Part I

Milestones to Phenomenological Marxism
CHAPTER I

TOWARDS A THEORY OF MINORITY IDENTITY

Beginning as a political fall-out of the First World War, "Minorityism" is ubiquitous to contemporary nation-states. The bewildering variety of races, religions, and languages that make up the fabric of plural societies offer diverse challenges and evoke various responses in the process of nation-building and national identity formation. The phenomenon is even more critical in post-colonial societies on the threshold of modernisation. Also in plural democracies with multi-party system like USA, India, UK, Ceylon, and Malaysia, political power plays a vital role in determining the point of equilibrium between the ethnic configurations constituting its citizenship basis. The under-currents of ethnic politics between the numerically larger groups and the smaller ones surface majority-minority situations in various aspects of social interactions. It is precisely because the problematic involves competitive power besides numbers and genetics, we find that sociology offers a comprehensive perspective for the study of 'minorityism'. Given the universal nature of the phenomenon in all nation-states at various stages of growth, development, and modernisation, the political framework (of nation-state) suggests itself to be the most logical unit for studies on ethnicity be it WASP
Ethnocentrism, Black Nationalism, Islamic Fundamentalism, or Irish Irrendentism. Notwithstanding their apparent differences the phenomenon points to the fundamentally ordered, similar and comprehensive ways of human behaviour in complex societies.

To harp on differences between peoples and cultures and overlook the hidden similarities is scientifically depriving, if not, even unethical. This is true of all studies, be they those of cross-national ethnicity or of ethnic groups within the same country. The focus on historicism and 'uniqueness' familiar to ethnic studies raises some fundamental questions on the epistemology of social science theory and concepts. In other words, are numbers and cultural factors sufficient grounds for definition of 'majority' and 'minority'? Are descriptive definitions explanatory in nature? So far, the academic esoterism about minorities was inhibited by the rhetoric of differences to define and identify a minority from a majority. Thus Mack tautologically concludes on the existence of minorities as a "sociological problem, because minorities get differential rewards because of differential identities."

The Consensus school of Structural-Functionalism was accordingly bogged down with equilibration theories of Integration, Assimilation and Acculturation. The Conflict theories went a step ahead to account for the confrontation between majority and minorities in terms of distributive inequalities. Failure to distinguish between the ethnic and non-ethnic sources of prejudice and discrimination resulted in overlooking the phenomenon of false perception.
Starting with the paradigm of social inequalities, the Marxist School in Minority Sociology dismissed 'minorityism' as a feudal survival to be overcome by the revolutionary process of history towards communism. The non-Marxist Power Theorists like Blalock and Van Den Berghe formalized theory in the field of Minority Sociology by identifying the relevant variables of number and control over resources as the most crucial determinants in the status of minorities in their relationship with the majority. Blalock's rigorous application of mathematical formulae clearly marked the coming of age for Minority sociology. Underlying all these various schools of thought were some common notions about minorities. These are as follows:

1. A popular and accepted belief is that the minority situation is an aberration of the normal, either 'pathological (Structural-Functional School) or 'reactionary' (Marxist) that needs to be set right. The majority culture is accordingly projected as the implicit normative framework for 'Acculturation', or 'Proletarianization' of the minorities depending on the ideological preferences of the academician and the administrator. To some extent, this explains the implicit practice of associating derogatory concepts with minorities as suggested by "backward Muslim" and "Nigger" and "Jim Crow" for Negroes. Contrarily, the term 'mainstream' is used to epitomise majority beliefs and of those minorities who are believed to be blessed with 'assimilatory' virtues. The most criminal consequences of such tyrannical concepts was to
associate the stigma of birth or ancestry of faith to the 'being' of a minority. The only redeeming solution was to cut off their roots, and adopt the 'mainstream' models of their respective majorities. Thus ontology superceded existentialism in theory construction.

The teleological and normative bias inherent to theorising on minorities resulted in circuitous logic and perverted conclusions. In a perceptive analysis on the business of sociological theorising Alan Blum claims that modern theorising has become less of rhetoric than philosophy. It is "the success of convincing, that is communicating and persuading others, and for silencing differences. The commu-nality and commonality of speech has overcome rhetoric by silencing the differences within the scientific community consequently, the old paradigms keep circulating". In spite of all his assimilatory virtues, the American Negro not surprisingly found himself still unwanted. Similarly, drastic proletarianisation did not deparochialise the Russian minorities like Armenians, Tartars and Muslims. However, the most aggressive manifestation of resurgent 'ethnicity' was seen in the land of the melting pot theorists themselves, so much so that in one of their recent works they have admitted the deplorable collapse of their theory.

(2) The role of 'numbers' in the definition and identification of minorities has been a technical dilemma for scholars in the field. The number-power combination that alone determines the minority status of any ethnic vis-a-vis
majority had to be rationalized within the theoretical framework of sociology. There are two contradictory viewpoints; Black, Barron and others including some Indian sociologists like Dutta believe in the precedence of power over size in defining a minority. Hence in the words of Barron

statistically smaller groups are in fact sociological minorities, and, the larger ones are dominant. But power is not dependent solely upon the variable of size or numbers; other variables such as weapons, organisational skill, leadership resources and literacy can offset numerical strength so that statistical majority can become sociological minorities and some statistical minorities can become sociological majorities (emphasis added).

Viewed thus South African Whites, Indian Parsis and Malaysian Chinese are sociological majorities though statistical minorities. Such glaring terminological inexactitude that make a minority into a majority by the mystique of power alone sounds rather nebulous. By its very definition the term 'minority' is statistically indicative of smallness of size. However, it becomes sociologically dominant or dominated in accordance with its resource status vis-a-vis a larger ethnic group or a majority in the distributive hierarchy. Conversely a majority too can be associated with dominant-dependent characteristics by the same criteria of resource control. Hence the mere size of a minority is not raison d'être concomittant with a status of deprivation. However, in the empirical situations prevailing in most of plural democratic nation-states like USA or India, the respective majorities enjoy a
politically dominant status stemming from the practice of universal representative electoral system. The conceptual lacunae of many sociologists of minority studies like Schermerhon or even Philip Mason for that matter is due to their glaring distortion of associating small numbers with subordinate status. In fact, the parliamentary system of Lebanon goes even a step further by provision of reservations for its minority communities like the Druz, Christians and Shias. Malaysia on the contrary, presents yet another unique situation wherein the politically dominant (hence larger) Malays are juxtaposed against an economically dominant minority, namely, the Chinese. The politics of numbers adds yet a new dimension to the problematics. For instance in China, the policy of protective discrimination extended to the minorities exempts them from the national birth control programmes. A situation has emerged wherein the youth of the Han majority community are confronted with equally large size of their counterparts from minority communities in the employment market. A more familiar illustration from India is the case of Hindu apprehensions of anti-birth control dogmas of Muslims and Catholics as a possible threat to their future strength and hence to their (numerical) political base itself.

