Part II

The Field, Field Work and Field Worker
CHAPTER II

LUCKNOW MINORITY SITUATION

The field study was undertaken to investigate the patterns of individual identity among Muslims and Christians of Lucknow. In this process, we shall also seek to highlight the synthesis between institutions, theories, concepts and personal experiences affecting the identity of the individual in public and private.

Section I: Some Historical Insights

It is, therefore, but natural to begin the task by assessing the methodological merits of the universe in the light of the study on-hand. In this respect, as a field for understanding minority identity (of Muslims and Christians) Lucknow projected a considerably puzzling image, as a city of paradoxes.

Though the Hindus have always been numerically larger than the Muslims, the Shias, a Muslim sect that constituted only one-third of Lucknow's Muslim population (the other larger group being Sunnis) was the dominant minority, having been the ruling dynasty of the city until its annexation by the British in 1858. The legacy of the Shia Court culture had become so deep rooted in the life-pattern and life-styles of Lucknow that even to this day, be it Hindu or Muslim, a special sense
of nostalgic pride is associated with being identified as a "Lucknauva". The hegemonic sway of the Nawabi traditions, characterized by articulated styles of etiquette, leisurely indulgence in aesthetics, art, music and sports under the royal patronage, finds their best expression in the eloquence of Shrar. Described in local parlance as "tehzib" and "takkaluf" it simply meant the absence of a war culture in Lucknow like the one that flourished in the then-contemporary Moghal Courts of Delhi. In short the social ecology was one wherein aesthetics of life and etiquette was put above politics in the minds of men. The monumental proof of which was the ironical fete of history when the golden age of Nawabi Lucknow flourished even in the exiled empire of its King.

The communal harmony of the city accounting for its cultural pomposity has gone into esoteric and scholarly debates. Hollister, for instance, has observed that, 'Moharram can perhaps be seen to best advantage at Lucknow. Even the Hindus participated in it with great zeal and enthusiasm'. Taziadar Vajpayee in fact had become an household name in the old city for fervent participation of Hindus in the festival of Muharram. The Sunnis, strangely enough do not subscribe to the passionata display of Faith as the Shias of Lucknow during Moharram. This is yet another paradoxical state of affair in the city where the Hindu fervour was once a striking contrast to the Sunni contempt of pomp and pageantry that marks Muharram mourning. The Hindu-Shia fraternity was the pride of Lucknow just as Sunni-Shia hostility its shame and disgrace.
The first official report on the 1905 Shia-Sunni riots observes, that both the sects had used the same 'karbala' for the ceremonial burial of the 'tazias' up to 1905. Sharar's eye-witness account adds that during Nawab's days, it was not known who is a Shia or a Sunni. However, the aesthetic preoccupations of the Court did not give importance to petty politics either between Hindus and Muslims or between Shias and Sunnis. But it is clear that the Muslim overtones of culture did not certainly alienate the Hindus of the city, particularly the Kayasthas and Kashmiri pandits. A local saying goes that a Kayastha could correct the Persian of a Muslim Pathan. Bennett observed in the 1877 Gazetteer of the Province of Oudh:

like the Muslim, Hindus also gained prominence for their knowledge of Persian, a fact that became evident in the early days of the Moghal rule when there were in general Hindu scholars and speakers of Persian. This vogue reached its zenith in Ayadh, when there were more Hindus with an eminent knowledge of Persian in the environs of Lucknow than anywhere else.

In his biographical recollections of his prison days in the Lucknow jail, Choudhury Kaliqurzamman reminisces on the communal unity of Kayasths and Kashmiri pandits of Lucknow who did not fall into the caste blocs that separated Hindus from the Muslims among the jailmates. Such was the spirit of communal comraderie and political passivity of the city, that to embark on a study of 'minority' identity in the absence of such an ethos in the minds of Lucknowas sounded illogical if not even unethical.
In fact scholarly opinion attributes the communal amicability of the city to the integrative potentiality of Nawabi culture so effective in its scope as to neutralize any divisive political forces or developments toward it for which recorded history is replete with favourable instances.

"Tehzib" set the norms of social behaviour transcending caste, class and communal barriers. Marked by refinement of language and politeness of speech, respect for authority, and hospitality, it provided a symbolic universe for the Lucknowas so much so that it could be construed as the taken-for-granted reality of Lucknow until the late 19th century. Though cultivated by the aristocracy and nobility of the Court, its pervasive presence down to the mass level remained an indisputable feature so long as Nawabi patronage was extended. And as long as the Moghal Court reigned supreme, such a patronage forthcoming the ruling ideology of "tehzib" did neither necessitate nor provoke the genesis of new concepts; and hence the static content of knowledge did not lead to the outgrowth of any other critical line of thinking. In other words, phenomenologically speaking, the survival of "Tehzib" as an overarching idea was relevant to all the "Lucknowas" irrespective of caste or religion because it was meaningful to their everyday life-experience that was devoid of contradictory class practices.12

Although it is hardly evident in the city today, it has left a strong imprint in determining the impact of the pre-categorical thought over the consciousness of the people
of Lucknow (except of course the Anglo-Indians and other migrant ethnics like the Chinese and Punjabis). The moot point however is not the integrative potentiality of "tehzib" but how far it was a veneer, if not even a myth of a husk culture. Historical incidents reinforces our hunch on the elusive role of "tehzib".

Going back in time, we find that the 1864 municipal elections were non-communal in its ethos. The six wards into which Lucknow was divided had representatives of both the communities. So the 1864-70 Hindu majority Board was as communally effective as the 1870-75 Muslim dominated Board indicating the communal consciousness at play beneath the veneer of apathy. Similarly the cow-protection riots under the instigation of Arya-Samaj and Brahma Samaj that swept across western UP and flared into communal fury had little impact in Oudh as Lucknow was then called. Incredible, it may sound, but in Oudh, the Kayasths along with Muslims submitted a petition against the imposition of the Nagri Script favouring Urdu in 1900. Even the 1893-95 Legislative Election records of Oudh indicate that the Hindu Congressmen of Lucknow put up a Muslim barrister as their candidate against a Hindu Taluqdar, representing landed interests. Similarly, in 1916, when the Hindu nationalists like Chintamani gave a call to boycott UP Municipality Bill, Lucknow was the only city in the entire state of United Provinces where it had a smooth passage.
The same spirit of communal amicability is reflected in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 and the famous public meeting of April 14, 1917, under the presidency of Kidwai. The communal cohesion and unity surfaced by the Lucknow Pact of 1916 and the Khilafat Action Committee that subsequently emerged on the horizon of Independence Movement in many ways resembled the conspiratorial spirit of the gang of six (one Sunni, two Hindus, three Shias) that planned the siege of the British Resident at Lucknow during the 1857 upheaval. To top it all, the first gazetteer of Independent India claims that Lucknow was one of the new cities in UP that was spared of the communal bloodshed and violence in the wake of India's truncated birth as a republic. In fact, as far as people's memory goes the 'sedimented' or the 'stockhouse of knowledge about their city' does not suggest of any communal bitterness between Hindus and Muslims but between Shia and Sunni Muslims. No wonder did Gardner Murphy discovered it to be a low tension city even during the critical year of 1952. Contrary to his conclusions on Meerut, Agra and Allahabad, both Hindus and Muslims among his respondents, associated the communal placidity of their city to its cultural continuity with the Nawabi past at the time of his study in early 50s. It is true, that Lucknow Muslims unlike in rest of UP show no signs of serious 'minority complexes' except as de-classed rulers. On the contrary, as Brass and Robinson have pointed out, in UP the separatist Muslim politics was not a backward class movement as in Bengal but of educated and highly professionalised
Muslims who in search of meanings to safeguard their power and prestige found separatism a convenient symbol.\textsuperscript{23} Ralph Russel commenting on the city's immunity to communal riots as late as 1946 and 1947 observe that "to the Lucknow man, the kind of religious zeal which could impel a man to kill another of a different faith was not perhaps so much wicked and immoral as ungentlemanly and uncultured".\textsuperscript{24} Yet, one wonders whether the 'cultural excesses' of Nawabisation influencing the present was not after all exaggerated.

