Chapter One
Introduction

A Brief Historical Summary

In Jordan and Morocco, societies are less homogeneous in terms of primordial affiliations and national cohesiveness. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has substantial Palestinian population, and Morocco has long experienced dissidence between the Berber tribes and the Arabs. Consequently, for Kings of Jordan and Morocco, the dilemma is particularly acute. Despite difficult circumstances, the two regimes have survived through reliance on the instruments of repression and coercion in the face of existence of politicised elements actively opposed to the system. Each regime has sought to inculcate ideological legitimacy to counteract anti-royalist doctrines. The Hashemites have emphasised, in addition to their Sharifian status, their role in the Arab nationalist movement. Moroccan rulers have tried to project their religious sanctity to the masses as well as the legacy of their illustrious father’s role in the struggle for independence from France (Hudson, 1977: 209-210).

The present ruling family of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is the descendant of various Sharifian Hashemites who ruled over the Hijaz region (967-1201) in Saudi Arabia. Particularly, King Hussein ibn’ Talal’s branch ruled over Makkah (1201-1925) in modern Saudi Arabia, although Hashemite family submitted to the Ottoman sultan in 1517. The Hashemite family claim direct descendants of Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah having a lineage to Banu Hashem descendants of the Qureish tribe (Salibi, 1998: 50-51; Kechichian, 2008: 349). Sharif Hussein ibn’ Ali (r.1853-1925) was the last Sharifian Hashemite ruler over Islam’s holy cities in the Hijaz in unbroken succession from 1201 to 1925. His active participation in the Arab Revolt liberated Arab lands from the Ottoman grip in 1916 through intervention of the British and the French.
governments, which resulted in Sykes-Picot Agreement. The agreement carved the region into small states coming under the tutelages of Britain and France respectively, and among those states, the emirate of Transjordan was established on 11 April 1921 (Kechichian, 2008: 350-351; Hudson, 1977: 211-213).

From the establishment of Transjordan, there were demands for representative body but for years, the British Mandate did not acquiesce for fear that an elected assembly might challenge their control over the country's affairs. In 1923, for instance, Abdullah ibn' Hussein took concrete steps towards convening of an elected assembly but the idea was quickly abandoned as a result of British pressures. At the end of the 1920s, the British realised that an elected assembly might serve useful purposes. However, precautions were taken to ensure that it would be subordinated to the executive branch and, through it to the palace and the British resident-general. The emir was given the power to convene, adjourn, suspend or dismiss the Legislative Assembly at will. In addition, through a system of quotas, the electoral law ensured the majority representation for Christian and Circassian minorities, considered natural allies of the palace in the Legislative Assembly. Despite controlled measures, the first Legislative Assembly elected in April 1929 became assertive and critical of the executive branch. It so often embarrassed the government that the emir finally decided to disband the Legislative Assembly on 9 February 1931 (Baaklini et al, 1999: 134-135).

Rather than governing Transjordan directly, the British established emir (Prince) Abdullah ibn' Hussein as ruler and granted him considerable domestic power while retaining overall control of the country's financial and security matters. The institutional curbs on government agreed upon by both Abdullah and the British spawned the growth

---

1 The Sykes-Picot Agreement: Secret Diplomacy – Three weeks before Hussein thought he had fulfilled his commitment by starting the Arab revolt, the British reneged on their promises to him by arranging the Sykes-Picot agreement (16 May 1916), confining the proposed independent Arab state to present-day Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Sir Mark Sykes of the British Foreign Office and Francois Georges-Picot, France's official in Cairo in charge of Syrian affairs, worked it out in a series of exchanged notes. The agreement granted the straits and northeastern Anatolia to Russia, and Cilicia to France. Alexandretta would be a free port. The best that the Arabs of Syria could hope for was autonomy under French protection while the Iraqis faced the same alternative under the British. As for the Arabs of Palestine, their homeland form Gaza to Tyre was to be given over to international control except for a British enclave around Akka (Aroian and Mitchell, 1984: 152).
of opposition within and outside the legislative council that called for greater representation and reduce British interference in Transjordan. Following independence in 1946, the country changed its name to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Abdullah assumed his official title as King (Fischbach, 1999: 84). Since the British mandate period, tribal tradition in Jordan remains entrenched with social institutions unaltered by British governance, except for the gradual replacement of antiquated Ottoman codes with modern legislation on the British model of common law (Lerner, 1958: 305).

