Chapter I

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Ottoman Turkey and India apparently resembled each other in being large assemblages of diverse peoples. They were inhabited by people of different creeds, speaking different languages and differing in their historical experiences. Unlike India, the Turkish empire was an independent power, yet it appeared to Indians to share in common adversity in that it was struggling to preserve and defend its integrity against constant Western encroachments and pressure. Almost all major European powers had political, commercial, strategic and religio-cultural interests in the Turkish empire. Often its internal problems became international issues, and its gradual dismemberment proceeded apace until the finale seemed to come with its defeat in the Great War of 1914-18.

Turkish developments in the first two decades of the present century therefore attracted the closest attention of Indians. These developments influenced Indian opinion, in particular Muslim opinion; and this in turn could not but have its impact on the policies of the British Government of India and the Home Government. In this chapter we propose to discuss the Indian setting, the historical background of interest in Turkish affairs of the Muslims in India and the British response to the developments.
British India's involvement in Turkey began in the 1830s, when Britain actively intervened to safeguard her routes to India.\textsuperscript{1} Since then her attitude towards Turkey came to be influenced considerably by her imperial interests in India.

The Sultan of Turkey was the Khalifa of the Sunni Muslims and the protector of the Holy places of Islam.\textsuperscript{2} Great Britain made use of his position on several occasions to influence opinion among Indian Muslims.\textsuperscript{3} This encouragement to pro-Khalifa and pro-Turkey feelings in course of time helped the growth of pan-Islamic ideas among certain sections of Indian Muslims. Partly the interest of Indian Muslims was aroused because of the peculiar circumstances created by the deposition of the Mughal Emperor in 1857; the name of the Turkish Sultan—

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\textsuperscript{3} Cf. Shukla, op.cit., pp. 121-2.
Khalifa could now be more naturally recited in the sermons after Congregational Prayers.  

It was during the Crimean war (1854-56) that the position of the Turkish Khalifa was magnified in the eyes of Indian Muslims. Apparently the British motive was to ensure Muslim allegiance to their rule in India and build and Anglo-Islamic bloc against Russia in Asia. It was gratifying for Indian Muslims to see Great Britain ranged on the side of Turkey. The Government of India for fear of internal trouble did not take any part in the military enterprise. In the North-West Frontier province and at some other places inflammatory pamphlets were circulated. Great Britain's victory over Russia impressed upon Indian Muslims the invincibility of the British empire.

Again in 1857 the British obtained Sultan-Khalifa's condemnation of the atrocities committed by the Mutineers and advising them to remain loyal to the British. When the Sultan visited England in July 1867, he was honoured by the India Office

1. Cf. Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (Oxford University Press, Delhi 1982), p. Peter Hardy is of the view that Sultan Abdul Hamid II was the first Ottoman Sultan in whose name the Khatba was read, see his The Muslims of British India (CUP, 1972), p. 120.

2. Shukla, op.cit., 152.


and entire expenses were drawn from the Indian revenue. The action was justified by the British Government on the ground that it would help to propitiate Indian Muslims.¹

The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 proved disastrous for Turkey. On this occasion Indian sympathy and support for Turkey was much more pronounced and definite. It was generally feared that Constantinople might fall into the hands of Russia; therefore, they appealed to Great Britain to support Turkey. Both the Hindus and Muslims were united in expressing their sympathy for Turkey, much to the surprise of Anglo-Indian observers. It was maintained by the non-sectarian or "Hindu" newspapers that their sympathies for Turkey were because of its being an Asian power.²

Memorials were sent to the Queen and the Secretary of State for India, imploring British help to Turkey against Russia. At various places meetings were organised to express their strong resentment over the lack of British sympathy and aid for Turkey. Among Indian Muslims anjumans or associations were formed to raise subscriptions for the Turkish Relief Fund.

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2. See for example, Hindoo Patriot (Calcutta), 23 August 1877, and Native Opinion (Bombay), 9 December 1877; also editorial note in Indian Daily News (Calcutta), 31 August 1877, cited in, S.A. Mehrotra, The Emergence of the Indian National Congress (Vikas, New Delhi, 1971), p. 122n.
Collections were made in cities such as Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras, Hyderabad, Baroda, Lahore, Amritsar, Aligarh, Muzaffarpur and Lucknow. Even Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the founder of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, held a meeting at his house in Aligarh and collected Rs. 6,807 for the Turkish Relief Fund.

Indian Muslim sympathy for Turkey was a new but perhaps natural phenomenon. It undoubtedly had religious overtones in that Russian action against Turkey was commonly denounced in the mosques. The interest aroused was so intense among Muslims that several of the vernacular newspapers in a number of cities brought out their daily editions in order to give the latest news about the events of the Russo-Turkish war. Gladstone's anti-Turkish speech was vehemently criticized. Some Muslim volunteers from India went to Turkey to fight along with the Turkish Army.

1. Banaras Akhbar reported that by 14 December 1876 the amount collected at Calcutta was Rs. 10,000, Bombay Rs. 30,000, Madras Rs. 8,000, Lahore Rs. 32,000, and Hyderabad Rs. 50,000. RGNPP-NMPP.

2. For Syed Ahmad Khan see Appendix A.

3. Aligarh Institute Gazette, 23 March 1877.

4. Ibid., 25 May 1877.

5. Lytton to Beaconsfield, 3 October 1876, Lytton Papers, cited in Shukla, op.cit., p. 97.

6. Notes, Foreign Department (hereafter F.D.), Secret, E, May 1907, Nos. 764-796, NAI.
Indian Muslim feelings ran high particularly in the North West Frontier Provinces, while in Bengal non-Muslims shared their resentment. In Calcutta, Nawab Abdul Latif (1828-1893) a notable citizen and Secretary to Muhammadan Literary Society, explained to his co-religionists the nature of the Eastern Question and its relationship with Islam and the Khalifa. The Turkish authorities recognised him as the representative of Islam in India, and bestowed on him the "Insignia of the Imperial Order of the Medjidi". It appears to have been the first instance in British India when a leading public man was honoured by the Sultan-Khalifa. The British authorities in India also appreciated the Nawab's role in this situation. Recalling them the Statesman, Calcutta wrote:

There is no doubt that this movement was judicious and acted as a safety valve for the ebulition of those sympathies which agitated the minds of the Indian Mussalman.

Syed Ameer Ali (1849-1928), the lawyer, judge and later a leader of the Muslim League, recalled that his interest in 'Old' Turkey dated from 1877, after he had read the Arabic journal the Darul- Khilafat published from

2. 27 March 1885, quoted in, Ibid.
3. For Syed Ameer Ali see Appendix A.
Compared with Nawab Abdul Latif his interest in the Turkish affairs was deeper; and he was aware too of the struggle between the forces of constitutionalism and absolutism, that was going on in Turkey in the form of the struggle between Midhat Pasha and Sultan Abdul Hamid II. In the neutrality that Britain assumed during the Russo-Turkish war Indian Muslims noticed a change in British foreign policy. However, the Aligarh Institute Gazette, nevertheless appreciated the policy and characterized it as an act of "foresight and wisdom." There existed a difference of opinion between the Government of India and the home government on the entire matter. Salisbury (1830-1903), then Secretary of State for India had begun to doubt the longevity of the "Sick Man" of Europe. Lytton, the Viceroy felt the British were living on a live volcano, and feared that if Indian Muslims suspected of British hand their loyalty would speedily dissolve. Soon after

2. Ibid., For Abdul Hamid II see Appendix A.
3. Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 18 May 1877, RONNP-NWP.
4. 11 May 1877, RONNP-NWP.
the Russian declaration of war on Turkey, Lytton wrote to Salisbury:

So far as I can judge the feeling of our Mahomedan subjects at the present moment is eminently satisfactory, more loyal than it has been at any former periods perhaps. But all the Government officers whose special business it is to study and watch Mahomedan feeling in India are strongly of opinion that, were we suspected by our Mahomedan subjects of active connivance with Russia in the spoliation of Turkey, and yet more, did they see us openly sharing the plunder, we should probably be at once confronted by an internal embarrassment sufficiently serious to paralyse all external action on our part. we should not only to have to reckon on a real jehad all around our frontier, but in every Anglo-Indian home there would be a traitor, a foe and possibly an assassin. Such a danger might possibly be more difficult to deal with than the mutiny which cost us such an effort to suppress.1

Lytton, therefore advised the home government to change its vacillating policy on the Turkish question. He

argued;

It is my strong impression that, at the present moment, the lives of all your officers and European subjects in India mainly depend on the course of Your Eastern policy and its freedom from all appearance of subserviency to Russia.¹

Lytton thus injected, the 'Indian Muslim' factor in the British foreign policy, and in the running of the British empire in India by asserting that "There is no getting over the fact that the British empire is a Mahomedan power, and that it entirely depends upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government, whether the sentiment of our Mahomedan subjects is to be an immense security or an immense danger to us."² Salisbury rejecting this suggestion remarked rather arrogantly: "It is somewhat startling to have our foreign policy in Europe prescribed to us by the people whom we conquered in the East."³

This view was shared in the India by Louis Mallet, Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office, "It seems to me a policy turned upside down. How can it be supposed that our hold on India depends on the love of our Mahomedan subjects? or that they will regard us for years to come with anything but in-

¹. Quoted in Ibid., p. 119.

². Ibid.

extinguishable aversion. And yet to conciliate these irreconcilable enemies, you are prepared to exasperate a great nation eminently needing your friendship and guidance. Yet, 'Indian Muslim' became a factor in British imperial considerations.

The Government of India was concerned enough to institute a secret and informal inquiry in May 1877; to assess and ascertain the extent of Indian Muslim's involvement in the support for Turkey. Confidential reports were invited from the local authorities and they were directed to keep a watch on Muslim feelings and their contacts with the Muslims outside India. The reports revealed the extent of Indian Muslim's involvement on the Turkish question. In Bengal the local authorities approached both Nawab Abdul Latif and Syed Ameer Ali for information and kept a watch over the important mosques and some Arab merchants of Calcutta. The Government of India assured themselves, however, that the Indian Muslims' feelings were more anti-Russian than anti-British. Lytton, nevertheless, found the language of the native press 'vicious' and made use of these reports to restrict the freedom of the vernacular press.

2. Cf. Peter Hardy, op.cit., p. 119.
4. Ibid.
Hereafter, Indian Muslim's got increasingly involved in the developments in Turkey. They sympathised with and actively supported Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Compared with the Crimean war they were well informed during the Russo-Turkish war, and this helped to evoke greater popular response. It was subsequently discovered by the Government of India that origins of the pan-Islamic movement in India lay in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78.  

After the war Sultan Abdul Hamid II was fascinated by the political side of pan-Islamism. He sought to enhance his position as Khalifa among all Muslims whether living in the British, French or Russian empires. With this end in view he began to send emissaries, agents, and pamphlets in those territories. In spite of this no significant progress could be made in the direction of winning active local Muslim participation in the effort.

Moreover, the claims of Sultan Abdul Hamid II to be the Khalifa of Indian Muslims was contested by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. He wrote articles in the Aligarh Institute Gazette and asked how Sultan of Turkey could be the Khalifa of Indian Muslims and remarked that political rights are more important.

2. Ibid.
than religious traditions. It is pertinent to recall that during the Russo-Turkish war he had himself collected funds for Turkey. But henceforth he repeated the same arguments against the Ottoman claims to Khilafat whenever he found Indian Muslims getting involved in the Turkish question and threatening to drift away from the British side.

In 1902 the declaration of a British protectorate in Egypt offended all Indians. The vernacular press saw in it a fresh sign of the expansion of British Empire and a deliberate attempt at the spoliation of the Turkish empire and lower the power and prestige of the Khalifa. Germany on this occasion expressed full support to Turkey. Apart from the Egypt British interests began to collide with Turkey on the question of Armenian Christians and Turco-Greek relations.

The Armenian question interested all sections of the Indian press between 1894 and 1896. They generally resented the use of strong language by Gladstone and Salisbury against the Sultan, and questioned British interest in Armenia, seeing in it an effort to coerce Turkey into providing bases for Britain's

1. Aligarh Institute Gazette, 10 and 31 July 1890.

Mediterranean fleet.\(^1\) Protest meetings were held at Lahore, Delhi, Bombay and even in London.\(^2\) Great Britain had been insisting upon the appointment of Christian governors for Armenia. The suggestion was not only criticized, but Britain was advised to do likewise in India and appoint Hindu and Muslim governors in place of Englishmen. Turkey was at the same time advised to imitate British principles of administration as practiced in India and South Africa, and so appoint only Muslims to high offices in the Turkish empire.\(^3\)

Gladstone was called an enemy of the Turks as well as Islam.\(^4\) As a consequence an anti-Christian attitude emerged and the Turkish empire became synonymous with Islam; for Muslims to sympathise with Turkey meant to defend the faith itself.\(^5\) Great Britain was warned by a Punjab newspaper not to provoke the Khalifa into declaring jehad against them.\(^6\) Even more ominously, wrongs against Turkey reminded Muslims of other wrongs, still closer at home:

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1. Faisa Akhbar (Lahore), 20 July 1895, RONNP, Punjab.
2. Ibid., 6 July 1895.
3. Pratap (Kanpur), 15 February 1897, RONNP - NWP.
4. Chaudwin Sadi (Rawalpindi), 2 November 1895, RONNP - Punjab.
5. Kohinoor (Lahore), 23 April 1895, RONNP - Punjab.
6. Akhbar-i-Am (Lahore), 17 August 1895, RONNP - Punjab.
England has taken from the
Mussalman Delhi, Agra, Egypt,
Jedda and Cyprus. Even now she
is in the act of occupying Gilgit
and Chitral. But strange to say
not satisfied with acquiring al-
most all the territories of the
Muslims, she is now about to wound
the Mussalmans in their heart of
heart.¹

The Turco-Greek war broke out in 1897 Greece helped
the insurrectionaries in Crete against Turkey with a view to
annexing it. But in spite of British sympathies for Greece the
Turks emerged victorious. This success thrilled Indian
Muslims.² Meetings were organized throughout India to congre-
tulate the Khalifa and congratulatory telegrams were sent to
him. The Aligarh Institute Gazette as usual discounted political
undertones in the joy of Indian Muslims; and dismissed it as an
act of levity on their part.³ On the other hand, Maulvi Hidayat
Husul used derogatory language about the British queen at a
meeting in Lucknow:

Our King, i.e. the Sultan of Turkey
gained a victory over the Greeks ---
Had the old woman, i.e. Her Majesty
the Queen interfered, her bones and
ribs would have been broken.⁴

¹. Mihar-o-Suchakar (Calcutta), 17 August 1895, RONNP-Bengal.
². Azad (Lucknow), 28 May 1897, RONNP-NWP.
³. Aligarh Institute Gazette, 17 July 1897.
⁴. Cudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 29 July 1897, RONNP-UP.
He was arrested and convicted for seditious language intended to insult the British Queen. ¹ Macdonell wrote to Elgin, the Viceroy:

There can be no doubt that there is great sympathy with Turkey and that the prevalent feeling partakes of the nature of an Islamic revival. This I believe to be partly due to incitement from outside India and partly spontaneous and I think it has been going on for sometime and I think it has been fostered in Mahomedan schools.²

He was convinced that pro-Turkish feelings had firm roots. Macdonell remarked: "Let theorists say what they will it seems to me to be certain that Sunni Mahomedans in India do owe a double allegiance; they do practically speaking regard the Sultan of Turkey as the Head of Islam. (I have an I write a leaflet before me in which he is called not only amir-ul-Muminin (chief of the faithful) but also Padishah-i-Musulman (King of Muslims))" He observed that Indian Muslims are more or less

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2. Ibid., 22 August 1897.