For instance, the leading role played by the conspiratorial gang of six in the 1857 upheaval at Lucknow questions the popular image of the Court's apolitical disposition. At the time of the Mutiny, the Lucknow court was a divided house of cut-throat internal rivalries.\textsuperscript{25} If "tehzib" was as real as it was made to be why then the lack of shared meanings with disastrous results in 1857? The burning of the Indian Christian Church at Chowk in 1857, that Suraj-ud-Daula had gifted to the Jacobites does not speak high of its tolerant culture.\textsuperscript{26} The 1877 opposition of "taluqdar"\textsuperscript{*} to merger of Oudh with Agra for formation of the North West Frontier Provinces finds a parallel much later in history when in 1947 the "Wasikadars" made a final bid to regain their lost status by seeking a separate political identity for Lucknow against its merger into the then proposed Indian Union.\textsuperscript{27} In the light of the above events, one wonders

\textsuperscript{*} Taluqdars refer to the class of landlords mostly created by the British after the Mutiny in Lucknow.
whether the entire upheaval of 1857 was a desperate bid for retention of power more than culture by a few classes since the latter cannot survive independent of the former.

Yet, surprisingly the legendary overtones of Nawabi culture survived the British Annexation of Lucknow in 1856 but was always interspersed with political melodramas. However, with the downfall of the Moghal Court and ascendancy of the Raj, the veneer of the Nawabi culture was gradually replaced by the onset of new institutions such as Westernism. Some inevitable damages must have certainly eroded the Lucknow tehzib from within under the gradual influx of Westernism and its new patrons among the locals. Subsequent history characterized by bourgeoising ideas of nationalism and socialism led to further degeneration of "tehzib" which almost came to dismal end with the Zamindari Abolition Act of 1956. Though this was true at the behavioral level, people's orientation to it, particularly for the few original inhabitants of the city, is still very strong. With the onset of the Republic and arrival of the non-Lucknowa migrants specially Punjabis, "tehzib" is perceived as an once-upon-a-reality by the Lucknowas and hence its relegation to a pre-theoretical domain. For all practical purposes, the "tehzib" of today's Lucknow is a supreme myth, but, phenomenologically still relevant. The process of mystification of this dominant value in everyday life started when upon the downfall of the Nawabs, politics gradually overshadowed culture. The process was further hastened with the upsurge of new class struggles between
taluqdars and the educated that rendered "tehzib" inadequate and meaningless.

The task of demystification of the myth led to unearthing of more startling and less apparent "realities" relating to the communal history of Lucknow. To begin with archival records indicated the outbreak of a violent Hindu-Muslim riots at Lucknow that paralysed the life of the city for nearly two years between 1924-26. The rioters on either side were mostly from the trading communities. In 1924, when the Independence struggle of the Congress Party was in its peak phase of the Non-Co-operation movement the already shattered communal unity of Lucknow was in a state of incredible peril.

Another threatened outbreak of Hindu Muslim riots was averted once in 1973 and still another one in 1981. In March 1982, when the anti-Urdu rioters ravaged the city of Varanasi, the anti-Urdu propaganda was at its peak in Lucknow.

Similarly in 1933, when the national movement was in full swing, Lucknow had one of the worst outbreak of Shia-Sunni violence which in the view of the official authorities was "due to increasing militancy of the local Sunnis under the Ahrar Party, whereas the Shias were concerned, most of the rioters arrested so far are from outside Lucknow, mostly from Punjab." The intra-communal rift has been incredibly increasing ever since, finding its most violent
outburst at the time of Muharram which was, ironically enough, the erstwhile symbol of Lucknow’s cultural symbiosis! Paradoxically enough the community that is hailed to have bequeathed the grand aura of Lucknow’s "tehzib" is unfortunately responsible for its annual bloodshed. By and large, we may hazard a guess that the communal triangle of the city indicated a higher degree of Hindu-Sunni conflict than that of the Hindu-Shia one. The fraternalization between Hindus and Shias continued for quite many years even after Independence and many local Shias have held important offices in the post-47 State, central cabinets and bureaucracy. The Hindu-Sunni estrangement was more acute following the rhetoric of Muslim separatism put forward by the Ahrar Party and its nucleus in Lucknow Sunni community. Recent scholarly opinion has even questioned the much talked about Hindu-Muslim unity underlying the Lucknow Pact and the Khilafat Front. The facade of communal harmony however did not withstand the announcement of the Communal awards in 1932.

The Shia-Sunni hostilities has cut such a deep-rooted wedge into the communal unity of the Muslims at Lucknow that it raises issues of both conceptual and methodological interest. Does the term 'minority' a relevant category for study of Muslim identity in Lucknow whose "recipe knowledge" is oriented to sectarian and not communal outlook? This is the primary question likely to confront any field workers on the city’s communal relations.
The Christians of Lucknow

Schermerhorn has one of the choicest epithets for Indian Christians as "Obscure Marginals". Since they remained a community apart under the direct patronage of the Church and the Raj until 1947, their social participation was a 'cloistered' phenomenon for the public. The causal linkage between proselytizing zeal of the missionaries and European power was deep-rooted in the Indian mind so strongly as to obscure the role of many Christian freedom fighters. But the local Christian community of Lucknow is equally well-known for its internal strife and inter-denominational animosities. For instance, the UP Christian Association founded as early as 1892 broke into a splinter group called the UP Layman's Association in 1947 over the issue of Indigenisation of Church authority and protest against Church Imperialism over India. Ever since then, many splinter groups have mushroomed in UP particularly at Lucknow as a result of Church intrigues. Available information suggest that there are at least seven groups that have broken from the main methodist organisation and shifted their loyalties to other denominations (for e.g. the Seventh Day Adventists, Dua Ka Ghar, Penticostal Church etc.). The genesis of factionalism are not so much due to disputes over the religious doctrines but over politics of control and authority. Consequently, the ideological rupture within the Methodist Christian community
(partly due to events at Pan-Christian level) that constituted
the largest section of Christian before 1947, estranged the
Anglo-Indians even more sharply than before. Since then the
local Christian community has also been a house divided in
itself. The rigorous Indianisation of Church rituals parti-
cularly among the Catholics coupled with the zealous drive
towards self-supporting churches in an effort to acquire
power completed the cultural isolation of the Anglo-Indians
from rest of the Indian Christian community just as the
Shias were from the Sunnis. Not surprisingly, in the initial
encounters with the field both Shias and Anglo Indians
displayed an acute sense of "double minoritiness" vis-a-vis
the Hindu majority as well as their own "sectarian majorities"
namely Sunnis and Indian Christians respectively.

The Anglo-Indians of Lucknow as elsewhere in India
were cocooned in a cultural and social enclave of their own.
"Uneasy minorities" as Schermerhorn describes them was
largely due to the conspicuously exclusive life-styles that
they followed to the extent that their insulation was
noticeable even within the walls of the Church. Though some
assimilatory changes are evident in the community after 1947,
the efforts may be summarised as cultural pluralism (in
styles of dress, use of Hindi in public etc.) than social
pluralism. Even this miniscule community (of less than a
decimal percentage in Lucknow) has a "Pro" and "Anti" Anglo
Indian Association faction. The latter are mainly from the
downtrodden unemployed poverty stricken strata, though not always. The internal division among Anglo-Indians is mainly over the issue of representative character of their leadership at the local, regional and national levels of the Association. Breakdown of consensus over the priority of issues concerning Anglo-Indians (such as employment vs English) is also responsible for the internal disunity. Besides, in Lucknow, an overwhelming membership of the community is drawn from the Goanese stock, much to resentment of the original Anglo-Indians. As in the case of Muslims and Christians (to be discussed subsequently) the internal animosities surfaced to crisis during the post-Emergency days. In 1977, when the newly elected Janata Party came to power, the central leaders (obviously non Anglo-Indians) nominated a Goanese as the Anglo-Indian MLC in the Parliament. Consequently, the Anglo-Indians felt a sudden loss of leverage that was hitherto symbolic in the legendary leadership of Frank Anthony.

Thus we find that contrary to the harmonious ethos of life as suggested by 'tehzib', the Muslims and Christians of Lucknow were characterised by intense political awareness at the intra-communal and inter-communal level of existence. The myth of 'tehzib' is best summarised in the words of an ex-corporator of the Lucknow municipality, a Hindu in the course of discussions with the researcher on the city’s major characteristics as follows:
Even to-day when Moradabad and Aligarh are so tense, I have made a Muslim become the President of the Avadh Gosala. It does not speak much of communal fraternalism, on the contrary, it is possible only because Hindus and Muslims are very deeply divided within themselves. We are saved only because of Shia-Sunni riots here. The caste politics within Hindus is equally bad. So they would rather see a Muslim as the president of the Avadh Gosala than me.

