Chapter Five
External Impact: Challenges and Prospects of Democracy

Nature of Democracy Promotion

The increasing number of democracies in the world is a distinctive feature of the contemporary era and a major component of the political dimension of globalization understood in its broadest sense. According to Peter Burnell, the idea of promoting democracy has an "active and a passive sense". The active sense would mean direct approach with deliberate actions undertaken with a view to achieving a democratic purpose. There is intentionality. The passive sense or indirect approach includes the kind of democracy that is emerging and whether the trends are being influenced by external forces and international events. Democratic impulses could come about in a country as the by-product of its international and trans-national dealings. The instruments/methods that are employed in promoting democracy directly can be placed along a continuum running from soft power to hard power. In coercive terms, it includes diplomatic pressure especially negative conditionalities that embody threats in the event of non-compliance, sanctions, and covert and overt military intervention. Democracy assistance as in the form of soft power is usually consensual. It comprises grant-aided support that can take the form of technical, material, and financial assistance to pro-democracy initiatives. (Burnell, 2008: 626-627).

However, as emphasized by Anne-Marie Le Gloannec and Jacques Rupnik, democratization involves costs and benefits in the form of economic, political and social costs to the countries where democratization is taking place. Reforms have to be carried
out, the country may suffer from temporary disruptions, cards are reshuffled between winners and losers – and if democratization fails or suffers setbacks, the overall losses can be severe and lasting. Democratization may also entail costs, economically and politically for those countries which foster a democratization process from the outside, whether they trigger it or they support an indigenous democratization process (Le Gloannec and Rupnik, 2008: 51). All regimes that claim to be democratic have interest in having other regimes adopt similar rules and ideals even if they have done little to promote or protect such an outcome explicitly, and have, frequently, supported autocratic regimes when it suited their national interests. In virtually every case, the former imperial power was itself a more or less successfully established democracy and sought to transfer its institutions to newly independent former colonies. Most of the transplanted institutions failed to take root, and many were rejected on the grounds that they were anti-thetic to cultural norms and popular aspirations (Schmitter, 2008: 26-27).

In essence, the United Nations is the only truly multilateral organization that is prominent in international democracy promotion. The UN’s contribution ranges from broad statements of support for democratic values to a considerable practical experience in helping to stage, monitor, and observe elections, especially in newly independent states. However, the variety of available methods or approaches to democracy promotion that range from democracy assistance – soft power and all the way to attempts to impose democracy by force, suggest that governmental and intergovernmental democracy promoters in particular face major questions of strategy. Democracy promotion is not a license to do anything in the name of advancing the cause. There are, at least in principle, constraints in international law. Not even the UN is legally entitled to try to impose democracy by force (Burnell, 2008: 632-638).

A more systematic commitment to promote democratization emerged in the policy statements of Western governments in the early 1990s. Numerous policy statements and documents, applying to regions and countries across the world, enshrined this commitment, and references to democracy and human rights became ubiquitous. ‘Democratic enlargement’ emerged as the overarching leitmotif of the U.S foreign policy,
while a commitment to spreading democratic norms was formalized as a priority objective of the European Union's new common foreign and security policy. From an erstwhile set of concerns largely limited to the micro-level conditions of social development and humanitarian relief, international NGOs based in the West came to embrace more politically oriented advocacy. The emergence of an apparently more political role on the part of international investors/multinational corporations expressed itself most notably in the increasing prominence of the "Corporate Social Responsibility" agenda. In sum, western governments, multinational corporations and international NGOs adopted positions and perspectives that claimed greater concern for the nature of political structures within developing and newly industrialized states (Youngs, 2004: 2-4). Thus, alliances, trade pacts, and economic assistance are offered as means to encourage political liberalization or foster democratic consolidation. More generally the changes of 1989-1991 have created a new international environment more conducive for democratization, and for numerous efforts to establish democratic systems throughout parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Kubicek, 2003: 1).

This chapter dwells on democracy promotion in Jordan and Morocco through various agencies and programmes promoted by the United States and European Union. The historical experience of democracy promotion of the US has been different from that of the European Union. While the US boasts of a long tradition based on a "liberal grand strategy" of democracy promotion, Europeans have no such tradition. Nevertheless, both share the Democratic Peace thesis as an important influence on democracy promotion. Enhanced coordination on the strategic, political, policy and even operational levels might be possible despite their major reservations about the use of force (Kohring, 2007: 5).

**The United States**

For the US, democracy promotion and of a democratic peace are recurrent themes in its foreign policy rhetoric, explicitly mentioned in the US National Security Strategy (NSS) (Kohring, 2007: 6). The Democratic Peace thesis rests on the notion that democratic
states do not go to war with each other but their approach can be aggressive towards non-liberal states (Russett, 1993:11). Hence, to ensure peaceful relations among states, the Democratic Peace thesis advocates the spread of liberal democratic institutions such as multiparty democracy, free trade and human rights as the best prescription for international peace (Brown et al, 1996: xiii). From the beginning, the use of force in the name of democracy promotion was seen as a valid option in the US strategy as illustrated by the Monroe Doctrine 1823. The Doctrine provided the conceptual basis of democracy promotion in Central and Latin America to keep the European imperial powers away from the continent of the Americas. The notion of defending democracy set the foundation for future US democracy promotion. The offensive variant of the Monroe Doctrine is the 1904 Roosevelt doctrine. It attempted to justify US intervention in Central and Latin America on the grounds of mismanagement (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 336-337).

In recent years, George W. Bush adopted a more military-minded concept in the form of pre-emptive attacks by democratic states against anticipated threats from non-democracies (Russett, 1993: 32). Bush Doctrine of preventive war and regime change were incorporated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 (The White House, 2002). The Bush Doctrine includes the possibility of the use of military force against non-democracies as part of the Democratic Peace thesis and thus formed a part of Bush’s concept of democracy promotion (Kohring, 2007: 9).

**The European Union**

In the European tradition, concept of democracy and its association with peace existed mainly in the sphere of ideas. Unlike in the case of the US, it did not enter their doctrinal and practical policy dimensions. In Europe, it was rather the opposite, that of spreading colonialism and authoritarianism, which dominated European history up to the 20th century despite the European enlightenment. The emergence of the European Union (EU) as a unifying organisation in Europe based on integration and multilateral cooperation brought the concept of democracy promotion. Both the EU Treaty (TEU) and the EC
Treaty (TEC) underline the EU’s fundamental attachment to the principle of democracy and its consolidation worldwide, relating it to good governance, rule of law, protection of human rights and strengthening the global order (Kohring, 2007: 9-10). In the European context, the preservation of global order is endorsed most notably in the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order” (European Security Strategy, 2003: 16).

The acknowledgement of a connection between democracy and peace is seen in the EU’s notion of “structural stability”, which tries to address the root causes of conflict. The EU places democracy as one of the characteristics of “structural stability” along with sustainable economic development, respect for human rights, viable political structures, healthy environmental and social conditions, and the capacity to manage change without resort to conflict (European Commission, 2001: 10). In the EU context, the concept of democratic peace is firmly embedded within the EU’s conflict prevention strategy and the use of force to promote democracy is not foreseen. The Commission document envisages a very limited role for military instruments (Kohring, 2007: 11-12).

**Democracy Promotion Policies**

It is noteworthy that neither the US, despite its long democracy promotion tradition, nor the EU have unified, coherent democracy promotion strategies and actors. The US governmental actors include the White House, State Department and US Embassies, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Pentagon, Treasury Department, and the Congress. The National Endowment for Democracy is a semi-governmental democracy promotion actor, whereas the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace operates more as a non-governmental democracy promotion actor. The situation is similar for the EU as well. However, for practical purposes, there is an EC/EU Strategy for Democracy Promotion that derives from various sources such as the
EU and EC Treaties. An unofficial paper on the EU approach to democracy promotion has been floating around in the EU institutions since 2006, which stresses that democracy should be regarded as a long-term, locally driven process (Kohring, 2007: 13-14).

Although both the US and EU lack comprehensive democracy promotion strategies, they have moulded different democracy promotion instruments that can be clearly identified. These instruments include political dialogue and diplomatic measures; multilateral initiatives; economic and financial incentives; conditionalities and sanctions; military mobilisation and intervention; and democracy aid programmes (Kohring, 2007: 14).

**Political Dialogue and Diplomatic Measures**

The US emphasises a strong pro-democratic rhetoric that creates high expectations both within the US and on the part of the partner. Such democracy rhetoric has had negative consequences for the US political dialogue in most cases, as expectations have not been fulfilled. Another tenet of the US democracy promotion is the association of democracy with a particular leader. This approach puts persons before structures and institutions unlike the EU that emphasises structural stability and long-term capacity, and institution-building (Kohring, 2007: 15). The EU-US efforts to coordinate the political dialogue with countries in democratic transition have been intensified in recent years (The White House, 2007). However, their cooperation on democracy promotion in particular circumstances can have a detrimental effect. The US democracy promotion policy is often accused of double standards. The US at times tends to support regimes that cooperate on counterterrorism despite their bad record on democracy. The US democracy promotion is embedded within a strong geo-strategic dynamic as compared to the more prominent development-based logic of the European approaches (Youngs, 2001: 176).

Nevertheless, most of the recent democracy promotion initiatives in multilateral forum have been successful when there is the US-EU coordination. The two parties have collaborated successfully on priorities for the Human Rights Council. The US-EU coordination was pivotal in the creation of the UN Democracy Fund that gives grants
mostly to pro-democracy civil society organisations around the world (US Department of State, 2007). A further example of the US-EU democracy promotion cooperation in multilateral initiatives is the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) launched by the G-8. It is a multilateral development and reform plan aimed at fostering economic and political liberalisation in Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries (Kohring, 2007: 17).

**Economic and Financial Incentives, Conditionalities and Sanctions**

In the 1990s, the EU introduced a standard human rights and democracy clause into its treaties with third countries as a means to facilitate the application of political conditionality in its external relations. Trade and cooperation agreements, aid, association agreements and finally EU membership were made conditional on criteria such as the adherence to democratic standards, human rights and the rule of law (Smith, 1994: 84). In cases of alleged violations against the conditions, the EU normally initiates a complicated consultation procedure. On the contrary, the US has been more willing to suspend democracy aid to uncooperative third countries altogether. The US is seen as more capable of quick responses to disruptions in democratic transition countries, whereas the EU is more attuned to assisting the conditions of political reform over a longer period of time (Youngs, 2001: 52). Moreover, the US does not hesitate from imposing unilateral measures if it sees the peaceful transition to a representative democracy threatened. For instance, unilateral sanctions against Cuba based on the Helms-Burton Act (Kohring, 2007: 17).

**Military Force**

Possibly the most controversial topic on the democracy promotion agenda is whether the use of force can be employed to promote democracy. From the EU’s perspective, democracy cannot be imposed but has to be built from within. When President George W. Bush placed democracy promotion at the centre of his agenda in 2005, much of the European community saw US policy as a repackaged commitment to the unilateral use of
force as well as justification for a war and occupation that were not going as smoothly as expected (Kopstein, 2006: 85). It was increasingly felt that any additional unilateral attempts to democratise any region, especially West Asia, through force could lead to more damaging breakdowns in the solidarity required for transatlantic co-operation in democracy promotion (Whitehead, 2004). Even though democracy promotion is usually not the only reason for US military intervention as in the case of Iraq, the US has advocated the use of force before. The case of US attempts to galvanise UN support for the intervention to restore democracy in Haiti is a glaring example (Youngs, 2001: 49).

