.
2. Nama-i-Mugaddas Hablul Matin (Calcutta), 16 October 1911, RONNP-Bengal.
3. Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 8 July 1912, Al Khalil (Bijnore), 1 November 1912, RONNP-UP.
Abdul Hamid II. There were suggestions that he be restored to take advantage of his experience.1 On the other hand, the Young Turks were defended by the Leader, which ascribed them a strong desire for progress and reform, and argued that four years were too short a time to judge them.2 Syed Ameer Ali believed that war was forced on them while they were endeavouring to establish a stable constitutional government.3 Muhammad Ali wrote that 1911 proved a fateful year for Muslim countries: "The new Governments of Turkey, Persia and Morocco, all began to meet with squalls in their initial voyage of reform and progress and these squalls soon developed into regular storms".4

The prospects of a defeated Turkey winning a favourable peace treaty were remote. Even its ultimate partition was now feared.5 Maulana Shibli wrote a moving poem apprehending this danger.6

1. Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 31 May 1912, Al-Khalil (Bijnore), 1 November 1912, RONNP-UP.
2. Leader (Allahabad), 3 November 1912.
5. Abhyudaya (Allahabad), 10 November 1912.
6. Published by Kohilkhand Gazette (Baroilly), 8 December 1912, RONNP-UP.

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The Italian aggression against Turkey seemed to shake the Muslim faith in Britain as a great Muslim Power though they had no direct cause of complaint against it. Hardly had the shock been over that one event further mortified their leaders. This was the annulment of the Partition of Bengal announced at the Delhi Durbar of December 1911. Repeatedly declared to have been a "settled fact", the revocation of the Partition was quite unexpected and by no means sweetened by the transfer of capital to Delhi.¹

The revocation was seen as the triumph of agitational politics of the Congress. Muhammad Ali believed that any decision of the Government could be unsettled if agitational methods were adopted.² What he disapproved strongly was the procedure adopted by the Government.³ Even the Aga Khan remarked: "That they will have considerable effect on Islam's future destiny in India is an evident truism". He advised Muslims to reconcile to the changes taking into consideration the interests of India: "the gain of India must be the gain

¹ History Sheet of Muhammad Ali, prepared by F.H. Vincent, Deputy Director of Criminal Intelligence. Home Poll. B, November 1913, No. 149, NAI.

² Comrade (Calcutta), 3 February 1912.

³ Ibid., 10 February 1912.
of the Mussalmans provided no direct Musalman interest is attacked.\textsuperscript{1} Some rethinking started among Muslims over their attitude and their policy. Some suggested that Muslims should join the Congress.\textsuperscript{2}

However, Viquerul Mulk's immediate response was that Muslims could no longer place their reliance on Government, and they would have to rely on the grace of God and themselves.\textsuperscript{3} Sticking to his old policy he advised against joining the Congress movement and antagonising the government.\textsuperscript{4} Abul Kalam Azad's advice to Muslims was that the event should teach them to think over and see through British policies.\textsuperscript{5} But it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} His article 'The Recent Changes and the Mussalmans' published in the \textit{Comrade}, 10 February 1912.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Samiullah Beg of Lucknow in an article in the \textit{Muslim Review}, cited by \textit{Muslim Gazette} (Lucknow), 21 January 1912, and Mushir Husain Kidwai in the \textit{Leader} (Allahabad), 27 January 1912, RONNP-UP.
\item \textsuperscript{3} His article entitled 'The Fate of Muslims in India' published in the \textit{Aligarh Institute Gazette}, 20 December 1911, RONN - UP., quoted in S.M. Ikram, \textit{Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan 1858-1951} (2nd Edn. Lahore, 1965), p. 118, quoted in \textit{Tazkirah-i Vigar}, pp. 340-341.
\item \textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{5} He wrote that when our compatriots will celebrate the others will celebrate it as a day of mourning. When compatriots will feel proud of their leaders and thirty years' struggle, we will, sarcastically remarking, mourn being wrongly led by our leaders all these years. \textit{Al-Hilal} (Calcutta), 25 August 1912.
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was Viqarul Mulk's advice that was pursued by Muhammad Ali. Verney Lovett, Commissioner of Lucknow, from his conversations with a few Muslim's gentlemen, realised that British prestige with the Muslims did not stand where it did a year ago. But he added:

At the same time they are well aware that their interests are bound up with ours. What we have to anticipate from them is far more active and persistent agitation to gain their objects than we have ever experienced in the past, and a more aggressive tone if we are not firm in showing what we mean to give them and what we do not mean to give them.¹

Lovett therefore could anticipate the tone of the Young Party of Muslims and Urdu journals like the Comrade, the Muslim Gazette and others. He concluded:

1. John Hewitt, lieutenant Governor of U.P., from the selections from vernacular papers published in various parts of India and from conversations he had with influential Muslims; was so impressed by the excitement on the Tripolitan war, Russian aggression at Meshed and towards Persia and the annulment of the Partition of Bengal, that he had enquiries made confidentially in all parts of the Province to gauge the state of Muslim feeling and communicated the results for the information of the Government of India. See Chief Secretary to the Government of U.P. to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department Pro. No. 45, 16 July; Home Poll. A, March 1913, Nos. 45-55, NAI. Chief Commissioner, Lucknow Division to the Chief Secretary to Government of United Provinces, 14 June 1912, Enclosed in above.  

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They are of course the small minority of Mussalmans; but they are quite able to extend their influence greatly among their co-religionists and are endeavouring to do so.

Further

We see on the surface a good deal of somewhat hollow agitation and obvious wire-pulling that there is little worthy of careful attention underground. But, what we have had occasion to learn is that such things may be manifestations of a gradual change of sentiment seriously inimical to the prestige of our rule. 1

John Hewitt found that a state of exacerbation existed among Muslims in United Provinces, and considered the situation was full of anxiety, and decided to keep a close watch over future developments and thought it desirable to bring it to the notice of the Government of India. 2 The United Provinces Government was the first to study the effect of the Tripolitan war on Muslims. Thereupon, the Government of India directed all the local governments to 'carefully and

1. Ibid.

2. Apart from the enquiry reports of his officials, he had exchanged views with Muslim officials, had conversations with Muslim elite in the U.P. including the Nawab of Rampur, in order to gauge the extent of Muslim feeling. Chief Secretary to the Government U.P. to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, Ibid.
confidentially review the situation on similar lines and furnish the necessary information to them. Emphasis was laid on obtaining information from the most reliable sources in particular on the effects of the Tripolitan war and events in Persia, as well as on other influences causing feelings of discontent and antagonism towards Government among Muslims.

We have seen earlier that the Government of India had made similar enquiries on the occasion of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 and the Greco-Turkish war of 1897.

In the United Provinces the feelings on the Tripolitan war were not confined to Muslims, but were shared by Hindus; and suggestions were made for sending Indian volunteers to assist the Turks. What was impressive was the unity of feeling among Shia and Sunni Muslims. Hewitt disapproved of the role of the Raja of Mahmudabad. Educated Muslims believed that there existed a secret alliance of Christian Powers including England to destroy the Turkish Empire

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1. He emphasized at a public meeting on 9 June 1912 the unity of interests of the two sects and referred to the threatened air attack by Italians to demolish Kaaba, and made no reference to British intervention to secure protection of the Holy Places. Hewitt desired he should have announced it to the public. 

Ibid.
in Europe and suppress Islam all over the world. 1

While the reports from other local governments were awaited, another jolt was received by Indian Muslims when the Muslim University Scheme was rejected by the Secretary of State for India.

The rejection of the Muslim University Charter discredited the 'Old' Muslim leaders, just as the award of separate electorates in 1909 had discredited the 'Moderates' in the Indian National Congress. The Observer of Lahore, hitherto a moderate pro-British paper wrote:

It will give us the greater pleasure to make the Secretary of State modify his orders. The decision is final. So much the better. It will be a great triumph for us to make him rescind his decision. They know how to rescind decisions. Nothing is 'Settled' - and they have taught us the way to achieve success. So let us welcome this decision. They are trying our mettle. Let us show them that it is not easy to dictate ideals. The decision to call it merely the University of Aligarh is an egregious blunder. So much the greater cause for rejoicing. We will have it called the

1. They came across a pamphlet in 'Hindustani' entitled Muhakma-i Nadir published by one Nadir Ali, a Vakil of Agra. The writer contrasted British preparedness to take active steps on behalf of Christians in Armenia against Turks; with the unwillingness to intervene against Italy when it so blatantly oppressed the Muslims, Ibid.
Muslim University. ¹

Mazhar-ul Haq contended that it was all because of the slavish policy of the Muslim leadership that they had been treated in this manner.² Abul Kalam Azad in his Al-Hilal attacked Muslim leadership, and the policy pursued for the previous forty years.³ Having seen the consequences of aloofness, he advised the Muslims to join the Congress.

The North-West Frontier Province had been lying aloof, but gradually its isolation was breaking down due to the improved means of communications and the spread of education. Hence there was now a 'general interest in politics among the educated and a steady growth of Pan-Islamic feeling among all classes'.⁴

¹ Observer (Lahore), 24 August 1912, quoted in C.A. Barron, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to The Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 17 September 1912, Pro. No. 48. Ibid.

² The remarks were made at a conference at Lucknow. The editor of the Al-Hilal admired the spirit of Mazhar-ul Haq attributing it to his association with the Congress, and remarked that had he been at Aligarh he would have also been trapped in 'Aligarh mire'. Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 25 August 1912.

³ Criticizing the leadership the paper observed that Muhammad Shafi and Raja of Mahmudabad never advocated Muslim interests at Simla. 1 August 1912.

⁴ George Roos Keppel, Chief Commissioner, NWFP, to H. Wheeler, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 6 September 1912, Pro. No. 47, Home Poll. A. March 1913, Nos. 45-55, NAI.
There was universal sympathy for Turkey. The Tripolitan war excited the people in the villages and among the tribes. The war confirmed suspicion that the Christian states were arrayed against the Muslims and conspiring to crush Islam. These views were derived from two influences, one from across the border, from Afghanistan and the other from Aligarh, Calcutta and other places of northern India. In itself this feeling was not considered dangerous "but when it coincides with personal or communal grievances an explosive mixture is formed to which a genuine fanatic or even a professional agitator may set alight". On Tripoli efforts were made largely to embarrass the Government by holding meetings to demand British intervention; this was however frustrated by conservative leading men of the province. The Comrade in an article accused the autocratic rule of the provincial government for preventing people to express their feelings or opinions. Roos Keppel prevented through his influences the formation of a committee of the All

1. Through the Siraj-ul-Akhbar and Urdu press of the Punjab and the Comrade of Calcutta, and Aligarh. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.
Indian Muslim League in the Frontier Province. Reporting about the fraternization between Hindus and Muslims, he assured the Government of India "that the combination could be broken up with the utmost ease".

For him the newspapers were a difficult problem, though "ten years ago hardly a vernacular newspaper crossed the Indus"; now papers like the Zamindar, the Paisa Akhbar, the Watan, the Vakil, the Tribune, the Panjabee, the Observer and the Combrade were widely read in the Province. Though their actual circulation was small, each paper passed through several hands until worn out. He therefore suggested special legislation for the newspapers to prevent their infiltration. Roos Keppel wrote:

"A warlike and fanatical Musulman population of four million is a good seed bed for revolutionary ideas; and every effort will be made in coming years to sow upon this fertile ground".

1. Especially through the efforts of Syed Ameer Ali. But in the changed circumstances it seemed to him, it was no longer possible to stave off any spread of political connection between this Province and the Muslim League and the Muslim Educational Conference, which he saw as two branches of the same political organisation. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.
An attempt was made to set Peshawar against Aligarh. With the support of the Government of India, Roos Keppel aimed at foiling the efforts of the Aligarh Party by using the powers of expulsion under the Frontier Crimes Regulation and by pushing on the work of the Islamia College so as to 'widen the breach between Peshawar and Aligarh'.

In the Punjab the seeds of Pan-Islamic sentiments were already in existence. Here Muslims had taken involving interest in the Hejaz Railway Project, towards which they had made large contributions. However, on Indian affairs their general belief was that welfare of the Muslims depended upon the strength and maintenance of the British Government in India. Accordingly they determinedly opposed the Congress through vigorous propaganda in the Muslim Press, in the Mosques and public meetings, and adopted a loyalist attitude towards the British Government.

On the other hand, the Muslim press and leaders pressed upon the British Government to invariably protect and support Muslim States throughout the world, irrespective of the

1. Ibid.

2. C.A. Barron, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 17 September 1912, Pro. No. 48, Ibid.
merits of the case and 'regardless of political complications with other European Powers'.\(^1\) Their contention was based on the claim that Britain herself was the greatest Muslim Power.

The Punjab Government believed that Muslim discontent would grow further unless the British did something to bring about an early termination of the Tripolitan war with as little humiliation of Turkey as possible.\(^2\) There were also signs of rapprochement between Hindus and Muslims made by the Zamindar and other newspapers; this was interpreted as a means of coercing the British Government.\(^3\)

Muslim agitation in connection with Turkey and Persia was confined to the Pan-Islamic party among educated Muslims and the newspapers like the Zamindar, the Vakil and Al-Muin. But their hold over the masses was growing. The disappointment over the Muslim University made even some 'respectable' Muslims tilt towards the Pan-Islamic Party.\(^4\)

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1. Ibid.

2. Muslim response to the sufferings and troubles of their coreligionists in Turkey was not a new thing; they had responded similarly to the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, but in that war the Turks were victorious, Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.
In contrast to U.P., Bihar was quiet: there was sympathy for Turkey but no active signs of discontent were in evidence; and the Government was unaware of any under-currents. But they expected that trouble may spread through emissaries from other parts of the country.¹

In Bombay there existed wide sympathy for Turkey on the Tripolitan War. It was interpreted as a step in the general policy of European repression against Islam; this belief was supposed to have been strengthened by visiting emissaries from Persia, Turkey and Egypt in order to spread Pan-Islamism.² The response to the Red Crescent Society was widespread and this movement kept the question constantly before the public.³ Apart from this the excitement was accentuated by the writings of the Al-Hilal, Zamindar, the Vakil, the watan and the Paisa Akhbar, newspapers from Northern India.⁴ The local newspapers of Bombay were numerous

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¹ Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 11 October 1912, Pro. No. 49, Ibid.

² C.C. Watson, Acting Chief Secretary, to the Government of Bombay to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 21 October 1912, Pro. No. 50, Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.
and carried more weight; but they also extended their support and sympathy for the Turkish cause.¹

In Bengal, Muslim newspapers moulded the opinion of the educated classes. The boycott of Italian goods was strongly advocated and a Red Crescent Society was established to collect funds for Turkey. In these circumstances the Bengal Government believed that Turkish success might prove more embarrassing than Turkish reverses.² Interestingly, their report made no mention of the enthusiastic support and sympathy extended by the nationalist press like the Bengalee of Surendra Nath Banerjee, the Amrit Bazar Patrika of Calcutta and nationalist leaders like B.C. Pal, Shyam Sunder Chakraverty and the Swadeshi advocate Maulvi Liaqat Husain to the Turkish cause.

