CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

In Indian tradition all most all the schools of Indian Philosophy, claim that even for the attainment of liberation (mokṣa), the Sumum bonum of life, right cognition of the real or reals (tattvajñāna) is essential. The right cognition in Sanskrit is technically called 'pramā'. The word 'pramā' derives from the suffix 'Pra' meaning excellent (prakr̥sta) and the root 'ma' meaning measurement or sometimes means cognition. So, the etymological meaning of pramā is either 'cognition par excellence' or measurement par excellence'. These two expressions may have the same meaning if 'measurement par excellence' is taken as a proper one for achieving the goal. In fact, the cognition acts as a measurement metaphorically. When a jar is known as a jar, the latter is the measurement of the former. When we know the existence of fire on the mountain inferentially, it is metaphorised as measurement of fire, on the mountain. The right measurement is the right cognition. In this context pramā has a double role in selecting the right purpose and means for achieving that goal also.

There is a controversy regarding what the Sanskrit word jñāna or pramā means. The Sanskrit word jñāna sometimes translated as knowledge because the Sanskrit word jñānin¹ means a knowledgeable person. Some Lexicographers think that as the Sanskrit word jñāna include any awareness like imagination, doubt, cognition, error, illusion, reductio-ad-absurdum etc. so to select a synonymy for the word 'pramā', an adjective is needed. Thus the Sanskrit word jñāna is a genus term of which pramā and a pramā are the species, so, they translate pramā as 'valid cognition' or true cognition' and a - pramā is translated as invalid cognition or false cognition. But as in western tradition 'knowledge' by definition is true and the expression true knowledge is merely a tautology. To
avoid such confusion J.N. Mohanty and B.K. Motilal hold that pramā can be translated as 'knowledge'. Again according to K.H. Potter as because in western tradition knowledge is generally defined as justified true belief, so pramā cannot be translated as knowledge. But in Indian tradition we do not find any corresponding word of belief. Moreover in Indian tradition pramā, is taken as aiming at fulfilling human pursuits (Purusārthasiddhi), whereas, in western tradition knowledge is for knowledge sake. According to some thinkers, pramā is not justified true belief in western sense, because pramā related sentences are prescriptive judgements (Kriyayā pravartakam vākyam), which lead to liberation (mokṣa), so pramā-related sentences are imperatives (vidhi) since they are not descriptive. But as because all pramā related sentences at least in Nyāya system are not prescriptive judgement, this view is not satisfactory.

Like Philosophy of each country, Indian Philosophy has uniqueness of its own. Meaning cannot be grasped from the surface of grammar but from the deep. To avoid any confusion, we may use the English word ‘cognition’ for jñāna, ‘true cognition’ or valid cognition’ for pramā and ‘false cognition’ or ‘invalid cognition’ for ‘a- pramā; only for our functional purpose. Truth and validity in Indian tradition, unlike western tradition has been taken in the same sense.

From the Vedic and Upaniṣadic era, knowledge or cognition is playing an important role in the phenomenon of philosophising. Valid cognition comes under the purview of the epistemological problem. Epistemology deals with the nature, scope, validity, origin etc. of knowledge. The role of epistemology is to present metaphysics in a sound way as per the principle – ‘Mānādhinā mayasiddhiḥ’, ‘the substantiation of a metaphysical entity is dependent on a particular source of valid cognition’ (Pramāṇa). Metaphysics intends to study reality as such. It also studies the basic concepts of science, like existence, negation, space, time, matter, substance, energy, number, attribute, life etc. Because a particular science, studies only a part of worldly objects (relevant objects to that science only). So it has to depend upon some presupposition. Presupposition means, whatever points, principles, topics or propositions are used in a study but not themselves studied there, though they are studied
elsewhere, "Philosophy, thus studies the presuppositions of science as facts (real) and yet facts of the second order and that makes a difference between philosophy and science. In the Upaniṣads a distinction is made between two kinds of knowledge, the higher (Parā) and the lower (aparā). The lower knowledge consists of all the empirical sciences and acts as also of such sacred knowledge related to perishable and enjoyable things that are contingent. It is to be noted that even the four Vedas are included in the category of lower knowledge. The higher knowledge is described as that whereby what has not been heard of becomes heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of, what has not been understood becomes understood. "Just as by one lump of clay all that is made of clay may be known, the modification being only a name depending on a word the truth being that it is just clay, so is that teaching?. Compared with the knowledge of the ultimate ground, which is the absolute self, the lower knowledge is the nescience or false knowledge known as avidyā. Widely contrasted and leading in different ways, says the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, "are there two – nescience (avidyā) and what is known as knowledge i.e., (vidyā)". Like darkness and light, they are opposed to each other and result respectively in bondage and release. What are refused to as the pleasing (preyas) and the good (Śreyas)? It is the knowledge of non-dual self that is the means to the supreme good, whereas nescience, its opposite is the cause of bondage. What is apparently good is called pleasant (preya) and what is good permanently is called (Śreyah). Anything may be pleasant, but from this it does not follow that it, by virtue of being pleasant, will be good (Śreyah). Good is connected with something having permanent value. Something is really good, if it is connected with an individual’s permanent welfare or well being. If otherwise, it is pleasant. In the Śvetāsvatera-upaniṣad it is declared that: "In the imperishable, infinite, Supreme Brahman are the two, knowledge and nescience, placed hidden. Perishable indeed is nescience, while knowledge, and verily is immortal. And he who controls knowledge and nescience is another i.e., he is distinct from either)". Here it is taught (i) that nescience (avidyā) is the cause of bondage consisting in transmigration (Samsāra), (ii) that knowledge (Vidyā) is the means to release (mokṣa) which is
immortality (amrtam) and (iii) that the Self which regulates both knowledge and nescience is distinct from them because it is the witness thereof. Non-dual pure consciousness is realized through self-knowledge. Self-knowledge does not mean the self as knowledge but knowledge of the self. This knowledge of the Self is the last mental mode known as akhandākāra-vṛtti, where there is no trace of impurity, which is like unto the Infinite. It removes the obstacle that stands in the way of the disclosure of the self and removes itself. The Self is Self-luminous and does not require to be illumined, just as a lamp does not need another lamp for its illumination. All that the final mode does is to remove the veil which is nescience (avidyā), and thus leave alone the Self which is Self-revealed. The knowledge that lets the Self-stand Self-revealed is Parāvidyā (higher knowledge).