The foundation of contemporary Morocco can be traced to the 16 century Sa’dian dynasty. In the mid-17 century, the Alawis triumphed over the Sa’dian principalities and established the Alawite dynasty in 1664. From the core of its territories around Meknes and Fez, it gradually extended and consolidated its rule under the leadership of Sultan Mulay Isma’il (1672-1727). Like Jordan, the Moroccan Kings claim their lineage to the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. The King holds the title, *Amir al-Mu’aminin* (Commander of the Faithful) and possessor of the *Barakah* (Special Blessing Power) (Gershovich, 2008: 1-2). The historical cleavages between the settled, coastal culture and the mountainous tribal culture of dissidence; the differences between Berbers and Arabs; and the varieties of Islam, from orthodox to mystical and particularistic movements reflect the existing polarities in society (Hudson, 1977: 220-221).

Like Jordan, the Islamic basis of the Moroccan political system is well established with the King combining temporal authority and spiritual legitimacy. As the commander of the faithful, the Alawite Kings laid the strongest possible claims to Islamic legitimacy (Hudson, 1977: 221-222). In 1901 Sultan Abd al-Aziz accepted the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale (1904) that assured French protection to the Sultan in the event of a threat to his rule. In 1910, sultan Abd al-Hafidh agreed to the formation of Moroccan army commanded by Spaniards in the Rif and by the French in the rest of the country. With series of agreements including the one on 30 March 1912, Abd al-Hafidh signed the Treaty of Fez confirming the French protectorate. In November 1912 France and Spain negotiated a separate convention (Aroian and Mitchell, 1984: 145-146) on a territorial administrative division. France held nearly 90 percent of the country while a Spanish
Protectorate was created along the northern coast and the extreme south of the Sahara region (McKenna, 2010: 113).

The French Protectorate did not radically alter the country’s socio-cultural or political structures. What distinguished the Moroccan ruling family from the most other Arab monarchies was the degree of continuity that it retained in conducting the Kingdom’s indigenous affairs. Morocco had a long tradition of centralised state control and was the only Maghreb state to escape full Ottoman rule (Kechichian, 2008: 383-384). The French and the Spanish administrations in Morocco created a system whereby the sultan ruled but assisted by nominated officials representing the Protectorate’s governments (Aroian and Mitchell, 1984: 146-147).

The most important law that favoured imperialist expansion was the 1919 dahir (decree). It allowed for the division of and transfers the Protectorate land held collectively for distribution among the French and other European settlers. The foreign Settlers focused on agriculture and establishing banks and industries. The Protectorate Council of Government combined elected representatives from these sectors. The few Moroccans who gained access to the council did so only by appointment (McKenna, 2010: 120).

To maintain its hegemony, the French administration issued a decree in May 1930 known as the Berber dahir establishing a system of jurisdiction that excluded the application of sharia (Islamic law) in Berber areas. It also sought to establish separate education systems for Berbers and Arab Moroccans. This was meant to further reinforce the existing division between the dissident Berbers and the Arabs. Consequently, the dahir provided significant catalyst for the nationalist movement with demonstrations in every major area of the country (Lust-Okar, 2005: 44-45). In 1930, the anti-dahir united civil society organizations in Fez and Rabat under the banner of the National Group (al-Jama’a al-Wataniyya) but their activities remained underground. Later, they adopted a new name, the National Action Bloc. In 1937, with the popularity and success of the movement, the Protectorate government banned it although without suppressing its leadership. Thereafter, its members regrouped as the Nationalist Party. After the clamp
down on the party leadership in October 1937, Ahmad Balafrej revived the Nationalist party and restructured its programme under the banner of Istiqlal (Independence) Party (Okoth, 2006: 235-238).

