Chapter II
CHAPTER II

FREEDOM, FACTICITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
THE SARTREAN ELUCIDATION

Despite great diversities in his writings that range from ontological treatise to political journalism, film scenarios and a variety of literary works, the central theme that runs through Sartre's works is his passionate interest in man. He always tried to highlight the primacy of human existence: of oneself, of the other and also of their world. While elucidating the characteristics of man, the Sartrean ideas are profoundly moral and humanistic.

2.1. An Introduction to Sartre's Ontology

Sartre's existentialism which highlights the significance of human existential predicaments has its basic theme contained in his major philosophical treatise Being and Nothingness. There are two aspects of this great work which mark it as a model of existentialist thought. The first is its unique treatment of the concretely existing, conscious, particular, individual human being, i.e. the being-for-itself. The second characteristic feature of the
book is its treatment of the key concept of human freedom. The significance of this treatise lies in the fact that one cannot understand the extent of human freedom unless one can understand what it is to be a human being. This great masterpiece on existentialism substantiates both these aspects.

*Being and Nothingness* received enormous attention from all over the world with its passionate arguments against all kinds of determinism and also for its ardent support to human freedom. This treatise explores the meaning of our involvement and action in the world. At its most profound sense it substantiates a strikingly original discussion on the ways in which individuals make themselves unique: of their consciousness, their subjectivity, their role as centres of meaning, sources of values, creators of possibilities and so on.

In this great philosophical work, Sartre also explores how conflict with others, alienation from the world, from other fellow beings, and constant frustration of our projects are all equally rooted in the very structure of human existence. Not only are total freedom and
responsibility examined but also man as a useless passion and the other as hell are intensely and carefully discussed in Sartre's "essay on phenomenological ontology."

For Sartre, there are no ready-made answers and objective norms to guide our destinies and to give them meaning. There are only our personal commitments. By rejecting the existence of God, Sartre affirms that the God's commandments do not give rise to values, nor do they have an a priori source. Sartre wants to make a new beginning totally. Man has no pre-given nature, instead man's nature is his freedom, i.e. his open-endedness. When Sartre affirms that there is no given human nature, he does not mean that human life is just a succession of disjointed happenings. The unity of human actions indicates that the past is retained and the future is projected, both intersecting in the vibrant present.

The meaning of human existential condition is not anything given in advance. It is constantly being created as well as revised. Although there is no universal human nature, Sartre speaks of a universal human condition such that we are all born, we all live, labour and die. Sartre's
existentialist motto is "existence precedes essence." This would, in other words, mean that subjectivity must be the starting point of our philosophical enterprise. We must do so not because subjectivity is a convenient starting point but because man has become a problem unto himself. His problem is his own existence. Through his descriptive phenomenological ontology Sartre underlines the fact that philosophy is an inquiry concerning human reality and any thought which is outside this area stands to be invalid.

2.2. Ontological Convictions of Sartre: Being and the Two Realms of Being - A Prelude to Freedom

As I understand it, Sartre's phenomenological ontology is essentially human. Existentialism for Sartre is an ontology which seeks to determine the nature of being via an investigation of man's being, thus indebting himself to Heidegger. It also seeks to determine the complete expression of phenomenology thus indebting himself to Husserl and Hegel (as we have seen in the first chapter). In Sartre's own words:

Existentialism cannot be regarded as a philosophy of quietism since it defines man by his action; nor as a pessimistic description of man, for no doctrine is more optimistic, the destiny of man is
placed within himself. Nor is it an attempt to
discourage man from action since it tells him that
there is no hope except in his action and that the
one thing which permits him to have life is the
deed, ethic of action and self-commitment.  1

For Sartre, a preliminary definition of being is
impossible. Its possibility would lead us either to
paradoxes or to infinite regress. He adopts the
phenomenological method which can provide an authentic
approach to the nature of being. Taken in its most
fundamental sense, phenomenology is a direct looking into or
an inspection of the giveness of sensory experience. Such
an inspection confronts us, first of all, with
`appearances.' These appearances are, in the sense, that we
are presented with them. They would not be appearances
unless they are appeared. If these appearances are, then,
according to Sartre, we have located being, for appearance
is being. Thus "if appearance is, being is, and this is the
sole manner of defining being."  2

It is essential to the understanding of Sartre's
doctrine of being to distinguish it to two realms, viz. the
pour-soi (the being-for-itself) and en-soi (the being-in-
itsel). The being-for-itself in its most primordial sense
is consciousness. For Sartre, speculation begins with the Cartesian cogito, which is taken to be the root of all judgements and cognition. Consciousness is according to Sartre, "an absolute truth founded upon the immediate grasp which consciousness has of itself, and as such is the basis of all other certain truths."³

Sartre recognizes that there is a pre-reflective as well as reflective cogito. It is through the examination of this pre-reflective cogito that the for-itself gets a general understanding of the other pole of being, viz. the being-in-itself.