3. Ibid., Camp. 16 July 1897.
subject to foreign influence.\(^1\) Wearing of Turkish fez had become popular, even Syed Ahmad Khan use to wear it. Macdonell found this as "perhaps a straw indicating how the wind is beginning to blow."\(^2\) He was particularly annoyed over the failure of our Mahomedan officials—tehsildars and Police officers—to give us any useful or tangible information as to what is going on beneath the surface. I cannot believe that they did not know. In fact some cases have come to my knowledge which raise suspicion, that our officers have themselves shared in secret meetings and otherwise fomented the agitation."\(^3\)

Therefore, he took certain steps to insure against such lapses in future, impressing upon the officials that their duty is to Government and keep it fully informed "of all that it ought to know regarding feeling and movements among the people."\(^4\)

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., Agra, 22 August 1997.
3. Ibid.
4. Macdonell wrote to Elgin that "whether it has been by accident or design of my predecessors I do not stop to imagine, but the fact is that in the subordinate executive and Police service in these provinces Mahomedans preponderate, out of 240 Tehsildars 140 are Mahomedans. There are 2570 Mahomedan Police officers to 2120 Hindus. I have for the last 18 months been endeavouring to correct this preponderance and to establish a proportion of 5 Hindus to 3 Mahomedans (on the general proportion the Hindus are to the Mahomedans as 7 to 1)." Ibid.
made even the government pensioners responsible for similar reasons.

Apparently the tone and spirit of criticism was largely anti-Christian, but underneath lay an increasing anti-British feeling among Indians Muslims. Future British attitude towards Turkey became the criterion for future loyalty to Britain: "But England however strong, can never be permanent in her Indian empire without the friendship of Turkey."¹

Although the Indian Muslims were aware that the Turkish Khalifa was not their Pope, yet they increasingly emphasized their religious attachment to him.² Obviously, they could not directly help Turkey from India except through subscriptions for the Turkish Relief Fund. Nevertheless, this too, after the abject attitudes after the Mutiny, was a novel political experience. The Aga Khan described Muslim sentiments in these words:

--- the average Indian Muslim looked upon himself as a member of a universal religious brotherhood, sojourning in a land in which a neutral government with a neutral outlook, kept law and order and justice --- while his

1. *Naiyaz-i-Azam* (Moradabad), 5 February, RONNP-NWP. An Arabic paper argued that "the British Supremacy from Cairo to Delhi rests on the ties of friendship which attach England to Mussulmanes" *El-Alem-el-Ilaem*, No.14, 9 June 1905, cited in N.O'Conor to Landedowns, 1 August 1905, Encl. to Pro. No. 68, F.D. Sec. E. January 1906, NAI.

allegiance was to Queen Victoria his political self-respect was satisfied by the existence of the Sultan of Constantinople and Fez, and of the Shah and Khedive at Tehran and Cairo. The fact that the British Government was the mainstay and support in the diplomatic arena of the independent Mahomedan states was naturally a source of continued gratification to him.¹

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was greatly alarmed at this kind of conditional loyalty to Britain. He found his cause of collaboration threatened by two rival forces, the Indian National Congress and the pan-Islamism and Khilafat. Sir Syed, therefore, came forward to repudiate the validity of the Khilafat and the futility of pan-Islamism. Whether he was prompted by the Government to do so is not clear. It seems he also feared the emergence of orthodox ulama leadership as a consequence of pro-Khalifa and pan-Islamic sympathies. He wrote a number of articles in the Aligarh Institute Gazette and the Chaudwin Sadi, in which he developed his arguments against the Turkish Khilafat.² He also stressed that the war between Turkey and Europe was political and not religious.³

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² Aligarh Institute Gazette, 5 June and 17 July 1897, and Chaudwin Sadi (Rawalpindi), 23 May 1897, ROHNP - Punjab.
³ Aligarh Institute Gazette, 11 September 1897.
As for the Indian Muslim's role in the matter, he questioned, how Sultan Abdul Hamid II could be their 'Khalifa', whom he did not govern and upon whose allegiance he had no claims. The views of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan evoked sharp criticism. The editor of the Azad of Lucknow, Sajjad Musain parted company with him, leaving his Patriotic Association. The history of the Khilafat was also traced in order to reject the objections of Sir Syed to the validity and claims of the Turkish Khalifa.

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2. Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 19 and 31 July 1897, RONNP-Punjab.

3. Zamanah (Kanpur), 15 July 1897, RONNP - NWP. In the recorded history of India, it was Sultan Iltutmish (1210-1230 A.D.) who first received an investiture from the Abbasi Khalifa in 1229 A.D. After him Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq received it from the Egyptian Khalifa in 1343 A.D. Sultan Feroz Tughlaq received robes and diploma from the Egyptian Khalifa. The Sultans of Delhi considered the recognition by the Khalifa, as a source of honour and prestige. (See Arnold, op.cit., pp. 103-5. Asiz Ahmed, op.cit., pp. 3-11). The Khutba was read and coins were struck bearing the name of the Khalifa right up to the reign of Humayun (1530-1556 A.D.), but Akbar (1556-1605 A.D.) made a departure in the practice. He styled himself as Imam. Muslim religious groups criticised Akbar. Tipu Sultan (1782-99) of Mysore sent an embassy to the Turkish Khalifa in 1785-90, and was recognized as an independent King. (Khwaja Abdul Qadir, Wagai-Manazil-i Rum, p. 62).
Alarmed by the pro-Turkish sympathies of Indian Muslims the Anglo-Indian press raised doubts as to their loyalty. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan protested that such apprehensions were "fake and unjust". In a letter to the editor of the Pioneer, he observed that Islam does not permit intrigues against their sovereign, more so when such wars are fought for political purposes and not religious. 1 Whatever, the motivations that guided Sir Syed, Valentine Chirol, the correspondent of The Times, deemed this the last great service rendered by him to the British rule in India. 2

This was the period of the emergence of Pan-Islamism. Jamal-ud-din Afghani (1838-1897) is recognised as the founder of the movement. 3 He travelled widely in Asia and Europe and was a keen observer of the conditions in Muslim countries. Western imperialism had annexed some of them and others were threatened with a similar fate. He saw no inherent strength in the separate Muslim states, and saw their salvation only in unity. Pan-Islamism was thus originally a natural response of the Muslim

1. See Shan Mohammad (ed.), Writings and Speeches of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (Bombay 1972), No. 60, pp. 253-54.

2. Valentine Chirol, India Old and New (London, 1921), p. 136. For Chirol see Appendix A.

world to the assaults of imperialism.\(^1\) To a large extent Afghani also favoured a rational approach and modernization. From 1866 Afghani became the most notable champion of Muslim struggle against British encroachments.\(^2\) He visited India in 1855-56 and 1881-82. During his stay he visited Hyderabad and Calcutta and met several leading Muslims including Nawab Abdul Latif and Syed Ameer Ali. Afghani made speeches and wrote articles. He strongly disapproved of Syed Ahmed Khan's propagation of collaboration with British imperialism, and bitterly attacked him and his supporters, notably Salimullah Khan. He advised the ulama in India to apply rationalist methods to the burning questions and modern problems instead of traditional scholastic discussions.\(^3\) Afghani highlighted the

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1. Sheikh Mushir Hussain Kidwai, defined pan-Islamism: "as a movement which expresses the resentment of the whole Mahomedan world at the growing pressure exerted by Christian Powers upon the kingdoms and states which have long been regarded as the bulwark of Islam." See his article entitled Pan-Islamism. Modern Review, February 1908, No. 2, Vol. II, pp. 141-42.

