CHAPTER FIVE

KEHRE FROM PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
5.1.0. Kehre as a Leap into the Circle of Understanding

In phenomenological and existential thinking one hardly finds a long list of arguments or proofs in support of a particular position. Instead, one finds a description or elucidation of the phenomenon as it is given. It does not mean that logical coherence is lacking in these areas. They are logical in an altogether different sense. Consider the case of Heidegger who lashes out a severe attack on 'logic' in his writings. One will be surprised to see the original and systematic construction of ideas with a well-grounded logical connection. Here, what is meant by 'logical' is a systematic construction of ideas to bringing about a coherent whole.

But there is formal logic which cannot be dispensed with in any conceptual analysis. Heidegger refers to formal logic, whenever it becomes necessary, by calling it either as 'logistic' or as 'mathematical logic.' Heidegger is not fully satisfied with the logico-scientific style of thinking to meet the challenges of thinking.
5.1.1. The Limits of Logical Thinking

Logic, for Heidegger, must be a reflection on logos, in which logos is conceived as being united to Being as truth, i.e. Being in its collectedness coming to presence. Moreover, logic is connected to logos in the sense of language in which Being is gathered and held in openness. Heidegger's interpretation of logic is perfectly compatible with his path of thinking, but not with logic as traditionally understood and practised. There are several reasons for it.

To begin with, Heidegger's primary concern is to raise anew the question of the meaning of Being or Being as truth. Secondly, the very core of his thought lies in his understanding of truth as aletheia, as simultaneous revelation and self-concealment. Thirdly, the history of western metaphysics has been characterized by its singular forgetfulness of the difference between Being and beings or Being in its revelatory power as truth. Fourthly, for Heidegger logic is not an accidental accessory in the process of the forgetfulness of Being, but it is the very condition for the development and deepening of the oblivion of Being in its difference.
The birth of logic, according to Heidegger, took place at that precise moment in history when truth as aletheia had been concealed. In other words, its very birth was caused by this concealment. The transformation of aletheia to idea is the beginning of the evolution of logic. Logic thus came to pass as the prerequisite for the emergence of western metaphysics which, in its very constitution, is logical, or more precisely onto-logical. Heidegger, therefore, points out the fact that logic has no place in the question of the meaning of Being. Heidegger's polemics against logic has two immediate reasons.

5.1.1.1. The Anti-metaphysical Movements

The Freiburg lecture of Heidegger on What is Metaphysics in 1929 contains obviously provocative statements concerning logic. But, one must recall the general philosophic atmosphere prevailing at the time of the inaugural address. Wittgenstein published Tractatus Logico Philosophicus in 1921. This extremely influential work has asserted that metaphysics is nonsense. The impact it made was very considerable especially in the Vienna Circle. The view of logical positivists, who reduced all
metaphysical statements into nonsensical statements was gaining momentum. There was a strong anti-metaphysical bias among many logicians at that time. It is against that background one has to examine the polemical statements of Heidegger on logic.

5.1.1.2. The Encounter with Nothing

Heidegger's primary concern is to raise anew the question of the meaning of Being or Being as truth. His enquiry begins with the existential analytic of Dasein. In the existential analytic the fundamental mood of anxiety (Angst) provides a very rich field of investigation for Heidegger. Anxiety is a rare and significant mood, for it is here one encounters nothing.

There is a logical difficulty in explicating what nothing is. If one applies a logical pattern of thinking, one is sure to land up in contradictions. Thinking is always a thinking about something. The fact before us is nothing which is not a thing. It is not an essent in any sense. The same is the case with Being. Being and nothing can never be put under the category of being or can be viewed as the quality of being. In Heidegger's words:
He who speaks of nothing does not know what he is doing. In speaking of nothing he makes it into a something. In speaking he speaks against what he intended. He contradicts himself. But discourse that contradicts itself offends against the fundamental rule of discourse (logos), against logic.