What he was trying to convey is only a reflection of the popular belief in Lucknow that so long as Shias and Sunnis are fighting the question of Hindu-Muslim riot does not arise. But it also shows how the apparent unity is only a tip of the iceberg as perceived and defined by the people themselves.

All through the Independence struggle, three streams of political ideology viz. communalism, pan-Islamism and Indian nationalism were actively present in its course. The politics of UP was prototype of these ideological pressures. The three ideologies were so subtly interspersed with each other, that the apparent reality was always contradictory to the hidden truths, for instance, as already stated, the much talked about Hindu-Muslim unity epitomised by the Lucknow Pact of 1916 was in its hardcore a demand of Muslims for communal awards. Even the Khilafat Movement, when analytically viewed shows the undercurrents of pan-Islamism beneath a thin layer of secular nationalism. Robinson believes that the high point of Muslim separatism was evident even as early as 1909. In his view the crystallization of a Muslim identity was seen during the mass meeting of Muslims held on April 28, 1909 at Lucknow. He notes, "western-educated and Orthodox
Shia and Sunni, landlord and professional men, shopkeeper and priest all joined their voices to the protest" for Muslim representation in Provincial and Imperial Councils. 

Lucknow was also well known for the fiery role played by the Muslim ulema of Firangi Mahal, a renowned centre of Islamic theology, in the mobilisation of Muslim masses into a separatist ideology under the canopy of Islam. That even the traditional patrons of the exotic "tehzib" were swept into the separatists bandwagon is biographically spelt out in the life of the Raja of Mahmudabad, who submitted a petition for separate awards to the then Commissioner in 1916.

Based on the existing source material, the communal landscape of Lucknow displayed the following features after 1920. Intra-sectarian rivalries were confined to a few Wahabi Sunnis and some migrant Shias. The "tehzib" was still an overarching symbol of reality though eroded by the rising influence of liberal ideas due to class polarisation of educated from the landed classes. Hindu-Muslim communalism and pan-Islamism were equally forceful undercurrents of Lucknow politics.

The most subtle outburst of communal consciousness in Lucknow was witnessed in the wake of the 1932 Government of India Act announcing communal awards. In a communication addressed to the then SP of Lucknow by the DSP, the official noting states (dated 26th August 1932):

Regarding communal awards, it has been received by Hindu Public of Lucknow, with no interest
has yet been evoked in the mind of the ordinary citizens and in the absence of any recognised Hindu leaders at Lucknow, the considered opinion of the enlightened mind is not yet available. The business and trades has not been able to understand what the award means and how it affects them but those amongst the educated who have been following the political tide express opinions one reads daily in the papers, generally Hindu think that their interest have been sacrificed and that the Muhammadans have been unduly favoured everywhere. In short, the Award has been received by Hindus with a keen sense of disappointment. They find themselves nowhere.

We can therefore agree with Metcalf that "Throughout the nineteenth century, then, along with the persisting Islamic veneer of its 'husk culture' a basic and more Hindu structure of attitudes and value continued in north Indian society". The most monumental proof of the "husk culture" and its political core is still discernible/the current controversies prevailing over the genesis of Lucknow. It is not sure when the legendary Lachmanpura changed its name to Lucknow. The origin of the city is steeped in doubts and curiously enough, roots of historical tradition lay claims to both Hindu and Muslim origins, as recorded in the District Gazetteer since 1891 to 1959. The last Gazetteer published admits the fact that legend and history have been so intimately linked that the authenticity of Lucknow's genesis - whether it preexisted Nawabi rule or not - has been a controversial issue. The subject interestingly enough acquires communal colours since the two prevailing schools of opinion with opposing claims to Lucknow's origin belong to Hindu and Muslim
communities, equally zealous to safeguard their respective claims. The bone of contention appears to be the Sunni mosque called Qila Masjid allegedly built over the ancient Hindu temple of Lachmananadas that was believed to mark the birth of Luckmanapuri or Lucknow.

Two serious efforts were made to dig up the dust off history when the newly elected Janata Government took office in 1977. Firstly upon the suggestion of a Hindu member of the Archaeology Advisory Committee Board, some survey work around the Qila Masjid was begun in 1959 but had to be discontinued when the archaeologists found no prima facie evidence to the Aryan theory of Lucknow's birth. The Imam of the disputed Masjid could mobilise a sizeable number of the Muslim inhabitants of the area powerful enough to thwart the efforts of the Emergency Beautification drives to put up a bill board called "Lakshmana Tila Udyas" declaring the Masjid to be a national monument. In the view of the district authorities, the situation would have provoked a communal flare up but for the timely intervention of the local police and magistracy. Finally the effort was withdrawn in the event of some physical altercations between the Imam's staff and those of the State Development Authority.

Strangely enough, it is worth noting that whenever the Government took an interest to authenticate the history of Lucknow (once in 1959 and then in 1977), the Hindu assertiveness in the political echelons of the State was noticeable.
The period when the field study began in 1978 the Christian community of the city were in some sort of an internal turmoil. While on the one hand, they were protesting against the mismanagement of Church property by the then Bishop of Lucknow, the Government interference imposing a ban on the sale under the Indian Church Trustees Act, 1923 revived the confidence of the members of the community to some extent. It is reproduced below to give some insight into the peculiarity of the communal set-up of local Christians:

Dear Friends,

This is an honest and humble demand for JUSTICE which make on behalf of UP Indian Christian Association and Christian Janta in particular, against illegal actions and exploitation of the community in the name of religion. This exploitation also existed during the British Raj but then we were slaves.

At the time of our Independence, the Indian Christians in U.P. were given two seats to elect their own leaders to represent the community in the Assembly. The Anglo-Indians were given one seat. But when our country accepted secularism, our representatives at centre and in states surrendered their reserved seats. But Anglo-Indians did not accept secularism and till to-day they have retained their seat in our Assembly.

After this surrender of our two seats in the Assembly, the exploitation re-started in Protestant missions, specially in, now called Church of Northern Indian and Methodist Mission in U.P. by Anti-Indian Foreign Clergy, their stooge i.e. Indian Clergy and American Brand Indian Caucus. 57

However, from the petition (presented below) submitted by one local Christian leader to the then UP State
Government, it is clear that the communal consciousness of Christians was apparently crystallized on the line of Christian
quo Christian and not vis-a-vis the Hindus. It states:

The illegal sale of Church properties was first exposed to the community when the then Rt. Reverend
C.J.C. Robinson, the Bishop of Lucknow, Bishop
House, Allahabad, requested the State Government
vide his letter dated 30th August and 6th November
1956, to declare that Indian Church Trustees, were
absolute owners of all ex-Government Churches in
UP. The then Chief Secretary, late Shri A.N. Jha,
did declare the same vide his D.O. dated 13th
December 1956, obviously influenced by white
cassacks. The declaration was challenged by me.
The appeal of Bishop Robinson was reconsidered
and the Sachiv Shri K.C. Joshi declared vide
dated 18th July 1968...."the Government are
advised that the vesting envisaged by Rule 15
by Indian Church Statutory Rule 1929 is limited
to vesting of the rights of possession control
and User only and does not extend to vesting
of full proprietary rights...." This declaration
clearly indicates that Foreign Missions never
had legal right to sell Christian properties at
any time in India." 58

A counter-representation challenging the authenticity
and legitimacy of the new leadership was made by a member of
the Church Governing Body who also held the post of nominated
MLC for one Legislature term. In a memorandum presented to
the then Chief Minister, reproduced below, clearly brings
out the struggle for democratisation of power within the
'compound complex'. 59

"Post Independent Control and Management
of the Church in India and Present"

It is a matter of serious concern to the Christian
community and its well wishers, that a few isolated
individuals posing as leaders of the Christian community make representations to Government or issue statements to the press falsely accusing the churches of being dominated by foreign missionaries or being in the hands of foreigners. We may categorically state that this propaganda is false and malicious.

