INTRODUCTION

Ever since the dawn of civilization, humankind has been consciously engaged in unravelling the mystery of the human self. The Vedic sages of India made ceaseless enquiries into the nature of Atman (soul) and Socrates in Greece gave the dictum “Know thyself.” In modern times too, sages like Ramana Maharshi have seriously dwelt on the question, “Who am I?” This question pertaining to the individual of the human species has occupied not only the minds of philosophers and seers but also the minds of great creative artists. But the question is not often tackled in isolation; the inquirer, by the very nature of the subject, studies the individual in his relationship with “his circumambient universe.” The individual self and the wide spectrum of relationships it enters into in its existence have been the greatest of D. H. Lawrence’s concerns as a creative genius, especially as a novelist and short story writer.

David Herbert Lawrence

David Herbert Lawrence, the most controversial twentieth century British writer of international recognition, was born in 1885 as the fourth child of Arthur Lawrence, an almost illiterate coal miner, and Lydia Lawrence, a lady from the middle class with intellectual aspirations. As John Worthen points out in his biography, Lawrence’s “was not a promising background for a man who would make his life’s work writing about the fulfilled relationships of men and women, and the crucial relationship between human beings and the natural world.”

Though the productive period of his creativity covers only twenty years of his life, Lawrence has been very prolific as a writer. He has penned twelve novels, seven novellas, about sixty short stories, ten plays and a few hundreds of poems, besides a
number of essays, travelogues and letters. Though there is no genre of English literature that he has not enriched with his powerful insight and imagination, his fame as a writer rests mainly on his novels and short stories.

F. R. Leavis places Lawrence in the company of Jane Austen, George Eliot, Emily Bronte, Henry James and Joseph Conrad in ‘the great tradition’ of English novelists, based on the criteria “that they not only change the possibilities of the art for the practitioners and readers, but that they are significant in terms of the human awareness they promote, awareness of the possibilities of life” (3).

**Wholeness: The Self and Its Relationships**

The greatest, perhaps the only, concern of the novel and the whole of literature is the human self. And the western mind has come a long way in probing the self with the help of Philosophy, Psychology, Anthropology and also Neurology. Coming as he does in the modern age, where man knows only “a heap of broken images,” Lawrence seeks to define the unified self and its complex relationships in artistic terms. In “Why the Novel Matters,” he comes down heavily on all partial, limited metaphysical considerations of the human being as spirit, or soul, or body, or mind, or consciousness. According to him, “to be alive, to be man alive, to be whole man alive: that is the point.” He expects an individual to be a *whole living human* being (288).

As Rabindranath Tagore says, human life is like a river, which “strikes its banks not to find itself closed in by them, but to realise anew every moment that it has its unending opening to the sea.” However small and limited his role is in comparison with the vastness of the universe and the eternity of time, the individual is placed in a context of time and place where he is to have varied relationships with the rest of the created things, be it with his fellow human beings, or with the flora and fauna, or with the physical world itself. In his adventure into the cosmic phenomenon of life, man may
also have communion with the world of art in which he engages himself either as an artist or as a connoisseur, or with the world beyond himself of which he may have intuitive or instinctive knowledge or glimpses. Of the several men and women in Lawrence's fiction who are found in their tangled web of relationships, at least some attain a living wholeness in their selves and move towards a wholeness in their relationships.

Raymond Williams, while thinking of the realist tradition in fiction, speaks of the conception of "a whole way of life," in the presentation of which novels like *War and Peace*, *Middlemarch* and *The Rainbow* achieve a balance between the "personal life" of the individual and the "general life" of the society they are connected with ("Realism ... 584). In the context of the wide range of the individual's relationships, the general life Williams speaks of may be expanded to include not merely the human world but the whole of the created world. The term "wholeness of life" would then embrace both the wholeness of the individual self and the wholeness of its relationships in the great panorama of life.