In Madras there was sympathy for the Khalifa and Turkey among Muslims, but the feelings were not strong or widespread. Other influences were not in evidence.³

1. Ibid.

2. C.J. Stevenson Moore, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 28-29 October 1912, Pro. No. 51, Ibid.

3. Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, Judicial Department to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 1 November 1912, Pro. No. 52, Ibid.
In the Central Provinces, it was in Jabalpur that feelings similar to Northern India were noticed, chiefly among the young educated Muslims.¹

These reports reveal that the pro-Turkish and Pan-Islamic tendencies among Muslims were mainly a phenomenon of the Punjab, United Provinces and Bengal. Yet their responses and reactions varied in emphasis. The Raja of Mahmudabad's Lucknow speech, referred to by Hewitt, caused such annoyance to the Simla establishment that Hardinge decided to remonstrate with him.² Reginald Craddock, the Home Member of the Viceroy's Council seemed more concerned with the changing attitude of Muslims towards the Congress.³ For the moment, he expected fanatical riot here and there but no organised movement.⁴

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¹. The Commissioner of Jabalpur discussed the question with one Mehdi Hasan, extra Assistant Commissioner and a Trustee of the Aligarh College. He agreed with the views expressed in the Times, London, 2 September 1912 on Islamism in India. Apparently, an Old Party man, he looked at Young Muslims in distrust. M.N. Maw, Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner Central Provinces, to Secretary to the Government of India. Home Department, 5 November 1912. Pro. No. 53, Ibid.

². Home Department Note by Hardinge, 20 July 1912. Ibid.

³. 'If the bigoted section were to join forces with the Young Party, and assuage the anti-Hindu feeling which is mainly confined to the North, the danger would become very serious'. Notes, 15 December 1912. Ibid.

⁴. Ibid.
No doubt the Pan-Islamists had a big field to cover before any organised Pan-Islamic movement could be launched. Syed Ali Imam, the law Member of the Viceroy's Council confirmed the strong tendency of the Young Party to join hands with the Congress. He demanded that the Government should make efforts to prevent this drift and bring the Muslims 'back to the fold' and not to rely too much on the antagonism between the Hindus and Muslims - 'Politics like adversity makes strange bed-fellows'.

The Tripolitan war and the events of India thus greatly discredited the Muslim leadership and their policy of collaboration with the British in India. The Young Party and Pan-Islamist press advocated reliance on themselves and the adoption of the politics of agitation, signifying a change of methods more than of political beliefs. Given these circumstances, a rupture within Muslim leadership became inevitable.

1. Note by C.R. Cleveland, Director Criminal Intelligence, 20 November 1912. Ibid.

II

Muslim Nationalist Opinion and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)

Taking advantage of the Italian invasion of Tripoli, the Balkan Confederacy also declared war on Turkey. Compelled by circumstances the Turks concluded a peace treaty at Lausanne with Italy, and agreed to give autonomy to Tripoli and Cyrenaica under Italian suzerainty. These disasters befalling Turkey in quick succession produced a profound effect on Muslim opinion and sentiments in India.

The Balkan wars helped to convince them further that there existed a plot against Turkey and that the Great Powers were involved in it;¹ and that no sympathy for Turkey could be expected from any of the European powers.² It was in fact believed that without the promised support of these powers the Balkan States could not have ventured on a war against Turkey.³ It was even thought that the real aim of the conspiracy was that the Young Turks might not successfully carry out reforms and consolidate the Turkish Empire.⁴ A few however did

1. Zaindar (Lahore), 10 October 1912, RONNP-Punjab.
2. Ibid., 11 October 1912.
3. Musalmān (Calcutta), 11 October 1912, RONNP-Bengal.
   Aligarh Institute Gazette, 23 October 1912; Musalmin Gazette (Lucknow), 30 October 1912, RONNP-UP.
4. Musalmān (Calcutta), 11 October 1912; Muhammadi (Calcutta), 25 October 1912, RONNP-Bengal.
evaluate the internal roots of the Turkish crisis in the Balkans. In the opinion of the Namai-Mugaddas-Hablul Matin of Calcutta, the problem was two decades old, due to the rise of feelings of independence among all inhabitants of the Balkan territories of the Turkish Empire.¹ But even so it was argued that in the demand of autonomy for Macedonia, the desire was not meant for the legitimate satisfaction of the people concerned but out of a desire not to acknowledge the suzerainty of a Muslim power.² The territorial ambitions of the external powers were also commented upon: the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance powers it was contended were against peace in the Balkans for their own political interests.³ Various Powers appeared to have put forward claims, for example, France in Syria, England in the Persian Gulf, Germany in the Baghdad plains and Russia in Armenia.⁴

While sympathising with Turkey, there was some criticism of the Young Turks from a 'hawkish' point of view; they had committed a great mistake by not attacking Greece when the Italians had attacked Tripoli; if the Italians could

1. 7 October 1912, RONNP-Bengal.
2. Musalman (Calcutta), 11 October 1912, RONNP-Bengal.
4. Hablul Matin (Calcutta), 5 July 1913, RONNP-Bengal.
violates the Treaty of Berlin, they had also a good pretext of doing so. Their second mistake was by concluding a peace with Italy, thereby causing serious injury to Turkish interests. For it not only created a political crisis in Turkey itself, but the Arabs and other Muslims also lost sympathy for its cause.

A section of Indian Muslims had felt surprised when the Turks accepted the peace negotiations at London. There was already resentment over the acceptance of the terms in Tripoli, and there was a tendency to ascribe the developments of the Balkans to it. However, some thought Turkish acceptance of negotiations to be justified.

Among the Great Powers, it was England which was expected to sympathise more with Turkey in view of her past relationships and because she was the greatest 'Muslim power' in view of the large Muslim population contained in her Empire. Since the Sultan of Turkey was the Khilifa and keeper of the

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2. Ibid., 4 November 1912.
3. For example, Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 17 December 1912, RONNP-UP.
4. Urdu-i-Mualla (Allahabad), October 1912, RONNP-UP.
5. Rohilkhand Gazette (Bareilly), 24 October 1912, and Al-Mushir (Bijnore), 25 October 1912, RONNP-UP.
Holy Places of Islam, England should honour his position. ¹
Sultan Abdul Hamid could have been dismissed as pro-German but
now that he was no more in power, this could not be held against
his successor; moreover, the Young Turks were sympathetic towards
England. ²

Indian Muslims may not be expected to dictate the
whole of the British foreign policy, but this was certainly a
matter on which they were entitled to speak up. ³ The Hamdard
of Muhammad Ali indeed asserted that they had a right to being
consulted in the shaping of the British foreign policy towards
Turkey. ⁴ But England opposed the Young Turks efforts through
Kiamil Pasha; and if this went on, the Young Turks would be
forced to turn to Germany. ⁵ It was believed with much prescience
that the Near East crisis might lead to a general European war. ⁶
The German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg was reported to have

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1. Observer (Lahore), 7 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab.
2. Ibid.
3. Reis and Rayyat (Calcutta), 6 September 1912, RONNP-Bengal.
4. Hamdard (Delhi), 14 March 1913, also Hablul Matin
   (Calcutta), 27 July 1913, RONNP-Bengal.
5. Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 9 October 1912, also Rafiq (Delhi),
   5 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab.
said that after the Balkan war Germany would direct her efforts to maintain Turkey's vitality as an important economic and political factor.¹

Every stage of the Balkan war was keenly followed by Indian Muslims.² They were not ready to rely on the Reuters and the English newspapers, and there was a suggestion that there should be exchange of news between India and Turkey directly.³ The circulation of the existing Urdu and other newspapers increased immensely, and a number of new papers and journals were started to cope with the demand.

Numerous resolutions were passed by various Muslim organisations in India and England, condemning the aggression of the Balkan Confederacy and the attitude of the European powers, and invoking British intervention on behalf of Turkey.

The London Branch of the All India Muslim League protested against the tactics of the "Balkan Committee in Britain. It argued that the Balkan Committee which by its activities kept the Balkan Peninsula in ferment as a consequence paralysed the efforts of the Turks to reconcile various

¹. Ibid., 13 December 1912.
². Naqvi-i-Azam (Moradabad), 11 March 1912, RONNP-UP.
³. Ibid., 12 December 1912.
races and creeds of the Empire to establish an equitable system of administration. 1 In a resolution the London Branch of the All India Muslim League, pleading for British friendship for Turkey, deprecated the attitude of the British press towards Turkey, which was resented in India. 2 Similarly the Islamic Society of England passed several resolutions at a meeting of all Indians of all castes and creeds; they, too, argued that the British Government should support Turkey and help to preserve the position as had been established after the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. 3

Resolutions on similar lines were passed by the All India Muslim League and various anjumans of Islam in India, in different parts of India. There was great resentment among Indian Muslims over the unrestrained remarks and utterances of certain British Cabinet Ministers regarding Indian Muslims and Turkey. 4 It was noted that even the British Radical Press

1. London Branch of the All India Muslim League to India Office, 7 October 1912, Pro. No. 362, F.D. Extl.-B, April 1913, Nos. 342-428, NAI.

2. Ibid.

3. Islamic Society to India Office, 4 November 1912, Pro. No. 366, Ibid.

denounced the Turks.¹

There were other grouses as well, which heightened criticisms of British policy. The Indian nationalists censured Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, for his policy towards Persia and for allowing his Liberalism to be smothered by Imperialism.²

A remark of Edwin Montagu, the Under Secretary of State for India, made in the House of Commons that the Indian Muslims were not a homogenous community was particularly resented by the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal.³ This was taken as a reflection on their inherent unity, and a possible indication of British indifference to their demands for greater, or separate, representation.⁴

Asquith, the Prime Minister, came in for much criticism. When the Balkan war began he had announced that territorial status quo would be maintained whatever is the outcome of the war. Thereafter, in a Guildhall speech of 9 November 1912 he referred to Salonica as the gate through which Christianity entered Europe.⁵ On the fall of Adrianople he anticipated the ultimate

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1. Ibid.

2. Leader (Allahabad), 12 November 1911, RONNP-UP.


4. Ibid, information based on the opinion of a leading Muslim, 6 November 1912, Pro. No. 88, Home Poll. B. December 1912, Nos. 88-91, NAI.

5. The Times (London), 11 November 1912.
success of the Balkan states over Turkey, and he proclaimed in his Mansion House speech that the victors would not be deprived of their spoils.\footnote{Observer (Lahore), 13 November 1912, RONNP-Punjab, Musalman (Calcutta), 29 November 1912, RONNP-Bengal; Also the Presidential address of Mian Muhammad Shafi, All India Muslim League, VI Session, Lucknow, 22-23 March 1913, See A.M. Zaidi, op.cit., pp. 422-427.} The Al-Hilal of Calcutta discovered in his utterances a Gladstonian legacy and a policy of denying to Turkey what had been wrested from her by force.\footnote{Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 23 July 1913.}

Asquith's utterances made the war appear a conflict between the Cross and Crescent. Winston Churchill, Naval Secretary, in his forthright manner declared that the Balkan powers had been justified in waging a war against the Turks.\footnote{Musalman (Calcutta), 7 December 1912, RONNP-Bengal.} These remarks would rouse religious animosities,\footnote{Observer (Lahore), 16 November 1912, RONNP-Punjab.} and stir up racial feelings; as a consequence they tended to weaken Indian Muslim confidence in British rule.\footnote{Zamindar (Lahore), 7 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab.}

At a meeting at Amritsar the Viceroy was even requested to forward these criticisms to Asquith;\footnote{Like the Anjuman-i-Anisul Islam, Amritsar, to Viceroy, 17 November 1912, Pro. No. 360, F, D, Extl. B, April 1913, (Footnote Continued) \ldots 133} the British
ministers' utterances amounted to a violation of the Neutrality declared by themselves.¹

Muslim feelings were shared, in some moderation, by the Nationalists. The Tribune of Lahore was very critical of the utterances of Asquith. But it also asked whether Britain was in a position to carry out the wishes of the Indian Muslims. Is Great Britain the sole arbiter in the Near East? "Can she Order a certain arrangement in order to prove her concern for the feelings of any section of her subjects?"² But such advice was not much heeded in the Muslim press. An impression had been created that the whole of Europe was determined to ruin and exterminate Islam.³ The utterances of the British Ministers and the Bishop of Oxford bore ample

(Previous Footnote Continued)


2. 19 August 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

3. Mushter Husain Kidwai in a letter published in the Leader (Allahabad), 27 January 1912 accused Europe trying to crush the Muslim power. Also Zamindar (Lahore), 15 and 16 April 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

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evidence to sustain such impressions.  

Nationalist support and sympathy for Turkey was very emphatic in Bengal. The Bengalee of Calcutta, a newspaper of Surendra Nath Banerji wrote strong editorials. Bipin Chandra Pal and some other leaders attended meetings and spoke in support of Turkey. He argued that Turkey should be preserved in Europe with its different races, creeds, and religions, because it was the only place where nationalism could grow in perfection; but he criticized the Muslim League and other leaders as well as the Pan-Islamic movement for being opposed to nationalism.

At Surat, at a public meeting presided by Sardar Ali El-Edross, a local notable, several resolutions were passed; one such resolution expressed thanks to all non-Muslim communities of India for sympathy towards Turkey. Sardar Ali El Edroos was apparently warned through the District Magistrate of Surat that the Governor in Council held it to be not decorous at the present juncture for any one in the Honourable Sardar's position to take part in such a resolution which criticized Edward Grey


2. Mazharul Haq in his Welcome address at the Bankipore Session of the Indian National Congress observed: "what moved the Muslim community most was the universal sympathy shown by their Hindu brethren in their dire affliction ... The moral and material support we have

(Footnote Continued)
for his policy.  

The Tribune of Lahore, which, as we have just seen, was advising moderation to Muslims, nevertheless held that the fall of Turkey would be a great blow to all Asia.  

All Powers saw opportunities for imperialist expansion in the Asiatic Turkey. England had been expected by some to side with Asiatic states in such a scramble; but such an assumption was wrong, because England too desired to secure its line of communication to India and acquire control over the Oil-rich Mesopotamia region.  

In the circumstances the Turks were advised to join with Afghanistan, Persia, Arabs and India in order to check the European expansion. They should do so on the principle that Asia for Asiatics, and unless they act on this principle Europe would remain a terror for them.  

(Previous Footnote Continued) 

received from them has gone straight to our hearts and conquered us. And in this respect no one has done nobler work than our veteran leader Mr Surendranath Banerjee. You Sir, day after day, in your paper have soothed the lacerated feelings of your Muslim brethren ... vigorously pleaded their cause." (Proceedings of the Indian National Congress, Bankipore, 1912, p. 5. MF, NAI). 


1. Ibid.  
2. 6 November 1912, RONNP-Punjab.  
3. Bengalee (Calcutta), 23 May 1913.  
4. Hitvadi (Calcutta), 13 June 1913. RONNP-Bengal.  
5. Name-i Mugaddas Hablul Matin (Calcutta), 9 June 1913. RONNP-Bengal.  