The series of events culminated into an ordinance that was proposed by the then Governor of UP known as the UP Public Religious Institutions Temporary Power, Ordinance, 1976 which was expected to be passed in October 1976 but one of the petitioners claims —

it was difficult to question the Government due to the Emergency and the MISA even for a just and honest cause. Then the 'Christian Voice', Kanpur indicated that few Christians from South met the Prime Minister and got the ordinance cancelled....At that time, the Congress caucus held the regions of UP Government indirectly in their hand and an American Brand caucus were welcoming and garlanding their leaders so there was no hope to get justice. 60

The above grievance is clearly indicative of the hostile divisions with the local Christian community that was as intense as that within the Muslim though not as vociferous and overtly violent as the latter. Another interesting sociological highlight of these internal dissensions is that while the Muslim rift was vertically stratified into neat sectarian groups, the Christians were horizontally divided, that is, between the clergy and the elite English speaking Christians on the one hand, vis-a-vis the 'Biradari' Church or Hindustani speaking white-collar Christians on the other. 61
Thus it is seen that the aftermath of the Emergency when the field study began in 1978 was very critical period for the concerned minorities. The hitherto pro-Congress Shias viewed the new Janata Government of 1977 with apprehension but it did give leeway for the Sunnis to claim their rights from the new government on the ground that it was voted to power on majority Sunni vote. The deplorable consequences of which snowballed into one of the worst ever witnessed Shia-Sunni riots in 1978 in the history of Lucknow.

To begin with, the explicit concern of the study was not with the intra-communal conflicts. Yet the process of factionalism provide rich insights into the sociological landscape of the communities and their perceptions articulated in terms of their intra and inter-ethnic reality constructions. The format of the study would not therefore overlook this fundamental feature of the universe.

As far as the Lucknow Muslims are concerned it may be hypothesized that after the 1924 Hindu-Muslim riot, the Shia-Sunni sectarianism has superseded the Hindu-Muslim communalism as an institution of inter-group relations and has become an household reality since then. Further exploratory work also revealed the interesting fact that whatever passed for in the name of Muslim minority problem were mostly Sunni dominated both in its leadership and organisation. Whether it is on the question of the minority character of Aligarh Muslim University, or the second language status for Urdu,
the Sunni preponderance was clearly evident. This may be due partly to its larger numbers and partly to its more vigorous participation in wider politics - both national and communal. As a contrast, the Shia political interest is confined mostly to its local issues of "Taziadari" rights during Muharram. Spurred by the success of Khomeini's revolution at Iran, the Shias of Lucknow have revived their defunct association of Shia Conference into the new Ali Congress with international affiliation.

Hence, the picture that emerged is one of multipolar models of conflict involving local, national and international interests at the intra-minority and majority-minority levels. The local-communal dimension of the Sunni confrontation contrasted well with the local pan-Islamic cause of the Shias. The rupture therefore resulted in a triangular basis of ethnic conflict in Lucknow between the Hindus and Muslims. No better proof of this can be had than the occasion of the 56th All India Muslim Conference held at Lucknow in August 1978, when the Shias staged a walk out on the ground that "a Muslim perspective is not possible until the Shias and Sunnis of Lucknow unite".62

However, in spite of the well-entrenched traditions of internal disunity, it was still possible to identify certain domains of interest projecting the image of Muslims and

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("Tazias" are the emblems taken out in the Moharram processions symbolic of the Karbala martyrdom of Hussain.)
Christians collectively as "Minorities" covering a wide spectrum of issues ranging from economic rights to those relating to freedom of worship. The various problems, familiarly known as 'minority grievances' in official parlance have been illustrated with extracts from petitions, memoranda and appeals submitted by these communities to the Government from time to time as reported by the Local English dailies:

I. Petition Submitted by Janata Minorities Forum to the Party President, "FLIGHT OF CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS"

There is only one Muslim working as District Magistrate in Uttar Pradesh while there is no Muslim Secretary to Government in the U.P. Secretariat and only 5 Muslims were appointed to the post of Sub-Inspector recently when 500 Sub-Inspectors were recruited by the U.P. Police Department. The Muslim population in U.P., being 15 per cent according to an old reckoning their percentage of recruitment of Sub-Inspectors comes to only one.

The facts were brought to the notice of Mr. Abbas Ali, President of the Janata Party of Uttar Pradesh recently by a delegation of Janata Minorities Forum when the delegation submitted a memorandum to Mr. Abbas Ali condemning the communal policies of the outgoing Home Minister, Mr Ram Singh, who encouraged injustice against Muslims and abetted in communalism at Aligarh according to the delegation.

The delegation asked Mr. Abbas Ali to resign his office as he had failed to get justice for Muslims though he is the chief of the U.P. Janata Party.

A Christian member of the delegation pointed out to Mr. Abbas Ali that not even one Christian held any responsible position in the State.
II. A popular Urdu daily "AZADM" having the largest circulation in UP published the following letter to Editor deploiring the higher regional discrimination of UP Muslims as compared to the rest of India:

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Among 2,800 officers, only 5 per cent account to civil list of 1972. But in 1979, where the increase in IAS officers was by 800, Muslims decreased by 15, bringing the percentage to 3 per cent in 1979.

III. The President of Islamic Schools and Religious Education which has its Headquarters at Lucknow writes:

From the books on language literature and history etc. it seems that systematic attempt is being made to create hatred against Muslims generally, those books do not refer to big Muslim personages and saints whose lives could surely be sources of great inspiration to all Indian without distinction of caste and creed. On the contrary, whenever a few Muslims personages of yore find place in any book, one would mostly find that their character has been depicted in such a manner as to create hatred of such personalities and also the religion that they profess. 65

IV. The 1978 resolution of all India Muslims Conference held in Lucknow states:

Economically, we are ruined absolutely. Our entrepreneurs are frowned upon. Licences, permits and financial assistance remained ever denied to us. By now we constitute the most economically backward cross-section of the population. 66

V. A memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister by the Anglo-Indian nominee of the UP State Legislative Council
reads as follows:

Dear Madam,

I am grateful for the opportunity you have given me, in spite of your busy schedule, to place before you some of the problems of my community and of the Christian community (emphasis added).

Your recent pronouncements against communalism and your desire for national integration and a fair deal to the minorities have proposed me to ask for this interview.

I shall present our difficulties as briefly as possible.

1. Representation in the Upper House: Since 1967/68 there has been no Christian representative in the Legislative Council.

2. Representation on Committees: Christian and Anglo-Indians are not nominated to the State Linguistic Minorities Committee or the Nation Integration Committee. How can this Committee be without a large minority community like the Christians being on it.

3. Employment: Because of casteism in selection committees and in services, Anglo-Indians and Christians are either not being selected or are being superseded. A number of instances could be quoted to substantiate this accusation but I cannot take time here to have them all. 67

Three very important questions arise from our above discussions on the historicity of the 'field' chosen for the study.

(1) How far are intra-communal rivalries responsible for minimising inter-communal conflicts?

(2) Can the low-communal tension of Lucknow be attributed to divided Hindu and non-Hindu communities alone? Or,
are these only apparent 'realities' of a situation with much deeper 'meanings' than what meets the eye on the surface?

(3) Why the Christian community with greater resource base (in terms of material and non-material resources) were always a 'backstage' or a 'bandwagon' minority? Was it only because of the stigma of Pakistan that Muslims appear more visibly minoritized than Christian? Or once again is it that the social transparencies conceal the 'reality of research'?

But our primary concern is with the individual Muslim and Christian identity and their articulation of what is or is not real about the three questions raised above will provide the major part of our discussion in Part III.

Section 2 : Lucknow: Some Impressionistic and Demographic Highlights

The essence of Lucknow is its lethargy and nostalgia. Attributed by and large to the unforgettable legacy of the Nawabs who ruled the city for 136 years the slow moving pace presents a striking contrast to the buzzing activity of Kanpur, hardly at a distance of 80 kms. Kanpur maintains its reputation of an industrial city and Lucknow takes pride in its "Nawabi Khoon". It is not uncommon even today to see crowds of men thronging the banks of Gomti for a deal in kites be it even a working day. Even more baffling is the
casual attitude of the onlookers many of whom may be en route to their offices, not to speak of the rickshaw-pullars whose keen participation may be at the cost of a few rupees! Kite flying next only to betel-chewing has now become a common man's pastime where Sikh, Hindu, Muslim and Christian rub shoulders with each other. The annual Tourism festival held by the State Government in the month of February every year revives the by-gone royal pastimes of the city by hosting many of the sports patronised by nawabs. As a striking contrast, horse-racing and golf patronised by the British rulers still remains the exclusive of the small English-speaking elite.