The individual's world, by the very nature of the individual's being, cannot remain static. The world widens from the individual's core self, and draws into itself, in a dynamic manner, one by one or in groups, several other individuals, resulting in numerous kinds of relationships, which, to all those interested in discovering structures, would present an amazing parallel with the linguistic structures. Like the Richardsian "interinanimation" between words in different "contexts of situation," the individuals in different contexts of relationship have several kinds of interactions, and move up, as the words do, to enter into relationships in 'higher' structures. Through an interesting analogous process, individuals enter into familial, societal, racial and other relationships in a wide variety that could be seen in the phonological, morphological and syntactical
processes of the languages of different climes. The analogy need not be stretched too far. It can stop with discourse analysis, where one looks for the total effect contributed by the parts and their relationships. The very nature of the individual self and the dynamic, organic relationships the individual enters into, contribute to the wholeness of life.

The structural analogy should not mislead one to believe that individuals are placed in neat structured packages and that the whole gamut of relations the self enters into at different levels is an ordered whole. Organic wholeness, in Lawrence's conception, does not mean conformity or unconformity with the structural patterns in which the self finds itself. A character like Tom Brangwen of *The Rainbow* may not have any break with the traditional familial and social structures, yet have a living wholeness in his own self and in his fulfilment in marital relationship. In *Women in Love*, Ursula and Birkin represent a living wholeness in exemplifying Lawrence's own concept of ideal love and marriage, but they are both iconoclasts, though not in the same degree, as far as their reactions to the contemporary values and beliefs are concerned; they do not go in conformity with the existing social order. Lady Chatterley transgresses her class structure seeking a whole, dynamic, sexual relationship with her gamekeeper. So, an analysis of the human self and its relationships has to make use of all the available tools and deconstruct not only the self but also the existing structures at different levels and see how the artist's tales show the individual's struggles, both successful and unsuccessful, to achieve wholeness of life.

**Objectives of the Study**

The main objective of the present study is to examine, with particular reference to his fictional works, the idea of wholeness of life that seems to be Lawrence's preoccupation as an artist. And an examination of the artist's idea of the integrated life
of the human being necessarily involves an inquiry into his conception of the human self and its varied relationships not only with the human and the non-human worlds but also with the realms of art and of the beyond.

Works Chosen for the Study

The chief concerns of Lawrence, who is committed to his vision of life with remarkable creative power, courage and sincerity, are to be found not only in his poems and fiction but also in all his other personal and non-personal writings. All major critics of Lawrence also take a serious look at his other writings when they are engaged in a study of one particular area of the writer’s interests. For example, Raymond Williams, while working on Lawrence’s social writings, says his general writing, which clearly expresses his social ideas, cannot be separated or judged apart from the novels. Similarly, Leavis frequently refers to Lawrence’s general works such as *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* to reinforce or explain some points in his criticism of the fictional works of Lawrence. The works chosen for the present study are the novels and short stories in which there is predominantly an expression of Lawrence’s views on wholeness of life and on the self and its various relationships. However, when occasion demands, references are also made to his other works, especially his critical and general essays and his letters.

Lawrence is a writer who writes and rewrites till his works reach the perfection that he has in mind. So there are more than one printed or written version for some of his works, as, for example, there are three printed versions, each having a different title, of *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*. In such cases, the present study focuses on the final, standard versions, but also refers to the other versions if required by the discussion.

Evolution of the Concept of Self

The concept of self has been the most elusive of all that the world of knowledge
has ever grappled with. There is a wide range of meanings that come into play with reference to self, from the apparently simple denotation of human beings by terms such as man, woman, boy, girl, etc. to very complex and abstract significations such as life, consciousness, being, soul, spirit, etc. And in the last three thousand years, both in the West and the East, human mind has made considerable progress in addressing the self in its astounding complexities.

In Western Thought

The philosophical enquiry into the nature of the human self was initiated the first time in the history of western thought by Socrates, who, it was believed, adopted his view of life from the words of the oracle at Delphi, "Gnothi seauton" ["Know Thyself"]. True, there had been great minds like Pythagoras and Empedocles in Greece before Socrates. But they were "physical philosophers"; "they had sought for the physis or nature of external things, the laws and constituents of the material, measurable world" (Durant 6). It was Socrates who turned inward to the human personality, to the mind and soul of man. As presented by his pupil Plato in his Dialogues, Socrates held soul as the "essence" of self. "He considered this essence as an incorporeal, eternal occupant of our being. As bodies die, the soul is continually reborn in subsequent bodies" (Socrates and Plato).