Moreover, the pre-reflective cogito is the basis for relating consciousness to objects for there can be no consciousness where there is no reference to an object.⁴ Consciousness cannot exist apart from its active unfolding in the acts of consciousness. Consciousness is thus the source of its own manner of being and is the identity of appearance and existence, i.e. consciousness exists to the extent to which it 'appears' and the absoluteness of consciousness consists in the identity of its appearance and existence.
Sartre's recourse to the pre-reflective cogito therefore enables him to escape from the infinite regress of knowing-known. This is because Sartre contends:

Coincidence of existence and appearance indicates that the pre-reflective cogito is an absolute in the order of existence and a condition of all knowledge.

In Sartre's conception, consciousness is more than reflection. All consciousness is consciousness of something. Consciousness intends some object in the world. Sartre asserts that what is intended by the consciousness is some transphenomenal being beyond consciousness. The realm of transphenomenal being is the realm of en-soi. For Sartre, the en-soi is the rough, is-ness of being, the brute confrontation of being, the stuff of the world. Thus the being of consciousness faces the being of the phenomenon, i.e. the pour-soi faces the en-soi and they remain alien to and severed from each other. To describe more the being-in-itself, it is the non-conscious being. It is characterized by a complete incapacity for any relationship to itself. It is in Sartre's highly metaphorical language "opaque" and it coincides exactly with itself. It is the pure opaque
positivity of which we can only say that it is and it is also a plenitude.

I would like to contrast the being-in-itself to consciousness or the being-for-itself, which is not static. It is passionately involved in temporality. In an attempt to define the for-itself Sartre clarifies that, "it is not what it is, it is what it is not," i.e. the for-itself cannot be expounded by reference exclusively to its past or to its present alone. But its future must also be taken into account. Sartre says that the being-for-itself, as present, cannot be seized as such. It is in a state of flight. The present is a perpetual flight in the face of being and that whenever we experience the present it is in the form of flight. We cannot truly seize the present in any of its instants, for these instants themselves are in flight. (Flight here indicates the intentionality of consciousness.)

With regard to the functions of the \( \text{pour-soi} \), Sartre points out that it engages itself in an active process of setting up relations. It introduces unity, meaning and purpose into the realm of the in-itself. It
brings about growth, decay and destruction. It illuminates the chaotic mass of aggregates leading them to unity. In short, in the absence of the for-itself, there cannot be a unified universe.

I would add that, inspite of all these functions, the for-itself is endowed with ontological deficiencies. The consciousness or the for-itself is imperfection or impoverisation of existence, for it is a lack or a want. The scatteredness of consciousness contributes to a split or discontinuity within the unity of consciousness which appears as a lack or a want. A want indicates the absence of fullness. It is on the basis of this deficiency that Sartre defines the for-itself as, "it is not what it is, it is what it is not."

The for-itself is its own surpassing towards what it lacks. It surpasses itself towards the particular being which it would be if it were what it is. The for-itself is not something which exists first in order to lack this or that afterwards. It exists always as a lack. Thus the event by which the for-itself rises as a presence in the world is apprehended by itself as its own lack. In its
coming into existence, the for-itself grasps itself as an incomplete being. It is this incomplete conscious being, a being with lack confronts itself with negation, another equally important notion of Sartre apart from being.

2.3. The Relation of Nothingness to Being

My initial task in the previous sub-section was to elucidate the Sartrean understanding of being and the two modes of being: the-being-for-itself and the-being-in-itself. Then naturally another question arises: what is negation? When one asks this question, one has hinted at the nature of nothingness, for each question that one asks, there exists the possibility of a negative answer. Sartre considers several varieties of negation: (a) the negation in knowing is of conceptual order. If a person says, "the dog is not a cat," he, according to Sartre, is formulating a conceptual negation. It has got an epistemological sense, (b) if a person remarks, "Pierre is not here," after he had expected to find Pierre to be there, then that person is uttering a negation which is not purely conceptual, rather it has got an ontological significance.
Sartre explains the being of nothingness in the following example: Let us say that Pierre did not wait for me at the appointed time. I came to the place where we were supposed to have met and I did not see Pierre there. When I looked at the scene where I was supposed to meet him, everything that I saw underwent a "nihilation" (neantisation). When I am looking for Pierre, at the scene where he is supposed to be present, there is for me a disappearance of objects. The nihilated form of Pierre rises between my look and the objects upon which my look is directed. The nothingness of Pierre is in opposition to the nothingness of objects because nothingness of Pierre "haunts" the scene. This is what Sartre means when he states that nothingness haunts being and nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being.  