Based on these diverse and strange ramifications of power and ethnic size, it is possible to derive a four-fold typology as a tool of enquiry into different majority-minority situations.
### Figure 1

**The Ideal and the Deviant Model of Majority-Minority Situations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Genetic Category of Race or Religion etc.</th>
<th>Sociological Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal type of single majority vs single minority</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority and Majority in the elite mass situations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Dominant Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Deviant type as in South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Dominant Minority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Symbol '+' indicates more than 50% of the population.

However, in most contemporary nation states both the ideal-type and the deviant type as presented in Fig. 1 above are non-existent. In these cases, a single large ethnic majority is co-existent with a number of minorities, some larger than the others, and of course, spread over a range of domination-deprivation characteristics. Thus the model presented in Figure 1 may be revised as below:
The above figure clearly indicates that the being of a minority by itself is not pari passu a state of overwhelming deprivation in the social scale of stratification. This is because of the diverse manifestations of resources resulting in dimension of domination distributed among the various groups. Thus a politically dominant majority is likely to face an economically dominant or culturally dominant minority as the case may be. What determines the criteria of dominance ultimately depends on the mode of production in a particular state system which shall be elaborated later. Nevertheless, as far as theocratic and totalitarian states like Iran or USSR
are concerned where free public opinion is frozen beneath the crust of party or religious ideologies, the minorities do suffer from cumulative deprivations in economic, political and cultural contexts. This is certainly not the case with the representative democracies wherein minority votes enjoy decisive political leverage, though not necessarily a dominant political status. For our study of minority identity, the empirical model in Figure 2 is more appropriate than the Ideal type or the Deviant type of Figure I. Consequently the notion of dominant minority in a political sense is ruled out of our theoretical focus though as far Indian Parsis and Jains go, it is still relevant in an economic sense. Conceptualising the great divide within Hindus (the Brahmins/Upper Castes) the various castes may also be termed as dominant minorities vis-a-vis Harijans in the cumulative sense of power, prosperity and cultural prestige thereby creating further ambiguities in the delineation of minority in countries like India. The phenomenon of cumulative and dispersed dominance create complexities of such nature that cannot be naively reduced to a simple equation of dominance-dependence factor across ethnic frontiers.

However, keeping the ethos of political power as the paramount parameter of a nation-state, the focus on minorities in this study shall tentatively fall under the familiar cliche of a dominated minority, based on the assumption that smallness of numbers is the principal deprivation for acquiring command over other resources, mainly power. It does not mean cumulative deprivation.
The sociological scapegoating of minorities as anomic has yielded mystifications of various sorts. One such mystification is "through the theorising activity" the tendency to dichotomise, as David Martin observes, "between sacred/profane, secular/communal, integration/pluralism". Mackney rightly calls this the process of myth-building and regrets that mythology has subtly insinuated itself into sociological concepts. In perceptive analysis of Melanesian Cults, Worsely remarks in a lighter vein "sociologists tend to distinguish between natural and supernatural aspects of religion in a way, that is not necessarily present in the minds of believers themselves". Not only were the theoretical formulation more descriptive and less analytical but, also failed to produce an overall perspective on the majority-minority situations. This was due largely to the historicist-isolated approaches to study minority-majority issues. The conceptual framework informed by either Consensus or Conflict doctrines fail to unfold the internal contradictions within the ethnic groups determining the sociological contours of conflict. The dismal consequences of the holistic perspective was seen in the widening gaps of inequality at all levels logically culminating into the unwelcome ethnic explosion of the 20th century resurgence phenomenon. The inter-penetration of social forces and the resulting spill-over effects cut through ethnic enclaves making it absurd to draw boundaries on the thresholds of 'number' and 'culture' alone. The phenomenon of Corporate pluralism on the one hand and the growing demand
for Cultural pluralism on the other surfaces controversial aspects of ethnic resilience thereby causing crisis in theory and method for study of minorities.

(3) An offshoot of the above argument is yet another popular misconception about 'minorities' as monoliths with an undifferentiated cohesive unified structure articulating a highly crystallized minority consciousness. While such a consciousness may be present at one level, it does not rule out the possibility of other levels of consciousness co-terminous with it, resulting in the paradox of plural identities. Consciousness is basically contextual in character. Thus we may find the overlapping layers of consciousness, and hence of identity unfolding their significance in accordance with the context of confrontation. For instance, we may identify four such levels, viz. (a) Majority-Minority, (b) Inter-Minority, e.g. Muslims Vs Harijans, (c) Intra-Minority (Sectarian, denominational or even sub-caste groupings e.g. Akali vs. Nirankaris among the Sikhs in India, Shia vs. Sunnis among Muslims, and (d) Intra-Sectarian e.g. Caste rivalries. Each level has a bearing on the mobilization potentiality and organization of consciousness at the other levels and hence are not mutually exclusive nor exhaustive.

Though the early Marxist theorists like Cox used the class model of White Bourgeoisie versus Black Workers to study the American situation, later theorists like Van Den Berghe highlighted the historical processes leading to such monolithic
confrontations as in the case of plantation economies. In this respect, Indian minority sociology has recently made some salient contributions to explode the myth of a monolith to show that intra-ethnic relations have a deterministic role to play in the inter-ethnic (be it communal, racial, linguistic or religion) patterns of conflict. Thus Imam points out:

Our purpose here is to advance scientific approach which must necessarily encompass the base and super-structure of a society like ours (India) as a unit in itself and only then to pinpoint the variety of multi-level problems, in this case, one particular set, that such a fundamental linking of all sub-units as a rule, is bound to generate.

Hence the plea for developing a Sociology of Minorities from the existing myopia of Minority Sociology is not an issue of semantics but a definite polemic against the Classical School of Minority thought.

**Minority Sociology : A Critique**

The classical Schools of Structural-Functionalismand Marxism were theoretically inadequate and morally dehumanising in accounting for the viability of ethnicity and its incredible resilience (of both minorities and majority) in contemporary situations. Their over-riding concern with teleological perspectives till late sixties led to misleading theories, misconceived notions and misplaced policies. The emphasis of Structural-Functionalists on holisms' rational engineering, penchant for generalisation and for the natural science status of sociology are some of the contributory
causes towards the failure of minority sociology to account for various empirical developments in the field.\textsuperscript{28} Historical analysis limited to 'culture' and time-bound proposition succeeded in evolving middle range hypothesis', contrary to the tall claims of positivists for generalisations. The process of concept formation conditioned by teleological, normative and deterministic theories, resulted in extrapolations of bizzare kinds. Inherent in this scientific ethos is the belief that

...the sociologists like the natural scientist studies his subject to diagnose it...the myth of Sociology functioning as rational engineering is based on the conviction that the process of investigation and of theoretical reasoning leave social reality intact.... 29

Thus, 'Integration, Assimilation, Proletarianization, Sessionism, Separatism, Communalism' and other epithets dominating Minority Sociology were but euphemisms of majority chauvinisms devised to maintain the equilibrium of the system and minimise conflict. The Marxist models were equally biased on account of its ideological predilections leading to the collapse of theory on threshold of reality.