The city impresses a new-comer as a bundle of bewildering paradoxes. For a capital city like Lucknow to be seen flourishing with a primitive conveyance like the cycle rickshaw is rather strange. The "ekka" or the one-horse cart plies even now on the old city route. Once in a while it appears to have not changed much from the 1908 Gazetteer's description, "Some of the most striking buildings that are by moonlight like marble are shown by the disillusioning sun to be degraded example of stucco and brick". However, since 1979, there has been a virtual spate of heavy constructions going on and the changing landscape that one can observe atop a three star hotel reveals the sudden appearance of multi-storeyed skyscrapers overshadowing the palatial ruins of the yester years. By all standards of aesthetics,
whether in poetry or in its "Charana" of Kathak dance and Ghazals, the city has its own unblemished charm of an exotic tradition. It does not certainly deserve the ruthless comments made by the Times Correspondent who visited Lucknow in 1858 to find it "ruled by a semi barbarous, effete, decadent emperor". On the contrary Sleeman's observation made in 1876 is to a large extent can be witnessed in the city even today. "It is a colourful city with a perpetual turmoil of processions, illuminations and festivities." Perhaps Lucknow has more people earning their livelihood as bandmen and decorators than as factory workers! In fact, the low industrial profile of this city is reflected in the flourishing growth of handicrafts in which a large number of Muslim artisans are engaged. The establishment of two major public sector undertakings has undoubtedly made a dent into the occupational pattern of the city, but has not altered it in any serious way. (See Appendix Tables 30, 31 and 32)

Located between 26° 30' and 27° 10' N latitude and 80° 30' and 81° 13' east longitude in Uttar Pradesh is the district of Lucknow containing the three Tehsils of Malihabad, Mohanlalganj and Lucknow Urban Agglomeration. The latter i.e. Urban Lucknow has registered the highest density of 7,241 persons per sq. km. and highest rate of urbanisation of 52.98 per cent in the State as a whole for a population of 1,006,538 according to 1981 provisional Census as against
79

79.8 and 50.98 per cent respectively for the district as a whole with a population of 2,047,172 in 1981. The decennial population growth for the city of Lucknow alone is from 813,986 in 1971 to 1,006,538 in 1981. Compared to the State literacy rate of 21.70 per cent and 27.40 per cent for 1971 and 1981 respectively, the district of Lucknow registers an incredible 40.20 per cent for 1981 from 34 per cent in 1971. The literacy rate for Lucknow Urban area in 1981 is projected to be nearly 57.28 per cent. The gradual growth of those employed in Trade and Commerce, alongside the marginal decrease in the category of Other workers since 1971 (see Appendix Tables 31 and 32) together with the rapid increase in literacy provides some interesting insights into the economic characteristic of Lucknow, on the basis of which one can make some prognosis of its occupational trends.

In the light of prevailing figures (see Appendix Table 32) one may hazard a guess that in spite of phenomenal rise of literacy those employed in professional and service classes may be much less than those in trade and commerce because of the invasion of business and entrepreneurship by the educated classes of the city. Thus in a population of 1,006,538 with 57.28% literacy, professionals number only 321,994 whereas other workers and main workers together amount to 518,053 (see Appendix Table 32). The sudden spurt in entrepreneurial interest is well
substantiated statistically as seen in the addition of 381 units in small-scale industries between 1978-81, as against 271 between 1976-78, and 65 only between 1965-70 according to the information disclosed by the Directorate of Industries.

Lucknow was always known as a commercial centre and perhaps the present too is indicative of the same. Even among the marginal and working class population, those engaged by industrial units are far less than those in self-employment as petty traders, hawkers, cycle-rickshaw pullers, skilled and semi-skilled technicians besides the artisans engaged in brass-ware and chikkan* embroidery.

Lucknow is yet to emerge in the industrial map of Uttar Pradesh. According to a study conducted by a semi-autonomous research organisation in 1975, there were 235 small industrial units (many of them not even registered) employing only 27,669 workers in all.74

Even footwear, press and printing business besides small electrical wares exist as household industry in Lucknow. Others are, grain mill products, breweries, perfumery, tobacco, garments, ropes and twines, chemicals, tanneries, railroad equipment, cycles, scientific instruments and confectionery. There are two heavy industries under the public sector project, a modest figure as compared to eight large-scale industries in

* Hailed to be the traditional pride and speciality of Lucknow, Chikkan work is an embroidery of cut-work and shadow work. The craft is believed to be gradually on the decline because the market for embroidery in golden and silver thread is more prosperous.
the private sector within the District of Lucknow. The years 1978-80 recorded the maximum entrepreneurial activity for the city when 381 new units were registered with the Government as against 65 for 1960-75 and 217 from 1976-78.

Table 1

Registered Small Scale Industries - A Communal Break-up of Ownership (1976-81) Lucknow District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
<th>Christian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Up to November 1981) Total</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 also throws some light on the communal ownership of small scale industries. It is seen that nearly 25% of the total is owned by Muslims as against 1% by Sikh and the rest in Hindu hands. Of the 8 large-scale units in Lucknow, ownership is entirely with Hindus and it is believed that nearly 90% of these Hindus are migrant capitalists from
Bengal who settled in UP since the 1970s when the naxalite problem drove many of them from that State. We may safely conclude that at least as far as the entrepreneurial status of Muslims vis-a-vis Hindus are concerned, the Community has a share of 25 per cent to the total ownership and thus almost approximates its 23 per cent of total population as per the 1971 census. At the same time the absence of even a single Christian entrepreneur is worth noting.

The Muslims of UP are essentially from the artisan classes. In Lucknow they are mainly either chikkan embroiderers numbering about 2,500 in the city and 4,500 in the district as a whole. Still more popular is the Zari embroidery work, called Zardogi and there are nearly 4,000 to 5,000 Muslims employed in this craft in the city of Lucknow alone. In the absence of any organised labour unions for these craftsmen, the adult zardogi gets Rs. 12-15 per eight hour day as against Rs. 8-9 for the adult chikkan worker as it prevailed in 1978. Though the process of manufacturing is like the guild system of cottage/household industry type, the capital investment and ownership is in the hands of mainly Rastogi Hindus. While 90 per cent of ownership rests with them, 8 per cent is with Muslims and 2 per cent with Sikhs. The chikkan Export Corporation set up by the Government has only 1,500 workers and there are only two co-operatives with 30 workers each for the chikkan industry at Lucknow.
The reluctance of the chikkan workers to get mobilised into the co-operative movement is understandable, since most of them are in bondage to their respective employers, who advance loans on easy terms to meet 'crisis'. The Rastogis are the monopolists in the field like the Muslim leather merchants of Kanpur. The Muslim ownership in the zardogi craft is about 20% as against 30% of Sindhis and Rastogis. But among the four leading exporters of "zari" goods two are Muslims and two are Hindus. The Zardogi Anjuman is mainly an association of owners that has more Shias than Sunnis in it; whereas the craftsmen are mainly from the Sunni community. Besides, chikkan and embroidery, a large number of Muslims are employed in perfumery and tobacco industry as well, a few Muslim families are almost an institution in the perfume trade of the city; while the tobacco industry has an equal share of Hindu-Muslim capitalists, the perfumery industry was the sole monopoly of just three Muslim households in the city. Apart from these, bakery, toy-making, tailoring, petty trade, dying, carpentry, butchery footwear and leather tanning have more or less become the hallmark of the traditional Muslim enterprises in Lucknow. Among the 'modern' professions, law followed by academics is popular among the Muslims though in the latter, their enrolment is highest in the fields of Persian, Urdu literature, Arabic culture and commerce. Besides in Lucknow the majority of technicians in electronic and automobile industry are mainly Muslims.
However, even today many Muslims continue to be engaged in their own traditional 'caste' callings, though a large number have migrated to non-caste professions in the wake of partition and the subsequent Abolition of Zamindari Act of 1956.

