Chapter 3

HERMENEUTICS OF COMMUNICATION
3.1 Habermas’ Program of Critical Hermeneutics

Jürgen Habermas minces no words in expressing his intention of making use of hermeneutics only as a universal pragmatics and not merely for textual interpretation. He writes:

Any meaningful expression—be it an utterance, verbal or non-verbal, or an artefact of any kind, such as a tool, an institution, or a written document—can be identified from a double perspective, both as an observable event and as an understandable objectification of meaning...To grasp (and state) its meaning, one had to participate in some (actual or imagined) communicative action in the course of which the sentence in question is used in such a way that is intelligible to speakers, hearers, and bystanders belonging to the same speech community.¹

Habermas found insights developed by hermeneutic philosophy very much relevant for meta-theoretical considerations which are connected to socio-political praxis. It aims at streamlining the communication about the aims, purposes, and the mode of social existence which are being slowly and steadily eroded by technocratic-manipulative social engineering. The hermeneutic endeavour is to free the suppressed avenues of communication and strive towards emancipation of human species. At the core lies the mediation between man and the eternal foundation of all meaning and values. The human history becomes the balance in which one weighs the values one perceives and prepares oneself for the future. The past and present are to be interpreted and the value content extracted and based on this the future encounter is to be fought against repression, distortion, stagnation, and dogmatism.
Habermas works his way towards a critique of ideology where the language is viewed as the instrument which facilitates ‘regulative ideas’ being formed. Language is the ‘universal pragmatics’ which has the key for furthering human interests in the society through a consensual approach, thus, removing the obstacles in the path of free communication. Habermas says, “one says something to someone else in a way that allows him to understand what is being said.” As a dialectical social science, Habermas’ critical hermeneutics attempts to mediate the objectivity of historical processes with the motives of those acting within it. The aim, here, is to unearth the emancipatory potential of the actors i.e. their intentions which are lying dormant. Thus, Habermas uses psycho-analytical model for a dialectical-hermeneutical social science. This is as a counter-weight to Marx’s over emphasis on the functional side of domination and exploitation and his scorn of critical reflection. For Habermas, the difference between hermeneutics and epistemology is that while the former is simultaneously concerned with three fold relationship with (a) an expression of the speaker’s intention, (b) an expression of the establishment of an interpersonal relationship between speaker and hearer, and (c) an expression about something in the world, and another important relationship is between the particular utterance and the set of all utterances within the linguistic frame.

Habermas, while describing the function of hermeneutics concurs with Gadamer whose horizon is ‘something into which we move and which moves with us’. Gadamer’s horizon is not a closed framework of options or standpoints. Habermas avers that when engaging in a conversation the speaker and the hearer touch upon their objective, subjective, and social worlds. In hermeneutics, the relationship
is not only analysed from the point of view of the speaker and the hearer but also from the perspective of the lifeworld, or against the background of the shared assumptions and practices in which every communication is unconspicuously embedded from the outset. Habermas opines that the interpreters are at a distinct disadvantage than the observers because, while debating, they have to employ a technique of mutual critique rather than a reckless evaluation. This is because they have already made a pact with the participants that they would not distort the import of the intended meaning. At the same time, their mission is to make the implicit meaning explicit and thus even in a dialogue the interlocutors learn from each other. The interpreter has to be truthful to the context of the object of interpretation. In addition, a correct interpretation demands that it fits, suits, or explicates the meaning of the *interpretandum*, i.e. the original meaning intended.

Habermas’ argument is that the interpreter should have the capacity to immerse himself into the debate as a mutual discursive partner and at the same time transcend the limitations imposed by the context and think broadly in terms of the general perceptions. He cites the instance of the interpretation of a text in which the interpreter tries to understand the purported meaning intended by the author, context, and squeeze in his own interpretation suited to the present context. The demands on the interpreter is exacting because of his altogether different social scenario from that of the author of the text. He has to hazard guesses regarding the motives, feelings, and the subjective prejudices of the author, in addition to appraising the value considerations of his time and also that of the author. The linguistic competence of a very high degree is presupposed to exam-
ine the semantic content and this exposes the variation between the epochs. The most crucial part of the interpreter lies in his ability to justify rationally within the universal claims of truth, truthfulness, and rightness. This is the reason why Habermas chooses formal-pragmatics which approves of general and necessary conditions for the validity of symbolic expressions and explicit expressions alike.9

3.2 The Hermeneutic Dispute between Habermas and Gadamer

Before elaborating on the differences in viewpoints between Habermas and Gadamer, the points of agreement should be listed. Habermas and Gadamer agree upon:7

1) The conception of pre-understanding as the given situated in a lifeworld, which Gadamer startlingly calls, Vorurteil, which in German means prejudice. Holub writes, "prejudice, because it belongs to historical reality itself, is not a hindrance to understanding but a condition for the possibility of understanding,"

2) The historicity of the text, interpreter, and the author,

3) The reflective and dialogical element in the hermeneutics, and

4) The provision for constant revision and reorientation of perspectives.

The hermeneutic dispute arises out of differences concerning:

i) the nature of the fore-structure of understanding especially with regard to the status of language as its ultimate foundation, and
ii) the justifiability of the critical stance vis-a-vis traditioned meaning which Habermas developed.

Habermas introduced hermeneutic thought into the methodology of social sciences in order to bring to light the lacunae in the prevailing interpretative approaches. These approaches focus on subjectively intended meaning, i.e. the meaning of an act as defined by the actor overlooking the implicitly objectivistic implications arising out of the failure to consider both actor and interpreter as interlocutors within a dialogical-dialectical situation. The ‘fusion of horizon’ compels one to critically evaluate the subjectively intended meaning in the understanding because of the prejudices that are harboured. Also the subject matter can offer different definitions and this also pertains to the acceptance or rejection of the interpretation. Thus, the critique constitutes a vital part in the dialectical process of hermeneutic understanding and it is not limited to any vested interest in a particular field of study. Habermas says, “Truth belongs categorically to the world of thought (Gedanken in Frege’s sense) and not to that of perceptions. This makes it doubly necessary to open out every conclusion to rational examination.”

What makes Habermas’ effort commendable is its emphasis on comprehensiveness and propensity for impartiality to counter any problem in any realm without flinching and a broad vision as regards the plurality of perceptions and conceptions. Gadamer criticized the behaviouristic way of approaching the social sciences. The object of a social science can be investigated by a researcher playing the role of a ‘reflective partner’ in a communicative interaction. A social scientist must know how to categorize certain manifestations of meanings
and this he could do provided he shares the same 'life-world' as his object. This pre-understanding is conveniently forgotten. Habermas says, "because of the radical limitation of linguistic horizon to a few elementary and well operationalized meanings (need satisfaction, reward and punishment), the pre-understanding relied upon does not need to be thematized." It is very difficult to capture the meaning, through the everyday language used in communication, of the data provided by the social sciences. It is only to be expected that there is bound to be arbitrariness in the translation of communicative experience into data for scientific inquiry. Cicourel opines that the 'world of science' is derivative of the 'life-world'.