Knowledge – even empirical knowledge – is not an act, although we sometimes use such an expression as ‘cognitive act’. It is true that both knowledge and action are related to the mind. But while action is what the agent does and is dependent on his will. Knowledge must be conditioned by its object. Action depends on the agent (Kartr-tantra); knowledge depends on its content (Vastu-tantra). For instance, it depends on a man’s will. Whether he decides to go to a particular place or not and if he decides to go how to get these. It is not so with knowledge. If what is in front of me is a pillar and I mistake it for a man standing, it would not be knowledge. Knowledge should conform to its object; it cannot be arbitrarily constituted by an act of will. Through avidyā i.e., Karma, one overcomes mṛtyu (death). One attains immutability through Vidyā i.e., Karma. One attains immutability through Vidyā i.e., meditation.

Knowledge cannot reveal the Self or Brahman in the way it does empirical objects, said T.M.P. Mahadevan in his paper ‘Vidyā and Avidyā’. All that it does is to remove the barrier in the form of nescience. It leads to self-realization by the negative mode of excluding what is not the Self, as ‘not this’, ‘not this’. When the not-self has been removed, what remains is the non-dual self. Even the notion that the Self is to be known is the result of nescience. When Vidyā (knowledge) has destroyed avidyā (nescience), the one eternal self alone
shines. To the seer who has realized the Self, there are no *vidyā* and *a-vidyā*, no *jñāna* and *ajñāna*.

Almost every system of Indian Philosophy, whether Vedic or non-Vedic, makes an extensive use of the work ‘*avidyā*’ in the theory of knowledge and metaphysics. In the Atharvaveda it has been stated that *Vidyā*, *avidyā* and whatever else is fit for being instructed entered the body of Brahman along with the Rāks, *Śama* and *Yajus*. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, it is said, “Both perform the sacrificial act, he who knows and he who does not know. But there is a difference between *Vidyā* and *avidyā*. For what is performed with *Vidyā*, with faith and with Upaniṣad, that is most efficacious.” Again in the Brhadāraṇyaka we find that a man, when dying shakes off his body and his *avidyā*. According to D.P. Sen the word *avidyā* seems to have been used in the sense of personal ignorance and the word *Vidyā* in the sense of true knowledge. Both are in the sense more or less subjective. But even in the context of Upaniṣadic teaching these two concepts are often used in a more objective and independent sense. Thus in Isa Upaniṣad we read, “Into a blind darkness they enter who are devoted to *avidyā*, and into greater darkness, as it were those who are devoted to *vidyā* alone”. In Katha Upaniṣad *vidyā* and *avidyā* are conceived as mutually opposed and divergent. Here the word *vidyā* and *avidyā* has a richer connotation, implying much more than subjective ignorance or knowledge. In the latter Upaniṣads the concept of *avidyā* came to acquire a new dimension and also the new name Māyā. In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad Māyā as universal or cosmic ignorance identified with *Prakṛti*, the root cause of phenomenal world.” Thus *avidyā* here has the role of the creative power behind the world of our experience.

In the age of the systems (orthodox systems only), we find that the concept of *avidyā* defined and named variously. In the Nyāya, it is called *mithyājñāna*, the Sāmkhya points it under the names *ajñāna*, *aviveka* and also *avidyā*, while Vedānta calls it variously as *māyā*, *avidyā* and *ajñāna*.

With regard to the nature of *avidyā* it may be said that is no mere absence of knowledge and on this point all the systems are closely agreed. *Avidyā* is in the *Yoga* view no more than a subjective state and this subjective foundation
gradually develops into a significant objective principle in the Advaita School. The Advaitins define *ajñāna* that is *avidya*, as something which appears to be existent, is not definable as either real or unreal is made of the three *gunas* and is opposed to knowledge. According to Advaitins *ajñāna* is an object of immediate knowledge, like our internal states of happiness etc. According to Samkara, Brahman is one. Infinite and undivided appears as many in name and form through avidyā. But the theory that *avidyā* is the creative power of Brahman having the two fold functions of concealment (*āvarana*), and projection (*viksepa*) seems to be a later development in Advaitism.

The post Samkarite Vedāntins have indulged in various kinds of speculations about the causal status of *avidyā*. Some for example Vācaspati, have argued that as Brahman appears as the world through the instrumentality of ignorance *avidyā* is just an auxiliary cause in creation, others hold that as pure Brahman by itself can not be a cause of anything; it is through *māyā* that it appears as the cause. Hence *māyā* happens to be the *dvārakārana* or instrumental cause others again are of the opinion that both Brahman and *māyā* are to be taken as the material causes of the world.

The Advaitins hold that if it were permeable by reason *avidyā* would lose its character and turn into its opposite i.e. Vidyā. The function of Vidyā is just to remove the veil, to destroy the *ajñāna* so that the Self may reveal itself. Hence in Advaitism knowledge as a function of mind, i.e. Advaitism knowledge as a function of mind, i.e. *antahkarana* has been conceived as something, which dispels or destroys ignorance. *pramāṇa* has, therefore, been defined as that which removes the ignorance concealing its’ object. According to one school of Advaitism (i.e. the Vivararṇa school) the final knowledge which results in Self-realization are a perceptual function of the mind produced by the hearing of such scriptural sentences as ‘that thou art’ (*Tattvamasi*) etc. The mental state (*Vṛtti*) produced by the uttered statement ‘that thou art’ destroys the enveloping *ajñāna*, which conceals the true nature of the Self. But according to Vācaspati Miśra, verbal knowledge in no circumstance can be immediate. The mind, he says becomes a direct instrument of Self-realization when purified by reasoning and
meditation\textsuperscript{14} that seems to agree with the standpoints of Nyāya-Vaishesika and Sāmkhya-Pātanjala schools. When it is said in the Brhadaranyanyako-panisad – ‘\textit{Manasaivāmudrastavyam}’ i.e. the Brahman is to be known through the mind (purified through some \textit{Sādhanā} or practice). An impured mind (\textit{asamskṛtah manah}) cannot grasp the Brahman.

