Chapter V

1914: BRITAIN AT WAR WITH TURKEY: THE IMPACT IN INDIA

As the war of 1914 drew near, the prospects of a war between Turkey and Britain caused grave forebodings among Indian Muslims. How they would have remained at peace with the Young Turks and how the imperialists and pan-Islamists would have been reconciled to each other remains a matter of conjecture. A direct confrontation between Turkey and Britain would place all pro-Turkish or pan-Islamic loyalties to the most crucial test.

I

In July 1914, Britain had warned Germany that they would not remain neutral in a war between Germany and France; but hostilities did not begin until 4 August. This was a period of great uncertainty for the Government of India as well as the Indian Muslims. Immediately on 1 August Reginald Craddock, the Home Member of the Viceroy's Council prepared a memorandum in which he identified possible sources of trouble and discontent; and suggested four principles on which the Government policy might be based.¹ He analysed the reaction to the war among various classes of India divided by heredity, status occupation and education as well as religion.

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¹ See Craddock's Memorandum, 1 August 1914, Home Poll Deposit, August 1914, No. 1, NAI.
In his opinion the Hindus as a religious group were not likely to be affected by the war in any way. The Parsis would be on the side of the government. But with the Sikhs and Muslims the case would be different. Yet he was confident that there would be neither any organised action nor any combination against the British in India. However, if "the course of this particular war may so develop as to have far reaching effects on Islam," then "the general attitude of India to British rule" would become potentially serious.\(^1\) This would be the case, when it would appear that the Allies had been aiming at the dismemberment of Turkey, and the Axis power assuming the role of its protector, the position of Britain in India would not only be awkward but dangerous. Under the circumstances the nationalists and revolutionaries would attempt to win over the Muslims for their cause. Delhi's options in such circumstances, were bound to be limited. At best the Government of India would "at least prevent this possibility being used as an irritant by disaffected Pan-Islamists before the actual occurrence of any such eventuality, or religious fanaticism being aroused."\(^2\) Therefore, he suggested a close watch on and supervision of the activities of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. His general understanding was that, until any religious question arose in an acute form, the British would receive the support of Muslims.

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
The four principles of the government policy proposed by Craddock were, first, an expression of trust in the loyalty of the Indian people; secondly, preservation of regular administration in India on routine lines, with normal functioning continuing; thirdly, an avoidance of all measures suggesting panic or tending to repression except when called for, and lastly, to move rapidly in suppressing all acts of disorder or violence. He suggested that immediately on the declaration of war between Britain and Germany, the Viceroy would make a statement in the Legislative Council. With regard to repressive measures the Government of India was already armed with the Press Act, Seditious Meetings Act, the Regulation III of 1818 and Martial law in reserve. With such vast powers, Craddock thought, the authorities would cope with any situation in India.

Hardinge was in full agreement with Craddock on the principles, but he decided against their communication to the Local Governments (as had been suggested by Craddock) for fear of leakage and giving undue impression of government anxiety over the situation.1

Among the members of the Viceroy's Council Harcourt Butler and Syed Ali Imam commented on the Memorandum. Butler noted that the war would give Muhammad Ali and others "a golden

1. See Minutes by Hardinge, 5 August 1914, Ibid.
opportunity, and war funds a great source of income and advertisement," just as "the Khuddam-i-Kaaba, i.e., Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali and Abdul Bari (had seized) a great opportunity over the Haj." Butler was generally sympathetic to the conservative elements among Muslims, and held Muhammad Ali and his friends in considerable contempt. The reference to their misappropriation of funds was a common talking point with the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy at this time, and it was easy to see militant Muslim politics purely in the light of a monetary opportunism.

Nevertheless, Butler identified the area from "Lahore to Lucknow", where Muslim response would be aggressive and sympathetic in the event of Turkey being drawn into the war. During the Aqaba crisis a loyal Muslim had told him that he could not sleep for nights fearing a war between Britain and Turkey, "in which case he would have to choose between the British Government and his Caliph." The Muslims of this zone were, however, isolated from the rest of India, and Butler noted that in the past their attempt to bring Turkey and

1. Note by Butler, 6 August 1914, Ibid., see above chapter III for the views earlier held by Butler.

2. Francis Robinson has primarily relied upon Butler's views for his conclusion that the entire politics of Muhammad Ali was based on self-aggrandisement and to live on funds. See his, Separatism among Indian Muslims, pp. 210-11.
Afghanistan closer had failed.¹

Syed Ali Imam partly concurred with Butler's views and expected some excitement among Muslims with regard to Turkey. But he saw no prospects of disturbance since they had been "scattered, unorganised, leaderless and religiously and socially isolated from the bulk of the population."²

The Local Governments had been advised to remain vigilant and apprise Delhi with the situation in response to the war and its developments.³ In September it was decided to direct them to obtain prompt declarations of loyalty and support from leading Muslim organisations, anjumans, and influential Muslims.⁴ At the same time directed to be careful and give no impression of official initiative.

Hardinge was aware that in India there was certain distrust for Reuters. So he laid stress on having Press Bureau telegrams from London for the dissemination of news. Involved in this suggestion was the Government of India policy to

1. Note of Butler, 6 August 1914, Home Poll. Deposit, August 1914, No. 1, NAI.

2. Note of Syed Ali Imam, 8 August 1914, Ibid.


4. Secretary, Government of India, Home Department to Chief Secretaries of Local Governments, 6 September 1914, Home Poll, A, November 1914, Nos. 1-27, NAI.
decide locally which news they would allow for publication.¹ Hardinge decided that immediately on the declaration of war with Turkey he would personally make a public announcement and considered it essential to proclaim on the authority of the British Government that in this war no religious question was involved and the Holy Places of Arabia and Jeddah and the Holy shrines in Mesopotamia would be immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces so long as there was no interference with Haj pilgrimages undertaken by pilgrims from India to these places. At the request of British Government, the Governments of France and Russia gave similar assurances. Hardinge believed these statements would propitiate the feelings of Muslims.² He got the communique prepared in which the facts were so placed that it would appear that Britain had made all efforts to secure Turkish neutrality and offered guarantee to its integrity and independence.

Hardinge expected that the Khalifa of Turkey would certainly declare jehad against Britain in order to enlist the support of Muslims of India. He therefore called on the Nizam of Hyderabad to stand forth as the spokesman of Indian Muslims and exert his influence over them, and declare the cause of

1. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Telegram, 30 August 1914, Home Poll. A. November 1914. Nos.1-7, NAI.

2. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Telegram, 30 August 1914, Home Poll. A. November 1914. Nos.1-7, NAI.
Britain "both right and just" against Turkey. He addressed similar letters to the Begum of Bhopal and the Nawab of Rampur.