In the natural sciences, the communication among the scientists involves hermeneutical reflection and this has been an important factor for the progress of science as pointed out by Charles Peirce. This goes a long way in ear-marking thrust areas of research for the scientists and the areas of interests for the scientific community. Habermas refers to the everyday language used in talking about the formal language of mathematical and scientific systems as 'meta-language' or, rather, as the 'last meta-language.' Everyday language plays an important role in translating scientific findings into the practical affairs of the ordinary language. Habermas considers this interpretation of the scientific information into everyday language very vital because of the technocratic and manipulative tendencies in the society. These tendencies only engender political-ideological dogmatism. Another point of disagreement is Gadamer's hesitation to accord science its due place. Habermas sees this as a retreat from the original position of Gadamer who has set so much store on historicity of knowledge.
It amounts to ignoring the horizon if he were to refuse the natural sciences their position as the prime contributors in the technological and scientific advancements the world has witnessed and in boosting the standard of living which has made life easier to live.

3.3 Gadamer's Views on Tradition and Habermas' Missive

Tradition is the fountainhead of all philosophical activities for Gadamer. Gadamer says:12

1) Tradition is the locus and summation of human awareness of the most important truths and hence to the normative of character of its content.

2) The progressive revelation of the meaning of the content of tradition in and through the concrete circumstances of history.

3) Hermeneutics as a method for making positive use of the distinctiveness of our own point in history in order to appreciate better the unfolding of meaning and value through historical experience.

In recent times, tradition is considered to be a forbidden expression and it is alleged that it plays only a restrictive role in politics and society. In short, tradition is the handmaiden of a chosen few. Gadamer undertook the task of allaying the fears regarding the purported biased role of the tradition and ventured to restore its image. Habermas is not entirely at variance with Gadamer's views. There are many points of concurrence in views on community and contextual indispensability of socio-historical factors and the like.
Gadamer’s emphasis on community is meant to clear the way for his subsequent ideas regarding tradition. At the cognitive as well as the experiential level, the learning processes start well before the birth of a child. This learning process is a chain in which generations and generations of humans have bequeathed a fund of information in the form of genetic transmission, tradition, culture, and history. All these factors are inseparably interlinked with each other. Our learning processes draw so much from the insights of our predecessors for the interpretation and development of knowledge. “There is a homology with the animal, nonetheless, for just as its knowledge is synchronized with that of either oneself or the other men.” Gadamer says that absolute knowledge is not possible as knowledge is irrevocably contingent on time and space. The learning processes blend with human insight and empirical experience. History is the crucible where various insights are tested. Tradition is a continuous stream of learning processes which are verified, ratified, corrected, incorporated or discarded. It is the treasure trove of learning inherited from our ancestors which unearths more and more avenues for research, innovation, and development of the human life and environment. Without anything to look back there can be nothing to look forward to.

Tradition is not sacrosanct to be unquestionable. One can be dependent on the tradition to elucidate instances if one is ignorant of certain aspects. But the preeminence is not guaranteed as tradition is not endowed with any perfect course of its own. To weed out any irritants, Gadamer entails competence as the prerequisite of traditional authority always governed by understanding. According to him, “Tradition is not simply a passive store-house of materials
depending entirely upon the inquirer, but its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages." Such a normative referent is needed for achieving even a semblance of consistency socially and historically. On the other hand, if the normative factors were exalted to an abstract or transcendental level, it would lead only to an idealistic fancy. Hence, the effort to situate the traditional content in the historical context which is relevant to the present but which transcends the present and stands as a scale against which the future events are to be measured. This presages a set of common goals and values which should govern each and every man in a society so that unity and harmony is maintained. The realization and adherence could pave the way for the formation of a perfect society where men have maturer, allround personality. This becomes all the more essential because the past chapters, present options, and future possibilities will be judged only in comparison to the above spoken normative referents. The yardstick with which the human development is measured against is the classical tradition which enshrines the time tested set of goals and values which every human being striving towards perfection should respect and follow. Knowledge forms only a part of tradition which encompasses the whole of life which contains ingredients like love and understanding, and which, in turn, leads to justice and peace. Subjectivity lies only in adapting to the situations created by the tradition in the society. Individuals, with their ability to decide and act upon, when presented with an opportunity, exercise their freedom of choice.

History is the playground for tradition. Classical tradition gives history an evaluative power. History which is considered as the chronological record of events has so far been donning only the role
of a chronicle. It has been neither reflective nor evaluative. The contextual interpretation or the social relevance and significance of the events were not highlighted. Classical tradition is the repository of historical events as well as human social experience and thereby fusing past and present to pave the way for the future. The knowledge of the past tradition enables us to appreciate the real impact of the achievements and the deformations of the present and this could provide us with an idea of what is in store for us in future. Without such a background, history would be simply a book of facts and counterfacts. On the contrary, man functions in the present with the knowledge of the past. No man can disown his past just because he may not like it. When man becomes nostalgic, he remembers his halcyon days when he was at the peak of his career, or his debacles, the morbid rememberances of which still haunts his memory and makes his heart ache. Man relives his past via the present. If given a chance, he would cringe to set his record straight. Likewise, tradition is the previous chapter in the life of man and his present necessarily is a continuance of the previous chapter.

At a macro level, tradition or culture engulf all activities. This totality is the vantage point from which all aspects of tradition or culture are seen. Hence, this point is called the Horizon. Every one has a preconception regarding culture and tradition. This notion is not fixed but it evolves as one participates in the dynamic evolution of the tradition. "It is a creative unveiling of the content of tradition as this comes progressively and historically into the present and through present passes into the future."16 Horizon is the playground for the understanding the experience, custom and tradition. Time unravels fascinating secrets in tradition and culture. This does not
mean that time should necessarily camouflage the subjective content and make things appear objective.

All our pre-conceptions need not be vindicated and it is better not to enshrine any ideas regarding tradition, text, or culture. It is mostly the loss of face that ensues a contradiction or the failure which is anathema to most and this takes an ideological shape in clasping close to heart some beliefs which are dear to them. Realizing that the actors are not always responsible for the consequences of their actions and neither are they to be held responsible for holding a different opinion about the course of an action performed by others. This saves one from clinging on to an idea or an opinion. On the other hand, taking another tack too is possible. The person who performs an action must also be inclined to accept the results of a venture graciously without flinching from the responsibility and taking into one's stride the triumph or the defeat with equanimity. In this, the horizons play a vital role in broadening the perspectives of an observer.

Horizons are vast and ever widening. They transcend all boundaries and are purely the product of the mind. Reflective evaluations of the ideas at every stage of their crystallization only expands the horizon of the individuals.