According to Samkara’s definition, discursive, undiscriminated knowledge is not \textit{avidyā} in the ordinary sense of error. Indeed “it results” from \textit{Pramāṇas} (means of procuring valid knowledge) and the object of the \textit{Pramāṇas} is reality as it exists (\textit{Yathābhūtavastuvīsayam}). “Between Brahman and the world, there is at least one characteristic in common: \textit{Sattā}”. Before the awakening to the true Self, every cognition is real in regard to its own object”. Samkara hold that being naturally pervaded by \textit{Vidyā}, illumined by pure consciousness, it is made cognitive by its light and reflects it in all its partial truths. The light of consciousness is the illuminer of the mind (\textit{manaso avabhāsakam}) because it is its controller (\textit{niyantarśvāt}), being the source of its light. The mind itself is able to think only when it is illumined by the light of consciousness residing inside. Hence, knowers of Brahman declare that the mind with all its functions is made into thought, made into a cognizing subject (\textit{Viśayikrtam}), as pervaded by the inner \textit{Ātman}.

Knowledge implies the knower, the known and the relation between the two (\textit{tripūti}). It not only covers external objects but also subjective facts, ideas, volitions, emotions and the like. Criticizing the notion, we have of knowledge \textit{brahmavidyā} points out that prevalent criteria of knowledge do not let us know the things as they are, as it is based upon the mutual superimposition (\textit{adhyāsa}) of the Self which is pure consciousness and non-Self. Self identification with the body, mind, Senses etc. are pre-requisites for the knowing activity as one accepts the senses as his own; has to take the body as himself etc., in this activity. The world of multiplicity (\textit{Prapañca}) is conceived as different series of three like time, space and causation (\textit{trayam}). The objects are taken to be related by way of cause and effect. Knowledge is based on all these condition. Though these conditions and presupposition are positive and beginning less, they would go
when other conditions and presuppositions are positive and beginning less, they would go when other conditions and presuppositions are accepted (Yad vijnānam viliyāte).

Brahman transcends the three divisions of time (Trīkālātparā). He is infinite, unitary and undifferentiated (avyakṛta). Brahman is identical with the soul (ātman). He is non-dual pure consciousness. Brähmavidyā then points out what there is to know. Not ordinary sources of knowledge, but only aparaksā-nubhūti enables one to know this reality, the adhisthāna, or the world-ground which creates the occasion both the avidyā and vidyā.¹⁵

Ordinarily the word vidyā means knowledge or a discipline of knowledge, but in the Vedāntic tradition it stands for absolute or unconditional knowledge of the ultimate reality. An addition or prefix Parā is usually renders it free from ambiguity as in the form of Parāidyā means “unconditional knowledge of the ultimate reality”. In the epistemological sense the term avidyā has the negative meaning of ajñāna (absence of knowledge) as also the positive meaning of conditional knowledge of the empirical reality. Knowledge concerning the pāramārthika is vidyā and concerning the vyāvahārika is avidyā.

When the Veda Vedāntic thinkers define Vidyā, as the unconditional knowledge of the Pāramārthikasat, they mean that it is the embodiment of the ultimate truth. It is a knowledge, which is true for all times (trīkālābādhita satya) as contrasted with that which is true-at-a-time (Kālikasatya).

Avidyā on the other hand, is a knowledge, which apprehends relation only (Samsargāvagāhi). It is necessarily relational. Not only that it is also a conditional knowledge. Both in its origin and validity it is dependent upon certain condition, under certain conditions it becomes false. In this sense the Upānisāads describe it as asatyam or just satyam as contrasted with Satyasya Satyam. This means it is subject to verification and its truth or falsity is contingent upon confirmation. This is due to its being empirical and synthetic in character. All empirical knowledge is avidyā, which is not really true but is believed to be true and has only provisional validity. Vidyā, on the other hand signifies that knowledge which is unconditionally true. Whose illustrations are
the identity statements like *Aham brahmāsmi Tattvamasi*.\(^{16}\) etc. It can be mentioned here that the acceptance of the validity of the distinction between *Vidyā* and *avidyā* presupposes the Advaita Vedantic metaphysics.

Ascertained of reality (*tattvajñāna*) has been the prime object of all Philosophical Speculation in the East and West. This is particularly proclaimed by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*. In the *Nyāya* the term ‘Tattva’, stands for reality and the term ‘Jñāna’ is refused to as a synonym of ‘buddhi’, which means knowledge or awareness, or apprehension of the real objects. There is a difference of opinion between the old and the new *Naiyāyika* with regard to the classification of knowledge we include the views of the *Navya Naiyāyikas*, which is now current. Jayanta like other old *Naiyāyikas* has not clearly classified knowledge in the fashion set by Sīvādīta in *Saptapadārthi* and culminated in *Tarkasamgraha* of Annanibhatta, but his analysis have and there consists in such elements which are not opposed, if not more or less relevant to the following scheme:
Except for a slight divergence in the scheme of classification of buddhi between old and the later Nyāya on the other hand and between Śibaditta and Annambhatta on the other it is clear that generally the Nyāya included all types of apprehension under buddhi but as far as valid knowledge (pramā) is concerned, it is simply that which is brought about by the four means of valid cognition.

Different systems of Indian Philosophy have expressed divergent opinion with regard to the nature of pramā and Pramāṇa. Prof. D.M. Datta seems perfectly right in his observation that ‘pramā’ is generally defined as a cognition having the twofold characteristics of truth and novelty (abādhitatva or Yathārthatva and anadhigatatva) and that as regards the first characteristics – truth – all schools of Indian Philosophy are unanimous. But on the second characteristic there is a difference of opinion. According to the Naiyāyikas, pramā is definite and assure knowledge of an object, which is true and
presentational in character. Jayanta is of the view that *pramā* is that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion. Gangeśa maintained that *pramā* is that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists. For Śīkādītta it is the experience of the real nature of things by Visvanātha. According to Annambhatta what we call Yathātha is otherwise known as *Pramā*. If we compare the Nyāya view of *pramā* with western thinking, it resembles the correspondence theory of Western Realists. With the Buddhists it is the causal efficacy, which forms the criteria of truth. This view is termed as the pragmatic theory of knowledge in the West. Dharmakirti also states that knowledge should correspond with experience. The view resembles the coherence theory of knowledge. According to Kapila *pramā* is determinate knowledge not known before. Prabhākara holds *pramā* as immediate experience. Another characteristic of valid knowledge has been mentioned as *anadhigatatva* by the Bhāṭṭa Māṁśakas. Though Dharmarāja Adhvarindra gives two definitions of *pramā*, one of which includes memory in it, the other definition refers to novelty as an essential feature of valid knowledge. This has been rejected by Naiyāyikas.