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was repeated that if the Turks were to succumb then the whole of Asia would go under the Western Imperialism.¹

About this time when negotiations between the ambassadors was being carried on in London, a memorial was presented to Edward Grey, who was the Chairman of the Conference on behalf of the Muslims of various countries, under the auspices of the Muslim Brotherhood of Progress and the Turkish Committee of London;² strongly denouncing the attitude of Christian governments towards the Muslims. They listed their grievances as the breach of treaties guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey,³ doubts about the true nature of the Triple Entente and the continuous pressure of Turkey since the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, preventing internal reforms.⁴ In particular they denounced the attitude of the Liberal Government, and its alliance with Russia and, argued in favour of British alliance with Germany in order to check the

1. Birbhum Vasi, 3 April 1913, RONNP-Bengal.


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.
Slav menace in the Balkans, above all by recognizing the "factor of very great importance--The Moslem World":

The Moslems of the World recognize the Sultan of Turkey as their Caliph, and a word from him will decide the co-operation of the Moslems.

The argument was that England should support Turkey. The Memorialists suggested four possible solutions; first, the preservation of the Status quo ante bellum; secondly, the grant of autonomy to various provinces under the Suzerainty of Turkey; thirdly, the creation of independent Kingdoms in the various provinces; and fourthly, the cession of some territories to the Balkan Allies. Of these possible solutions, the memorialists contended, the only just one was the first, because its enforcement would revive trust in the treaties and in Europe, when all nationalities obtained representation in the Turkish Parliament, there would be no cause of complaint. The memorialists further claimed that Adrianople was an Islamic city. So it should not be given to the Allies. It held the key to Constantinople; if the Turks were to retain the latter, they must have the former.

Upon these demands made on Turkey in the London negotiations the Turks were advised by Indian Muslims to resume

1. Ibid.
the war, though Nawab Haji Muhammad Ismail Khan did indeed take exception to such advice given to the Turks. The Bengalee felt that if the Turks conceded the demands, there might be another revolution in Turkey. Indeed, there was a revolution in which the Kiamil Pasha Government was overthrown. The Indian press had considered him to be pro-Britain; and now Enver Bey led a new Young Turk revolution. The event was welcomed in India. The Bengalee of Calcutta remarked that Enver Bey was a force in the present day military world. The European press had earlier made it their sole preoccupation "to carp and cavil" at the Young Turks; but they survived these calumnies and misrepresentations.

Taking advantage of the dissensions in the Balkan Confederacy the Turks recaptured Adrianople. The event was celebrated throughout India. For two consecutive nights there was illumination in Lahore. There were illuminations and fire works at Patna as well.


2. In a contributed article published in the Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 11 February 1913, RONNP-UP.

3. Bengalee (Calcutta), 1 January 1913, RONNP-Bengal.

4. Ibid., 24 July 1913.

5. Observer (Lahore), 26 July 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

6. M. Yunus to the Chief Secretary, Government of India (Sic), Pro. No. 57 & Encl. F.D. Extl. B, September 1913, Nos. 42-79, NAI.

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There was great resentment when it was learnt that the Powers had sent a note to Turkey through France, asking her not to occupy Adrianople. Britain was advised at meetings of Muslims, to observe strict neutrality and not to take part in coercing Turkey. The Turks had broken no treaty since none had been signed. At Lucknow the leading Ulema and Muslim citizens addressed the following warning to the Government.

In the interest of the British Empire we appeal Britain not to lose irretrievably the good will of Indian Mussalmans for it is great asset and its loss will entail serious consequences.

The London Branch of the All India Muslim League addressed another letter to the India Office pointing out that Turkish efforts to obtain a rectification of "a strategically indefensible frontier with the possession of a city hallowed to her by all the traditions of religion and history" which in any case was "vital to her existence as an independent state, do not affect British interests or British dominancy in any part of


2. Hablul Matin (Calcutta), 23 July 1913, RONNP-Bengal.

the world. "1 Crewe did not find any fault in their representa-
tion, and yet refused to discuss the issue with them; for while
sympathising with their religious sensibility and apprehensions
the British Government "cannot regulate its policy in Europe by
such considerations alone". 2 This reply hurt the feelings of
Indian Muslims. 3 It was fruitless to ascribe the hue and cry
of the Indian press and numerous resolutions to the efforts of
a limited number of the young Muslims party corresponding to
the Young Turks. 4

Enver Bey became a hero in the popular imagination
of Indian Muslims. There was a rumour that he was contemplating
a visit to India after the end of the Balkan war. 5 The news was
believed to have come through the sources of the Comrade of
Muhammad Ali. The Government of India circles decided to ascer-
tain the facts from the British ambassador at Constantinople. In
their view the political condition of India made it most un-

1. Vice-President, London All India Muslim League to India
132-140, NAI.

2. India Office to London All India Muslim League, 7 August
1913, Pro. No. 135, Ibid.

3. Hablul Matin (Calcutta), 15 August 1913, RONNP-Bengal.

4. Letter of one Matiullah Kakakhel, Camp Phag, 3 August
1913, Pro. No. 77, F.D. Extl. b. September 1913, Nos.
42-79, NAI.

5. Notes Foreign Department, F.D. Extl. B. July 1913,
No. 351, NAI.

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desirable that "an individual of Enver Bey's character and political views should visit India." His visit would produce immense excitement; the Ambassador was asked to discourage him otherwise "at a pinch we can refuse facilities" although realising that "it would be worse than the disease."¹

III

The Government and the Pro-Turkish Press

We have seen how, since the time of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, Indian Muslims had been increasingly involved in the affairs of Turkey. Since then the number of educated Muslims had also increased and their newspapers were far more numerous and carried much more weight. Their leaders publicised their views through their newspapers.

Muhammad Ali, the editor of Comrade, was in the service of the Baroda State. He left his job towards the end of 1910. He started his career as a journalist in January 1911, with a weekly paper of his own, in English. During the Tripolitan and Balkan wars his Comrade became the foremost spokesman of Indian Muslims on the Turkish question. Originally, he had gone to journalism to represent the interests of

¹. Ibid.
his own community in India. Through his paper he sought to mould, project, and influence the views and opinion of Muslims as well as the authorities in India. It was a secular organ and not religious. Though he spoke for the Muslims as a community after the Minto-Morley Reforms that gave separate electorate to Muslims, he came to realise that one "should never lose sight of the prospects of the future when ultimately all communal interests had to be adjusted in order to harmonise with the paramount interests of India". He rightly understood that the political problem of all Indians was neither territorial nor racial in character; yet he wrongly diagnosed it as 'religious'. He dreamt of India as the "United Faiths of India". So his Comrade was to be "comrade of all and partisan of none", and thus prepare Indian Muslims to make their proper contribution to territorial patriotism without abating a jot of the fervour of their extra-territorial sympathies which is the quintessence of Islam.

1. It was Lovat Fraser, the editor of The Times of India, Bombay, who had invited him to contribute an article. Muhammad Ali then wrote his famous "Thoughts on the Present Discontent" in 1907; this was appreciated by Lord Minto, the then Viceroy in India. This was his only previous experience in journalism. Muhammad Ali, My Life ; A Fragment, op.cit., p. 34.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 35.

4. Ibid.

5. Muhammad Ali, My Life ; A Fragment, op.cit., p. 35.
Hindu and Muslim political controversy had seemed to be his immediate concern, which he thought had the "semblance of an acute international conflict;" "and Turkey and Persia seemed comparatively remote."¹ But with the quick succession of events in India and abroad, "the Musalmans felt themselves to be betrayed both in India and abroad." Muhammad Ali himself was so emotionally affected by the disasters of the Balkan war differently that he even contemplated suicide.² He became anti-British without any basic changes in his convictions; he "lost grace with the official world."³ even those like Aga Khan and Syed Ali Imam who had given financial help to him to launch the Comrade, became cool to him.⁴


2. There is a 'Note on the Muhammadan Situation' in the Meston Papers from Viceroy to Lt. Governor of United Provinces; this note was prepared possibly by Theodore Morrison, Member Secretary of State for India's Council, a former Principal of the M.A.O. College, Aligarh, which Hardinge apparently passed on to James Meston, then Lt. Governor of United Provinces. In this note there is a reference about Muhammad Ali that the 'Liberal Muhammadans' consider him to be very 'unstable in his views' and liable to be 'swayed by gusts of feeling'; and that Muhammad Ali himself told the author of the Note that "he was very emotional and that he often did things under the influence of feeling which he regretted afterwards." See Meston Papers - 136/6, p. 113, IOL.


4. Butler to Hardinge, 3 November 1912, Butler Papers-40, IOL.
After the Durbar announcement of 1911, the Comrade also shifted its office to the new Capital, Delhi, its first Delhi issue coming out of 12 October 1912. The Comrade was very ably edited in English, "an odd mixture of Islamic tradition and an Oxford education." Soon Muhammad Ali brought out an Urdu paper, the Hamdard, also from Delhi. Both were, undoubtedly the organs of the Young Muslim Party and Pan-Islamists; Muhammad Ali wrote that: "The Hamdard was intended to educate the people whereas the Comrade had to be their spokesman as well, and to act as a medium between them and their rulers." By advocating the cause of Turkey during the Balkan war, these papers became chief organs of Pan-Islamism in northern India. Through them Muhammad Ali and his associates began to collect funds for the Turkish Red Crescent Society in India, organised a Medical Mission, and undertook the sale of Turkish Bonds in India. There was hardly any emphasis on internal news except in connection with the Muslim University. But the Kanpur Mosque incident afforded the opportunity to converge the external and internal grievances into one against the authorities in India.

Another important Urdu weekly published from Calcutta which played a significant role during this period was Al-Hilal

(The Crescent). Its editor and proprietor was Abul Kalam Azad. A moving style, "new phrases for new ideas", illustrations and printed type, were some of the important characteristics of the paper. Azad had clear objectives which he wanted to achieve through his paper. Jawaharlal Nehru was later to describe him as "a strange mixture of Medieval Scholasticism, eighteenth century rationalism, and the Modern outlook."

Azad advised his co-religionists to make religion the basis of all their political activities. At the same time he strongly decried obscurantism in the religious life of Indian Muslims. Through his paper he advocated the cause of Liberty, Equality, constitutional and parliamentary government, struggle for lawful independence, and unity between the Hindus and Muslims. He had a profound knowledge of Islamic scriptures and traditions so that his opinions on their inter-

1. Its first issue appeared on 13 July 1912.


4. Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 6 November 1912.


6. Al-Hilal, 1 September 1912.
pretation carried great authenticity.\(^1\) He was remarkable for the scorn with which he treated the servile and flattering attitude of Muslim leaders towards the British government.\(^2\) He accordingly unsparingly attacked the Aligarh College and the leadership identified with it.\(^3\) The men who cooperated for forty years with "the Satans of Europe to weaken the influence of the Islamic Caliphate and Pan-Islam."\(^4\) His attack on the Aligarh College and imperialism was in the tradition of Jamal-ud-din Afghani. Nevertheless his advocacy of a common cause between Hindus and Muslims was responsible to a great extent in bringing the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League together,\(^5\) and the educated Muslims nearer to the Ulema.\(^6\)

\(^1\) His critics did not often approve the insertion of the verses of the Holy Quran in the columns of his paper supporting his argument. Those who sided with him included Maulana Shibli Nomani, and even the famous satirical Urdu poet Akbar Ilahabadi (\textit{Al-Hilal}, 18 August 1912).

\(^2\) \textit{Al-Hilal}, 16 October 1912.

\(^3\) \textit{Al-Hilal} (Calcutta), 18 August and 1 Sept. 1912.

\(^4\) Quoted in Ikram, \textit{Modern Muslim India} (1965), p. 118.

\(^5\) He wrote that Muslims have nothing to fear from Hindus, be afraid of God. If we have to live in India, then let us join them, and not fear them. You have already seen the consequences of your aloofness; now let us see by joining them. If they do not treat you well you treat them well. \textit{Ibid.}, 1 September 1912.

Azad proclaimed that the *Al-Hilal* was not just a religious war-cry; it is a political revolution.\(^1\) He had first felt the need of starting a new movement among Indian Muslims, while he was on a visit of the Muslim countries in West Asia. After his return in India he gave shape to his idea in the form of the *Al-Hilal*.\(^2\) Celebrating the second anniversary of his paper, he observed that the *Al-Hilal* is a call which summoned people; a movement to bring about revolutions and changes among people.\(^3\)

The ideas and the political attitude of this young writer and journalist were frowned upon by the conservatives and loyalists.\(^4\) Moreover, his writings caused a sensation in Muslim intellectual circles, stirred the masses, and created a ferment in the minds of the younger generation. He had roused the Ulema to turn to politics;\(^5\) he was, therefore,

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1. *Al-Hilal*, 20 July 1912.


4. Syed Ali Imam wrote: "I have carefully gone through the *Al-Hilal* ... It is a poisonous publication ... aims at exciting Mahommedan feeling in particular against the British." Syed Ali Imam to Hardinge, 28 August 1914, No. 169, Hardinge Papers-87, CUL.

5. Sheikh-ul-Hind Maulana Mahmud Hasan, alim of Deoband School is reported to have said 'We (the Ulema) were sleeping, Azad had roused us from our slumber.' quoted in Mushirul Haq, *op.cit.*, p. 53.
accused of trying to pit the Maulvis against the Muslim educated classes. 1

The Al-Hilal emerged as the foremost Urdu paper in northern India. 2 It strongly championed the cause of Turkey and other Muslim countries. Azad told his co-religionists in India that either they should support the Turks on Tripoli or support the British, because for them there is no middle path. 3

The paper admired the Young Turks and regularly wrote about the heroes of the war. It described Young Turk leader Enver Bey as Ghazi and published his photograph on a separate page, for its readers to keep. 4 Azad expressed no sympathy for the deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid, whom he described as the 'Kaiser of Yildiz', an autocrat. He felt surprised that a section of Indian Muslims continued to worship him; 5 this was when some people, in the face of defeats in Tripoli

1. A letter from the Benaras correspondent of, Kaiser-i-Hind (Faizabad), 31 October 1912, RONNP-UP.

2. Al-Hilal replaced the Comrade as the leading Pan-Islamic organ at Calcutta. Weekly Report of Director of Criminal Intelligence, 24 September 1912, Pro. No. 10, Home Poll. B., October 1912, Nos. 7-10, NAI.

3. Ibid., 18 August 1912.

4. Ibid., 1 September 1912.

5. Ibid., 25 August 1912.
and the Balkans had begun to demand the restoration of Abdul Hamid. 1

There was a distinct shade of difference between the political views of Muhammad Ali and Abul Kalam Azad. Azad's Pan-Islamism supported Indian Nationalism and an avowed enemy of Imperialism, whereas Muhammad Ali's vision of Pan-Islamism saw British Imperialism in India as a possible ally; and he repeatedly sought understanding with Britain with regard to the Muslim states.

The Muslim Gazette of Lucknow which appeared during this period also had a distinct approach of its own. This important Urdu paper was edited by Wahid-ud-din Salim, a graduate of the Aligarh College, representing the 'New Liberal group of the Aligarhians'. 2 The paper was supposed to be under the influence of Maulana Shibli Nomani, and received financial assistance from the Raja of Mahmudabad. 3

1. For example, Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 31 May 1912, 3 November 1912 and 19 February 1913. Medina (Bijnor), 8 July 1912. Al-Khalil (Bijnor), 1 November 1912. Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 8 April 1913, RONNP-UP.

