Chapter VII

MUSTAPA KEMAL AND THE INDIAN KHILAPAT MOVEMENT

In October 1919, the Turks suffered a great defeat from General Allenby's army; and with the Armistice already signed in Europe, Turkey too on 3 November signed the Armistice. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister hailed Allenby as the 'Conqueror of Palestine' and 'Victor of the last Crusade'. This was followed by the occupation of Mosul by the British and of Constantinople by the Allies. The statements of Lloyd George1 and the attitude of Curzon indicated that the very existence of Turkey as an independent nation was in jeopardy.2

1. Meston represented the Government of India at the Imperial Conference. After hearing Lloyd George he wrote to Chelmsford that while discussing the 'General Terms of Peace' the latter was emphatic on a complete smashing up of Turkey. He unreservedly expressed his determination to drive the Turks out of Europe "which it stained with blood and misgovernment, out of Palestine as a sacred duty and out of the Tigris and Euphrates Valley which Turkey has converted from a garden into a desert." Meston remarked that fortunately none of his (Viceroy's) nominees were Muslims. Meston to Chelmsford, 23 March 1919, Meston Papers - 136/1, IOL.

2. Curzon's attitude could be seen from the minutes of a Cabinet meeting held on 19 May 1919 in which the terms of the treaty were discussed. He said that he had no desire whatever to deal gently with the Turks. They should be deprived of all their outlying provinces (Arabia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria and Armenia). He considered it essential to deprive the Turks of their two symbols of victory Constantinople and Mecca and unless this was done, the East would never believe that the Turks had been defeated in the war. Minutes of a Meeting, 19 May 1919, CAB 23 (44 B), Cabinet Papers, PRO.
The Sultan-Khalife Wahiduddin Effendi who was virtually a puppet of the Allies and compelled his ministers to sign the Treaty of Sévres (5 May 1920). These developments helped the rise of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey. He moved away from Constantinople into Anatolia and succeeded in consolidating the nationalist forces there. Even the heartland of Turkey was endangered when Greek troops landed in Smyrna in May 1919.

The Entente powers and Italy had actually contracted secret arrangements during the war to partition the Ottoman Empire in the event of their victory. Already the Balkan wars had reduced Turkish possessions in Europe and the World War deprived it of all its Arab provinces.

1. The four sets of undertakings were: (1) the Constantinople Agreement (6 March - 10 April 1915) which conferred Constantinople, Eastern Thrace and the Straits on the Russians, in return for a British sphere of influence in Persia. After the revolution the Soviet Government renounced all such claims. (2) the London Agreement (26 April 1915) and (3) the Tripartite Agreement for the Partition of the Ottoman Empire: Britain, France and Italy (19 April-26 September 1917). Here Italy was awarded a large portion of Asia Minor, viz., the province of Adalia to the west of Cilicia, the Dodecanese Islands and the port of Smyrna and much of its hinterland. (4) the Sykes-Picot Agreement (April-October 1916), partitioned the Arab territories between France and Britain, allowing Mesopotamia to the British and Syria and Cilicia to France. See J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle Easts: A Documentary Record 1914-1956 (D. Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 7-23.
Given British ambitions and commitments and the trend of the peace terms which the Allies were planning to impose on Turkey; the hopes of resurrecting the Ottoman Empire were gone. The acceptance of the Treaty of Sevres by the Sultan-Khalifa appeared to seal the fate of the Turkish Monarchy and Khilafat.¹

There had been a keen anxiety on the part of Indians in general and Muslims in particular concerning the fate of the Khilafat and the sanctity of the Islamic Holy Places, once Turkey was forced to bow to the Allies. Since Great Britain was the moving spirit behind the Treaty of Sevres, it could no longer escape responsibility for the humiliation of Turkey as well as of Islam. Inevitably, then, the desire to aid and

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¹ The Article 139 of the Treaty read: "Turkey renounces formally all rights of suzerainty or jurisdiction of any kind over Moslems who are subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other state --- No power shall be exercised directly or indirectly by any Turkish authority whatever, in any territory detached from Turkey ---" (Section XIII, General Sections, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1920, Treaty of Sevres, No. 11, (md. 964.) This clause ended the fiction of the Khilafat. Turkey was deprived of all rights in Cyprus, Egypt, and the Sudan, Eastern Thrace, Gallipoli and the Aegean Islands were ceded to Greece; Smyrna was to administered by Greece for five years, transferred the Arab areas of her empire to British and French Mandates; Holy cities were to be left under the control of the British ally Sherif Hussain of Mecca.
protect Turkey, and assert Islamic solidarity, which gave rise to the Khilafat Movement; took a nationalist and anti-British form. If in the substance of its objective it was "romantic and out of touch with actualities," it was nonetheless in tune with the great anti-imperialist upsurge which followed World War I. There were clearly logical difficulties in the position of the Khilafat Movement. Wahiduddin Effendi, the Sultan-Khalifa had elected to throw his lot with the occupying powers. And yet the Khilafat Movement appeared to demand that the puppet should be everything. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal who was leading Turkey in an armed revolution against the Allies, and therefore, a natural ally of the Indian Khilafat Movement, could not at heart sympathise with any endeavour to impose on Turkey an authority in the guise of the Khalifa who was on the side of the enemy.

In this chapter we shall trace the relations between Mustafa Kemal and the Indian Khilafat Movement, to explain how circumstances developed leading to a total alienation between Modern Turkey and the Khilafat leaders.

As early as April 1918, Mahatma Gandhi refused to take part in the War Conference and took exception to the

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Al1l4 etU tutle towards Turkey: "I have just read the Home Mail papers. They deal with the Secret Treaties. The revelations make painful reading. I do not know that I could call the Allies' cause to be any longer just if those treaties are truly reported."¹ He was not yet sure what effect this news would have on Indian Muslims. Therefore, he advised Viceroy, Chelmsford, to obtain definite assurances from the ministers of the British Government about Muslim States in which every Indian Muslim was deeply interested. Mahatma Gandhi urged "the most scrupulous regard for the right of these states, and for the Muslim sentiment as to places of worship."²

In December 1918 Dr M.A. Ansari initiated at the annual session of the All India Muslim League a move to agitate for the protection of the Khilafat and Turkey.³

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¹ He was invited to take part in the War Conference at Delhi. He refused to take part in the proceedings for this reason and also demanded the release of Tilak, Mrs Annie Besant and Ali Brothers whom he called the real leaders of public opinion. Gandhi to Claude Hill, 26 April 1918, Encl. in No. 256a, Chelmsford Papers - 20, IOL.