Being has priority over nothingness in the sense that there can be being without nothingness. But there can be no nothingness unless there has been being. Sartre insists:

It is necessary to find the foundation of all negation in a nihilation which would be exercised at the very core of immanence. It is in absolute immanence, in the pure subjectivity of the
instantaneous cogito, that we must discover the original act by which man is to himself his own nothingness.

The original negation or nothingness arises from the pre-reflective cogito because the cogito is not. To put differently, Sartre says that in rising from the heart of being, consciousness creates and sustains its essence - the synthetic arrangement of its possibilities. He implies that the pre-reflective consciousness is (exists) only in so far as it does realize its possibilities. But if the possibilities are "possibles" (i.e. if they lie in the future), then the possibility of their not being realized exists. This is negation in its root form. When we consider the possibilities of the for-itself, it refers to the freedom to choose a goal which in Sartre's ontology is synonymous with the for-itself.

2.4. The Sartrean Elucidation of Freedom

Like major thinkers of his time, Sartre gave himself over without reservation to the invention of a theme - a theme pursued with immense energy, elaborated with originality and yet in an increasingly self-critical spirit.
with a compelling and coherent vision of the world - a theme focussed on human freedom.

Sartre upholds: "Man cannot be sometimes a slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free, or he is not free at all."12 This quotation of Sartre should not be taken in its literal sense. Sartre's contention is that freedom is not a quality like being rich, poor or healthy. The usages "slave," and "not free at all" are expressed to indicate indirectly the fullness of freedom. According to him man is freedom. It is the freedom to choose a goal from various alternatives thrown open to the individual. The above mentioned usages can be adapted to a situation where the human reality becomes unaware of its freedom. The freedom which Sartre elucidates is realized through individual actions. Man's actions can be judged with reference to his particular mode of existence which itself is a free self-determined choice. His freedom reveals his firm determination to exist the way he wants to be and it also establishes his relation to himself, to the world and to other fellow beings.
In Sartre's opinion, ontology can be and must be discussed from the stand-point of freedom. In order to determine what a free existent is, consciousness must detach itself in its imagination from the physical frame seeming it to be something impersonally other than its own consciousness. It must go beyond itself towards its meaning, must see what is lacking in it in order to return to it with a grasp of self-identity. Sartre opines:

What we call freedom is impossible to be distinguished from the being of human reality. Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently. There is no difference between the being of the man and his being free.  

To put it differently man is freedom. Therefore freedom is absolute. It extends to everything that is human. No one can separate the for-itself from its freedom. All modes of the for-itself equally make manifest its freedom. Sartre while referring to the freedom of oneself adds that there is no freedom in which the other and I participate. From the Sartrean stand-point man is condemned to be free. [A person condemned (to death) is totally and irrevocably filled with the horror of death. There is no way to escape either from the jail/cell where he
is imprisoned or from his awareness of the tyranny of death. To be condemned would mean having no way to escape. So is the case with the for-itself with regard to freedom; the for-itself has no way to escape from or discard its freedom, for it is condemned to be free. This means that no limits can be assigned to freedom except in freedom itself or that we are not free to cease to be free.

Sartre's contention regarding a free existent can be summed up as: (i) an existent who as consciousness is necessarily separated from others; (ii) an existent who decides the meaning of its past in the present in the light of the future; (iii) an existent who makes known to itself what it is by means of something other than it, i.e. by ends, projects or goals.

In short, an existent acknowledges its own consciousness, existence and freedom as necessarily separated from that of the other. An existent's present existence can be elucidated only in relation to its past and also to its future possibilities. Again an existent derives the meaningfulness of its existence not merely from its past and present but also from its future projects or goals.
I would like to add that there is scope for anxiety within the domain of freedom of the for-itself. In the moment of choosing a goal from various alternatives, the for-itself becomes aware of its helplessness and alienation with regard to the choice it makes along with a sense of responsibility for its choice. This induces anxiety in the for-itself. Anxiety plays an important role in the freedom of the for-itself.