Both Socrates and Plato seemed to believe in the immortality of the soul, and Plato drew from the pre-Socratic philosopher, Pythagoras, the notion of transmigration of souls from one living being to another when death occurs. To understand Plato's conception of the nature of the soul one should turn to his theory of Forms or Ideas, which is a unique contribution of Plato to philosophical thinking. According to Plato, Forms are the ultimate reality and they are eternal and unchanging. There follows from his theory of Forms Plato's concept of two worlds. One is the unchanging, real world of
Forms, known as the world of Being. The other is the changing world of our own, known as the world of Becoming. As Robert C. Solomon points out, Plato’s “two worlds” view does not imply that the everyday world of man is an illusion; it only means that it is less than real, “a set of shadows of the real,” “an imitation of the bright originals” (70-74).

The bridge between the world of Being and that of Becoming is Plato’s second principle of metaphysics, the immortality and the immateriality of the human soul. “Our souls contain knowledge of the world of Being that is already in our birth. Such knowledge and ideas are called innate” (qtd. in Solomon 77). In Plato’s dialogue The Meno, Socrates tells Meno, “As the soul is immortal, has been born often and has seen all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is no way surprising that it can recollect the things it knew before, both about virtue and other things.” So, in the words of Socrates, “searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection” (qtd. in Solomon 78).

Nevertheless, with Aristotle, Plato’s disciple, metaphysics turned from “the study of another world, recollected in our eternal souls” to “the study of nature (physis) and, as importantly, the study of ourselves.” He rejected Plato’s argument that reality was removed from the world of our experience. To this practical philosopher this world of ours was the reality and the Forms of things could not be separated from particular things. Hence he rejected Plato’s separation of the human soul from the body and saw human beings “entirely as creatures of nature, ‘rational animals’” (Solomon 81-82). Aristotle’s cosmology had an interesting notion known as teleology. It comes from the Greek word telos (‘purpose’ or ‘goal’) and conceives the universe as a whole, and all things in it, as having a purpose. It is in direct contrast with the causal view of modern science. While the causal view seeks to know how something came about, the
teleological view seeks to understand why it came about.

In *Metaphysics*, in his enquiry into what is meant by *being*, Aristotle speaks of the primary category of *substance*, by which he means what something *really is* in the primary sense of *being*; he distinguishes it from categories such as *quantity* and *quality*, which also, in their own way, contribute to the meaning of *being*. The fact that a man is a man shows his substance. That he is six feet tall indicates quantity and that he is dark or fair indicates quality. So, substances are the basic elements in Aristotle’s metaphysics. While a horse, a tree and a butterfly are substances, a table or a chair made by a human being are not because they do not have their own natures.

The question of self-identity that has engaged all philosophers in the later ages has had its beginning in Aristotle. Aristotle not only characterizes substance by its *essence*, that aspect of an individual that identifies it as a particular individual, but also seeks to solve the problem of change through his own concept of form and matter. According to Aristotle, form and matter cannot exist separately, but they can be distinguished everywhere in nature. Plato’s Forms were eternally unchanging. But in Aristotle’s conception, while the essence of a thing cannot change if it is to remain the same thing, matter and form combine in different things in a variety of ways so that matter is given new forms. “The form, *by itself*, can never change, nor can the matter, but the way they combine can change. By changing their form, caterpillars turn into butterflies and seeds into fruits and flowers. Thus, Aristotle explains both change and stability” (Solomon 85).