² Gandhi to Chelmsford, 29 April 1918, No. 260, Ibid.

³ At the Congress session at Delhi, of 1918, Hakim Ajmal Khan as Chairman of the reception committee also referred to the Khilafat issue and thanked Mahatma Gandhi for writing about it to the Viceroy.

...355
received all round support including that of Abdul Bari of Pirangi Mahal. Consequently by November 1919 two separate organisations namely the All India Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind had been founded; these were to be in the vanguard of the Khilafat Movement.1

Mahatma Gandhi advised Muslims at a meeting of the Anjuman-i-Ziaul Islam, Bombay, held on 9 May 1919 to formulate their demands explicitly regarding the Khilafat and the future of Turkey. He took the opportunity to caution them that they should not passively expect to achieve soft terms for Turkey. Therefore, the remedy lay in their joining the Satyagraha movement.2

Keeping in view the Muslim sentiments in India, Lloyd George after obtaining the general approval of the

1. On 20 March 1919 Seth Mian Muhammad Haji Jan Muhammad Chotani founded a Khilafat Committee at Bombay. On 5 July it resolved to establish Khilafat organisation all over India. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind was founded by the Ulema of Deoband and Pirangi Mahal and held its first session at Amritsar. For a recent study of the Khilafat Movement, see Gail Minsolt, op.cit., also see A.C. Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924, (Hague, 1972).

Cabinet, had in a major speech on 5 November 1918, given the following assurance: "Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race." The fulfilment of this pledge became the main plank of the Khilafat Movement in India. Significantly the Turks, too demanded a fulfilment of the Prime Minister's pledge. But the pledge was completely ignored at the Treaty of Sevres and subsequently.

Once Turkish resistance under Mustafa Kemal began to stiffen, there was spontaneous response in India, to the call of Turkish leader and attempts were made to enlist volunteers


2. The Government of India in a resolution on 15 May 1920 (i.e. after the Treaty of Sevres had been signed) asserted that the promise made by the British Prime Minister had not been broken. See Serial No. 22, F.D. File No. 228-Extl, 1922, NAI.

3. When the Turkish National Assembly sent Yusuf Kemal Bey to London, on 18 March 1922 he told Curzon that the Turks wanted only what the British Prime Minister had said on 5 January 1918. Curzon retorted that the Prime Minister made no such promise. Cabinet Memorandum of an interview between Lord Curzon and Yusuf Kemal Bey at Carlton House, 20 March 1922, Ibid.
for an Angora Legion to support the Kemalist cause. An Angora Fund was established to help the Turkish nationalists financially.¹

Nowhere in the world outside Turkey was the Turkish cause supported with such public enthusiasm as in India. The Turks however tended to doubt whether the sentiments of Indian Muslims exercised any effect on the policy of the British towards them.² Mustafa Kemal himself held that though the Indian Muslims spoke up in support of Turkey, they did not really do much in practice for it.

This was surely an ungenerous assessment. Until the abolition of the office of the Khilifa introduced dissensions between Mustafa Kemal and Indian Khilafat leaders, the latter stoutly supported the Turkish cause. Numerous memorials were submitted and delegations pleaded the cause of Turkey before

1. Reading to Peel, 28 September 1922, No. 32, Reading Papers - 238/5, IOL; also see Home Department notes, Home Poll. F, No. 19/1923, NAI. The Bombay Chronicle, 1 February 1922 published a statement of accounts of the Central Khilafat Committee, which showed that Rupees 5,34,857 and 3,75,231 had been remitted to Smyrna and Angora respectively, see P.C. Bamford, History of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements (Reprinted 1974), p. 190.

2. Such views were expressed by the members of the Red Crescent Mission which arrived in Bombay on 6 February 1924, but which had to cut short their visit after the abolition of the Khilafat by Mustafa Kemal (as reported by a Muslim friend of Butler in a letter), Butler to Reading, 18 April 1924, Butler Papers - 116/57, IOL.
the British authorities in India and Britain.\footnote{For example, Indian residents in England submitted a memorial to the Prime Minister on 19 July 1919, the signatories were the Aga Khan, Syed Ameeer Ali, S. Aftab (member India Council), Sir Krishna Gupta of Calcutta, Jamnadas Dwarkadas of Bombay and Mushtir Husain Kidwai. A delegation led by M.A. Jinnah met the Prime Minister on 27 August 1919 on behalf of the All India Muslim League; and the London Muslim League submitted memorials on 25 June 1919 and 4 March 1920. The Aga Khan and Syed Ameeer A. Ali sent six memorials between 1 January 1919 and January 1920 regarding the Turkish settlement. An Indian Khilafat Delegation led by Muhammad Ali met the Prime Minister on 19 March 1920. Syed Hasan Imam, Seth Chotani, Mushtir Husain Kidwai, Dr M.A. Ansari and A. Chaffar submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister at the House of Commons on 24 March 1921.} These approaches had of course little value. But these were backed by a vigorous agitation in India. Muhammad Ali wrote to his brother Shaukat Ali after the failure of his Khilafat Delegation to London and Paris that "we are doing all we can here. But I still insist on telling you that our real work lies in India."\footnote{Muhammad Ali to Shaukat Ali, 21 May 1920. Shaukat Ali Papers - KFML - NF.} On his return in India, he emphasised in a statement that the freedom of India was necessary for the freedom of Islam and suggested an united struggle with his compatriots.\footnote{\textit{Tribune} (Lahore), 9 October 1920.}
In India it is true, the views of the Khilafatists and nationalists were not identical. The former treated the Turkish question as mainly "a religious question," while the latter saw it as a national and military question, though they respected the religious sentiments involved in the issue of their compatriots.1 Mahatma Gandhi saw in the support of the Khilafat a basis for Indian national unity; and under his leadership a 'General Hartal' in defence of the Khilafat was observed in India on 19 March 1920. Muhammad Ali admitted that the Muslims themselves desired an alliance with Mahatma Gandhi 'a great power in India', in their struggle.2 Mahatma Gandhi issued a manifesto on the Khilafat question asserting that "The Khilafat question has now become a question of questions. It has become an imperial question of the first

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1. Muhammad Ali put the matter in a religious setting before Lloyd George on 19 March 1920. He opposed the "independence" of Arabia while Syed Husain (editor of the Independent, Allahabad) explained that they were opposed to Faisal's declaration but wanted complete autonomy for the Arabs in harmony with the claims of the Khilafat. He was more forthright in stating that "they (Indian Muslims) have come to regard the Khilafat issue as a national rather than a sectarian question." (Minutes of Proceedings at a deputation from the Indian Khilafat Delegation to the Prime Minister on 19 March 1920, p. 2210/1920, L/P&S/10/790, 10R). For the nationalist view see Lajpat Rai's signed article "The Turkish Empire" in the Independent (Allahabad), 2 April 1920.