Thus, normative theorisation resulted in conceiving minority ethnics as social pathology with deplorable consequences for peace and harmony of the State. Besides, some unmistakable streaks of paternalistic overtones were inherent in the administrative approach to minorities as needing a change of cultural exposure. Thus uplift of minorities from
their "backwardness" emerged as the corner-stone of state policy percolating down to public opinion. Welfare mechanisms were at times deceptively used so as to minimise conflict through ambiguous notion of consensus such as the familiar National Integration of India and Assimilation of America. The central point of the foregoing argument is that the ideal of objectivity embodied in the joint norms of operational definition and formalization of inference as illustrated by the concept of "minority", is unattainable in sociology because it fails to do justice to cultural reality. No wonder therefore the majority cultures became national pace-setters if not even modernisation models for minority 'sub-cultures' to fall in. For instance, the implementation of integrative and assimilatory measures immediately raises the question of assimilation for whom?, into what? and why? Even the Marxist ideologues (who claim no pretensions of value - neutrality) had to admit that the premises of minorities as epiphenomenal irritant did not find empirical evidence in the wake of the establishment of the Socialist Republic in Russia. As a result of the bureaucratic management of social science in the 'Marxian' states Habermas rightly concludes that like Structural functionalism, Marxism too inclined to take a natural science view of man and hence its degeneration into a mythology. The doctrine of proletarianization was as deeply institutionalised in Marxist states as that of Acculturation in USA. Winch's scathing polemics against Structural-Functionalism is precisely over the same issue of the myth of value-free Social Sciences at the cost of human reality.
The emancipatory potentiality of man's free will has today become the problematic focus of theoretical activity in sociology. The problem is still more serious in the domain of theorising on minorities where the forces of cultural realism poses a grave epistemological issue to begin with. By acknowledging the intra-group tension within the majority and minority ethnics, Sociology of Minorities unlike Minority Sociology overcomes the conceptual lacunae in demystifying the apparent 'realities' of unified and integrated ethnic communities be it a Majority or minorities. /The structural dynamism created by changes in the distribution of resources can alter the pattern as well as the basis of conflict that may be ethnic rivalries or economic animosities or both. Given the multiple models of tension, it is futile to prognosticate the movement of structures from ethnic to economic or vice versa, when the possibilities of their co-existence if not even inter-determination cannot be ruled out at the level of theory and practice.

Some recent contributions by neo-Marxists like Althusser and Poulantza and Neo-Functionalists like Gouldner suggest a scope for a fruitful marriage between the two polarised schools of minority thought viz. the Consensus and the Conflict theories.

The conceptual modifications added to the notion of "Structure" as a "totality" marks a distinct intellectual leap to the credit of both the schools of thinking. Gouldner believes that the process of systemic complexity and autonomy
can release forces of differentiation so as to re-order the existing pattern of relationships between the structures and hence the system of relations itself.\textsuperscript{34} Althusser seeks to delineate the causal (functional?) relationships between the various structures (levels or instances as Althusser calls them), the autonomous character of each in combination with others as capable of determining the nature of the expressive totality.\textsuperscript{35} Due to the asymmetrical and uneven developments of the various elements, the over-determination of certain elements become inevitable, which in turn, gives a characteristic feature to the totality itself. These formulations underlying the epistemology of neo-functionalism and neo-Marxism have been suitably adapted for our purpose.

Thus Althusser asserts that contradictions are never simple but always overdetermined. The point of departure between Gouldner and Althusser is on the question of dominant (casual) elements behind the phenomenon of over-determination. In the tradition of Marxist thought, Althusser declares:

A particular social formation at a particular time will be inhibited by a multiplicity of contradiction in complex and reciprocal relations of dominations and superordination, each determining to some degree the character of the whole, reflecting in itself the character of the whole. Contradiction in this sense are overdetermined, over-determination in the last instance is fixed by the economy. \textsuperscript{36}

Poulantza explicates the notion of totality beyond the Althusserian concept of it as a methodological entity for purposes of historical critique.\textsuperscript{37} He believes that a
particular combination of structures or levels and class practices leads to specific kinds of overdetermination leading to different kinds of modes of production like feudalism, capitalism etc. The unevenness and autonomy of structures (to recall Gouldner) results in the simultaneous presence of many overdeterminations or modes within one and the same social system. Though, ultimately determined by economy, in Poulantza's view, the "social classes" and their respective "class practices" indicate which of the elements are dominating the various "regional structure" of social struggle. 

Furthermore the theoretical contribution of Giddens, and Hindess and Hirst are very relevant to our present effort at evolving a synthesis of a theory of minorities transcending historical particularisms. 

Giddens claims that contradiction of structure does not imply functional incompatibility but only contradiction of interests or class practices to bring in Poulantza. 

Emphasizing the notion of contradictions and autonomy, Hindess and Hirst argue that certain economic bases presuppose the presence of corresponding ideological disposition to start with. For example, to implement the equality dogmas in the economic base, many of the post-colonial nation-states found secular polity as an indispensable ideological prerequisite. The precedence of ideology over economy not only generated new conditions between the prevailing economic structure and the new ideology but between the existing and emergent ideologies as well. The entire gamut
of tension theories of tradition and modernity can be successfully explicated in the light of the mode of production concept of structural over determinations. Marxist totality is not certainly a consensus totality in the ontological sense of the Functionalists. It is a totality breakable into uneven parts owing to the persistent phenomenon of class struggle as is illustrated by ideology preceding economy. In the course of such struggle, ethnicity may be surfaced as a dominant element determining class practices at various levels -- political, cultural and ideological. It is not to be misconceived as a resurgence *sui generis* but as part of totality unlike most contemporary students of ethnicity do. Ethnic domination of totality is only one level of determination, but to the extent that it is the preponderant determinant, it is a reflection of the mode of production that is ultimately determined by the economic base, though asymmetrically related to it. Thus categories such as Majority or minorities are necessary class practices evolving into new forms of social classes, and hence dynamic in nature. According to the reformulated concept of structure, Majority-minorities relations within a State are to be viewed as contradictory class practices, in the Poulantzian sense, and not as "functional incompatibility" underlying Functionalist thought. Thus, as an analytical concept of enquiry (and not as a descriptive epithet) a minority may be defined as follows:

Any ethnic group may be identified as a minority primarily on the basis of its size vis-a-vis another larger ethnic.
Additionally it becomes dominant or dominated depending on its power relations with other ethnic groups involved in class practices in the nation state. 42

Accordingly ethnicity becomes a criteria of determination of contradictions in the interaction of structures.