Only a dialogue with others sort out prejudices. A decision or a conclusion regarding the meaning of the text or tradition is possible with the sanction of one's judgement which will be necessarily sub-
jective. If one's prejudice or partiality is realized, then one can alter one's views without hurting one's ego. Ironically, both agreeing and disagreeing are strong affirmation of one's ego. But, the cliche lies in acceding to what others agree or disagree or vice versa. In this connection, Gadamer throws some light on how the texts are to be viewed.

First, the object of interpretation is not the subjective meaning of the author but the objective meaning which the text has for the present. Thus, in questioning I serve as midwife promoting the historicity or life of the text or tradition. Secondly, the logical structure of this process is to be found in the dialectic of question and answer. Thirdly, as discovery depends upon the questions, the art of discovery is the art of questioning.\(^6\)

Here, the questioning attitude holds the key. The issues should not be settled or determined. The problem should be allowed to last the full distance and only if the conclusion withstands a barrage of questions from various angles should it be accepted. This does not mean that one should dissipate one's attention in all directions. This entails that the problem should be traced to its logical conclusion pre-empting any critical observation not as a mode of defence but as a method of verification of any defect in the conclusion. A questioning activity should be allowed to unfold fully so that the depth of the question becomes discernible. If the lacunae in others' viewpoints are probed uncompromisingly and if the same is done to one's own, the errors which could have been hidden due to over-sight could be eliminated. This facilitates the unvarnished truths to emerge from the shadows. Finally, since the horizon of the author of the text could be in a different plane from that of the interpreters due to the
passage of time many questions would crop up. Because of this, new dimensions of potentialities are thrown up and the understanding of the meaning of the text lies in the consciousness of man living in history with others. "It is the fusion of one's horizon with that of the others - whether of text or of a partner in dialogue - that enables one to receive answers that are ever new." 17

The authority vested with the tradition may strangulate the spirit of creativity and freedom of the spirit. The exalted feeling of identifying oneself with the countless millions who have traversed the path for centuries and the transcendental aura that the beliefs, rituals, and culture radiate is too potent a mixture not to get inebriated with. This poses the danger of a total rejection of any lateral analysis. But Gadamer does highlight the role of novelty. His text is not immutable in interpretations. He arrogates the authority of questioning the tradition to the sciences of spirit (geistewissenschaften), e.g., philosophy and literature.

Habermas approaches this in the angle of human interests of both cognitive and moral variety and the influence of ideology. Any misgivings in this regard can be removed through a dialogue and a critical examination of the structural causes. 'It is through that where Gadamer seeks these goals in terms of an examination of understanding, critical hermeneutics seeks them through an examination of the conditions of this understanding.'18 The salient features of the critical hermeneutics are its self-reflection of the intellect, communicative ability through language, and responsibility in action. Taking the cue from Hegel, the subject-object distinction is not considered to
be rigid. Likewise, theory-practice, and theoretical-practical reason are considered together as acting in the ‘lived process of the socialization of the individual and the universal history of man.’¹⁰ Thus, the critical knowledge is not absolute and it is grounded on the historical relationship between man-man and man-nature. This was necessitated by the foibles of almost all the great minds that bestrode the world in trying to construct theories aimed at providing wholesome explanation of knowledge engulfing all facets of knowing.

In Zur Logic der Sozialwissenschaften (1967), Habermas initiated the hermeneutic dispute by providing the first counter statement to Gadamer’s position. Bleicher says,

Habermas identifies a reluctance on Gadamer’s part to engage in any methodological considerations—a strand of thinking epitomized by the abstract he establishes between hermeneutic and methodical experience which, in a sense, ‘involuntarily supports the positivists degradation of hermeneutics’. Under this approach, Habermas notices the Heideggerian self-conception of a philosophical hermeneutic as the ‘inquiry into what happens with us beyond our willing and doing’.

Tradition, being dynamic, can never be completely objectified but provides the basis for all methodical activities. Habermas feels that the naturalization of tradition only reaffirms authority. In his opinion, Gadamer too readily accepts authority and tradition; his ‘relative idealism’, which regards language as a transcendental absolute, exhibits a lack of objectivity. Habermas recommends the systems of labour and domination as the framework within which ‘the objec-
tive context from within which social actions have to be understood' through the medium of language. Hermeneutics becomes a critique of ideology when traditioned meaning is interpreted with respect to the standard of labour and the level of domination.21 Hitherto, the tradition was considered to be a wholesome entity and as a reference point. To interpret the tradition with regard to the social relationships helps in empirically determining the factors which influence the association between the tradition and social forces. The theory of societal evolution, especially, in terms of emergence of class societies can account for fundamental distortions operating in human's self-understanding.

By ‘dialogue’, Gadamer alludes to the dialectic between past and present in the articulation of the individual’s understanding of himself and his world. This dialogue need not be an open one. Gadamer’s ontological leaning overlooks the economical and the political factors which effectively limit the ‘horizon’. “Tradition, as a context which includes labour and domination restricts the parameters within which we define our needs and interact in order to satisfy them.”22 Limiting the social phenomena to only the meaning-interpretative inquiry is not sufficient because the socio-historical processes are not wholly determined by the human actions.

Dilthey and Gadamer deal with the accessibility of meaning in the field of hermeneutic interpretation. In psycho-analysis, it has been clearly explained that socially unacceptable motives are repressed and they are channelized into creative forms of expression. Such ‘re-definition’ which occurs under the compulsion of society, represented
by the demands of the Super-ego, can be used to critically evaluate self-delusion of some groups within the society. The repression and the channelization of the expressions is not always unconscious and involuntary. Though there are social taboos which prohibit certain practices they are always resisted either furtively or openly and are perennially violated. Thus the sublimation is not always unconscious but can also be voluntary and deliberate. For example, if a person resists sexual desires the society does not force him to do so. The responsibility is his. Many factors like his own family status, objectives, disappointments, and priorities could influence his decision and he is free to take a decision in favour or against his marriage or even strike an illicit relationship. While it is possible that the repressions are social and unconscious, by the same logic, they can also be conscious and deliberate. The guilty complexes, neuroses, psychosis, schizophrenia, and other psychical disturbances are not sudden developments but a gradual build up of pent up emotions and their explosion.

In our everyday life, we have alternating success and failure in varying degrees and conscious and rational justifications are produced and analyzed. It takes an enormous amount of pressures, reverses or successes for a person to wilt under them. The mental state and the composure of a person also contribute towards mental disturbances. If a person behaves with equanimity and takes the results in his stride no great turbulence is caused. When persons are able to exercise unbelievable control over their bodies about which not everything is known there is nothing which prevents them exercising their competences for better sense, judgement, and temperamental factors and aspire for a peaceful life though society, tradition, and culture
cannot be ignored. But there is no writ which says that the society abets only dominance, exploitation, alienation, and repression and does not allow the individual to blossom into a well-developed personality.