2.5. The Consciousness of Freedom as Anguish

Sartre adapts this notion of anguish from Heidegger's notion of Angst. Anguish is often confused and wrongly identified with fear. It must be noted that in fear there is an element of threatening which can be eliminated. That is, fear has a fearsome in it. It always has a solution. It is ontic (empirical) in character. Fear is a kind of emotion. In contrast to fear, in anxiety there is nothing extraneous threatening the individual. It is the for-itself's finitude that threatens itself. It is ontological in character. In anxiety, one's awareness of one's own finitude is that which is threatening oneself. This means, anxiety arises from within the individual when
he becomes aware that he has no other option but to face his freedom.

In Sartre's own words: "Fear is the fear of beings in the world ... whereas anguish is anguish before myself." In other words, in fear the danger is outside the for-itself and in anguish, it is within the for-itself. It is the feeling that grips the for-itself like a vertigo. It evolves when the for-itself realizes that it is alone and helpless, separated from others and it alone has to carry out its responsibilities.

Anguish is therefore inscribed within the existential condition of being human, since it is nothing but the sense of our freedom and our self-consciousness. Sartre writes:

I emerge alone and in anguish confronting the unique and original project which constitutes my being. All the barriers, all the guardrails collapse nihilated by the consciousness of freedom. I do not have nor can I have recourse to any value against the fact that it is I who sustain the values in being. Nothing can ensure me against myself, cut off from the world and from my essence, from this nothingness which I am. I have to realize the meaning of the world and of my essence. I make my decision concerning them - without justification and without excuse."
I would like to summarize that the moment in which an individual becomes aware of the fact that he is free, anguish sweeps into him. At this moment he realizes that by making the (right) choice, he has to inculcate the values within him. There is no one but himself to ensure him of his freedom to choose. The world and his fellowman have no part in his decision making choice. By his freedom to choose he understands the meaning of the world and also that of his own existence. Neither any justification nor any excuse can be given by the individual for making or not making his choice. All these adds to his anxiety.

Thus it is through anguish that the human reality becomes intensely conscious of its freedom. Anxiety reveals the immediate givenness of freedom. It is therefore impossible to stifle or even hide it. It is not an external object from which we can turn our look or our attention. To deny anguish is always a mode of being conscious of it. Anguish surges within the individual when he encounters his freedom.
2.6. Confrontation With Other's Freedom

According to Sartre, man makes himself what he wants to be in his existential situations in the presence of the other. An individual's awareness of his own existence gives him an awareness of the existence of the other, for he can say 'I am' only when he separates himself from the other. Sartre expresses himself saying that "Others are the other, i.e. the self which is not mine." The other appears as an individual originally and primarily as a body. The presence of the body makes one aware of the concrete existence of the other. This is what Sartre has in his mind when he remarks: "Being-seen-by-the-other" is the truth of "seeing-the-other." Sartre goes on to illustrate this view by narrating the example of a peeping Tom, i.e. a person who peeps through the key-hole to see what is going on in a room. But after a while, the peeping Tom becomes aware of another person watching him from behind. This realization of being watched by somebody induces a sense of shame in the peeping Tom. The peeping Tom feels as if he is only an object for the other's look. The other's look weighs heavily on him. The peeping Tom feels quite helpless on being caught red-handed in his vulgar act of peeping. He
also becomes aware of the fact that at each instant the other is looking at him. 19

The other's look enables him ever to sustain himself as the subject, transforming the peeping person (Tom) into an object. This objectification fills Tom with shame. In Sartre's opinion: "Shame is to realize that I am an object of other's look." 20 It is to apprehend oneself as seen by the other, to comprehend oneself as submitting most unwillingly and yet helplessly to the unpredictable judgement and evaluation of the other.

On account of the other's look, subjectivity as well as freedom of the for-itself flow towards the other. The for-itself feels an emptiness within. As a subject, and therefore, as boundless freedom, the other fixes all the possibilities of the for-itself and reveals to it the limitations of its possibilities and yet not revealing the limitations of his subjectivity. By his look, the other becomes a "transcendence transcended," 21 i.e. though the other and the for-itself are transcendent beings, he overcomes the transcendence of the for-itself by his look. His look cancels the distance between himself and the for-
itself. His look haunts the for-itself even in his absence, i.e. his look discloses a distanceless presence. As an object, the for-itself is forced to submit itself to the whims and fancies of the other. The other's presence in this world is an absolute, self-evident, but a contingent fact, i.e. a fact impossible to deduce from the ontological structures of the for-itself.