The problem of self-identity has been under constant enquiry even after two millennia after Aristotle. In the enquiry of the later philosophers, *consciousness* occupies the prime place in the body-consciousness-soul trio. Two orders of consciousness are distinguished by modern Western thought: the empirical and the
transcendent (trans-empirical). Spinoza, Leibniz, Fichte and Schelling developed the tendency to dwell on the trans-empirical realities by the exercise of \textit{ratio} or \textit{intellectus}, which, they believed, was "a much higher capacity than mere sense-thinking." On the other hand, Descartes and then Locke and Hume developed the tendency to dwell on empirical realities through sense impressions, "to examine and adapt philosophical concepts to the demands of sense-thinking" (Srinivasan 1). However, Solomon puts Descartes along with Spinoza and others as a rational (trans-empirical) philosopher (193). But he is said to be a philosopher making use of 'rational elements' and 'empirical data'.

The philosophical problem of establishing self-identity may take into account the following three aspects: 1) the essential characteristics that mark one individual as different from others, 2) the possibility of identifying an individual as the same individual over time, and 3) the nature of the individual's consciousness. Modern philosophical tradition from Descartes and Locke to Hume and Kant focuses on individual consciousness, especially the individual's self-consciousness. One may here recall what Freud said on individual consciousness. Every man is in some ways like all other men, in some ways like some other men, and in some ways like no other man. Self-consciousness is one's perception of one's own consciousness, "to look at ourselves as others see us." But one cannot be self-conscious unless one has a sense of one's identity. So, as Solomon points out, the concept of self-consciousness and the sense of identity go hand in hand (333).

Descartes' system can be described as a transition from "the theocratic to the anthropocentric systems of philosophy," "from those systems of philosophy centred round the inner spiritual experience and an 'intuitive' comprehension of the world through God to those systems of philosophy centred round the purely sensate and
rational nature of man" (Srinivasan 2). Descartes’ most famous sentence, “Cogito, ergo sum” (“I think, therefore I am”), which occurs in his Discourse on Method (1637), gives his definition of the self in terms of thinking. Descartes, in Meditation VI in his Meditations on First Philosophy, says that he has, on the one side, a clear idea of himself only as res cogitans (“a thinking and unextended thing”) and, on the other, a distinct idea of his body only as res extensa (“an extended, unthinking thing”) and he is certain “that this I [that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am], is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it.” So, according to Descartes, self-identity depends on mind or consciousness and not on the body. And the attributes of soul (or mind) are already given in Meditation II: “What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels” (qtd. in Solomon 334, 202).

But, as Srinivasan points out, Descartes’ anthropocentric or egocentric system, confines “the reality of the self to the purely empirical existence” because a self “can hardly be said to exist when it does not think.” Pointing to this French philosopher’s consideration of the self on par with the corporeal matter, Srinivasan argues, “If the self is, thus, just a party in the dualism of mind and matter, and if it has no being or reality beyond this strife, to talk of its freedom or immortality becomes a glaring self-contradiction”. His complaint is that “Descartes fails to emphasise the trans-empirical reality of the self, in spite of his recognition of ‘innate ideas’, and with the result, establishes an anthropocentric tradition which in due course closes the door against the light of inner experience and leads to atheism and skepticism” (2-4). This complaint seems obviously to have come from a spiritual point of view, which would find great satisfaction in the philosophy of Spinoza, who “frees the self from its imprisonment in the empirical boundaries set by Descartes’ dualism of mind and matter, and restores it
to the superior status of an ‘eternal essence’ in God” (6).

The Jewish philosopher Spinoza and the German philosopher Leibniz followed Descartes, but developed “elaborate metaphysical systems quite different from – and in opposition to – his own” (Solomon 90). According to Descartes’ metaphysics, the world was divided into three ‘substances’. One was God. The other two substances, both homogeneous, underlying all forms of mind and all forms of matter, depended on God. The unifying passion of Spinoza sought to have a ‘monistic’ vision of the universe and reduced the number of substances in Descartes’ conception of reality into one, the universe or God. Spinoza’s system argues for “the transcendence of the dualistic and the relational point of view and the attainment of a monistic vision (Srinivasan 8). According to Spinoza, “the body and soul of man are not really separate and distinct, but only different aspects of the same Substance [God]” (Greene 230). As in Spinoza’s conception all things in the world are only Attributes of God, God and the universe are one, and this position of the philosopher is regarded as **pantheism** (literally, “everything is God”).