Known locally as 'biradari', the Muslim occupational castes in Lucknow has almost a representative cross-section of the region itself, though a sizeable number of them have ceased to be engaged in their traditional 'calling'. Yet in matters of social customs, conventions and practice, including rules of marriage and inheritance, the various 'biradaris' follow their own system of native jurisprudence or Conventional law, which, in some cases, may even contradict the tenets of the 'sharia' or Islamic personal law. Defined in simple terms a 'biradari' is a group of individuals bound by a common caste or sub-caste, language or dialect, common history, proscribed occupation, kin and marriage relations and common life situations with a feeling of in-group identity. However, it is not necessary for 'biradaris' of one particular caste-calling to have a common religion. Thus we have washermen from Hindu and Muslim 'biradaris' alike. The peculiar characteristic of the Lucknow biradaris are that they are organised into economic associations like the caste associations and function as effective pressure groups, vis-a-vis other 'biradaris' or members of the same 'biradari' across other religious communities.
The basic unit of 'biradari' organisation is therefore religion and sub-caste and not economic, resulting in parallel organisations for one and the same kind of work. Thus we have in Lucknow, a Salmani Union exclusively for Muslim Barbers, an association of Lal Begis for Muslim sweepers (as different from the other sweeper unions) and Qasaii Association of Muslim butchers. On the contrary, the Zardogi Anjuman is a non-biradari voluntary association like the Chikkan Manufacturers' Association. The Sunnis have larger number of occupational castes among them, and so the 'biradari' stronghold is obviously more among them. The 'Lal Beghis' is the only Shia biradari association found in our study. The hierarchical character of the wider social order is also reflected in a hierarchy of the 'biradari' association. Groups such as Momin Ansari Association of Muslim weavers has been politically influential ever since the Independence, particularly in UP and Bihar, since a majority of UP Muslims belong to the Ansari Caste of weavers and enjoy political power and patronage, the organisation is highly resourceful in its mobilisation base as well. As per a Gazette notification the Ansaris have been classified among backward classes in the State (vide G.O.No. 2003/40/Ra-EK1/20-8-77) entitling them to all the privileges available on the quota system therein. (It is even rumoured that with urban mobility and increasing influence, many 'Ansaris' have dropped their surnames in preference to those of the Muslim upper castes like the Sayyeds.)
At the time of the field work, the 'Raeen Associati
of Oil merchants and grain dealers had submitted a petition
for recognition as backward classes. Hence the 'biradari'
identity was utilised as a force on the economic frontier;
however in case of Lucknow, the sectarian affinity assumes
an overarching identity framework within the concerned
'biradaris' to divide them politically. This is true of even
professional association such as that of the Shia Lawyers
Association. As Ahmad rightly observes, "it is however
possible that caste, sectarian and religious identities each
exert pressure and categorises affiliations that vary from
instance to instance, shaping the response of individual
Muslim".79

Unlike the Muslim stronghold in the artisan and
craft industry particularly as non-owners, Christians are
dispersed over a variety of modern professions. However, not
more than half a dozen families have landed interests and
hardly any in large scale business or industrial units. In
Lucknow unlike Kanpur, majority of Christians including Anglo
Indians are engaged in teaching jobs, though very few at the
university level. Private technicians, and secretarial/
clerical staff in the offices of Central/State Government and
municipality besides Railways also have sizeable number of
Christians.

Nevertheless, it is of some academic interest to
note that unlike in Moradabād or Varanasi, the Hindus and
Muslims of Lucknow have no clash of vested interests in a particular domain of business or manufacturing activity. Because, so far Muslims were concerned mainly with manufacturing and trade in traditional wares like perfumes and tobacco etc., On the contrary, a cut-throat competition was noticeable between the migrant Punjabis and local Hindus when the latter ventured upon the arena of modern business that was under the monopoly of the former since 1947. However, there is a slow influx of Muslims into modern arenas of manufacture and trade but not in a formidable way as to provoke any communal contempt so far.

Of the three major zones in the city, excluding trans-Gomati area, old Lucknow and Aminabad still proves to be the Muslim stronghold in residential choice. A trend toward nascent cosmpolitisation of housing is seen in the trans-Gomati areas where a number of service and professional Muslims and Christians have purchased houses under the new Ownership Schemes. However, segregation is still predominant feature of housing in Lucknow that is at times detailed to even sectarian preferences.

For instance in old Lucknow, an entire street of nearly 20 to 25 households belong to the sub-caste of carpenters who manufacture combs from buffalo horns. Similarly Shia and Sunni neighbourhoods are at times separated by by-lanes of Hindu households. Parochial considerations dominate the residential patterns of both Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians as well. However, due to the steady exodus
of Anglo-Indians even as late as the seventies has resulted in the gradual invasion of hitherto exclusively Anglo-Indian localities like the Maqbera and Lawrence Terrace by many Punjabis and local Hindus.

Though the Christian population of the city was only 0.73 per cent as per 1971 Census, yet the socio-cultural ecology of Lucknow, first as the seat of the Nawabs and then as the administrative headquarters of the British since 1923 projected Lucknow as an admirable setting for the study of both Muslim and Christian minority identity.

The following considerations also influenced the choice of Lucknow for the field study:

(1) The State of Uttar Pradesh could boast of a Minorities Commission much before the Centre or any other State of India.  

(2) There are well-known Christian and Muslim organisations specifically to serve minority interests. Of these, the two leading ones are the UP Congress Minorities Cell of Congress (I) Party and UP Minorities Federation belonging to the Janata Party; the only non-party Minority organisation is the UP Minorities Educational Institution founded in 1968 with Christian representatives also in its Executive Board. The presence of the only Christian MLC in the city, besides the Christian members in the State Minorities Commission also was one of the reason that justified the choice of Lucknow for a comparative investigation of Muslims and Christians.
(3) From the reported news items in the local English dailies, it is seen that some Lucknow Christians at least were aware of their rights as a minority community; and since their grievances were addressed to the Minorities Commission or the State Government as the case may be, it was expected that the phenomenology of the field for study of Christian Identity too will be sufficiently rewarding.

(4) Historically viewed, Lucknow was one of the epicentres for Christian political activity as in the case of the Muslims. Prior to the announcement of the communal award for Indian Christians by virtue of the Government of India Act, 1932, the question allotting reservation to Lucknow Christians was put to serious debate on account of its meagre population even then. As per Census of 1921 and 1931, the Government found out that Lucknow did not fall within the six largest populated districts of UP. But the then Chief Secretary of UP Indian Christian Association Mr. Dube declared in his letter to the Commissioner that "heads alone should not count but due weight should be given to political consciousness, enlightenment, and public spirit and similar factors." Subsequently Indian Christians favoured joint electorates but with a seat reserved for Lucknow Christians in the Assembly."
Like the Muslims, majority of the Lucknow Christians are also biradari converts. This is confirmed by Henry Prestler's study. But unlike the Muslim biradaris that have been reinforced under market pressures of urbanisation, the Christian biradaris have become more or less de-institutionalised for all practical purposes. With near 100 per cent literacy in the community at Lucknow, the caste-occupation syndrome characteristic of Muslim biradaris is non-existent among Christians. For the Indian Christians in Lucknow, "caste" has ceased to be a meaningful category in the sphere of day-to-day behaviour or interaction. However, its relevance as a quasi-ontological reality still continues to influence the self-image of the individuals; particularly the few upper caste converts, still sensitive for being identified along with the low caste Christians. As a mark of identification, they retain the Hindu caste name e.g. Sharma along with the Christian name or anglicise their erstwhile Hindu name e.g. Tewarson so as to retain its upper caste identity in a casteless exterior.
### Table 2

**Some Highlights of Lucknow Christians**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the denomination among the local Christians</th>
<th>Church of North India - splinters (excluding from Protestant Church of col. 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methodists including (Anglo-Indian)</td>
<td>Catholic including (Anglo-Indians and Goanese)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>4,622</td>
<td>3,000 (500 Anglo-Indian)</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>250 to 300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literacy</th>
<th>60% - 8th class</th>
<th>20% - High School</th>
<th>20% - College education</th>
<th>90% - Literacy</th>
<th>98% Literacy</th>
<th>50% - 8th class</th>
<th>30% - High School</th>
<th>10% - College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source of employment</td>
<td>40% - Government</td>
<td>30% - Government</td>
<td>50% - Government</td>
<td>30% - Employed</td>
<td>45% - Unemployment</td>
<td>20% - Unemployed</td>
<td>15% - Government</td>
<td>30% - Self or Community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (contd.)
Institutions run by the denomination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Educational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A. 1 College</td>
<td>A. 1 College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Medical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B. 4 schools</td>
<td>B. 1 School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Vocational/Social services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Recreational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above information was furnished by the concerned Church Authorities.
In UP as a whole, Christian ownership extends over 64,000 recognised schools and colleges; 34,000 social service centres; 3 medical colleges; 1,10,000 hospital beds. For a mere 0.75 per cent of the State population, the command over resources under the exclusive ownership of the community is fairly impressive as compared to the meagre 150 institutions (educational etc) managed by Muslims in UP.

