CHAPTER ONE


4. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p.183.


CHAPTER TWO

1. Heidegger categorically asserts that it is impossible to carry out research into the source and the possibility of the idea of Being in general by means of the abstractions of formal logic. He says, "one must seek a way of casting light on the fundamental question of ontology, and this is the way one must go." Being and Time, p.437.

2. Being and Time, p.437.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.4.

5. Ibid., p.5.

6. Ibid., p.436.

7. Vide: Foot-note No.1 above.


11. Ibid.


Heidegger in a letter to Father Krebs dated January 9, 1919 writes about what is demanded from a philosopher. He writes, "It is hard to live as a philosopher - inner truthfulness toward oneself and those one is supposed to teach, demands sacrifice, renunciation and struggles that remain forever foreign to the academic tradesman." Quoted by Thomas Sheehan in "Reading a life: Heidegger and Hard Times" in A Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Edited by Charles B. Guignon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.73.


An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.8.

Heidegger targets his criticism on professors of philosophy, who carry out teaching of philosophy as a profession. Vide: An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.11.

An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.11., Vide: Foot-note No.15 above.

Ibid., p.8.

Ibid., p.10.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.11.

Ibid., p.10.

Heidegger's observation is significant in the wake of contemporary debate on the methodology of Social Sciences. Different types of scales are to be set to measure the progress in these two fields. Vide: "Letter on Humanism" in Basic Writings, p.215.

Being and Time, p.1.
A scientific enquiry into an entity, which makes use of categories and is factual is called ontical. A philosophical enquiry which makes use of existentials and is factical is named ontological. Vide: Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p.20.
42. Ibid., pp. 242-3.


44. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology p.92.

45. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p.11.

46. Ibid.

47. Being and Time, p.28.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., p.31.

51. Ibid., p.29.

52. Ibid., p.31.

53. This is a preliminary discussion necessitated by Heidegger's elucidation of logos in the context of the explication of the expression 'phenomenology' and for a detailed discussion Vide: 4.1.4.

54. Ibid., p.34.

55. Ibid., p.27.

56. Ibid., p.28.
CHAPTER THREE

1. This German term literally means "Sciences of the Spirit". In 19th century it acquired the meaning that goes in opposition to Naturwissenschaften (the natural science), especially in the writings of Dilthey and his followers, where the hermeneutic method is applicable in contrast to the explanatory techniques of natural sciences.


8. Verstehen, Vide: 3.3.0.

9. There are three phases in Husserl's thought. The Logical Investigations (1900 - 1901) belongs to the realistic phase. Ideas (1913) belongs to the idealist or transcendental phase. The third phase, where Husserl came more close to the notion of lived-world (Lebenswelt) is seen in Cartesian Meditations (1929) and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936). The Heideggerian criticism is directed to the first two phases.
10. *Being and Time*, p.117.

11. Ibid., p.52. *Vide* also Part I, Sections I-IV.

12. This expression means 'lived-world'. The later writings of Husserl, which come under the influence of Dilthey, are shadowed by this notion.


15. "Even the phenomenological intuition of essences is grounded in existential understanding". Cf. *Being and Time*, p.147.

16. Ibid., p.12.

17. Ibid., pp.372-392.

18. Ibid., p.20.

19. Ibid., p.144.

20. Ibid.

21. *Being and Time*, p.148. Heidegger makes use of two words that can be translated as interpretation: *Auslegung* and 'Interpretation'. The former refers to an activity in which we interpret something 'as' something. The latter is used in the case of textual exegesis and, therefore, more theoretical in nature. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translates the former as 'interpretation' and the latter as 'Interpretation'. Cf. *Being and Time*, p.1. Note.3.

22. *Being and Time*, p.150.

23. Ibid., p.151.
24. Ibid., p.149.
25. Ibid., p.148.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p.151.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., pp.149, 158.
31. Ibid., p.154.
33. Ibid., p.67.
34. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p.57.
35. Ibid., p.162.
36. Ibid., pp.58-59.
37. Ibid., p.59.
38. Ibid., p.60.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p.61.
42. Ibid., p.64.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p.69.
45. Ibid.
50. Ibid., pp.63-67.
51. Ibid., p.66.
52. Ibid., p.67.
CHAPTER FOUR

1. An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.133.

2. Ibid., p.61.


4. Ibid.

5. An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.128.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p.124.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


12. Ibid., p.61.

13. Ibid., p.62.


15. Ibid., p.124.

16. Ibid., p.129.


24. "\textit{Physis} is the process of a-rising, of emerging from the hidden, whereby the hidden is first made to stand." Cf. \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}, p.14. However, Heidegger cautions by saying "This opening up and inward-jutting-itself must not be taken as a process among other processes that we observe in the realm of the essent. \textit{Physis} is being itself, by virtue of which essents become and remain observable". \textit{Ibid.}


26. \textit{Ibid.}


31. "It is this conflict that first projects and develops what has hitherto been unheard of, unsaid and unthought. The battle is then sustained by the creators, poets, thinkers, statesman." An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.62.

32. Ibid., p.131.

33. Ibid., p.63.

34. Ibid., p.102.

35. "On the Essence of Truth", in Basic Writings, p.132.


37. Ibid.

38. "On the Essence of Truth", in Basic Writings, p.124.

39. Ibid.

40. Being and Time, p.133.

41. Ibid., pp.133, 147, 170, 350-351.

42. Ibid., p.2.

43. An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.41.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p.15.
46. "The beginning is the strangest and mightiest. What comes afterward is not development but the flattening that results from mere spreading out; it is inability to retain the beginning; the beginning is emasculated and exaggerated into a caricature of greatness taken as purely numerical and quantitative size and extension". An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.155. It is Heidegger's basic contention that "the great begins great, maintains itself only through the free recurrence of greatness within it, and if it is great ends also in greatness". Ibid., p.15. Heidegger finds such a beginning in the philosophy of the Greeks.

47. Being and Time, p.22.
CHAPTER FIVE

1. An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.23.

2. Ibid., p.107.


4. What is Called Thinking, p.6.


6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p.9.

8. What is Called Thinking, p.8.

9. Ibid., p.139.

10. Ibid., p.144.

11. Ibid., p.140.

12. Ibid., p.348.

13. Ibid., p.126.


15. Ibid., p.150.

16. Being and Time, p.150.

185
17. Ibid., p.153.
18. Ibid., p.232.
19. Ibid., p.315.
21. Ibid., p.315.
22. Ibid.
23. What is Called Thinking, p.322.
26. Ibid., p.12.
27. Ibid., p.8.
28. Ibid., p.21.
29. Ibid., p.12.
30. Ibid., p.170.


33. *Chairos* refers to time reckoned according to significant events rather than by some scientific standard of measurement.