The EU, on the other hand, prefers civilian to coercive military measures to protect human rights and democracy. However, the EU could involve the use of civilian and military mobilisation in a pre-crisis situation as part of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy (European Commission, 2001: 23).

**Democracy Aid Programmes**

Democracy aid is designed to foster a democratic opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening (Carothers, 1999: 6). Assistance is typically directed towards elections, political parties, constitutions, judiciaries, police, legislatures, local government, militaries, non-governmental civic advocacy groups, civic education organisations, trade unions and media organisations. The enlargement process is the first and the oldest indirect democracy promotion tool of the EU. At the Copenhagen European Council meeting in June 1993, the “Copenhagen criteria” was formulated, including the requirement that the candidate country for membership in the EU must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (European Commission, 2010).

While the EU has adopted a regional, multilateral focus for democracy assistance projects, the US, on the other hand, often stepped outside the confines of regional organizations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) to adopt unilateral measures. Whereas the EU concentrates on local ownership in its democracy aid
programmes, the US often supports high profile initiatives which are sometimes insensitive to local conditions using replica features of American democracy (strong checks and balances, two moderate parties, privately owned media and decentralised union bargaining) as the model for democracy (Youngs, 2001: 49-51). Both the US and EU have set up institutional mechanisms to coordinate their respective democracy aid efforts more effectively. Within the European Commission, the Europe Aid Cooperation Office was set up in 2001 to coordinate the EU’s external aid programmes, with the unit on Governance, Democracy, Human Rights and Gender dealing specifically with democracy promotion issues. As for the US, an Interagency Working Group on Democracy was set by President Bill Clinton to coordinate different elements of democracy-related strategy in the State Department and USAID. The USAID has also developed a sub-office for Democracy and Governance (Youngs, 2001: 46).

The USAID started its intensive democracy assistance programme in Central and Latin America in the 1980s, initially as part of the Reagan Administration’s support for anti-communist regimes, but then more generally to foster the democratic transition in the countries of the region. This included sponsoring electoral assistance and rule-of-law aid. By the end of the 1980s, USAID had expanded its democratic aid programmes to the rest of the world (Carothers, 1999: 184-185). Political foundations and various NGOs are also active democracy promotion actors in the US. In 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created as a governmentally funded but privately operated organisation devoted to democracy promotion (Scott and Steele, 2005: 441).

The ENP offers a set of neighbouring countries from Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean a ‘stake’ in the EU’s single market and closer cooperation on other EU programmes in return for democratic reforms (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). New financial support is available through a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which adds new impetus to the democracy assistance agenda. The European Parliament took the initiative in 1991 to propose a separate “democracy line” of support in the EU budget to finance a new European Fund for the promotion of civil society and democratisation. More recently, the Parliament used its budgetary powers to implement
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), a special budget for civil society projects. The EIDHR is part of the thematic projects of the Europe Aid Cooperation Office (Kohring, 2007: 20-21). Despite encouraging signs of cooperation, the EU remains reluctant to join projects on the operational level given the perceived US agenda with a focus on short-term regime change and imposing democracy from above. Instead, the EU approach stresses rather the holistic nature of democracy promotion in concurrence with the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and good governance (Council of the EU, 2006).

The United States has a history of imposing democracy by control, though it has also supported and still supports, mainly through its NGOs. The European Union has mostly fostered democracy through extension. Enlargement has proven to be one of the most powerful instruments in the hands of the EU. This tool has influenced the internal dynamics of the fledgling democracies that wanted to join the EU. It has helped reshape the European continent and changed its geopolitical dynamics. It has certainly turned out to be the most effective foreign policy the EU has ever pursued. Yet, it has been intrusive in democratizing countries in so far as it has imposed a number of conditions for them to join the EU while it has changed its own makeup by opening its market and its decision-making organization to the newcomers (Le Gloannec and Rupnik, 2008: 52). In West Asia and North Africa (WANA), the U.S government has spent more than a half century promoting economic, social, and political development in the region while Europe’s engagement dates back far longer. It did not take the events of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to persuade either side that promoting reforms were in their interests. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration had a halting approach to promoting reform. Much of its regional agenda was focused on promoting Arab-Israeli peace, which squeezed out parallel reform efforts that might have antagonized necessary allies in that task. Europe was more deeply engaged on reform issues, not so much out of altruism but out of a growing fear that unimpeded migration from a dysfunctional West Asia and North Africa would bring new political and economic pressures on European societies. The overwhelming desire was to heal the problems of the region so that those problems would stay in the region, and be out of Europe. The threat of terrorism reminded leaders on both
sides of the Atlantic that reform in WANA was not merely an interest but it was an imperative (Malka and Alterman, 2006: 23).

The US regards itself as the main security guarantor of the region and underlines the importance of the military action both as an instrument of pre-emptive action and as a means employed during crisis. However, the EU emphasizes promotion of rule-based societies and institution and development of policies seeking to avoid more serious problems in the future as a major instrument of pre-emptive action. The US tends to cite the democratic deficits of governments that oppose western interests in the region and threaten them with punitive measures, sanctions and even the possibility of an externally imposed regime change, whereas European policymakers likely try to support reform-minded forces within the countries in questions and nudge existing regimes toward the path to reform through dialogue, material support and reforms of conditionality. The EU believes that democratic change and economic modernization must be driven from within the Arab societies themselves and these values cannot be imposed on these societies without any base in their home countries. Similarly, it is underlined that democratization and human development in the region must spring from indigenous roots (Bal, 2009: 106-107). In its influence on the developing world, the EU clearly prefers the approach of using soft power (through persuasion) rather than the hard power approach of relying on military force, as the United States has tended to do (Mold, 2007: 238).

The US and the EU both have a major stake in promoting democracy and good governance in the European neighbourhood. They observe that democratic countries are likely to be more stable, friendlier towards the West, and more effective partners in efforts to combat terrorism. They are also more likely to be reliable sources and transit routes for energy, if for no other reason than democracies tend to be market-oriented economies. Despite having overlapping interests, the US and the EU face very different realities in dealing with the European neighbourhood. For the US, the European neighbourhood is geographically distant and with the exception of Persian Gulf oil and close ties to Israel, its level of economic, social, and political interdependence with the European neighbourhood area is relatively low. For the EU, however, reality is quite
different. The key factor is geography\textsuperscript{21}. With geographical proximity to the Southern Mediterranean and West Asia, the European countries are the most directly affected by security threats emanating from the region. Geographical proximity makes the EU much more vulnerable to the negative spill over effects of instability in the region, such as increased illegal immigration. Thus, while the US pursues narrow geopolitical and security objectives in the region, the EU is engaged in a long-term project of "community-building (Baun, 2006: 4-16).

Among the numerous foreign policy challenges President Barack Obama inherited from his predecessor, re-establishing a credible and effective US approach to promoting democracy abroad is one of the most profound. They are not just confronting the challenge of how to recover from the damage to the legitimacy of the US democracy promotion inflicted during the presidency of George W. Bush. They are also grappling with a basic question that emerged on the US policy at the end of the Cold War and remains a source of debate (Carothers, 2009: 3).

The United States seems to implicitly recognize that the European Union’s approach to democratization in WANA has had much greater potential for success as it was based on both long-term positive engagement with regimes in the region through multilateral frameworks and on the development and growth of an independent civil society. The US efforts to strengthen its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the launch of the Broader Middle East Initiative (BMEI) can be understood in this context, although they have so far failed to deliver (Cavatorta, 2009: 27-28). Still, promoting democracy in the Arab world remains an imperative for the United States. This is the case not merely or even mainly because democracy might act as an antidote to the spread of Islamist terrorism but because enduring American interests in the region require US to advance democracy for Arab citizens. America’s fundamental interests in the Middle East remain

\textsuperscript{21} The Mediterranean region is divided into two sub-regional groups: the Northern Mediterranean, on the one hand, and the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean on the other. The Northern Mediterranean includes Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. The Eastern and Southern Mediterranean includes the Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority) and the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) (Pieters, 2006: 392).
largely unchanged, despite the dramatic threats revealed by the attacks of September 11, 2001, and despite the massive, costly, and long-term intervention in Iraq (Wittes, 2008: 2).

**United States and European Union Programmes in the WANA Region**

The US foreign policy took a conscious shift in the late 1970s and early 1980s towards a strategy based upon democracy promotion. Rather than solely providing military, economic and political support to unpopular military and authoritarian regimes, the US government moved towards attempting to influence and control social and political mobilization from below. Key to this strategy is the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), established in 1983 and funded by the US State Department through organizations such as USAID. NED, in turn, supports other democracy promotion organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), linked to Democratic and Republican Parties respectively and bodies such as the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and the Solidarity Centre. A host of other private corporations and NGOs are also involved. A group of US, EU and other financial institutions are then writing new policies for these regimes, and, in the process, institutionalising a separation of economic decision-making from accountable political structures. They are also closely tied to institutions of international capital such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Hanieh, 2006).

For almost half a century, the USAID has been the principal US government agency providing assistance to countries recovering from disaster or attempting to escape poverty. Since the end of the Cold War it has taken on additional functions, including promotion of human rights, democracy, and conflict management. The USAID is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Over the decades, its degree of independence from the State Department has come even more formally under the State wing. The USAID was mandated to use foreign policy assistance to support the development of free and fair elections, rule of law, civil society, human rights, women’s rights, free media, and
religious freedom (Smith, 2010: 131-132). The USAID organizes assistance in four categories: Rule of law, Governance, Civil Society, Elections and political processes (Carothers, 2009: 13). No country has had a greater impact on global democratization, for better or for worse, than the United States during the twentieth century. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the involvement of the US in democracy promotion has received such great attention, along with a considerable degree of scepticism and suspicion. Unfortunately, the subordination of US democratic ideals to geopolitical concerns during the Cold War, combined with the tendency to impose its own democratic model on foreign countries, fuelled ideological polarization within many developing countries and left a legacy of mistrust and resentment that has yet to be overcome more than a decade after the end of the Cold War (Hook, 2002: 109).

Indeed, the very foundations of the US democracy promotion have come into question since September 11, 2001. In the U.S, small-scale plans to increase democratization efforts in West Asia were under way even before September 11. For the most part this task was left to the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, which allocated modest sums to West Asia through the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF). After the September 2001 attack, the context changed completely. It became an issue for the Secretary of State and for the president himself. Thus, the Bush administration made its first mark by launching the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in December 2002. It was an opening foray into the realm of democracy promotion in the WANA region. The State Department structured its MEPI as a bottom-up mechanism to fund and strengthen civil society groups in the region. The MEPI’s core areas of action include political, economic, and educational reform as well as women’s empowerment. The MEPI’s operations and funding channels are adapted to specific countries on the basis of the host’s sensitivities. In Morocco, where the MEPI has its largest programme, the US can directly fund projects with less government interference. During fiscal years 2002 through 2005, the US Congress appropriated almost US$300
million to MEPI, which used the money to organize more than 350 programmes in 15 countries of WANA\textsuperscript{22} (Malka and Alterman, 2006: 23-25).

The MEPI sought to effect change by funding pilot projects, such as an election assistance program in Jordan. The willingness of Arab governments to allow such funding in their countries signalled a tangible readiness to permit the advance of their democracies. The focus shifted from traditional government-to-government aid programs to emphasize smaller grants to smaller NGOs. For example, it brought student leaders from countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia to Purdue University, Notre Dame University, George Washington University, and the University of Delaware. It also supported parliamentary training in Morocco for members of as the country progressed towards political reforms (Craner, 2006).