2. Keddie, op.cit., p. 11.

3. He averred: "Why do you not raise your eyes from those defective books — not cast your glance on this wide world? — not employ your reflection and thought on events and their causes without the veils of those works? You spend no thought on this question of great importance, incumbent on every intelligent man, which is: what is the cause of the poverty, indigence, helplessness, and distress of the Muslims, and is there a cure for this important phenomenon and great misfortune or not?" Afghani on 'The Benefits of Philosophy' (Arabic) quoted in Keddie, op.cit.,
virtues of patriotic and religious zeal. He held that all
these are attributes of the same virtue which "unites multi-
ferious groups" instead of causing "improper hatreds and use-
less enmities." He regretted that "the Muslims in India have
applied the desire to defend religion or religious zeal, in a
very bad way --- to a point where it has become a cause of
hatred for knowledge and the sciences --- for aversion toward
industries and innovation."1

Afghani advocated a united front of Indians against
the British and gave preference to linguistic unity over re-
ligious unity among Indians. During his stay in India he
appealed for Indian unity rather than pan-Islamism. Addressing
a Muslim audience at Calcutta he recalled the glorious heritage
of India.2 He contended that the Aligarh College's emphasis
on emulating the British aimed at abandoning the Indian Muslim's
own heritage; and thus depriving them of an inherent source of


2. On 6 November 1882, at Albert Hall, Calcutta. Afghani
delivered a 'Lecture on Teaching and Learning', and
said: "--- to express my pleasure that so many Indian
youths are here --- they are the offshoots of that
India that was the cradle of humanity. Human values
spread out from India to the whole world --- reached
the highest level in philosophic thought. The soil
of India the same soil; --- and these youths who are
present here are fruits of the same earth and climate.
So I am very happy that they, having awakened after a
long sleep, are reclaiming their inheritance and
gathering the fruits of their own tree." Ibid., pp.
101-2.
nationalist and anti-imperialist convictions.¹ Nikki Keddie remarks that "nowhere in his writings does Afghani appear as any kind of Muslim communalist or separatist in relation to India."²

Professor K.A. Nizami has made a comparison of Afghani and Syed Ahmad Khan. He is of the view that the two persons were working in different circumstances and conditions; the former was faced with "sick men" of Europe and the latter the dead man i.e. the Indian Muslims.³ We find that Afghani had a clear insight into the nature of western imperialism and had a broad perspective before him, whereas Syed Ahmad Khan did not visualize any opposition to imperialism at all. Afghani rather ungenerously accused him of sowing discord between the Hindus and Muslims, and of preaching the exploitation of Indian resources:

"But Ahmad Khan and his companions --- invited people to reject religion (also) disparaged to them the interests of their fatherland, and made people consider foreign domination over them a slight thing, and strove to erase the

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1. Ibid., p. 67.
2. Ibid., p. 58.
traces of religious and patriotic zeal.
They breach those national resources
that perhaps the English have neglected
to plunder, in order to call the govern-
ment’s attention to them, so that they
should not neglect them --- for a vile
piece of bread, a paltry gain."¹

Afghani did not win over any tangible section of Indian Muslim
opinion to his views; his preaching perhaps was premature,
given the state of Muslim political consciousness of the time.
But in the early years of the present century Abul Kalam Azad
sought to invoke the spirit of Afghani, though Muhammad Ali,
a product of the Aligarh College seems to have made no effort
to understand Afghani’s views. Afghani left India in November
1882. Bipin Chandra Pal in his memoirs remarks that Afghani
“inoculated them (Muslims) with the virus of his pan-Islamism.”²

Pal seems to have based his opinion on later developments. The
foregoing discussion reveals that during his stay in India,
Afghani rather spoke in the language of an “extremist” among
the nationalists. His concept of pan-Islamic unity was addressed
rather to the Ottoman Empire, with the Khilafat as the most
suitable nucleus of a strong Muslim power. He had therefore
undoubtedly made contact with pro-Khalifa sympathies among
Indian Muslims also; he told W.S. Blunt that “the Sultan’s name

1. Quoted in Keddie, op.cit., p. 178.

2. Bipin Chandra Pal, Memoirs of My Life and Times (Calcutta,
was now venerated in India as it had not formerly been. Afghani's visit was then successful to the extent that in spite of Syed Ahmad Khan's refutations of the claims of Sultan Abdul Hamid II to be the Khalifa of Indian Muslims a sizeable section of the educated Muslim middle class and the ulama began to acknowledge him as such. This, as we have seen, was made obvious in the polemics aroused between the loyalists and the sympathisers of Turkey at the time of the Greeko-Turkish war.

In May 1900 Turkey started the construction of the Hejaz Railway. Sultan Abdul Hamid II used it for furthering pan-Islamic propaganda and policies, and appealed for subscriptions from all over the world. It was claimed in India that the construction of the railway was taken up on the advice of Muhammad Inshaullah, editor of the Water, Lahore. The Hejaz railway became a regular feature in the vernacular press in the Punjab and the United Provinces. The Indian Muslims were advised to contribute wholeheartedly for this "grand religious task." The project began to interest even the common people.


3. As noticed by the Criminal Intelligence Department, See Notes of H.H. Risley, F.D. Sec. E. October 1908, No. 24, NAI.
The *Watan* of Lahore sought to satisfy doubters by declaring that the whole Islamic world was involved. The *Muhammadan* of Madras, observed that the project could not be abandoned for want of funds. It was reported that the Sharif's brother visited India in this connection. He met the Governor of Bombay who was not unfriendly. At Calcutta a meeting was called by the Imam of the Nakhoda mosque where the leaders of the Swadeshi movement expressed their sympathy with the project. It was the Punjab Muslim press however, which was most active in raising contributions for the project. The amount collected was remitted from time to time through the National Bank and other agencies to Constantinople. Professor Vambery the Hungarian Indologist estimated Indian Muslim's contribution towards the Hejaz Railway about Rupees One crore and fifty lakhs.

The Macedonian crisis of 1903 further aggravated Muslim feeling in India. It was feared that a war between Turkey and

2. *Muhammadan* (Madras), 23 February 1905, see in Pro. No. 293, P.D. Sec. E., May 1905, NAI.
3. The identity of the Sharif is not clear, possibly it refers to Sharif Hussain of Mecca. The *Anglo-Vernacular* Press (Gujranwala), 1 March 1904, ROINP - Punjab.
4. By November 1902, the *Paisa Akhbar*, Rs. 1,864-13-9, and by December 1902 the *Watan* had raised Rs. 9,936-15-2, *Vakil*, Rs. 13,780-6-11, and by April-May 1904 *Watan* Rs. 16,452-0-1 and *Paisa Akhbar*, Rs. 2,915-7-9.
5. Sub-Encl to Pro. No. 253, P.D. Sec. E. October 1906, NAI. For Vambery see Appendix A.
Bulgaria might break out. This time they did not anticipate results similar to the last Turco-Greek war of 1897. They believed that a new conflict with Turkey would not be an isolated affair, the whole of Europe would be politically involved. The Anglo-Indian paper, The Pioneer advocated the liberation of Macedonia from the Turkish Yoke thus inflaming fears. The Bengalee of Surendra Nath Banerji expressed the nationalists sympathy with Turkey and argued that Europe was not prepared to tolerate Turkish rule in Europe. The Zeminder of Lahore discovered England ranging herself against Turkey. There was a greater realisation that Salisbury was doing more harm to Turkey than even Gladstone had done.