2. Leader (Allahabad), 3 October 1913, RONNP-UP.

3. Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 2 April 1913. The charge of receiving money from the Raja of Mahmudabad was denied.
Salim strongly advocated a change in Muslim politics, and the paper expressed its admiration for the Indian National Congress; an organisation which survived criticism and vilification - "is guarantee of the future progress in India." 1 Though it still stuck to the idea of a separate organisation for Muslims, it held that the Muslim League, no longer enjoyed public confidence, and should be made more representative, 2 it demanded that the League adopt the ideal of Self Government within the British Empire. 3 It did not approve of Aligarh College politics, though Salim claimed to be a well wisher of the College. 4

The paper wrote passionately of the Balkan war. During the Kanpur Mosque episode it criticised the local administration in very strong language. The paper emerged as the most important paper of educated Muslims the United Provinces, and enjoyed friendly attention in the Nationalist press.

1. It remarked that so far Muslims kept aloof from this organisation for particular reasons, although the majority of them were never opposed to its principles, Ibid., 29 May 1912.

2. Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 18 March 1912, and 17 July 1912, RONNP-UP.

3. Ibid., 11 March 1912, It also reproduced an article on the subject from the Al-Hilal in its issue of 18 December 1912, Ibid.

4. Ibid., 2 April 1913.
The Muslim Gazette could not escape from the wrath of the bureaucracy and the clutches of the Press Act. Often it received warnings from the authorities. Ultimately it had to close down in 1913. Its exit left a vacuum deeply regretted by the Abhyudeya and Leader of Allahabad.

The Urdu-i-Mualla of Aligarh, edited by Maulana Fazlul Hasan Mohani, advocated aggressive Pan-Islamism. The editor was a political activist. He organised boycott movement in the United Provinces and enveloped the students of the Aligarh College in his activities.

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1. Leader (Allahabad), 3 October 1913. The editor was warned by orders of the Lieutenant Governor, Meston. See Notes, D.O. letter from R. Burn, Chief Secretary to the Government of U.P. to H. Wheeler, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 11 February 1913, Home Poll. A. March 1913, Nos. 45-55, NAI.

2. 4 October 1913.

3. 3 October 1913, RONNP-UP.

4. Hasrat Mohani presided over a public meeting at Aligarh, which passed, resolutions release of Tilak and condemned the anti-Asiatic Religious war declared by the Balkan Confederacy against Turkey. Urdu-i Mualla (Aligarh), October 1912, RONNP-UP.

5. A student of the Aligarh College Saiyid Hashmi was expelled from the College for being friendly with Hasrat Mohani. He had helped him to paste boycott posters at the Aligarh Exhibition. Hashmi was also penalised for expressing his sympathy for the Turks, which offended the staff of the College, because on the Tennis Party day he asked the authorities to postpone the Party because it was the day when Adrianople fell into the hands of the Balkan Allies. Kaiser-i-Hind (Faizabad), 19 June 1913, Ibid.

(Footnote Continued)
These new radical papers, by forcing the issue of the Turkish question and enflaming passions over the Kanpur Mosque exposed the Muslim leadership and forced it to retire or recede into the background. It was hard for a bureaucrat like Reginald Craddock, the Home Member of the Viceroy's Council, to reconcile himself with the programme and activities of the progressive Muslim press, which was upsetting the traditional attitude of Muslims towards the Government.\footnote{Craddock noted, "I have been brought up in the creed that Aligarh was a stronghold of loyalism" Referring to the changes that had come about in Muslim politics, he observed --" I consider that Muhammadan leaders like Right Hon'ble Amir Ali and the Agha Khan are responsible for a great deal." See Home Department Notes, Home Poll. A., March 1913, Nos. 45-55, NAI.}

What worried them most was the change that had come about in the Aligarh College itself. Dr Ziauddin Ahmad of the College, was very bitter about Muhammad Ali. He was used by the authorities of the local and provincial administration to keep watch on the activities of the Ali brothers. He even advised the authorities to take action against Muhammad Ali. He told Butler that --" he could counteract his influence in
the College, but he could not counteract the influence of his paper."¹

For a while the bureaucracy, the titled gentry and, men like Dr Ziauddin Ahmad even entertained the idea of starting a paper to counteract the propaganda of the Young Party and Pan-Islamic press.²

The Government of India was scared of the Pan-Islamic propaganda. It had already taken measures to check the flow of Pan-Islamic literature in India. With this view in mind they took action against The Islamic Fraternity an Urdu monthly published from Tokyo, Japan, edited by Maulvi Barkatullah of Shopal. It was an anti-imperialist and anti-British paper. The paper advised Indian Muslims to sympathise with Turkey and other Muslim states. Like the Al-Hilal it also asserted that Muslim sympathy would in no way interfere with

¹. Harcourt Butler to Meston, 30 June 1914, Meston Papers-3, IOL.
². Nawab Fatehali Khan Cizilbash suggested starting of a daily paper in English and in Vernacular in every province, in particular in the Punjab and U.P. the most infected areas. For this he demanded an initial grant from the Government of a sum of ₹1,00,000 per province, along with grants from the Nawab of Rampur and himself, Jehangirabad and Pahasu (₹5,00,000) while the Raja of Pirpur was to pay ₹10,000 and others ₹5,000. He wanted it to be kept confidential, with no connections from others directly in the shaping of the policy. It seems that no credence was given to this scheme by Meston. Nawab Fateh Ali Khan to Meston, 26 December 1913, Meston Papers-6, IOL.

(Footnote Continued)
their local patriotism. It laid stress on unity, and pointed out to Muslims that with the co-operation of their compatriots they would be able to help better their co-religionists abroad.\footnote{1}

The Government of Bombay notified it under Section 12, of the Indian Press Act 1910, and prohibited its importation in India under Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. Since Maulvi Barkatullah was a subject of the Bhopal State, it suggested that pressure be brought on him through the Begum of Bhopal, to force him to discontinue the publication of the paper.\footnote{2} The Government of India advised the India Office to bring the matter to the notice of the Japanese Government.\footnote{3} As a result not only was the paper forced to cease publication,

(Previous Footnote Continued)

Sheikh Abdullah, a Trustee of the Aligarh College and Dr Ziauddin Ahmed thought of starting an Urdu daily to counteract the Hamdar, and they expected help from men like Alay Nabi and Abdur Rauf, and the Old Boys in their service. It seems even this scheme failed to materialise. See Notes on the Muhammadan Situation by Theodore Morrison in Viceroy to Lieutenant Governor of U.P., Meston Papers -- 6, IOL.

1. Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 10 September 1912, Pro. No. 8, Home Poll. B., October 1912, Nos. 7-10, NAI.

2. Enclosure 1 to Pro. No. 3, and Pro. No. 4, F.D. Secret-I., August 1912, Nos. 3-4, NAI.

3. See F.D. Secret-I, December 1912, Nos. 3-5, NAI.

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but Maulvi Barkatullah was removed from the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages, where he was a teacher of Urdu language.\(^1\)

The authorities in India were already keeping a watch on some newspapers.\(^2\) Surveillance was kept over the movement of the editor of Al-Hilal.\(^3\) In 1913 several of the newspapers were warned.\(^4\) More stringent measures were taken when securities were demanded from a number of the leading newspapers, like the Zamindar, Comrade, Handard, Al-Hilal, Urdu-i-Mualla, Rafiq, Muslim Gazette and Tauhid. The Security of the Zamindar was forfeited a number of times. Apparently the authorities in the Punjab were determined to throttle this popular paper. Similar was the case with the Comrade and Handard.

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1. See F.D. Secret-I, July 1913, No. 54, NAI.

2. On the Al-Hilal and Namai Mugaddas Habilul Matin, both of Calcutta, see Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, Pro. No. 1, Home Poll. A. Jan. 1912, Nos. 1-2, NAI.

3. Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 3 and 10 September 1913.

4. The Islam Rabi (Tangail), was warned for its article on the Tripolitan war. Pro. No. 48, Home Poll. A. February 1912, Nos. 47-48, NAI. The Al-Bashir (Stawah) and Vakil (Amritsar), See Appendix X, Home Poll. A. November 1914, Nos. 33-38, NAI. See also Notes on Sedition in the United Provinces, by S.H. Freemantle - December 1917 in Maston Papers--15, ICL.
In May 1913 Urdu-i-Mualla ceased publication because it could not deposit the demanded security; so also the Muslim Gazette. When securities were being demanded from these leading papers, in most cases these were forfeited, the Al-Hilal boldly denounced the demand made on it, asserting that any action against it would be against Islam.¹

A determined attempt was thus made to persecute the Muslim press. Meston sought to dissuade people from reading the papers like Al-Hilal, Muslim Gazette and the Tauhid. This was got done through the Muslim 'raiser' and Honorary Magistrate by telling them that Britain was not an enemy of Turkey.² British Officials were surprised to note that attack on them during this period had come from the Muslim press and not from the "Hindu" press.³ They noted that even a moderate paper like the Observer of Lahore was affected by the recent events.⁴ The official wrath on the Pan-Islamic press fell specially severely in the Punjab and the United Provinces. Bengal was largely an exception to this.⁵

1. Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 1 October 1913.
2. See Enclosure in Meston to Hardinge, 9 September 1913, No. 181, Hardinge Papers, CUL.
4. Ibid., 28 August 1912, Pro. No. 24.
5. One Hakim M. Rukunuddin Dana of Calcutta, suggested to the editor of the Zamindar that let the paper be published from Calcutta instead of Lahore, Zamindar (Lahore), 3 March 1914, RONNP-Punjab.
The obnoxious Press Act of 1910 and the Muslim sympathies with Turkey were characteristically entangled in an interesting episode.

Muhammad Ali received a pamphlet published in Constantinople, regarding the atrocities committed by the Balkan Allies in Macedonia. It was an appeal to Christians - "in particular to Englishmen, the old Allies of Crimes and friends of the Congress at Berlin."¹ The Government of India declared it forfeited under the Press Act.

Muhammad Ali chose the High Court of Calcutta for challenging the Act. He had admiration for its tradition of independence from the influence of the Executive.² The Government even tried to avoid the case there, but was outwitted.³ The Chief Justice Sir Lawrence Jenkins found the notification of the forfeiture defective, as it did not state the grounds on which the local Government had acted.⁴ This judgement practically tore up the Press Act. This 'monstrous judgement' excited

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3. Hardinge to Chirol, 28 August 1913, No. 72, Hardinge Papers-93, CUL.
4. See Home Poll. A. October 1913, Nos. 1-3, NAI.
the ire of Hardinge, but Muhammad Ali naturally made the most of it. Soon afterwards he left for London to take up the matter with the authorities in England.

IV

Relief Fund and Medical Missions

Turkish ordeal invoked immediate response from Indians, particularly Muslims. News of atrocities and sufferings moved them to contribute to the Turkish Relief Fund. Some donated on humanitarian grounds and others on Pan-Islamic and purely religious grounds. Contributions were made by Hindus as well.

1. Hardinge to Chirol, 10 September 1913, No. 79, Hardinge Papers-93, CUL. Hardinge was greatly annoyed with the judgement - "it strikes me that the High Court will assume a very grave responsibility if they dare to combat the opinion of the Government of India, who are responsible for peace and order in the country." Hardinge to Chirol, 28 August 1913, No. 72, Hardinge Papers-93, CUL.

2. Hardinge was aghast to see - "finally gave Mahomed Ali a pat on the back. I see that that arch agitator suddenly left Bombay last Saturday for London, evidently with the intention of trying to work up public opinion in England against my Government in connection with Mahommedan affairs in this country." Ibid., 10 September 1913, No.79.

3. Note by S. Habibullah, 17 February 1913, Measton Papers-6, IOL.
An Indian Red Crescent Society was established at Calcutta. Muhammad Ali, editor of the Comrade (Delhi), founded a Red Crescent Society at Delhi. All these Societies derived their name from the Ottoman Croissant Rouge of Constantinople, of which Hilmi Pasha was the President. The Watan (Lahore) published his telegram appealing for funds.

Muhammad Ali requested the Viceroy Hardinge to become Patron of the Society. Hardinge accepted the offer and approved the collection of money by the Red Crescent Society for humanitarian purposes. Hardinge himself contributed Rupees One thousand towards the fund and his example was followed by many other senior officials of the Government of India. Muhammad Ali was gratified and believed his gesture would dispel the notions lurking in some people's mind about the purpose and

1. See above.

2. 15 October 1912, RONNP-Punjab.

3. Muhammad Ali to James Du Boulay, Private Secretary to Viceroy, 11 November 1912, see Notes, F.D. Sec. G, February 1913, Nos. 1-19, NAI

4. For example, Lord Kitchener, Lord Carmichael, Lord Pentland, Sir Charles Bayley and Sir James Meston, also Syed Ali Imam. See Panjabee (Lahore), 5 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab.
policy of the Government. He assured the authorities that he would try to remove such misconceptions. Yet he would have to rouse Indian Muslim sympathy on behalf of the Muslims of Turkey.  

1. Syed Ali Imam, a member of the Governor-General's Council too thanked Hardinge for his generous donation and said that it had a soothing effect on Muslims.  

2. Muhammad Ali even requested Lady Hardinge to involve herself in the drive to enlist the support of Muslim women of Delhi.  

3. A zenana branch of the Red Crescent Society was established at Lahore. Similar societies were established at various places in India and organised meetings to collect funds.  

The Punjab branch of the Society was inaugurated at Lahore and the meeting was presided over by Nawab Fateh Ali

1. Muhammad Ali to Du Boulay, 11 November 1912, P.D. Sec. G. Feb. 1913, Nos. 1-19, NAI.

2. Syed Ali Imam to Hardinge, 11 November 1912, No. 306b, Hardinge Papers. Also thanked by Mir Ayub Khan, President Red Crescent Society, Sind, to Hardinge, 5 November 1912. Teleg. No. 293, Ibid., and Ghulam Hussain Ariff, President Calcutta Muslims Meeting to Private Secretary to Viceroy, 6 November 1912, Teleg. No. 297, Ibid.

3. Muhammad Ali to Du Boulay, 11 November 1912, P.D. Sec -G, February 1913, Nos. 1-19, NAI.

4. Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 19 November 1912, ROHNP-Punjab.

Khan Qizilbash. Mian Muhammad Shafi was to be the Chairman of the Executive Committee.¹ Both of them were well-known loyalists.

In Calcutta the campaign was started with great fervour. The Nawab of Dacca was called upon to be the Patron.² We have noted earlier that, as soon as the news of the Tripolitan war reached Calcutta, a committee was formed to collect funds for the Red Crescent Society.

The students, staff, trustees, Old Boys and well wishers of the M.A.O. College, Aligarh, also formed a Red Crescent Society. They collected funds, both in kind and cash for the sick and wounded and for relief of the families of the soldiers killed in the Tripoli War. Students also resolved unanimously to abstain from taking 'delicious dishes' and donate the savings towards the Turkish Relief Fund. Frequently, Principal Towle, of the College, sent on behalf of the students, money to the British Ambassador at Constantinople for onward transmission to the Ottoman Red Crescent Society or the Grand

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2. Chief Secretary to Government of Bengal to Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 17 November 1911, Pro. No. 5, Home Poll. A, December 1911, Nos. 5-6, NAI.