It amounts to saying that any discussion on nothing is illogical and, therefore, unscientific. Since speech which contradicts itself is meaningless, Heidegger's thematization of nothing is often considered as nonsensical.

The practical difficulty to give an adequate description of nothing in the logico-scientific model precludes even the possibility of a meaningful questioning about nothing. Heidegger's polemics against logic begins with the failure to meet the demands of logic. Since nothing is not a being with the feature of an objective entity, it may remain always inaccessible to science. But that inaccessibility need not be given a face value, for it is not a conclusive demonstration of its meaninglessness. Two questions emerge in this context:

(i) What does it mean to say that metaphysical statements are non-sensical?

(ii) How can we say that science and logic are the only approach to reality?
The first question is worth considering in the context of the severe criticism raised against nothing by Rudolf Carnap. Carnap argues that Heidegger's statement "the Nothing Nothings" is a syntactic nonsense. In this pseudo-statement nothings is a name generating functor. But according to the rules of syntax it is not name generating. Nothing cannot be called a name. It is only an abbreviation for negation. But negation is not a name but a functor. So, from a syntactic standpoint it is merely a pseudo-statement and meaningless. Heidegger agrees to the view that nothing is nonsensical from the syntactical standpoint. But one must bear in mind that although a statement may be a syntactic nonsense, this in no way means that it is a semantic nonsense. The problem arises precisely from the narrow view that logic is the highest court of appeal.

Though scientific and logical modes of thought are legitimate in themselves, to assert that they are the only valid means to get accessibility to reality is an impoverishment of human thought. Heidegger's attack is directed to this wrong tendency and not certainly against science and logic per se. According to Heidegger logic cannot be taken as the final court of appeal as far as
our experience is concerned. Logic does not provide us with the final word on metaphysical issues. The encounter with nothing is a primordial experience and it cannot be described through the medium of language which necessarily presupposes subject-object duality.

Nothing is not a logical negation or a denial, but it is the necessary condition rendering such logical acts possible. It is more originary or primary than negations. It leads to the conclusion that there is a need to seek an alternative realm of experience which may grant the true sense of nothing. In the final analysis, this will be the end of the supremacy of rational thought over the realm of experience. It is evident in Heidegger's call for a new way of thinking. He observes:

No matter how much or in how many ways negation, expressed or implied, permeates all thought, it is by no means the sole authoritative witness for the revelation of the nothing belonging essentially to Dasein.... Unyielding antagonism and stinging rebuke have a more abysmal source than the measured negation of thought. Galling failure and merciless prohibition require some deeper answer.

5.1.2. Originary or Recollective Thinking

Heidegger observes that there is much unsaid in our answers to the queries pertaining to many of the
fundamental questions of philosophy. He, therefore, calls for an originary or recollective thinking that is capable of carrying the thought to the milieu where logic fails to carry us to. Logical thinking is inadequate, for it does not explore the full amplitude of the richness of Dasein's relation to Being. Recollective thinking can meet the demands for it can grasp Being in its unique difference, i.e., Being in its truth. Here, thought is a response to Being, in the sense that thought is ruled by the command of Being.

Heidegger holds the view that what must be thought about has become hidden in the course of thinking. Therefore, he remarks: "Most thought-provoking in our thought provoking time is that we are still not thinking."

Science does not 'think' in the sense of the thinking of the thinkers. The birth of science is at the precise moment in history when thought ceased. It is the moment when Being which is experienced as logos, physis, and aletheia, was transformed into idea. From then on, thinking gave way to philosophy and philosophy accepted the scientific model of thinking.
Heidegger's attack is against the attempts to sever Being from thinking. But before getting into the details of this particular mode of thinking, it is important to say what Heidegger does not consider to be thinking. To begin with, thinking is not what we generally call having an opinion or a notion. Second, it is not representing something or having an idea about something or a state of affairs. Third, thinking is not ratiocination, or developing a chain of premises which lead to a valid conclusion. Lastly, it is not conceptual or systematic as understood in the idealistic traditions.