Moreover, the Macedonian crisis stirred deep religious sentiments. It was said that if “Jerusalem is at the bottom of European hostility towards Turkey then they would face the entire

1. Rozname-i-Mogaddas Hahlul Matin (Calcutta), 31 August 1903, RONNP - Bengal.
2. 25 May 1903, Ibid.
3. Al-Punch, 5 September 1903, RONNP - Bengal.
4. Bengalee (Calcutta), 25 August 1903, also The Indian Mirror, 26 September 1903, RONNP - Bengal.
5. Zeminder (Lahore), 24 September 1903, RONNP - Punjab.
6. Watan (Lahore), 28 August 1903, RONNP - Punjab.
Islamic world.\textsuperscript{1} Such claims of opposition to the European powers were, mere words. Moreover, the internal contradictions in the Ottoman Empire (notably national injustices) were also lost sight of. The support to Turkey was almost totally unqualified and without reservation.

About this time in 1903 Abdullah Mamun Suhrawardy founded in England a Pan-Islamic Society in London. He became its secretary and published a journal named *Pan-Islam*, which largely dwelled upon western concepts and highlighted Islamic virtues against European vices. In 1905 the Society approached the British Home Office to accord it recognition and allow them to use the prefix 'imperial' before its name.\textsuperscript{2} The desired permission was refused.\textsuperscript{3} On Suhrawardy's return to India, Sheikh Mushir Husain Kidwai\textsuperscript{4} became the Secretary of the Society. In order to remove doubts about the objectives of the Society, Kidwai insisted that they are purely religious and social.\textsuperscript{5} As the political prospects seemed doubtful, the Society sought to revive Islamic spirit of unity purely on the basis of a common faith.\textsuperscript{6} The Society began to influence Muslim students and

\begin{itemize}
\item 2. Pro. No. 135 and encl., Home Office to India Office, 19 September 1905, F.D. Int. B. December 1905, NAI. For Abdullah Mamun Suhrawardy see Appendix A.
\item 3. Pro. No. 136, 16 October 1905, Ibid.
\item 4. For Mushir Hussain Kidwai see Appendix A.
\item 5. Kanauj Punch. 15 February 1907. RONNP-UP.
\end{itemize}
and recruited them for the propagation of pan-Islamic ideas.¹

Seeing the rapid progress of the Hejaz railway the question of consolidating its position on the Aqaba boundary acquired a sudden importance for Britain, and the Anglo-Turkish clash of interest became a subject of comment in Indian press. The Oudh Akhbar acknowledged Turkey’s right to strengthen its position on the Hejaz coast. But it was futile to hope to wrest Egypt from Britain.² The Muslims of Aligarh held a meeting and sent a telegram to the Viceroy imploring an amicable settlement of the Aqaba boundary question. It was suspected that the local Secretary of the Congress, Hasrat Mohani had organised the meeting. The telegram was published in The Pioneer. This caused concern in government circles;³ hitherto Aligarh had been deemed to be secure from pro-Turkish sentiments. Sheikh Abdullah, a trustee of the Aligarh College, hastened to write a letter to The Pioneer, dissociating himself from the meeting and the telegram. This provoked criticism of the loyalist attitude of the trustees of the Aligarh College.⁴

Pan-Islamic ideas had already begun to affect the students of the Aligarh College.⁵ Now anti-British feelings

1. See Foreign Department notes, P.D. Sec. E. May 1907, Nos. 764-796, NAI.
2. Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow). 5 May 1906, RONNP - UP.
3. Pro-No. 765, P.D. Sec. E. May 1907, Nos. 764-796, NAI.
5. In 1901 even the Aligarh Institute Gazette had supported the formation of a pan-Islamic association, 12 December 1901.
also become widespread. It was commonly believed that Britain itself was responsible for depriving the Sultan-Khalifa much of his glory and importance. Britain was also suspected of helping the Arabs against Turks.\(^1\) This was a definite departure from the policies of Syed Ahmad Khan. Mohsin-ul-Wulk, his successor came "under duress from the pan-Islamic publicists and their young supporters.\(^2\) He refuted the claims of the Khalifa, yet acknowledged the attachment to him of the Indian Muslims:

"Evidently the Sultan cannot exercise any of the powers and prerogatives of the Khalifa over the Mohammedans of this country, nor are they in any matter bound by their religion to obey the Sultan. They are subjects of the King-Emperor and owe their allegiance to him alone. ---

But by denying the Khalafat it does not follow that the Indian Mussalmans have no love for the Sultan of Turkey and that they do not care for the safety of the truth is that the Mohammedans have great sympathy and love for the Sultan. They all wish --- the stability of the Turkish rule and earnestly pray to God that friendly relations between their Government, i.e., the

\(^1\) "Swaraj" or self rule in Oriental Countries", Modern Review, June 1907, Vol. I, No. 6, p. 539.

British Government, and the Sultan may be firmly established.\(^1\)

Significantly, Mohsin-ul-Mulk stated:

"loyalty to our Government does not exclude the idea of sympathy with one's co-religionist. Those who think that the two are exclusive of each other are ignorant both of their religious duties and their political relations."\(^2\)

The views expressed by him signify the change that had come about in the citadel of Anglo-Muslim collaboration. Mohsin-ul-Mulk thus laid the basis for Muhammad Ali's\(^3\) subsequent pan-Islamic activities for same ends in view from the Tripolitan war till the abolition of Khilafat by Turkey. In spite of this Mohsin-ul-Mulk was strongly criticized by the pro-Turkey and pro-Khalifa elements. He was dubbed as a traitor to the cause and a stoppage of contributions to the Aligarh College was threatened.\(^4\) Even the qualified repudiation of the Khilafat by him was alleged to have been prompted by the British in India.\(^5\)

Indian pan-Islamists now began to establish direct contacts with Constantinople. The visits of Indian Muslims and journalists were widely publicised in the press. Some Indian

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2. Ibid.

3. For Muhammad Ali see Appendix A.


5. *JaREATE (Agra)*, 14 July 1906, RONNF-UP.
newspapers like the Mulk and Millet of Calcutta, the Muslim Patriot of Madras, the Indian Daily Telegraph of Lucknow and the Observer of Lahore arranged for weekly letter from the "City of Caliphs". 1 The Indian Daily Telegraph suggested the replacement of N. O'Connell, the British ambassador in Turkey, for failing to promote friendly relations between the two countries. 2 The pan-Islamists even thought of establishing a college in India on the model of the Galata Sarai and name it after the Sultan of Turkey, and to award fellowships to Indians to study in Turkey on the pattern of the Rhodes scholarships. 3 No serious efforts were made and all these remained mere idle thoughts.

Sheikh Mushir Husain Kidwai and Sheikh Abdul Kadir of Kasur, Lahore visited Turkey between 28 July to 23 September 1906. 4 They were warmly received at the Porte. Tewfik Pasha, 5 the Turkish foreign minister placed at the disposal of the two visitors the services of one Jalal Unsi Bey, who acted as their

1. Encl. to Pro. No. 216, P.D. Extl. B. May 1907, NAI.
2. Indian Daily Telegraph (Lucknow), 20 February 1907, RONNP - UP.
3. Ibid.
4. Sheikh Abdul Kadir serialized his travel account in the Observer, (Lahore), 6 and 29 August; 5, 15 and 22 September; 13 and 24 October and 28 November 1906; the Urdu newspapers also published them.
5. For Tewfik Pasha see Appendix A.
guide and friend during their stay. They met the Sheikh-ul-Islam and were enlightened by his views. While ulama Mahmud Effendi a Qazi of Akzar in European Turkey impressed upon them that the education should always be in keeping with the needs of the age. He decried those mullas who put religion in opposition to modern education. He even offered to issue a fatwa in this connection. Mahmud Effendi was a man of extreme liberal and enlightened views; and held that most of the misfortunes of Islam are due to misunderstanding and minister-pretations.