Though Leibniz also works with the same notion of substance, his picture of the universe differs greatly from Spinoza’s. Unlike Spinoza’s universe, “which was mechanical and wholly dependent upon causes,” Leibniz’s universe is “very much alive” and everything in it has a purpose, as in Aristotle’s teleology (Solomon 105). While Spinoza spoke of one cosmic substance, Leibniz introduces the concept of **monads**, by which he means “simple, unextended, and indivisible” substances that are “the metaphysical building blocks of the universe” (Greene 241). The monads are created by God, who is “something of a supermonad and the only ‘uncreated monad’” (Solomon 105).

With the British philosopher Locke, philosophy takes a sharp turn from
metaphysics. Locke accepts his French predecessor Descartes' method of tentative scepticism, but questions his "urge to metaphysics as well as confidence in the insights of pure reason." Rejecting "the unsupportable 'intuitions' that provided Descartes with his rules and premises," Locke turns to "the data of experience as the ultimate source of all knowledge." In his view, "there cannot possibly be ideas prior to experience, ideas that are 'born into us,' as suggested so vividly by Plato." It is Locke who takes up the question of consciousness after Descartes. He differs from Descartes in seeing the soul (a substance) as distinct from consciousness. In his view, consciousness is self, and "what makes a person the same person is that the same consciousness and memories are present" (Solomon 207, 335).

There are two aspects of consciousness that are involved in the Cartesian and Lockian concepts of self. One is what consciousness does ("thinking, doubting, feeling, perceiving, imagining, and desiring") and the other is perceiving or being aware of what consciousness does. The latter is known as self-consciousness, the key to self-identity in the systems of Descartes and Locke. While for Aristotle self-identity was essentially bodily identity, "modern theories of personal identity have by and large appealed to some notion of memory, self-consciousness, or psychological continuity" (Solomon 339).

The Scottish philosopher Hume, rejects outright Descartes' and Locke's view of self-identity. He relies on his belief that all ideas must be derived from impressions. According to him, "mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance"; they "pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations" without creating any impression of the self or a thinking substance (A Treatise of Human Nature qtd. in Solomon 341). From this he concludes that the self is merely a fictional thing. Along with this Hume also rejects the concept of
the enduring self.

With the German thinker Kant, philosophy turns again to the transcendental. According to Kant, the enduring self is not empirical, but transcendental. The self ‘I’ is “the necessary logical subject of any thought, perception, feeling and so on. It is not an object of experience but transcends and is presupposed by all experience” (Solomon 344). This activity is held according to the rules of organization, and the result is a synthesis. The unified self exists with a unified synthesis of experiences. Kant calls this notion of the self “the transcendental unity of apperception.” He uses the term, “transcendental ego,” to refer to the self which holds all the experiences together in a single thread. Kant does not agree with Descartes’ view that human existence is always a self-conscious existence. According to him, one need not always be self-conscious; it is enough one is capable of becoming self-conscious at any point of experience.

Kant divides the question of self-identity into two: 1. What is essential to being a self? 2. What is essential to being a particular self? Kant’s concept of transcendental ego answers the first question. And the answer to the second question is possible with his identification of another ‘self’ that he calls “the empirical ego,” which includes “all of those particular things about us that make us different people.” While the transcendental self makes human consciousness possible, the empirical self identifies human beings as individuals with different bodies, different personalities and different thoughts and memories (Solomon 347).

Modern thinkers like Meredith Michaels go beyond distinctions between the spatiotemporal continuity of the body and self-consciousness to solve the problem of self-identity. They speak of the connection between body and consciousness. Michaels tells the imaginary story of the transplanting of the live brain of Wanda, who gets killed in an accident, into the head of a person whose brain is damaged by a stroke. Th
question now is what gives the person in the hospital bed his or her identity. He considers both the Aristotelian position that “self-identity is essentially bodily identity” and the Memory Theory and affirms the need to take into account, in the discussion of self-identity, “the psychological and physical connectedness” (Solomon 348-50).