A landmark in the Moroccan independence struggle was the deposition of Muhammad ibn' Yusuf on 20 August 1953. The sultan was exiled to Corsica and later to Madagascar and Mawlay Ben Arafa replaced him. As nationalists relentlessly rallied around the deposed sultan and as increasing incidents of armed resistance emerged, French Prime Minister Edgar Faure acknowledged the problem in 1955 and called for a conference at Aix-les Bains in August 1955 to placate the political unrest in the country. The French government promised to constitute a government of national union for the purpose of negotiation and the establishment of the throne council. With the persistent nationalists’ call for the role of the exiled sultan in the new framework, on 29 October 1955 Muhammad ibn' Yusuf returned to occupy his role as Alawi monarch, taking the name of Muhammad V. In February 1956 Morocco became independent from the French and Spanish Protectorates (Newbury, 2003: 93-94).

After Jordan and Morocco emerged as independent states from the British and the French imperial powers, liberalised monarchical regimes remain the hallmark. Despite existing institutional symbols of democracy, political liberalisation is yet to translate into real participatory process in relatively modernised and open societies. If the monarchs are seen as distancing themselves from the routine matters of government, granting limited autonomy to parliaments and other constitutional bodies, it remains a careful strategy to shield them against criticisms of government policies. Nevertheless, the monarchs ensure that ultimate power resides with them.

In the late 1980s King Hussein (r-1952-1999) initiated significant political reforms in Jordan and continued under his son, King Abdullah II (since 1999). Morocco has also seen some significant reforms, particularly with the promulgation of new constitution in 1992 under King Hassan II (r-1961-1999), expanding parliament’s prerogatives that were further strengthened by 1996 amendments. Later, King Mohammed VI (since 1999)
continued with reforms but they were more of a modernisation pursuit than a democratic process. In the absence of institutions fully accountable to the representatives and electorates, the Kings remain the dominant political authorities. Extending legal recognition to political parties and holding regular parliamentary elections have not been sufficient to evolve into genuine democratic systems. In both countries, reform efforts were the result of external compulsion to build legitimacy and maintain domestic political stability. Despite some significant reforms, main issue of political power distribution remains a contentious debate in Jordan and Morocco. Moreover, despite existing vibrant civil society, its emergence as a resilient force to push for democratisation remains to be seen in the face of limited state delineated political space. Besides, cultural norms, especially premised on religion and long held traditional loyalty towards dynastic rule have constrained their growth.

Notwithstanding competitive multi-party system in both states, majority of the political parties are often co-opted under the Kings’ largesse, rendering them subservient to play the effective opposition roles. Mutual suspicions between secular and Islamist parties have inhibited their full potential as a strong counterforce to the regimes and instead secular parties prefer to coalesce with the Kings to thwart Islamists’ rise to power. The use of coercive security establishments and intelligence undermines political reforms. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been the most significant challenge to Hashemite monarchy given its uneasy share of Palestinian population and border proximity with Israel. For Morocco, the issue of Western Sahara and radical movements within the country and across the borders are serious concerns. Thus, regional political environments affect and shape their internal political dynamics.

Hindrance to political reforms also lies in the elites’ support base of regimes that control major shares of countries’ economic and political influence in both countries. Members of the security establishments, tribal leaders and powerful business elites resist any reforms that would undermine their interests and influence. Yet, moderate Islamist parties, notably Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan, and Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco have emerged leading critics of the regimes. While Islamists are
largely political organisations, they also foster civil society organisations to mobilise their cause against the regimes. They find democratic process more appealing that would give them ample space to pursue their goals without state repressive policies.

**Literature Survey**

Taking into account different perspectives on the existing literature related to political systems in Arab monarchies, the literature survey is divided into two sub-themes: Democracy and Arab Monarchies, and Challenges to Democracy in Jordan and Morocco.