About this time Mallet, the British Ambassador at Constantinople suggested to the Foreign Office the desirability of an announcement from "the leaders of Muslim opinion" in particular the Nizam. Possibly he wanted to use them to thwart German propaganda in Turkey of anti-British and revolutionary conditions existing in India. Hardinge rather curtly ignored this suggestion, nor did he approve of touching the question of Khilafat as it "would be playing into the hands of the pan-Islamists." Moreover he argued that the British hands would be tied down when "the Turks were expelled by Arabs from the Holy Places in the event of war with Turkey." He stressed above all that it was "in India that we have to consider the effect of Turkey's attitude rather than in Constantinople." Crewe in India Office concurred with Hardinge.

1. Hardinge to Nizam of Hyderabad, 7 September 1914, Enclosure in Ibid.

2. Foreign Office to India Office, 11 September 1914, P 3548/1914, L/PS/10/472, IOR. Mallet also demanded from Delhi a list of Turkish Emissaries who visited India between 1913 and 1914 and had carried on anti-British propaganda amongst Indian Muslims. The Viceroy in his reply stated that S.M. Tewfik Bey of Constantinople, Tewfik Shukri and Abdul Majid, fall in this category. Viceroy to British Ambassador, Constantinople, Telegram, 5 October 1914, Pro. No. 205, Home Poll. A, December 1914, Nos. 195-214, NAI.

3. Viceroy to Mallet, 23 September 1914, Telegram, P 3712/1914, L/PS/10/472, IOR.; also see Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 17 January 1915, Pro. No. 448, F.D. Sec-War, May 1915, Nos. 433-52, NAI.
Hardinge had been stressing in his correspondence with India Office and others, that the declaration of war should be allowed to come from Turkey even if it meant certain military disadvantage to Britain. Just then he was ordered to despatch troops to Abadan to protect the oil establishments there. Hardinge strongly deprecated the orders as these amounted to a disregard of Turkish neutrality and would play into German hands. "If I am to keep the Mahommedan quiet and loyal, there must be no provocative action against the Turks on the part of either our ships or troops --- I have pointed out --- serious flaws in the policy --- proposed."  

Having prevented such provocations as best he could at the beginning Hardinge successfully steered Indian public opinion into support for the war with all its costs in resources and man-power though no direct interest of India was involved.

1. Hardinge to Crewe, 20 August 1914, No. 41, Hardinge Papers - 120. It is interesting to note that this was also the insistence of the Aga Khan, Chirol to Hardinge, 7 October 1914, No. 288, Hardinge Papers-93, CUL.

2. Hardinge to Nicholson, 8 October 1914, No. 230, Hardinge Papers - 93, CUL.

3. Hardinge to Chirol, 8 October 1914, No. 230a, Hardinge Papers - 93, CUL.

4. Hardinge had despatched 200,000 troops by mid-September, see Hardinge to Chirol, 21 October 1914, No. 236, Hardinge Papers - 93, CUL.
The Local Governments had been directed to keep a close and strict watch on the pro-Turkish and pro-German sympathies, and these generally reported quiet conditions before the actual entry of Turkey into war. The districts of western Punjab had been "undoubtedly loyal", while the central and southern districts had an exaggerated idea of Turkish military strength. But in the event of a war with Turkey there would be passive hostility among Muslims for the British in the Punjab.¹

In Delhi till the end of August there was not much adverse reaction; but Hailey, believed that the Muslims had just begun to realise the significance of the situation. Muhammad Ali was condemned by him for his Comrade article of 12 August, but he felt that having "satisfied the demands of an exacting conscience (Muhammad Ali) would not cast further doubts on British policy".²

In the United Provinces the situation was expected to be delicate. Nonetheless the general feeling appeared to be on the side of the British against Germany. Trouble could come only from journalists and agitators. The authorities

1. A.B. Kettlewell, Chief Secretary, Punjab to Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 31 August 1914, Home Poll. Deposit, September 1914, No. 3, NAI.

2. Hailey, Chief Commissioner, Delhi to Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 31 August 1914. Ibid.

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particularly noted that since the war the importance of Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal had considerably increased. The Seiyara (Lucknow) and its editor Syed Shabbir Hasan was a brother of Syed Wazir Hasan, came under scrutiny. The loyalist Muslims complained against the provocative tone of the Zamindar and Hamdar. Much of the Hindi press appeared to be pro-German. The editor of the Abhyudaya (Allahabad) was warned.

The Bihar authorities complained against the influence of Al-Hilal and Comrade. Bombay expected some excitement among lower class Muslims. In south India it was thought that the Moplahs would "probably consider themselves bound to Turkey if she were at war with England", yet expected no active expression of sympathy.

1. Chief Secretary, U.P. to Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 31 August 1914, Ibid.

2. The paper was started after the closer of the Muslim Gazette (Lucknow) of Wahid-ud-Din Salim.

3. R. Burn to Wheeler, 27 November 1914, Home Poll. Deposit, December 1914, No. 32, NAI. The District Magistrate of Dehradun warned Mahendra Pratap for one of his article in his Nirbal Sewak (Dehradun) for being pro-German, and had to deposit Rs. 500 as guarantee, see Mahendra Pratap, My Life Story, p. 36.

4. Chief Secretary, Bombay to Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 29 October 1914, Home Poll. Deposit, November 1914, No. 34, NAI.

5. Chief Secretary, Madras to Wheeler, Government of India, Home Department, 1 September 1914, Home Poll. Deposit, December 1914, No. 3; see also, F.Rt. Home Poll. Deposit, December 1914, No. 29, NAI.
A directive was issued to the Local Governments that no pan-Islamic propaganda was to be tolerated. The Jahangir İslam, a weekly pan-Islamic newspaper published from Constantinople was under watch since May 1914, later on it was prohibited.

Valentine Chirol of The Times dealing with the India desk was supplied every Wednesday the extracts of the native newspapers and other reports confidentially by the Government of India. It was an arrangement to which Hardinge attached importance.

Hardinge expressed satisfaction with the declarations of loyalty by Muslims holding meeting throughout India and urging Turkey to remain neutral: "Nothing could be more satisfactory and I feel that the bread which I cast upon the waters at Cawnpore a year ago is being gathered fairly

1. Secretary, Government of India, Home Department to All Local Governments and Administration, Telegram, 20 August 1914, Pro. No. 5, Home Poll. A, November 1914, Nos. 1-27, NAI.

2. See Pro. No. 262, W.Rt. of DCI, 28 July 1914, Home Poll. B, August 1914, Nos. 259-262, NAI.

3. See Notes, Home Poll. B, November 1914, Nos. 306-7, NAI.

4. Chirol desired this arrangement mainly to counteract German propaganda against British policies and internal situation of the British Empire, to which Germany would make attempts to inflame. See Home Poll. A, November 1914, Nos. 33-38; also see Home Poll. A, January 1915, Nos. 275-76, NAI.
abundantly at present."¹ Hardinge was convinced that Turkey would pay no attention to appeals by Indian Muslims for neutrality.² But he was determined, unlike in the Balkan War days, "not to be defeated by Mahomed Ali and such a crew".³ He was confident that he would face the situation and threat of any trouble on Turkey's joining war against Britain.⁴

II

On 4 August 1914 when war broke out between Britain and Germany, there was a general spate of expressions of loyalty to Britain. The ruling princes vied with each other in placing their personal services and resources at the disposal of the

¹. Hardinge to Crew £, 11 November 1914, No. 58, Hardinge Papers - 120, CUL.