The European leaders historically have dreamed of transforming Europe into a unified political actor that has a common political system and foreign policy. This was officially launched by six European countries in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to today's European Union and it was gradually strengthened during the second half of the twentieth century. It was not until the end of the Cold War that democracy promotion became an explicit goal of the EU foreign policy. As early as 1991, the EU members adopted a resolution unequivocally stating that the transition to democracy would be one of the conditions for receiving the EU foreign assistance (Olsen, 2002: 131). The EU now comprises of a much more diversified heterogeneous grouping of 27 member states with the most recent enlargements in 2004 and 2007 (Mold and Page, 2007: 11). The EU today is one of the most unusual and widest-ranging political actors in the international system. Since the 1950s, this capacity has gradually expanded to encompass foreign policy initiatives toward nearly every corner of the globe, using a range of foreign policy tools: diplomatic, economic, and now limited military operations (Ginsberg and Smith, 2007: 267).

\textsuperscript{22} The MEPI areas of operation are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen.
Although the 1991 democracy promotion policy reflected Europe's preoccupation with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, it laid the groundwork for putting democracy and human rights in a broader context and this new approach was soon adopted toward the Arab states of the Mediterranean. Established in November 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process, was intended to be Europe's answer to growing concerns about instability on its southern flank. The Europe's desire for a role in the Middle East peace process inaugurated by the 1991 Madrid Conference also played a role in the creation of the EMP. The EMP provides a framework for cooperation between the EU members and their twelve Mediterranean partners on broad multilateral aspects. The Association Agreements (AA) serves as the European Union's principal instrument for promoting democratic change in the Arab world. When signing association agreements, the Mediterranean partners have been obliged to endorse the human rights clause, which stipulates a commitment to democratic reform. A political reform/human rights subcommittee has been established with Morocco, a first for any of Europe's partners, Arabs and non-Arabs alike, providing an opportunity to engage on these issues at the working level with even greater regularity and seriousness. Human rights, women's empowerment, and press freedom projects constitute the majority of political funding. Judicial reform stands as another prominent focus. Only a small number of projects have been aimed at institutional reform, and the European Union has resisted funding parliaments, political parties, or trade unions directly (Yacoubian, 2004: 3-5).

Despite the amount of material resources and political capital invested in the partnership, the Barcelona process has failed to deliver when it comes to democratization, protection of human rights and good governance (Cavatorta, 2009: 28). The MEPI of the US resembles the Barcelona Process in many respects. The MEPI can be regarded as geographically more extensive, but less extensively funded and a more bilaterally inclined version of the Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The MEPI aims to promote political, economical, and educational reforms, women's rights, and supports activities of civil society (Bal, 2009: 108-109). Since 2002, the European Union
has struggled to formulate a coherent strategy for the "wider Europe", then including several countries that subsequently became neighbours of the enlarged community. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) emerged out of the dilemma over membership that faced the EU, offering an uneasy and varied mix of proposals and plans for closer cooperation with a very diverse group of countries (Parmentier, 2008: 103).

In recent years, the EU has endeavoured to become a strategic actor in its own geographic neighbourhood. This ambition was most clearly announced in the first-ever European Security Strategy that was approved by EU leaders in December 2003, which declared "Building Security in our Neighbourhood" to be one of the main strategic objectives of the EU. The main instrument for achieving this goal is the ENP, which offers neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, Northern Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean the prospect of closer ties with the EU if they make political and economic reforms that conform to EU standards and cooperate in resolving pressing foreign policy problems. To date, the record of US-EU cooperation in the European neighbourhood is mixed. Brussels and Washington have increasingly coordinated their efforts to promote democratic change in Eastern Europe and resolve the troublesome "frozen conflicts" in Moldova and the South Caucasus. In the Mediterranean and broader West Asia, however, cooperation has been more problematic and the divergence of policy views more pronounced (Baun, 2006: 1).

**Democracy Promotion in Jordan**

Throughout the course of the second half of the 20th century, the Arab regimes proved themselves to be stable. Indeed for the better part of five decades, the United States officials believed that the non-democratic leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Qatar, Bahrain and others were good partners in helping protect America's vital interests in West Asia. The America's overarching strategy in the Arab world sought to work with friendly leaders in the region, regardless of the character of these regimes, to ensure the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, confront rogue regimes, help protect Israel's security, and during the Cold War, contain the Soviet Union. Despite intermittent setbacks this strategy achieved its primary goals (Cook, 2008: 71).
Political reform in Jordan remains well overdue was the conclusion in the “2009 Emerging Leaders for Democracy conference”, held in Amman on October 8-9, organised by the Project on Middle East Democracy. However, the more interesting discussion was over the question of whether foreign powers like the United States, which gave Jordan nearly US$1 billion in aid in 2008, could have any positive influence on Jordan’s political reform process. Musa Al Ma’ita, Jordan’s Minister of Political Development while highlighting Jordan’s progress in terms of holding parliamentary elections and empowering women admitted that political reform had not proceeded far enough. Others argued that despite presence of political reformers in Jordan, they do not get positive response from the government. Issues like the failure to follow up on the National Agenda recommendations ranked high in the discussion. On the question of whether foreign influence could ever be positive for democracy, many believed that the US engagement with the region in the past had been extremely self-interested, and more concerned with security than with democratisation (Seeley, 2009).

It reflects how the US programmes have so far worked in the region. Along with the MEPI, since September 11, 2001, the USAID has increased its focus on governance, reflecting the shift toward democracy promotion at the expense of traditional development and poverty relief. Examples of the USAID programmes include four governance projects in Jordan, which focus on judicial reform, increased transparency, and accountability in the legislature, and a more active civil society with an allocation of approximately US$21 million (Malka and Alterman, 2006: 26-27).

The USAID programmes in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance. In the democracy sector, the US assistance supports capacity building programmes for the parliament’s support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) receive US grants to train among other groups, some Jordanian political parties (Sharp, 2009: 20). Jordan’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab
sources. The US support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States. However, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from Saddam Hussein (Sharp, 2009: 2).

The US is well aware of Jordan’s poor record on civil rights and political freedoms, when Jordan also became eligible to receive US funding through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 34-35). The MCC grant would broaden public participation in political and electoral processes in Jordan, as well as increase government transparency and accountability. The programme would supplement an initiative in Jordan designed to improve public administration, civil liberties, infrastructure and the economy. The MCC is a US government corporation that supports countries which promote democracy, economic freedom and govern well in other ways (The Jerusalem Post, 2010). The USAID programmes in Jordan are designed in partnership with the Government of Jordan, the private sector and NGOs and the current programmes focus on five aspects: Water Resources Management, Increased Economic Opportunities, Improved Health, Improved Education and Life Skills and finally Improved Governance and Civic Participation (The Star, 2009).

In September 2007, the U.S House of Representatives commended Jordan for holding parliamentary and municipal council elections and for bringing about political reforms. Further, the US lauded King Abdullah II for emphasizing on the importance of building a thriving civil society and placing greater emphasis on the rights of women to vote and run for public office in the kingdom (House of Representatives, 2007). The U.S democracy assistance to Jordan has focused more on female participation in politics. Earlier in 2003, King Abdullah established a six-seat quota for women parliamentarians in Jordan’s National Assembly, the 110-seat lower house of Parliament. In 2003, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) launched training programme for women. The IRI also runs programmes in Jordan focused on overcoming political apathy and increasing citizen participation in politics (Sharp, 2005: 27).
The central element of the ENP is the bilateral Action Plans agreed between the EU and each partner. It sets out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities. The ENP replaces the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) as the latter had not produced expected results (Martinez, 2008: 120). The ENP countries were slated to be provided through a dedicated European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) starting from 2007. The ENP, TACIS and MEDA funds are aimed to be replaced with ENPI. In December 2004, it was announced that the European Commission (EC) would seek a budget of €14.9 billion for the ENPI for the period 2007-2013. The new policy would give the neighbouring countries decidedly closer relations with the EU compared with non-neighbouring countries, including the chance to integrate further economically in the EU market and then achieving the four fundamental freedoms of movement – persons, goods, services and capital in the long term. As the neighbour countries fulfil their commitments to strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, promote market-oriented economic reforms, and cooperate on key foreign policy objectives such as counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the EU will offer a deeper relationship (Goksel and Cepel, 2006).

In the framework of the EMP, the European Community and its Member States signed an Association Agreement with Jordan on 24 November 1997, which came into force on 1 May 2002. Earlier, similar agreement was signed with Morocco on 26 February 1996 and entered in force on 1 March 2000. All Association Agreements provide that the relations between the parties, as well as all the provisions of the agreement itself shall be based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Respect for democracy and human rights constitutes essential elements of all Association Agreements (Pieters, 2006: 403-405).

Jordan played a dynamic role in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and its Association Agreement provides a legal basis and a comprehensive framework for the economic, political and social dimensions to the EU-Jordan partnership. However, to benefit fully from this partnership, Jordan must pursue its reform agenda to address the vulnerability inherent in its economic, political, social, and demographic situations. The strategic
interest of Jordan for the EU lies on the country’s willingness to undertake political and economic reforms and the positive influence it can bring in the region to promote reforms and contribute to peace and stability (ENPI Strategy Paper, 2007-2013).

On this basis, the EU-Jordan European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan was approved in January 2005, for a period of three to five years. The EU-Jordan meetings took place at the level of the Association Council, the Association Committee and the eleven subcommittees, of which ten were activated. Up to 2009, the fourth round of subcommittee meetings was completed (Commission Staff Working Document, 2010: 2). Among the EU Member States, 13 states have missions in Jordan with varying degrees of bilateral co-operation with Jordan. On political reforms assistance, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom are actively involved in Jordan on individual state donor level (ENPI Strategy Paper, 2007-2013: 43-44). One of the four main priority objectives of the first European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 2007-2013 with Jordan stresses on political reform and good governance. Other priorities are trade and investment development, sustainability of the development process, institution building and financial stability (ENPI Strategy Paper, 2007-2013: 3).

Jordan’s key strategic importance for the EU lies in its commitment to reforms, openness to political development, potential for deeper economic relations with the EU and willingness to cooperate in the fight against extremism and promoting reform in the region. While the framework can be manifold, financial assistance is conceived as the main tool for achieving objectives common to both EU and Jordan. Jordan’s commitment to political reform was illustrated by the establishment of the first sub-committee on human rights and democracy in 2005. Progress in implementing priority measures is jointly monitored (ENPI Strategy Paper, 2007-2013: 16-17).

In November 2005, Jordan developed a comprehensive strategy of modernisation and launched a National Agenda of reforms, which gives priorities and action plans in the political, social and economic fields. The Agenda was set on the principle to increase the quality and effectiveness of the public administration and developing a result-oriented public service. The themes developed in the document are (1) political development and
inclusion, (2) legislation and justice, (3) investment development, (4) fiscal discipline and financial services, (5) employment support and vocational training, (6) social welfare, (7) education, higher education, scientific research and innovation, and (8) infrastructure upgrade. Jordan further initiated a parallel programme under the slogan, *Kulluna al Urdun* (We Are All Jordan) intended to consolidate support for the objectives of the National Agenda. A major innovation of this process is the involvement of youth in the debate on reforms, through the Youth Commission of *Kulluna al Urdun*. Implementation of these reform plans is designed on the basis of a three year executive programme with monitoring indicators to measure results. The fact that Jordan has to deal with real challenge of implementation, the EU’s strategy is to contribute in the context of the EU-Jordan Action Plan (ENPI Strategy Paper, 2007-2013: 12-13).