**Democracy and Arab Monarchies**

On the concept of democracy, S.I Benn and R.S Peters (1970) stressed that the unique essence of democratic institution rests on legal authority, directly depending on the confidence of the electors, and elections are periodic tests to check the legitimacy of the leaders/governors. Thus, democracy is a rule by consent. However, they asserted that if leaders do not lead with unbiased opinion, mature judgment and enlightened conscience but prefer to play for easy popularity, democratic governments degenerate into mob rule. D.D Raphael (1970) pointed out that the ordinary citizen’s role ends with casting of the vote in favour of a representative or of the broad policy of a party. Decision on concrete issues is left to the body of elected representatives, or executive acting with the consent of the legislature. To Raphael, democracy in practice is an oligarchy elected by the people as a whole and responsible to the people. In a broad spectrum, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1986) emphasised that in practice, democracy is identified with liberty and popular sovereignty. Liberty entails freedom of thought, freedom of association, and freedom of political, cultural and religious expression, and one’s preferred style of life. Moreover, to Bowles and Gintis, popular sovereignty implies that the power is accountable to the people.

Daniel Lerner (1958) gave a glimpse of West Asian society torn between modernisation influence and the traditional ways of life in the 1960s. He brought six West Asian
countries: Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iran under his ambit of study. Drawing upon the concept of modernisation theory, Lerner emphasised a parallel comparison of how traditional society and modernisation affect various facets in the lives of the people. In traditional society, the norms are heavily drawn from the kinship that distinctly segregated the rulers and the ruled without popular participation in state governance. On the contrary, the modern society is based on the 'consensus' what he called as “Participant Society”, where individuals have the space to pursue and determine what they want from the government. Although, explicit study on Morocco is missing in Lerner’s book, his insight into the Arab political institutions has ample bearing even on the Moroccan political system.

The Arab Human Development Report prepared by the United Nations (2004) observed that concept of good governance has eluded the people of Arab States, leading to widespread frustration and chaos in the region. Political restrictions have been the most serious obstacle for Arabs to attain freedom and good governance. The two factors impinging on people’s rights are the autocratic regimes and traditional tribalism. The report noted that the real reason for absence of democracy in Arab world is not the cultural origin but it is manifested in political, social, and economic structures, which successfully eliminated the potential opposition from challenging autocratic regimes. Larry Diamond, Marc F Plattner and Daniel Brumberg (2003) agreed that the regimes have absolute control over the state machineries with economic resources and repressive security establishments at their disposal. According to them, state-monitored political parties, state controlled press, and state managed elections without popular sovereignty and political accountability are an essence of “liberalized autocracy”. As Michel C. Hudson (1977) noted, the political turmoil in Arab world was that of legitimacy problem. In the absence of “meaningful institutionalised participation”, there is ambiguity in the legitimacy of the ruler /government's authority. The political process remains stagnant, which has been the result of problems of identity, legitimacy and equality. Even though they have given in-depth study on Arab political systems, their analyses were premised on general context only, without dealing with specific country studies.
On the Gulf Monarchies, Neil Quilliam (2003) emphasised historical significance in the formation of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 against the backdrop of the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the uncertainty of Iranian and Iraqi ambitions. Gulshan Dietl (1991) dwelled on two Gulf Wars’ (Iran-Iraq War and Kuwait Gulf War) ramifications upon individual Gulf States and the region. Dietl extensively covered political developments, social changes, security and defence dimensions, and economic aspects in regional and global context in the midst of Kuwait Gulf crisis. On ruling families of GCC states, Michael Herb (2003) observed that the ruling families hold exclusive monopoly over Internal, Foreign, and Defence ministries ensuring their political security. Like elsewhere in Arab world, they too share the anxiety about the real intention of Islamist forces on the question of political reforms. Tom Pierre Najem and Martin Hetherington (2003) dwelled on the concept of good governance. These include the elimination of corruption, guarantees of fundamental civil and human rights. Despite their critical works on various aspects of Gulf monarchies, role of civil society vis-à-vis political activism has not been sufficiently covered.