Thinking, viewed from the Heideggerian perspective, is a response on our part to the call of Being. This call happens not depending on our wish and will, but by that which is to be thought as well as by him who thinks. Being calls forth thought and directs it to its true nature. Therefore, thinking must always be oriented toward it and happens for its sake. In short, thinking is thinking of Being. The genitive use here has to be taken both as an objective and subjective genitive. In the objective sense it means that thought must be focused on, and is rooted
in, Being. In the subjective sense, thought belongs to Dasein which has Being as its ground.

In Discourse on Thinking, Heidegger brings out the salient features of the originary thinking he calls for. Without giving room for a second thought, he says that thinking requires greater effort, practice and can be compared to any other craft. Once we are on the right track, it can bring amazing results because it is a mode of elucidation which is rooted in the earth and capable of satisfying the demands of the present.

Meditative thinking need by no means be 'high-flown'. It is enough if we dwell on what lies close and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and now; here, on this patch of home ground; now in the present hour of history.

This pattern of thinking is something which everyone has to become acquainted with by his own effort. For we cannot wait for someone else to reveal what we do not understand. We have to make an effort to raise such matters for ourselves. Here, Heidegger emphasizes the point that what we take for granted as understood, in fact, is only noticing. As a result, we are often left alone with
fragmentary ideas causing a lot of confusion. The basic thrust of meditative thinking is to take one toward a fuller and comprehensive understanding. Heidegger informs us:

Meditative thinking demands of us not to cling one-sidedly to a single idea, nor to run down a one-track course of ideas. Meditative thinking demands of us that we engage ourselves with what at first sight does not go together at all.

How can we expect someone to get into such a method all of a sudden? It, of course, demands a radical change in the very style of our thinking, and, therefore, its impact will definitely be wide ranging. One must subject oneself to some sort of deconditioning or unlearning to get into meditative thinking. Heidegger makes such an observation:

We moderns can learn only if we always unlearn at the same time. Applied to the matter before us: we can learn thinking only if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally. To do that, we must at the same time come to know it.

Heidegger, therefore, asks everyone to take a deliberate and firm decision to meet the challenges posed by the increasing thoughtlessness, which appears as an uncanny visitor in our every day life.
5.1.2.1. Grateful Thinking

When we examine the etymology of the word thinking, it reveals its close relation to the old English noun 'thanc'. The present day usage of 'thanks' is derived from 'thanc' which literally means a grateful thought. The root or originary meaning of 'thanc', is "the gathered all gathering, thinking that recalls." The English word 'thank' conveys to us the impoverishment it underwent in the course of time and how it lost its original sense of gatheredness and memory from its sphere. The erosion of the meaning of memory from our understanding, says Heidegger, is a serious lapse occurred in the course of history.

It is to be noted that Heidegger's understanding of memory is quite different from our ordinary conception of it as the ability to retain or hold back the ideas which has a reference to the past. Thinking and memory have a close affinity with its originary meaning. This is evident from the meaning of the old English word, 'thanc'. Heidegger says:

The 'thanc' means man's inmost mind, the heart, the heart's core, that innermost essence of man which reaches outward most fully and to the outermost limits, and so decisively that, rightly considered,
the idea of an inner and an outer world does not arise. The 'thanc', the hearts' core, is the gathering, of all that concerns us, and that we care for, all that touches us in so far as we are, as human beings.