Kañada, has stated that the general definition of *Pramāṇa*, should be based on the principle that the cause of cognition should be free from defects. *Prasastapāda* includes perception, inference and ārṣa under *Vidyā* and illusion etc. under avidyā. Śridhara refers to an additional characteristic *adhyāvāsāya* meaning that *Vidyā* is a definite cognition. But he creates confusion by including memory under *Vidyā*. Samkara Mis’ra in his *Upaskāra* commentary on the Vaishesika Śūtra however seems to be less ambiguous when he asserts that a *Pramāṇa* is that which produces true knowledge.

In the *Nyāyasūtra*, Gautama simply enumerates four means of knowledge and leaves the term, *Pramāṇa* unexplained. According to Vātsyāyana *Pramāṇa* is that which causes cognition, or in other words which is the instrument of valid knowledge. Uddatakara repeats Vātsyāyana’s views in somewhat clarifying manner and has not added anything substantial in the already existing etymology-based definition of *Pramāṇa* a logical form by inserting in it the word
'artha' and taking the word 'jñāna' occurring therein to stand for the valid kind of cognition. It is actually Jayanta who has given the Nyāya definition a comprehensive and all embracing status by way of including in it the missing links propounded by the logician of his own tradition and also by evaluating the views propounded by the Ācāryas of other schools.

Now the subject matter of our discussion is Vātsyāyana on Pramāṇa.

The cause of Pramāṇa is called Pramāṇa or the means of proof. Pramāṇa i.e., the instrument of Pramāṇa is the most fundamental concept of the Indian theories of knowledge. Nyāya system of Indian philosophy is based on the foundation of the theory of knowledge and Pramāṇa plays an important role in Nyāya system. According to Gautama, the author of Nyāyasūtra these are the four kinds of Pramāṇa. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. The etymological meaning of the term Pramāṇa supplies us with the definition of Pramāṇa pointing to its general feature. The cause par excellence of true knowledge is called Pramāṇa. The suffix attached to the root of Pramāṇa denotes the sense of an instrument. The term 'Pramāṇa. Consists in the root 'mā' with a prefix 'pra' and suffix 'lyut'. The suffix 'lyut', being in the instrumental. Pramāṇa means the instrument, by which something is rightly known or as Vātsyāyana, puts it. "That the Pramāṇa are the instruments of right knowledge is to be understood by the etymological analysis (nirvacana) of the epithet (i.e. Pramāṇa itself). The word Pramāṇa signifies the instrument because (it is derived as) "by this is rightly known" (Pramiyate anena) 21. Loosely the term stands for knowledge as well as for the means of valid knowledge but in Indian Logic it is generally used in the second sense. There is however, a marked difference of opinion regarding the exact nature of Pramāṇa amongst the philosophers. According to Nyāya, a Pramāṇa is that through which something is correctly known. The root mā literally means 'to measures'. That which measures properly (Prakratarūpenamāti) is called Pramāṇa. To know an object correctly is a kind of proper measurement of an object 'knowing' is metaphorically called 'measuring' through our cognition. As a valid cognition
gives us a picture of a particular object, it may be described as 'intellectual measurement'.

Vātsyāyana begins with the determination of the validity or rightness of Pramāṇa with the texts — "Pramāṇatah arthapratipattu Pravṛttiśāmarthyaādarthavat Pramāṇam". The phrase 'Pramāṇaṃ arthavat' means Pramāṇa in non-deviated to the object (arthavyābhiṣīti). The function of Pramāṇa is to reveal the real nature of an object. From the revelation of the real nature of an object the rightness of Pramāṇa is proved. The suffix matup added to artha (arthavat) denotes 'an eternal connection'. (Nityayoga) which indicates the fact of non-deviatedness of an object (avyābhiṣcitā) 'Pramāṇatah arthapratipattau' — in the above Bhāṣya means that the cognition of an object received through the instrumentality of cognition of Pramāṇa is valid presentative cognition. The phrase — ‘Pramāṇatahārthapratipattau Pravṛttiśāmarthyaādartha-vat Pramāṇam means the function of Pramāṇa is to reveal an object if the cognition leads to a successful activity.