When Kidwai and Abdul Kadir met Farid Pasha, the Turkish Prime Minister, he enquired from them whether in India they had learnt to distinguish between the spheres of religion and secular duties. Sheikh Abdul Kadir's reply was that "we often confuse the dictates of the two." Farid Pasha confessed that the same was the case with the Turkish Muslims. Tewfik Pasha made enquiries about female education among Muslims in India. Ibrahim Hakki Bey, the Consular Legiste de la sublime

1. See notes, Foreign Department, F.D. Ext. E. May 1907, Nos. 764-796, NAI.

2. Observer (Lahore), 5 September 1906, ROINP - Punjab.

3. Ibid.

4. 6 August, 1906, Ibid.
Porte seemed to be well informed about India, and enquired from them about the Partition of Bengal.

To their dismay the visitors found the Turks completely Europeanized with fez as the only distinguishing mark from the rest of Europe. The degree of religious tolerance, however, attracted their attention. They also met the editors of the two Turkish newspapers Sabah and Ikdam. The Turkish newspapers gave wide publicity to their visit. During their stay they also met the Egyptian Khedive and impressed upon him the need for holding a pan-Islamic conference in Egypt. They noticed that the Turkish newspapers did not publish anything about Islamic unity (Ittihad-i-Islam), possibly in order not to scare the European Powers. The editors themselves complained of press censorship and saw no immediate remedy.

The Sultan was ill, but recovered during their visit. Upon receipt of good wishes from them, the Sultan conferred on them the Order of Osmanieh, Third Class. Both felt elated at this award and emphasized the religious significance of being honoured by the Khalifa. They sought the permission of the British ambassador in Turkey to accept it and be allowed to

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1. 29 August 1906, Ibid.
2. 5 September 1906, Ibid.
3. Sheikh Mushir Husain Kidwai in his letter asking for permission from British Government for accepting the honour asserted that the Sultan-Khalifa had a right to confer such honour upon Muslims, sub. enc1., No. 2 to Pro. No. 45, F.D. Genl. B. June 1907, NAI.
wear the honour. He forwarded their request to the British
Foreign Office. Sir Edward Grey,\(^1\) the Foreign Secretary
ostensibly saw no reasons to object yet decided to consult the
India Office. Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for India
thereupon sought the opinion of the Government of India. The
Governor General-in-Council opposed the permission and their
request was turned down.\(^2\)

In an earlier instance Nawab Abdul Latif had been
given the permission to accept the honour from the Khalifa. The
Government of India had now obviously decided not to recognize
and encourage any attachment of Indian Muslims to the Sultan-
Khalifa.

Close on their heels in 1907 Abdullah Mamun Suhrawardy
also visited Constantinople and met the Sultan and the Sheikh-ul
Islam.\(^3\) About this time Suhrawardy and Kidwai proposed to build
a mosque in London. For this they sought financial assistance
from the Turkish ambassador in Britain and possibly from the
Indian Office.\(^4\) Grey was verbally informed about it by Murus
Pasha, the Turkish ambassador. He told the latter that he saw

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1. For Edward Grey see Appendix A.

2. To Morley, 28 February 1907, Pro. No. 46, Ibid. The
   Government circles suspected that Sheikh Abdul Kadir
   had embraced the Congress ideology and pan-Islamism,
   see notes by H.A. Stuart, 14 November 1906, F.D. Ext.1
   B. May 1907, No. 216, NAI. For Morley see
   Appendix A.

3. Pro. No. 216. Ibid.

4. Note by Political Aide de Camp, Pro. No. 4, F.D. Sec. E.
   September, 1907, NAI.
no objection whatever if private individuals built such a
mosque, but the British Government would not approve construction
financed by the Turkish Government. 1 Morley concurred with the
reply given to Musrus Pasha. 2 This too underlined the British
anxiety to acknowledge any Turkish hegemony over the religious
life of Muslims in the Empire.

The Aqaba boundary dispute demanded reinforcement of
British forces in Egypt. Therefore Cromer 3 asked for the deploy-
ment of Indian troops. Believing that all Muslims held the
Sultan-Khalifa into esteem, and the latter might test their
jebed, a possibility which he could not rule out, he suggested
the deployment of non-Muslim troops. 4 The British Government
invited the opinion of the Government of India. 5 Kitchener
advised against the deployment of Muslim troops in Egypt, while
Maj-Gen Bayley saw no risk in their deployment and argued that
their exclusion would unnecessarily hurt their feelings. 6

Just about this time some importance seems to have
been attached to an anonymous letter received by the Secretary to

1. Foreign Office to India Office, 16 April 1907, Pro. No. 1, Ibid.
2. India Office, 25 April 1907, Pro. Nos. 2 and 3, Ibid.
3. For Cromer see Appendix A.
5. Minto obtained the views of Kitchener, the C-in-C in
India and Maj-Gen Bayley, the Secretary to the Government
of India in the Army department.
6. Bayley to Dunlop Smith, 7 March 1906, No. 194, Minto Papers.
the Government of India in the Foreign Department. This was written in Urdu by pencil, with the pseudonym 'Truthful'. The writer claimed to have written similar letters in the years 1896, 1897 and 1898. He attributed the causes of unrest in the Punjab region to the affairs of Egypt and the Sultan of Turkey. He even warned that in the North west Frontier Provinces exists a conspiracy against the British and the army would be affected by it.¹

Seeing the growing interest of Indian Muslims in the Sultan-Khalifa, Morley enquired from the Government of India as to the real extent of their interest in him.² Earlier the events of 1877 had prompted the Government of India to order an informal enquiry on the feelings of the Indian Muslims on the Turkish question. Now Minto administration obtained reports from the provinces and native states.³ The general assessment based on the reports was that except in the North West Frontier Provinces and the Punjab, elsewhere not much interest was taken by the Muslims in the dealings of the Powers with the Sultan-Khalifa. The appeal to Islamic unity in Bombay, Madras and Central provinces was apparently meant to embarrass the British Government.⁴ It was understood that the 'fervent sunnis' in upper

¹ See Pro. No. 53, F.D. Front. B. June 1906, NAI.
² Louis Dane to Dunlop Smith, 7 May 1906, No. 195, Minto Papers.
³ See Pro. No. 261, F.D. Sec. E. October 1906, NAI.
⁴ Ibid.
India take interest in the Turkish Sultan as being the only powerful Muslim state left free. They desired that Britain should remain friendly with Turkey. Prince Surrya Jah, possibly a member of the Nizam family, told the British resident at Hyderabad, that Britain may engage herself in war with any other Muslim state like Egypt, Persia or Afghanistan, but not Turkey, because its Sultan is their 'Khalifatullah'.