Examining elites and society relations, Anoushiravan Ehteshami (2003) summarised that traditional Gulf elites literally bought off their population with irresistible services like expensive health care, education, subsidised housing, food, and a wide range of other important services. Thus, monarchies remained relatively autonomy from society. However, the one factor that prompted these states to embark on at least token reform was the fiscal crisis. Falling short to meet their needs, the population began to question the absence of public consultation in affairs of the state. From another perspective, AK Pasha (1999) contended that with the initiation of modernisation and development programmes from abundant oil revenues, emerged middle class demanding for political reforms. Again, the 1990s saw changes, especially Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait resulting in political disquiet at home. According to Rolin G. Mainuddin (1999), the dilemma facing the ruling Monarchies is their apprehension of losing power if at all democracy is established. At the same time, by resisting change, they also fear political upheaval. Thus, so far, their best bet has been granting limited concessions to their people.
Challenges to Democracy in Jordan and Morocco

Abdou Baklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg (1999), while stressing importance of studying Arab legislatures emphasised that since 1980s, Arab states have opened up their political systems, especially in establishing or re-emergence of parliaments as one of the major trends in Arab politics in recent years. They traced the existence of Morocco’s parliament system since 1962 and that of Jordan in 1929, which saw frequent empowering of parliament and backtracking as they struggled to establish representative political system. Likewise, Michael Herb (2004) gave comparison of Arab monarchies’ parliaments with European counterparts. Herb observed that Arab monarchies have reasonably elected parliaments with major democratic elements, except that power centre is concentrated with the monarchs. Parliaments are centrally important political institutions in these states, having scope of determining future political process towards democratisation. In Jordan and Morocco, parliaments have substantially got stronger to the extent of exerting pressure on the government’s decisions. Despite impressive political space, Herb concluded that Jordan and Morocco have stagnated in political process due to disproportionate kings’ prerogatives. Baklini, Denoeux and Springborg, and even Herb have not taken into account the people’s participation rather legislature as an institution was the major focus of their studies.

Joseph A.Kechichian (2008) brought the aspect of people’s participation in his work, when he looked at Arab monarchies in terms of power struggle and succession among the royal families, and power struggle between the monarchs and citizens. Despite existing symbols of democratic institutions in both Jordan and Morocco, reforms were inconsistent while the monarchs attempt to leverage their authority through constant amendments to constitution. According to Kechichian, in comparison to other Arab monarchies, Jordan and Morocco have high level of multi-party politics and active parliaments with better human rights and press laws. However, like Herb and Quintan Wiktorowiez (1999), he too contended that the looming large presence of Monarchs wields ultimate prerogative powers.
While Michael R. Fischbach (1999) found Jordanian political system on the positive role of embarking on democratic path, Valerie Yorkie (1988) and Julia Choucair (2006) contended that regional instability mainly emanating from Arab-Israeli conflict still restraints Jordan’s political development towards democratisation. Both Yorkie and Choucair gave special emphasis on the monarch’s role caught in between the crucial need for security considerations and pressure for internal political change. Choucair stressed that possibility of democratisation in Jordan depends largely on the ability of monarch to ensure stability and security to the kingdom, and monarchy itself for any meaningful political reforms. However, Choucair neglected the importance of civil society in democratic process, and their contribution towards kingdom’s security and stability, instead of relying on monarch for reforms.

In the edited book by Peter J.Chelkowski and Robert J.Pranger, Ideology and Power in the Middle East, Robber J.Pranger (1988) discussed in introductory chapter on the role and significance of ideology in West Asia between the regimes and various movements. According to Pranger, political activism revolves around reformist authoritarian regimes, Marxist movements, Liberal democratic forces, and Islamist movements. Peter Gubser analysed Jordan’s political system as that of pluralism with a streak of authoritarianism. Instead of challenging religious establishment, the king co-opts with them manifested in giving due importance to public observance of Islamic laws and its symbols in the kingdom. Gubser described Jordanian monarchy as a moderate regime highlighting its liberal political and socio-economic reforms.