The term thinking calls for a brief explanation in this context. One must do away with an understanding of thinking as placed between the subject and the object, which have opposing characteristics. Thinking is not even conceived as ideas that are formed in our mind. For us, thought primarily means an idea, a view or opinion, or a notion which is abstract and remains in mind, which functions as a container. In Heidegger's view, there is no gulf between the subject and object; on the contrary, he views thinking as a constant and abiding appropriation of something given. The world of meaning related to the term thinking is nothing but a steadfast and intimate concentration upon the things that essentially speak to us. When we understand thinking as memory, it is understood not just as gathering of thoughts; on the contrary, the essential nature of thinking is conceived as gatheredness. The present day meaning of the term 'memory' as the power to recall was something alien to it originally. Moreover, it was not exclusively related to the past; the
present and the future too had a place in it. When expressed in phenomenological terms, memory carried with it retention, now, and protention. Thus Heidegger, like Husserl, affirms categorically that the act of reserving or holding back is not an act of memory, but rather a primary mode of the original givenness. The past, present, and future form a oneness of itself in the recollective thinking, when various shades of it are explored. The question which now needs to be answered is central to the new way of thinking. Heidegger asks: What calls for thinking? The answer can be given unhesitatingly: it is Being. Being and thinking belong to the same realm. In Hidegger's view, the original thinker is the one who gives a response to the call of Being. This response he considers as essential thought, a thought which gives priority to the authentic basis of man, i.e. his rootedness in Being. Unfortunately what we find in the present-day world is the forgetfulness of this essential relation, and the primary concern is centered around that-which-is.

Authentic thought is owned by Being and, at the same time, it makes a response to the call of Being. So the question "What calls for thinking?" naturally takes us to an
understanding of the need to be responding to the gift of
Being.

What it is that gives to us the gift of this endowment, and to ourselves, whose nature lies in
being gifted with this endowment. We are capable
of thinking only in so far as we are endowed with
what is most thought-provoking, gifted with what
ever and always wants to be thought about.

In recollective or originary thinking, thus, we
understand our relation to Being as essential; and there
arises, as a result, a feeling of thankfulness or
gratefulness for this gift. This, in turn, makes one
convinced that authentic life is the preservation of the
relation to Being as grateful thinking.

5.1.3. The Circularity in Understanding

When we elucidate the nature of understanding, it
often becomes noticeable that a certain pre-understanding is
required for any meaningful communication. We also realize
that this pre-understanding must constantly undergo
alteration or modification. This apparently simple
observation has serious implication relevant for the
contemporary philosophical debate.
5.1.3.1. The Forerunners in the Debate

It was Friedrich Schleiermacher who, having faced some problems in the Biblical exegesis, categorically asserted that complete knowledge involves an apparent circle. There is a fundamental relation underlying the whole and the parts. It means that, when a text is being interpreted, one can understand the part of the text only in relation to the whole and vice-versa.

August Boeckh, on the other hand, held the view that hermeneutic circularity is vicious and that the primary task of hermeneutics is, therefore, to overcome it. He even laid down certain methodological devices to meet this end. To start with, one is asked to proceed only from clear-cut examples that are sufficient to show the historical basis. This helps one to understand the principles governing a particular description. The second step is to apply these principles to more complex ones and thus to the entire text. This methodological procedure will finally help one to get out of the hermeneutic circle.

It was Wilhelm Dilthey who extended the application of this methodological technique beyond the
realm of text. If the whole-part relationship holds good in the textual interpretation, it can be used, argued Dilthey, even to explain the structural unity of life. The formation of a general rule was sufficient to widen the scope of hermeneutics. Dilthey, who was concentrating on the dynamism of historical life, developed hermeneutics bringing the life situation into prominence. The dynamism of life is such that the apparent vicious character of hermeneutic circularity does not demand any attention.

6.1.3.2. Circularity and the Challenge of Logic

Deductive logic is an important procedural technique in conceptual analysis relating to any field of enquiry. It cannot, therefore, be dispensed with in toto. The traditional principles of understanding regard logic and its maxims to be the highest laws of thought. Thus, from a vantage point of view all talk in favour of circularity commits the fallacy of petitio principii. Heidegger agrees with the point that "ordinary understanding demands that this circle be avoided because it violates logic." While making a reference to the fallacy, Heidegger wants to bring home two important ideas. First, he wants to make it clear that we are not committing the
fallacy; on the contrary, he calls for a distinct way of thinking quite different from a naive logical error. Second, a strict adherence to the laws of thought leads to the failure in grasping the true character of beginning or the meaning of the origin. It has already been dealt with in the context of the nature of the original identity of Being and nothing, which the traditional logic has failed to grasp. If circularity, as generally understood, is an empty repetition or a movement closed in upon itself, how does Heidegger defend his position? In Heidegger's view, if thought is to be true to its task, the circle is not to be avoided, but entered into. We are compelled to follow the circle, not as a defect; on the contrary, "to enter upon this path is the strength of thought, to continue on it is the feast of thought." The circularity we find from 'work to art' and from 'art to work' is a good example to the case we deal with.