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Vizier of Turkey. The zeal and enthusiasm of the Aligarh College students was widely reported in the Urdu press.

Zafar Ali Khan, editor and proprietor of the Zamindar (Lahore) organised a separate Turkish Relief Fund. He held meetings in connection with the Balkan War and urged upon all sections of Muslims and their societies to contribute towards the Fund. He denounced Muslim leaders for misrepresenting the matter to the Government authorities.²

The Government's refusal of the Charter for the Muslim University at this time astounded Indian Muslims. In their enthusiasm Pan-Islamists and others suggested that the Muslim University Fund should be given to the Turkish Relief

1. On 2 November 1911, a meeting was held at the Strachey Hall of the College, presided by Towle. Several resolutions in support of Turkey were passed at the meeting. A committee was formed, headed by Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad to collect funds, whereas Nawab Muzammilullah Khan subscribed Rs. 200 at the meeting itself. Next day the students held another meeting in the University Mosque. Aligarh Monthly, Vol. X, No. 11, November 1912, pp. 361-62.

2. On 3 and 4 November 1912 two meetings were held in Lahore. One Khan Bahadur Mian Khairuddin, a Government servant (District Traffic Superintendent, N.W. Railway) opposed his proposals on religious grounds and certain remarks in his speech. When rebuffed, he left the meeting along with his supporters. Weekly Report of Director of Criminal Intelligence, 12 November 1912, Pro. No. 89, Home Political B, December 1912, Nos. 88-91, NAI.
Fund. Some argued that it would be better to give the money on loan to Turkey, instead of keeping it in a Christian Bank. Others even suggested that the idea of establishing a University, be abandoned and the entire fund be given to the Turkish Relief Fund. Nawab Vigar-ul Mulk opposed the proposal of giving the University fund to Turkey even on loan. The Muslim Gazette, Lucknow, regretted the attitude of Vigar-ul Mulk.

But the strongest opposition to such proposals came from Aftab Ahmad Khan, a trustee of the Aligarh College. But even he suggested that a separate fund for Turkey be started and associations in every district of United Provinces

1. Nizam-ul Mulk (Moradabad), 31 October 1912; Naiyar-i Azam (Moradabad), 19 November 1912; Agra Akhbar, 7 December 1912, RONNP-UP; Rafiq (Delhi), 13 November 1912, RONNP-Punjab.

2. Naiyar-i Azam (Moradabad), 19 November 1912, RONNP-UP.

3. Dabdaba-i Sikandri (Kampur), 16 September 1912. For criticism of such proposals see Tajir (Meerut), 11 November 1912, Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 26 November 1912, RONNP-UP.

4. Aligarh Institute Gazette, 11 December 1912, RONNP-UP; Observer (Lahore), 14 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab. For similar views Al-Bashir (Etawah), 12 November 1912, RONNP-UP; also by one Mustafa Husain of Aligarh in Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 7 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab.

5. 18 December 1912, RONNP-UP.
be organised. He even suggested names for an Organizing Committee.¹

Even so the proposal to lend the Muslim University Fund to the Turks acquired considerable support among the Muslim masses. At a meeting in Bombay on 27 February 1913, it was publicly decided to lend money to Turkey; the motion was moved by Aga Khan and supported by the Raja of Mahmudabad and others. They obtained the assurance of the Turkish Consul at Bombay that the money would be repaid within a year.² The Observer of Lahore was opposed to the loan, but agreed to lend it for a year only.³

Even Viqarul Mulk afterwards agreed that the University fund may be invested in the Turkish Bonds made available for sale in India by the Turkish Government, through Muhammad Ali the Editor of the Comrade, Delhi.⁴ This proposal

¹. His proposed committee was to include, Manager, Madarsa-i Deoband, Secretary, Nadwat-ul Ulema, Nawab Viqar-ul Mulk, Raja of Mahmudabad, Raja of Jehangirabad, Secretary of the M.A.C. College, Aligarh, Secretary, All Indian Muslim League and the Honorary Secretary, Muslim Educational Conference, Aligarh Institute Gazette, 13 November 1912, RONNP-UP.

². Zamindar (Lahore), 5 May 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

³. 5 March 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

⁴. Aligarh Institute Gazette, 13 March 1913, RONNP-UP.

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was countered by an argument that Turkish financial position was deplorable hence it was not safe to invest University Fund there.\(^1\) and Haji Ishaq Khan, editor of the *Aligarh Institute Gazette*, opposed the sale of the Turkish Bonds itself.\(^2\)

The Balkan wars thus almost scotched the Muslim University movement for the time being; and even its fund could be saved only with great difficulty.\(^3\)

Various organizations with different names collected funds for the Ottoman Red Crescent Society all over India.\(^4\) Each, however, functioned independently of the other. Nor was it known, how these funds were utilised in Turkey. Muhammad Ali advised Muslims to send their contributions to the Ottoman Red Crescent Society of which Hilmi Pasha was the head, which he said, utilized their money for the purpose it was contribu-

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1. The editor of *Urdu-i Mualla* (Aligarh), May and June 1913, RONNP-UP, believed that this view has been secretly published by Sheikh Abdullah a Trustee of the M.A.O. College.

2. *Aligarh Institute Gazette*, 2 April 1913, RONNP-UP.


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ted by Muslims in India. 1

The funds for Turkey were mostly collected by leading newspapers like the Comrade, Zamindar, Paisa Akhbar, and the Went, all the last three issued from Lahore. Meetings were held to collect funds. 2 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, took part in one such meeting at Bombay. 3 Among the nationalist papers the Bengalee, Calcutta and Tribune, Lahore, advised Hindus also to contribute liberally towards the fund. 4

Contributions to these funds generally came from the middle class Muslims. 5 Muslim women in the Punjab who were active were said to belong to the poorer and middle classes. 6 Efforts were made by the editors of the Comrade and

1. See History sheet of Muhammad Ali, by V.H. Vincent, Assistant Director of Criminal Intelligence, Government of India, Home Poll. B, November 1913, No. 149, NAI.

2. Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 16 October 1912, RONNP-UP.


5. Zamindar (Lahore), 18 February 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

6. Paisa Akhbar (Lahore) 19 November 1912, RONNP-Punjab.
the Zamindar, though unsuccessfully, to have a circular issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army calling upon Muslim soldiers to contribute towards the Turkish Relief Fund.¹

There were suggestions to turn the Turkish Relief Fund into a permanent body, keeping in view the future problems of Turkey.² Even Haji Musa Khan a conservative of Datsuli Aligarh, suggested a permanent means in order to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood with Turkey and help Muslim countries.³ Hasrat Mohani, editor of the Urdu-i Mualla agreed with his suggestion.⁴ Viqar-ul Mulk advised to expand its work.⁵

The ulema of Deoband issued a fatwa making it incumbent on Muslims to subscribe towards the fund; and declared lawful the sale of skins of the animals sacrificed on the occasion of Iduz-Zuha and money thus obtained donated

1. Military Secretary, Commander in Chief to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Telegram 26 November 1912, No.349, Hardinge Papers. See also Akhbar-i Am (Lahore), 11 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab.


3. Aligarh Institute Gazette, 25 December 1913, RONNP-UP.

4. Urdu-i Mualla (Aligarh), January 1913, RONNP-UP.

5. Aligarh Institute Gazette, 16 April 1912, RONNP-UP.

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to the Turkish Relief Fund.¹ Shibli advised Muslims to donate the price of the sacrificed animal.²

The Government of India raised no objections in the remittance of money collected in India to Turkey.³ Necessary instructions were issued to the British Ambassador at Constantinople by the British Foreign Office. In this way ₹30,000 collected in Rampur State were remitted to Turkey.⁴ The Begum of Bhopal’s donation of ₹21,000 was remitted to the President of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, Constantinople.⁵ The Nizam of Hyderabad contributed £1000 and his ministers ₹6,000 in response to a direct appeal made by the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, although at his request this money was diverted towards Lady Lowther’s Fund meant for the same


2. Zamindar (Lahore), 7 November 1912, RONNP-Punjab.

3. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Telegram, 22 December 1912, No. 536, Hardinge Papers - 96, CUL.

4. India Office to Foreign Office, 13 March 1912, Pro. No. 34, F.D. Genl. A, June 1912, NAI.


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purpose. It was, however, suspected by some Muslims that often the money sent to Turks fell into the hands of Italians. This could have happened only when Indian money was sent to Turks through other channels.

Muhammad Ali demanded that while dispersing the amount, the British Consul should let it be known to the Turks that these contributions had come from the readers of the Comrade and other Muslims of India. He should send accounts for publication in his newspapers. Muhammad Ali was inflamed when he learnt that General Birdwood was distributing a Bible and an anti-Turkish pamphlet along with relief in Adrianople:

This end with our money! Will England never learn to spare our feelings? Can you imagine our distress at this treacherous breach of confidence.

1. Resident Hyderabad to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Telegram, 13 November 1912, No. 309, Hardinge Papers - CUL.

2. Syed Ameer Ali made no allegation publicly. He referred to this matter in his correspondence with Muhammad Ali. For not doing so, his argument was that any public statement in this connection would have been a disservice to Turks, by revealing that monetary help was being sent into Tripolitan hinterland. This would have increased their difficulties more. The argument is unconvincing; the suspicion was apparently baseless. Ameer Ali to Muhammad Ali, 6 March 1912, MOH/L-549, Muhammad Ali Paper, NMML-MF.

3. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Telegram, 13 April 1913, No. 238, Hardinge Papers-97, CUL.

4. Editor of Comrade to Private Secretary to the Viceroy, No. 327, 29 June 1913, Hardinge Paper-97, CUL.
His allegations were denied by Hardinge after making enquiries.1

Hoping to utilize their sympathies for raising large loans from Indian Muslims, the Turkish Committee of National Defence addressed letters to prominent Muslims in India and Egypt. The Turkish paper the 'Turgis' 7 February 1913, published names of the Indian Muslims to whom these letters had been sent.2 The Committee of Union & Progress also despatched two agents to India to raise loans by selling the Turkish Treasury Bonds.3 In CUP circles it was averred (though Lowther dismissed it as 'usual bluff') that they had

1. He enquired as to what was General Birdwood's connection with the distribution of the relief, Viceroy to India Office, 2 July 1913, No. 397. It turned out that General Birdwood was staying in the British Consulate when the Comrade fund of £2000 were spent on the distribution of bread. Ibid., 11 July 1913, No. 386, Hardinge Papers-97, CUL.

2. The Prominent nemes were: Ghulam Husain Arif, President, Red Crescent Society, Calcutta; Kasim Bhai Ibrahim, President, Red Crescent Society, Bombay, Proprietor, the Watan, Lahore; Muhammad Ali, the Comrade, Delhi, and Abdullah Haroon, Karachi. Lowther to Grey, 7 February 1913, Pro. 168, F.D. Genl. B, June 1913, Nos. 168-69, NAI. See also Encl. to Pro. 168.

3. The names of the two agents were Fazil from Salonica and Ali Khulki Effendi, left Constantinople on 16 February 1913 via Egypt. British Ambassador, Constantinople to Viceroy, Telegram, 27 February 1913, Pro. 28, F.D. Extl. B, August 1913, NAI.
assurances from wealthy Indian Muslims for contributions.¹

Muhammad Ali began writing about the Turkish Bonds in his paper.² The Viceroy did not consider the selling of Turkish Bonds in India to be against British policy, although he had doubts about the security of repayment. He, therefore, made it known to political officers to warn the Chiefs of these doubts, though he left it for them to decide the matter for themselves.³ Muhammad Ali approached the Nizam of Hyderabad, who, however, declined to accept them.⁴ Nevertheless, his scheme of Turkish Bonds was approved by the Aligarh Institute Gazette, and the Muslim Gazette.⁵ Later on, however, the sale of Turkish Bonds within the Aligarh College was deprecated.⁶ The Al-Bashir of Etawah disapproved the scheme

1. Lowther to Grey, 5 February 1913, Pro. 421, F.D. Extl. B, April 1913, Nos. 342-428, NAI.

2. See History sheet of Muhammad Ali, Home Poll. B, November 1913, No. 149, NAI.

3. Notes, F.D. Extl. B, August 1913, Nos. 28-31, NAI.

4. Ibid.

5. 6 November 1912 and 5 February 1913 respectively, RONNP-UP; also Hablul Matin (Calcutta) 24 July 1913, RONNP-Bengal.

6. One Shakir Ali tried to sell them in the Aligarh College, Aligarh Institute Gazette, 30 April 1913, RONNP-UP.
on the ground that Indian Muslims could not contribute any larger amount for Turkey. 1

The Deutche Orient Bank at the request of Turkish Government unsuccessfully corresponded with a Bank at Hyderabad and the National Bank of India, with a view to arranging the sale of five million Treasury Bonds as loan. Similar efforts were made at Lahore. 2

Matters were, however, complicated by suspicions being raised as to the integrity of those raising funds were proper for Turkey in India the Millet of Lahore regretted that there was no organization to protect these funds from peculation. 3 This paper was persistent in his attack on Zafar Ali Khan, for not keeping proper accounts of funds collected and remitted to Turkey. 4 There was a rumour that the Young Turk leader Enver Bey was being brought to India. The Millat denounced the move intended only to gain personal reputation and entrap Indian Muslims by gaining more influence and rob them off whatever little money left with them. 5 There was

1. 5 November 1912, RONNP-UP.
2. Telegram, British Ambassador to Viceroy, Pro. 29, 28 February 1913, F.D. Extl. B, August 1913, Nos. 28-31, NAI. See also Pro. 423, F.D. Extl. B, April 1913, Nos. 342-428, NAI.
3. Millet (Lahore), 14 February 1913, RONNP-Punjab.
4. Millet (Lahore), 25 April and 2 May 1913, RONNP-Punjab.
5. Ibid., 9 May 1913.
substance in the charges, and against whom these were made, were reckless and irresponsible on this count in their public life. Zul Qarnain of Badaun, called upon the editors of the Zamindar and the Comrade to publish their detailed accounts.¹ The Shams of Jaunpur, suggested the appointment of a committee to scrutinize their accounts. His opinion was to entrust the task to government auditors, as was done by the Government in case of the defalcation of the Aligarh College Fund.²

The Watan of Lahore reported on the basis of a biennial report of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society that Indian Muslim contribution towards the Fund was less than twenty four lacs of Rupees whereas it was generally estimated to have been more than a crore rupees. The paper did not find the name of Zamindar in the list of contributors given in the report.³ The Paisa Akhbar and Observer of Lahore, also denounced the Zamindar and sought clarifications.⁴ The editor

1. Zul Qarnain (Bedaun), 20 May 1914, RONNP-UP.
2. Shams (Jaunpur), 15 August 1914, RONNP-UP.
3. 10 April 1914, RONNP-Punjab.
4. 25 April 1914, Ibid.
of the **Zamindar** published clarification and claimed to possess proper remittance receipts from the Turkish authorities. The **Al-Bashir** of Etawah joined in the controversy and suggested an enquiry through the Government of India and the British Ambassador at Constantinople to ascertaint how these funds had been remitted to Turkey. Unless this was done, the confidence of Indian Muslims would be shaken and the Turks would not receive any assistance in future.\(^1\) Apparently the suggestion was reasonable, but it was meant to administer a blow to their professional rival, and affirm loyalist Muslim confidence in the British Government. The **Zamindar** dismissed all these charges as originating out of professional rivalry and personal malice.\(^2\) There is no doubt that the charges of misappropriation of Red Crescent Fund were made rather loosely. But it is also true that the Muslims leaders of public opinion were indiscreet and less careful in this regard than they should have been kept their public image above reproach.