Lucas E.Russel (2003) attributed Jordan’s political liberalisation in the 90s to the “strategy of survival” in pursuit of protecting the monarchy’s legitimacy in the face of domestic discontent over country’s economic deterioration and regional tension. However, with political liberalisation came the conflict of interests between the monarch and the opposition. Often, the reform initiatives are swiftly followed with clamp down when monarch felt threatened by opposition. Likewise, J.C Hurewitz (1982) traced the history of military interventions in West Asian politics as to the cause of authoritarian regimes and their impact on political systems. Unlike most other Arab States, where
prominent military rule became common features, in Jordan and Morocco, monarchs subtly used their respective loyal military establishments to consolidate their dynastic rule. Hurewitz's main argument revolved around security establishments, which he considered crucial factor in deriving royal authorities, neglecting other important factors like tribal loyalties, religion, and powerful elite sections.

While focusing on elections in Jordan in the 1980s, Layne (1987) analysed the factors of socio-economic, culture, and political spheres in determining the existing political system. Intelligentsia in close relation with party politics, and tribalism on the other spectrum, dominated the political structure, mostly at odd with each other. For Layne, tribalism does not inhibit the country's move towards political development, which is essentially culturally rooted in national identity. However, given the existing other population of Palestinian origins and ethnic minority groups, tribalism could be a threat to the state in the absence of pragmatic policies. Further, Khaled Hroub (2007) and Oula Farawati (2007) discussed the circumstances that could advance or impede democracy in Jordan. They pointed out that main hurdles to democracy are the conservative elements, tribalism, Islamist movements, and traditionalists resulting in weakening parliament's role and its status, while in conflict with monarch's overwhelming power. On possibility of Jordan's democratisation, Hroub stressed that efforts of continuing modernisation under young and modern monarch leadership could help to become constitutional monarchy. Besides, equal distribution of state resources, especially among the middle class that form the core segment of the society has the potential to ensure sustainable democratic process. However, Farawati observed people's disillusionment with parliament, reflecting political gap between political parties and citizens.

Writing on political power centre in Morocco, Abdeslam M. Maghraoui (2003) noted that the roles of elected government and parliament are limited to managing social and economic spheres with the constitution conferring the sovereignty upon the king. Similarly, Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou (1999) stressed that with liberal and leftist forces against the Islamists, the king plays an arbiter role, transcending political actors giving him clear political advantage. According to Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley
(2006), despite Morocco’s significant reforms – encompassing wider political participation, improved human rights conditions, redressal of past injustices, economic reforms, and measures to curb corruptions, they contended that powerful monarchy still needed to concede state power to the representative body. While commenting on recent Moroccan parliamentary elections, Amr Hamzawy (2007) stressed that people’s disenchantment with country’s political reforms led to low participation in the electoral process. Hamzawy observed that inability of the parliament to play influential role vis-à-vis palace is impeding the move towards sustainable democratic transition.

In the edited book by John P. Entelis (1997), Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, various authors have analysed political situation in Maghreb since the 1980s, as the region passed through phases of modernisation buttressed with uneven political reforms. In John O. Voll’s opinion, Maghreb regimes are facing problem of legitimacy with Islamists leading the anti-incumbent regimes, while Dale F. Eickelman stressed that the trend is reflected in Islamist movements manifested in both moderates and radical organizations. In turn, the regimes see their assertiveness as a challenge to established political system. John P. Entelis and Mark Tessler attributed the rise and influence of political Islam in Morocco to citizen’s disenchantment with socio-economic crisis, particularly poverty and unemployment problems. Clement M. Henry stressed on the economic reforms vis-à-vis political reforms. He contended that although economic reforms hardly have any direct impact on political reforms, economic liberalisation has altered the political game. The regimes use economic incentives to cushion dissent against their legitimacy through strategic network patronage.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (1997) had taken a comparative study of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in relation to Islamist movements in Maghreb and responses of the respective regimes. Morocco has the distinction of a king wielding both temporal and spiritual authority with liberal economy and liberalised political system as a modernised state. According to Maddy-Weitzman, Islam as religion and culture is deeply rooted in the country but political Islam, as an opposition movement clashes with the monarch. Michael McFaul and Tamara Cofman Wittes (2008) argued that contrary to the popular
conventional belief in the Arab world, that given free and fair elections, Islamists would sweep to power and pursue anti-democratic political process did not quite happen in Morocco’s recent elections. McFaul and Wittes asserted that not all Islamists are same and that political environment plays a major role in each state. In Morocco, despite Islamists’ continuing strong performance at the polls, citizens did not give clear mandate to Islamists - Justice and Development Party (PJD) even under free and fair elections. Another significant factor was the effective curb placed on PJD to form or be a part of government at the whims of the palace in close ties with secular parties. McFaul and Wittes contended that the regime could be compromising democratic legitimacy while securing its own interests.