². Ibid., 3 September 1914, No. 43.

³. Hardinge to Chirol, 21 October 1914, No. 236, Hardinge Papers - 93, CUL.

⁴. He wrote to Holderness in the India Office: "I am not even afraid of the attitude of the Mohammedans in the event of war with Turkey, 21 October 1914, Hardinge Papers - 120, CUL.
Viceroy. There was a call even in the nationalist press that for the time being all internal dissensions should cease to save the authorities from embarrassment. Muhammad Ali of the Comrade proclaimed on behalf of the Muslims: "They have little enthusiasm for war in Europe, but they recognise their responsibilities." The Muslims were prepared even to forget the past wrongs done to Turkey and the Muslims in India:

"Whether Great Britain has respected Indian Muslim feelings in her dealings with Turkey, Persia, Mesopotamia, Morocco or not --- whether in the annulment of the partition of Bengal the Muslims were treated with due consideration for loyalty--- we say that, irrespective of any or all of these considerations --- we shall remain loyal."  

1. The rulers of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Kishangarh and Nawanagar even went to the battle front, and the Nizam of Hyderabad donated ₹60 lakhs as the expenses of war, while the ruler of Mysore gave ₹50 lakhs and a regiment of Lancers. The Scindia and the Begum of Bhopal a hospital ship called "Loyalty". For details see Press release by Secretary, Foreign Department, F.D. Genl., Deposit, June 1916, No. 16, NAI.  

2. For example the nationalist papers like the Bengalee, Amrit Bazar Patrika of Calcutta, the Panjabee of Lahore and the liberal Muslim paper the Observer of Lahore. See W. At. of the DCI, 11 and 18 August 1914, Pro. Nos. 624 and 625, Home Poll. B, September 1914, Nos. 623-25, NAI. See also the Comrade (Delhi), 12 August 1914, whereas the All India Muslim League decided not hold its session during the war, Leader (Allahabad), 30 October 1914.  

3. Comrade (Delhi), 12 August 1914.
In another issue of his paper he went so far as to say:

"Whatever our grievances, whatever reforms we desire, everything must wait for a more reasonable occasion. Even if the Government were to concede to us all that we ever desired or dreamt,"  

Likewise Zafar Ali Khan, in his Zamindar advised the Muslims to give practical proof of loyalty. He attempted to allay the belief held by a certain section of Muslims that Germany was friendly to Islam and quoted remarks of the Kaiser in which he had deprecated the spread of Islam. He appealed to the well known formula that Islam inculcates loyalty to their rulers. The Deoband and Nadwat-ul-Ulema, the two seats of Islamic learning also passed resolutions of loyalty.

In Al-Hilal, Abul Kalam Azad gave a far less favourable assessment of Britain in the rights and wrongs of the European conflict. He argued that it had been England's policy to

1. Comrade (Delhi), 14 October 1914.
2. Zamindar (Lahore), 9 August 1914, cited in Home Poll. A, November 1914, Nos. 33-38, NAI.
3. Ibid., 12 August 1914.
4. Ibid., 18 August 1914.
5. F. Rt. Home Poll. Deposit, October 1914, No. 61, NAI.
6. Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 12 August 1914.
gain friends by permitting the spoliation of the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{1}

Since the paper presented Germany in more favourable way and predicted that Turkey would make efforts to regain some of her lost possessions, the Government of Bengal served a warning on the editor.\textsuperscript{2}

The \textit{Hablul Matin} of Calcutta in a similar vein asserted: "The Sultan of Turkey is not only a reigning sovereign but also the spiritual head of the Islamic world. He is the Caliph --- as such his authority extends beyond his dominions. His wishes are regarded as binding by Muslims of other countries, who do not owe him any political allegiance."\textsuperscript{3} The paper opined that it was for this reason that the powers adopted "a temporising and vacillating" policy towards the Porte.\textsuperscript{4}

The \textit{Paisa Akhbar} of Lahore initiated a discussion on what attitude Indian Muslims should adopt in the event of Turkey joining in the war. The paper advised them to remain loyal to Britain.\textsuperscript{5} The \textit{Hamdard} (Delhi) observed that by presenting one

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Al-Hilal} (Calcutta), 5 August 1914.
\item \textit{W.Rt.}, of DCI, September 1914, Home Poll, B. December 1914, Nos. 216-17, NAI.
\item \textit{Hablul Matin} (Calcutta), 3 August 1914, cited in Home Poll. A. November 1914, Nos. 33-38, NAI.
\item Ibid.
\item \textit{Paisa Akhbar} (Lahore), Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
sided views it would create unnecessary excitement among Muslims and such discussions were inopportune. However, the Hamdard and the Habilul Matin and some other papers held that whatever the result of the war, in any case the comparative importance of Turkey would increase.

The loyalist Muslims in Bengal had warned Turkey that if she decided to side with Germany they would support their sovereign Britain. It was expected that Aligarh would also pass a resolution on similar lines. Aftab Ahmed Khan and Nawab Muzzamil-ullah held a meeting in August and wanted to pass a resolution appealing to Turkey to remain neutral, while urging the British Government to honour Turkish neutrality. But the meeting dispersed without passing any resolution, much to the annoyance of the local authorities.

1. Hamdard (Delhi), 6 September 1914, Ibid.

2. The Hamdard remarked that the victors and vanquished would be paralysed and would have hardly enough strength left to support themselves. While the state which remained aloof would have every opportunity for making progress. For this reason Turkey ought to keep herself out of the present war. 28 August 1914.

3. Sheikh Abdullah, trustee of the Aligarh College consulted the District Magistrate whether there would be any objection if the above stated resolution was passed at the meeting. Upon enquiry later on by the District Magistrate Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad explained that it was considered not expedient to say anything about the attitude of Turkey. For the District Magistrate reported: "Too shocking and regrettable that Aligarh preferred to sit on the fence and hesitated to take lead when such an exceptional opportunity occurred." For reference to the Bengal resolution and report of the meeting, See Encl. in the F.Rt. of Chief Secretary, U.P. to Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 15 September 1914, Home Poll. Deposit, October 1914, No. 61, NAI.
Immediately after the outbreak of the general war in Europe Turkey had made a declaration of her neutrality. Muhammad Ali wrote: "To us, who are at a distance, it seems to be the safest and on the whole the next satisfactory position for Turkey to adopt and maintain."¹

The feelings of Indian Muslims underwent several changes. So long the war was confined between Austria and Serbia, their sympathies had been with Austria, on account of the recent hostilities between Serbia and Turkey. When Russia and Germany joined the war their natural sympathy was in favour of Germany, owing the memory of the Russo-Turkish war.² When England entered the war Indian Muslims' sympathy veered round to her side. Abdulla Mamun Suhrawardy endeavoured to organise a Red Crescent Mission of Muslim volunteers to help the British troops.³ Some still spoke highly about Germany and considered her a friend of Muslims; and there was some expectation that Turkey might join Germany in the war.⁴ The Saiyara of Lucknow observed that if this happened Indian Muslims would be placed in

¹ Comrade (Delhi), 26 August 1914.

² Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), 10 September 1914, RONNP-Punjab.

³ Pro. No. 623, 11 August 1914, Home Poll. B., September 1914, Nos. 623-25, NAI. The Trustees of the MAO College offered the services of five hundred students for the Ambulance Corps. F.Rt. Home Poll. Deposit, September 1914, No. 3, NAI.

⁴ Saiyara (Lucknow), 13 and 21 August 1914, RONNP-UP.
a a great dilemma.¹

The general wish of the Muslims was that Turkey should remain neutral in the war.² Therefore, appeals had been made to it, and in this regard the lead was given by thirty two Muslims of Bengal including Nawab Salimullah of Decca by despatching a telegram to the Grand Vizier expressing their gratification at Turkish neutrality and at British assurance of respecting her integrity and independence.³ The Panjabee of Lahore hoped that the example set by the Bengal Muslims would be followed by Muslims all over India.⁴ Dr. M.A. Ansari and Muhammad Ali also sent a telegram to Talaat Bey on 23 August declaring that "it would be disastrous for Turkey and the entire Moslem world if Turkey does not maintain strictest neutrality. We entreat you think a thousand times before launching into war, in case of war between Turkey and England our condition also will be extremely sad. Please convey —

¹. Saiyara (Lucknow), 29 August 1914, RONNP-UP.

². Indian Daily Telegraph (Lucknow), 28 August 1914, Ittehad (Amroha), 28 August 1914, Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 1 September 1914, RONNP-UP; Islamic Mail (Bombay), 13 September 1914, RONNP-Bombay.

³. This was appreciated by the Tribune (Lahore), 28 August 1914, see also D.O. Letter of Cumming, Chief Secretary, Bengal, to Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 31 August 1914, Home Poll. Deposit, September 1914, No. 3, NAI.

⁴. Panjabee (Lahore), 29 August 1914.
message to (Grand Vizier) and Enver Pasha". In September Abdul Bari of Firangi Mehal, also sent a telegram to the Sultan of Turkey urging him to remain neutral or to join Britain in the war. Before sending the telegram, he had consulted the Commissioner of Lucknow, Verney Lovett, about the terms of the message. The Raja of Mahmudabad did not lag behind in sending a telegram to Turkey in similar vein. But the ulema of Firangi Mehal equated Turkey and Britain by sending a telegram to the Viceroy as well to urge the British Government "to adopt such an attitude towards Turkey --- that the Ottoman Nation may feel bound not only to observe the strictest neutrality but even come to the aid of the British people." Mushir Husain Kidwai along with Sheikh Shawish and an Indian theologian had even planned to

1. Subsequently Muhammad Ali in his written statement described the circumstances in which the telegram was sent. He was called at Simla by Cleveland, who suggested him to send a cable to Turkish ministers and its prompt despatch was arranged by him with the British authorities at his own cost. The text of the telegram was published in the Comrade (Delhi), 7 November 1914. See his written statement, p. 34.

2. In his message to the Sultan he gave as the reason for siding with Britain the rights the Muslims of India enjoyed under British rule. See Home Poll. Deposit, October 1914, No. 61, NAI. While Khaliquzzaman states that he sent the telegram on Muhammad Ali's advice, Cf. Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p. 28.

3. See Memoranda of conversations with Raja of Mahmudabad, Ferard to Wheeler, 26 October 1914, Home Poll. Deposit, November 1914, No. 34, NAI.

4. Abdul Bari to Viceroy, Telegram, 1 October 1914, Home Poll. A, November 1914, Nos. 1-27, NAI.

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go to Turkey and convince them.\textsuperscript{1} There was no Turkish response to these appeals.\textsuperscript{2}

The sending of such telegrams was criticised by the Saiyara of Lucknow. It considered them an exercise in sycophancy and flattery. Moreover, Turkey would never allow its policy to be influenced by people from outside.\textsuperscript{3} Indeed, the Turkish Government might construe that all these messages had been sent by them at the behest of British.\textsuperscript{4}

There was, on the otherhand, a view that these telegrams would enable the Turkish leaders to realise that the moral and material help they had received during the Balkan wars would be withheld from her in the event of a war with Britain. Germany would be shocked to see that even Turkish participation in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item[1.] Kidwai, op.cit., p. 155.
  \item[2.] Abdul Bari told Lovett that some Muslims had received from Turkey messages to the effect that Indian Muslims should sit tight and show their devotion by raising subscription as at the time of the Balkan wars. Memoranda of conversations, Ferard to Wheeler 26 October 1914, Home Poll Deposit, November 1914, No. 34, NAI.
  \item[3.] Saiyara (Lucknow), 8 September 1914, also Musawat (Allahabad), 21 September 1914, which advised Muslim leaders to leave Turkish statesman alone to decide their own policy. HONMP-UP.
  \item[4.] Saiyara (Lucknow), 8 September 1914. HONMP-UP.
\end{itemize}
war would not shake the loyalty of Indian Muslims. ¹

It was, however, no smooth sailing either for the British Government or, still more for the 'khilafat' leaders. Muhammad Ali got provoked when he read an article in the Times entitled "The Choice of the Turks"; this declared that "If they (Turks) elect for war at the bidding of Germany, they will be staking their existence as a state."² Muhammad Ali promptly replied under the same title in his Comrade of 26 September 1914. The thrust of his argument was that having seen the true character of the Entente powers during the Tripolitan and Balkan wars what value could one attach to their assurance of guarantee to the Turkish Empire about its integrity and independence. Muhammad Ali saw no third alternative for Turkey except to remain neutral or support Germany. He asked if for this situation only the Turks could be held responsible. He criticised the confiscation of the two Turkish Dreadnoughts under construction in Britain and fully paid for, even before the Turks made their fatal choice. He wrote:

"To the extent that the Turk has wantonly destroyed the capital of goodwill that stood to his credit in England in the

¹ Indu Prakash (Bombay), 3 September 1914, RONNP-Bombay; Panjabee (Lahore), 29 August 1914; Kaiser-i-Hind (Faizabad), 8 November 1914, and Ittehad (Amroha), 10 November 1914, RONNP-UP.