As a rider to the above definition, we may add that given the diverse structural forces inter-penetrating the majority-minority power relationships, there are 'dominant' groups and dominated 'groups' within the majority and minorities as well, just as there are dominant and dominated individuals within each. The totality i.e. the mode of production is therefore an expressive totality that reflects the whole in its structures; if the whole enjoins a struggle between two classes say for example the struggle between industrial Muslim bourgeoisie and bureaucratic Hindu bourgeoisie or between semi-industrial Hindu bourgeoisie and Muslim labour, the "regional" structures will reflect it, provided the practices of class interests are also taken into consideration, in the understanding of Majority and Minority relations.

A critical analysis of the reformulated perspective however suggests that even this revised structural approach is not absolutely free of anomalies. This is due to the nominalistic epistemology of its tenets giving primacy to objective categories over its subjective factors of cultural realism. The institutional preponderance of power, ideology and market relations assume autonomy of their own resulting
in reification of ideas and categories. However, individuals do play an important role in production of ideas affecting mobilization process of social classes and their class practices in the resolution of conflicting interests. The process of institutionalization of conflict is therefore not entirely objective in character but influenced by subjectively oriented frames of individual perceptions and definitions within the social nexus. For instance, 'communalism' as an institution taken within the neo-Structural paradigm of mode of production totality can imply either ideological, cultural, political or economic levels of struggle between Hindus and non-Hindus or all of them at the same time. However, it may also mean a mental process carried in people's heads merely as a reification of old structure; it need not reflect the existential collective belief of all individuals engaged in different class practices; it may also partially indicate fetishized beliefs which are nothing but 'false consciousness' as per Marxist theory of knowledge that function as a kind of cement gluing elements of society together that may otherwise fall apart, in short as a cohesive ideological mechanism of control.

In order to avoid the risk of seeing societies as over integrated from the perspective of reified ideas, Gramsci visualizes that the hegemonic role of ideology need not be always cohesive - due to the dichotomy of human consciousness between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. The one is determined by theoretical component of transformation
of working world as a worker. Given the origin of this consciousness, it is implicitly oppositional, because there is a whole tradition, a way of thinking informed by the life-experiences, and uncritically absorbed as consciousness super-imposed by theoretical knowledge. This is what is known as practical ideology or practical knowledge. The commonsense practical knowledge may or may not be consistent with the ruling class hegemony. In other words, the demystification of ideology is rendered possible only due to the unity-distinction between theory and practice in Gramsci's work.

In his critical comments on Gramsci, Kilminster claims:
"Such demystification would form part of a practical theoretical process in which the social reality effectively becomes known to itself with theory (quo demystification) only a moment in process". In the definition of any sociological category, including 'minority', the dimension of human consciousness of life-experiences (subsumed within the Gramscian notion of practical knowledge) must be incorporated into the theoretical format, otherwise, the definition will be biased and lopsided as well. It provides valuable insights into understanding the everyday impact of knowledge categories in society, including the ideology of intellectuals and other classes.

By substituting human passivity (common to both Marxist and Positivist thinking) with conscious critical activity of man in-the-world, Gramsci has unwittingly prepared the ground for subjective sociology. The dimension of human subjectivity is crucial to any discussion of class practices.
be it Majority-Minorities or working class struggle within a certain mode of production. The concept of contradictory interests developed in the course of our earlier discussions has merely skimmed the surface of the problem. Given the powerful role of practical knowledge superceding theory, the very notion of glib labels such as hostile Muslim or fanatic Christians is highly questionable. Unless an attempt is made to understand the identity of the individuals who are stereotyped, it will never be possible to demystify the role of ideology nor emancipate man from the stronghold of institutions and labels. Our contention is empirically substantiated by the fact that nowhere in India do the Hindus confront en bloc any of the minorities. Being so, why this absurdity of legitimising surface realities as theory by negating the other aspects of human factor as non-theory? For instance, what is so minority about a Muslim landlord and what is majority about a Brahmin beggar? Their perceptions of reality is denied its due place in theory but is replaced by objective categories such as "minority" that is uncritically absorbed into and reinforced by existing theoretical activity.

Unless the apparent 'truth' is demolished, research remains a pseudo-scientific enterprise. But this is precisely the crisis gripping the objectivity oriented nominalistic theories and policies, that we discussed at great length in the foregoing paragraphs. The subject and object synchronisation into a well crystallised minority or majority consciousness as the case may be is the ultimate proof of a class practice.
It is equally possible that even in the absence of well-recognized objective criteria as minorities, subjective consciousness may be forceful enough to institutionalize such a reality. The object-subject dialectical relations result in transforming a minority-in-itself into a minority-for-itself where the contradictions are resolved by the genesis of minority as social class in struggle. For a Sociology of Minorities, the Verstehen approach and the Lebenswelt thesis in Weberian sense are epistemologically as significant as the objective factor of mode of production. For example, the Hindu Brahmins in different parts of India, particularly in Tamil Nadu, Kerala and UP have organized themselves into a social class against non-Brahmins and non-Hindus, demanding for themselves protective privileges as a minority. If the mobilization and struggle become powerful, the future may grant a minority label to them! The 'push' however has started at subjective/perception and definition of the being and becoming of a social class. This brings out the central role of "ideas" in the everyday lives of individuals as reflected in their identity.

Accordingly, the perspective most logically suitable for offering explanatory definitions is to explore the subjective base of identity patterns and consciousness of minorities from the Sociology of Knowledge orientation. This assumption rests in the belief that society exists only as individuals are conscious of it and the mechanisms by which their ideas are implemented inhere within itself a structure
of social relations no less "real" and "true" than the economic. The moot point however is on question of whose consciousness, of elites, leaders or of all people called the masses? This has spurred some serious debate that culminated in Manheim's critique of Marxist sociology of knowledge.47

What we are interested in is not the role theories of knowledge that Marx, Gramsci or Manheim have propounded.48 On the contrary, the emphasis is on the idea itself or on an epistemic community of ideas and beliefs that guide individual actions. For any study of minority identity where 'collectivity' is a subject-object conceptualisation, it is necessary to take subjectivity (say of ethnic roots of awareness) as it is pervasively present in what is known as socially distributed basis of knowledge pertaining to the being of a minority in society.