2. See Report of his Faizabad speech, 10 February 1921, GAD, Home Police Department, Serial No. 16, UPSA.
magnitude.\textsuperscript{1} He stressed that Muslims were not claiming anything more than had been promised by Hardinge and Lloyd George. He advised the Viceroy (Chelmsford) to place himself at the head of the Khilafat agitation as Hardinge had done in the South African struggle.\textsuperscript{2} The developments caused deep anxiety to the Viceroy.\textsuperscript{3}

Reading (Viceroy) subsequently did plead the case of the Indian Muslims, although for the very different object of weaning them away from the nationalist movement. After a full consultation with Local Governments, he appealed to the British Government on the eve of the Turkish Conference for a drastic revision of the Treaty of Sevres.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. Gandhi released his Manifesto on 7 March 1920 and published in the \textit{Young India}, 10 March 1920, See CRG, Vol. XIV, No. 54, pp. 73-76.
  \item 2. Commenting on the Government of India's inability to do anything in the matter of the Khilafat, Gandhi stressed "This is a lie. It can do everything". See his Morehbad speech, 11 October 1920, GAD, Home Police Department, Serial No. 10, 1920, UPSA.
  \item 3. He informed India Office that under Gandhi's personal influence the movement had penetrated to the lower strata of the Muslim population so that "sepoys and police must ultimately be affected by virus with which their recruiting grounds and environment are being inoculated --- All these constitute a real and growing danger to the administration". Viceroy to India Office, Telegram, 23 November 1920, P 8419/1920, L/43/10/395, IOR.
  \item 4. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Telegram, 28 February 1922 (Received on 1 March) Serial No. 15, F & Poll. Department, Sec-Ext1., Part I, F. No. 228/1922, NAI.
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In his arriving at this decision considerable influence
seems to have been exercised by Mian Muhammad Shafi, whose
argument had run as follows: "About the ultimate failure of
this campaign of non-cooperation, I for one, have no doubt
whatever. The real danger lies in the ultimate success of the
movement. In these circumstances, what is the correct policy
for us to adopt? what is the right line of action for the
Government and officials to follow in relation to the situ-
tion which is likely to arise in this country." Shafi
suggested that "our officials and Anglo-Indian press, there-
fore, ought to abandon at once the line of justification of
Turkish Peace Terms. What they ought to do, in private to all
Muslim visitors and in public whenever necessary, is to
express their sympathy with the Indian Mussalmans in their
hour of religious sorrow. They should point out to them that
they have had the support of every Englishman in India official
or non-official as well as the Government of India." The
bureaucrats and the loyalists like Shafi were reeling under the
pressure of Non-Cooperation and the Khalifat Movement. Greek
Cunning did not die with Ulysses: Shafi therefore suggested
that "This is the line of policy which is likely to counteract
the machinations of the Extremist Party. And statesmanship
requires us to adopt a line of action which is likely to prove
effective in checkmating those machinations."¹

¹ Private and Personal Memorandum on Turkish Peace
Terms, 18 May 1920, Home Poll. F. No. 197/1, 1923 &
K.W., HAL.
It is interesting to note that the occasion for writing such memoranda was afforded to him by a query from the India Office as to "what will be the attitude of Shafi and Rahimatoola to the Turkish Peace Terms." In his "anxious watchfulness of British interests", Shafi trusted that his advice would not go unheeded. Eventually this was the line of policy adopted to secure the interests of imperialism in India.

The major demands of the Indian Khilafat Movement as summed up by Reading were:

First - evacuation of Constantinople,
Second - Sultan's suzerainty over the Holy Places,
Third - restoration of the Ottoman Thrace including sacred Muslim City of Adrianople and unreserved restoration of Smyrna.

1. Vicerey to India Office, Telegram, 28 February 1922, P 916/1922, L/655/10/353, IOR, also see F. & Poll, Department, Sec-Extl, Part I, P. No. 225/1922, NAI.
Cf. H. Montogomery Hyde, Lord Reading: The Life of Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading (London, 1967), pp. 371-72. We may compare Reading's summary with the memorandum submitted by Syed Hasan Imam which stipulated five points - (1) Constantinople evacuated and left in the hands of the Turks, (2) Thrace not to be given to the Greeks, happy if given to the Turks otherwise constituted as a new state, neutral with a Muslim ruler, (3) Smyrna for economic reasons a necessity for Turkey, (4) the Arab states namely Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and the Hejaz created as independent states freed from outside control, (5) Khaifaa's suzerainty be recognised over all the portions of the territories that had constituted the Ottoman Empire in 1914 (See Minutes, P 1275/1922, L/P&S/10/353, IOR). Hasan Imam particularly

(Footnote continued)
Reading undertook vigorous efforts to pacify Indian Muslims on the Turkish question, by supporting concessions on these demands — "their fulfilment is of the greatest importance to India". He warned "that failure to assuage the Moslem feeling over the revision of the Treaty will have dangerous results to India". The impact of the Non-Cooperation and Khalifat Movement is evident when he urged "that whatever influence HM’s Government may be pleased to exert on Turkey’s behalf should be exerted openly so that Great Britain may claim and win full credit for her attitude throughout Islam. So important is it for the Government of India to range itself openly on the side of Moslem India that we press for permission to publish fore-going forthwith down to words — "greatest importance to India".

The Aga Khan argued that Reading’s terms were "India’s minimum terms and they would have been accepted" "Unless Britain revises her Mohammedan policy", he went on to say, "the greatest revolution in India is inevitable."

(Previous Footnote continued)

referred to Art. 139 of the Treaty which interfered with the position of the Khalifa. Lloyd George countered that the Turks never raised that point. He laid stress on the recognition of Turkish suzerainty. Reading evaded this point and mainly conceded the question of Constantinople and the Holy Places with a view to pacify Muslim religious sentiments.