It is true that the life of an individual in the society is like a lumbering goods train which is very long, carrying various things, climbing a precipitous mountain cliff and the individual is like an engine which pulls the train. There are many trains and there are many engines. But only those engines which have the power to pull the train over the steep ascent are used for the mission. Likewise, only those people who have the fire and gumption in them to tide over various challenges come out with flying colours and others are left trailing behind. Therefore, society is receptive to changes but in order to hasten the reformation Habermas' communicative competence and communicative action is but one way in which objective, subjective, social, and unconscious constituents of the human life are given equal and studied importance. Thus, the distortion in communication can be corrected by interpreting the meaning in the backdrop of personality development or the historical development of the society. Gadamer argues that should the hermeneutic problem encompass all meaningful activity the vantage point from which one has to look from outside cannot be there. Counter arguments are also ruled out and the supporting ground, presuppositions, and preconceptions lose their validity.

Gadamer forcefully argues for the universal validity of philosophical hermeneutic.
This, he does on the basis of Heideggerian conception of Verstehten as an existentiale rather than methodically arranged procedure of hermeneutical sciences; understanding and communication are the modes of social coexistence which, in the last formalization, is a community of dialogue. Nothing is exempt from this community, no experience of any kind. "Neither the specialization of modern science ... nor material labour ... not political institutions of domination and administration ... exist outside the universal medium of practical Reason(and un-Reason)." 23

For Gadamer, the hermeneutic situatedness of all reflexive thought is language - 'Being that can be understood is language'. 24 Therefore, Gadamer is unwilling to accept any paradigm outside the language. Gadamer is against separating the material forces such as labour and domination which Scheler calls Realfaktoren from the sphere of cultural tradition and restricting the hermeneutic method to such material forces. The antithetical pairing of reason and authority, reflection, and tradition is rejected. The critique of ideology vis-à-vis the universality of hermeneutic problem is explained with the help of a metaphor of that of a 'game'. A sociologist participates in this 'game' by playing his role in a community by sharing the understanding. But, when one analyses the society critically, one has to step outside the 'game' and treat his 'object' as a psycho-analyst would treat a patient probing for any unconscious, hidden motives. 25 Gadamer thinks that such a criticalobjective thinking could be unwelcome in the society. The analysis, for Gadamer, occurs in consensus and shared understanding. There is a societal consciousness that encompasses all human situations within which a critique is to be attempted by an emancipatory social science. Habermas tries to
discern the limits of hermeneutic consciousness and sets out to draw a programme of theoretical framework based on which a critique of ideology can be justified. His universal pragmatics would have: correct inferences; good arguments; accurate explanations, descriptions, and predications; grammatically correct sentences; successful speech acts; effective instrumental action; appropriate evaluations; authentic self-presentations; etc. and it is the work of various theories like linguistics, logic, ethics and action theory, argumentation theory and so on. Thus it assumes at once the critical, constructive, and theoretical functions.\(^{26}\)

### 3.4 The Theory of Communicative Competence

Habermas' hermeneutic programme aims at combating the overt objectivity in the sphere of science. These objective methods also met with great success in the sphere of social sciences too. It is true that in a social existence the intended meaning of actions as well as the delimiting objective contexts are equally essential. The firmly rooted socio-political interest, edified by the social institutions are reflected, in the everyday language and this prevents self-clarification and introspection. Neither the hermeneutical nor the empirical analytical sciences are able to bridge the gulf between theory and practice because they focus on different realms of a disjointed reality.

The subjective and the objective factors contribute to a sort of spontaneity and regularity, simultaneously, in social processes. The objective factors sometimes reveal the hidden intentions imbedded in
the mind unknown to the actor. Meanwhile, the objective regulative factors are given fresh dimensions by the subjective understanding. A dialectical social science has to aim at a theoretical framework which would allow the objective understanding of the subjectively intended meaning. A dialectical social science is critically evaluative to the extent that the historical processes and the existing tendencies point towards a freer society. The concept of totality is introduced in order to measure the attitudes, tendencies and processes in relation to universal history. This facilitates the objective understanding of the subjective actions. This, at once, is a theory and critique of socially distributed meaning.

Habermas performed an *Aufhebung* of hermeneutic philosophy and psycho-analysis before embarking upon the project of dialectical-hermeneutical theory of action. For this to happen, psycho-analysis should emerge as the general interpreter of self-formation processes occupying the meta-theoretical status of general empirical theory and hermeneutic philosophy. Habermas dismantles the hermeneutic claim to universality before answering Gadamer's query, 'Is the critique of ideology not itself ideological?' He addresses himself to the hermeneutic claim as a defense to his critical hermeneutics. Hermeneutic consciousness 'has to remain incomplete as long as it has not reflected upon the limits of hermeneutical understanding.'²⁷

In order to expose the claim to universality, Habermas refers to genetic epistemology, generative linguistics of Chomsky, and systematically distorted communication, concentrating on the last one. George Mclean crisply sums up the approach of the Frankfurt theorists attitude towards Freud saying that they did not treat him as an analyst alone but as a pioneer in uncovering unknown histori-
cal and human factors which are not limited to therapeutic sphere, but as being torn between the social and physical beings and the internal libidinal powers. In this connection, Habermas makes use of psycho- analysis to explicate the structure of genuine communication through a theory of ordinary language. While a speech is normally understandable, in some cases the speakers commit systematically distorted mistakes while communicating and this is also the case in pseudo-communication where the listener observes certain disturbances unknown to the speakers. This gap leads to misunderstanding.

If one views the social framework in relation to the communicative aspect, one can easily glean information. In a capitalistic society, ideology goes a long way in perpetuating domination of one class over the other behind the veil of pseudo-scientific explanation and emotive appeals to some mythic entity or 'cultural ideal'. Passive acceptance of the status quo or the fictitious reasons adduced for harmonious co-existence keep the people resigned to their fate. The alienated withdrawal from the public affairs can easily be interpreted as an assent to the status quo. Any false consensus upon major issues only reinforces the feeling that the influence of dominant section is very powerful in galvanizing the public opinion. Sometimes, tradition, in which public opinion of generations are enshrined, is used to stifle any show of dissent.

Habermas takes the help of psycho-analysis in his 'depth-hermeneutics' where he reconstructs the original situation in order to fill up the periods of life-history which are semantically empty. "Scenic
understanding is an explanatory understanding in that it can pinpoint the initial conditions that led to the systematic distortion of language." Hermeneutics can only deal with well functioning everyday communication which has the sanction in ordinary language. 'Depth hermeneutics' deals with patterns of speech affecting the organization of language and so hermeneuticians can do very little about it. Habermas questions the status of factually existing consensus as the last supporting ground of all communication and critique as it has been proved that the consensus could be brought about through coercion. With the help of psycho-analysis, Habermas was able to explain the distorted self-understanding of the individual.