This sort of confrontation with the other's freedom makes the for-itself realize the limitations of its own freedom. When these two kinds of freedom are confronted, there arise the problem of intersubjectivity. Between the other and the for-itself there is a reciprocal and dynamic relation which is essentially conflictual in character. Sartre points out that:

Everything that goes for me goes for the other. While I try to free myself from the grip of the other, he tries to free himself from mine. While I try to enslave the other, he tries to enslave me.

Thus it follows from this that relations with the other is essentially conflict. Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others. Sartre's examination of intersubjective relation in terms of conflict does not end
with his philosophical works. He gives concrete shape and a real form to it in his literary works. In the fourth chapter of this thesis, there will be illustrations from The Wall and No Exit to elucidate the above theme.

The Sartrean approach to the confrontation between the freedom of the other and that of the for-itself is more realistic than his approach towards the nature of intersubjective relationship which results as a consequence of the said confrontation. There is a difficulty to accept Sartre's conclusion of intersubjectivity, viz. intersubjective relations essentially involve conflict, i.e. reciprocal relation of mutual negation. Sartre is universalizing a partial experience, i.e. conflicts and differences arise (among people) in human relationships. But we cannot therefore conclude that our intersubjective relations consist only of such phenomena. There can be a counter model to Sartre's which is characterized by various attitudes like love, masochism, hatred, etc. There are innumerable positive attitudes in life for setting up very stable relationships like deep rooted understanding, strong faith, passionate commitment, selfless love and the like.
Every man has positive and negative attitudes. It is not correct to stress only the negative attitudes. It is a wrong way to weigh intersubjective relationships.

It is true that attitudes like love, masochism, hatred, indifference, sadism, desire, etc. are present in man. But there is something else too, over and above all these. If conflict becomes the essence of all intersubjective relationships, then, human social fabric like family, friendship, etc. will collapse and will cease to exist. Then the essence of man which is developed through the process of making himself would not lead anywhere.

Sartre's explanation for confrontation (of freedom) between the other and the for-itself and his conclusion of conflictual intersubjectivity are justified on his account of the self-deceptive attitude (bad faith) of the for-itself.

2.7. The Inevitable Bad Faith: Justification for Intersubjectivity and Freedom

Sartre holds that the spontaneity of consciousness is responsible for two important features of human
existence. Firstly, it is responsible for the dread or anxiety that pervades our existence. This dread is caused by our own awareness of the consequence of freedom. Because of this dread, the for-itself is subjected to all sorts of absurdities during its existence, ignoring the fact that it is a free existent. Secondly, it is responsible for what Sartre calls bad faith. In order to escape from the dread, the for-itself must lie unto itself and thus deny its own spontaneity. (This is what happens when the other's look objectifies the for-itself.) Then it must think of itself as a being determined by a character or personality though, this novel, contextually self-imposed personality cannot be identified with its original personality.

In order to escape from the dread of confronting its limitless freedom, the for-itself adopts roles and slips into fake personalities. In Being and Nothingness Sartre remarks:

The determined attitude which is essential to human reality and which is such that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward, turns it towards itself. This attitude is bad faith (mauvaise foi). 23
What it means is this. Self-deception is a determined and deliberate, negative attitude of the for-itself directed towards itself and which is essential to the for-itself in an attempt to flee from a particular situation where it would have realized its freedom.

Sartre points out that bad faith has some elements common with a lie. However, he points out that bad faith is fundamentally different from the lie insofar as the bad faith is a lie to oneself. Sartre insists that:

In bad faith, it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here as in the case of a lie. Bad faith, on the contrary, implies in essence, the unity of a single consciousness.

In short, bad faith originates from the for-itself and it is the same for-itself that gets affected by bad faith, i.e. consciousness affects itself with bad faith. This project implies a comprehension of bad faith as such and a pre-reflective apprehension of consciousness as affecting itself with bad faith. It follows that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same. Here arises the problem of duality of facticity and transcendence.
Facticity refers to the for-itself being a fact. It means the for-itself's being a fact confronted by its future, past as well as its present. It's future refers to its transcendence. Bad faith arises when the for-itself fails to have a compromise between these two modes of existence: the past and the present on the one hand and future on the other. The for-itself cannot exist apart from facticity and transcendence. Its existence is encapsulated by both these modes of existence. Sartre remarks:

Even though the existence of bad faith is very precarious and though it belongs to a kind of psychic structure which one might call "metastable" (subject to sudden changes and transitions) it presents nonetheless an autonomous and durable form. It is the normal aspect of life for a great number of people. A person can live in bad faith which does not mean that he does not have abrupt awakenings to cynicism or to good faith, but it implies a constant and particular style of life. Our embarrassment then appears extreme since we neither reject nor comprehend bad faith.