We understand what art is from a piece of work of art. However, what the work is can be learned only from the essence of art. Here, obviously we are moving in a circle, which definitely cannot be avoided. For, in order to be able to distinguish works of art from other things, one must
know what art is. In the same way, what art is can be gathered only by a comparative consideration of available works of art. Thus, there is an inherent demand to enter the circle and to carry it out. But, Heidegger points out that the circularity we encounter in understanding a work of art is really rooted in the circular character of all human understanding.

5.1.3.3. The Hermeneutic Situation of Dasein's Being

A radical approach to the nature of understanding reveals that circularity is the very constitutive structure of understanding. All interpretation must move from a previous understanding, which may be implicit or vague, to a new understanding which can form the basis for further interpretations. Every case of interpretation, says Heidegger, is grounded in something we have in advance (fore-having), and something we see in advance (fore-sight), and something we grasp in advance (fore-conception).

From the Heideggerian point of view, the aim of interpretation is to make explicit what is given vaguely or implicitly. Something significant that emerges from this approach is that there is no possibility for a complete
understanding. The new understanding remains always ready for modifications, and thus to become a preunderstanding for the new experience.

Heidegger categorically asserts that hermeneutic circularity is not vicious. There is a hidden possibility in circularity, for it is a primordial kind of knowing. The hermeneutic circularity is co-existent with the question of the meaning of Being. Ontological knowledge presupposes pre-ontological understanding and all interpretations presuppose previous understanding of that which is interpreted. In Heidgger's view:

The circle in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein - that is in the understanding which interprets.

The term 'hermeneutic situation' is a name for the circularity of hermeneutic understanding which designates the totality of its presuppositions under the rubric of 'the existential fore-structure of Dasein.' To uncover the constitutive structures of Dasein we need a procedure suitable to its existential features.
If someone holds that it is a vicious circle, it is a serious lapse in two respects. First, understanding constitutes the basic structure of Dasein's Being. Second, the Being of Dasein is constituted as care and so to deny the circle is to make a secret of it, or to make an attempt to overcome it means finally to reinforce this failure.

Hermeneutic circularity can also be viewed in relation to the 'fore-structure' of Dasein. The existential constitution of Dasein is such that it requires an interpretative understanding. Heidegger remarks:

The circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move, it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself.

The existential analytic of Dasein is to make explicit the unique relations it has with Being. We need to move beyond what is already given and, hence, circularity coming on the way can never be viewed as something imposed on Dasein; on the contrary, it belongs, as noted earlier, to the existential constitution of Dasein.

The circle must be entered into, because it describes the precondition for the access to the question of
the meaning of Being. Heidegger insists that the circularity is unavoidable in the existential analytic, because such an analytic does not prove anything at all by the rules of the logic of consistency. The circularity of Dasein is a consequence of its way of Being. "The circular Being" of Dasein is evident when Dasein relates itself to beings in their Being and thereby reaching out to an understanding of Being. In short, the circle is an expression of the 'ontological difference'.

The experience of Being is the final goal of Heidegger's thought. The understanding of Being is different from discursive knowledge which is concerned with essents. The difference between them is at least in two respects. First, understanding is non-cumulative, whereas, knowledge is always progressive and cumulative. Since Heidegger does not make a difference between the act of knowing and description of an event, understanding is both pre-theoretical and articulated theoretical interpretation. Second, understanding cannot be transmitted. When one articulates understanding, what can be expected is that similar articulation takes place in others. There is no new knowledge other than what is there already. This is
precisely the reason why Heidegger avoids a logico-scientific investigation and keeps close affinity with poets, artists and craftsman. They make use of the primordial knowledge derived from experiential relation. The works which are the outcome of such an understanding express a vision. This union with Being is the primordial experience that occupies the whole of the Heideggerian thought.