Until the existentialists (both the Christian existentialists like Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel and the existential atheists like Heidegger and the French existentialists) came to assert the belief that existence comes before essence, it was commonly held that “the essence of man precedes that historic existence which we confront in experience.” In the traditional concept, as Sartre explains it, God, “the supernal artisan” is believed to have a conception of each individual man before He creates him, just as the artisan has a conception of the book or the paper-knife before he really makes them. With the philosophical atheism of the eighteenth century the notion of God is replaced by the concept of essential human nature. “Each man is a particular example of a universal conception, the conception of Man.” But atheistic existentialism, of which Sartre is an avowed representative, holds that existence precedes essence, which means that “man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards.” According to Sartre, “there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is.” This is what is referred to as the “subjectivity” of existentialism. In the existentialists’ view, “man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes himself to be.” They put “every man in possession of himself as he is, and place the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders.” While laying emphasis on the individual’s choice, the existentialists also show relationship with the whole of humanity. They show how the image of himself the individual creates of himself through his choice is “valid for all” and how the individual’s responsibility “concerns mankind as a whole.” Sartre argues, when a man
chooses to be monogamous, he is committing humanity as a whole, to the practice of monogamy” (Sartre 26-30).

However, as Solomon points out, “the existentialist doctrine of choice doesn’t make the problem of self-identity any easier.” The question is whether the facts the man chooses to be essential alone are sufficient to determine his identity. In judging a person’s identity, as Sartre suggests, what is to be considered is not only the facts true of him or her (Sartre and Heidegger call it “facticity”), but also the projections into the future, their ambitions, plans, intentions, hopes and fantasies (Sartre calls these a person’s “transcendence”) (354).

**In Eastern Thought**

As in the West, there is also in the East a long tradition of philosophical thought concerning the self. As Solomon says, while the pre-Socratic Naturalists were pursuing their “protoscientific inquiries” in Greece, sages in India were developing their own doctrines about the nature of reality which were essentially religious. “The earliest articulation of the concept of God as the reality appears in the ancient Indian Vedic literature, especially in the appendages called *Upanishads*, ‘secret doctrines’ from which later eastern religious and spiritual notions emerged” (58).

There is a passage from one of the oldest of *Upanishads*, *Brhadaranyaka*, which forms part of the daily prayer of most Hindus, is commonly believed to be a solemn appeal to the Brahman, “the Unity underlying all individual selves and things”:

From non-being (*asat*) to true being lead me.

From darkness (*tamas*) to light (*jyoti*) lead me.

From death (*mrt*) to immortality (*amrt*) lead me. (1.3.28 tr. Stephen Phillips)

(While there is unanimity in the translation of the other keywords in the passage, the
word *asat* in the first line is variously translated as ‘non-being’, ‘illusion’, ‘untruth’, ‘delusion’, ‘the unreal’ etc.) As Solomon observes, this passage “relates to the spiritual aspiration that sets the tone for much Upanishadic teaching.” (58-59).

As Radhakrishnan points out, the *Katha Upanishad* speaks of the need for turning the eye “inward” and seeing “the self”(403). Naciketa, the young seeker of truth, asks Yama, the God of Death, questions about the nature of the human self. Yama says, “The human body is like a chariot and the soul is the charioteer. The senses are the horses and the sense-objects are the roads along which they travel. The wise people who know the truth say that the soul is the enjoyer through the senses and the mind” (Diwakar 37). In Indian philosophical thought, the self is considered to be “the one thing that remains constant and unchanged in the incessant and multiform activity of the universe, in the slow changes of the organism, in the flux of sensation, in the dissipation of ideas, the fading of memories” (Radhakrishnan 405).