What Sartre intends to convey here is that though contextually dependant, bad faith is a normal aspect of life with the full awareness of the person who is undergoing that experience in the same manner in which he is conscious of his good faith and cynicism.
Sartre defines, as mentioned above, the for-itself as, "it is not what it is, it is what it is not." The for-itself is what it is not in the sense that it is its possibilities, it is what it has not yet realized. It is freedom. The for-itself is not what it is in the sense that it is not its body, its past, or its environment. According to Sartre, there are no ready-made answers and objective norms to guide our lives and to give them meaning. There are only our personal commitments. But in bad faith human reality keeps separate what it is from what it is not. Each human reality displays bad faith which is due to the inappropriate relationship between facticity and transcendence. This inappropriation manifests itself in two ways: (1) the inappropriate relation within oneself. It is a role-play, i.e. identifying oneself with the role one plays, and (2) the inappropriate relation between oneself and the other as in the case of the peeping Tom.

I would like to mention the views of (Sigmond) Freud who takes into consideration a similar theme while discussing the division of psyche. The distinction between the 'Id' and 'Ego' results in the fundamental division of
the psyche. Freud holds that the unconscious activities of the psyche are suppressed by the conscious part, viz. the ego, resulting in split personality.

But Sartre rejects the Freudian psychoanalytic interpretation. The Freudian division, Sartre points out, destroys the unity of the self. The very act of hiding something from oneself implies the unity of one and the same psychic mechanism and consequently a double activity in the heart of unity, tending on the one hand to maintain and locate the fact to be concealed and on the other to repress and disguise it. These two attitudes are complementary to each other, both originating from one and the same psyche, i.e. in bad faith, we succeed in convincing ourselves that our lies to ourselves are true. The paradox lies in the fact that we are conscious of lying to ourselves and yet, believe in our lies.

To clarify this paradox, Sartre dwells on the nature of bad faith by differentiating it from good faith. He points out that in knowing anything, the evidence should be convincing, apodictic. These two kinds of faiths are to be distinguished in the context of evidence. In good faith
we decide on what is reasonably convincing as the stable evidence. But in bad faith, we first decide to accept what is given unquestionably and do not demand satisfactory evidence for our acceptance of it. In good faith we have an awareness that we are freedom and we understand that we can exist only by trying to be what we freely choose to become utilizing our freedom. But we recognize at the same time that the very flight towards that being will never be achieved as an identity as both good faith and bad faith refer to relatively transitory behaviour, they slide into each other.

It is a fact that the first instinctive act of bad faith is that the for-itself (affected by bad faith) tries to flee from what it is, viz. freedom. If bad faith is possible, it is because there is an immediate, permanent threat to every free project of human being. Consciousness conceals in its being a permanent risk of bad faith. This risk originates from the very nature of consciousness as that it is not what it is but it is what it is not.

I would like to express my opinion with regard to bad faith. From Sartre's perspective one irrevocable fact
is the existence of bad faith and also of good faith in human reality. None of these can be ruled out completely. But his rejection of a given human nature, in my opinion, is inconsistent with his elucidation of bad faith. To him there is no given human nature, for existence precedes essence. The for-itself first of all exists, confronts itself, emerges into the world and then defines itself. In short, man makes himself. We cannot ascribe beforehand that the for-itself should be like this or like that. The freedom of the self in its entirety belongs to the for-itself. Here occurs the difficulty with regard to bad faith which Sartre regards as a form of normal indulgence in the worldly affairs of the for-itself. If that is the case, is it not a universal found in the for-itself? Is it not an emphasizing indirectly of a commonly found phenomenon (of self deception) in/of human reality? Again, if there is no given human nature, how can Sartre bring human reality under one definition — "it is not what it is, it is what it is not?" This generalization of human reality through which Sartre seeks to explain bad faith thus goes against some of his earlier convictions.
The uncompromising attitude of the for-itself towards its facticity and transcendence according to Sartre leads to bad faith. Then another question which come to my mind it this: is the for-itself alone responsible for bad faith? It is true that the for-itself is the one who experiences responsibility. But often it is burdened by social norms. And, consequently, it is forced to take refuge in bad faith because it hesitates to utilize its freedom to overcome a difficult situation out of fear of the kind of response it may receive from the society. Since the for-itself is a social being, living within the four walls of society, it is forced to adopt or accept some socially acceptable norms. Even Sartre accepts one's environment as one of the coefficients of adversity which limits the freedom of the for-itself. If its freedom of expression is of an extremely radical kind, it will encounter enormous difficulties and thus the for-itself becomes answerable to the society. Here arises the possibility of bad faith. In order to avoid the measuring eyes of the public, it slips into different roles to avoid embarrassing situations. In this manner, society becomes partially responsible for the bad faith of the for-itself.
As long as man (the for-itself) lives in the society, mingling or socializing with people around who are endowed with different attitudes, it plays different roles which suits its environment to win over a particular moment of life. As long as bad faith harms nobody, it is only a tactful attitude to overcome a difficult situation, a unique, useful way of living. Even the very thought of avoiding bad faith from the consciousness is nothing but a moment of bad faith. Bad faith, anxiety, resistances or obstacles against the free choice occur in a particular situation or context during the existence of the for-itself. Thus situation and free-choice are interdependent.