The most recent ENPI 2011-2013 programme that EU introduced is based on ENPI 2007-2013 structure, and further reinforced its objectives along with Jordan’s reform agenda and the EU-Jordan Action Plan (ENPI, 2009: 6-7). The total bilateral ENPI budget allocation for Jordan for the period 2011-2013 has been proposed at €223 million over three years. This is an average of €74.33 million a year, which represents an increase of 12.2 percent over the period 2007-2010. This increase is perceived with Jordan’s commitment to advancing the implementation of the Action Plan, its desire to enhance its relations with the EU and its proven capacity to absorb ENPI funds effectively. Political reform is a key priority of the EU-Jordan Action Plan (ENPI, 2009: 8). The EU’s primary channel in the Jordanian Government on matters of financial assistance is the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) (Echague, 2008: 46).


**Table 5.1: Budget and Phasing of the Programme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

208
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>NIP</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Reform, Human Right, Justice and Co-operation on security</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and fight against extremism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for human rights, democracy and good governance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Investment Development</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the modernisation of the services sector</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise and Export Development</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and transport facilitation</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability of the growth Process</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to education and employment policy</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water management</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of renewable or alternative energy sources</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution Building, financial stability and support for regulatory</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approximation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities</td>
<td>Total NIP</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Supporting Jordan’s reform in the areas of democracy, human rights, media and justice</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratisation, Civil Society and Media</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice, Home Affairs and Security</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Trade, Enterprise and Investment Development</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Enterprise and Investment Development</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sustainability of the growth process</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resource development and employment</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, National Indicative Programme 2011-2013

Table 5.2: Budget of the Programme
Development of renewable or alternative energy sources 35

Local development 35

4. Support to the implementation of the Action Plan

Support to the implementation of the Action Plan Programme (SAPP) 45 20.1%


In October 2010, under the ENP Action Plan, Jordan entered into an “advanced status” partnership with the EU (The Jordan Times, 2010). This partnership also opened up new opportunities for economic cooperation between the Kingdom and Europe. Jordan is the second Arab country to obtain advanced status after Morocco (Hazaimeh, 2010). These opportunities include facilitation of market access, progressive regulatory convergence, and preparations of future negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement as well as reinforced cooperation with certain European agencies and programmes (Europa, 2010).

The implementation of the proposed strategies is subject to certain risks, notably linked to regional political and economic developments. Indeed, Jordan’s internal stability is clearly linked to progress in the Middle East Peace process and stability in Iraq. The EU is aware that any deterioration in the political and social stability in Jordan could have a negative impact on reforms prompting for change in the priorities of the government. Persistent inequality and poverty would increase the risk of social instability. Progress in implementing reforms also depends on the existence of a national dialogue and on the degree of consensus among all sections of Jordanian society on the reforms (ENPI Strategy Paper, 2007-2013: 23).
Democracy Promotion in Morocco

Until recently, Morocco was rather peripheral to the US interests in democracy promotion, although it has always been a staunch ally with close ties to NATO. The US attention was instead centered on Israel and its neighbours, and on the oil-rich Gulf. However, this has changed, most notably after 11 September 2001. The U.S is now active in Morocco through a number of avenues. Funding comes mainly from MEPI, USAID, and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. Important implementing agencies include the main quasi-governmental organizations: NDI, IRI, and the National Endowment for Democracy. The MEPI's presence is largest in Morocco, where programmes have targeted, apart from a range of region wide activities, parliamentary reforms, support to political parties, and the strengthening of local government. The USAID also provides democracy assistance, and increasingly so since September 2001. In 2005, the USAID invested more than US$5 million to support local government and decentralization, fund workshops and conferences, supply trainers, and create integrated budget and planning systems. Slightly less was invested in supporting reforms in the Moroccan Parliament, helping strengthen parliament’s oversight and policy assessment capacity. The MEPI funding added millions of dollars to the democracy and governance projects as it supported efforts to strengthen political parties (at both the national and regional levels), boosted the actions of grassroots and local organizations, trained women and girls, and encouraged entrepreneurship (Malka and Alterman, 2006: 63-64).

In view of the 2007 elections, the USAID commissioned NDI and IRI to work with Moroccan political parties, including the moderate Islamist party PJD, to improve their capacity to develop politically viable policy positions and to effectively communicate those same positions to voters. The NDI also assisted Moroccan civil society in ensuring voter participation in the elections, and has conducted a large number of focus groups to gauge Moroccan public opinion. The Human Rights and Democracy Initiative of the Bureau of Democracy has also funded judicial reform projects in Morocco (Khakee et al, 2008: 12).
American policy makers describe the Kingdom of Morocco as an example of Islamic democracy. In the past, American officials had portrayed King Hassan II as a visionary leader in the Arab world and, in 2004, they designated Morocco under the rule of his son Mohammed VI, as a major non-NATO US ally. President Bush bestowed such recognition on Morocco because of the country’s involvement in the global war on terrorism and the longstanding, close relationship with the United States. The Islamist terrorist attacks in Marrakesh and Casablanca in May 2003 consolidated this perception of Morocco as an ally who deserved assistance and backing. While during the Cold War, Morocco was perceived as a bulwark against communism in North Africa, it is now seen as shifting that role against radical Islamist forces. American officials appreciate Morocco’s ability to repress extremists while institutionalizing moderate Islam (Zoubir, 2008: 281). Besides, Morocco is eligible for funding under the Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The U.S has also increased aid to Morocco to assist with countering terrorism, democratization, and fighting poverty. In August 2007, the Millennium Challenge Corporation Board approved a five-year, $697.5 million grant for Morocco (Migdalovitz 2008: 6).

To a certain extent, US democracy promotion efforts in Morocco are largely regime-friendly, in an effort not to disrupt strong U.S-Moroccan relations. Nevertheless, the U.S has become more involved in Moroccan domestic politics and has sponsored several programmes in which the moderate Islamist, Justice and Development Party (PJD) is an active participant. The PJD is treated as one of several organizations whose members attend NDI and IRI sponsored seminars on strengthening political parties and enhancing campaign skills (Sharp, 2005: 13-14). The US set up MCC in January 2004, which allocates aid, based on a country’s performance on various policy indicators, including civil liberties, rule of law, control of corruption, and government accountability (Brookings Doha Center, 2009).

The contrast with Jordan is palpable. While some Islamic Action Front (IAF) members, particularly women participate in the U.S-sponsored workshops, there is no concerted
effort by the US diplomats in Amman to engage the IAF, though occasional dialogues do take place. King Abdullah and other senior Jordanian officials have repeatedly emphasised that change is necessary for Jordan’s survival but that a reform process should be internally driven. With Jordan facing a terrorist threat emanating from Iraq in the east, and with Hamas in the bordering West Bank, the US seems willing to accept whatever pace the government sets for the political reform process. In Morocco, the US engagement is complicated by internal divisions within Islamist organizations such as the PJD, in which liberal and conservative factions vie for influence. The PJD, while outwardly more moderate in its political discourse, has its hardliners, many of whom are opposed to better relations with the West. The PJD has occasionally boycotted some US embassy-sponsored events, particularly during times of regional tension, as in the case of US invasion of Iraq. Moreover, the Moroccan government often warns US observers that non-violent Islamists in Morocco view electoral politics as a means to come to power and establish a theocracy in the kingdom (Sharp, 2005: 15, 17 and 27).

The EU’s relations with North Africa are profoundly marked by the colonial legacy of European countries such as France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In particular, Morocco was French protectorate from 1912 to 1956, and its Western Sahara was a Spanish protectorate from 1884 to 1976. The colonial period established the dependency that continues to mark relations between Europe and North Africa (Tanner, 2004: 136). To this end, a number of initiatives were put in place in support of the EU’s role as a donor and a promoter of democracy in the region. The EU financial assistance and economic co-operation with developing countries have become conditional on respect for democracy and the building of democratic institutions. Civil society and non-governmental organizations have been deemed by the EU as credible partners with which to conduct cooperation for the implementation of such goals. On the other hand, the political liberalization that has taken place in Morocco since the early 1990s has been considered by some as a significant step towards democratisation (Haddadi, 2004: 73).

Compared with the US levels of funding, Europe is a far more significant player in Moroccan development. The European Union itself donates nearly 10 times the amount
of money as the United States and is embarking on a far more ambitious agenda. Individual countries make significant contributions as well. France’s contribution alone is more than US$300 million annually, exceeding that of the entire European Union by more than 60 percent. Germany and Spain at US$75 and US$72 million, respectively, in 2003 individually gave almost three times as much as the US$23 million given by the United States in the same year. Two things are striking about the European plans. The first is the emphasis on dialogue in order to reach common goals. The Association Agreement the EU signed with Morocco in 2000 called for: exchange of information and training; joint ventures; and a commitment to combat money laundering, drug trade, organized crime, and migration. On the social front, it calls for dialogues and programmes to address concerns over living and working conditions of workers, migration and illegal immigration, social and economic development of women, family planning, and health care (Malka and Alterman, 2006: 65).

The ENP action plans for Morocco is relatively less focused on the questions of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights, and more concentrated on economic aspects, including illegal and legal migration. The questions of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights are more developed in the action plan for Jordan. Thus, despite many general similarities and clauses, the lists of priorities in different ENP action plans also point out varying goals of the EU in different regions as well as differentiating between individual countries (Council of Europe, 2005: 201).

The EU-Morocco relations traced back to 1960 and 1976, when a first commercial agreement and a cooperation agreement were signed between the European Community and Morocco. In 1995, the Barcelona conference speeded up the degree of relations by creating the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Finally, an Association Agreement of 2000 constitutes the legal basis of relations for ENP. The agreement provides an Association Council with seven theme-based sub-committee and an Association Committee, which together form the institutional framework for both the EMP and the ENP. The EU has remained extremely cautious over many politically sensitive issues in Morocco: democratic political reforms and respects for human rights, mobility of person and
conflict resolution (Carafa and Korhonen, 2008: 2-9). Regional security is a pressing concern which often clashes with democracy policies. Against the background of regional conflict, trans-national terrorist networks, trafficking of human beings and organized crime, Europeans value Morocco’s stabilizing influence in the region, and are reluctant to risk this for the sake of optimising Moroccan democratic standards. Initial efforts to promote democracy had given way to an increasing focus on activities with a more discernible link to countering terrorism (Kausch, 2008: 3).

With no country adjoining the EU territory regarded as a military threat, the Union has focused its attention on what can be considered soft security issues such as terrorism, migration, illegal trafficking or organized crime. The necessity to deal with these issues and the fact that they are bound up with the larger problem of political Islam make the Partnership much more security oriented (Cavatorta et al, 2006: 10). European commitments towards democracy and human rights remain limited with funds allocated to supporting democratic governance representing usually no more than three or four percent of overall Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). The bulk of support focuses on building state institutions in collaboration with the government. For this reason most support is direct budgetary support, much more than support for civil society. Such model favours state-led development to the detriment of political competition and a redistribution of power. Thus, EU increased allocations of funds for these issues in 2007-2010. The 2007-2010 plan states that the EU should continue to provide support for civil society organizations with the objective of empowering civil society to be an influence on the quality of governance (Kausch, 2008: 47-48.). The speech of the EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner on the post-communist countries reflects the current EU policy issues even in the context of the WANA region:

We recognise that the practice of democracy can look very different from one country to the next, and political institutions must match local conditions. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to democracy promotion. We know we need long term commitment and patience. Democracy is not instant coffee - it takes time to build new institutions and widespread trust in them. And perhaps most importantly, we understand that democracy can never be imposed from outside:
genuine democratic transition must always come from within. And this takes time and can be accompanied by temporary setbacks.23

The US is the major donor in Jordan, notably through massive budget support (US$996 million disbursed since 1997) and cooperation embracing technical and political dialogue. In this respect, the US and the EU cooperation programmes have common features in that their support encompasses both financial assistance and a wider political and economic partnership.24 The Jordanian Action Plan is considered more as a framework for trade and economic reform than a tool for deep political cooperation. Jordan is a cooperative political partner for the EU, and the king manifests European inclinations. However, the US is its predominant international partner. Politically, the government’s human rights practices, particularly towards political Islamist opposition and a large community of displaced Palestinians are subjects of international criticism. For Morocco, the reject of its application for EC membership in 1987 has not diluted its ambition for an “advanced relationship” with the EU. Its enthusiastic engagement with the ENP and relatively early adoption of an Action Plan are indicative of Morocco’s aspiration to anchor its reform process to deep cooperation and integration with the EU. However, like Jordan, political and social reforms in Morocco are being introduced at a much slower pace (Emerson et al, 2007: 26-27).