In Indian philosophy a distinction is made between the universal, transcendental self and the empirical self. The empirical self conserves itself by perpetual change and is “shaped by relative happenings, mutable and accidental, as compared with the universal self.” In their ordinary life human beings are exiled from the universal self by ‘*maya*’, which means both “the fragility of the universe” and the human tendency to identify with the apparent, empirical self. The ‘I’, the *Atman*, the universal self, is a trinity of transcendent reality / existence (*sat*), awareness / knowledge (*cit*), and freedom / bliss (*ananda*) (407). As Radhakrishnan observes, the fundamental truth of Hindu religion is that “our real self is the supreme being, which it is our business to discover and consciously become, and this being is one in all”(410). And it is said in the *Vedanta* (“the end portions of the Vedas,” the *Upanishads*), in which “the germinal conceptions” of Hindu religious thoughts are contained, that *Brahman* (the Supreme
Being), and Atman (the self in the human being) are really identical. As Chandrasekhara Pillai points out, this identity between Brahman and Atman is declared emphatically in all the four maha vakyas (“major texts”) of the Upanishads (16). Each major text belongs to an Upanishad attached to a Veda:

“Prajnanam brahma” (“Consciousness is Brahman”). (Aitareya. Rg-veda)

“Aham brahmasmi” (“I am Brahman”) (Brhadaranyaka. Yajur-veda)

“Tat tvam asi” (“That thou art”) (Chandogya. Sama-veda)

“Ayam atma brahma” (“This self is Brahman”) (Mandukya. Atharva-veda)

Ramana Maharshi, answering a devotee’s question, says, “Meditation exists in thinking that one’s self is Brahman, existence-consciousness-bliss.” And, according to him, liberation is realization of the true nature of one’s self (15).

On the question of relationships, the Hindu philosophy affirms that all individuals, races and nations are specific articulations of “the universal life.” This “essential unity with the whole of being” is seen in the words, “Thou in me and I in thee” (Radhakrishnan 410). And in the Bhagavad Gita Sri Krishna says: “When he realizes the whole variety of beings as resting in the One, and is an evolution from that One alone, then he becomes Brahman.” (13.30)

In the system of Yoga, which means the union of the human self with the Supreme Self, the individual self is said to have been covered by pancha kosas (“five sheaths”): (1) annamaya kosa (“the physical sheath”), (2) pranamaya kosa (“the vital energy sheath”), (3) manomaya kosa (“the mental sheath”), (4) vijnanamaya kosa (“the intellectual sheath”), and (5) anandamaya kosa (“the blissful sheath”). Inside the most subtle of these kosas (anandamaya kosa) is the self. Incidentally, the Hindu temple architecture symbolizes the self and its sheaths. The idol in the sanctum sanctorum is the self (ksetrajna) and the temple structure is the body (ksetra) (Pillai 47).
As Ramakrishna says in his conversation with his devotees, the process of arriving at one’s real self is called “Neti neti” (“Not this, not this”) in the ancient texts. When asked, “Is this ‘I’ the flesh, the bones, the blood, or the marrow? Or is it the mind or the buddhi?”, the answer is “Neti” to each question (180). As Ramana Maharshi explains it, after negating all, the Awareness alone remains: “That I am” (6). And Sankara in Atma-Bodha (“Self-Knowledge”) says, “one should realize the individual soul and the supreme soul through the major texts” negating all adjuncts, through “neti neti” (verse 30).

Though in Indian thought the concept of wholeness of self always includes the spiritual, “the other-worldliness” spoken of in the Upanisads does not condemn active life or bodily activity. For example, the Mundaka Upanishad says, “Let us fully enjoy and live our allotted days with firm limbs and strong body” (Diwakar 26). According to Aurobindo, while spirituality is its “master-key,” the Indian mind does not belittle the mind or life or body. In fact, “they are the conditions and instruments of the life of the spirit in man” (5, 38). Another tendency of the Indian mind that Aurobindo observes is “the impulse to follow each motive [. . .] to its extreme point and to sound its utmost possibility.” For example, it carries both “the ideal of opulent living and the ideal of poverty” “to the extreme of regal splendour and the extreme of satisfied nudity” (11).

John W. Spellman, in his introduction to the Kama Sutra of Vatsyayana, an ancient Hindu treatise on kama (“love”, “desire”, “lust”, etc.), considers it a “colossal ignorance” to say that the Indian mind is always “other-worldly”. He lists the four purusharthas (“definitive goals of human life”) as given in Indian philosophy: dharma (“right conduct”), artha (“accumulation of material goods”), kama and moksa (“ultimate liberation of the soul from the cycle of rebirths”). The first three, known as the trivarga, “ought to be practised in this life, and if done successfully will lead to
And in Tirukkural, the supreme ethical work in Tamil, each of the *trivarga* is celebrated in each of the three *pāls* ("divisions") of the book: *aram*, *porul* and *inbam*.