2. Viceroy to India Office, Telegram 28 February 1922, P 916/1922, I/P&O/10/853, ICR.

3. Daily Telegraph, 2 May 1922.
Reading subsequently explained that his insistence on publishing the telegram was to assure Indian Muslims of the action the Government of India had taken to get their aspirations fulfilled. Reading further pressed Montagu by sending another telegram seeking an early permission to publish the original telegram. He had made up his mind to arrest Mahatma Gandhi within the next few days. Undoubtedly, without Mahatma Gandhi's arrest he could not have achieved the desired ends in view.

George Lloyd the Governor of Bombay had been constantly pressing him, to permit him to arrest Mahatma Gandhi.

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1. Reading's speech at Peshawar, 6 April 1922, (Official Report, Column 561, Foreign & Political Deptt. 1923, F.No. 228-(X), NAI.

We find that Shafi as Law Member of the Viceroy's Council commented on a telegram of the Secretary of State for India dated 11 July 1922 as furnishing "a welcome indication of the fact that at last our representations have begun to have effect and the Cabinet have adopted the right perspective in dealing with this important problem". He noted that "it is indeed refreshing to find that His Majesty's Government are now anxious to frame a formula which to quote the words of the telegram "will in the first place be acceptable to Indian Muslims and fulfill the Prime Minister's pledges." Notes, dated 20 July 1922, Ibid.


3. Reading to Montagu, 9 March 1922, No. 7, Reading Papers, MSS Bur. E. 238/4, IOL.

4. See 5 January 1922, No. 1, Ibid., further, Reading disapproved his action of sending his protest to Montagu without informing him. See his letter 23 February, No. 5, Ibid. For Montagu's reasons for not approving Gandhi's arrest at that stage, see his letter to Montagu, 5 January 1922, No. 1 (Ibid.)
The Viceroy and the British Cabinet were in agreement that his "challenge to the Government of India could not be ignored, that the authority of the Government must be indicated by his (Gandhi's) prosecution".¹ The British Cabinet authorized the Prime Minister to send a personal telegram to the Viceroy that "very prompt action" be taken.² Reading still waited for an opportune time; but this caused disquiet in London: "General regret was expressed" by the British Cabinet, "at the delay which had taken in arresting Gandhi, a policy which the Cabinet had favoured more then three months ago."³ Reading could not ignore it any longer. Seeing the turn of events he tried to make a popular move with the publication of the telegram of 28 February 1922, expecting "that it will cause a definite and open secession of the Mahomedans from the Non-Cooperation." Enjoying the sense of satisfaction and complacency in the Khilafat camp, he wrote to Montagu's successor, "you will remember that the publication of the telegram was two days before the arrest of Gandhi."⁴

¹. Prime Minister in the Chair, 12 October 1921, CAB 23 (27) Cabinet 78(21)-1, Cabinet Papers, PRO.
². 20 October 1921, Cabinet 81 (21), (13, Ibid.)
³. 6 February 1922, Cabinet 8 (22) (4), CAB 23 (29) Ibid.
⁴. Reading to Peal, 13 July 1922, No. 17, Reading Papers - MSS Eur E, 238/5, IOL.

...366
The seeds were laid for alienating the Khilafat Movement from the National Movement, much to the delight of Shafi and other pro-British leaders. Even Abdul Bari and Sheikh Mushir Musain Kidwai expressed appreciation of the Government of India's stand. Montagu had indeed exerted himself all through the Turkish Peace negotiations for a settlement with Turkey. He recalled the Prime Minister's pledge of 5 January 1918 and referred to it on 26 February 1920, and said: "This was not an offer to the Turks --- we have a solemn pledge and they (the Mohammadans of India) accepted it, and they are disturbed at the prospect of our not abiding by it --- There is nothing which would damage British power in Asia more than the feeling that you could not trust the British word. That is the danger. Of course it would be a fatal

1. See Memorandum by Shafi, 20 April 1922, Encl. in Reading to Peal, 26 April 1922, No. 6. Reading Papers - 5, 10L.

2. At a Cabinet meeting where Curzon had expounded his views and opposed any consideration of soft terms for Turkey, Montagu urged strongly that looking at the question from Muslim point of view, neither France nor Italy should be given any mandate. He reminded the meeting that the Indians had a claim to have their views favourably considered as they had supplied the troops through whose agency the Turks had been overthrown. They had sent a million and a quarter men from India to the Eastern theatres of war. The Prime Minister's declaration in regard to leaving the Turk in Constantinople had been largely used during the recruiting in 1916. See Minutes of meeting held on 19 May 1919, CAB 23 (44 B), Cabinet Papers, PRO.
reputation for us."¹ This insistence on his earlier pledge caused so much embarrassment to Lloyd George, that he retorted in a letter to Montagu, dated 25 April 1920: "In fact, throughout the Conference your attitude has often struck me as being not so much that of a member of the British Cabinet, but of a successor on the throne of Aurangzeb -- I am not sure that in your advocacy of the case as viewed by yourself, you have not given encouragement to an agitation in India which if it were to continue might undermine the edifice of Indian Government which you have so carefully reared."² Montague's plea now received support from Reading, and Montagu, therefore, willingly authorized the publication of the telegram as asked for by Reading.³ Curzon and Lloyd George took exception to this; and, as a result, Montagu had to resign from the British Cabinet on 9 March 1922. The real reason, of course, was the position he had taken against the uncompromisingly pro-Greek

¹ Quoted in S.D. Waley, Edwin Montagu: A Memoir and an Account of his visits to India (New Delhi, 1964), p. 246.
² Ibid., p. 246.
³ Reading saved himself by observing: "in as much as I fully appreciated that publication might affect the international situation, we requested the assent of His Majesty's Government ---- " Speech at Peshawar, 6 April 1922, Official Report Column 561, P. & Pol. Deptt. F.No. 228 (X) of 1923, NAI.
policies of Lloyd George.¹

Montagu had to pay a heavy price for his action, though ultimately Turkey was to gain all the major points it was seeking. Montagu felt assured that the peace which we advocated for Turkey, "the peace which I lost office for advocating, now looks like being achieved, but alas, with no credit to the British Government."² In fact, Montagu's point of view was shared not by Reading alone but also by other British officials in India who, being on the spot, felt anxious over the repercussions on India of British policy towards Turkey.

George Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay wrote to Montagu after his resignation that "your unswerving desire to procure a proper settlement of the Turkish Treaty on behalf of Indian Moslems, you cannot be anything but absolutely right."³ He went on to assure him that "all my colleagues here will

1. Lloyd George "had a romantic admiration for ancient Greece, for the Gladstonian tradition, with its concern for minorities, and for Venizelos, "the greatest statesman Greece had thrown up since the days of Pericles." (Thomas Jones, Lloyd George (London, 1951), p. 197. Montagu defended his own action; in an address to his constituents at the Cambridge Liberal Club: "I have never been able to understand from what motive his pro-Greek policy was dictated," The Times, 13 March 1922; see also, Waley, op.cit., p. 279.

continue to press upon your successor or upon any government at home the vital need of recognising the Muslim question out here."¹ The efforts of imperialists in India were directed towards the restoration of British influence on Indian Muslims which had been eroded by the Khilafat Movement and Non-Cooperation led by Mahatma Gandhi. Montagu's resignation even tended to overshadow the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi.

The Aga Khan indeed said with much satisfaction that "the Government of India has espoused their cause is already a great point gained"² by Indian Muslims. Much more was the gain of Mustafa Kemal because the constraints openly imposed on Britain's public and private postures by its anxiety for its position in India, greatly limited the room for manœuvre left to British diplomacy.

Even Lloyd George himself conceded that "the Mohammedans of Turkey have had the advantage of a very powerful and able advocacy (from India), and there are several points which have been modified in the Treaty largely as the result of the intervention of our Mohammedan fellow subjects in India by presenting their case."³

¹ George Lloyd to Montagu, 11 March 1922, Montagu Papers, MSS Eur. D. 529/26, IOL.
² Pionnner Mail, 14 April 1922.
³ Reply to the Deputation led by Syed Hasan Imam, 24 March 1921, P1279/1922, L/PS/10/652, IOR.
The shift in the British position lessened the pressure on Turkey, but did not remove it altogether. Even after Mustafa Kemal had established his position in Anatolia, Great Britain supported the Sultan-Khalifa against the Kemalists and got many of them arrested and deported. Subsequently, the British sent an invitation for the Lausanne talks to the Sultan-Khalifa Wahid ud din Effendi in Constantinople, ignoring the National Government of Angora, in spite of the latter's military successes. Mustafa Kemal saw it as a device of the British to use the Khalifa for their purposes. He retaliated by asking the National Assembly to abolish the Sultanate in November 1922. Although the Assembly allowed the Khilafat to remain in the House of Osman, it elected Abdul Magid Effendi as the new Khalifa. The deposed Sultan Wahid ud din Effendi fled and took refuge on a British battleship.¹

The Khilafatists in India were a little disturbed at the abolition of the Sultanate, but in the light of the collusion of Wahid ud din with Britain, they tended to regard the Kemalist action as inevitable. Dr. M.A. Ansari supported Kemal's action, declaring that Wahid ud din Effendi was sacrificing the interest of his country and would have got Mustafa Kemal "punished with the help of the so called Khilafat

¹ Curzon told the French Prime Minister that in his flight there was no prearranged plot on the part of the British, he escaped from the approaching Kemalists. Harold Nicholson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925 (1934), p. 287.
Army.¹

The occasion did however give rise to a criticism of the basic stand taken by the Khilafat Movement; this was quite possibly encouraged by loyalist elements. Sheikh Mshri Husain Kidwai suggested that the Khilafat Committees be dissolved.² He was opposed to Non-Cooperation Movement and appeared to be turning a loyalist.³ The Bala Akhbar of Lahore, called upon Indian Muslims to reconsider their movement in view of the changes in Turkey, and said it was useless for the Khilafat Committees to carry on their agitation.⁴ (The Zamindar of Lahore opposed the suggestions).⁵

The separation of Sultanate from the Khilafat also gave room to British policy makers for wriggling out "of the necessity of finding the correct formula to carry out Lloyd

¹. See his Presidential Address, All India Khilafat Conference, 9th Session, Gaya, 27 December 1922, Zaidi, op.cit., p. 565. Also see 'Most Secret' extract from the 'Caliphate Question Introductory', Home Pull. No. 60/1923, NAI.

². Zamindar (Lahore), 11 August 1923, RGNRP-Punjab.


⁴. 18 November 1923, RGNRP-Punjab.

⁵. 11 August 1923.
George's pledges of 1918. They could now say that the pledges only covered the office and influence of Khalifa and not the authority of a secular Turkish government.

The successful conclusion of the Lausanne Peace talks, where Kemal's government was fully represented was largely seen in Indian nationalist circles as a triumph over imperialistic ambitions; among others as "the first stage in the renaissance of Islam". The Turkish success was celebrated by all sections of the Indian people. The Muslim members of Indian Legislatures in their address to the Viceroy expressed the belief that "Your Excellency is aware of the high respect and admiration which the Moslem world entertains for Ghazi Mustafa Kemal whose wonderful genius has brought a glorious victory to the Turkish arms." They argued that the Prime Minister was acting against Turkish interests and requested the Viceroy to take up their case with the British Government.

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1. Peel to Reading, No. 2, 10 January 1923, Reading Papers, 138/5, IOR.
2. Muslim Outlook, 28 July 1923, ROHND-Punjab.
4. Address presented on the occasion of Peace Terms, 25 July 1923, P/3162/1923, L/P&3/10/855, IOR.
Reading too heaved a sigh of relief. So far the Kemalist victories had checked the re-emergence of Muslim collaborators and the British policy of using them against the nationalist aspirations in India had not yet got off the ground. This could now change.

Mustafa Kemal successfully completed the second stage of his revolution, when in October 1923, Turkey was formally proclaimed a Republic. Though the threat from the Khalifa and his entourage remained, Kemal's hands were now greatly strengthened against Anglo-French designs and rivals. This had partly been due to the Soviet Russian support. At this juncture the tendency of the Khilafatists to become partisans of the Khalifa greatly irked Kemal and suggested to him that the erstwhile opponents of British imperialism were tending to make use of their credit on that account to thwart the further progress of Turkish nationalism.

1. Earlier he had resolved that once the Turkish problem was over he would try to "keep the Moslem grappled to us." Reading to Peel, 21 September 1922, No. 30, Reading Papers-238/5, IOL.