2.8. The Situation and The Coefficients of Adversity of the For-itself

Sartre reminds us that the for-itself exists only insofar as it is engaged in situations. Man encounters obstacles only in the domain of his freedom. The relationship between situation and freedom is dialectical. Freedom exists only in a situation and a situation exists only if the for-itself is free. In Sartre's own words:

The human reality encounters everywhere resistances and obstacles which it has not
created. But these resistances and these obstacles have meaning only in and through the free choice which is the human reality.  

In other words, Sartre describes this relation as "being-there." It is through being-there that the for-itself assigns meaning to its existence. Thus the situation is the result of the confrontation of the for-itself with the other and the in-itself amidst the coefficients of adversity. It stands for five factual limitations (facticities) which obstruct human freedom. They include, one's place, one's past, one's environment, one's fellowman and finally one's awareness of death. I wish to explain them briefly.

2.8.1. One's Place: It is naturally where the for-itself exists or lives. It also includes all the objects and other individuals which/who appear before it. It is impossible for an individual not to occupy a place. The for-itself exists in its place without choice, without necessity as the pure absolute fact of its being-there. This is an absolute and incomprehensible fact, a fact of pure contingency - an absurd fact.  

Sartre affirms:  

I shall apprehend myself at any moment whatsoever as engaged in the world at my contingent place. But it is precisely this engagement which gives
meaning to my contingent place and which is my freedom. To be sure, in being born, I take a place. But I am responsible for the place which I take. The fact is that I assign meaning to my current state of existence in a particular place. Here we can see clearly the inextricable connection between freedom and facticity in a situation.

Here I would like to supplement that the place becomes a coefficient of adversity insofar as the individual is not choosing his place. He is born in a place. He is only taking responsibility over the place where he exists.

2.8.2. One's Past: It is an irrefutable fact that all of us do have a past. When the for-itself forge towards the future it cannot adapt any attitude towards its past depending on its fancy. Basically one should give immense importance to one's past because one cannot think of anything about oneself unless one's past is included in it. Sartre confides: "I preserve the past with me and by action I decide its meaning."29

We choose the meaning of our past in the light of a certain end. But from then on, it imposes itself upon us and devours us. Thus like place, the past is integrated into the situation when the for-itself by its choice of the
future confers on its past a value, a hierarchical order, and an urgency in terms of which this facticity motivates the act and conduct of the for-itself. So I would say that the past is like a shadow which follows the for-itself throughout its existence. The for-itself cannot free itself for a moment from its past. Even at the moment of making free choice, (the freedom to choose a goal) its past haunts it.

2.8.3. One's Environment: The for-itself's environment is made up of the instrumental things which surround it. It includes their utility and peculiar coefficients of adversity. By occupying its place, the for-itself prepares the ground for the revelation of its environment. By changing the place, the for-itself provides the basis for the appearance of a new environment. It should be noted that the environment can change or can be changed by others as well without the aid of the for-itself. Sartre wholly agrees with Bergson's conviction in Matter and Memory that a minute modification of one's place involves a total change in one's environment.

Thus as soon as the individual exists, he is in the midst of other existence different from himself. If the
individual fails to win over other existence, it is only an explicit recognition of its powerlessness and the clearest admission of the limits of its freedom. Sartre warns that one should not confuse one's freedom to choose with his freedom to obtain a chosen end. But Sartre points out that one is always free to choose to modify one's chosen end. Otherwise expressed, to be free is to-be-free-to-change. Freedom implies therefore the existence of an environment to be changed, obstacles to be cleared, tools to be used.

Every project of freedom is an open project and not a closed one in a given environment. Although highly individualized, it contains within it the possibility of its further modification. Thus though Sartre accepts environment as a coefficient of adversity which limits human freedom, he takes a positive attitude towards it insofar as he considers that the obstructions in the environment can be replaced by modifying the for-itself's chosen end.