² The Times (London), 29 August 1914.
days of Palmerston --- of Disraeli he stands guilty and condemned. But how many Mussalmans are convinced that not an iota of responsibility lies at the door of England of fanatical Gladstone of cynical Salisbury, of sleepy Lowther and of a whole host of present day ministers, both of the silent and blabbing varieties, for the deplorable estrangement of today."1

Muhammad Ali through his article demanded that Britain must repudiate the threats flung by the Times at the Turks nay "entire Moslem world"; and naively suggested that Britain should evacuate Egypt as a token of sincerity for its assurances to Turkey. However, perhaps seeing the Democles' sword in the Press Act hanging over him, he stressed "whatever England may do to Turkey or Egypt our anchor holds."2

The issue of Comrade containing the article was forthwith forfeited. The facts that Muhammad Ali recounted in his


2. This article was one of Muhammad Ali's most effective pieces. Professor Muhammad Habib was later to recall how he "read it with tears - and faith - as an Aligazr undergraduate, and it was not till the rise of Lenin and Kemal Pasha that I discovered that his facts were wholly wrong and that the fall of the Turkish leaders, whom he supported, was not worth a tear." See his Introduction in Moin Shakir's, Khilafat to Partition: A Survey of major political trends among Indian Muslims during 1919-1947 (New Delhi, 1970), p. xii.
article directly contradicted the "facts" that Hardinge had set out in his draft communique got ready as early as August. Hardinge had made much of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" the two German ships purchased by Turkey after Britain had confiscated the money as well as the two ships under construction for Turkey in British dockyards. Had the "Choice of the Turks" been published, Hardinge's communique would have been exposed for a piece of dignified lies. With its forfeiture¹ Hardinge heaved a sigh of relief - "we have clipped Muhammad Ali's wings."²

On 1 November war broke out between Britain and Turkey. In an interview Muhammad Ali said that what he had "feared for some months past had to his deep distress at last come to pass" He went on: "The Turks have now made their choice and it can cause Indian Musalmans nothing but the deepest pain to find the armies of the servant of the Holy Places of Islam and the King-Emperor who rules over the largest number of Mussalmans facing each other as enemies --- their (Indian

1. By an Order in Council, 2 November 1914, all the copies of the Comrade issue of 26 September 1914 was forfeited. See Pro. No. 290, Home Poll. A. February 1915, Nos. 265-92 & K.W.; the security of rupees two thousand in respect of the Comrade and Hamdard was forfeited, Pro. No. 94, Home Poll. A. January 1915, Nos. 76-97, NAL.

2. Hardinge to Chirol, 5 November 1914, No. 244, Hardinge Papers - 93, CUL.
Muslims') worst forebodings have come true. Though in anguish and distress he without any hesitation stated that the "anchor of Indian Mussalmans "holds" on with Britain. There was a general attitude of helplessness at the situation. In spite of the expression of pain, Muhammad Ali wrote that the Indian Muslims "have no difficulty in recognising that this is a mere secular conflict" and "are not bound by any temporal or spiritual obligation to back them (Turks) in every mundane quarrel of theirs which might as often as not be the fruit of a bad and blundering policy." He categorically declared that "whatever the Turkish case may be in the present crisis, the Indian Mussalmans are fully aware that it does not bear any religious character."

Abul Kalam Azad also called the declaration of war between Turkey and Britain as the most distressing moment for Indian Muslims. Nazhar-ul-Haq felt let down that the earnest

1. Interview given to the representatives of the Associated Press and Reuter, see Comrade (Delhi), 7 November 1914.

2. Ibid.


4. Comrade (Delhi), 7 November 1914.

5. Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 4 November 1914, also Comrade (Delhi), 7 November 1914, and Indian Daily Telegraph (Lucknow) cited in Home Poll. A. December 1914, Nos. 256-370 & K. W., NAI.
entreaties of Indian leaders, theologians and people had been ignored by Constantinople: "As long as they were defending themselves from the unjust attacks of other nations the Indian Mussalmans were wholeheartedly with them; but (they) refuse to be dragged into any aggressive venture that they may choose to make." ¹

Mazhar-ul-Haq appears to have given thought to the dichotomous position hitherto taken up by them; he had remarked "The Indian Mussalmans have to look to their own interests, and the case of the interests of Islam in their own country is the duty that has fallen upon them." ² The editor of Al-Bashir (Etawah) Bashiruddin similarly advised Muslims not to sacrifice their own political interests by expressing sympathy to ill advised Turks. ³

Thus what was feared, did not take place. The Muslim reaction to Turkey's entry into war was one of pain, but of no overt sympathy for its cause.

¹. Letter to Editor of Statesman (Calcutta), 6 November 1914.
The Nationalist and Muslim papers which had been sympathetic to Turkey, did not take kindly the Turkish participation in the war and thought that this would be suicidal for the Turkish Empire. One paper foresaw correctly that the Arabs would take advantage of the war; if the Turks were to attack on Egypt, this would indeed prove the hollowness of the pan-Islamic ideal.

The Panjabee of Lahore, finding the predicament in which the Turkish decision had thrown Indian Muslims, again observed that pan-Islamism as a political movement was inconsistent with "the highest patriotism and the highest loyalty." Circumstances forced Muslims in India to "choose between loyalty and Pan-Islamism." Therefore, pan-Islamism in order to be a "healthy and wholesome movement must confine

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1. Abhyudaya (Allahabad), 4 November 1914, Advocate (Allahabad), 5 November 1914, Leader (Allahabad), 13 November 1914, Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 5 November 1914, Musafir (Agra), 6 November 1914, Al-Khalil (Bijnore), 16 November 1914, Saiyara (Lucknow), 19 November 1914, RONNP-UP, Indu Prakash (Bombay), 9 November 1914, RONNP-Bombay, also the loyalist Aligarh Institute Gazette, 4 November 1914, Indian Daily Telegraph (Lucknow), 7 November 1914, published the observation of Mazhar ul Haq that Turkey had been duped by Germany (RONNP-UP).

2. Bombay Samachar, 19 November 1914, RONNP-Bombay.

3. Panjabee (Lahore), 29 August 1914.
itself essentially to the sphere of religion and should on no account encroach on politics." The paper argued that "in its political aspects (pan-Islamism) means nothing if not divided allegiance" which was indefensible in theory and incompatible in practice.¹ It expressed its appreciation of the loyal statements made by Muhammad Ali and other prominent leaders of the 'Young Moslem Party'. A similar advice was tendered by the Kesari of Poona, but more to assert that Muslims be loyal to India than to plead for their loyalty to the British Empire, though the Kesari still held that the British power was essential for India.²

After the declaration of war with Turkey public announcements were obtained from leading Muslim institutions and associations (anjumans) and prominent Muslims in support of the British Government.³ It was mostly the pro-British papers and known loyalist Muslim personalities, retired officials and honorary magistrates who responded to this pre-planned endeavour. Everywhere resolutions were passed expressing loyalty to Britain;

¹. Ibid., 5 November 1914.