In his 'Reply', Gadamer objected to Habermas' application of psycho-analysis to the social sphere. He proceeded to say that in the social sphere emancipatory praxis was perceived by the dominant class as a threat to their fiefdom unlike in a psycho-analytic therapy where the patient willingly seeks remedy for his malady. Habermas clarifies saying that the model of emancipatory praxis is rather applicable to the relationship between communist party and the masses. 'Theories of the type of psycho-analysis and Marx's critique of ideology can be used to initiate processes of reflection and to dissolve barriers to communication.' Even in the case of a direct dialogue which is needed when radical reforms are attempted, the critical-emancipatory knowledge comes to the rescue preventing a bloodbath in the name of revolution. The meta-hermeneutic, Habermas is aiming for, takes the form of a theory of communicative competence. His meta-theoretical considerations follow the model of psycho-analysis as the critique of individual's distorted self-understanding, based on a theoretical frame combining the knowledge of personality devel-
opment and individual life-histories. Under the sway of ideology, social groups are prevented from pursuing common interests due to the erection of communication barriers preventing the formation of socio-politically relevant aims and directives. Habermas feels that such barriers are to be explained within the framework of a theory of systematically distorted communication. This, along with the universal pragmatics and precisely formulated basic assumptions of historical materialism, makes the comprehension of the cultural tradition possible. This may lead to assumptions concerning the logic of the emergence of systems of morals, of cosmologies and corresponding cultural practices.

In the field of everyday language, the aim is to 'derive the principle of reasonable speech, as the necessary regulation of every actual speech, however distorted, from the logic of everyday language.' Habermas proposes the method of 'discourse' to distinguish between a true and false consensus. In a discourse, the norms and opinions are problematized. Unlike in a normal interaction, the validity of the norms and opinions are to be arrived consensually. In an interaction, their validity is already assumed. Habermas even doubts the authenticity of the concept of truth to be a distinguishing agent between true and false consensus. Even truth, for Habermas, has to be arrived at consensually. Only a consensus arrived at in the course of discourse is to be considered a true consensus. For such a discourse to take place, an 'ideal speech situation' devoid of any external pressures, i.e. a conducive climate free from domination of any one view or opinion is imperative. Free exchange of ideas and opinions is to be encouraged and the best argument is to be adopted without any bias. In an ideal speech situation, the full intentionality
of the speaker is presupposed.\textsuperscript{32}

Habermas states, 'the idea of truth which is measured against the idea of a true consensus, implies the idea of a true existence—or we could say, it includes the idea of \textit{Mundigkeit} (being-of-age).\textsuperscript{33} Only the formal anticipation of the idealized dialogue, as a form of life to be realized, guarantees the ultimate, counter-factual agreement that already unites us and which allows us to criticize any factual agreement, if it is a false one, as such.

3.5 The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality

Hermeneutics is an 'ability' one acquires in order to 'master' a natural language. It is 'the art of understanding the linguistically communicable meaning and to render it comprehensible in cases of distorted communication.'\textsuperscript{34} The understanding of meaning includes the semantic content of speech, written forms, and even non-linguistic symbolic systems in so far as they can be expressed in words. This talent, one possesses, can be honed into an artistic skill. Rhetoric, which uses persuasion and forceful argumentation is a part of communicative competence. In the case of philosophical hermeneutics, the reflective element is valued more than argumentation. It is concerned with the conscious experience gained through exercising one's communicative competence in the sphere of language. There are two important factors to be considered:\textsuperscript{35}

i) The art of understanding and making oneself understood, and

ii) The persuasive ability to convince people.
The former repose faith in the armoury of natural language to negotiate even unfamiliar expressions and symbols and make them intelligible. The natural language makes it possible to understand events which happened in a distant past by relating them to the familiar, pre-understood context of our own world. But, there is always a wide chasm between different epochs, cultures and traditions which can never be bridged. Natural language facilitates the understanding of different horizons but the complete understanding is never possible. This applies to the contemporary communication both within a socio-culturally homogeneous language community and across the distance between different classes, civilizations and epochs. Hermeneutical understanding brings to fore the relationship between a speaking subject vis-a-vis his language.

In everyday language, the rules of application for the individual sentences can be determined ad-hoc and can be commented upon or changed. In the case of everyday language, it itself is a metalinguage. This gives the flexibility in making the semantic impregnated with varieties of dimension. On the other hand, natural languages are informal. With regard to a meaning-complex, it remains tied to a pre-determined context. Even in hermeneutical understanding, a subject learns his wares of interpretation inside a pre-given context. Thus, objectivity of language vis-a-vis the speaking subject is always existent. Gadamer says, ‘awareness of effective history is unavoidably more being than consciousness.’

The latter, rhetoric provides the philosophical hermeneutic with an action oriented attitude. Where reasoning fails, there rhetoric is bound to succeed. The force of arguments are very helpful in brain-storming others to arrive at a consensus. Even consensus regarding standards of ac-
tion can be achieved by resorting to rhetoric. Thus, it becomes clear that even practical questions have to be resolved dialogically making use of both the cognitive as well as expressive elements in everyday language in ushering in a consensus.

The rhetoric presents the user of the language with different situations to which the subject adapts dexterously. But, this could be impossible without knowing the structure of language. A consensus on practical questions prompted by a good speech serves to remind us of the need to re-evaluate the interpretative schemes already existing in a tradition. This innovative approach alters the sequence of natural-innate process. On the other side, there arises a situation where the speaker is tied to habitualized language games. For any modification to be carried out the participation of the speaker is necessary. The rules of language have to be internalized. The linguistic tradition presupposes socialization. The grammatical usages have become a part of the personality structure. Rhetoric shows the intimate nexus between language and praxis. It is important that there is a grammatical base underlying even everyday communication. 'Reflexivity and objectivity are fundamental traits of language, as are creativity and the integration of language into life praxis.'

Linguistics is not concerned with the communicative competence of the participants. A linguistic expert has command of the abstract system of rules of natural language. 'The concept of language system in the sense of langue excludes the pragmatic dimension in which langue is transformed into parole.' Philosophical hermeneutics is concerned with the experiences of the speaker.
3.6 Relevance of Philosophical Hermeneutics to the Social Sciences

The following reasons show how philosophical hermeneutics is relevant to the social sciences.\(^{39}\)

1) Hermeneutic consciousness destroys objectivist self-understanding of the traditional Geisteswissenschaften. It follows that mere abstractions from preconceived ideas do not guarantee the objective understanding. Only the reflective evaluation of historical relationships between the subject and object makes it possible.

2) Hermeneutic understanding exposes the chinks in the symbolic pre-structuring of the object in the social sciences. If the controlled observation gives way to communication through everyday language, then the localization of theoretical concepts between the framework of pre-scientifically developed language game of physical measuring occurs.

3) Hermeneutic consciousness also affects the scientific self-understanding of the natural sciences but not their methodology. The insights, that natural language represents the last meta-language for all theories expressed in formal language, elucidates the epistemological locus of everyday language within the scientific activity. The discussions and the strategies which abound in the scientific community are conducted through the explicative forms of everyday communication. Here too, only a rationally motivated consensus is possible.