2. Sheikh Mushir Husain Kidwai writes: "It cannot be denied that at this juncture, the Indian Khilafat Movement, and Bolshevik friendliness strengthened the hands of Kemalists" Pan-Islamism and bolshevism, p. 186.
The House of Osman had discredited itself because of collaboration with the occupying powers. Still the intrigues and machinations went on. Contacts had been established between the forces of reaction in Constantinople and the Khilafatists through Marmaduke Pickthall (a convert to Islam), the editor of Bombay Chronicle, and a member of the Central Khilafat Committee. He wrote to Dr. M.A. Ansari after a meeting with Ismet Pasha that "the central aim of all our propaganda, is being thrust into the background, and unless some work of organization is done quickly, the Khalifa will become a shadow, and his power nil."¹

Later on he visited Constantinople and then wrote to Muhammad Ali:

"There is a very large party in Turkey which regards the separation of the Khalifat from the Turkish Government with great disfavour. They are not what we call Khilafatists, but simply monarchists, conservatists, men loyal to inherited tradition and the ancient dynasty."²

Pickthall, therefore, proposed to bring these elements over to the Khilafatist view, and in Abdul Hajid "there is that solid

¹. Paris, dated 27 June 1923, see Serial No. 89, F. & Poll. Deptt. F.No. 228 (3) X. Extt. HAI.

². Middlesex, 21 August 1923, this letter was censored by the Punjab Government on 9 September, see Serial No. 130, Ibid.
nucleus in Turkey to begin with."¹ He suggested that a delegation should visit Constantinople to seek the Khalifa's blessings, and then contact Angora and extend their missionary work for mobilising support in Central Asia and Afghanistan in the name of the Khalifa.² Earlier, Seth Chotani of the Bombay Khalafat Committee had also sent a letter to Ismet Pasha at Lausanne, outlining the main principles on which the Indian Muslims would like the Khalafat to continue; he advised the Turks to convene a Muslim Conference after the conclusion of the Peace talks.³

Mustafa Kemal too received critical letters from abroad. Abdur Rahman Siddiqi had managed to see the Khalifa; and he also carried a letter from the Khalafat Committee to Kemal. These letters greatly annoyed the Turkish leader, who had begun the preparations for the third stage of his revolution.⁴

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
³. 3, March 1923, Telegram, Serial No. 2, P & Poli. Deptt 1923, P.No. 611-X-Secret, NAI.
⁴. Kemal told the Turkish Deputies: "The Republic must finally become a secular state", that "the Caliph and the remains of the House of Osman must go" (p.250). On another occasion he said "It is time that Turkey looks to herself, ignores Indians and Arabs, rides herself of the leadership of Islam. Turkey has enough to do to look after herself. The Caliphate has sucked us white for centuries" (p. 267), quoted in H.C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf (1932).
After the declaration of the Turkish Republic, the Khalifa was advised to move out of Constantinople, and move to either Brousse or Konia. But he refused and threatened to abdicate. The Constantinople papers published the news that the Khalifa was determined to resign; it caused tremendous excitement and pressmen waited on the Khalifa to ascertain facts. In the meanwhile, Lutfi Fikri Bey, wrote an open letter to the Khalifa, published in the 'Topin' of 10 November 1923, calling upon him to defend his position.\(^1\) Fethi Bey, President of the National Assembly, on the other hand, declared that there was no Khilafat question; it had been settled by the Grand National Assembly. Other Muslims he said, had absolutely nothing to do with it; "we cannot surrender this right to any one."\(^2\)

External pressure on Mustafa Kemal on behalf of the Khalifa began to mount. The Amir of Afghanistan disapproved of the Turkish policy towards the Khilafat. Mustafa Kemal, through his representative in Kabul had previously assured the Amir, that no definite decision has been taken: "it would be considered after the Peace of Lausanne, when a Grand Islamic...\(^3\)

\(^1\) Encl. No. 1, F & Poll. Deptt. Secret - Extl. F.No. 34-X-1924, NAI.

\(^2\) Interview given to the editor of Ileri, 22 November 1923, Home Poll. Deptt. F. No. 197-II of 1923, NAI.

...377
Congress would be held at Broussa or Constantinople.¹

The Indian Khilafat Committee in the meantime demanded that the Khalifa should be allowed full liberty of action and should not be subjected to any authority, and that the Constantinople district should be placed directly under his jurisdiction and control.²

Seeing this the Angora authorities instructed Adnan Bey to conduct a secret-enquiry, with the object of discovering whether the communication of the Indian Khilafat Committee has been sent to Angora at the Khalifa's instigation. He was also required to enquire through the secret police whether the Khalifa was intriguing with any powers, particularly the British.³

At the same time, Mustafa Kemal sent a firm reply to the Indian Khilafat Committee on 27 November 1923, saying:

"I would recommend that you should act with prudence and foresight before reaching to a definite decision on

1. See Notes, Home Poll. Deptt., F.No. 209/1924, NAI.

2. See Notes, Foreign & Poll Deptt., 1923, F.No. 945-X-Secret, NAI.

3. On 19 November 1923, he received a cypher telegram from, which was to be communicated only to Haider Bey, Vali of Constantinople, Ibid.
such an important and delicate issue as that concerning the Khalifa.”

He attributed their erroneous opinion to pernicious propaganda: "I am convinced that this propaganda which is being disseminated by agents of the Khalifa, by Vehideeddin and by the English, is having considerable effect in India.” He expected "sane and more logical decisions on this question”. \(^3\) He promised to explain the actual circumstances through persons who would shortly visit India on his behalf.

Subsequently, a delegation of the Turkish Red Crescent Society arrived in Bombay on 6 February 1924, and was warmly received by Congress and Khilafat volunteers including the Ali Brothers. \(^4\) Apart from allaying their misgivings about the Kemalists, the mission came with the object of collecting donations, which were badly required by the Angora authorities.