Life-experiences and common-sensical knowledge have tremendous influence over the reproduction of collective ideas and their subsequent implementation in societies. The categories of everyday thinking as expressed through language and other symbolic media affect the perception of 'reality' both of the individual in private realm and his public orientations. Social consciousness stemming from social knowledge is rooted as much in the public-private taken-for-granted dialogue of the man in-the-street as that of the intellectual and the scientist. This in essence is the doctrine of phenomenology and its collective theory of knowledge. Social beliefs reflecting identity either partially or wholly, the habitual
relevant mode of response executed uncritically most of the
time and bound by experiential and institutional pressures,
plays a significant role, overtly or covertly, in the articu-
lation of or changes in a particular mode of production. Social
actions do not take place always as logical processes but as
protological process of passive synthesis recognition or simply
as habitual response of action in familiar moorings. Our
choice of Phenomenology as a theoretical apparatus for study
of 'identity' can be therefore easily appreciated. The phenome-
nological anti-dote to positivism is mainly in its emphasis on
the centrality of man's experience in creation of social
realities whether he be an intellectual or a leader or a
commoner. As Speier observes:

Human subjectivity is an active, creative
face in the constitution of real world. The
human mind is not a passive reception of an
independently and pre-formed order of meaning-
ful events. Meaning is not found in objects
or events as a self-originating property;
rather it is constituted...social reality is
constructed by persons in every day life.... 49

The knowledge of ordinary man-in-the-street, his categories
of thinking therefore become the subject matter of sociology.

Thus we see contrary to positivistic and Marxist
traditions, phenomenology ushers the era of humanistic
Sociology. It is not ideology or theory but simple experience
of man that determines his awareness; and hence his identity
is rooted in his knowledge of the world. That alone constitutes
reality to the individual and core of his existence in the
society. Human consciousness may be experientially determined
as well as ontologically oriented. Here again the neo-structural concept of a totality as spaceless and timeless structure is very relevant to understanding the phenomenological notion of consciousness. In other words, taken as a totality, the structure of human consciousness is only one of the autonomous yet integral part of the social structure, and hence need not necessarily have one-to-one relation with its infra-structural basis though it is certainly a unit of the total mode of production in a system. Ontological time of man can overflow his existential time. Thus phenomenology has been rightly called Reflexive Sociology.50

Furthermore, even in the recent modifications made to the Reference Group theory and Role Theory the psychological dimension is segregated from its sociological aspects such that it was rendered unfit for study of individual identity as part of phenomenological exercises.51 What we mean by identity in this essay is simply the state of being aware of the 'reality' meaningful to the existence of self and others in society. Thus even social psychological models of reality (for example the Aggression complex of Negroes, withdrawal personality of Anglo-Indians that are familiar psychologisms in ethnic studies) are questionable at the level of theory. It is so because such models are themselves constructions of 'reality' as it appears to the intellectual under a given mode of production and its consequent intellectual impact; whereas such 'models' need not exhaust the 'interpretation of reality' as seen by the individuals themselves.52 It may not appeal in
any rational terms to them at all. Thus both social psychology and sociology of knowledge offer theoretical insights only partially. On the contrary, human identity and consciousness manifested as a repertoire of identities is part of the knowledge that is pre-theoretical or pre-categorical to the emergence of such consciousness as that of the scientist at a given point in time. (Hence the possibilities of divergence between consciousness as it ought to be and as it results from the knowledge 'hangover' or the realism of human life.)

The pre-theoretical roots of identity that social psychology ideals with brings forth the impact of objective (societal) reality on the development of particular knowledge categories in determination of identity. On the contrary, the constructions of 'reality' articulated by individuals in everyday life experiences facilitate the study of identity at both the categorical and pre-categorical level. This is so because the notion of individual identity in phenomenology is determined by ontological as well as situational factors in the realm of the subject but in the context of inter-subjectivity. By offering sociological critique of consciousness, phenomenology lays successful claims to be recognised as the hallmark of inter-disciplinary thought in contemporary social science. We can therefore fully agree with Berger in entitling this new branch of social sciences as Sociological Psychology. These are some of the theoretical considerations that influenced the development of this study on the lines of phenomenology.
Our focus on the impact of subjectivity on formation of identity is particularly relevant to the study of national identities where multiple levels of identity factors influence perception of an overarching political concept called the Nation-State. The onset of state-nationalism in countries like India laid emphasis on the spirit of citizenship as a prerequisite for the process of political modernizations. Such a demand could not however actualise into smooth experiences for all the people alike as a result of the tension created by the 'survival' factor of old identities. From the people's point of view, the successful amalgam between the 'old' and the 'new' was a private experience that had a veneer of public manifestation. As observed by Geertz, the ensuring tension is always simmering with discontent so much so that the actual foci around which such discontents tend to crystallize are various, sometimes concurrent contradictory or even at cross-purposes.54

The analytical concerns of this essay also includes the definition and classification of a 'minority' as a category. Our contention is that no group becomes a minority merely by virtue of its genetics alone nor by its being labelled so in institutionalized public opinion. The subjective awareness of common identity articulated in ethnic terms vis-a-vis the majority is a significant accompaniment; while mobilized action and effective leadership are necessary indications of such an awareness, they are not sufficient proofs of a concrete consciousness of minority—for—itself. Any ethnic outburst on the arena of politics such as the Hindu-Muslim riots can be
instigated by struggle for power or for material benefits through manipulation of ethnic symbols such as language and religion. The participation of the rank and file of the community need not always be due to their subjective acceptance of self-images as minorities, or, of their elan for organised protest. Thus, the phenomenon of ethnic hostilities need not be a genuine reflection of the individual identities participating in it. For lack of adequate opportunities limited by the social stock of knowledge at his command, the response of an individual indulging in communalistic practices can also be a way of his communication seeking new symbols or vocabulary of knowledge for which the existing nexus of relations are not adequately developed. To seek an identity is therefore to seek a new meaning of things, and hence transcend the existing.

The transformation from Minority Sociology to Sociology of Minorities marks an epistemological watershed in theorising on minorities. Our contention is that to humanise sociological understanding of minority ethnic, it is necessary to develop an empathetic frame of reference through Verstehen Sociology, which means to shift the focus from institutions to identity of the individual. That is, does he subjectively perceive himself and his group to be "minority" at all as understood in the common parlance of genetics, size and deprivation? Or, does he have two or more sets of identity references, one for public recognition and other for his private consumption? Or, finally, it is quite possible that he
does not visualise a "minority" being to self and others in his primary group but wants to develop other categories of defining their beings. His symbols of reality in which the identity of his self and that of his milieu are expressed may not be the same as that of the intellectual or academic "meanings" underlined by the term "minority". Who is guilty of masking the realities? The scientists? or the subjects he studies? This is an interesting question that crops up on the threshold of research. In order to understand the sources or knowledge-basis of individual identity, Sociology of Knowledge must develop a mass-oriented theory of consciousness by shedding its conventional esoterics for elitist knowledge. Phenomenology as a branch of knowledge sociology has successfully evolved such a perspective, the central focus of which is the collective stock of knowledge known as common sense reality.

Inspired by the intellectual antecedents of Husserl and Scheler, it was Alfred Schutz who brought phenomenology within the scope of sociology of knowledge. Thus he declares:

> By the term 'social reality' I wish to be understood the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellow-men, connected with them in manifold relations of interaction.