². Kesari (Poona), 24 November 1914. The Comrade of Muhammad Ali also maintained that the tutelage of Britain would be necessary in India at that stage of national and commercial growth. See Comrade (Delhi), 12 August 1914.

regret over the Turkish entry and that it was a political and secular war in which no religious question or Islam was involved. Nearly all resolutions condemned the Young Turks. Nearly all resolutions condemned the Young Turks. Even public meetings were held and the proceedings were conducted on officially prescribed lines. The response was wholehearted and impressive in Central India and the Bombay province, which was, however, of little consequence as far as the Muslim opinion was concerned. Elsewhere too there was expression of loyalty and appreciation of the British Government's assurance to honour the sanctity of the Holy Places of Arabia. Yet there was some unwillingness to condemn Turkey and the Young Turk leadership. Verney Lovett, Commissioner of Lucknow reported difficulties in obtaining declarations to this effect.

1. Al-Bashir (Etawah), 27 October 1914, and Nashriq (Gorakhpur), 3 November 1914, published a fatwa of late Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi of Deoband (RONNP-UP).

2. The Young Turks were called "the cats paw of Germany"; "German agents"; their action the outcome of "the machinations of Enver Bey"; "to help the land grabing Germans"; "ill advised action of the military party under the influence of outside intrigue" and so on. See Home Poll. A., December 1914, Nos. 500-542, and F.D. Extl. B., April 1915, Nos. 259-305, NAI; The Al-Bashir (Etawah), characterized the Turkish plight as a visitation of "Divine Wrath", 17 November 1914, RONNP-UP.

3. At a public meeting Abbas Tyabji delivered a speech under the auspices of the Anjuman-i-Islam, Baroda, held on 27 November 1914. See Pro. No. 287, F.D. Extl. B., April 1915, Nos. 259-305, NAI.

4. P.Rt. of 12 October 1914, Home Poll. Deposit, December 1914, No. 30, NAI.
Naturally enough, several of the loyal resolutions were sheer examples of sychophancy.¹ Loyalty to Britain was now even projected as the best way to protect the Islamic Khilafat: the Islamic Mail (Bombay) originally started to combat the influence of the Comrade wrote: "The Khilafat should be preserved intact as a reward for Mohammedan loyalty."²

The Ruling Chiefs issued their own manifestoes. The purport of these was to distinguish between the Sultan and the Young Turks were indifferent to religion and, on German instigation had declared war against Britain. The Aga Khan in the same way declared that "No Islamic interest was threatened in this war and our religion was not in peril."³

Among the moderate Muslim leaders the Raja of Mahmudabad reminded Muslims of their duty to stand by the British and stressed that there could be no similarity between the conditions obtaining at the time of the Tripolitan and Balkan wars and the

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1. For example the manifesto of the Majlise Islamia, district Bellary declared: "To the Indian Muslim loyalty to the British throne is holier than adherence to the Caliphate", Pro. No. 531, Home Poll. A., December 1914, Nos. 500-542, NAI.

2. 1 December 1914, RONNP-Bombay. The paper received official patronage and during the war one of its articles was translated by a government agency and distributed throughout the Presidency. At the government behest published Weekly Urdu Bulletin, P.Rt. Bombay, 16 December 1914, Pro. No. 276, Home Poll. A., January 1915, Nos. 275-276, NAI.

The Turkish fatwa of jehad raised certain theoretical doubts, and some, like Shaukat Ali and Ghulam Husain privately acknowledged its force. But by and large it evoked no response; especially since expressions of loyalty came from all the three schools of theologians, Deoband, Nadwat-ul-Ulema and Firangi Mahal had amply insured it. Some theologians were prepared even to go further. Maulvi Abdul Haq of Calcutta issued a fatwa to the effect that in the war no religious question was involved that neither Muhammad Ali nor Abdul Bari could subscribe to it.

1. Interview published in the Indian Daily Telegraph (Lucknow), 6 November 1914, in Pro. No. 277, Ibid.

2. For the text of the jehad see J.C. Ker, Political Trouble in India (Calcutta), p. 297-98. The Delhi Secret Police had come to know that on 22 December 1914, in the Hamdard office a discussion on jehad took place between Shaukat Ali, Ghulam Husain and Oazi Sarfaraz Husain. Shaukat Ali and Ghulam Husain considered that the jehad declared by the Sheikh-ul-Islam was binding on Indian Muslims, while Sarfaraz Husain contended that it was not applicable to India, where religious freedom was observed. Shaukat Ali was reported to have said that the Indian Maulvis were convinced of the applicability of jehad on Indian Muslims but would not admit for fear of their lives at the hands of the government. See Delhi Police Secret Abstract, No. 1,2 January 1915, Foreign Department notes, F.D. Sec- War, July 1915, Nos. 176-194, NAI.


4. Deoband passed a resolution of loyalty. F.Rt. Home Poll. Deposit, October 1914, No. 61. After Turkish declaration of war Nadra declared that India was a dar-ul-Islam. W. Rt. of DCI, Home Poll. B., January 1915, Nos. 278-282; Abdul Bari of Pirangi Mahal agreed to participate in a public meeting only when he was assured that in the loyalty resolution Turkey would not be named. F.Rt., Home Poll. Deposit, December 1914, No. 32, NAI.

5. W.Rt. of DCI, 2 February 1915, Home Poll. B., February 1915, Nos. 777-780, NAI.
Once the war was declared, by Turkey, Asquith the Prime Minister and Lloyd George, the Chancellor Exchequer, made certain speeches which caused considerable resentment among Muslims and proved greatly embarrassing to the Viceroy and the Government of India. Asquith, as we have seen even before, made unguarded statement that the Turkish Empire would be wiped off in Europe and Asia. 1 Hardinge found Asquith's speech imbued with the "bag and baggage" policy of Gladstone. Although in essence he agreed with what had been said by him about Turkey, he would not say so except in a private letter. 2 Lloyd George made an odious reference to the Prophet. There was strong criticism in the Indian press and the Nawab of Rampur and the Raja of Mahmudabad lodged their protests by taking up the issue with British officials. 3 Hardinge admitted that these speeches

1. For earlier reference see above chapter III. Islamic Mail (Bombay), 15 November 1914, Akhbar-i-Islam (Bombay), 11 November 1914, Gujarati (Bombay), 15 November 1914, RONNP-Bombay, and Pratap (Kanpur), 15 November 1914, Al-Khalil (Bijnore), 16 November 1914, RONNP-UP.