Given a large Moroccan emigrant population in Europe, threat of radical groups within the country itself is a cause of concern that the US and the EU want to help Morocco’s fight against subversive forces for their mutual interests. Direct government assistance is most often in the tens of millions of dollars for the United States and in the hundreds of millions of euros for European countries. Morocco receives further support through preferential terms of trade with the United States and the EU (Malka and Alterman, 2006: 61).

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Human Rights and Civil Society Dialogue in Jordan

The United States provides financial support for human rights and civil society in the WANA region through a variety of bilateral and regional programmes funded through the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, and the US Agency for International Development. These programmes encompass civil society, human rights, women empowerment, and literacy and education among host of other specific policies. On 13 January 2011, during the summit in the Forum for the Future held in Doha, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed the US continued support for civil society’s essential role in advancing democracy and human rights in the region (US Department of State, 2011). The past two decades saw undermining its power to inspire as the core principle of the US foreign policy in international diplomacy despite human rights and democratic rhetoric for domestic political consumption (Sulmasy, 2008).

In 2009, in its efforts to embrace multilateralism and promote human rights, the Obama administration joined the United Nations Human Rights Council from which the Bush administration had left earlier after its formation in 2006. The Council replaced the former Commission on Human Rights and features a new peer review mechanism, which requires every UN member state to undergo scrutiny of its human rights record. Particularly in the WANA, where unilateral and inconsistent US efforts at democracy promotion have been controversial, this approach has allowed the US to call attention to human rights abuses in partnership with other governments (Piccone and Alinikoff, 2011: 1).

In 2002, the Bush administration established the Middle East Partnership Initiative to advance democratic, economic, and educational reform and women’s empowerment in the WANA (US Department of State, 2010: 3). In recent years, the US President Barack Obama revealed through his public remarks, however indirectly, a human rights doctrine during his first year in office. The right that Obama champions is the right to life (broadly understood to include freedom from torture, maiming, and starvation). Closely related is
promoting security before other foreign policy goals. It also implies that the US will not seek to change regimes and refrain from intervention as long as others states perceived as “illiberal nations” do not use force. This is in a sharp break from the neo-conservative Bush administration that in order to secure peace, it called for pre-emptive measures and nations must have democratic regimes (Etzioni, 2011: 95-96).

The Obama administration has seemingly distanced itself from the high profile and controversial democracy promotion of the Bush administration, mired in Iraq War and condoning abuses of human rights in its counter-terrorism agenda. The 2010 National Security Strategy asserts that the US must support democracy and human rights abroad on the premise that governments that respect these values are more peaceful and legitimate, contributing to an atmosphere that supports America’s national security interests. Furthermore, the report stated that both the US government and the private sector have roles to play in advancing democratic values (Nanto, 2011: 71).

Since its inception, one of the MEPI’s major contributions to US democracy promotion in the Arab world has been to directly fund indigenous Arab non-governmental organizations (NGOs) throughout the WANA. In 2004, the MEPI began issuing small grants directly to NGOs in the region to support political activists and human rights organizations. Apart from the MEPI, in 2005, the Foundation for the Future was launched, which is a multilateral grant designed to fund Arab Civil Society Organisations. It is based in Amman with a satellite office in Washington, D.C. It was an offshoot of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (Sharp, 2010: 17-20).

During the period 2003-2004, at the government level, the US State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour provided training on international human rights law and practice to Jordan’s Directorate officials and members of the Ministries of Education, Justice and Interior, police, military and the National Centre for Human Rights. In another instance, fifteen judges participated in a 10 day mediation and case management workshop in the United States that included visits to different courts in California. The US embassy provided orientation and training on parliamentary
procedure and human rights issues to members of a women's network organisation that included six new parliamentarians and others who ran unsuccessfully in the 2003 parliamentary elections. The MEPI supported civic education and human rights awareness in Jordanian public and private schools with American counterparts to exchange ideas and information on human rights. The US maintained dialogue with key actors in the labour union, industry and factory owners, and government representatives, while also stressing on Jordan's international commitments to fight child labour and trafficking (US Department of State, 2004: 179-180).

The Human Rights and Democracy Initiative (HRDI) of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour has encompassed networking of democracy activists, women's advocacy groups, trade unions and media and journalism (Khakee et al, 2009: 12). Through the initiatives of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, the US is involved with Jordan's quasi-independent National Centre for Human Rights, which publishes report on the status of human rights in the country. Several exchange programmes were initiated to strengthen local NGOs. These programmes focused on fostering networking and cooperation between groups working to promote democratic reform and human rights, and on strengthening their capacities to inform and communicate with national decision-making institutions to encourage reform. The US assistance is also targeted towards the advancement of women's role in society in the sphere of advocacy against gender-based abuse. It also supports and organises numerous training and exchange programmes, including developing skills of women leaders in trade unions and civil society organisations, especially in the rural areas. The programme also stresses on the US military education and training Jordanian military forces to raise awareness and respect for human rights. Additionally, the Counter-terrorism Fellowship Programme imparts the rule of respecting human rights and civil rights, while combating terrorism (US Department of State, 2006: 165-166).

Since 2005, the International Republican Institute programme in Jordan engages civil society, particularly women and youth, political parties, and public opinion research. Programme activities include civil society advocacy training, citizen sponsored issue-
forums, and training for local government staff and agencies. It provides regular technical assistance to political parties and candidates to strengthen their capacities to develop more effective platforms, campaigns, and internal communications plans. These activities are supported by regular public opinion research at the national and municipal level (International Republican Institute, 2005). In early 2010, ahead of the parliamentary elections, a national coalition of civil society organisations led by the National Centre for Human Rights launched advocacy campaign to push for improvements in the country’s electoral system. The US based organisation, National Democratic Institute assisted the campaign, which submitted recommendations for reforming Jordan’s electoral law to the prime minister. Calls for reforms included establishing an independent elections commission, replacing single non-transferable vote system and increasing quota for women parliamentarians from 6 to 12 seats. Although the government did not affect basic electoral system, it increased women’s representation to 12 seats (National Democratic Institute, 2010).

Despite the US efforts in promoting democratic values through various agencies and programmes, its engagement with Jordan largely encompasses economic and military aids. Jordan’s stability in the region is paramount and to that end ensuring the United States’ strategic and security interests.

The EU Barcelona Declaration (1995), the founding act of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), formalized a widely accepted link between the promotion of human rights and the existence of a well organized civil society. Recognition of the role of civil society has been one of the most original features of the Barcelona Process (Lecha, 2004: 112). In effect, the development of civil society in an authoritarian country with the aim of provoking regime change has been a pillar of Western pro-democracy strategies for some time (Cavatorta, 2009: 38). However, the EU has found common ground with the state but less so with civil society. Although foreign funding is vital for the survival of a large number of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), there is general awareness of the associated risks and the possible negative effects of dependency on external funding. The
risk involves NGOs having to adapt to the requirements of a funder’s proposals instead of focusing on their own domestic agenda (Dimitrovova, 2009: 13).

The EU is aware of the poor state of the rights of association and assembly in Jordan. Its assistance programme seeks to improve the environment in which civil society operates and promotes changes to the law of associations. However, the EU holds a human rights dialogue with the Jordanian government behind closed doors and seems to have been unable to stop Jordan from regressing on freedom of association, let alone implementing an association’s law in compliance with human rights. Rather than specifying condition for funding on such improvement, the EU announced in February 2007 its continued funding of €265 million over the next four years and an ever-closer political partnership. Ironically, the highest priority of EU engagement over the coming years lists “support to political developments, including role of civil society”. In its National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Jordan for 2007-2010, a planning tool for aid disbursement, the EU indicates that it plans to use the new funding to help set up NGO, “networks and umbrella groups” (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 35).

The sixth round of the Human Rights, Governance and Democracy Subcommittee between Jordan and the European Union was held in Brussels in March 2011, the first since the EU agreed “an advanced status” partnership with Jordan in October 2010 against the background of the reforms processes that is going on in Jordan. The human rights dialogue with Jordan is included in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Jordan has been the first ENP partner to hold regular human rights subcommittee meetings with the EU. The agenda provided for a review of the implementation of the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan in the area of reforms in the electoral framework, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of the media, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women’s rights, and eradication of torture (Europa, 24 March 2011).

Despite the EU’s contribution towards promoting respect of human rights and freedom of the press and enhancing the professionalism of journalists in Jordan by supporting the
Jordan Media Institute, some concerns still remain. The amended law of “Associations Act 2009” no longer includes the possibility of imprisonment for breaches of the law. However, conditions under which an NGO can be created, controlled and financed remain ambiguous. In 2009, the definition of torture under the Jordanian legislation was brought in line with the UN Convention against Torture. The existing Press and Publications Law still authorises imposition of fines and the imprisonment of journalists, leading to resorting self-censorship. The Public Gathering Law introduced some limited positive developments with 14 categories of gathering exempted from mandatory prior approval from the government. While women’s status has improved, Jordan still needs to ensure effective protection of women against all forms of discrimination and violence in law and practice. Women are now allowed to travel without permission from family male members and to choose their residence. (Women’s status is discussed in Chapter Four). However, Jordan still maintains reservations related to the transmission of nationality to children and their inheritance rights of women married to non-Jordanians (Commission Staff Working Document, 2010: 4)

In August 2009, preventive measure was initiated on issue of “honour crimes”, with the Ministry of Justice establishing a special court to handle cases of honour-killings. In October 2009, the court passed its first verdict, imposing a 15 years imprisonment sentence on a man for committing an honour crime. Besides, the first Women’s Complaint Bureau launched in February 2009 addresses domestic violence, workplace discrimination and sexual harassment (Commission Staff Working Document, 2010: 4-5). Under the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2007-2010, the EU has been providing support to the implementation of the Judicial Upgrading Strategy (JUST) to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary. The EU has also started supporting the upgrading of the criminal justice legal framework, penitentiary reform, and the strengthening of the juvenile justice (ENPI, 2009: 9-10). Jordan’s Ombudsman bureau, established in 2008 became operational in February 2009 and a first Ombudsman was appointed in June 2009. In December 2009, the Ombudsman joined the Mediterranean Association of Ombudsmen (Commission Staff Working Document, 2010: 3).
The U.S and EU together provided more than US$600 million in assistance to Jordan in 2006. Both donors have stated that their goal is to assist Jordan in developing its democratic institutions and strengthening civil society. Yet neither has developed appropriate funding mechanisms, such as funding conditions, to ensure that Jordan's laws and practices comply with international standards on the rights to freedom of assembly and of association. They continued to fund the government while its laws and practices have increasingly interfered with NGO work. This undermines their financial support for local NGOs, which have less ability to work independently (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

**Human Rights and Civil Society Promotion in Morocco**

The line between Western state and Western NGO-financed democracy assistance is sometimes blurred. As seen in the American case, quasi-governmental organizations are key to democracy promotion policies. The US civil society has been active in exchanges and programmes with Moroccan organizations. The Ford Foundation has a long-established programme in the region, run from Cairo. Moreover, Universities and NGOs give platform to Moroccan opposition groups to express their views. For instance, Nadia Yassine of Morocco's banned Justice and Charity Movement was invited by the University of California for a tour of the US for a series of lectures, which included stops at Harvard and other top universities. For the similar reason, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace invited the PJD in May 2006. In relation to this, the Moroccan government has not attempted to discredit NGOs by using the argument of foreign funding. Instead, it has employed a strategy of co-option of civil society by cooperating with and incorporating national NGO elites into government service. Under Mohammed VI, the law on associations was altered in 2002 so as to make it easier for NGOs to seek and accept foreign funds. The main reason being that NGOs provide important social services that the government could not guarantee, and these NGOs need foreign funding to function. The Moroccan government itself makes use of foreign aid for a variety of purposes, and even set up quasi-NGOs in the 1980s in order to tap into international donors’ strategy of funding civil society organizations (Khakee et al 2008: 13-15).
Between January-December 2007, under several cooperative agreements, the US NGOs and academic institutions engaged to build the capacity of Moroccan civil society, universities, and political parties to contribute to effective representational government under Morocco's system of participatory, consensus-based governance. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) are both working with Moroccan political parties to improve their capacity to develop politically viable policy positions and to effectively communicate those positions to voters in the elections. NDI has an additional cooperative agreement to work with Moroccan civil society to assure voter participation in the elections, especially among young voters and women (USAID, 2009).