The manifestation of subjectivity in the intersubjective milieu constitutes the core of Schutzian phenomenology.
Critiques however have not spared Schutz for the ambiguity of subjective freedom within the scope of his theoretical formulations. Schutz's actor is a paradoxical subject because his consciousness as self is generated only in the inter-subjective mechanism of socialization articulated in terms of norms, beliefs and typifications of world-view. Hence the inauthentic subject of Schutz contrary to professed claims of subjective moments of choice is a basic fallacy of dual vision in his theory. Thus Gorman concludes, "meaningfully, subjectively defined and determined social action is scientifically explained neither by naturalist empiricism nor by phenomenology of Schutz".57

The illusory subject of Schutz is a by-product of his epistemological precepts that sees a smooth consensus between the individual (subject) and his social milieu (object) facilitated by the stock of shared meanings. By replacing the classical Consensus model with a Dialectical one, Berger and Luckmann made monumental contribution to revamp the Husserlian phenomenological thought.58 Theory of identity is central to their emphasis on social structure as a reality construction of individual consciousness partly reified by ontological thought and partly perceived as a lived experience. In fact, in Luckmann's view, there is nothing called a phenomenological sociology because phenomenology is proto-sociology.59 Hence it is existential and pre-existential, situational and trans-situational more egological and less cosmological culminating into an everchanging process of social dialectics between man
and society. Unlike in the theoretical schemata of Schutz, 'shared meanings' do not play a deterministic role on human consciousness because reality-definitions are both cognitively and habitually borne out from individual experiences. The form of consciousness are tied down to the content of experience. Thus they conclude, "Identity is of course a key element of subjective reality and like all subjective reality stands in a dialectical relationship with society". 60

Elaborating on the notion of dialectics they observe "if one is mindful of this dialectics one can avoid the misleading notion of collective identities without having recourse to the uniqueness of individual existence." 61 (emphasis added) Therefore, at a given point in time, the individual identity is a reflection of two forces - (a) the sedimented social/collective reality (objective), and (b) the experiential 'reality' (subjective) of the self. The former has provided a common stock of pre-given Identity-Types or objective lables such as the stereotypes about peoples and objects. But the objective movements of history does not become viable with only institutionalized stereotypes, until the specific identities of men perceive it, at the level of private experiences.

Therefore, what is a monolithic undifferentiated stock of knowledge in classical phenomenology is conceptualized as a tension-ridden bundle of subjective and objective, perceptions and symbols respectively. The fragmentation of knowledge for the multiplicity of situations confronting the individual creates segmented universe of knowledge. This
process of knowledge-segmentation and multiple-reality definitions that controverts all notions of "mainstream" identities and "mainstream" ethos is germane to our analysis of minority identity as a subjective phenomenon.

Among the repertoire of 'identity' concepts, the notion of 'Alternation' provides the dynamic dimension of changes in the identity life-cycle of the individual as a result of knowledge-experience dialectics. By changes, we do not mean only the phenomenon of identity breakdown, but also of repair and renewal; and change dynamism essentially involves a feed-back on knowledge-identity exchanges. Unlike in social psychological conceptualization, identity breakdown does not produce a 'crisis' situation of 'neurotic' individuals in the analysis of phenomenology, because it basically believes in man's individuality to draw from the repertoire of life-worlds beyond the actual visible experience. The Bergerian notion of alternation is essentially one of identity change. But others like Stone and Brittain conceptualize alternation as the simultaneous masquerading of one or more identities by the same individual (what we have referred to as Identity dualism in our thesis - Refer Part II). Thus quoting Stone, Brittain writes: "Identity is established as a consequence of two processes, apposition and opposition, a bringing together and setting apart. To have an identity is to join with some and depart from others". The conventional approach to study of minorities were static to the extent that they devalued the role of consciousness. The Identity approach advocated here
is certainly more dynamic in its scope.

In order to overcome the conceptual lacunae of Schutzian theory, Berger and Luckmann resurrect subjectivity of the self by attributing to it a significant role in the formation of identity, and extending the conventional object-subject diad into a triad in the self-society axis of individual consciousness. Hence their dictum of three movements in the participation of the self viz. (a) Internalisation of the objective world; (b) Externalization of the internalised individualised self; (c) Objectivation - That is the process by which reciprocal typifications (or shared meanings) externalised by the self as "real" develop over a period of time into institutions (which, in turn, are internalised by the Self). Thus Berger and Luckmann conclude: "Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product."65 The human enterprise is an indispensable mechanism of identity formation. The anchorages of identity in this triad is achieved/established by the dialectical process of relations between internalisation, externalisation and objectification, which is diagramatically sketched below:

**Diagram 1**

The Dialectical Triad of Identity*

![Diagram](image)

*The shape of the triangle can vary from one individual to the other depending on which of the three identity-anchorages, his choice is most favourably disposed to.
The triad as conceived by Berger and Luckmann is not an explanatory theory of identity but an interpretative schemata of unfolding specific contexts of meanings and motivations. The most relevant question that arises is how and at what level does private 'knowledge' becomes institutionalised? Or rather, phenomenology has to account for the institutionalisation of 'some' ideas of only some and not all individual 'constructions of reality' gaining collective legitimacy. Schutz' theory of institutionalisation of social knowledge is essentially a movement of ideas resulting from polarisation of power in society. In "Structures of Life-Worlds" co-authored with Luckmann, he states:

In simple social distribution of knowledge, general knowledge is evenly distributed. Only in societies with extremely simple divisions of labour and without established social strata, are the problems that are imposed on "everyone" is also presented to everyone in similar apprehensional perspectives and contexts of relevance. But as soon as division of labour is even little, but further developed and as soon as social levels are established, the perspective in which the same problems are apprehended decline. 66

Berger and Luckmann are unmistakably influenced by Marxist thought in attributing diversification of knowledge to accumulation of economic surplus leading to changes at the level of identity of the individual. 67 Berger and Pullberg are nevertheless in disagreement with Marx and Lukacs that reification is a bourgeois phenomenon. 68 They believe on the contrary, that the reification (of consciousness and hence of human identity itself) is not the reality unlike in
Marx. It is a fundamental terror of human existence that
generates free will making it externalised and coercive. It
can happen as much in production of ideas as in the production
of commodities itself and has no base-super-structural
relationship exclusive to capitalist societies. The dialectic
method is therefore not the only recognisable Marxist
legacy in the works of Berger and Luckmann. The introduction
of the Marxist surplus variable factor into the thesis of
Knowledge-identity dynamics raises some fundamental
questions on the success of their theoretical speculations on
the role of subjectivity. The contemporary debate over the
desirability and necessity of merger between Marxism and
phenomenology has gone into eloquent and provocative scholar-
ship.69 In an insightful analysis of the controversial
rapprochement between Marxism and phenomenology, Dallmayr is
of the view that both the schools of thought suffer the legacy
of ambivalence.70 The controversial issue of integrating
Marxism and Phenomenology is highlighted in a dialogue between
Enzo Paci and Paul Piccone.71 In his translated critique of
Paci's "Function of Sciences" Piccone is emphatic about the
inherent phenomenological attributes of Marxism. He believes
that -