5.1.4. The Saving Leap

A thorough examination of the works of Heidegger announces the fact that there is a deliberate attempt to resolve a series of conflicting principles which, from a logical point of view, go against the laws of thought. In Being and Time, there is a conflict between authentic and inauthentic aspects of Dasein's Being. In the essay On the Essence of Truth, Heidegger speaks of a conflict in which truth and untruth come into prominence. In Holzwege, there is a conflict between two primeval forces, the world and the earth.

For Heidegger, these apparently opposing principles are not something running parallel and avoids any
chance of convergence. They are only multiple meanings and there is a single unitary meaning in them. The originary thinking, according to Heidegger, will help us to see, recall, and hold together the meaning unaccustomed to ordinary speech. We always and already move within duality. In other words, language is a path within the duality. We can learn multiple meanings within duality, because the presence of what is present prevails and calls for saying and thinking. Heidegger says that the duality "speaks throughout language and maintains for it the possibility to tell, to state."

When multiple meanings come on the way or when a distinction becomes a conflict giving rise to a dialectical tension, or when two factors become poles apart, one naturally thinks of a leap rather than a reversal of basic contentions. But a leap is justifiable only when there is Being as the ground which makes the distinct poles to remain together possible.

A hermeneutic of understanding justifies such a leap. Dasein's understanding is not a gradual, step by step comprehension. It is an entry into the circle of understanding in the sense that from precognitive awareness
one moves towards an explicit understanding. This event which is basic to hermeneutic phenomenology is evident in Hidegger's development of basic notions. There is a leap from the active role of Dasein in the event of truth to the passivity in the face of that event. There is a leap from the emphasis on understanding latent in human project to the emphasis on the mystery latent in human mind. These are not radical changes in Heidegger's position; on the contrary, they show how two moments in a hermeneutic situation necessarily belong together or grounded in Being. It is unjustifiable to the spirit of hermeneutic approach to attribute these changes in emphasis to a total reversal in thought whereby one phase is subsumed under the other.

5.1.4.1. The Leap of a Single Vision

The leap we are probing into is a leap in meaning and relation where we move from representational thinking to a recollective mode of thinking which is basically revelatory of Being. This leap is not a sudden shift, but a process that requires a long and slow preparation. The process can be compared to the way in which one moves from a place familiar to a totally strange one. We explain things in terms of radical movement, making use of all that is in
common. Certain artful leaps are quite necessary in some stages. In the words of Heidegger:

In contrast to a steady progress, where we move unawares from one thing to the next, and everything remains alike, the leap takes us abruptly to where everything is different, so different that it strikes us as strange.

Here, there is no bridge; only a leap is possible.

The thinking which Heidegger advocates cannot be imparted to a novice by instructions. Unless we think for our own, we cannot follow the thought. As he puts it, "We shall never learn what is called swimming, for example, or what it 'calls for' by reading a treatise on swimming." We have to play our part, and it is precisely for this reason that Heidegger thinks aloud in front of us in the book What is Called Thinking. We are asked to think with him or more correctly leap with him when it becomes necessary. When one is part of the process of the thinking that takes place, the leap may go even unnoticed. "We therefore shall take a few practice leaps right at the start, though we won't notice it at once, nor need to."

Heidegger always taught us that his thinking is a way. It is a path one has to walk upon, for a talk or
discourse on it may hardly help one to traverse it. He writes, "If we are to remain underway we must first of all and constantly give attention to the way. The movement step by step is what is essential here." The movement in the path is not something extraneous to thinking. In other words, the way Heidegger's thought moves coincides with what he thinks. Though distinguishable, they are, in fact, not separate. Thinking is a gathering, a gathering of what-lies-before-us. Heidegger's thought, therefore, only indicates the path and it is everyone's lot to follow it or not. However, one is always reminded of the fact that the way one has shown is only one way of thinking, perhaps may not be the right way. Then it is the one who traverse in the forest path who can choose accordingly any path to one's thinking.