C.R. Cleveland who later became the Director of Criminal Intelligence of the Government of India, observed that Indian Muslims had a good deal of "Platonic sympathy" for the Sultan of Turkey. Syed Ahmad Khan had worn the fez and popularised it by making it the part of M.A.O. College uniform. The Shia Muslims, had no special interest in Turkey, some of them did have pan-Islamic sentiments. This was the case, for example, the Hablul Matin of Calcutta, an Urdu and Persian newspaper. In view of the developments the Government of India

1. Chief Secretary of United Provinces to Louis Dane, 4 June 1906, Pro. No. 261, Ibid.
3. Cleveland, Inspector General of Police, Central Provinces, to Chief Secretary, 14 May 1906, Pro. No. 248, Ibid. For Cleveland see Appendix A.
kept a close watch on Delhi, Ajmer, Agra, Patna and Hyderabad. 1 Morley read the telegram of Minto before the British Cabinet and reminded his colleagues that Indian troops should not be used on all occasions as a matter of course. 2

After a few weeks Minto wrote again to Morley: "the pan-Islamic agitation is much deeper than I thought when you asked me as to the advisability of employing Mohammedan troops in Egypt." He observed; "there is evidence that it is a wide spreading organisation whose doings it is very difficult to follow." 3

The Spectator of London published an article on Pan-Islam, with a view to counteracting the claims of the Sultan of Turkey to be the Khalifa of Muslims and the head of the Muslim religion. 4 The paper contended the claim as unjust and

1. The following were suspected to be agents in India for the circulation of pan-Islamic literature:
   Calcutta - Musa-bin-Ahmad, Imam of the Zakaria Mosque,
   Bombay - Mohammed Abdullah Jatekar, Bookseller Bhindi Bazar,
   Hyderabad Deccan - Syed Abdul Haq of Baghdad,
   Madras - Nasiruddin, Proprietor of the Muhammadan, and Shemsul Akhbar, Newspapers,
   Agra - Syed Ghulam Shah, Editor of the Jamai,
   Lahore - Mahbub Alam, Proprietor of the Paisa Akhbar and Inshaullah, Proprietor of the Watan,
   Amritsar - Ghulam Muhammad of the Vakil.

3. Minto to Morley, 12 June 1906, No. 51, Minto Papers.
endeavoured to convince the Muslims that any opposition to the Sultan was not an attack on Islam. It suggested that in order to reassure the Muslims of India, Egypt and Persia, Britain might guarantee the safety of the Holy Places and freedom of access to them. The author disclaimed, however, any intention to occupying Arabia. It advised that a fatwa from Indian Muslim scholars and lawyers be obtained regarding the validity of the institution of Khilafat. If it was in favour of the Sultan then it should be honoured. But if the fatwa was to the contrary, then the whole issue would be simplified and provide a surer ground for Britain to formulate its policy towards Arabia.¹

The aim of the paper clearly was to prove to the Muslims that it is Mecca and not Constantinople which was the centre of the Muslim faith; it is the 'Kaaba' and not the dome of the St. Sophia whose direction the worshipper faces in the Muslim prayers.

Cromer read this article and sent his views to Sir Edward Grey.² Morley sent a short memorandum from Sir Alfred Lyall on Cromer's letter. He also sent a note by Sir W. Lee-Warner of his conversation with the Aga Khan, and a note by Sir Theodore Morrison, former Principal of the Aligarh College, who

1. Ibid.
2. Earl of Cromer to Grey, 22 May 1906, encl. 1 in Morley to Minto, No. 69.
was now in the India Office. Morley considered Morrison to be a competent person to speak on the questions under discussion and Muslim opinion in India.

The occasion for such a debate in British circles was obviously due to the growing German influence within the Turkish empire. Morley denied that he was under panic, yet he could not conceal his apprehensions about a Turco-German entente. The possibilities of British participation in the construction of the Baghdad Railway and its effect on India were being debated in India as well.

Cromer had observed that the Sultan of Turkey was apprehensive of British intentions, and believed that they coveted his Arabian possessions and wished to undermine his position as the Khalifa. He doubted the possibilities of obtaining from Indian Muslim theologians any pronouncement against the Sultan's claim to the Khalifat. Therefore, he cautioned that in concl-

1. See enclosures in Morley to Minto, 22 June 1906, No. 69, Minto Papers.

2. 29 June 1906, No. 70; also see Gods' ly to Minto, 17 July 1906, Ibid.

3. Cromer to Grey, 22 May 1906, Cairo, Encl. 1, No. 69, Morley to Minto, Minto Papers. Cromer referred to Northbrook's Mission to Egypt in order to influence the Egyptians through an Indian Muslim judge. The Egyptians considered Indian Muslims as Shias of doubtful orthodoxy due to their association with the Christians.
liating Muslims the validity of his title should not be raised. He also thought that Britain could give no guarantees regarding the Holy places. While disowning any intention of directly overthrowing Turkish rule in Arabia, he asserted that "If the Turkish hold over Arabia is ever abolished it will be through misgovernment, and not as a result of foreign intrigue." He went on to predict that "the downfall of Turkish power in Arabia is not far off"; and that Britain itself would "take no steps to hasten the end."¹

The Indian Muslims quite reasonably began to suspect a deep laid British design and conspiracy about Arabia. Ultimately, the Arabs were emboldened to revolt against Turkey when Britain intrigued with their chiefs during the First World War.

Sir Alfred Lyall in his Memorandum quoted Professor Vambery, the Hungarian indologist, that the recognition of the Sultan as Khalīfa of Muslims was connected with the movement toward pan-Islamism. The Hejaz railway was to facilitate pan-Islamic communications.² So he himself was against reviving the old controversy over the validity of the Khilafat. On this point he was in agreement with Cromer. Lyall appears to have been well acquainted with the state of Indian Muslim opinion:

¹. Ibid.
². Alfred Lyall's Secret Memorandum, 19 June 1906, Ibid.
"The attempt to question it would I believe at best only get going a complicated polemical debate, which would have no practical value; for at the present moment the real aims and objects of those who support the Sultan's title are not religious so much as political."¹

Lyall asserted that Indian Muslim would not debate strict legitimacy of the Khilafat. At best they would maintain that the Sultan had a better title than anyone else. He referred to the views of Syed Ameer Ali that the Khalifa need not necessarily be of the Koreish tribe. Therefore, he suggested that Britain should act on its broad notions of essential justice and civilized administration, and in no case give the impression to the Sultan that it was afraid of his influence. He spurred the idea of giving any guarantee or assurance to buy Turkish friendship.

Lee-Warner touched on the points which greatly troubled the Anglo-Indians. It caused them much annoyance that the non-Muslim press in India sympathised with the Muslims and helped them to realize that the British have not treated them well, so that all their troubles were due to them. The possibilities of an understanding between Gokhale and the Aga Khan caused uneasiness in those circles. Theodore Morrison mainly stressed the

¹. Ibid.
need to give consideration to educated Muslims in services.¹

Minto was basically concerned with the changing horizon of Indian opinion. He therefore advised the Home government the Britain should improve its relations with Turkey. Morley in response conveyed to him what Sir Edward Grey had to say on this: "It would be against British self-respect to bid for such an alliance. We may improve our relations with him (the Sultan). But I think a reformed Russia is more possible than a reformed Turkey."² Minto was aware of the changes taking place in the perception of British policy makers towards Turkey. The India Office kept him fully informed about these developments.³

The Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907 was a major obstacle which Britain wished to use as a counterpoise to

1. Morrison in his note stressed "Ideas can only be combated by ideas, and you won't keep the young generation away from Congress unless you have another programme and another set of ideas to set up against theirs."⁴ See note by Theodore Morrison, 10 July 1906, Encl. to Morley to Minto, No. 69, Minto Papers.

2. Morley to Minto, 7 December 1906, No. 38, Minto Papers.

3. Morley stressed that the "main and central preoccupation of our Foreign Office is about the German menace. (Morley to Minto, 4 March 1908, No. 14, Minto Papers). Godley also apprised Minto that "the German scare is very strong just now" Sir Arthur Godley, Under Secretary of State for India to Minto, 17 July 1906, No. 39, Minto Papers.

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German threat to presume British interests and security. With such a pro-Russian orientation, however, British policy makers deprived themselves of any prospect of weaning Turkey away from its increasing German attachment. Kitchener was now sure that Britain could not rely on Turks for material assistance in Southern Persia; it “will be to trust to a very broken reed.”