4) The most important of the interpretative work done by hermeneutic consciousness is the deciphering of the highly technical
scientific information making them available in a simplified form in everyday language so that the sense of scientific progress is not restricted to the technically advanced sections of the society, but also to those sections for whom science has to find solutions for a whole lot of problems which inundate them. ‘All science that hopes to be of practical use is dependent on rhetoric.’ This is essential to explain the relationship between the life-world and the scientific technological pursuits which play a stellar role in the maintenance of the society. Hermeneutic claim to universality opens the path towards ‘integrating again the experience of science into our own general and human life-experience’ only when it is possible to consider ‘the universality of human linguisticality as an element that is itself unlimited and that supports everything, not just linguistically transmitted cultural objects.’

Hermeneutic consciousness emanates out of reflection within the natural language. In the case of science, a mediation between a natural language system and a monological language system is necessary. All experiences cannot be explained through everyday language of communication however skillful one’s expression may be. Such incomprehensible expressions make known the fact that everything cannot be explained through the structure of everyday language which is recommended by the hermeneutics. If the comprehension proves to be difficult in the case of cultural, social, and traditional horizons it is at least possible to state what is needed to understand them. But, in the case of systematically distorted communication the hermeneutic understanding is hapless. Here, the incomprehensibility is due to defective organization of speech itself. Pathological defects can be easily recognized. The self-conception of hermeneutic consciousness can be rattled only when the systematic distortion appears as
normal. Thus, in a pseudo-communication the participants cannot recognize a breakdown in their communication; only an external observer can detect the defect. This can, also, not be termed as false-consensus.

Sigmund Freud has dwelt upon this experience of systematically distorted communication in order to demarcate a sphere of specifically incomprehensible expressions. He always regarded dreams as the ‘standard model’ for those phenomena which themselves extend innocuous pseudo-communication and parapraxes in everyday life to the pathological manifestations of neuroses, mental illness and psychosomatic complaints. Freud used the insight to deal with the clinical phenomena of pseudo-normality, i.e. the hidden pathology of social systems. The specifically incomprehensible expressions can be classified under three criteria. 1) On the level of linguistic symbols, distorted communication is apparent in the deviation from the publicly accepted rule-system. Freud examined the content of dreams mainly in relation to the condensation, displacement, a-grammaticality and the role of contraries. 2) On the level of behaviour, a deformed language game is noticeable in its rigidity and compulsion to repeat. Stereotyped patterns of behaviour recur in situations with the same stimuli which give rise to affective impulses. This inflexibility shows that the semantic content of a symbol has lost its specifically linguistic situational independence. 3) In the case of distorted communication there exists a characteristic discrepancy between the levels of communication: the usual congruence between linguistic symbols, actions and accompanying expressions disintegrate. Neurotic symptoms are merely the most stubborn and manifest evidence of this dissonance. On every level, whether it is linguistic
expression, body language, or compulsive behaviour the expressions which are not in vogue in the language assume independence. The content expressed remains outside the purview of public communication and also of that of the author. Freud says that the ‘I’ which communicates is different from the ‘inner exile’ which has a private or protogenous language of its own.

3.7 Scenic Understanding and its Advantages

The scenic understanding makes possible the translation, into public communication, of the sense of pathologically petrified pattern of communication which has so far remained inaccessible, but which determined the behaviour. It can be distinguished from elementary hermeneutical understanding of meaning by its explanatory potential. Scenic understanding explains, to a certain extent, the incomprehensible forms of expression by creating a scene akin to the original scene, thereby explaining away the non-sensicality. Only by the reconstruction of the original can the reasons for the incomprehensibility be discovered. For this, in addition to communicative competence, theoretical basis is also necessary. The theoretical assumptions underlying depth-hermeneutical language analysis can be developed in relation to three aspects:

1) The psycho-analyst has a preconception of the structure of undistorted everyday communication.

2) The psycho-analyst traces the systematic distortion of communication back to the confusion of pre-linguistic and linguistic organization of symbols.
3) The psycho-analyst explains the emergence of deformation with the aid of a theory of deviant processes of socialization which extends onto the connection of patterns of infant interaction with the formation of personality.

The first refers to the structural conditions regarding normal everyday communication.\(^{43}\)

a) In a normal, undistorted communication, all three levels, namely, symbolical, linguistic actions and those embodied in physical expressions complement each other. Intended contradictions and meanings which are unique to a cultural milieu are also included in the aforesaid normal levels of communication.

b) Normal everyday language is inter-subjective as it follows the public rules. The meaning of an utterance has to be accepted by the public and grammatically supported.

c) In a normal speech, the speakers are aware of subject-object difference. They distinguish between inner and outer speech and public and private speech. The differentiation between reality and appearance is dependent on the difference between the linguistic symbol, its meaning content (signification) and the object referred to by the symbol (referent, denotation). Only based on this difference is decontextualization possible.

d) The intersubjectivity of relationships between various individuals is established only through everyday communication. The analytical usage of the language is capable of categorizing various events but the reflexive usage helps in mending our fences with the language community. The relationship which is forged by coming together of a number of ‘Is’ is characterized by mutual acceptance of each other’s existence. The individuals share
feelings, knowledge etc. by consciously affirming the other while maintaining their individuality, which is inalienable to every individual, while being a reflective participant in collective endeavours. In the analytical usage, the language is used to explain the state of affairs which can be done in a direct way. While in a reflexive usage what cannot be expressed is alluded to in an indirect manner, i.e. those things which are individualized and privatized can be only understood subjectively. The reflexive usage is the self-expression of the individuals.

e) The categories of substance, causality, space and time differ accordingly when applied to the world of objects and linguistically constituted world of speaking subjects. The interpretative scheme 'substance' can be categorized unequivocally in the identity of objects. In the case of subjects who have Ego-identity, the causal interpretative scheme is applied as 'motive' in the context of intentional action. In the physical sense, 'cause' is the concept which manifests in consequences. Likewise, space and time are schematized differently in physical objects whereas the intersubjective experience is contextually related to symbolically mediated interaction. In the former, the categories are applied as a system of coordinates for observation facilitating instrumental action while in the latter the categories serve as references for subjective experiences of social space and historical time.