5.2.0. Kehre from a Theological Perspective

Another way of looking at the question of Kehre is to examine the theological roots of Heidegger's thought. Heidegger was very sensitive to the religious decline that affected the Christian way of life. The primitive Christian experience was swept away in the strong wind of modernity and cultural invasion. The forgetfulness of Being, to
which Heidegger addresses himself, has got indirect
relations to the situation of modern man resulting from "the
death of God". There is a forgetfulness of the primitive
experience which resulted in a deviation from lived
experience to detached contemplation. The birth of theology
or science of God paved way for the fall of religious life
where there is no experience of God. The absence of a
concrete lived experience made metaphysics as that which
thinks Being as a constant being-present-at-hand. It failed
to do justice to the temporality of factical life.
Heidegger categorically states that there is no room for a
metaphysical God (i.e. the God of onto-theology) or
supersensible reality in the primitive Christian experience.
It was rather an experiential relation and was mysterious in
nature.

5.2.1. Eschatological Dimension of Factual Existence

The Christian conception of parousia or the second
coming of Christ is an important theme of the Heideggerian
concern. The original Christian experience of waiting which
is rooted in hope is seen reflected in this notion. In
fact, Heidegger's notion of authenticity arises from these
interrelated concepts. The significance of parousia is that
it is a constant and enduring waiting for an event that can take place in any moment of time in the future. But to understand \textit{parousia} as a form of waiting is to restrict the meaning intended by it. It is not merely a waiting for a future event that chronologically has to take place. Heidegger observes that in the original Christian experience one cannot find such an objective structure of time which is a clear case of conceptualization. St Paul in his letters does not speak about the time of the event, rather he tells the Thessalonians: "You know quite exactly!" It means that the obvious reference is to a kind of knowledge that lies beyond the realm of objective events. The responsibility of taking a decision rested on the Thessalonians, which was an experience of fulfilment or self-accomplishment. Thus, for Heidegger the primitive Christian life became a prototype for an authentic life which is factual and historical.

\textit{Parousia} is not "an event among other objectively present events, but in sober, attentive preparedness for a wholly unobjectifiable grasping of the self." This eschatological waiting is an authentic experience. Authenticity, if correctly viewed, means the self-
recollection and self-discovery, and parousia is the practical realization of it. In his 1927 lecture on "Phenomenology and Theology", Heidegger tries to draw a line of demarcation between philosophy and theology and shows that his conception of authenticity is philosophical in import. But for the one who is familiar with the background of the Heideggerian thought and the Christian way of life, the extent to which the primitive Christian experience became a prototype to authenticity is clear. From the above examination of Heidegger's association with the Judeo-Christian theology, one can arrive at some valuable insights, which may shed light on the question of Kehre. The authentic life from a theological point of view is to establish a close relation between God and the individual. This relation, which is currently established, is not something de novo, but a going back to the primordial relation the individual previously enjoyed. The awareness of the possibility of beatific vision intensifies the authenticity. Thus, an authentic person is open to the call of God at any moment of his life. God, in response, reveals Himself to him.
In the context of the Heideggerian thought it is the relation between Being and Dasein that constitutes authenticity. Dasein's relation with Being is primordial, and an authentic life is to remain in the proximity to Being. Dasein's call to authentic life starts with anxiety. But Dasein's awareness of itself as Being-towards-death intensifies authenticity. Here, death is not viewed as an end, as something happening instantaneously at the end. The move from inauthenticity to authenticity can never be viewed as a reversal or turn in one's life. It is a recapturing of the lost meaning of existence as well as a determination to remain in authenticity in future. Such a change took place in the life of St Augustine. The Heideggerian conception of Dasein too envisages such a going back to the primordial relation with Being from which it got estranged. Viewed from this perspective, authenticity is Dasein's resoluteness to remain in relation to Being. Here, Kehre acquires a new meaning; it is no more a reversal, or a return to the sources, but it is an intensification of authenticity. Moreover, it means to confront the source (Being) no more as the origin, but as the finality.
5.2.2. The Temporality of Factual Existence