2. Hardinge to Governor of Bombay, 16 November 1914, No. 330, Hardinge Papers-88. CUL.

3. In his Queen's Hall address he quoted one passage in which the German Kaiser described himself as the Sword of God and "His Vice-gerent" and "woe to the disobedient, Death to Cowards and unbelievers". Commenting on these statements Lloyd George went on to say: "There has been nothing like it since the days of Mahomet. Lunacy is always distressing, but sometimes it is dangerous and when it has become the policy of a Great Empire, it is about time that it should be ruthlessly put away".

(Footnote continued ....)
"add greatly to my anxieties in regard to Indian Mahomedans - a consideration which appears to carry no weight at all with the Cabinet. ¹ He was convinced that there was no doubt that the Muslims felt very strongly and even the most loyal would not want Turkey to be crushed and wiped off the map of the world.²

But if these speeches proved provocative to the Muslims, the British Government was not inclined to treat any possible harbouring of sympathy for Turkey with kid gloves. The pro-Turkish papers like the Comrade, the Hamdard, the Al-Hilal and the Zaminder and their editors Muhammad Ali, Abul Kalam Azad and Zafar Ali Khan had been singled out for action; and every effort was made to eliminate their influence. Muhammad Ali in particular faced a phalanx of hostile civil servants and

(Previous Footnote continued)

See Vakil (Amritsar), 28 October 1914, Paisa Akhher (Lahore), 31 October 1914, Zaminder (Lahore), 2 November 1914, KONNP-Punjab, and Saiyara (Lucknow), 19 and 25 October 1914, Akhbar-i-Islamia (Lucknow), 18 October 1914, Naini-UP. The Nawab of Rampur sent his protest telegram to the Lieutenant-governor on 22 October; who in his reply said that regarding the speech the Nawab had "misapprehended their intention" See D.O. letter to Nawab of Rampur, 22 October 1914; the Raja of Mahmudabad took up the issue in a conversation with Verney Lovett, Commissioner of Lucknow, Home Poll Deposit, November 1914, No. 34, NAI, also see Governor of Bengal to Viceroy, 3 November 1914, No. 392, Hardinge Papers - 88, CUL.

1. Hardinge to Chirol, 12 November 1914, No. 249, Hardinge Papers - 95, CUL.

2. Hardinge to Holderness, 16 November 1914, No. 59, Ibid. 120.
loyalists from Craddock to Dr Ziauddin. The search was on for a pretext to put him out of action. Hardinge had indeed decided to wait until "the cause had shown up", for detaining Muhammad Ali. Syed Ali Imam too had opposed his "lock up". When the Governments represented against the Al-Hilal for its provocative writing, Syed Ali Imam pointed to provocative anti-Turkish journalism of the Pioneer. Craddock would not countenance juxtaposing the two kinds of writing and wrote a rude note: "as regards the stultification of the Government of India by this ordinance of genuineness of its belief in Indian loyalty resents the suppression of treasonable men, it can not be worth much." Hardinge for the moment remained unimpressed.

1. Craddock noted that two days earlier (i.e. 13 October 1914) the officiating Principal of the Aligarh College told him that he had great difficulty in keeping Aligarh in order so long as Muhammad Ali continued to have a free rein; that he had twenty per cent College boys with him as his followers, but if Turkey came up in the war, he would have eighty per cent as he had in the Balkan troubles and during the Kanpur Mosque issue. See notes, 15 October 1914, Home Poll. A., January 1915, Nos. 76-97, IAI.

2. Ibid.

3. See notes 5 November 1914, Ibid. Craddock could not stomach the snub. He complained in his private correspondence with Hardinge that he depended and sought advice on matters which appertain to his department; Syed Ali Imam had claimed influence over Muhammad Ali, which had not been of much avail in reforming him. (See Craddock to Hardinge, 2 February 1915, No. 67a, Hardinge Papers). In his reply Hardinge said "you are one of my advisers" and we do not always agree; that "If am asked to define the differences between you and my views - I would say I am more trustful of the Indians than you are, and that is the root of any difference of opinion that there may be between us." Hardinge to Craddock, 13 February 1915, No. 56a, Hardinge Papers - CUL.
Subsequently, Meston, O'Dwyer and Charles Bayley laid stress on the issuing of a Press Ordinance. Seeing the draft, Hardinge noted that it was "of most sweeping kind giving powers under which there --- (was) no appeal and which might be seriously abused."¹ In March 1915, however, the Defence of India Act was passed, which naturally evoked criticism in the Indian press.²

Now it was Hailey's turn to tighten the noose on Muhammad Ali's Hamdard. Hardinge believed that Hailey would not take precipitate action and use powers with care and moderation.³ As a consequence the Government of India lifted the restrictions that it had imposed on the Local Governments under the Press Act, though there was to be prior reference to Delhi.⁴

In the meanwhile, Meston initiated proceedings for Muhammad Ali's internment by the Nawab of Rampur.⁵

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2. Abhyudaya (Allahabad), 26 March 1915, admitted its need but remarked it had been passed in unjustifiable haste. Similar was the argument of the Leader (Allahabad), 21 March 1915, Maehrig (Gorakhpur), 23 March 1915; others considered it to be synonymous with Martial law. Al-Bashir (Etawah), 23 March 1915, and Kaiser-i-Hind (Faizabad), 22 March 1915, RGNP-UP.
3. Hardinge's minutes, 26 March 1915, Home Poll. A., April 1915, Nos. 153-154, NAI.
4. Secretary, Government of India, Home Department to Hailey, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, 15 March 1915, Pro.No.154, Ibid.
5. A. Burn, Chief Secretary to Government of UP to Wheeler, Home Department, 26 April 1915, Home Poll. Deposit, May 1915, No. 36, NAI.

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Craddock exclaimed that "this settles the question."\(^1\) O'Dwyer initiated action against Hamdard under the Defence of India Act, subjecting it to pre-censorship.\(^2\) Meston argued for its closure altogether.\(^3\) Craddock now confronted Hardinge with his policy "to deal with the individual offender", and precisely this course which he claimed to have advised.\(^4\) Earlier Hardinge had agreed with the view of Wheeler, the Home Secretary, that Muhammad Ali should sever his connection with the Hamdard during the war.\(^5\)

We do not know whether it was ever conveyed to Muhammad Ali, and if it had been? what his reaction was. In the meanwhile the internment proceedings against Muhammad Ali were quickened. However, for the present Hardinge agreed only to censorship of the Hamdard and decided against its suspension, remarking that he had "no desire to see the Mahommedan world ablaze. The sudden suppression of the Hamdard, without any definite reason being assigned might I believe do this."\(^6\)

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1. See notes, 30 April 1915, Ibid.
3. Meston stressed that "a very strong body of moderate Muhammadan opinion would welcome one further step in the campaign which you have undertaken against the noisy extremist." Meston to Craddock, 30 May 1915, Ibid.
4. Home Department notes, 8 June 1915, Ibid.
5. Hardinge's minutes, 11 May 1915, Home Poll. Deposit, May 1915, No. 36, NAI.
The next move against Muhammad Ali was made by Cleveland, Director Criminal Intelligence; he demanded imposition of restrictions on him so that he should not leave without the permission of the Government of India. Cleveland's contention was that having sown the seed of a "big trouble" in India, Muhammad Ali "would be a very dangerous person in Afghanistan or in Germany." ¹

Muhammad Ali was allowed to leave Rampur on health grounds. While on his way to Mussoorie, he came to Delhi. Here he received his internment orders under the Defence of India Act. ² Thus began his incarceration from 15 May 1915 to December 1919, at Mehrauli, Lansdowne and Chindwara. Hardinge as we have seen was under pressure from his advisors and he also gave credence to loyalist Muslim leaders who had urged action against Muhammad Ali. ³

From Mehrauli, Muhammad Ali addressed a letter to Hardinge saying that he was a victim of a conspiracy whose target in fact,

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1. Notes in Home Poll. Deposit, May 1915, Nos. 36, NAI.