Apart from sending money, the editor of **Comrade** decided to despatch a Medical Mission with a fully equipped field hospital to Turkey.\(^3\) Syed Amade Ali had approached the

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1. **Al-Bashir** (Etawah). 19 May 1914, RONNP-UP.
2. 13 May 1914, RONNP-Punjab.
India Office to favour him with an intimation that help given to him in this connection would not be viewed with disfavour by government.¹ People were otherwise reluctant to help and involve themselves.² (A similar enquiry was made by Muhammad Ali, in particular about the advance of a loan to Turkey by Indian Muslims.³

Sir James Meston was against the sending of a Medical Mission to Turkey, for it would be too late. He was also opposed to sending any contributions to Muhammad Ali or Dr M.A. Ansari. However, Varney Lovett, Commissioner of Lucknow, told Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal that he would be allowed to go, though no one else would be allowed to accompany the mission.⁴ This attitude caused anxiety among the promoters of the Mission: "If our Mission fails we will be made a laughing stock of all the English club goers in India".⁵ Ultimately, on the recommendation of Grey,

1. Syed Ameer Ali to India Office, 23 October 1912, Pro. 6, Ibid.
3. Muhammad Ali to Du Boulay, 11 Nov. 1912, Ibid.
4. Naziruddin Hasan to Dr. M.A. Ansari, 26 November 1912, Ansari Papers, Reel I, NMMI.
5. Ibid.
the Government of India decided to put no obstacles. The Governor-General in Council authorised the Chief Commissioner of Delhi to issue passports to the members of the Medical Mission, and the Viceroy himself saw the Mission off from Delhi. Its members left Bombay on 15 December 1912 for Turkey.

Syed Ameer Ali had sponsored a Medical Mission from London. From India two Missions were despatched, and there was news that some more will be sent. The first Medical Mission was organised by the Anjuman-i Zia-ul Islam of Bombay, led by Dr Muhammad Hussain, an assistant Surgeon of Madras. A significant feature of this Mission was that it included Brahmins as well as Muslims. But three members of the Bombay mission came back from Turkey before scheduled date, possibly because of internal quarrels.

The second, and better known medical mission was sponsored by Muhammad Ali of the Comrade, Delhi. This

1. Foreign Office to India Office, 19 November 1912, Pro. 9, F.D. Sec. G., Feb. 1913, Nos. 1-19, NAI.
2. Pro. 13, 30 November 1912, Ibid.
3. This was claimed by Dr A. Suhrawardy, Director of the First Indian Red Crescent Medical Mission in a letter published in the Leader (Allahabad), 1 May 1913, RONNP-UP.
4. Medina (Bijnor), 15 April 1913, RONNP-UP.
5. Comrade (Delhi), 11 November 1912.
mission was led by Dr M.A. Ansari, with Abdur Rahman Siddiqi as its Manager.¹ This Medical Mission received the patronage of the Ulema of Deoband.² This Mission was well equipped, well organized and well provided with funds.³ The Government of India however took care to keep a watch on the activity of Dr. Ansari and Zafar Ali Khan while in Turkey.⁴

1. The Members of this Mission were: Chowdhary Khaliquzzaman, Dr. M.A. Ansari, Shuaib Gureshi, Abdur Rahman Siddiqi and Bashiruddin Ahmad. All were Old Boys of the Aligarh College. Another Old Boy Raja Mahendra Pratap went to Constantinople to join Dr. Ansari’s Medical Mission. He offered his services to Turkey during the Balkan War. But he came back soon: “The officer ...... asked me for my name. I gave my name ... but it was not a Muslim name. I realized where was his difficulty. I did not care to stay long after this experience”. Mahendra Pratap, My Life Story of Fifty Five Years (Delhi, 1947), pp. 27-8.


3. One Dr. Shams-el-din-el Bari (possibly his correct name was Shamsul Huda) was wrongly supposed to be a member of Dr. Ansari’s Mission. He came back to Geya. Before reaching India he visited Cairo. He explained that he was returning because European climate did not suit him. Perhaps he was expelled. Pro. 32, 29 April 1912, Home Poll. B, May 1913, Nos. 33-34, NAI. See also Al-Mushir (Bijnore), 18 March 1913, RCNNP-UP.

4. Grey to Marling, Foreign Office, 4 July 1913, Pro. 43, Home Poll. B, August 1913, Nos. 43-44, NAI.
Because of the partial failure of the Bombay Mission, the despatch of other missions to Turkey was deprecated. Critics disapproved of entrusting of such charitable work to individuals. On the contrary, Suhrawardy claimed that his mission was a success and their work was praised by the Sultan. He believed that Hindus and Muslims were now awake over the "mysterious call of the East".

The medical missions did not go on well together while in Turkey. Dr. Ansari criticised the working of the mission sponsored by Syed Ameer Ali and Kazim Husain, and

1. Such adverse comments were made when it was known that a Medical Mission was to go from Kasur, Lahore and another from Simla by one Dr. Said Ansari, Observer (Lahore), 1 March 1913, RONNP-Punjab. See also Zia ul Islam (Moradabad), November 1912, (undated) and Azad (Lucknow), 19 December 1912, Surma-1 Rozgar (Agra), 16 May 1913, RONNP-UP.

2. In a letter to Hablul Matin (Calcutta), 2 May 1913, RONNP-Bengal.

3. Abdur Rahman Siddiqi, Manager of Dr. Ansari's Mission, complained that Syed Ameer Ali supplied inferior quality tents to Mission. And one Abdul Wahid Khan wrote that some members of Syed Ameer Ali's mission were insincere and had gone for sight-seeing, and that one Hasan Raza Beg was suspected to be an ex-C.I.D. employee; Dr. Shamsul Huda and Hasan Raza Beg were later expelled from the Mission.
latter they repudiated the charges made against them.  

Some members of the Mission were also disillusioned about Turkey. Bashiruddin informed Muhammed Ali that the Turks had been thoroughly beaten and outdone by Balkan Allies. They lacked military talents to call them respectable and an ordinary Turk knew not why his country was beaten.  

Still, Dr. Ansari's medical mission gained considerable popularity in India. In recognition of their services the Turkish authorities named the hill and village of Omreli, by an Imperial Edict as 'Hindustan Jebel' and

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1. Al-Mushir (Bijnore), 18 March and 4 July 1913, RONNP-UP. Observer (Lahore), 19 March 1913, RONNP-Punjab, whereas Zulgaranin (Badaun), 28 May 1913 (RONNP-UP) reported on the authority of the Curzon Gazette that a defamation suit was filed against Dr. Ansari by certain members of the British Red Crescent Medical Mission. They had been accused of causing the death of wounded Turkish soldiers by giving them poison. The editor remarked that if it were true, it would discredit Dr. Ansari.

2. He noticed a tendency among Turks, from ordinary man to government officials to abuse and blame each other. While the government conveniently put the blame on Sultan Abdul Hamid's long reign of mal-administration. He remarked that apparently British India has a peaceful government and the weaker sides of the 'Nation' were 'hidden from our view which we shall see when we shall have to stand on our own feet'. Bashiruddin to Muhammad Ali, Dardanelles, 13 May 1913, MOH/L-907, Muhammad Ali Papers.

3. Surma-i Rozgar (Agra) observed the Mission had failed and deserved no praise, 16 May 1913, RONNP-UP.
The Sultan of Turkey conferred decorations on the members of the Medical Mission, these were presented at a ceremony in the Turkish Consulate in Bombay by Halil Halid Bey the Vice Consul for Turkey on 12 November 1913.²

Apparently the objective of the Medical Mission was humanitarian, and a genuine response by Indian Muslims to help their co-religionists in Turkey; it was also the product of young Muslim politics in India.³ Above all it was intended to impress upon Europe that Islam was "still a corporate body and each and every member of this body feels for it". Besides, to prove that "we are moving a step forward in the direction of (taking part in the) inter-

1. *Leader* (Allahabad), 1 May 1913, RONNP-UP.

2. Dr. M.A. Ansari received on 1 February 1914, the honour of the second class of the Osmaniah Order; Dr. A.H. Fyzee the Order of the third class of the Medjidie; one Mr. Rouchun, the fourth class of the same decoration; Hakim Serejuddin and Abdul Latif the fifth class of the Medjidie; second class of the Order of Shafkat to Sherimbai Ebrahim the Lady nurse who had accompanied the Medical Mission, and an Order of the Medjidie to Dr. Niranalkar, Home Poll. D, July 1914, No. 17, 1914.

national affairs (lit. relations) of the world", these measures were intended to impress upon the British Government the political importance of the Muslim leadership in India.  

Dr. Ansari's Medical Mission certainly achieved some success from this point of view. Vigar-ul Mulk expressed his gratification and asked him to make a tour of India and remove misconceptions about Turkey.

Dr. Ansari visited Aligarh on 12 June 1913 and was accorded a rousing reception by the students of the Aligarh College. Muhammad Ali accompanied him and appeared in public wearing the field dress worn by members of the Medical Mission in Turkey. He told the students that Mission's main objectives were political.

1. Writing about the object of the Medical Mission to Turkey, the editor wrote "After all Indian Muhammadans are contemporaries of the Turks, and if there is any difference between them then it is that while the latter still hold the sceptre the former have lost it". See Rafiq (Delhi), 12 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab. The Zamindar published a communication of Hasan Nizami of Delhi: 'Salutations from our wound to wounded Turks'. Muslims desire Dr. Ansari to deliver their message: 'We have no balm to soothe those wounds into which salts are occasionally sprinkled by the speeches of Mr Asquith', 9 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab.

2. Musafir (Agra), 24 January 1913, RONNP-UP.

3. In a contributed article to Kaisar-i Hind (Faizabad), 3 July 1913, RONNP-UP.

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Boycott Movement and Other Schemes

As a protest against the Italian aggression on Tripoli the Muslims of Calcutta decided to launch a boycott of the Italian goods, at a meeting held on 22 October 1911 on the Federation Hall grounds. Earlier the organisers were denied permission to hold meeting on the Maiden and certain public squares. At the meeting Golem Hosein Ariff, Dr. Suhrawardy and Abul Kalam Azad urged the people to join the boycott.¹ Now Hindus and Muslims were in the same boat, remarked a Calcutta paper, in that they had proclaimed boycott against the west.² But there was slackening in the observance of the boycott of Italian goods, so that the Ulema and the Mashaikha were advised to preach a vigorous boycott among Muslims.³

Indian resentment against European aggression on Turkey during the Balkan Wars was better expressed when they resolved to boycott all European goods. Support to the call

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¹ C.J. Stevenson Moore, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to A. Earle, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 24 October 1911, Pro. No. 298, F.D. Sec.-E. February 1912, Nos. 265-317, NAI.

² Nayak (Calcutta), 24 October 1911, RONNP-Bengal.

³ Al-Bashir (Etawah), 19 March 1912, RONNP-UP.
came from the erstwhile revolutionaries of the Swadeshi and boycott movement in Bengal, like Maulvi Leakat Husain, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Shyam Sunder Chakravarti. The latter presided over a public meeting, where Bipin Chandra Pal advocated the adoption of a systematic boycott.¹ The Imam of the Nakhoda Mosque (Calcutta) gave his support and advocated fraternal relations between Muslims and their compatriots.²

The boycott movement gathered some momentum if not in terms of volume at least ideologically and went a long way to bridge the gulf that existed between the Hindus and Muslims in Bengal. Apart from advocating boycott of European goods, more emphasis was put on the unity of the Indian people.³


2. Ibid.

3. On Friday 8 February 1913 a meeting was held at the College square, Calcutta. It was attended by 5000 Hindus and 300 Muslims (The Englishman gave the number of 1000 only). It was presided by Shyam Sunder Chakravarti and addressed by Maulvi Leakat Husain, Panchkari Banerji, and Imam Maulana Hafeez Muhammad Musa Misri prayed for strength to fulfil the vow of the boycott. Speakers laid emphasis on the unity of the two people. Nayak (Calcutta), 9 February 1913, RCNP-Bengal. The paper took exception to news being not reported in the Sanjivini, Bengalee, and Amrit Bazar Patrika.
From Bengal the movement spread outside. Maulana Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani (1877-1951) editor of the Urdu-i Mualla (Aligarh), inaugurated the movement at Aligarh. He got a fatwa issued by the Ulema of Aligarh supporting the boycott movement, although the names of the Ulema were not published by him. He himself wrote and published poems in support of the boycott. There was some criticism of the fatwa issued by the Aligarh Ulema.

The boycott of European goods was not considered to be a practical proposition by some. Yet set out to organize and propagate the movement in U.P. and the Punjab, and toured a number of towns. Unlike Bengal, and excepting

1. Urdu-i-Mualla (Aligarh), Feb-March 1913, RONNP-UP.
2. Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 28 January 1913, RONNP-UP.
3. Sheikh Muhammed Tahawar Ali Kidwai, Jugsuri in a contributed article in Hindustani (Lucknow), 18 February 1913, Musafir (Agra), 14 February 1913, RONNP-UP.
4. Al-Khalil (Bijnor), undated, February 1913, RONNP-UP; Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 29 January 1913, RONNP-Punjab.
5. He visited in western U.P. Bareilly, Moradabad, Meerut, Deoband, Saharanpur, Haradwar, Lahore, Amritsar and Ludhiana in the Punjab; Urdu-i-Mualla (Aligarh), April 1913, RONNP-UP.
students of the Aligarh College there was not much enthusiasm among people.¹ James Maston, the Lieutenant Governor of U.P. believed that the loyalist Muslims and in particular the Shia community among Muslims was opposed to the movement.² So also was the case in the Punjab where the loyalist and "the leading Muhammadans" opposed it.³ The Observer of Lahore, disapproved of the boycott movement among Muslims, being impracticable and

1. Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 15 February 1913, ROHNP-UP.

2. He based his opinion about the response of Shias from the letter of one Saiyad Khakan Husain, an Honorary Magistrate of Kanpur, dated 5 February 1913. Saiyad Khakan Hussain held a meeting on 4 February at his residence, and got passed certain resolutions to the effect: 1. That the Shias have nothing to do with the Turkish Government with a Sunni Muhammadan ruler; 2. That Shias do not join with Sunni Muhammadans in their attempt for boycotting European goods including English; 3. That Shias have nothing to do with the "All India Moslem League" and the "Majlis Moyadul Islam" of Lucknow, etc., since they are the political and religious bodies of Sunnis only. We know that Syed Wazir Hasan, a Shia, was then Hon. Secretary of the All India Muslim League, while Syed Ameer Ali, another notable Shia was taking a keen interest in Turkey. Saiyad Khakan Husain appears to be a sycophant who wrote this letter to please the officials who openly disapproved of the sympathy and interest of Indian Muslims in the Khilafat and Turkey. See Notes, Home Poll. A. March 1913, Nos. 45-55, NAI.