If an individual attains right cognition of an object through Pramāṇa he will be able to incline or reject something if he is desirous of doing so. If otherwise, it will not be taken as Pramāṇa, but as Pseudo Pramāṇa i.e., Pramāṇabhāsa, as it cannot lead someone to the successful activity. Here Pramāṇa differs from Pramāṇabhāsa. The means of knowledge have reference to an object. Pramāṇa produces valid knowledge, the object of which exists in the actual world, whereas, Pramāṇabhāsa produces only illusory knowledge. If someone attains the cognition of snake in place of rope, his inclination or rejection does not become successful, because the object of illusion does not actually exist there. Hence, the Pravṛtti either to get or to avoid that object is not successful rather as in the Pseudo cognition of snake there is no snake at all, the inclination etc becomes meaningless. So without the instrument of valid knowledge there is no arthapratipatti (cognition of an object) and without cognition of objects there is no successful activity. That is why, the fact of being non-deviatedness to the object (arthavyābhiṣīti) is the uncommon property of Pramāṇa which called Prāmāṇya.
That a Pramāṇa must invariably be related (avyabhicāri) to the object is proved later through inference. Otherwise Pramāṇa will be variable (vyabhicāri), and in that case there will be no successful activity (Pravṛttisāmarthya). To Vātsyāyana, means of valid cognition (Pramāṇa) is meaningful (arthavat) i.e., constantly connected with the object actually exists. This constant connection of the means of valid cognition (Pramāṇa) with the object (arthā) is called non-deviatedness (avyabhicāritva) is called non-deviatedness (avyabhicāritva). The nature of an object revealed by the means of valid cognition (Pramāṇa), which reveals the actual characteristics of an object – technically called avyabhicāritva or non-deviatedness of the meaning, received through the means of valid cognition (Pramāṇa). But in the case of illusory perception snake in the rope, there is the absence of the qualifier snakeness in the place of the qualificand i.e. rope. Hence, the means of valid cognition (Pramāṇa) will have its object of valid cognition (Pramāṇa) as its’ pervader (Vyāpya) which is otherwise called non-deviatedness with the object (arthāvyabhicāritva). It is the probandum (Śādhyā), the probāns (Hetu) is the “Capacity of fulfilling successful activity” (Samarthapravṛtti janakatvā). As the means of valid cognition (Pramāṇa) is the cause of the successful inclination, it is non-deviated to its object. This non-deviatedness (arthāvyabhicāritva) is explained as ‘arthāvyabhicāryanubhavājanakatvamityarthah’ that is the property of being a generation of an awareness, which invariably corresponds to an object. In this initial statement Vātsyāyana favours the Nyāya theory of extrinsic validity of truth (Paratafprāmiṇyā) through this argument Pramāṇa differs from Pramanābhāsa (Pseudo - Pramāṇa). From the fact of successful activity Pravṛtti-Sāmarthya) one can assume the reality of Pramāṇa, which is different from Pramanābhāsa.

As an āstika system Nyāya holds that the highest goal is called niḥśreyasa or liberation. For the attainment of Liberation tattavajñāna (right cognition of the categories) is essential – which can be obtained by Pramāṇa. Tattva is to know an object as such. Tattva (reality) is cognized through Pramāṇa and something is accepted if it is conducive to happiness. If the object is not accepted due to having some obstacles, there is at least an acceptability of the same. If an object
seems to be the cause of misery, it is rejected or there is the possibility of rejection. The object, which is not acceptable or rejectable, comes under indifference (Upekśā). Pramāṇabhāsa cannot provide the cognition of reality (Tattva), but Pramāṇa can easily provide'.

Tattva (Reality) is the positivity of the positive and negativity of the negative (Sataśca sadbhāvah asataśca asadbhāvah). ²³ When an object is cognized as Sat it is to be taken “as it really is”, i.e.; to cognize something in it’s true form. (Sat saditī grhyamāṇam Tathābhūtama-viparitam tattam bhavati. asaccasaditi grhyamāṇam tathābhūtamataviparitam tattvam bhavati). ²⁴ When a positive object is known as positive i.e. as it actually is rather than as it’s contradictory, it becomes the tattva (of Sat or Bhāva). Again when a negative object is known as negative i.e. in its’ actual nature, rather than as it’s contradictory, it becomes the Tattva to Vatsyāyana. The Pramāṇa which reveals the existent reveals also the non-existents. That which is not perceived is known as not existent because there is no perception of it. The existents are in sixteen forms e.g. Pramāṇa, Prameya etc, the knowledge of which is conducive to the Summum bonum. There are twelve Prameya, e.g., self, body etc. of valid knowledge – rightly known by the instrument of valid knowledge. There are also other objects of valid knowledge like substance, quality etc., which again have innumerable variety. Thus the objects of knowledge are in fact innumerable. But the twelve Prameyas are specially mentioned, because the right knowledge of these leads to liberation and its false knowledge to worldly existence.

One point may be mentioned in this connection that among the four kinds of Pramā, the perceptual cognition above is not caused through the instrumentality of other cognition. When a jar is perceived, it does not depend on other cognitions to have direct awareness of it. It is called independent. The perceptual cognition is called jñānakaranakan jñānam i.e. a cognition not caused through the instrumentality of another cognition. Other than perception, inference etc. is dependent on the cognition of some other factors (Jñānakaranaka) like cognitions of Vyāpti etc. Cognition through comparison (Upamiti) is generated through the cognition of similarity (Sādṛṣyajñāna) and
testimonial cognition (Sābda) is generated through cognition of word (Padajñāna). In the case of perception the sense organ etc. are alone taken as an instrument but not any cognition.

Another derivative meaning of the word Pramāṇa (Pra + Mā +ani) is ‘to measure’. The thing which is according to Pramāṇa is acceptable. And which is not according to Pramāṇa is not acceptable. It deserves a mention that Rabindranath Tagore also said in his famous writings ‘Shantiniketan’ that "Praman Manena Je Rup Se Kurup" (ugliness lies there where there is no limit or measurement). Beauty is always measured having some balance or limit.

Goutama, the author of Nyāyasutra and Vātsyāyana in his Adibhāsyā, has established the non-unique status of the means of valid cognition (Pramāṇa). In Nyāyasutra it is categorically explained that the same thing in different circumstances can really both a means of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa) and an object of valid cognition (Prameya). Thus here in Indian tradition, Epistemology i.e., the theory of means of valid cognition (Pramāṇa) is interconnected with ontology or object of valid cognition (Prameya). The Nyāya dictum ‘Pramāṇādhina Prameyasiddhiḥ’ means ‘the theory of reality is established through the theory of valid cognition (Pramāṇa), without the help of Pramāṇa an object called Prameya having some ontological reality cannot be substantiated. Vātsyāyana has placed Pramāṇa in the first position in the list of sixteen categories, the right cognition of which leads us to the attainment of liberation (apavarga), because without Pramāṇa valid knowledge is not possible. Prameya is placed in the second position, which signifies that the cognition of Prameya depends on the cognition of Pramāṇa. Any type of cognition involves these four.