Any Khilafat, whether vested in the House of Osman or not, was not consonant with the modern republican structure of

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. The members of the delegation were Dr. Kemal Qmar Bey, Rassikkh Effendi, Bedri Bey and Tzefik Bey. Ibid.
the Turkish state as envisaged by Mustafa Kemal and his supporters. Just about this time a joint letter from the Aga Khan and Syed Ameer Ali, addressed to Ismet Pasha, was published on 24 November 1923 in three leading newspapers of Constantinople, even before they reached their destination.\(^1\) The writers urged that "any diminution in the prestige of the Caliph as a religious factor from the Turkish body politic would mean the disintegration of Islam." They asked that the Khalifah should be placed "on a basis which would command the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations and thus impart to the Turkish State unique strength and dignity."\(^2\)

Mustafa Kemal seized this opportunity to prosecute the press supporting the Khalifa in Constantinople.\(^3\) At the same time he professed to be outraged to see men loyal to British


2. Ibid.

3. On 7 December 1923, the Angora Government sent an "Independence Tribunal" to Constantinople to try the staff of newspapers opposed to the government and supporting the Khalifa. The editors were imprisoned but later released Lutfi Fikrî Boy was sentenced to five years; he too was pardoned. See F. & Poll. Deptt., F. No. 228(3)-K, Ext1., secret, 1923, NAI.
imperialism advising Turkish nationalists on their policies—more so "a Shii and a Khojeh telling the Turkish Muslims how to behave".¹ Ismet Pasha ridiculed the Aga Khan and Syed Ameer Ali for not possessing "right knowledge and experience to forward observations and suggestions from a religious point of view".² The letter was dismissed as the product of an attempt of the British to cause Schism in Turkey under the cover of the Khilafat.³

This point of view found an echo in India as well. The Janiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, condemned "the propagandist activities of the enemies of Islam" and deplored the fact "that even some Mohammedans have allowed themselves to be used by the enemies of Islam for this purpose".⁴ Kidwai thought that the Kemalists were justified in questioning the bona fides of Aga Khan and Syed Ameer Ali. But he asserted that "the matter of Khilafat was too serious to be dealt with precipitously on the spur of the moment."⁵

4. See Zaidi, op.cit., p. 536.
The Khilafat Committee and the Indian National Congress resolved to send a Khilafat delegation to Turkey to present the Indian point of view to Mustafa Kemal. But it was already much too late. The very emphasis on the Khilafat's "link with the past and with Islam" gave sufficient reasons to Mustafa Kemal to abolish it.¹

On 3 March 1924, the Grand National Assembly abolished the Khilafat - "The Caliph is deposed. Functions of Caliph being essentially included in meaning and connotation of government and republic, office of Caliph is abolished."² The abolition was seen by many Muslims as creating a vacuum in the religious structure of Islam. But Sherif Husain's assumption of the Khilafat was not generally approved by Indian Muslims.³ However, Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal sent a telegram to the Sherif Husain congratulating him on his assumption of the office of Khilafat.⁴

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2. See in Lindsay to Foreign Office, Constantinople, 8 March 1924, No. 57, F. & Poll, Deptt. Secret-Extl., F.No. 34-X-1924, NAI.

3. Zamindar (Lahore), 30 April 1924, ROJSP- Punjab, the All India Khilafat Conference held at Calcutta on 19 March 1924, condemned his action. Zaidi, op.cit., p. 620, also P2150/1924, L/P&S/10/1111, JOR.

4. Saying 'which office you so deserved assumed', Telegram, dated 13 March 1924, Serial No. 95, F & Poll. Department, F.No. 34-X, 1924, NAI.
The news of the abolition of the Khilafat caused grief and consternation among Indian Muslims. Kemal's struggle for national liberation had widely been interpreted as being simultaneously a struggle in the defence of the Khilafat. In spite of the establishment of a republic in October 1923, the Khilafatists had not fully realised the main trend in Turkish politics. In fact, Muhammad Ali expected that the "valiant and God fearing Turks" will revive the Khilafat.¹ The abolition of the Khilafat now gave an opportunity to even those who had upheld the British cause and opposed the Khilafat movement to shed tears for the deceased institution. Muhammad Shafi, a pro-British conservative Muslim, pronounced the abolition of the Khilafat to be a "suicidal step on the part of Turkey and great blow to the solidarity of Islam."² Without apparent irony, Shafi could still say: "Truly Indian Mussalmans have been let down by the Turks."³ Similar views came from Mushir Husain Kidwai who dubbed the abolition as the 'capital blunder' of Mustafa Kemal.⁴ He called the Kemalists


2. Note from the Diary, 5 March 1924, quoted in Afzal Iqbal, Life and Times of Mohamed Ali, p. 325.

3. Ibid.

"brainless" to have thrown away the Khilafat on their own accord. Instead of utilising the political platform of pan-Islamism he was unnecessarily adopting a policy to antagonise his own people. He protested that while even Mussolini had reconciled the Italian state with the Pope, Mustafa Kemal had decided to abolish the Khilafat.¹

In these circumstances, the Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema jointly appealed to the Turkish National Assembly to reconsider its decision, so far as it related to the abolition of the office of the Khalifa. They entirely dissociated themselves from any desire to intervene in Turkish affairs, but they urged for the re-establishment of the Khilafat, and asked for an opportunity to a delegation of Indian Muslims to visit Angora and make a fuller representation on the subject.² Mustafa Kemal, however, refused to carry on any negotiations on this decision.³

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1. Ibid., p. 147.


3. At the meeting of the Khilafat Working Committee a telegram from Angora was read conveying that the decision was in the interest of the Khilafat and Turkish territory was unalterable and no negotiations will be carried on. But Indian Muslims would be welcome. So, the idea to visit Iraq, Hejaz, and Palestine was dropped. Report dated 18 May 1924, F. & Poll, Deptt. Secret-Extl, F. No. 34-X of 1924, and Home Poll. Deptt. F.No. 167 of 1924, NAI.
The Government of India, in consultation with the British Government, refused, on its part, to give permission to any delegation from India to any of the Turkish succession states. Nor would they allow any convicted person to go to Turkey; obviously, this was aimed at excluding the Ali Brothers, Yakub Hasan, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Husain Ahmad Madni; permission would not also be given to any Hindu.¹

Thereupon, at the Khilafat Working Committee meeting at Bombay on 10 May 1924, Shaukat Ali proposed alternative names for the Angora deputation.²

The Central Khilafat Committee again met at Delhi on 23 June 1924, to discuss the directions to be given to the members of the Khilafat deputation to Angora. Shaukat Ali denounced the abolition of Khilafat as a breach of religious injunctions and wanted Abdul Majid restored at least as a President of the Assembly. He attributed selfish motives to Mustafa Kemal, and he felt that Kemal should not hold the office of the President in case the office of the Khilafat was to be vested in the President.³ Muhammad Ali too called

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¹. Telegram, Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, 7 March 1924, F & Poll. Deptt. Secret-Extl. F.No. 34-X of 1924, NAI.