3. D.O. letter, Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government to Secretary, to Government of India, Home Department, 18 February 1913, Ibid.
injurious to the interests of Muslims and "opposed to the general policy of the community" itself.\(^1\) In spite of this, Muslim press continued to advise Muslims to boycott the European goods, and news about Turkish women's boycott was published.\(^2\) The boycott movement might not have been a success as far as its observance was concerned, but certainly it helped to promote fraternization between Hindus and Muslims. This aroused the annoyance of the pro-Government elements. The advocates of boycott were dubbed to be "extremely silly band of agitators."\(^3\) It was thought that there was "a persistent effort to rekindle the embers of the boycott movement."\(^4\) Hence the Government was advised that it "must break the alliance between Bengali Extremists and Pan-Islamists without delay."\(^5\)

These fears were unfounded because there existed no alliance between the Bengali Extremists and the Pan-Islamists.

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1. 12 February 1913, Encl. Ibid.
2. *Muslim Gazette* (Lucknow), 7 May 1913, RONNP-UP.
3. *Indian Mirror* (Calcutta), 20 February 1913, RONNP-Bengal.
4. Ibid., 19 February 1913.
5. Ibid., 20 February 1913.
The former had come out on their own to support whole heartedly a political movement. They were not in sympathy with any religious movement. Bipin Chandra Pal had made it clear that it was the response of Indian Nationalism to Turkish Nationalism. But among Muslims it was essentially a religious response. This was a limitation which bore on the possible scope of cooperation between Hindus and Muslims.

Yet the potential alienation of Muslim sympathies from the British government could not be lost sight of. The interest taken by the students of the Aligarh College in the boycott movement and agitational politics was considered undesirable. Officials who were "brought up in the creed that Aligarh was a stronghold of loyalism", could not countenance its great fall. The Government of India decided to write to the U.P. and Punjab Governments about the boycott and attempts to inflame Muslims feelings; the movement was not to be allowed to gain strength and so was to be "nipped in the bud."

A general enquiry into the state of Muslim feeling followed. In U.P. the state of Muslim feeling had already

1. Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 4 November 1912, RONNP-Bengal.
2. Notes, by Home Member, R.H.C. Craddock, 1 January 1913, Home Poll. A, March 1913, Nos. 45-55, NAI.
3. Ibid.
4. Notes, by Craddock, 4 February 1913, Ibid.
5. Ibid.
attracted the attention of the Lieutenant Governor, James Meston, and he was quite determined to take steps to suppress the boycott idea if the Government of India were prepared to support him.¹ Perhaps Meston was the first high official in India to get alarmed over the developments in connection with Turkey, and over the growth of a movement with extremists tendencies among young Muslims and that too in the Aligarh College.² Meston paid a visit to the Aligarh College on 4 December 1912. The students of the College had been fasting, and abstaining from taking rich food so long the Balkan War lasted. Meston in reply to the address presented by the Trustees of the College, endeavoured to impress upon them that "if the misfortunes of Persia and the calamities of Turkey have taught us anything, they teach us that a nation cannot live on prestige, on tradition, on memories of past glories." The Observer of Lahore found his speech a severe though not undeserved indictment of the Muslim community.³ On behalf of

1. D.O. Letter, R. Burn, Chief Secretary to the Government of the United Provinces, to H. Wheeler, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 7 February 1913, Ibid.
2. Urdu-i-Mualla (Aligarh), Feb-March 1913, RONNP-UP; See Notes, Home Poll. A. March 1913, Nos. 45-55, NAI.
3. Observer (Lahore), 11 December 1912, RONNP-Punjab; Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 17 December 1912, RONNP-UP. For the text of the address of the Board of Trustees and Meston's reply see in Comrade (Delhi), 14 December 1912.

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the students it was argued that their sympathy with Turkey was religious and not political.1 Not content with his Aligarh visit in a speech at Gorakhpur he again advised Muslims to pay heed to what he had said. Meston admonished Muslims upon their attitude to the Turkish question, because "Neither you nor I, at this distance, and in the comparative seclusion of India, can pretend to understand the delicate and complex problems of international policy, and it is most unjust to assume ... the European nations are therefore hostile to Turkey."2

Howssoever plainly Meston might have spoken and tried to explain the position of the European powers, there was a general impression among Indian Muslims that the European powers had undoubtedly entered into a conspiracy to expel Turkey from Europe,3 Moreover there was also a general disagreement with the views that Meston had expressed.4

1. Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 17 December 1912, RONNP-UP.
2. Musalman (Calcutta), 7 March 1913, RONNP-Bengal.
3. Zamindar (Lahore), 3 March 1913, RONNP-Punjab.
4. Naigar-i-Azam (Moradabad), 5 March 1913, Muslim Gazette (Lucknow, 5 March 1913, Musawat (Allahabad), 6 March 1913, Leader (Allahabad), 7 March 1913, RONNP-UP, Musalman (Calcutta), 7 March 1913, RONNP-Bengal.

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Muslim Gazette of Lucknow argued that in the actual circumstances surrounding Turkey, the Muslims had been in fact more moderate than warranted by the circumstances. Meston was asked to convey Indian Muslims' protest over British policy, especially the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Tripoli, and the lowering of the Turkish flag in Crete by British warships.

Meston then decided to warn the Muslim Gazette of Lucknow that its security would be forfeited. He also decided to come down on the students of the Aligarh College, and the Muslim Swadeshi movement. He silenced the Urdu-i Mualla, edited by Hasrat Mohani and by so doing virtually succeeded in killing the movement in the U.P.

1. Musalman (Calcutta), 7 March 1913, RONNP-Bengal.
2. Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 19 March 1913, RONNP-UP.
3. The editor of the paper was warned through the Commissioner of Lucknow, D.O. letter, R. Burn, Chief Secretary to the Government of the U.P., to H. Wheeler, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 11 February 1913, Home Poll. A. March 1913, Nos. 45-55, NAI.
4. Habiul Matin (Calcutta), 9 September 1913, RONNP-Bengal.
5. Ibid.
Shaukat Ali the elder brother of Muhammad Ali of the Comrade was an adept in conceiving schemes one after the other to involve and keep the interest of Indian Muslims alive in the affairs of Turkey. Through the columns of the Comrade he appealed to Muslims to volunteer to go to Turkey and fight on behalf of the Turks in the Balkan war, offering to go as a volunteer himself. He also addressed a similar letter to the editor of the Zamindar of Lahore. The editor of the Zamindar endorsed Shaukat Ali's proposal. The Muslim Gazette of Lucknow and many other Urdu newspapers also supported the proposal.

1. Comrade (Delhi), 12 October 1912.

2. Zamindar (Lahore), 28 October 1912, RONNP-Punjab. The editor reported that one Maulvi Shakur Ahmad Khan Ansari of Panipat offered himself as a volunteer at his own expense; a similar offer was made by one Mir Farzand Husain of Narowal, Sielkot. Mirza Anwar Beg wrote that one Diwan Bhagwan Das of Hyderabad (Sind), who had embraced Islam and had gone to Tripoli got killed while fighting, a brother of Acharya Kirpalani, the veteran freedom fighter, had embraced Islam and was killed while fighting against the Greeks in the Balkans. (See Acharya Kripalani, in the Dictionary of National Biography, Ed. S.P. Sen, Institute of Historical Studies, Calcutta 1973, p. 363) Diwan Bhagwan Das is the name of his father. Apparently the father's name was given by mistake to the editor of the Zamindar.

3. Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 30 October 1912, Mashrig (Gorakhpur), 29 October 1912, Kaiser-i-Hind (Faizabad), 31 October 1912, Al-Khalil (Bijnor), 1 November 1912, Rohilkhand Gazette (Bareilly), 1 November 1912, RONNP-UP.
The idea of sending volunteers to help the Turks was not new. Earlier there was a suggestion that some Hindu volunteers could go to attend to the wounded. Syed Raza Ali of Moradabad suggested that India should send about 8 to 10,000 Muslim volunteers. He further suggested that in case the Government objected then such willing volunteers should leave India without disclosing their destination.

(Previous Footnote Continued)

Rafiq (Delhi), 30 October 1912, Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 28 October 1912. The paper also reported that one Lieutenant Montagu went Turkey even at the risk of losing his Commission in the Army to fight from the side of Turkey. It advised Indian Muslims to emulate the example of Lt. Montagu and offer themselves as volunteers. 

1. The Secretary of Bharat Dharam Mahamandal (founded in 1902, with head quarter at Benaras), Raja Shashi Shekhar-eshwar Ray of Tahirpur, Bengal, at a meeting in Benaras promised a large sum of money for the relief of Muslim sufferers in the Tripolitan war, and made an offer to send Hindu volunteers to attend to the wounded. In this connection he even addressed a letter to the Government of India (Raja Shashi Shekhareshwar Ray of Tahirpur, Telegram, Benaras, 10 November 1911, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Pro. No. 58, F.D. General-A. December 1911, NAI.) He promised a donation of Rs.5000. (Bharat Dharam Neta (Benaras), 20 November 1911, RONNP-UP. The gesture of Raja of Tahirpur, was appreciated by the Aligarh Institute Gazette, 22 November 1911.

Nevertheless, many pro-British and conservative elements disapproved of the Raja’s proposal. The Rahbar of Moradabad, commented that the famine stricken people of Kathiawar, Gujrat had a superior claim over the sufferers of Tripoli, 14 November 1911. Others reminded him that sending of volunteers would be a violation of Neutrality proclaimed by the British Government. Awaz-i-Khalq (Benaras), 16 November 1911, RONNP-UP. Bharat Mitra (Calcutta), 25 November 1911, RONNP-Bengal.

2. Naivar-i-Azam (Moradabad), 26 October 1912, RONNP-UP.
Shaukat Ali claimed that 54 Muslim volunteers were actually ready.

He now addressed a letter to the Government of United Provinces enquiring whether there would be any objection to Indian Muslims proceeding to Turkey to fight for their co-religionists against the Balkan Confederacy. He made it clear that these volunteers would be on their own expenses and not in the pay of the Turkish Government. He awaited a reply on behalf of himself and a 'fairly large body' of Muslims. He contended that his legal expert held that the declaration of Neutrality by the British Government did not prohibit Muslims or Christians from fighting on either side. And on

1. Shaukat Ali to Chief Secretary to the Government of the United Provinces, 3 November 1912, F.D. General - A, January 1913, Nos. 1-36, NAI.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. The Nawab of Rampur in a telegram informed the Viceroy that numerous volunteers among his subjects were eager to go to fight in the war in Turkey. Nawab Rampur to Viceroy, telegram, 5 November 1912, Hardinge Papers - 83, CUL.

4. In a private letter to R. Burn, Chief Secretary to the Government of U.P. dated 3 November 1912, F.D. Genl. A., January 1913, Nos. 1-36, NAI.
the basis of newspaper reports he understood that Russian volunteers were already fighting against the Turks. ¹

The Government of United Provinces with the concurrence of the Foreign Department of the Government of India however replied that Indian Muslims volunteering for service with Turkey would offend against the proclamation of Neutrality by the British Government. ² Shaukat Ali could have anticipated such a reply but he perhaps wanted merely to have the attitude of the authorities made explicit, which in any case could not prevent Indians from going to Turkey on other pretexts and then join the fighting. ³ He himself had

1. Ibid.

2. The Lt. Governor of U.P. was advised that the said proclamation of Neutrality by the British Government of 21 October 1912 does not apply to the subjects of a Native State. Shaukat Ali was a resident of the Rampur State.

R. Burn to A.H. McMahon, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, 18 November 1912, Ibid.

See also the proposed draft reply of the Government of U.P., Ibid.

3. L.W. Reynolds noted in the Foreign Department that "I should imagine that this reference to the British Government is a mere try on. Anyone who was really keen would have gone to Turkey without applying for permission." See Notes in the Foreign Department, Government of India, Ibid.
stated in his appeal to Muslims that the despatch of volunteers was meant to show as the 'practical proof of our strong sympathy' for Turkey. In actual fact, a few individuals not many Muslim volunteers went to Turkey to fight on its behalf.

Pan-Islamic journalists like Zafar Ali Khan and Muhammad Ali continued propogate several schemes possibly to keep up the enthusiasm of the people and regularly feature news about Turkey before their readers. One such scheme was to set up colonies in Anatolia in the name of the Zamindar and the Comrade for the settlement of the Muhajirs from Macedonia and Thrace, as a living memorial of the Islamic Brotherhood. Funds for establishing these colonies were to be provided by these two newspapers. Muhammad Ali seems to have sent some money for the scheme with a promise to send more in future.

1. Comrade (Delhi), 12 October 1912.

2. The Panjabee of Lahore, disapproved of the scheme of sending volunteers to Turkey. Panjabee (Lahore), 24 October 1912, RONNP-Punjab.

3. Zamindar (Lahore), 28 April 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

4. Muhammad Ali to 'Dear Friend' (possibly Talaat Bey, Minister of the Interior Turkey, 16 July 1914, Muhammad Ali Papers -
The scheme received the sanction of the Porte. A committee was appointed with Dr. Asad Pasha as Head and Dr. M.A. Ansari as secretary while Zafar Ali Khan, Muhammad Ali, Basim Umar Pasha and Talaat Bey were the other members. The Royal Ottoman Bank were its Treasurers.¹ There was not much reporting about the colonies in the newspaper thereafter. The Ifade of Agra considered the scheme was nothing short of 'madness'.²

There was a proposal to establish an Islamic Bank at Constantinople, with branches all over the world.³ Then there was a proposal to establish a University at Medina, which was to fulfill the requirements of Muslims all over the world.⁴

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1. Zamindar (Lahore), 28 April 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

Three Indian Muslims Dr. M.A. Ansari, Ahmad Ansari and Zafar Ali Khan reached Konia on 1 June 1913 from Constantinople to purchase land to settle 300 Muhajirs from Macedonia and Thrace.

Vice Consul Mathews to Lowther, Adana, 7 June 1913, Encl. in No. 1, Pro. No. 210, F.D. Extl. B. November 1913, Nos. 194-266, NAI. Also in Encl. to Pro. No. 44, Home Poll. B. August 1913, Nos. 43-44, NAI.

2. March 1914 (undated), RONNP-UP.

3. Zamindar (Lahore), 10 June 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

4. Sheikh Shawish the Egyptian nationalist and editor of the Arabic paper Alam of Cairo, requested the editor...
The Balkan wars revealed Turkish unpreparedness and incapability to safeguard and defend the Holy places of Islam. The Italian advance during the war in the Red Sea brought home to Indian Muslims interested in the Khilafat the much dreaded possibility of non-Muslim control of the sacred places in Arabia.¹

VI

Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba

Realizing the deplorable condition of the Turkish Empire, Syed Ameer Ali wrote to Muhammad Ali that Muslims in India and elsewhere should employ their energies, when the wars are over in prosecuting two projects. The first was to collect funds for a mosque to be built in London as "a living and visible symbol of the solidarity of Islam".²

(Previous Footnote Continued)

of the Comrade of Delhi, Muhammad Ali to draft the scheme in collaboration with Maulana Shibli Nomani, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, and Professor Hamid-ud-din Khan of Muir Central College, Allahabad. Zamindar (Lahore), 16 May 1913, Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 16 May 1913, Observer (Lahore), 17 May 1913, ROKNP-Punjab.