Although attempts to address the rights of women and the adoption of the new family law are praiseworthy, violations of human rights in the country and in occupied Western Sahara, which the US Department of State reports yearly, are a reminder of democratic deficits. The common areas of abuses include police and security force impunity, unresolved cases of disappearance, lack of judicial independence, and restrictions on freedoms of speech and of the press. However, issues of human rights do not seem to outweigh the excellent relations between the two countries. Despite the flagrant abuses of human rights in occupied Western Sahara, the US supports Morocco in its attempts to circumvent international legality regarding the disputed territory (Zoubir, 2008: 282).

**European Union**

With the declaration on Human Rights adopted at the Luxembourg European Council on 28-29 June 1991, the EU put a premium on the indivisible character of human rights and highlighted the catalytic role civil society and NGOs can play in promoting democratic principles (Haddadi, 2002: 160). Although respect for human rights was an essential element of the legally binding of the Association Agreement, the EU did not publicly raise any human rights concerns initially. The EU policy continued to be guided by a desire to curb legal and illegal migration from Morocco to member countries such as France, Spain, and Belgium (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 458).
The European parliament became receptive to ideas of linking foreign aid to the promotion of human rights and democracy. When Morocco's fourth financial protocol went before the European parliament in 1992, it vetoed the financial aid programme in view of Morocco's bad human rights record, especially in Western Sahara; although financial protocol was later approved after Morocco cancelled its fisheries agreement with the EU. In 2006, Morocco renewed its fisheries agreement after a five-year pause. In the meantime, Morocco could no longer downplay its human rights violations and in the period 2005 – 2006, it displayed an ambitious programme that culminated in the Justice and Reconciliation Commission, which publicly examined human rights violations under Hassan II (Sater, 2010: 133).

The European parliament is the only forum outside the UN where European policy differences play out most vividly, which is also the only EU institution that openly supports the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. The inception of the ENP in 2003 brought renewed hope not only for the reinvigoration of Euro-Mediterranean relations but also for the resolution of frozen conflicts in the WANA. These conflicts were seen as impediments to the EU’s strategy of building a ring of well-governed friends in the vicinity, and the Western Sahara was no exception. Despite the EU’s determination to contribute to UN regional conflict resolution efforts, no confidence-building measures have ever been put forward in the case of the Western Sahara conflict. In fact, even Morocco’s Association Agreements make no mention of how the agreements’ principles might be used for dealing with Western Sahara. Indeed, in October 2008, Morocco was granted “advanced status” to reflect its domestic reform achievements. Such formalistic recognition has inevitable implications for the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco’s advanced status agreement with the EU has been specifically criticised by the European parliament, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network and Moroccan NGOs for failing to address fundamental limitations on political freedoms in the country (Darbouche and Colombo, 2011: 137-139).

In the 1990s, the improvements in Morocco's human rights situation was seen as the
notable case of successful European influence, but significantly, it was only on relatively narrow confined human rights issues, and not the broader aspects of reforms (Youngs, 2001: 77). The EU’s involvement with civil society in Western Sahara seems limited to providing humanitarian aid to the refugees in Tindouf in Algeria. Since 1993, the EU has donated €143 million to the refugees. The fact that the EU has found it difficult to surpass the omnipresence of state-sponsored Moroccan civil society organisations whenever the issue of engagement with civil society has arisen is further evidence of its inability not only to alter the structural setting of CSO activity, but also empower these organisations to function on their own without state’s interference (Darbouche and Colombo, 2011: 139-140).

Democracy-relevant measures in Morocco have been funded largely by the MEDA, the EMP programmes and since 2004 by the ENP. Most of the programmes are financed through the ENPI funds, which are negotiated and channelled through governmental bodies. On a lower scale, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) projects are implemented directly by Moroccan NGOs or international organisations. Annual EIDHR funding for micro-projects increased from €1 million in 2004 to €1.23 million in 2007, representing only 2 percent of commission funding to Morocco. The beneficiaries are NGOs, which are not fully independent from the government (Kausch, 2010: 128-129).

When addressing the civil society level, direct funding was offered to specific micro-level projects, while the organisations could also profit from knowledge and expertise disseminated at workshops and other events. Civil society actors in turn enjoy a strengthened position as legitimate defenders on the issues of human rights and the state of democracy, making frequent use of the EU data in their criticism of the country’s slow progress in human rights and political reforms. Building on the incentives for non-governmental organisations, a national network of NGOs was established in 2009, critically evaluating the progress of the EU-Moroccan partnership and actively promoting democracy and human rights issues. However, the EIDHR’s funding requirements tailor the system in a way that albeit not explicitly excludes Islamist groups and only secular
organisations are eligible for funding, in the process leaving out substantial segment of the society (Budde and Grobklaus, 2010: 21 and 28).

While the direct channelling of funds through local NGOs makes the EIDHR a powerful tool to counterbalance the Moroccan regime's top-down reforms, low funding levels substantially weaken the instrument's potential. Total EU funding to Morocco earmarked for democracy projects has increased during recent years but remains a small share as compared to development assistance aimed at modernisation. Member states' bilateral commitments are negligible. The reluctance to commit significant amount of sensitive political aid is particularly striking in the cases of France and Spain, most closely tied to Morocco by history, geography, migration, and trade. The EU has made a valuable effort to assist the process of liberalisation led by the Moroccan government in the ENP framework, including through increasingly explicit criticism in official documents, but systematic support on all fronts towards genuine democratisation is yet to be introduced in the EU policies towards Morocco (Kausch, 2010: 129-131). In essence, the EU does not try to address and engage the public. Interaction with Morocco is exclusively used at the governmental level, in line with the repeatedly observed strategy to avoid the impression of external interference into Moroccan internal affairs, rather the EU pursues indirect approach and its policy affects (Budde and Grobklaus, 2010: 26).

Engagement with Islamist Movements

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued, the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a defining issue for foreign policy. Many analysts have advocated engagement with Islamists, but the actual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamists organizations remains limited. A series of ambiguities has emerged as tension surface between their role as religious organizations and as aspirant political players. These ambiguities relate to issues such as: the relationship between the sharia and law-making by elected parliaments, for example on matters of family code; mode of violence rejected by political organisations but with
more questionable positions taken by loosely-linked networks; women’s personal status issues; and respect for religious minorities (Emerson and Youngs 2007: 1-3).

The question of how to deal with Islamists who reject violence, embrace democracy and outperform their competitors at the polls especially in Jordan and Morocco has become a central concern not only for the incumbent WANA elites, but also for interested external actors, like the US and the EU. On the one hand, they are uncomfortable both with the authoritarianism of most incumbents and with much of the content of Islamists’ beliefs and policy preferences. On the other hand, they are comfortable with the semi-secular policies of most incumbents and with moderate Islamists’ apparent embrace of democratic processes (Springborg 2007: 160).

**Jordan**

The constant determinant of the US policy in West Asia is free access to strategic resources in the Gulf and the commitment to a secure and stable environment for Israel. Jordan’s policy of reconciliation was therefore greeted generously by the US. Despite some cold relations between the US and Jordan during the reign of King Hussein from 1957 to 1999, Jordan’s alliance with the US has seen tremendous improvements since King Abdullah II’s ascension. In relation to Islamists’ activism, the US interests in Jordan might be challenged if Islamic Action Front gains significant voice in the political decision making process. Thus, the benefits of Jordan’s status quo have a higher weight than political changes, which might confront US interests (Hammerstein, 2010: 121-122). The IAF is a significant Islamist political party and serves as a key opponent of many government policies, including support for US efforts in Iraq (Terrill, 2010: 37). For instance, in the backdrop of Iraq imbroglio, despite Jordan officially being pro-United States, Jordan saw a marked rise in anti-US sentiment among its population led by the IAF. The party is the main opposition force to openly denounce Jordan’s ties with Israel and its role in the US-led war on terror, and against interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Shahzad, 2003). In 2006, the IAF leader, Zaki Saad candidly predicted that if the party were to achieve a dominant place in the government, Jordan’s relations with both the US
and Israel would change (Williams, 2006). The IAF parliamentarians periodically propose legislation to prohibit cooperation with Israel in various sectors and even to abrogate Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel (Sharp, 2011: 15).

Following the 2007 parliamentary elections, the IAF released a statement clarifying its positions. On the Arab and Islamic, it affirmed support for the Palestinians and the rights of Hamas, and all factions to carry out resistance to regain Arab rights. It condemned Israel’s occupation of Palestine, the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The IAF furthermore renewed its call to pursue Arab unity and eliminate foreign hegemony and influence. In this context, a strengthening of IAF power in the government would most definitely result in attempts to abrogate Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel. Barring relations with Israel and its opposition to Western hegemony in the form of Western cultural values, military intervention, and socio-economic policies, the IAF has shown itself to be open to a democratic strengthening process. On democratic ethos, the IAF has been open to overtures from Western officials. The party is aware that warming relations with Western powers will serve to increase its legitimacy as Jordan’s leading proponent of democratic reforms and any consequent Western pressure on the regime for political reforms (Clark, 2007: 53). In one of their interactions abroad, in January 2007, in a roundtable meeting organized by the Chatham House, London, leaders of the IAF, Nabil Kofahi and Nimer Al-Assaf expressed that the party was keen to help foster values of pluralism, equal rights and democracy in Jordan (Chatham House, 2007).

While the US has been quite willing to engage with moderate Islamists in some of its other key allies in the region such as Morocco, this has been much less in the case of Jordan. Presumably, the IAF’s close ties to Hamas, its staunch opposition to Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel, and its comparatively conservative profile impede their relationship. Instead, the National Democratic Institutie and the International Republic Institute have worked closely with *al-Wasat*, a splinter party of IAF on platform development and campaign training (Khakee, et al, 2009: 13).
Similarly, in recent years, against the backdrop of Islamist terrorism on one side and election victories by moderate Islamists on the other, Europeans have become increasingly aware of the phenomenon of political Islam and the need to develop policies for addressing the issue. In 2004, the EU paper on Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, it acknowledged for the first time that moderate Islamists should no longer be excluded from measures aimed at democracy promotion. In May 2007, European parliament resolution made this approach even more explicit that the EU should give visible political support to Islamist organisations, which promote democracy by non-violent means. However, in practice, the EU engagement with Islamists has lagged behind these ambitions (Asseburg, 2009: 174-175).