². The proposed delegation now was to comprise Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. M.A. Ansari, Seth Abdulla Haroon, Maulana Suleiman Nadvi, T.A.K. Sherwani and Muhammad Hammaduke Pickthall; and Chaudhry Khaliq-uzzaman as Secretary. Ibid., and Home Poll. Deptt. F.No. 167 of 1924, NAI.

³. Ibid.
Kemal "la mezhab" (irreligious) and a traitor to the cause of Islam, who had greatly embarrassed the Indian supporters of Turkey. The other members of the Khilafat Working Committee resented this outburst on the part of the Ali Brothers. The Committee thought it impolitic to demand the restoration of Abdul Majid. After all the Muslims had earlier accepted the deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid and banishment of Wahiduddin as being in the interest of Islam.

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema members Maulana Husain Ahmad Madni and Kifayatullah also strongly opposed the views of Ali Brothers, and were unwilling to denounce Mustafa Kemal and his supporters - "the Turkish statesmen and politicians who are at the helm of affairs knew their business better than the Muslims of India who are thousands miles away from the scene." Muhammad Ali thereupon made some slighting remarks on the judgement of Ulema, which he later withdrew.

The Central Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema then decided to get into touch with Sheikh-ul-Ashar and Zagiul Pasha asking for Egyptian Muslim's support in their efforts to get the Khilafat re-established in Turkey. They felt that in the event the Turks did not respond to the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CKC meeting at Delhi on 26 June 1924, Ibid.
wishes of the Muslims, the future of the Khilafat ought to be settled by a World Muslim Conference to be held at Cairo.¹

The dissension within the Khilafat leadership now came into the open. Compared with the Ali Brothers the reaction of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was extremely moderate. He was against forcing the Turks to review and change their decisions. He thought that the Khilafat continues to exist and still resided in the Turkish government!²

Muhammad Iqbal, the poet, too approved of the developments in Turkey. To him the abolition of the Khilafat was an act of proper jihād, and he personally believed "that Turkish view is perfectly sound". He averred:

"The truth is that among the Muslim nations of today Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slumber, and attained to self consciousness. She alone has claimed her right of intellectual freedom --- suggesting new points of view --- fresh interpretations --- the Turk is on the way to creating new values. The question which confronts him today, and which is likely to confront other Muslim countries in the near future is whether the law of Islam is

¹. See Reports Home Poll, Deptt. F.No. 167 of 1924, and F.No. 209 of 1924, NAI.

². He wrote a series of articles to this effect in the Zaminder (Lahore) 11 and 15 May and 8 and 11 June 1924.
capable of evolution --- (This) is sure to be answered in the affirmative, ---

This was totally opposed to the opinion of Muhammad Ali who considered the law of Islam as immutable. 2

The resolution to abolish the Khilafat by the Turkish National Assembly was certainly a radical step. Its significance was lauded by M.N. Roy, the Communist and radical humanist remarking: "Neither the papacy of the Roman Church nor the patriarchate of the Greek Church was ever abolished by any bourgeois revolution. They were only deprived of all influence over the State." 3

Niyazi Berkes observes that traditional power groups in Constantinople had begun to dream of a British protectorate over the Ottoman Khilafat and he alleges that this idea was expressed indirectly by Muhammad Ali both before and after the war. 4 But this is an unfair assessment of Muhammad


Ali's views; he never contemplated a British dominated Khilafat, however much his support for the Khalifa's office might objectively have helped the pro-British elements in Constantinople.

The ideas of the Khilafatists in so far as they stood against the secular ideals of Turkish Nationalism, tended to support the continuation of a reactionary social and political order. Muhammad Ali could not resolve this dichotomy to the detriment of the future of his own people.

Mustafa Kemal's experience and objectives were naturally different from what Kidwai, the Ali Brothers and other Khilafatists wished him to adopt. He seems to have anticipated them as early as December 1921, he averred:

Everyone of our compatriots and co-religionists may nourish a high ideal in his mind; he is free to do so, and no one will interfere. The government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has a firm, positive, material policy and that, gentlemen, is directed to the preservation of life and independence — within defined national frontiers

Further

--- We are not men who run after great fantasies and present a fraudulent appearance of doing things which in
fact we cannot do --- without actually doing them. We have brought the hatred, rancour, and malice of the whole world on this country and this people. We did not serve pan-Islamism --- we did not serve pan-Turanianism."¹

Mustafa Kemal refused to go beyond the limits and responsibilities he had set for his people, and thereby not to "increase the number of our enemies and pressures upon us."²

This realistic attitude was supplemented by a rather contemptuous attitude towards Turkey's own supporters. In the words of Ismet Pasha "If Constantinople is today in our hand, it is because we have fought to the death the Greeks and the Khalif. If other Moslems have shown sympathy for us, this was not because we had the Khalif, but because we have been strong."³ Ismet Pasha might be correct in his assumption of Turkish strength, but absolutely wrong in his contention for the Indian support to Turkey was, of course, never in any expectation of the Turk's ability to help any


one in India.  

Placed as they were, the Kemalists by their action took the risk of alienating the sympathies of the Muslims; but it is possible that they expected to moderate British antipathies towards them. By abolishing the Khilafat, Kemal sought to prove that the pan-Islamist ambitions of Turkey were dead, and thereby assure Great Britain to have no fears on this count. Ismet Pasha hoped that "it is not only British but also French and Italian suspicions" which would be dissipated by this measure. The Kemalists chalked out a policy which aimed at conciliating England and avoiding difficulties with the Allies. Great Britain appears to have reciprocated Turkish overtures by refusing passports to the

1. Shafi called: "This is absolute nonsense". Note from the Diary, quoted in Afzal Iqbal, op. cit., p. 325.

2. Lindsay, the British representative in Constantinople, derived this impression from the Turkish overtures through Adnan Bey, with special regard to impending negotiations on Mosul. Lindsay to Ramsay MacDonald, 8 March 1924, No. 28, F. & Poll. Deptt. Secret-Extl. P.No. 36(X) of 1929, NAI.

3. In February Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha went to Smyrna and had a Conference with the Senior Military Commanders and discussed foreign policy and the Mosul questions. Ismet Pasha spoke on the necessity of banishing the then Khalifa and of the suppression of the Khilafat. Summary of Report Home Poll, Deptt. P.No. 209 of 1924, NAI.
Khilafat deputation for visiting Turkey or any of the Muslim states. Thus Britain prevented any direct contacts of the Khilafat Movement with the Turkish leaders which would doubtless have proved embarrassing to the latter.