2.8.4. One's Fellowman: According to Sartre, the for-itself's co-existence with the other has two aspects: (a) the for-itself has to encounter the other and (b) to find itself engaged in the midst of the things which can have meanings which the for-itself has not assigned.
The other's presence in the world cannot be deduced from the ontological structure of the for-itself. It makes the latter's facticity very profound. The other's presence makes the for-itself aware of his freedom. It reminds the for-itself of choices and possibilities. In vain, the for-itself tries to establish a stable relation with the other. It realizes that all its possibilities are negated or sublated in the presence of the other. The other acts as a facticity which opposes the for-itself's free ventures.

The other objectifies the very being of the for-itself and also the situation in which the for-itself exists. In short, by the fact of the other's existence, the for-itself exists in a situation of alienation which the for-itself cannot remove from its situations. This limit to its freedom is posited by the other's existence - that is, by the fact that its transcendence exists for a transcendence. 31

2.8.5. One's Death: Sartre criticises Heidegger's claim that the consciousness of death produces individuality by detaching us from the banality of everyday life and by
paring us to assume our Being-towards-death. Sartre holds that only an individual choice alone can determine our individuality. He rejects the Heideggerian contention that by running ahead of ourselves towards death can we establish a measure of totality to our lives.

For Sartre death is never a personal possibility. It is merely an external limit or a "wall" which one may encounter at anytime while pursuing one's personal projects, but which one can never personally or freely project as an end to be pursued. Death remains always as a possible nihilation of the possibilities of the for-itself. It is outside the possibilities of the for-itself.

By declaring that the death of the for-itself is not fixed by it but by the sequence of events in the universe and by the external circumstances, untouched by its freedom, Sartre claims that death cannot provide meaning to the life of the for-itself. It only removes all meanings from life. In short, Sartre contends that death is nothing but a certain aspect of facticity, i.e. nothing other than the given. It is absurd that we are born and it is absurd that we die. On the contrary, this absurdity is presented

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as the permanent alienation of the for-itself, a possibility which is no longer the possibility of the for-itself. It therefore remains an external and factual limit of the subjectivity of the for-itself.

It occurs to me that Sartre by rejecting the for-itself's personal possibility of death prefers a never ending life - a practical impossibility. It serves as an absurd attitude since he already accepted the for-itself's co-existence with others. If existence (and therefore freedom) are equally applicable to being-for-others as well as for being-for-itself, Sartre should have accepted death not merely as a possibility for being-for-others but also for being-for-itself too. Again if death remains far from the personal possibility of the being-for-itself it will be pointless to blame death for removing all meanings from life of the for-itself. I wish to note that to make life worth living, to make it meaningful and to avoid strayed ways of life, the for-itself should deliberately cultivate an intense and persistent awareness of its death which ever remains a personal possibility. Ventures into life becomes meaningful only for a person who lives in the shadow of
death and resolutely faces the fact that all are condemned to die in the same manner that all are condemned to be free.

2.9. Freedom and Responsibility

Human reality being condemned to be free, carries the weight of the whole world on its shoulders. Since existence precedes essence and each for-itself can make itself what it wants to become, it is responsible for itself. Here the word responsibility means "consciousness of being the intolerable author of the event or of an object."\(^32\) In this sense the responsibility of the for-itself is overwhelming since it is the only one who makes itself. Also, whatever be the situation in which it finds itself, the for-itself must wholly assume this situation with its particular coefficient of adversity.

The for-itself must assume responsibility for the situation with the proud consciousness of being the author of it. The worst disadvantage which can endanger its existence has meaning only in and through its project. It is senseless to complain since nothing foreign has decided what it feels, the way it lives or even what it is. Furthermore, this absolute responsibility is not
resignation. It is simply the ontological requirement arising from the consequence of the freedom of the for-itself. Sartre concludes:

I am responsible for everything, in fact except for my very responsibility. Therefore everything takes place as if I were compelled to be responsible. I am abandoned in the world. I find myself suddenly alone and without help, engaged in a world for which I bear the whole responsibility without being able to tear away myself from this responsibility for an instant, for I am responsible for my very desire of fleeing responsibilities.

From the above elucidation it is clear that freedom of the for-itself is central to Sartre's ontology. It has not only become a synonym of the for-itself, burdened with the confrontations of various coefficients of adversity but also impregnated with the sense of responsibility. In the third chapter, there will be an attempt to bring out how Sartre considers literature as an apt and scopeful medium to express this freedom and its consequent responsibilities.