2) The relationship between prelinguistically and linguistically organized symbols are also discussed here.

a) The symbols which are not translatable into grammatically regulated communication can be interpreted on the basis of pathol-
ogy of speech on the basis of analysis of dreams. Symbols, though inexpressible in language, are gained from interactive experiences. These paleo-symbols are not integrated into a system of grammatical rules. Freud had pointed out the lack of logical connection in his analyses of dreams. The logically irreconcilable meanings have been preserved in the linguistic systems. Pre-linguistic symbols are tied to specific contexts and they are not easily relatable to other actions. Even though paleosymbols are the pre-linguistic expressions of intersubjectivity of co-existence and collective action they are inaccessible for public expressions. This is due to the lack of constancy in the meanings. This can be attributed to the privatism in all forms of pathological speech which pay little or no attention to the distinction between the addressee and the addressee. All distinction in contents, semantic and symbolic, have been only vaguely developed. The prelinguistical organization does not help the categorization of objects. In the case of communication disorders and malfunctioning of thought patterns in psychotics, the analytical operation of classification is disturbed. The contradicting individual pieces of information appears to be at loggerheads with each other. The mind is at a loss to bring into shape the thoughts which appear to be shapeless and unconcretized. There were identifications of properties in the early stages of ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of speech pathology but only in an emotive context.44

b) The pre-linguistic organization of symbols is only a theoretical construction. The distorted communication is considered by depth-hermeneutics as due to forced regression to earlier defective modes of communication or the intrusion of the earlier forms
of into language. Alfred Lorenzer, in his opinion on psycho-analytical therapy, says that the de-symbolized contents which have been repressed are brought out into the purview of the general language. It is paradoxical that the ineffability could also lead to repression. In such cases, it is neither pre-linguistic nor unintentional. In the case of genuine blackout of certain portions in the memory, only reenactment through language elicits a response and this great service is done by the psycho-analysts. Hermeneutically this is possible only through the language. The fleeting Ego can be cajoled to loosen its vehemence as the forgotten pages of communication in one's self-understanding are reopened. Even in our daily usage of language, lack of confidence in the veracity of an information causes repression. If the information turns out to be false and if the claim is repudiated, the person goes into a shell. Constant auto-suggestion or soliloquy in the case of sensitive people helps in improving the matters. But, people with mental fortitude who can weather insults and debacles with aplomb take things in their stride without buckling down. In the case of repression, it is possible to provide a language-analytical interpretation for a complementary defensive mechanism that is not directed at the self but at external reality, viz. projection and disavowal. Here, language analysis is aimed only at the consciously undertaken excommunication of the pre-linguistic elements. In the process of linguistic creation, the meaning potential is freed from the *paleo-symbols* and used in the grammatically guided usage of the symbols.

'The transference of semantic contents from the pre-linguistic to the linguistic state of aggregation widens the sphere of communicative action at the expense of un-
consciously motivated action. The moment of successful, creative use of language is one of emancipation. 46

3) Depthhermeneutics clarifies the specific incomprehensibility of distorted communication. The controlled 'translation' of pre-linguistic symbolism into language purges the obscurities which arise through the language. In the case of depthhermeneutics, the pre-understanding of language is necessary. For hermeneutic understanding, a pre-understanding shaped by tradition which changes with the language is a must. Freud formalized various theoretical assumptions regarding de-and re-symbolization of language, intrusion of paleo-symbols, conscious excommunication of the interspersals, and the integration of pre-linguistic symbols, while analysing the mechanism of defense. The construction of the 'Ego' and the 'Id' interpret analysts experience of resistance on the part of the patient. 'Ego' fulfils the task of examining reality and censuring drives. 'Id' is separate from 'Ego' and it becomes manifest in mechanism of defense. Freud attributes the role of 'Id' to the gaps in normal discourse in the course of de-symbolization. 'Id' is directly represented by the delusive paleo-symbols. Freud postulated 'Super-ego' to explain the unconscious defensive mechanisms.

'Super-ego is an agency unknown to Ego which is formed through open-ended identification with the expectations of the primary object. Ego, Id, and Super-ego are tied to a specific context of a systematically distorted communication between the analyst and the patient in order to encourage the patient to reflect upon himself. 47

The structural model introduced by Freud depends upon the detection of systematic distortion in everyday intersubjective communica-
tive competence.

Regarding questions about the last meta-language and the interpretations of everyday language, a knowing subject who can draw upon the linguistic competence explicitly during the course of theoretical discourse need not worry about the questions posed. ‘The implicit knowledge of the conditions of systematically distorted communication’ is presupposed in the actual form in the depth-hermeneutics.\(^48\) This pre-supposition is sufficient for the self-understanding of the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer. Gadamer emphasizes the primacy of that linguistic tradition when alluding to the context-dependency of the meaning. He, while delineating the concept of misunderstanding, dwells upon the role of a consensus, which is prevalent before and after an act of understanding, which has been nurtured by the tradition. The lacunae lies even in the pre-judgemental nature of understanding in which truth-claims are established only through a consensus. This pre-understanding itself harks back to socialization. Only repeated legitimation of a consensus could alleviate the pre-judgemental errors. This is probable only through a dialogue. We can consequently criticize specific traditions only on the basis of our being a part of the comprehensive context of the tradition of language. This belief could be shaken by the depth-hermeneutic insight that a reasonable consensus may be due to pseudocommunication.

Enlightenment insisted upon the role of reason as the governing principle of communication free from force. ‘The Enlightenment knew what a philosophical hermeneutic forgets’- that the ‘dialogue’ which we ‘are’ is also a context of domination.\(^49\) It has to be realized
that the context of tradition being the locus of possible truth and factual agreement is not free from force and untruth. Various factors like the objectivity of language, the repressivity of forces which deform the intersubjectivity of argument and other dogmatism of tradition subject everyday communication to severe pressures which might result in pseudo-communication.

A critically enlightened hermeneutic that differentiates between insight and delusion incorporates the metahermeneutic awareness of the conditions for the possibility of systematically distorted communication.\textsuperscript{50}

The critical hermeneutics connects the process of understanding and the principle of rational discourse. Only only a consensus which is achieved under the idealized conditions of free communication devoid of domination could guarantee any aspirations for a truth-claim.

K.O. Apel claimed that by following a regulative principle it is possible to ascertain, critically, the truth but only through an agreement within a community of interpreters. Only based on this regulative principle can we identify 'the deception of a forcible consensus or a systematic distortion behind seemingly accidental misunderstanding.'\textsuperscript{51} In order to attach an idea of truth in an act of understanding of the meaning, it is neccessary to stipulate an idealized concept of truth where a consensus is possible without domination or force.

Truth is the characteristic compulsion towards unforced universal recognition; the latter is itself tied to an ideal speech situation, i.e. a form of life, which makes possible unforced universal agreement.\textsuperscript{52}
Thus, the critical understanding must have an edified ideal of the anticipation of a true life.

G.H.Mead says: “Universal discourse is the formal ideal of communication. If communication can be carried through and made perfect, then there exists the kind of democracy ... ” At the sametime, Bleicher writes, “The idea of truth, which measures itself on a true consensus, implies the idea of true life: it includes the idea of being-of-age (Mundigkeit), which infers the competence of a speaker.” Only the yearning for the realization of truth through a proper consensus and the possibility of such a realization makes everyone adhere to a regulative principle in a dialogical situation. In order to deduce the principle of rational discourse in the everyday language is in need of a regulative principle.