### Table 3

#### Percentage Employment of Muslims and Christians in Lucknow District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Board of Revenue (in per centage)</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mus-</td>
<td>Chris-</td>
<td>Mus-</td>
<td>Chris-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lim</td>
<td>tian</td>
<td>lim</td>
<td>tian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Civil Service</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehsildars</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naib Tehsildar</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakhpal/Patwari</td>
<td>Kanugo</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information for all districts were not supplied nor was for all grades available. Source of information was Board of Revenue, UP State, 1978.
Table 4

District Commissioner's Office (Lucknow) - Employment by Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Class A</th>
<th>Class B</th>
<th>Class III</th>
<th>Class IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H.</td>
<td>M.</td>
<td>Ch.</td>
<td>H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: Muslim representation is larger in the lower grades as compared to the Christians.

Table 5*

UP Police Service - Percentage Employment of Muslims and Christians (1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Service</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.S.P.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectors</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Inspectors</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Constables</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constables</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* UP Police Information supplied by the UP State Police Bureau of Intelligence.
Table 6

Employment by Religion: Lucknow Mahapalika
(Urban Lucknow)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>3,537</td>
<td>3,537</td>
<td>3,537</td>
<td>3,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Christian representation in Mahapalika is perhaps more than in other departments of the State except Medical and Educational. The teacher-nurse syndrome among Christians continue as unfailingly as the lawyer-politician combination among the Muslims.

* Information supplied by the Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow City.
### Table 7

**Organisation of Muslims and Christians in Lucknow City**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management/Community/Secretarian as unit of Control</th>
<th>Economical/Occupational</th>
<th>Communal (including religious/educational)</th>
<th>Political (Party) Units</th>
<th>Minority Welfare Associations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. (Sunni)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Grocers-grain and</td>
<td></td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>of Uttar Pradesh</td>
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<td></td>
<td>green)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Butchers) Non-Political</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mushawarat</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Badagi (carpenter-</td>
<td>c. Anjumaan Tariqui-Musalmeen</td>
<td>c. Khaksar Party</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or wood work)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Salmani (Barber)</td>
<td>d. Muslim Personal Law Board</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Haiwai (confectioners)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F. Ansari Momin</td>
<td>e. All India Muslim Youth Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Weavers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Anjuman Qureshi</td>
<td>f. Nadwa College of Theology</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Association (Local</td>
<td></td>
<td>g. Students Islamic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>political organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>Movement of India</td>
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<td></td>
<td>of butchers with 700</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>members)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>H. Rangrez Anjuman</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Dyers’ Association)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 (contd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. (Shias) I. Ali Congress</td>
<td>II.a Shia Lawyers' Conference (25 members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>II.a. Urdu Adab Award Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Lal Beeghis (Sweepers) only 6 families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Urdu Samaj</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Hindi-Urdu Sangam</td>
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<td></td>
<td>d. Urdu Association (600 to 1000)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>III.a. Anjuman Islahul Musalmeen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Anjuman Zardoji (Silk Embroiderers' Association)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e. Anjuman Tariqui Urdu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IV. Muslim Muzzafir Khana</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a. UP Indian Christian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. The Anglo-Indians Association of UP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Young Men's Christian Association</td>
<td>UP Indian Christian Federation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Indian Christians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Anglo-Indians</td>
<td>Young Women's Christian Association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Besides the communally based organisations mentioned above, there are two associations viz. Minority Youth Forum and Minority Educational Institutions that operate an inter-minority basis. Also, the two leading national parties, viz. Congress (I) and the Bharatiya Janata Party and its splinter groups have well organised minority cells within them, articulating their ethnic grievances in political party cliches.
At the time of entry into the field the terrain was not necessarily hostile to the research project on hand. Lucknowites are basically very friendly people with a well deserved pride of conventional hospitality known as "takkaluf" which beyond barriers of caste, community and class welcomes the guests with an "adab" (characteristic of Avadhi style of greeting) followed by generous offering of spiced betel leaves from ornamental container called 'paandaan'. The hospitality of the people is at times so oppressively overwhelming that it did not suggest of any 'hurdles' for field work particularly as far as accessibility to 'data' was concerned. However, in August 1977, when the study began, the 'Emergency psychosis' was still fresh in the minds of the citizens, particularly among Muslims and Christians, whose alleged suffering on account of compulsory sterilisation (in the district of Sultanpur) was claimed to be worse than that of Hindus; mistrust and animosity was further aggravated by the popular belief in the then ruling party of the State Government dominated by the RSS organisation of the Hindus.

In addition to environmental constraints on research there were other limitations arising from the religious background of the researcher and the sensitivity of the topic itself. Religion in India, as elsewhere is a highly emotional and evocative theme, not limited to academic interests alone. Also, in the light of the country's unpleasant 'communal' memories it was not very comfortable
or even advisable for a member of the majority community, not belonging to the local familiar environs of the city to embark on the proposed study with the same outburst of impulsive enthusiasm that initially characterised the encounter with the field. In order to understand the methodological improvisation forged for the purpose of data accessibility, in the next chapter, we shall start with a discussion on the method of phenomenology, the conceptual model of the study and the impact of the field on the researcher leading to the choice of interpretative techniques in the study. The chapter concludes with highlights of field protocols, tools of investigation, and data collection methods employed in the study.
According to the Imperial Census of 1869, the Shia population of Lucknow was 34,550 as against Sunnis numbering 115,371 and Hindus 161,729 (UP State Archives, Lucknow).


Ibid. Unlike Delhi, Lucknow was not a walled city indicating its apolitical character. "Tehzib" is the Urdu word for polished and sauv manners in speech, gesture and behaviour in general. Considered to be an outstanding feature of Lucknow's cultural supremacy under the Nawabs as compared to rest of the State, "takkaluf" or hospitality and "tehzib" or etiquette were perceived to be the hallmark of Lucknow's civilised manners and cultural poise.


Muharram is the first month of the Muslims lunar calendar and is observed as a month of mourning by the Muslims to commemorate the martyrdom of Hussain, the grandson of the Prophet. As to the participation of Hindus in Muharram, the researcher has witnessed it during the Majlis procession taken inside one of the "Imambaras" in the city. However, the participation of Hindus in the festival has now become a thing of the past.

The Hindu-Muslim hostilities have become the cornerstone of Majority-Minority relations in India. But the peculiarity of Lucknow is the equal intensity of sectarian animosities between Sunnis and Shias, the two major Muslim sects of the city. Hence it is of equal academic interest for any student of ethnic (minority) identity, because the Shias of Lucknow, numbering approximately 1/3 of the Sunni strength (correct figures are not available) are larger than in any other city in India. Having been its ruling
class for 136 years, the Shi'as claim the right to take out the "Tajia and Alum" procession in the commemoration of Karbala and martyrdom of Hussain on the last day of Muharram. However, the alleged recitation of certain verses offending the Sunni faith in the Prophet Mohammad provokes violent clashes between the two communities in the old city. The Shia-Sunni rivalry has now become a regular feature of the city's law and order problem in the wake of its violent outbursts during Muharram annually. For details of Muharram in Lucknow, see, J.N. Hollister, op. cit., 1953. For an eye-witness account, see Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali, Observations on the Musalmans of India, Oxford University Publication, London, 1974 (first published in 1932). A.H. Shrar, op. cit., 1975, recollects dirges being sung by Hindus during Muharram.

8 T.C. Piggot, "The Madh-e-Sabta Report of 1908", Resolution No. 323, Home Department, United Provinces, October 3, 1908. The second report on the increasing Shia-Sunni disturbances was the J.J.M. Allsop report dated April 1937. It was followed by the Pent Communique of July 1939. The final action of the Raj on record is the Maulana Azad's appeal to Sunnis dated 20th April 1940, as per the Home Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh. After 1977, the two major Shia-Sunni agreements were in 1969 and in 1974 (Office of the District Magistrate, Lucknow Division).


11 Choudhury Kaliqurzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, Longmans, Lahore, 1961. This book has been officially banned in India but is available in some private collections with friends of the author who hails from Lucknow.

12 India was a semi-feudal if not even prematurely developed feudal society at the time of the British arrival. However academic claims are to the contrary. It was in essence a system characteristic of the Asiatic mode of production and the province of Oudh was an outstanding example of the same. Obviously with a benevolent despot at the pinnacle of political pyramid, the formation of classes or of ideas.
initiating such process was non-existent. Accordingly, "Tehzib" provided an all-purpose ideological canopy for everyday life of the Lucknows.