Vācaspati Mishra opines that the terms ‘Pramāṇamarthavat’ would mean that Pramāṇa is necessary factor in the phenomenon of valid cognition (Pramā). That is why, it is maintained by the Naiyāyikas at the very beginning. If Pramāṇa becomes non-deviated from the object (arthavyabhicāri), cognizer (Prāmātā), cognizable entity (Prameya), cognition (Pramiti) become meaningful or non-deviated to the object (arthavat ca Pramāṇe Pramātā Prameyam
Pramitirityārtharthavanti bhavanti). 25 If Pramāṇa cannot reveal an object, the Pramāta etc. would become meaningless (anyatama-paye’ rthasya anupapattah). An individual who inclines to accept or reject is called a cognizer (Pramātā). The means of proving an object is Pramāṇa. The object, which is being proved is called Prameya (Yo’r thah Pramiyate tat Prameyām). The valid cognition regarding some object is called Pramitiḥ (Yadārtha vijñānam. Sa Pramitiḥ). All types of human behaviour are centered around these four and Tatva reaches the fulfillment with the help of these four. That is why it is stated in the Nyāyabhāṣva, (Catasṛsu Caivambidhāsu arthatattvam Parisamāpyate). 26 In fact, the first category Pramāṇa gives rise to the concepts of Prameya, Pramātā, and Pramiti. In other words, these concepts are centered around the key-concept Pramāṇa – the pioneer on which other concepts depend.

According to Jayanta, Pramāṇa is at collocation of conscious as well as unconscious factors which results in producing such an apprehension of knowable objects that is different from illusion and doubt. Jayanta clarifies that the epithet ‘bodhābodhasvabhāva’ characterizes the collocation of objects (Sāmagri) and the statement ‘Pramāṇa’ is the instrument of cognition, which is other than doubt and illusion, forms the definition of Pramāṇa. Jayanta anticipates objection to his definition. It may be argued that Pramāṇa is the Karana (instrument of true knowledge and Karana is that which is the best of all the causes of an effect (Sādhakatamam Karlam).

According to Nyāya it is however, a fact that perception, inference and verbal testimony differ from one another because of the difference in the condition of their objects. We grasp an object through visual perception of qualified by its specific property. Inferential knowledge grasps the minor term as qualified only by the objects inferred on the strength of an induction. Testimony reveals the meaning of a word as associated with the word itself. Still as the substratum underlying the properties of these objects is sometime one and the same, there is no contradiction in the assertion that many means apply to the same. The great commentator on the Nyāyasūtra has given an appropriate example. From the words of the trustworthy person we learn that fire exists at a
distant place. A person proceeds in that direction relying upon his words. When
he comes near he sees smoke and infers its existence. When he advances further
and approaches fire Naiyāyikas and Vaishesikas have propounded that the same
object can be grasped by perception, inferences etc. under different
circumstances. Thus they uphold the principle of “Pramāṇasam plava”. When
many means of proof reveals one and the same object it is technically called
Samplava (mutual co-operation). The knowledge of one and the same object
revealed by many means of proof is Pramā according to Nyāya. The Naiyāyikas
assert that if we do not subscribe to the theory of ‘Pramāṇa Samplava’, the
existence of inference cannot be established since knowledge of the relation of
invariable concomitance depends upon the apprehension of the Probans and the
Probandum and it cannot be gained without the aid of perception. In some cases
restriction is imposed upon the function of proofs. As for an example, the Vedic
Injunction alone that one who intends to attain heaven should perform Agni-
hotra-Sacrifice throws light upon the attainment of heaven by means of a Vedic
sacrifice but perception and inference do not enlighten us. When one hears the
roaring of thunder, he infers its cause which he neither perceives nor learns from
the scripture. One directly knows that his hands are two but he does neither infer
the number nor does learn it from another person. In majority of cases all proofs
apply to all objects but there are few cases in which a particular proof has an
exclusive object of its own.

The Buddhists maintain that each of the two Pramāṇas accepted by them
viz.; perception and inference has its own exclusive and distinct jurisdiction.
Their corresponding objects are particular and universal. The universals are
cognized by inference and the particulars by the senses. In their opinion a unique
particular can only be apprehended by perception and never by inference. The
Buddhists uphold these restrictions as necessary and call it “Pramāṇa Vyavasthā”. They intend to deny existence to a universal etc. A fit reply will be
given to them by re establishing the hypothesis of a universal etc.27

Knowledge is a cognitive experience and it has to be distinguished from
types of non-cognitive experience, such as willing, and feeling as exemplified by
volitional acts or emotional states as pleasure, anger or lust. What is peculiar about the cognitive attitude is that we want to “see” or “take in” things as they are, as they obtain in reality: we do not want to add or modify or distort the given, and to the extent we do this, it is not knowledge. To be discovered, the object of knowledge should exist prior to and independent of the knowing it must be an accomplished fact — a *Siddha-Vastu*. One that is not brought into being through the knowing. If it were simultaneous with knowledge or were created by it, how can my knowledge be true or false? The perception of the “rope-snake” would not be an illusion and would not be recognized as such any time, if the rope (the real) were not taken as existing both during and before the illusion, it must be something absolutely independent of our knowing of it. The “rope-snake”, however has no existence independent of our knowing and is totally exhausted in that relationship (*drṣyatvātmityā*). Once this is granted that the object of knowledge should exist prior to it. We cannot also assign any period of limit to its priority. For today any such things we have to reach a stage when consciousness alone existed and the object was ushered into existence later on, presumably by the former. It is evident that such consciousness is not knowledge; it is willing. However far back, we may trace our knowledge it will always presuppose the object as prior to it. This priority is not primarily temporal, but only signifies the accomplished character of the object:

Not only is the object to be independent of our knowing, but we have also to regard the object as not being required to be known by any person or mind. When we know an object we need not at once be conscious of this very knowing for the object, which alone should determine the nature of consciousness in knowledge, says nothing about ‘its’ present known ness or its past unknown ness.

The above contention about the ideal of knowledge run counter to the commonly received principle of idealism that the object is mind-dependent in the someway or the other. But according to T.R.V. Murti all arguments of idealism (e.g., those advanced by Viññānavāda, Berkeley or Hegel) rely upon feeling and willing and mis-apply them to knowledge. He says that the knowledge absolutist
agrees with the realist and with Kant as against the idealist. That the object of knowledge is or should be independent of the knowing consciousness. There is profound disagreement, however, with realism in another respect. No actual knowledge (in the empirical way) is completely free from non-cognitive factors such as imagination, constructions, bias and prejudice etc. Such states appear as knowledge is taken to be knowledge, but are actually illusion or erroneous perception. The rope-snake, for example is mistaken as knowledge; what we seem to perceive is not given or known; it is a creation or projection of our imagination or fantast, although not apprehended as such in the state of illusion. Thus knowledge as such is invariably true, and truth is known only, not self or willed. It is only metaphorically that we speak of the truth of a feeling or willing, not literally.