Debates on political Islam have gained momentum in recent years, helping to differentiate Western views on Islamists’ goals and means to some degree. Moreover, removing the stigma that has been attached to Islamic political actors over the last decades is becoming particularly important, as Islamist parties are increasingly frustrated over their inability to meaningfully influence political realities in their countries via the political process. The main determining factors of engagement include the degree of European interest in establishing dialogue with a specific group. For instance, a rising political force likely to win elections and the diplomatic risk entailed in the form of the particular group’s legal status and overall relation with the ruling regime (Kausch, 2009: 1-2).

In the absence of policy to engage Islamist organisations in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy, most European engagements with Islamist movements are based on the ad-hoc bilateral level. The UK and Germany with large Muslim immigrant populations have taken the lead, establishing divisions within their foreign offices focused on political Islam (Hamid and Kadlec, 2010: 10). For the Islamic Action Front, while the party believes that Jordan and the EU can engage constructively on various issues, there is a general suspicion and lack of understanding about how the EU initiatives work and what they intend to achieve. To Islamists, the EU’s support for Israel undermines its credibility in the region. They also feel that the EU
is more interested in ensuring Jordan’s support in the fight against terrorism at the expense of supporting political reforms. This has prevented the EU from pressing the Jordanian government publicly on its commitments to promote political pluralism. Security concerns relating to regime stability have also limited the EU’s willingness to engage with the Islamic Action Front (Glennie, 2007: 15-16).

The EU’s democracy assistance to Jordan is conditional in theory, but it is not used as an instrument to push the monarchy for a political opening, which might favour Islamist organizations. Instead, the EU shares the economic reform agenda of King Abdullah II and the risk assessment of the Jordanian regime with regard to Islamism. The EU remains ambiguous regarding more political influence by moderate Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The complex contractual framework of the EU partnership with Jordan ignores the role of Islamist movements in Jordan as a legitimate political force. Islamism is only addressed in light of religious extremism (Hammerstein, 2010: 132-145). Cooperation between the EU and Islamist organisations in Jordan depend on the goodwill of the ruling regime and for the EU to implement its liberal statements into practice (Hammerstein, 2010: 147).

**Morocco**

While the US enjoys good relations with the Moroccan monarchy, it has also established fairly good relations with moderate Islamist party – the Justice and Development Party. The party is legal and a significant political player in the country. Good relations with the PJD suit the US government’s need to show at very little risk that is not against moderate Islamic organizations. As a result, PJD leaders have contacts with the US embassy officials, are invited along with leaders of all other parties to embassy receptions, and have no trouble obtaining visas to the United States. This has created a minor backlash against the US on the part of some Moroccan secular parties and NGOs, accusing the US of trying to help the Islamists to come to power. Indeed, the superficial cordiality does not indicate closeness, much less the US influence over the PJD. The US is already trying to strengthen Moroccan political parties through non-governmental organisations –
National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute. These organisations provide non-partisan training to all legal political parties at the local and national levels (Ottaway and Riley, 2008: 183-184).

In the aftermath of the Casablanca attacks on 16 May 2003, the US supported the PJD when Moroccan secular political leaders called for it to be disbanded. In response, the PJD encourages co-operations between the US and Morocco. The US also initiates a programme to train the Islamist academics, economists, and political leaders, under which the editor-in-chief of the Islamist publication, *Al-Tajdid* of the Movement of Unity and Reform was admitted to John Hopkins University in Washington for political science studies. In May 2006, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace invited the PJD to speak on the issue of challenges the Islamists face in political development and democracy. Besides, the US facilitates Islamist representatives to visit the US embassies in Europe, US State Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Congress with the aim of exchanging views on the American occupation of Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the political situation in their country. Even though the US shares the European’s security imperative and the desire for political stability in the region in relation to Islamist movements, the US seeks to address these issues through dialogue with moderate Islamists (Boubekeur and Amghar, 2006: 24).

The US policy in Morocco seeks to safeguard the very old friendship and cooperation with the kingdom, which is perceived as a stable state in the Maghreb region. The US viewed positively the cooptation of moderate Islamists in Morocco and their inclusion in the political system. Given the closeness of its relationship with monarchy, the US seeks gradual reforms that do not jeopardise the stability of the country. The PJD enjoys popular support and its active involvement in political and economic activities, its participation in US programmes is inevitable. The fact that the PJD accepts the legitimacy of the monarchy and seeks to integrate in the political system facilitates the US engagement with the PJD. However, internal divisions within the party due to the US policies in the West Asia and support for Israel places the PJD under stress, as it has to negotiate between the moderates and conservatives support bases. At the other spectrum,
in its efforts at democracy promotion, the US seems to overlook the fact that the monarchy is not willing to push the reforms beyond certain limits. Moroccan officials are annoyed with what they see as American interference in the country’s internal affairs. The monarchy is quite apprehensive about the US support for Moroccan NGOs and the cosy relationship it has with the PJD, regardless of how subservient to the palace the PJD is. Furthermore, the PJD, no matter how moderate, is not willing to accede to one of the United States’ long-term wishes: recognition of Israel (Zoubir, 2008: 283-285). The US has worked with PJD, which is legally recognised and do not work against the monarchy. At the same time, the party espouses a more open support for democratic rights and the rule of law than the ruling regime, making it evident target for democracy promotion programmes (Mikhelidze and Tocci, 2010: 155).

In the late 1990s, Moroccan Islamists, especially Justice and Charity movement began to view Europe as a safe haven to express their political views given that their activities were restricted by the Moroccan regime. Expressing itself outside the country on the Moroccan situation and hoping thereby to put pressure on the monarchy, having a base in Europe is part of a strategy to ensure their alternative platform for political engagement. The JC pursue its policy of criticising the government in the realm of human rights and public liberties and not on the question of monarchy's legitimacy. While Justice and Charity uses Europe as a political platform, for the PJD maintaining a presence in Europe is more a question of electoral strategy. Nearly three million Moroccans live abroad, most of them in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy. The PJD regards immigrants and their dual-nationality as a significant electoral reservoir, capable of being mobilised in the course of campaigns (Amghar, 2007: 18-20).

Although Moroccan Islamist movements have not been subjected to the test of their political positions through the responsibility of government, they recognise the nature of the modern international community of states. They look to Europe and the US for support and engagement and seek to put forward the image of modern movements based on political Islam. In view of their moderate stand and particularly their endorsement of democratic system, PJD and Justice and Charity Movement present themselves as

While Moroccan Islamists support democratic rule and admire Europe, there is a desire to distinguish between being pro-democracy and being pro-Western. Both PJD and JC denounce Western culture and political imperialism. They assert that Moroccan society possesses the cultural resources necessary to become a democratic society, which are to be drawn from Islamic sources. The Islamists also denounce the selective manner in which Europe applies democratic principles. Despite the importance of the EU aid to Morocco, European policies have yet to conceive of a place for the Islamists in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy. The failure to integrate Moroccan Islamists into these programmes contrasts with the American policy of establishing relations with these political actors. The EU views the Islamist movements of the region from the perspective of security concerns, considering them as having equivocal relations with terrorism. Strongly influenced by the spectre of Algerian Islamism, the EU has refused to accept North African Islamists as reliable partners in dialogue, judging that these groups advocate the creation of an Islamic state opposed to democratic principles. For the Islamists, given the importance they occupy in the Moroccan political scene, they are willing to respond to any overture on the part of the EU. Although the EU does not maintain official contacts with the Islamists, some links exist on an ad-hoc basis with Islamists through projects run by individual EU member states (Amghar, 2007: 23-26).

While Islamist movements are mainly regarded as a security concern, there is a growing consensus that Islamists are necessary if real democratic transitions are to occur in the region. For instance, in April 2005, European foreign ministers met in Luxembourg for an unofficial debate on possible co-operation with Islamist parties. Dialogue with the Islamists consequently remains informal and outside the institutionalised structure despite the growing interest expressed by the EU over the question of political Islam. Islamists are also particularly critical of the policies pursued under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, decrying Europe's supposed determination to impose its own values, in particular on women's rights. Another frequent reproach by Islamists was that Europe
should work to ensure respect for the rights of Muslims in Europe rather than try to influence the orientations of Muslim civil societies of the Arab world (Boubekeur and Amghar, 2006: 20-21).

While the US and the EU have been paralysed by the so-called “Islamist dilemma”, both IAF and PJD have signalled interest in opening dialogue with the US and the EU governments. For instance, the Moroccan PJD embarked on a tour of Spain and France in 2005 to meet with senior governmental officials and political party representatives. In February 2009, Ruheil Gharaibeh, Deputy Secretary-General of the IAF spent a week in Washington, DC, where he met with leading academics and other members of the policy community stressing that the West and Islamists need to begin talking to each other. Although many Islamists are aware of the link between external pressure and domestic reform, they are also wary of being seen as seeking American and European help to undermine existing regimes. Perhaps a bigger obstacle to engagement is the mistrust that Islamists evince toward America and Europe, a result of the sometimes striking gap between Western pro-democracy rhetoric and policies that support repressive regimes. So far, the U.S engages with the PJD with the Moroccan monarchy’s blessing. Significantly, despite IAF’s willingness to engage with the West, it refused to have official contacts with the U.S government in 2004 in protest of the Iraq war (Hamid and Kadlec, 2010: 1-8).

The policies of the US and the EU on democracy promotion in the WANA region are lucidly summarised by Francesco Cavatorta:

The inability of the United States and Europe to accept Islamist parties and movements thus far as potential democratic actors has fundamentally undermined the international efforts to encourage democracy. Thus, despite the rhetoric, material support has been granted to those friendly authoritarian regimes who are engaged in satisfying the economic and security interests of the West in exchange for token liberalising gestures that have created façade democracies through the region. The supposed post-9/11 policy changes with respect to how the theme of democracy in the region should be approached are, at closer scrutiny, quite disappointing and have not yet altered the suspicions of the West vis-à-vis Islamist parties. This leads to lack of credibility and further emboldens those who speak out against the hypocrisy of the West. Unless there is a real shift away from the preconceived notions that Islamist parties are bad for democracy, and there is
realisation that a third force, which would be secular and liberal, the persistence of authoritarianism will be continually facilitated (Cavatorta, 2007: 71).

**Jordanian Public Perceptions on External Democracy Promotion**

Despite increased funding for democracy promotion efforts, Jordanians are sceptical of the United States’ commitment to democracy due to its regional policies and specifically within Jordan. Many Jordanians see American cold treatment of Islamic Action Front as hypocritical. Moreover, the United States’ refusal to accept Hamas’ success in 2006 Palestinian elections had an enormous impact in Jordan having substantial population of Palestinian descent. In recent years, the general attitude was reflected in a particular instance of a Jordanian non-governmental organisation, Mizan, which declined USAID offers for funding. Mizan provides legal counsel to vulnerable populations and lobbies Jordan’s parliament on issues of democracy and human rights. A setback for the US efforts was the regional developments of 2006-2007: deterioration of security in Iraq, the election of Hamas in Palestine, and the relative growing power of Iran in the regional dynamics. These events forced the US to pull back from applying pressure for reforms on friendly regimes. Jordanian civil society finds the US regional policies troublesome to navigate if it accepts American funds and to maintain its credible image amongst Jordanian population (Joint Research Project, 2008). Democratic agenda was unevenly applied and even reversed when democratic elections produce governments that did not favour the US policies. Supporting elections in the Palestinian Territories until Hamas was democratically favoured; the US government appears to show only conditional support for democracy (Yaghi, 2007:113).