The growth of pan-Islamic sentiments and increasing interest of educated Muslims in Turkey caused considerable anxiety to British administrators and statesmen. Cromer from Cairo informed Minto that Dr Ziauddin Ahmad of the Aligarh College during his visit to Cairo in the autumn of 1906, had got into touch with pan-Islamic elements there. He expressed surprise at seeing a professor of the Aligarh College associating himself with a class of Muslims opposed to the basic principles inculcated at the College. He feared that Dr Ziauddin Ahmad might act as a correspondent of the pan-Islamic press of Egypt. Cromer was particularly disappointed with Dr Ziauddin Ahmad, because he had been nurturing a “small coterie” of re-


2. Dr Ziauddin Ahmad was a Professor of Mathematics at the M.A.O. College, Aligarh. Cromer erroneously considered him a Professor of Law. During his stay in Cairo, Dr. Ziauddin met the Egyptian Khedive through the editor of El-Mowayyad, whom Cromer characterised as a violent Anglo-phobe and pan-Islamic paper hostile to British Government. For Dr Ziauddin Ahmad see Appendix A.
formers of the type of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in Egypt and he had been impressing upon them the example of the Aligarh College. He had even urged them to send some Egyptians to Aligarh. Now the ground had been cut from under his feet by the (suspected) activities of Dr Ziauddin Ahmed.

When Minto took up the matter with the Aligarh authorities he received satisfactory reports about Dr Ziauddin Ahmad from the District Magistrate and the Principal of the College. Nevertheless, Minto considered the penetration of pan-Islamic ideas at Aligarh a "bad job".¹

The Aligarh College was exposed to the twin influences of Congress nationalism and pan-Islamism. The portraits of the Sultan of Turkey, the German Kaiser and Gokhale would be found in the students' rooms.² Hasrat Mohani, the editor of the Urdu-i Mualla, an Urdu Weekly (1903) and an old boy of the Aligarh College was an admirer of Tilak and exercised strong influence on the students of the College.³

The students strike of 1907 in the College⁴ caused

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1. Minto to Cromer, 20 December 1906, No. 61, Minto Papers.
2. See Bhatnagar, op.cit., p. 206. He refers to a conversation that he had with Dr Syed Mahmud an old boy of the College, who told him that when the Prince of Wales, visited the College on 8 March 1906, the latter visited some of the rooms of the boarding house. It was in his room that the Prince was surprised to see the portraits of the Sultan of Turkey and the Kaiser of Germany (p. 236 n).
3. For Hasrat Mohani see Appendix A.
particular concern in the bureaucratic circles. The students reported that Cornah a European teacher used to make offensive remarks in the class against the Sultan of Turkey. Anti-British sentiments now pervaded students of the College. Although the trustees of the College tried to impress upon the government that the strike was devoid of any political overtones and unaffected by the Congress ideas; the European staff of the College distinctly saw the germination of Congress ideas among the students. Muhammad Ali published articles in the Times of India, Bombay and the Indian Spectator in 1907, in which he referred to the strike and urged that statesmanship demanded on the part of the rulers to save the College students from the "present infection" (of the Congress).

1. Shatnagar quotes from the enquiry report, Cornah saying "If I had the power I would make Abdul Hamid the Sultan of Turkey my fan puller, the Fankha Coolie" Ibid., p. 204.

The strikers against whom action was taken later on became prominent nationalist leaders and editors like, T.A. K. Shervani, Raja Ghulam Husain.

2. Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman who joined the College soon after the strike confirms this view, see his Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, 1961), p. 17.


4. Subsequently these articles were published as Thoughts on the Present Discontent (Bombay, 1907). These views are in line with the arguments that Morrison had expressed in his note to Morley, as we have seen above. Morrison noted that "a generation of young Mohammedans is springing up not only in Aligarh but in all the big towns of northern India, which has learnt English and whose thoughts run easily in the Congress mould." See note by Morrison, 10 July 1906, Encl. to No. 69, Morley to Minto, Minto Papers.
An effort was now made to reinforce loyalist feelings at Aligarh by a Viceroyal visit to the College on 22 April 1908. In the fluid political situation Minto had already won the gratitude of the Muslim aristocracy and upper classes by his response to the Simla Deputation. Minto was satisfied with the success of his visit, and he wrote to Morley to say of Aligarh that "it is becoming a great centre of influence in the Mahommedan world of India."¹

One difficulty for Turkey's admirers in India was the very one sided nature of the relationship. Turkey did not seem to reciprocate their sentiments.² Often enough criticisms of the Turkish indifference were motivated by a pro-British attitude. The Oudh Akhbar of Lucknow, deprecated the conduct of educated Muslims both in India and England, who presented the Turkish Sultan as the Khalifa of Indian Muslims. Nor did it approve of their attempting interference in British foreign policy.³ Mirza Ghulam Qadian, pertinently advised Indian Muslims to leave the Khalifa alone.⁴ A few in India could see

1. Minto to Morley, 23 April 1909, No. 22, Minto Papers.

2. The Union Gazette (Bareilly), rather complainingly enquired, "Is it necessary for Indian Muslims to express their sympathy for Turkey? What has the Sultan-Khalifa done for the education of the Muslims in India? Did he help the poor? Did he make any arrangements for the protection of helpless Indian pilgrims from the hands of the 'ruffianly Bedouins'? 28 May 1906. RONNP-UP.

3. Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 10 March 1906, also Tafrih (Lucknow), 1 May 1906, RONNP-UP.

4. Rohilkhand Gazette (Bareilly), 16 November 1906, RONNP-UP.

For Mirza Ghulam Qadian see Appendix A.
that Turkey was moving towards republicanism, and if the Sultan would not heed to the wishes of his people, it would ultimately prove disastrous for him. These impressions were gaining ground among those who were keenly watching Turkish developments on the eve of the Young Turk Revolution.

The general state of feeling among Muslims continued to be almost uncritically pro-Turkish. Any news about the Turkish finances, ill organized army, repression under Sultan Abdul Hamid II and non-payment of soldier's salaries were discounted as inspired to malign the Sultan-Khalifa.

Such was the setting in India, when the distinct forces of nationalism, pan-Islamism and imperialism reacted with each other. Certain developments in Asia, in particular from Turkey influenced the Indian notably Muslim opinion.

In 1906 the long reign of Conservative governments in Britain came to an end and the Liberal party came into power. Naturally, the question of reforms in India also came to the forefront. The moderates quickly pinned their hope in the liberal Morley, who as R.J. Moore observes had sought to arrange an alliance between the Imperial Government and the liberal interests in India. But Minto, a conservative confron-

1. Kanauj Punch, 23 March 1906, RONNP - UP.
ted the liberal Morley with an accomplished fact. He as Viceroy committed the British in India to communal and separatist demands at Simla in 1906. Thus a clear policy towards India evaded the new Liberal government. A similar lack of direction could be discerned in the policy towards Turkey. W.S. Blunt complained of the weak character of England and the changes that he had noticed in the past three or four decades, and more so in the preceding ten years.1

In India, the separatist sentiments incited among Muslims by Minto's parleys with the Simla Deputation led to the emergence of two strands in the Muslim leadership. One was represented by the Old Guard of the loyalists for whom the permanence of the British Empire was the chief article of faith; the other comprised the younger elements, who began to visualise the Muslim community as a political entity seeking to obtain rights for itself in India (in a temporary alliance with the British Government against the Congress) while at the same time aspiring to establish a deeper relationship with the Sultan of Turkey. The latter element was deeply permeated with pan-Islamism; its position was inherently unstable in relation to Britain, since it depended so greatly on what policy Britain adopted towards Turkey. Minto's success at Simla thus could prove to be a Pyrrhic victory.

1. See W.S. Blunt, My Diaries, 1900-1914, Part II (London 1919-20), p. 409. For Blunt see Appendix A.