Phenomenology as a whole can, already, be
found within Marxism as a necessary and
essential movement of the whole structure,
and the crisis of the science is the crisis
of capitalist use of the sciences and there-
fore the crisis of human existence in
capitalist society. 72
On the contrary, according to Paci, "the crisis is the forgetting of the origins, the human roots, the human subject and the pre-categorical genesis" which Marxism tends to overlook. The return to subjectivity is the mark of triumph of phenomenology over Marxism. Paci holds that if phenomenology believes in the intuitive evidence then it means experience and presence of the subject in "the first person". Paci dismisses the need for Marxist props by asserting "once the life-world is interpreted as incorporating the level of the basic needs and of material production, phenomenology and Marxism are destined to converge". Phenomenology does provide a perspective and hence cannot be denounced as solipsism and egotistic theorising. But it does not highlight the relationship between structure and super-structure that shapes the pre-categorical level of human consciousness. It is at this stage that the Marxist props become indispensable to phenomenological insights into identity. Firstly, the methodology of historical dialecticism as a legacy of Marxism applied in phenomenological analysis has made the subject the focal point of identity configuration. Secondly, the materialist ontology of Marxism outlined by Lukacs and the theoretical improvisation made by Gramsci to the notion of ideology enables us to understand the genesis of pre-categorical reality influencing existing categories of individual perception. A fundamental rupture is therefore clearly evidenced between Husserlian phenomenology advocating an epoche of ontological beliefs and of Phenomenological Marxism.
unfolding ontology as a necessary instant of the subjective consciousness of man. Elaborating on the highly provocative object-subject determinacy Colleti observes:

There is no conception in other words that if subjectivity is a function of objectivity and if the relation between man and nature is fundamentally a relation within nature, it is also however a relation between men in which the sensible world like language in knowledge and like object in labour is in turn the medium of the vital manifestations of man. 76

Meanings institutionalized as symbols of collective understanding are always not consistent with the material distribution of resources. In other words, ideas and human relationships are usually asymmetrical structure that are not always identical with the base and superstructure respectively. By upholdings subjectivity determinants in identity formation phenomenology highlights the human factor in the social but cannot account for its dynamic changes. Thus Allen believes, that the structure of human relations is only a necessary condition for the phenomena, the sufficient condition being provided by its dialectical relationship with the superstructure that determine any situation.77 They belong to visible social relations, but in so far as it is possible to separate process from the thing itself, they arise out of an environment of act on a situation in it.78 For instance, the bewildering co-existence of communalism and nationalism or primordialism and secularism show the unevenness thesis of the mode of production analysis. Similarly in USSR economic
theories survive along with ethnic sub-systems of chauvinistic beliefs as counter-views. Phenomenology by itself can at best rationalise the reality claims of an individual ethnic whether he be a Caucasian Socialist or a Muslim priest. Its eclecticism will not help to however understand the paradox of a Muslim worker finding ethnic categories more meaningful than economic theories. It is the Marxism of Althusser, Gramsci and Poulantza with their revised concept of mode of production totality that help us to overcome the lacunae of classical phenomenology. Furthermore, given the Bergerian thesis of triadic formation of individual identity, it is possible to see the crucial nexus of relationship between the structure of consciousness of the individual as a three-dimensional phenomenon – (a) Private Self, (b) Public Self, and (c) Institutionalised beliefs that may be relics of pre-existing modes but sedimented in people's minds. Thus Berger concludes that identity with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality is always within a specific socially constructed world.80 But the focus is on the individual definitions leading to collective practices not vice versa.

Phenomenological Marxism has informed the theoretical perspective for a field study of minority identity. The study was carried out in Lucknow, the Capital of Uttar Pradesh, the most populous State of India during 1978-81. "Minorities" chosen for the field study were Muslims and Christians of urban Lucknow.
Notes and References

1 "Minorityism" a term coined by Hamilton Gibb in his book "Modern Trends in Islam" to describe the politics of Muslim diaspora, cited by Aziz Ahmad in Islam and Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1957-1964, Oxford University Publication, 1967. In this essay, it is used in a more general sense to signify the characteristics of minority politics vis-a-vis majority within the nation-state framework. The term 'nation-state' is to be understood in the Emersonian sense of a 'terminal community' (physical boundary, common citizenship and other civic rights). Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Cambridge University Press, Massachusetts, 1960.

2 Modernisation is perhaps one of the most ambiguous concepts in Sociology. In this essay it is used as a phenomenon indicated by the following traits as a part of the economic, and sometime technological development of democratic nation-states imbibed by ideals of equality, liberty and freedom.

(a) Emphasis on progress and improvement as an all-round change of human conditions of life contradicting the fatalism familiar to traditional social order.

(b) Emphasis on 'achievement' as against 'ascription' as a criteria of progress. For further discussion, see, (1) S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernisation Prolet and Change, Prentice-Hall, USA, 1964, (2) F.S.C. Northrop, Resurgence of Submerged Civilisation, Macmillans, New York, 1952.


3 In this essay, 'ethnicity' is implied in the same sense as used by Abner Cohen; "Ethnicity is essentially a form of interaction between culture groups within a common socio-political context, which happens to be the nation-state in the contemporary period", see Abner Cohen (ed), Urban Ethnicity, Travistock Publication, London, 1974, p. 7. The term 'ethnics' refers to the ethnic groups in political action, which may be a single large majority with many small minorities constituting the ethnic configuration. In this connection, we cannot quite agree with Paul Brass on his definition of an ethnic group as non-politicised, non-mobilised and objectively
distinct group. Because, in the plural societies which are multi-ethnic in nature almost all ethnic groups are politicalised though not necessarily mobilised into action. All ethnic groups by definition are also nationalities (i.e., culture groups) or nation as used by Akin, Benjamin, State and Nation, Hutchinson University Press, London, 1964, as cited in Paul Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in Uttar Pradesh, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1974.

4 Sociological perspective for study of ethnicity is certainly more encompassing because of the insights into stratificatory dimensions of power, wealth and status involving the 'ethnics' in interaction. See, Hunt and Walker, Ethnic Dynamics, Dorsey Press, Illinois, 1974.