In Jordan, the most contentious issue within the democracy promotion agenda has been Western funding of Jordanian NGOs, especially the US since the 1990s with liberalising NGOs access to foreign funds. The debate pits professional associations dominated by nationalists and Islamists against activists that are more liberal. Unlike professional associations that are financially secure through compulsory membership fees, many other Jordanian NGOs are unable to raise funds domestically, thus relying heavily on foreign funding for their survival. Opposition to foreign funding is based on the argument that the
NGOs receiving funds serve the interests of the external donors. However, criticism does not extend to receiving aid from Arab donors. Working with foreign civil society organisations is also acceptable. In fact, the Jordanian Engineers Association has many ties with external organisations. In response, NGOs also point out that the Islamists receive funding from Saudi Arabia and the International Islamic Conference. At times, opposition to foreign funding comes from the parliament and from the government. In 2007, the public controversies on foreign funding led the Ministry of Social Development to issue communiqué to all external donors to get ministry consent before funding Jordanian organisations (Khakee et al, 2009: 17-23).

As compared to public mistrust of American democracy promotion, the Jordanian public is more comfortable with European funds. They prefer to work with the UN agencies and the EU in view of their relatively perceived good record on human rights. It is also rather common to make distinction within Europe. For instance, they are even wary of the UK for its involvement in Iraq war but they have no qualms about Scandinavian countries’ funding. One of the few issues on which there is quite wide agreement in Jordan is the legitimacy of the US State Department criticism along with the Europeans of the state of democracy in the country. Such criticism generally concerns issues that Jordanians themselves can observe. Criticism is beneficial because the Jordanian government is concerned about its international image (Khakee, et al, 2009: 24-29). Although Jordanian public are in favour of democratic process in the country, they are disappointed at the US democracy promotion as they felt that the US lacks seriousness in supporting democracy (DeBartolo, 2008: 11).

On political reforms, despite approval from international community and semblance of reform in Jordan, the consensus among the domestic opinion expressed that Jordan has seen stagnation in its path towards democracy. Neither the regime nor the international donors are prepared to forgo stability for democracy. Maintaining the status quo in Jordan has proved of greater priority than pushing for genuine reform. The EU stands accused of not reacting to clear instances of democratic backtracking, most notably in the areas of freedom of association and assembly, and in the constraints on civil liberties included in
the anti-terrorism law. The democracy and human rights clause espoused in the EU agreement with Jordan includes conditionality terms but it has never been invoked. Oppositions in the country have called for more conditionality, which they felt would be the best way to move reforms process forward (Echague and Michou, 2011: 2-9).

Jordanian public attitude is favourably inclined towards the EU-project of democratisation and emphasised that it is generally better viewed than the US endeavours in Jordan. However, they blamed government’s reluctance to pursue political reforms stipulated by the EU-Jordan agreements. On the issue of common shared values, there is general agreement that universal values like peace, freedom and human rights exist. However, in practice, there are substantial differences between values – European liberal values as against Jordanian Islamic ethos. They also contended that the EU is lenient towards the ruling regime and instead it supports the government’s superficial reforms rhetoric (Jonasson, 2010).

The reform in Jordan is essentially driven from above, with the monarchy closely monitoring political reform in a top-down process. Undoubtedly, the process makes more bureaucratic for foreign agencies to work with top institutions than with regular civil society. The EU’s contribution through the ENP is particularly of such an approach, primarily supporting the Jordanian National Agenda of reform of the palace. This concretely means that the content of political dialogue with Jordan is prone to be rather inoffensive, as the Europeans could not afford to really interfere with burning issues, such as the reform of electoral law. Despite this limitation, the Jordanian public perceives the European Union’s approach towards democratic reform more positively than the US efforts. The EU’s method tries to accommodate with every stakeholder on its goals and incentives. The EU maintains good relationship with Jordanian NGOs and in turn, the EU’s policies are well accepted by the public at large. Some organisations who would otherwise reject international funding have readily accepted the EU funding for their projects (Schmid and Braizat, 2006: 17-19).
Moroccan Public Perceptions

It is widely recognised that the US is viewed with great suspicion as a promoter of democracy in the Arab world, and Morocco is no exception in this respect. Some NGOs accept American government aid; while a sizable share of Moroccan associations refuse it outright. Resistance to US initiatives is at times based on disagreement with US stances in the Arab region, such as the war in Iraq and its support for Israel over the Palestinians. Such unease is not only, or indeed primarily, and Islamist phenomenon. Some of the fiercest opposition has come from secular NGOs. Neither is unease solely an NGO affair. Timing has also been an issue as regards some US initiatives. For instance, the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative, a year after the US invasion of Iraq made many Moroccans perceive it as another example of US attempts to heavy-handedly push through its agenda in the region (Khakee et al 2008: 18).

In early November, the leader of the National Syndicate of Moroccan Journalists joined five other NGOs in circulating a petition calling for a formal boycott of all US. Embassy activities. The resistance is, however, almost always confined to the American government. The willingness to work with US civil society organizations remains intact. Despite years of working with and benefiting from the US sponsored assistance, the PJD at times advertises its refusal to participate in US. funded political party training sessions and consultations. Despite, negative reactions, many political parties, and local NGOs continuously seek support and benefit from the assistance of US aid organizations. However, to proceed with the debate on democracy promotion without recognizing its diminished credibility does not gain favourable results (Liddell, 2007).

In the case of the EU democracy promotion, its programmes and policies are relatively accommodated. However, there are disagreements as to the legitimacy of the EU’s policy of excluding moderate Islamists form their democracy promotion programmes (Khakee et al, 2008: 7). Compared to the US, the democracy promotion efforts of the EU are generally better received. The reason for judging the Americans, according to their wider policies in the region is due to Moroccan’s knowledge of Europe much better than that of
the US. The US is therefore, more likely to be judged according to its international political stances, while Moroccans are familiar enough with the nuances of European political life to understand even adverse European policies. This does not mean that the relationship is friction-free. The NGOs are critical of the EU, but it does not go as far as boycotting EU programmes (Khakee et al, 2008: 18-19).

Although, the EU does not face the kind of resistance that US endures in the region, the EU’s own approach and policies on democracy has come under scrutiny. Over the last ten years, the Southern Mediterranean economies have not taken off and security problems have remained in the form of terrorism. In the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, democracy seems to be left by the wayside (Martínez, 2008: 121). As such, within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the economic and security dimension has largely prevailed over the prospect of political reforms (Frohlich, 2007: 82). Although the ENP in principle gives first place to democracy promotion, human rights, rule of law and the development of civil society, the Commission’s recent document is silent on these subjects. The “joint ownership” of the Action Plans has weakened the “democracy priority” as in Jordan and Morocco, and other partner countries. In this soft diplomatic activity, the EU lags behind the US, whose state-supported NGOs, private foundations and universities are highly active in states like Morocco. The weak performance of the ENP in the democracy field is coming at a high cost to the political credibility and reputation of the EU, especially in the Southern partner states (Emerson et al, 2007: 15).

**General Public Attitude in the Arab World**

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, there was a worldwide sympathy and support for the United States. Since 2002, positive ratings declined generally with unfavourable attitudes towards the US in Arab countries in particular. While the US cannot base its foreign policies solely on public opinion polling, consistently negative view of the US foreign policy adversely affects it credibility, especially in democracy promotion. Significantly, the rhetoric and actions of the Bush administration saw
unpopular sentiments not only in Muslim countries but also in Latin America and Western Europe. The United States’ rhetoric about unilateral military action against Iraq and threats against Iran was interpreted by the broader Islamic world as creating a paradigm in which conflict was seen as inevitable (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2008: 1-5).

Negative ratings are even higher in the key moderate countries of Jordan and Morocco. By any measure, the US attempts at communicating with Muslim-majority nations since 9/11 have not been successful. More than merely a lost popularity contest, the deepening divide between the United States and Muslim communities around the world poses a huge barrier to US success on vital issues, from fighting terrorist groups to expanding economic development and political freedom. Much of the United States’ recent crash in credibility and standing in the Muslim world has been the result of the actions of President Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq (Amr and Singer 2007: 22-27). The lack of democracy in the Middle East is itself a threat to the US interests in the region, especially when its allies are examples of repression. People in the region understandably resent the denial of their basic rights and freedoms, and they hold the US government responsible for cosying up to disaffected regimes. Such resentment fuels anti-Americanism that can provide fertile ground for violent extremists profoundly hostile to the US interests (Hicks 2009).

The Arabs’ Civil societies’ response to the US War on Terror is highly sensitive and critical to the US strategies in the Middle East (Sater, 2007). Associated with this is the US government’s insistence that its actions in Iraq are part of an effort to promote democracy in the Arab world (Jamal and Tessler, 2008). The Arabs scornfully received the Bush administration’s rhetoric of freeing the Iraqi people from the dictatorship. Their immediate response was to question about the Palestinians who are under the Israeli occupation for decades. They viewed the American occupation in Iraq as punishment to Saddam Hussein for his position against Israel and a war to takeover the Iraqi oil reserves (Yaghi, 2007: 121).
However, it is important to note that majorities in the Arab world, including Jordan and Morocco in fact have positive opinions about most things American except its foreign policy. The Arabs do not hate the US for who they are or for the cultural and religious values they hold. Negative sentiments are being fuelled, rather by what they do for specific policies and the impact upon the Arab world. Disagreements on policies – perception of the US hegemony to control the region’s oil, Iraq invasion, handling of Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of Israel, and the US rhetoric on democracy while supporting ruling regimes are at the root of anti-American, and by extension anti-Western sentiments that permeate the region (Rugh, 2006: 186-187).

Over all, the targets of democracy promotion are similar in the two countries: NGOs, political parties, parliaments, judicial sector, state bureaucracy and the media. Respect for democratic principles form part of the main agreements with the EU for Jordan and Morocco. Both countries are among the most reform-oriented countries of the WANA region. There are also some basic commonalities in perceptions of Western democracy assistance in Jordan and Morocco. In both countries, there is a distrust of the US as a democracy promoter and refusal in some quarters, to accept the US funding or take part in the US government-sponsored programmes (Khakee, et al, 2009: 31).

Jordan unlike Morocco receives support for democracy and governance from a wide variety of donors: the US, the EU, individual EU governments, Western NGOs and multilateral institutions, although the US is a significantly more prominent actor in Jordan than in Morocco. Morocco has close historical ties to several European countries with large diaspora in Europe. Unlike Morocco, Jordan has fewer ties to Europe. Through its geographic position, Morocco is relatively sheltered from the conflicts rocking West Asia. The Hamas’ success in 2006 Palestinian elections and its aftermath had a stronger impact on perceptions of the US democracy promotion in Jordan than in Morocco, given Jordan’s geographical proximity to Palestine and a large Palestinians descent living in Jordan. Moroccans have fewer links to the Gulf States, which is culturally further apart than Jordan and the Gulf (Khakee, et al, 2009: 32).
Thus, apart from some differences, the external actors are visibly active in their efforts to promote democracy on similar levels in both countries. Two distinct factors are present in both countries in reform process. The reforms are controlled by the palace as to the scope and limitations with less or no input from the citizen stakeholders. The other factor is the approach of the external democracy promoters, whose engagements are limited to the top-level governments' hierarchy. Although domestic civil societies and NGOs are included in their contacts, such interactions are constraint as reforms proceed according to the terms of the ruling regimes.