Going through the survey of available literature on this study, there has not been any comparative study done on political systems of Jordan and Morocco. Further, comprehensive study on state-civil society relations and cause/s for the absence of meaningful representative political system in two countries is lacking. In view of the identified gaps in existing literature pertaining to Jordan and Morocco, this study will attempt to give an in-depth comparative study on the nature of political systems in Jordan and Morocco and the problems facing them towards democratisation.

**Rationale of the Study**

Jordan and Morocco give an interesting study of political systems among Arab monarchies. Despite having relatively free, open and modernised societies, both countries are struggling to build firm democratic roots. Notwithstanding monarchs’ interest in preserving their dynastic rule, their attempts and efforts at political reforms have been constraint by various factors. The powerful elites in both countries have dampened democratic process. In this context, the roles of political parties, civil society and the palace become crucial in understanding the underlying issues. This will further lead to examine how far the two monarchies have initiated political reforms towards plural participation. The purpose of this study arises from the fact that political systems in Jordan and Morocco are rarely studied, especially state-civil society relations. Moreover,
there has been no comparative study of these two countries. Furthermore, unlike other Arab monarchies, the political processes in Jordan and Morocco are relatively advanced and both countries face similar challenges towards democratisation.

Research Questions

1. Do Jordan and Morocco have prospect for sustainable democracy?
2. What are the prospects and implications of Islamist movements vis-à-vis democratic process in Jordan and Morocco?
3. How important is regional political environment to internal political process of Jordan and Morocco?

Hypotheses

In view of these research problems, this study will examine the following hypotheses:
1. Modernisation process will gradually pave way for democratisation in Jordan and Morocco.
2. Strong civil society can play influential role in democratic transitions in Jordan and Morocco.
3. Islamist movements contribute towards the struggle for democracy in Jordan and Morocco.
4. Regional political environment affects democratic process in Jordan and Morocco.

Research Methodology

This study is essentially premised on the question of elusive democratic process in Arab monarchies vis-à-vis Jordan and Morocco. It seeks to study the underlying causes responsible for these monarchies’ inability to move towards sustainable democracy. On conceptual framework, the study will examine Political Development and Modernisation concepts vis-à-vis Arabs political systems in terms of social, political culture and religion, which had considerable impact on the political development in these countries.
This study in essence is descriptive in nature premised on historical basis deriving from both primary and secondary sources. The primary source will mainly include the governments' declarations, documents and other relevant international treaties. Historical and current writings from relevant books, Journals, Newspapers, and Internet sources will form major literature of secondary sources.

Limitations of the Study

In an effort to study the political systems of Jordan and Morocco from comparative perspectives, keeping the main theme focused on Monarchies and political parties in the process towards democratisation, the aspect of socio-economic issues and the roles of the political actors on such issues have only limited mentions in the study. In the modern political systems, given the ever-growing importance of economic role, further study on economic relevance and its impact on social mobility in relation to political developments in both countries are necessary to understand more about the causes and effects of the political reforms processes.