2. Hailey reported action taken vide telegram, 24 June 1915, Pro. No. 36, Ibid.

3. Hardinge was informed by a Muslim member of the Legislative Council that Shaukat Ali was in correspondence with the people in Afghanistan encouraging them to declare jehad; while Muhammad Ali had been sowing trouble wherever he went. At Lahore he had addressed the students of the Medical College and that 14 or 15 students then left for Afghanistan. Hardinge appears to have given credence to the insinuation. Hardinge to Crewe, 27 May 1915, No. 31, Hardinge Papers - 121, CUL.
was Hardinge himself. He contended that the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy "disguised as 'Local Government'" was a political party as much as the Congress or Muslim League. While perpetually in office "these men masquerade in the guise of administrative responsibility of the realm and for public peace and tranquility." With the declaration of war Turkey "we knew, wrote Muhammad Ali, "that neither our liberties nor our lives were safe in India." On the other hand, Muhammad Ali's internment naturally greatly raised his political stature in India.

At the same time steps were taken to secure Abul Kalam Azad's expulsion from Bengal. The move was to keep him away from Bombay, United Provinces, Delhi and the Punjab as well. Azad was forced to stay throughout the war at Ranchi.

1. He wrote that when he was in England (in September 1913) "Sir Charles (Cleveland) (who) was there on furlough --- saw me and tried to persuade me to join in a conspiracy against you and Sir Ali Imam, in which the principal members were Sir Reginald Craddock and possibly Sir Charles Bayley in India, and Lord Curzon and other Tory leaders and Sir John Hewitt in England--- if I joined their ranks and lent to the conspiracy the semblance of Moslem support the changes effected at the Durbar would be upset at once --- I however declined". The members of the Viceroy's Council wanted to discuss the letter, but Hardinge ordered it to be filed. It is intriguing, why Muhammad Ali waited so long and did not report the matter to Hardinge for a full one year. Cleveland must have utilized the opportunity of a meeting to obtain personally the views of Muhammad Ali against whom the Viceroy had sent telegrams to India Office. (See above chapter IV), Muhammad Ali to Hardinge, 23 June 1915, Home Poll. A., July 1915, Nos. 30-33, NAI.

2. He wrote "The Civil Service has raised me to a height to which I could not have aspired at this age". Ibid.

3. Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, to Chief Secretary, Bihar and Orissa, 20 May 1916, Home Poll. A., May 1916, Nos. 455-56, NAI.
Ali Khan was interned in his native village in the Punjab, by O'Dwyer under the Ordinance for the Ingress of Indians. 1 Hardinge described it "as quite an ingenious way of dealing with him, and within the law." 2 Hasrat Mohani was interned at Kithore, a village in district Meerut on 23 May 1916. 3 Mazhar-ul Haq was spared of the ordeal, although Cleveland had urged action against him. 4

Muhammad Ali's internment caused expressions of resentment at Aligarh and Lucknow. 5 Meetings were organised at Delhi

1. He was interned after his return from a visit to Britain and Turkey, for his speeches at Lahore; it was noticed that he was getting friendlier with the editors of the Hindu (Lahore) Harsh Lal Sharma and Dina Nath of the Desh (Lahore). See Pro. No. 221, Home Poll. B., December 1914, Nos. 218-222, NAI, also see Shorish Kashmiri, Zafar Ali Khan (Lahore) 1957), pp. 51-52.

2. Hardinge to Crewe, 17 September 1914, No. 47, Hardinge Papers-120, CUL.

3. A. Burn, Chief Secretary, UP, to Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 24 May 1916, Home Poll. Deposit, June 1916, No. 23, NAI.

4. Cleveland in a lengthy note alleged that he was pro-Turk and in touch with Turkish pan-Islamists of Constantinople and yet enjoyed place of eminence being a member of the Legislative Council. Such a man should have been "frozen out of his position as a political leader" in the Punjab, See notes, 25 April 1917, Home Poll. A., July 1917, Nos. 408-410, NAI.

5. Chief Secretary, UP, to Wheeler, Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 3 June 1915, Home Poll. Deposit, June 1915, No. 20, NAI. Abhyudaya (Allahabad) reported public meetings held at Bankipore, Delhi, Aligarh and Aligarh for their release, 5 June 1915.
and attended by several thousands of people demanding the cancellation of internment orders against him. At one such meeting Dr M.A. Ansari remarked that it had been constitutional agitators like Muhammad Ali who kept young men from joining the anarchist party.\(^1\) Mahatma Gandhi also strongly pleaded for the release of Ali Brothers and refused to take part in the conference at Delhi unless they were released.\(^2\)

During the war strict surveillance and restrictions on travel was enforced in view of suspected undercurrents of feelings among Muslims.\(^3\) The Aga Khan had visualised that danger to the British in India, if any would take place several months after the war.\(^4\)

But with the pro-Turkish Muslim leaders interned and their press muzzled and the activities of the Anjuman-i

\(^1\) The meeting was held on 19 and 20 May 1915, W.Rt. of DCI, 25 May 1915, Home Poll. B., May 1915, Nos. 853-858, NAI.

\(^2\) Gandhi to Claude Hill, 26 April 1918, Encl. in Gandhi to Maffey, Private Secretary to Viceroy, 27 April 1918, No. 256, Chelmsford Papers - IOL. See also Mushirul Hasan Mohamed Ali Ideology And Politics, (Manohar, Delhi, 1981), p. 28.

\(^3\) See Pro. No. 273, 15 August 1915, Home Poll. A., August 1915, Nos. 260-273, NAI.

\(^4\) Crewe to Hardinge, 5 November 1914, No. 5, Hardinge Papers - 120, CUL.
Khuddam-i-Kaaba suspended, the British Government was able to tide over these temporary outbursts of public feeling. But however quiet the surface, resentment continued to simmer underneath, and was to break forth with unexpected vigour for a revolutionary struggle against British imperialism.