13 The term "husk-culture" was used as an epithet for the post-1857 Lucknow by Henry Lawrence, the then Commissioner, and widely referred to by Thomas Metcalf in his book, *Land, Landlords and British Raj in 19th Century North India*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid. The Lucknow Pact signed between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League came to an understanding on the number of reservations for Muslim representation in local bodies. Unlike in Punjab and Maharashtra, Lucknow Pact was a relative but controversial success because Muslims did not object, to the passing of the resolution. The public meeting was a joint communal affair. GAD (1917), United Provinces and Oudh, UP State Archives.

20 V.C. Sharma, *UP District Gazetteer*, vol. XXXVII, Lucknow, 1959. (Published by UP State Information and Publication Division)


22 Ibid.
Even today the Residency where the British were held in captive for nine months from March 1857 until the relief operations under General Outram came from Kanpur, is shown with pride as a place of tourist interest in Lucknow. Reduced to its skeletal structure of brick walls, this colossal mass of ruins stands as a monumental evidence to the valour and gallantry of the natives, which were spawned by nothing other than political intrigues of the de-classed nawabi descendants. So the spirit of politics is not alien to the Lucknowas. The communal comraderie of the Mutiny leadership is testified by the gang of six - 3 Shias, 2 Sunnis and 1 Hindu. However the ultimate proof of their comraderie would have been seen had the Hindus or Sunnis questioned the Shias in the event of their victory.

GAD File No. 502(58) 1947, State Archives, Uttar Pradesh. Wasiqadars are those who draw a pension from the interest paid by the Government (now Indian) on the loan advanced to them by the Nawabs of Oudh.

There are no official records made available for public. However, the local English dailies for the relevant period did carry news reports on the 1981 provocation of a piece of beef found in a temple situated in the old city where Hindu-Muslim concentration is heavy. See Northern India Patrika, November 8, 1981. The 1973 disturbances have been cited from Radiance Views Weekly, EID Special, August 1981.
Short of breaking into a violent eruption, the anti-second official language status to Urdu was marked by fiery public meetings, processions, propaganda and petitions to concerned officials. See *Northern India Patrika*, March 1982.

GAD, 1933, UP State Archives.

The sudden affluence of the Sunnis partly due to industry, commerce and education, besides Arab patronage, not to speak of the unexpected political windfall following 1977 general elections, has been an increasing irritant to the Shias. The 1973 Islamic Revolution in Iran had certainly boosted the anti-Sunni spirit of Shias as reflected by the most dreadful of the riots that rocked the city in 1979. We have only sketched an objective profile on the existing stock of knowledge that is Lucknow. How far, and, in what manner the people interpret in it was seen in the case-histories presented in Part III.

It is widely believed that the lack of unity among Lucknow Muslims has been responsible for communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims, not only has the data of the study belied the myth of Lucknow's communal harmony but it has also shown that except for a few Shias, the majority are unconcerned about the local happenings as a matter of political interest. If at all, there had been no Hindu-Muslim violence in Lucknow, even since 1947, it was mainly because of the absence of the educated middle class among Muslim who were at the vanguard of Muslim separatism in pre-Partition days. Moreover, Lucknow having been the administrative headquarters of the then United Provinces, the remnant of the middle class who stayed were those apolitically dispossessed officials of the State Government who maintained a level of cordiality with the new rulers. The emerging Muslim middle class is more commercially inclined, and hence, the educated Hindu middle class does not pose a threat as such in Lucknow. However for the educated Muslims of UP as a whole, the controversial minority character of Aligarh University is likely to be made a communal issue.

"Communal Awards", F.No.86/1932, OAD, UP State Archives. The records on Lucknow testify the dissatisfaction of Hindus and the secret satisfaction
of Muslims. It is told that even the tiny and privileged Christian and Anglo-Indian communities were awakened from their dormant communal consciousness.

36 A. Schutz and T. Luckman, The Structure of Life-Worlds, Heinemann, London, 1974. The phrase "Recipe Knowledge" is used by the authors to refer to useful responses to specific situational contexts, e.g. technical skills etc.


42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 F.No. 81/1916 OAD, UP State Archives.

46 Some historians claim that the Lucknow Pact of 1916 epitomised Hindu-Muslim Communalism just as the Khilafat Movement was a symbol of Pan-Islamism. See Chapter III, and Chapter II, Mushirul Hasan, op. cit., 1981.

47 Communal Awards, F.No. 86/1932.


The above official report known as the Fuhrer's report is the oldest recorded information claiming the origin of Lucknow to pre-Nawabi days of Aryan period. The discovery of Lakhanau is accredited to Lakshmana, the brother of King Rama of Ayodhya, and it is also reported the temple of Lakshmana called Lakshmanavati now lays buried beneath a mosque built by Moghal King Aurangzeb (p. 265). Similar claim is repeated in the Imperial Gazetteer of Oudh, 1908 (p. 195) and also by the first District Gazetteer of Lucknow (since Independence). See V.C. Sharma, *District Gazetteer of Lucknow*, op. cit., 1959.

The researcher carried out an intensive field study of the controversial genesis of Lucknow. Besides secondary source data, it also involved extensive discussions and meetings with district officials, experts and officials from the department of archaeology, UP State Government. Other private individuals included the Imam of the disputed Masjid and Mr Amrit Lal Nagar, a famous Hindi writer in whose custody are kept some of the excavated pieces of the 1959 survey. An amateur archaeologist, Mr Ramesh Mahliviya, who is also a nominated member of the State Archaeological Board, claims to have proved the Hindu hypothesis behind the genesis of the city, which, in his view has not deserved the necessary governmental attention for the fear of raking up communal sentiments. This was also confirmed in great confidence by the then District Magistrate of the city.

According to Lucknow Development Authority, File No. 3958/12.4.229/79.

This is recorded in a communication addressed to the Lucknow Development Authority and office of the District Magistrate by State Agricultural Department, August 9, 1979, 184/NS.


Since this is considered a confidential item, the official records were not available for scrutiny.

A.K. Dutt, Secretary, UP Christian Federation, 6th August 1977.

A.K. Dutt, 11th September 1975. The Christian leaders could not press further on account of Emergency rule then.

A.C. Das, MLC, UP State. Memorandum to the Chief Minister, dated 9th April 1978.

A. Samuel, Secretary, UP Christian Association.

The phrase, "Bradari Church" is used by J.W. Pickett, op. cit., 1969. The author uses the term "bradari Churches" to denote the mass conversion of Hindus belonging to a single ethnic entity which was usually the unit of caste and sub-caste to Christianity. Mass converts in UP were almost entirely from the Scheduled Castes of Hindus.

The researcher was an observant participant in the said conference.

Petition submitted by Janata Minority Forum to the President of UP State Janata Party in a meeting held on May 13, 1978, that was witnessed by the writer.


All India Muslim Conference Resolution, 1978. Most of the signatories to the said Memorandum were Sunni lawyers and businessmen.

A.C. Gryce, MLC, Memorandum, dated 20th June 1970.


Ibid.

Information provided by the Directorate of Industries Lucknow, 1981.

Ibid.

Ibid.

For instance, the Shariat or Shara (or Muslim Personal Law) was not familiar to many Muslims from the Biradari (caste) groups. Still more surprising was that some of the functionaries like the Muslim dabbies maintained that their law allows polygamy only in the event of the previous marriage turning out to be childless in blatant contradiction of the Shariat. The divergent life-worlds one at the realm of (Islamic) theory, and the other of practical customary folklore affords a rich field for phenomenological interpretation of individual identity.

Imtiaz Ahmad, Caste and Social Stratification Among Muslim, Manohar, 1973, p. XXXII, Introduction. Equally important stratificatory dimension among Muslims is the Ashraf-Ajalaf dichotomy to differentiate between original nobility and converts.

Census of India - Series 21, Part II-A, Uttar Pradesh, General Population Tables.
Vide Gazetteer, Notification, UP State, 3rd July 1969, and renewed in June 26, 1974

Reforms CAD, File No. 8(7)/1952, UP State Archives.

Ibid.


Cited from a report of the Methodist Church, the last publication of which to date was in 1979-80, Lucknow Publishing House, Lucknow.