1. Mushir Husain Kidwai holds that the Italian aggression on Tripoli created grave doubts in Muslim mind and "we should remember that every European Power is an Italy in Empryo and would not hesitate to do with Arabia as Italy did with Tripoli ---". Mushir Husain Kidwai, Pan-Islamism and Bolshevism (London, 1937), p. 155.

The second project suggested by Syed Ameer Ali was to "assist their custodian of their Holy Places in organising their proper defence". For this project too funds were to be collected, and he desired that Muhammad Ali should employ all the force of his advocacy.¹

Ultimately the general uneasiness manifested among Muslims on this question led to the formation of a society called the Anjuman-1 Khu1adam-1 Kaaba in May 1913. Mushir Husain Kidwai claims that the idea of forming such a society came to him and he induced a few other Indian Muslims to form an association to safeguard the Kaaba, and help its custodians the Turks in protecting it from the Europeans.²

It appears that Kidwai first discussed the scheme with Maulana Abdul Bari of Pirangi Mahal, Lucknow in January 1913. They planned to collect one crore rupees in a year and utilize it for acquiring dreadnoughts, and aeroplanes and an Army and Navy for protecting the Holy Places of Islam in Arabia.³ He also sent an outline of his scheme to Abul Kalam Azad, editor, Al-Hilal, Calcutta, who took no notice of it at

1. Ibid.
3. R. Burn, Chief Secretary to Government of U.P. to H. Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 10 June 1913, Home Pol1. D, July 1913, No. 7. NAI.

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that time. Nonetheless the scheme was made public by Shaukat Ali on 31 March 1913 in a speech at Amritsar. He called upon all Muslims to combine in a society to be named the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba with the aim of protecting the Holy Places from non-Muslim aggression. It might be that Shaukat Ali was inspired by the suggestion of Syed Ameer Ali given to his younger brother Muhammad Ali.

Kidwai got his scheme published in Azad's Al-Hilal, (Calcutta) on 23 April 1913. On 6 May 1913 Ali Brothers went Lucknow and discussed the details of the scheme in a meeting held at the house of Maulana Abdul Bari. A committee was appointed with Maulana Abdul Bari as Khadim-ul Khuddam (servant of the servants), Shaikh Mushir Husain Kidwai and Shaukat Ali as two Secretaries, and Hakim Abdul Ali, Lucknow.


2. Ahl-i Hadis (Amritsar), 11 April 1913, RONNP-Punjab; also see R. Burn, 10 June 1913, Home Poll. D, July 1913, No. 7, NAI.

Dr. Nazir-ud-Din Hassan, Barrister, Lucknow and Muhammad Ali, Editor, The Comrade, Delhi as Mautmidin Khadim-ul-Khuddam (assistants of the servant of the servants). At this meeting provisional rules were framed declaring that its chief aim was to maintain the honour and safety of the Kaaba and defend against the non-Muslim aggression.¹

The final constitution was adopted early in 1914, where its objects were broadened. The Central Organization was proposed to be located at Delhi. Under the rule of Society, Rupee one was to be collected each year from every Muslim, rich and poor.² This amount was to be divided in three parts: one share was allotted to that independent Muslim Power which controlled the Holy Places; the second was to go to different orphanages, schools and missionary Societies; and the remainder was to be kept reserved for use at times of need in the defence of the Kaaba.³ The fund was also used for promoting the Haj and other religious duties.

¹. The Rules and Regulations of the Anjuman were published in the Muslim Gazette (Lucknow, 21 May 1913, RONNP-UP; also in Comrade (Delhi), 31 May and 7 June 1913.

². Mushir Husain Kidwai, op.cit., p. 155.

³. R. Burn, Chief Secretary to Government of U.P. to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 17 September 1913, Home Poll. A, October 1913, Pro. No. 118, NAI.
Evidently the object of the Society was to give substantial help annually besides arousing the spirit of Pan-Islamism all over the world in favour of the Khalifa.\(^1\) Essentially the Society was a religious organisation. The Comrade wrote:

> that the protection of Holy Places of Islam is a religious duty which is as much yours as that of the Turks, --- you know well enough that the Turk who has for centuries stood as your sentinel at the gate of the Kaaba is weaker today than he has ever been since he planted the Crescent over St. Sophia, and you know that he has to guard his own hearth and much if not most of his vigilance is now needed nearer home.\(^2\)

Keeping this view in mind a proper organisation of the society was set up complete in administrative hierarchy from circle, district and provincial units to an all-India organisation.\(^3\) The Society had two types of membership. Those who paid their subscriptions and swore allegiance to the objects of the Society were called the Khadim-i Kaaba

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2. Comrade (Delhi), 7 June 1913.

(servants of the Kaaba), while those who took the oath and undertook to devote their lives in the service of the Kaaba were enrolled in the Society as Shaidan-i Kaaba (votaries of the Kaaba). In the case of the latter the Society was responsible to support their families from its funds. Evidently the promoters of the Society contemplated action and would not remain content merely with proselytisation or educational work.

Efforts were made to make the Society representative of all Muslims. Nevertheless it was primarily a combination of the 'Young Party' and the Ulema of the Firangi Mahal and others organisation. The patron was Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal.

But all the Ulema could not be persuaded to join the Society. The Ulema of Deoband were against the Society. Maulana

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1. 'Complete Rules', Clauses 6-10. Ibid; Shaidan-i Kaaba undertook to wear a green uniform adorned with a yellow crescent badge.

2. The Members of the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba Central Committee were: Maulana Abdul Bari, Firangi Mahal, Lucknow; Hakim Abdul Wali, Lucknow; Muhammad Ali, Delhi; Maulvi Ghulam Mohiuddin Kasur; Maulvi Ghulam Muhammad, HoshiARPUR; Nawab Viquer-ul Mulk, Amroha; Dr. Naziruddin Hasan, Lucknow; Maulana Maulvi Shah Ahmad ‘Asruf’, Kasrocha, Maulana Maulvi Abdul Majid Qadri, Badaun; Maulana Mian Khweja Ahmad, Rampur; Dr. M.A. Ansari, Delhi; Nawab Bashiruddin Ahmad, Hyderabad Deccan; Qazi Wahiduddin, Barabanki; Mushir Husain Kidwai, Lucknow; Shaukat Ali, Rampur, Clause 31, Ibid.
Abdul Bari accompanied with Shaukat Ali visited Bareilly, Badaun, Delhi, Ajmer and Deoband to convince them. Mushir Husain Kidwai visited Kashmir in order to organize a branch of the Society there.¹

Yet we do not find the names of Maulana Shibli Nomani and Abul Kalam Azad in the Society. The formation of the Society evoked mixed reaction among Indian Muslims. Some acclaimed it,² while others took exception to its formation. Some saw in it an agency to spread only jehad.³ The Comrade was accused of taking advantage of religious fervour for personal ends through the Society.⁴

The Oudh Akhbar, Lucknow, raised doubts as to how Indian Muslims would defend the Holy Places of Islam.⁵ The Naiyar-i Azam, Moradabad, though appreciated the idea, but

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1. Several branches of the Society were established in different parts of India. For example, at Hyderabad (Deccan), Lucknow, Sukkur, Khast (Baluchistan), Ajmer, Jamnagar, Amritsar, Naini Tal, Soheranpur, Benaras, Sandila, Bareilly, and Aligarh etc. Home Poll, A, May 1914, No. 46, NAI; Hamdard (Delhi), 30 May 1913, RONNP-Punjab.

2. Zulqarnain (Budaun), 7 May 1913; Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 13 May 1913; Muslim Gazette (Lucknow), 21 May 1913; Medina (Bijnor), 22 May 1913; Kaiser-i Hind (Faizabad), 12 June 1913; Urdu-i Mualla (Aligarh), May & June 1913, RONNP-UP.

3. Ittehad (Moradabad), 14 May and 1 June 1913, RONNP-UP.

4. Musafir (Agra), 6 June 1913, RONNP-UP.

5. 18 June 1913; also by Zia-ul Islam (Moradabad), undated May 1913, RONNP-UP.
doubted the utility of the Society. Condemning all this, it appears, Shaukat Ali then published an article in the Muslim Gazette, Lucknow, and explained the aims and objects of the Society as to protect the Holy Places of Islam and educate Arabs. This religious organisation will have no connection with administrative or political questions. He received enquiries regarding it from Egypt, Morocco, Turkey and other countries. He supplied them the required information on the understanding that the membership of the Society was open to Indian Muslims only.

1. 26 May and 19 June 1913, RONNP-UP.

2. He also notified changes in the rules of the Society. Most significant change was the abolition of the oath of membership, and the substitution of a vow or promise in which the words "all possible help" replaced the words "life and property", 9 July 1913, RONNP-UP.


4. The Anjuman proposed to publish a paper in Arabic. For this they obtained the services of one Hafiz Wahabi who was Chief Editor of Al Mag Yallu, a paper published in Constantinople. Wahabi was in India at the close of 1913. He was appointed editor of the Arabic journal, proposed to be started by the Anjuman. His appointment was announced by his letter addressed to the Manager of Al-Shaab, Cairo on 22 January 1914. Home Poll. A, May 1914, Appendix E, No. 46, NAI. It appears that the Anjuman published its journal, and its first issue contained an article by Maulana Abdul Bari on the objects of the Society and announced that the Anjuman

(Footnote Continued)
approved the scheme and gave no encouragement to it. Mushir Husain Kidwai writes that some Turks suspected that the scheme was part of the Pan-Arab movement. Evidently they had reason to do so. Kidwai believed that the Turks were 'unimaginative' as it would have relieved them of a great burden and raised their power and prestige. He made arrangements to go to Turkey along with Allama Shawish and an Indian theologian, possibly Maulana Abdul Bari, to remove the misunderstandings. To his regret, — 'Alas! Fate was against them', the Turks allied themselves with Germany, and met with disaster before Pan-Islamism could be organised. 1

The announcements on behalf of the Anjuman were bold and impressive, but not matched by its activities. The whole movement was centred round the mosque. We have little information as regards any active preaching done by it. Women were also associated with its activities.

(Previous Footnote Continued)

proposed to send a deputation to Arabia to preach the importance of unity and the evils of dissension to the Arabs and impress upon the Turks the duty of protecting the sacred places of Islam. W.Rt. of DCI, 7 July 1914, Home Poll. B. August 1914, Pro. 259, Nos. 259-62, NAI.

The promoters of the Anjuman failed to obtain official recognition.¹ The Government was suspicious and was not ready to accept the Anjuman at its face value.² They carefully watched its growth particularly in the Punjab and United Provinces. More so, because it was an organisation in which young men were associated, therefore "always potentially dangerous" in India.³ Its members were considered "more dangerous than all the Bengalis and Mahrattas put together".⁴ Maulana Abdul Bari's association with it was thought to be a great accession to it.⁵ We have known how Maulana Abdul Bari desperately tried to obtain Government recognition. Syed Ali Imam, the Law Member of the Governor General's Council, in his lengthy note dwelt upon the reasons why this Society was founded and on what ideals it was based upon - "This Society is based upon one

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2. Muhammad Ali wrote: "The Society is prepared for every suspicion, --- if Government so wills it, it may suspect the movement --- let it not be suspected that it is our own Government that has designs which this Society is created to frustrate". The Comrade, 7 June 1913.


4. Note by S. Habibullah, 17 February 1913, Meston Papers-6, IOL.

5. Note by Butler, 24 March 1914, Home Poll. A, May 1914, No. 46, NAI.
of the deepest sentiments of Islam.\(^1\) He, however, did not see any possibility of the movement dying out, nor found it possible to check its growth without departing from 'traditional policy' of non-interference with religious motives of Indians. At the same time he thought it would be "unwise to ignore the dangerous potentialities" and "militant spirit of its Khuddams".\(^2\)

So in his view an attitude of indifference was inadvisable. Therefore, he contended that since the movement was young and in its inception, at this stage it was possible to direct it. He expressed his confidence in Maulana Abdul Bari, and held that through him we could introduce such safeguards in the constitution of the Society to protect it from turning into a secret Society hostile to British rule. Where Maulana Abdul Bari had failed, Syed Ali Imam exerted his influence in providing recognition to the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba: "The personal equation counts for a great deal in such matters --- I do not feel hopeless of giving the right direction to the movement by securing the good offices of the Maulvi".\(^3\) But the ideas of influencing the Society by squaring its

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President was strongly opposed by other members: "would certainly not give the Society any recognition or advertisement". Syed Ali Imam failed in his efforts. Strangely a moderate like him pleaded for an organisation about which he himself was doubtful, yet he opted for exercising his influence.

The Government of India made enquiries to know the extent and support enjoyed by the Anjuman-i Khuddem-i Kaaba, especially in the Punjab which was becoming an important centre of Muslim politics. The report of the Punjab Government was based on the views obtained from Muslim elites of Lahore. It found that the Anjuman was politically dangerous. Because of the association of Shaukat Ali and Muhammad Ali, and the Zamindar, an indication of the tendencies it was likely to develop, it was found an aggressive and not pacific organisation.

1. Note by M.S. Meyer, 27 March 1914, Ibid. Craddock argued that Maulana Abdul Bari might be led astray by young or he might even sever his connection with the movement. No amount of encouragement or guidance from him will affect those who wanted a religious object, a respectable figure head and then use such an organisation for any and every object. Note, 28 March 1914, Ibid.

2. Writing about the politics of Muslim moderates, Lajpat Rai remarked: "They use their extreme Party as a trump card in their negotiations with the government more effectively than the Hindus do or have ever done." Lajpat Rai, Young India (1916), pp. 237-38.
It was found that it had following among urban people having 'neo-Muslim' and Pan-Islamic leanings, but had little influence in the Muslim community in general. Almost all its members were also members of local branches of the 'Turkish Committee of Union Progress', therefore, suspected it might ally itself with the Pan-Islamic movement outside India. Above all the leaders of the movement primarily aim at their own private interests first and politics and religion next. Basically the government circles appear perturbed over the issue of its leadership, whose aims and objects were yet obscure to them. The Ali brothers were believed to be proteges of Aga Khan and the Raja of Mahmudabad. The latter was seen endeavouring to become leader of the 'educated Muhammadan community' and was using them and the Comrade for his ends.

1. Mostly among the clerks in offices, and some pleaders, barristers and a few Maulvis. A.B. Kettlewell, Officiating Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 15 April 1914, Home Poll, A, May 1914, No. 46, NAI.

2. This was also the view of C.R. Cleveland, the Director of Criminal Intelligence (20 March 1914) which he wrote in his introduction to the note of Isemonger, Assistant Director, on the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba, Ibid.

3. A.B. Kettlewell to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 15 April 1914, Home Poll, A, May 1914, No. 46, NAI.