While detailing how situations of authority arise, Gadamer confidently says that the sustaining factor is the dogmatic recognition of authority. He argues that it is only natural to concede authority to the superiority of language. The truth claims of a tradition can be equated to knowledge only if they are sans any strain. Gadamer argues that the consensus validating the authority can develop without any force. In the case of pseudo-communication, the authority is perpetrated in the guise of unforced agreement. Reason can act as the regulative principle which distinguishes between a true consensus and a dogmatic recognition. The tension between authority and reason poses fundamental problems for the interpreter. The fidelity to the Enlightenment tradition is to be maintained albeit in the horizon of currently existing convictions. Another deterring factor is the
time gap between the author and the interpreter which might prove decisive on account of the incompatibility between variant cultural and social ethos of the times. There is room to assume that a background consensus of established traditions and language gaps may be a result of pseudo-communication which may be either social or pathological in the individuals. The critical hermeneutical understanding should take cognisance of a wider spectrum of historical factors. As in depth-hermeneutics even the recognized legitimations are to be scrutinized for distortions. Gadamer’s hermeneutic reservations are targeted against monological self-certainty which claims for itself the mantle of a critique. Only in a dialogue, the self-reflection of all participants is possible.

3.8 George Herbert Mead: Language as the Medium of internalization of the External

3.8.1 The problem of ‘I’ and ‘You’

George Herbert Mead was not favourably disposed towards psychological notions prevalent during his time for their excessive emphasis on the individual to the neglect of the social facet of man. According to Mead, “the social environment is endowed with meanings in terms of the process of social activity.” Thus, for Mead, the individual grasps the meanings only from the interaction with the external. It will not be out of place to state that Mead followed Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), a German psychologist, who opined that gestures were intended manifestations of communication while Darwin considered gestures merely as self-expressions. Mead went one step further saying that both mind and self were social products. Language, for Mead, is
a vocal gesture. Here, he clubbed both social and biological approaches. Mind and self originate out of the internalization of “conversation of gestures.” Language, which affects this internalization, remains essentially social, for Mead. By social, it can be construed that Mead alludes to other players for whom the communication is intended. Even though he lets the non-mental take precedence over the mental, mind is considered to be a special type of behaviour under the organization of the society.

Mead presupposes a social set up which would facilitate exchange of linguistic communication. He also accepts certain physiological competences as essential in any social act. Such verbal acts as well as gestures assume the individual self and a corresponding external self or selves. The individual self ‘I’ and the external selves ‘You’ possess the insatiable urge to communicate for which language is the via media.

When a mind reflects upon its own actions and functions, it becomes a self. This prompts the mind to contrive various situations in which its own reactions can be studied and analyzed. This ever-enduring process finetunes the language as the medium of exchange between the ‘I’ and the ‘You’. The sender as well as the receiver of the verbal signals share the lifeworld of meanings. This duality further strengthens the idea of social emergence of meanings. The social frame-work is the context with reference to which the actions of the actors are to be viewed. The self crystallizes when the ‘I’ views its actions from the shoes of the ‘You’. Only then can the message pass through without eliciting any misresponses. These gestures which
are performed consciously after weighing the consequences are called Significant gestures by Mead. A reflective and controlled communication is the hallmark of the self. A society, which would have existed, hitherto, as a collection of biological units before the consummation of the self is transformed into a humane organization only after the evolution of mind into self. This self is the decider of the roles to be played by the people in different situations. A person is involved in a common activity with any other individual. This Mead calls the "generalized other". He says, "Any fellow member of a social group is called the generalized other." For example, before berating a person, we have a fairly good idea about how the person would react because of the fore-knowledge of such reactions of one's own self under similar situations. Such an idea could act as a catalyst as well as a deterrent in our actions. Therefore, Mead says that the relations are objective. The universality of any concept, for Mead, lies in the act in which it has been conceptualized. Essentially, the language remains social even though it becomes internalized and constitutes a part of what is known as mind.

It is very interesting to note that Mead's paradigm of objective-social basis of language resembles Habermas' concept of communicative competence which is transcendental on being the a priori, natural and universal capability to communicate, whether it is symbolic or linguistic competence. His self and mind owe their origin to a society which houses individuals with certain physiological capabilities to carry on certain social activities. According to Mead, the minimum effort to carry on a social act means that the individuals are using each other's gestures, as guides to the completion of the act. This he takes as the starting point for any meaning forming activity.
Habermas suggests that Mead was not overtly concerned with linguistic analysis. But, surprisingly, his views on language indicated a deep awareness of the association between language, society, and human communication. He points out to a sort of simultaneous development of individual and social consciousness in Mead. Mead differs from social psychology in arguing for the non-external character of meaning of the social acts. Especially regarding the speech acts, he says that they are social acts which have internal meaning but which can be revealed objectively. Mead’s social behaviourism stands out in that it views humans essentially as interacting subjects.

Habermas sees certain drawbacks in Mead like his neglect of mutual understanding and the internal structures of language. This is due to his analysis of gesture, symbolical, and verbal interactions as reactive responses in the stimulus-response fashion. In Mead, Habermas sees a deficiency of not generalizing, in the sense of universalization. Since Habermas aims at normatively regulated action the need of a universal framework of language, culture, and tradition is inevitable. In his communicative action, he aims not only at a reciprocation of gestures or verbal expressions but also at a practical discourse. Thus, Mead’s social behaviourism falls short of Habermas’ beloved aim of formal-pragmatic connection between language, communication, and society. This problem remains a stumbling block for achieving socialization, social integration, and social emancipation. Since Habermas’ aims are practical, they can be achieved only by a social rationalization process which is free from coercion and strategic intent. Thus, in order to engage in a practical discourse, a rationality characterized by a practical intent is necessary. Habermas opts for communicative rationality, which is directed
towards cementing understanding among the members of a society, as an instrument for his programme of communicative action. This communicative rationality involves discursive redeemability of validity of claims and a dialectical-dialogical estimation and critique of social aims and objectives. Its nature is an admixture of objective, subjective, and interpresonal dimensions of human communication.
NOTES

4) *Habermas, op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.
5) *ibid.*, p. 25.
14) *ibid.*, p. 10.
15) *ibid.*, p. 18.
16) *ibid.*, p. 20.
17) *ibid.*, p. 21.
20) Bleicher, op. cit., p. 155.
21) ibid., p. 155.
22) ibid., p. 156.
23) ibid., p. 157.
24) ibid., p. 157.
25) ibid., p. 157.
26) Habermas, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
27) Bleicher, op. cit., p. 159.
28) ibid., p. 160.
29) ibid., p. 161.
30) ibid., p. 161.
31) ibid., p. 162.
32) ibid., p. 163.
33) ibid., p. 164.
34) ibid., p. 181.
35) ibid., pp. 182-183.
36) ibid., p. 183.
37) ibid., p. 185.
38) ibid., p. 185.
40) ibid., p. 191.
42) Bleicher, op. cit., p. 194.
43) ibid., pp. 195-196.
44) ibid., pp. 198-199.
45) ibid., p. 200.
46) ibid., pp. 199-200.
47) ibid., pp. 200-201.
48) ibid., p. 203.
49) ibid., p. 204.
50) ibid., p. 205.
51) ibid., p. 205.
52) ibid., p. 206.
53) ibid., p. 206.
54) ibid., p. 206.
56) ibid., p. 265.
57) ibid., p. 266.
59) ibid., p. 4.
60) ibid., pp. 8-10.