5 WASP Ethno-centrism implies the attitude and behavior of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants who constitute the majority in USA. Hindu Chauvinism is its counterpart for the Hindu Majority in India; Islamic fundamentalism refers to the resurgence of Islam as a political movement both in Islamic theocracies such as Pakistan and Arab countries as well as the diaspora of Muslim minorities in India and other countries. Black Nationalism is once again the ethnic outburst of the Black minorities in America. For Hindu Chauvinism and Islamic Fundamentalism see, D.E. Smith (ed), South Asian Politics and Religion, Princeton University Press, 1969; and W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, Princeton University Press, 1957. For WASP ethnocentrism and Black Nationalism, see D.P. Moynihan and Nathan Glazer, Beyond the Melting Pot, MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964. Clifford Geertz has identified five types of multi-ethnic situation in his book Old Societies and New Nations, The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, Free Press, New York, 1967.

6 It is so because the exposure of hidden factors highlighting similarities besides differences between minorities and majority is likely to dispel some of the prejudicial and derogatory notions with which the literature on Minority Sociology is currently plagued.

... Scholarship in Indian Minority Sociology is rich in the tradition of historical particularism. Foremost among them are, a) Louis Dumont, "Nationalism and Communalism", Contributions to Indian Sociology, VII, March 1964.

b) G.S. Churrye, Social Tensions in India, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1966.

d) S.P. Jain, *Hindu-Muslim Social Structure*, National Publishers, 1975. Starting with the apriori assumption of differences exclusively, these works naturally tend to overlook the similarities between the ethnic groups whether Majority or minorities.


9 Conflict model of minority theories have been explored by sociologists within the structural-functional framework; the leading advocates of the model are Donald Henderson, "Minority Response and Conflict Model", *Phylon*, Winter, 1963, p. 19; also J. Citleller, *Understanding Minority Groups*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1956.


The Phenomenon of 'false perception' of reducing non-ethnic differential treatment to ethnic factors has been discussed in detail by Hubert Blalock, *Toward a General Theory of Minority Group Relations*, John Wiley & Sons, 1967.


13 For some recent interpretations of the concept of communalism, see, (a) Ratna Dutta, *Communal Edge to Plural Societies, A Comparison of India and Malaysia*, Vikas, New Delhi, 1980;


(c) For some new interpretations on Negro Racism, see Peter Schrag's *Unmelttable Ethnic*, New York, 1973.

The term "Communalism" and "Communal" in popular image enjoys a derogatory status. In this essay however distinction has been made between 'communal' and 'communalistic'. The former indicates staunch ethnic complex without being ethnocentric in a relative sense. The latter denotes vitriolic and even violent ethnic assertiveness in attitude and behavior as well.


15 Ibid., p. 179.


18 Hubert Blalock, op. cit., 1967.


19 M.L. Barron, ibid., p. 3.


25 Corporate Pluralism and Cultural Pluralism symbolise the centripetal and centrifugal forces in majority-minority relations of co-operation and conflict. For example, the process of elite formation cutting across ethnic barriers as a political/social class with particularist class-interests overshadows specific majority and minority interests. On the contrary, the growing preponderance of Pluralism in Parliamentary democracies reflect the demands of cultural groups to maintain their specific identity on par with nation-state identity leading to explosive situations in cases of unequal number and power. (See, M. Barron, op. cit., 1961) The former is a case of Corporate Pluralism, the latter is Cultural Pluralism.


Van Den Berghe, op. cit., 1970.


A. Gouldner, ibid.


Ibid., p. III.
We are highly indebted to Poulantza for clarification of some concepts cited from his work below. In this essay they are used in an identical sense as that of Poulantza.

(a) **Mode of Production**: "By mode of production we shall designate what is generally marked out as the economic (i.e. relations of production in the strict sense) but a specific combination of various structures and practices which in combination appear as so many instances or levels, i.e. as so many regional structures of this mode", (pp. 13-14).

(b) **Power**: "By power we shall designate the capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interest", (p. 104).

(c) **Social Class**: "More exactly, social class is a concept which shows the effect of the ensemble of the matrix of a mode of production or of a social formation on the agents which constitutes its support", (p. 69).

(d) **Class Practice**: "The purposive organisation of classes using power, ideology and market for achieving their respective class interests", (p. 86).


40 A. Giddens, *ibid.*, p. 128.

41 Hindess and Hirst, op. cit., 1975.

42 The Writer's definition of a minority.

43 A. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks* (English edition), Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. He identifies two separate functions of an ideology in a social system:

(a) the traditional Marxist function of concealment or false consciousness and the other;
(b) of Cohesion that is to silence opposition. For further reading see, Ted Banton, *The Philosophical Foundations of Three Sociology*, op. cit., 1977.


45 This is the Weberian dictum on cultural realism of Social Sciences. "Verstehen" and "Lebenswelt" mean "Subjective" and "World-view" respectively. See, Julien Freund, "Interpretative Sociology", Chapter III, from *The Sociology of Max Weber*, Penguin Books, 1966. Also see, T. Banton, op. cit., 1977, the chapter on Peter Winch's correction of Weber's methodology is insightful.

46 The rise of Brahmin consciousness articulated in terms of minority deprivation of power and privilege has drawn enough public support as to be capable of organising into an All India Brahmin-Samaj that held its first annual conference at Varanasi in October 1981, according to informed sources. The researcher met some spokesmen of the Samaj later at Lucknow when they had come to participate in anti-Urdu propaganda.


A Gramsci, op. cit., 1971, and K. Manheim, op. cit. (1936), all three of these theorists emphasize the relative importance of some knowledge, either of classes (Marx) or of intellectuals (Gramsci) or of both (Manheim) and not of knowledge in general.


50 For a lucid discussion on Phenomenology as Reflexive Sociology see, George Psathas (ed), *Phenomenological
For a detailed discussion on psychological dimensions of Sociological Theories, see, Robert Merton, op. cit., 1968.

P. Berger and T. Luckmann, Social Constructions of Reality, Penguin, 1966. The authors explain the differences between psychological and phenomenological approach to study of identity, (pp. 194-204).


61 Ibid., p. 194.

62 Ibid., p. 176.


64 Ibid., p. 156.


71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., p. 332.

73 Enzo Paci, "The Function of Sciences", as discussed by F. Dallmayr, ibid., p. 321.

74 Ibid., p. 318.
The dialectical concept of consciousness as stemming from theoretical and practical knowledge formulated by Gramsci has to be seen in the light of the phenomenological notion of pre-categorical reality and its influence on human consciousness. According to Lukacs, the Marxist Ontology is a materialist phenomenon, which due to unevenness in "modes", does not result in one-to-one matter-mind relationship. See G. Lukacs, The Ontology of Social Being, Marx, Merlin Press, London, 1978.


Ibid.

The sub-universe of segmented knowledge here refers to the beliefs, folklore and world-view of ethnic nationalities as a sub-sect of the dominant communist ideology (at times even counter ideology) of the Soviet State. Sub-unit does not denote inferiority of knowledge universals.