Heidegger's preoccupation with time can be traced back to his Habilitation lecture delivered at Freiburg University in 1915, where he spoke mainly on "The Concept of Time in Historiography". It shows that even before the publication of Being and Time, the urgent need for a new conception of time began to be felt in him. The thoughts of Dilthey and Count Paul Yorck contributed positively to exploration of the various dimension of historicity. It is in this period his attention turned more on primitive Christianity and to the religious thoughts of St Augustine.

Heidegger's lectures on "Phenomenology of Religion" which were delivered at Freiburg, while he was a Privatedozent deal with the religious consciousness of the early Christians and the way they experienced time historically. Heidegger's conception of facticity is, to a great extent, rooted in this primeval experience of Christianity. He understands historical time as the epiphany of that which gives itself. The Hebrews too, it must be noted, experienced the meaning of history as an epiphany of God. Here, the Heideggerian concern is
primarily directed to make us think about the origin of time.

It is Heidegger's basic stand that factical existence is constituted not by events that take place at a definite time, but by the significance of performance that may befall unexpectedly. Heidegger prefers to have a chairological reckoning of time rather than a chronological one. This refusal of chronological occurrence of events as the primordial constitutents of factical life is, again, seen in the early Christian experience. St Paul in his letter to the Thessalonians says:

But it is not necessary to write you, beloved brothers, about times and hours, for you, yourselves certainly know that the day of Lord will come like a thief in the night.

The historical time as the epiphany of that which gives itself is different from chronological time. A chronological account of time gives primacy to the significance of contents, where time, as the succession of moments, play the key role. However, in a chairological reckoning of time the emphasis is on the significance of performance. The one who is accustomed to chronological computation of time tries in vain to make secure and
accessible what is basically inaccessible. Moreover, the content-oriented approach to time objectifies the contents for our scrutiny and evaluation and thereby destroys life's dominant structures which are grounded in the significance of performance rather than in contents.

It has been noted earlier that the circularity of understanding which Dasein confronts is a consequence of its way of Being. Now, it can be said that the circularity of understanding is the character of the temporality of Dasein. This temporality or the temporal movement is characteristic to Heidegger's concept of time which is akin to the factical experience of time in early Christian life. The primordial time is historical. It does not begin in an a-historic starting point; on the contrary, it finds itself as "always already" began. If the beginning is not a-historic and pregiven, it naturally follows that the beginning is already underway and is moving towards the possible end. This circularity of time points to the fact that there is a sort of wholeness ingredient to it. The anticipatory wholeness is not complete, but it is already begun and is underway.

This characteristic feature of time will definitely make its impact on one's thought, for it is the
mainspring that regulates all the pursuits one undertakes. Here, the beginning is not static, but is characterized by ecstatic origination. The whole process is dynamic, and the beginning paves way for that which has to follow. The later development never leaves the beginning into obscurity. Moreover, it is not a sheer repetition of the same.

Heidegger's fondness for the 'non-metaphysical' thinking of Parmenides is mainly due to the fact that he gave emphasize to Being-process, or more specifically to the temporal process which is the core of struggle that persists between concealedness and unconcealedness. This process is not static, but spins new possibilities into it. Therefore, return to authentic life is essentially endowed with a new beginning. The return to authenticity or to the primordial relation with Being demands a shifting of locus. It is the beginning of looking at the past and future from a different perspective. This is another reason why Heidegger speaks of the origin as an occurrence of truth. Circular though it appears, there is definitely a dislocation of essential concerns. In short, the temporal circle discloses not concentric, but heterocentric circles paving way for growth and novelty and at the same time a return to primordial relation to Being.