When we look at a physical thing from a distance or from a particular angle, we may get only a perspective. There could be an infinite number of such perspectives and each one may be useful, no doubt. No one perspectives of a combination of them can claim to be absolutely correct. But the question is how will we come to be sure of absolute truth? The only way to be sure of absolute truth is to get into the skin of the thing as it were by becoming identical with it. Here knowledge and its object coincide. There is no possibility of discrepancy or falsity here, because we are not looking at the thing externally, mediately, from a distance or through the mediation of categories or in a biased or prejudiced way. Here we know the thing not by representation but by being it, as it were. Knowledge and the thing known become one. There is however a drawback, when we have the intuition we are not at once aware of it as intuition of the real. It is indeed a paradox. We have truth when we are identical with the real, but cannot be reflectively aware that we know the truth; and we reflectively make the assertion. We all already away from it. Our assertion may be a falsification or a distortion of the real and is therefore only appearance. To avoid this Advaita Vedānta takes recourse to negation. By consciously and systematically negating all thought-elaboration and linguistic expression in every form. We arrive at
ultimate Truth or Reality (adhyāropāpavādābhyām nisprāṇcam bhrama Prapadyate). 29

For a discovery of the real, the appearance is negated. This is possible only if the appearance were in some sense related to the real. All appearance is appearance of the real and by removal of the appearance we realize the presence of the real as underlying it. According to T.R.V. Murti a further consequence of this view is that we have recourse to two levels or orders of things, the real and its appearance.

R.K. Tripathi in his 'The Mādhyamika and Advaitism, also hold that the Mādhyamikas insist on the negation of appearance for the realization of tattva (Prajñā). 30 Tattva is beyond all thought and speech. In this context he makes a distinction between Samsāra and Paramārtha. The Mādhyamika also makes a distinction between Samvṛti and Paramārtha. The Mādhyamika also makes a distinction between Vyāvahāra and Paramārtha and hold that it is only by negating Samvṛti that we get the Paramārtha. That is why it is said that there is no difference whatsoever between Samsāra and Nirvāṇa, as Nirvāṇa nothing but knowing the Samsāra truly is. It is further held that Samvṛti covers or conceals reality. If the Mādhyamika says as the Vedāntins does, that reality is the ground of appearance (Samvṛti), then there is no difference between the two. But to be able to say this one has to depend on perceptual experience and not on mere thought. If however, the tattva were not said to be the ground of appearance then it would be either because there is no tattva or because it is not related. Either position is damaging to the Mādhyamikas. In the first case appearance itself will be reality and in the second, there will be dualism of appearance and reality and there will be no need to negate appearance.

According to Viññānavādins school of Buddhism cognition is a medium of an object. The object is such as is not ordinarily present to sense but is conveyed to sense through a medium and that medium is cognition. According to this school perception does not yield knowledge of external objects distinct from percipient. The arguments in favour of their opinion are (1) the experience of a datum and the datum itself occur simultaneously, but two supposedly different
events occurring simultaneously cannot be distinguished and should be treated as identical, (2) the external world supposedly consists of a number of different objects, but they can be known as different only because there are different sorts of experiences “of” them, yet if the experiences are thus distinguishable, there is no need to hold the superfluous hypothesis of external objects. (3) Sense organs are supposedly intermediaries between external objects and consciousness. However, we have sensory experience during dreams. When the sense organ are not functioning. Thus it is feasible to explain the existence of sensations as due to the inner workings of consciousness. The absolute evolves itself in a way, which makes individuals think that there is an external world. The saint in the mystical non-dual state realizes pure consciousness and sees the misleading character of ordinary experience.

Not only metaphysical presuppositions are embedded in different theories of valid cognition, even the theories of false cognition which are technically known as ‘Khyātivāda’ (Theories of Error) are formulated after keeping parity with such metaphysical presuppositions e.g. when a rope is perceived as snake, it is described as perceived wrongly and reject our earlier cognition as a false cognition. Now the question what is the factor which constitute falsity of the error? Is the falsity ascribed to the apprehension itself or to both apprehension and content? These questions are solved by different systems of Indian Philosophy in different ways after following their presupposition. There lies the controversy among different philosophers regarding the nature of false content. There are six principal theories on such issues called Asatkhyātivāda, Ātmakhyātivāda, Akhyātivāda, Anyathākhyātivāda, Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda and Satkhyātivāda.

The first view – Asatkhyātivāda held by the Mādhyamikas (Śūnyavādins) of Buddhist school. They maintained that nothing is real in this phenomenal world. For instance, in the illusory cognition of a shell as a piece of silver is real. The silver is unreal since it is sublated at the disappearance of the illusion. The shell is also not real since it is but one factor of the sublating cognition. Others being the silver and the connection between the silver and the shell. The
Mādhyamikas believe in the ultimate principle of void (Śūnya) which according to them is different from (1) reality, (2) unreality, (3) from both reality and unreality and (4) from neither reality nor non-reality. It implies that the real nature of things (Śūnyatā) is indeterminable. According to them when someone is in error, he sees an absolute non-existent object such as sky-flower or hare's horn etc. in any of the two given two senses. When an individual perceives the rope as a snake, he sees not a snake only but a rope that has expressed itself the properties of a snake. In other words, he receives not a snake as such, but rope snake. But a snake, which is a rope as well, is an absurdity. The snake may exist but a rope-snake is nowhere found except in cognition of the false.

But Nyāya refutes this theory by saying that “an absolutely unreal object”, has a place neither in the world of theory nor in the world of practice”. 31

The theory of error held by the Viññānavādins is known as Ātmakhyāti. They have totally rejected the view of Sānyāvādins regarding error as a content less cognition that cognizes nothing. In their opinion there are no objects external to consciousness. If a cognition be different from its object, it must arise either before or after the object or simultaneously with it. It does not arise before the object since at that moment it has no object. It does not arise after the object since the object of cognition disappears at that instant. In case of simultaneous, there cannot be any difference between the two. Thus the Viññānavādins believe that a cognition is not different from its object. Error according to them is not asatkyāti, the cognition of sheer non-existent, rather it consists in an illegitimate process of projection of subjective ideas as objective and extra-mental facts.