While focusing on the role of the Islamist movements as the main oppositions in Jordan and Morocco limited to the period since the 1990s, sufficient study on the roles of other opposition parties has not been devoted equal space. It is important to mention that before the emergence of Islamist political parties, the leftists and Arab nationalists dominated the political scene as main opposition forces for several decades in both the countries. Since the establishment of the states, oppositions had tried to wrest powers from the palace that saw assassinations and violent attempted coups by civil and military forces against the monarchs. In response, the ruling regimes unleashed reprisals to contain and tame the oppositions. Thus, more analyses on the role of the opposition forces before the 1990s to the present scenario would serve better understanding of the political processes. The issues of ethnic and religious minorities, their political affiliations and their roles are also not covered in the study partly due to want of time factor and additional sources. Moreover, Western Sahara and Palestinian issues have seen only limited description in the study. Analytical studies on these issues demand separate study vis-à-vis political
reforms and their relations with the monarchies while also assessing these issues in the context of regional politics.

The scope of this study is also limited by the absence of field study, which has also affected the analytical research. Except for the availability of some primary sources in the form of governments' documents and text, the study has relied mostly on the secondary sources that have put constraint on independent view of the intended study.

Overall, despite mentioned limitations and scope for improvements abound, the study has attempted to do justice to the proposed topic based on varied sources from old literature and recent sources in relation to the political progress in Jordan and Morocco.

**Organisation of the Chapters**

The study will comprise of four chapters directly dealing with the topic besides introduction and conclusion.

**Chapter One: Introduction**

This chapter presents a brief historical background, the problem of the study and the framework of the study encompassing rationale of the study, research questions, hypotheses, literature survey and introduction to Chapters framework.

**Chapter Two: A Brief Overview of Political Systems**

In this chapter, a brief account of political systems of Jordan and Morocco comes into focus. Constitutional provisions and structures of governments of each country is discussed in the chapter. In view of the developing political process in Jordan and Morocco, the chapter looks into relevant theoretical approach, particularly Political Development and Modernisation concepts vis-à-vis democratic process in these countries.
Chapter Three: Palace, Political Parties and Democracy

This chapter covers the period since 1990s in the aftermath of the political liberalisation process. As compared to previous decades, important political reforms were initiated during this period beginning with King Hussein and King Hassan in their respective countries. Despite being constitutional monarchies, the executive powers of the Kings are overarching. In this backdrop, it examines the comparative powers and influence of the Kings. Various measures of political reforms initiated by the palace are also taken into account. The chapter also discusses dynamics of power scramble between palace and political parties, and among various political forces in the two countries. The roles of political parties as opposition, especially Islamist parties are discussed through their participation in parliamentary elections and the issues they raise.

Chapter Four: State-Civil Society Relations and Democracy

In this chapter, a comparative concepts and significance, and role of the civil society towards democratic process are highlighted in the first part. The chapter examines the existing civil societies in Jordan and Morocco, and their activities in relation to the government. Despite reforms, civil societies face various hurdles due to numerous legislations targeted to curb their activism. Hence, the chapter also dwells on the reforms process in the context of state-civil society relations and their possible influence upon government policies. Finally, it focuses on the popular emerging trend of moderate Islamist movements and their role as political organizations and as civil society groups in their struggle for representative political system. Islamists have successfully gained influence in most of the civil society organisations. In their quest to gain political legitimacy, the Islamist movements have proliferated in the spheres of both charity services and politics.
Chapter Five: External Impact: Challenges and Prospects of Democracy

This chapter examines international dimension such as, the United States and the European Union in their efforts to promote democracy in Jordan and Morocco. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the US and the EU have increasingly become concerned with their strategic and geopolitics interests in the WANA region. Further, it explores implications and prospects of democracy in the two countries given the precarious nature of the regional political environment. Apart from maintaining balancing act towards the ruling regimes, the external donors also face expectations and challenges from civil society, Islamists movements and the public in general. From domestic spectrum, it also examines the pressure to democratise and resistance from within the society in response to the external democracy promoters.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

The last chapter in conclusion will summarise the overall findings of the study.