But this theory also refuted by the Natyāyikas on the ground that if it is accepted, there will be no difference between knowledge and the subject and object of knowledge, since according to these Buddhists everything is an idea and in that case instead of speaking as ‘this is silver’, one could even speak as “I am silver”.

The theory of error advocated by the Prabhākaras known as akhyāti or vivekakhyati refute the asatkyāti and ātmakhyāti views of the Buddhists. The Prabhākaras are of the view that error is the result of the lack of discrimination
between two cognitions. The illusory cognition occurs in the failure of the apprehension of distinction between the perceived fact and the memory image “Yatra Yad Adhyāsastad Vikēkāgrahani-Vandhano Bhramah”. For instance in the illusory cognition of silver in the shell, the shell, by virtue of its luster which it has in common with silver is mistaken as silver on account of obscuration of memory (Smrtipramoṣa) The Prābhākaras hold that the following three forms of fusion are responsible for the lack of discrimination between two cognition: 1. For example fusion of the presentation and presentation e.g., when a crystal appears red on account of an adjacent rose both the crystal and the redness are given in cognition. Though redness is a quality of the rose and not of the crystal, the fact is not apprehended. (2) Fusion of presentation and memory e.g. when the shell is taken as silver, the presentation of the shell and the memory of silver are confused, (3) Fusion of memory and memory e.g. when a person is not able to determine whether a ball object situated at a distance is a post or an ascetic, he gets confused. In case of snake-rope illusion the given element lies on the ‘rope’ and the remembered content is ‘snake’. The illusion lies on the non-distinction of the rope represented as ‘this’ and the ‘snake’. The illusion lies on the non-distinction of the rope represented as ‘this’ and the ‘snake’. This non-distinction gives rise to confusion and leads to the false judgement—‘this is snake’. The two facts—the given and the remembered are thus amalgamated or confused as one and certain false expectations are aroused as consequence. The Prābhākaras believe that illusion is not a positive experience, but a negative non-distinction. As a result there is no positive falsity in error anywhere.

The Naiyāyikas propound the Anyathākhyativāda, urge that the intrinsic positivity of error as distinct from the negative non-distinguishing or akhyāti. Every illusion is a single complex experience, but not two things given and remembered— are falsely confused and non-distinguished as Prābhākaras say. In the snake-rope illusion we all not aware of two experiences but of a single complex experience of a perceived ‘this’ appearing to be a snake. At the time of correction a single is rejected. That is, ‘this snake’, that was falsely perceived through the inference of the defects of sense media etc. The illusion is a unitary
composite presentation of this 'snake', the 'this' being presented through the natural (Laukika) contact of the visual sense and the object lying before it, and the snake being also presented through the extraordinary (Alaukika) contact of the visual sense with the 'snake' perceived elsewhere. The error thus consists in a complicated perception of the extra ordinary seen snake-characters of the jungle snake as imposing in 'this', that is seen by the external sense organ viz. the eye, by natural contact of sense and objects.

Error, according to Samkarites involves more than the experience of a false relation. It is the experience of a unitary false content, not the experience of a false selection between real contents. Samkara concludes that every error involves an unreal positivity or positive unreality. It is neither the cognition of a sheer negation as found in Asatkhyaṭṭivāda nor a cognition of an object existing elsewhere as found in the Anyathākhyaṭṭivāda. It is a positive experience and hence it is the experience of a positive content. That which is absolutely non-existent (asat) cannot be the content of a positive experience. While every error is a positive experience. When a rope is cognized as a snake, the status of snake is not non-existent (asat) as we cognize it in this way and it is not existent (Sat) also as the cognition of it is sublated by the subsequent valid cognition of rope. Hence the snake is neither existent nor non-existent which is described as indescribable (Anirvacaniya). This illusory cognition is taken as a real, which is of apparent type (Pratibhāsikasattā).

Ramanuja regards error as consisting in the apprehension a partial truth as the whole truth. His theory is known as Satkhyāṭṭivāda according to which error is neither the apprehension of the sheer nothingness nor of any indescribable object. Thus when a rope is cognized as a snake, the cognizer perceives a real snake feature in the rope existing before him. He perceives a real 'here and now' snake character in the object lying before him 'here and now'. His mistake consists not in perceiving anything false or unreal but in considering the snake character to be the only characteristics of the object, lying before.

So far we have thrown some light on the concepts of right cognition and false cognition. Epistemology deals with the both. Apparently a question may be
raised why the discussion on \textit{Apramā} in the form of error is done in this context. The main intention of the discussion is to show that both the theories concerning valid cognition and invalid cognition are connected with the metaphysical presuppositions accepted in a particular system. Just as \textit{Pramā} and \textit{Pramāṇa} are influenced by the presuppositions, the error etc. is also not free from these. In order to prove this different theories of \textit{Khyātivāda} are explained. Moreover the concept of doubt (\textit{Samsaya}), which is also a form of a \textit{Pramā}, has got tremendous influence in philosophical methodology. Without doubt one cannot proceed to the realm of philosophy. One can have enquiry if one has some confusion on the nature of an object. This confusion or doubt leads to further know the exact nature. Had there been no doubt, there would not have been any philosophical query. That is why, doubt though \textit{A-Pramā} has got some positive value. In the same way, \textit{Tarka} or \textit{Reductio-ad absurdum}, which is taken as a form of \textit{A-prama}, is a kind of indirect method of knowing. Any doubt can be removed through the application of \textit{Tarka}. The example may be given in the following way. If there is a doubt of deviation between smoke and fire, an argument in the form of \textit{Tarka} can be done in the following way – “If smoke be deviated from fire, it would not have been caused by fire’ (\textit{dhumo yadi vahni vyābhicāri syattarhi vahnijanya na syāt}). As the smoke generated by fire is an established fact, it is wrong that smoke will be deviated from fire. In this way the doubt of deviation or any other doubt can be removed. Hence like \textit{Pramā a-Pramā} is also philosophically significant.
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