The Buddhist view of the self differs much from that of the Hindus. As V. Jayaram presents it, Buddhism believes in the existence of the ordinary self, but not in "the Hindu view that the self is indestructible or immortal." However, its concept of *anatta* ("anatma" or "no self") does not refute "the fact of reincarnation of soul and the evolutionary nature of soul as integral parts of our journey into expanded awareness." According to the Buddhists, "the ordinary soul may outlast a lifetime and take birth in another form or another life, but is still the same ordinary self, made up of several components and subject to pain and suffering, illusion and ignorance." In their view, the (ordinary) self is made up of five *khandas* ("distinct parts") namely: feeling, corporeality, consciousness, perception and mental formations.

But, in Hane Htut Maung's view, the *anatta* doctrine is among the most poorly understood of the teachings the Buddha. Thanissaro Bhikkhu in "No-self or Not-self?" says that *anatta* ought to be translated as "not-self", rather than "no-self." Following Bhikkhu, Maung considers the doctrine, not as a metaphysical assertion, but as a practical strategy to free oneself from attachment. When asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer whether there is a self, the Buddha refused to answer, because, as the Buddha himself later explained to the Venerable Ānanda, an answer to his question would only bring Vacchagotta confusion, since his naïve mind would misunderstand it, and that, in turn, would adversely affect his struggle for liberation.

Bhikkhu notes that the denial of the self is incompatible with the doctrine of rebirth: what is it that experiences rebirth? Maung, by the same token, argues that the denial of the self is incompatible with the doctrine of *nibbana* ("liberation"); in Sanskrit *nirvana*: what is it that realises *nibbana*? Furthermore, Thanissaro Bhikkhu argues that
to deny the self is to devalue the purpose of a spiritual life altogether: in the struggle for liberation, what is it that is being liberated?

Lawrence was familiar with the development of the concept of self in Western as well as Eastern thought, though, as one of the most original of writers with a genuine interest in human self, Lawrence did not belong to any particular school of philosophy or thought. He never visited India, but was interested in Yoga and the other systems of the Hindu religion. As Harry T. Moore records in *The Priest of Love*, in Sri Aurobindo’s observation, “Lawrence was a Yogi who had missed his way and come into a European body to work out his difficulties” (440).

**Review of Lawrencian Criticism**

There have been numerous books and articles on Lawrence in the last seven decades since the death of this great novelist. In fact, the editor of the *Cambridge Companion*, in his judicious preparation of the Lawrence bibliography, is confronted with the task of selecting from “over 650 books or pamphlets on Lawrence and literally thousands of essays” (274).

Contemporary criticism of Lawrence was greatly divided in recognising the literary merit of the artist. The first official recognition of his creative talents came from the editor of the *English Review* Ford Madox Hueffer, who on the strength of his reading of the opening paragraph of the manuscript of “Odour of Chrysanthemums” sent by Jessie Chambers, immediately recommended it for publication, and announced to established writers like Hilaire Belloc, G. K. Chesterton and H. G. Wells that he had discovered “another genius” (Moore, *The Priest* . . .140-41).

The earliest critic to attack Lawrence was his friend John Middleton Murry, with whom Lawrence had experienced “a gradual dissolution of relationship” (Ford, “Notes . . .37). In his review of *Women in Love* in the *Nation and Athenaeum* in 1921, Murry
expressed his disapproval of *Women in Love*, which, according to him, had “five hundred pages of passionate vehemence.” Murry could not tolerate the sexual episodes in the novel, which he considered “passionately obscene in the exact sense of the word” (Andrews 21). It was Murry who first objected to the scene in which Birkin is described “sitting like an Egyptian Pharaoh.” Years later, even Leavis admitted that the passage was one of the faults of the novel (*D. H. Lawrence* ... 154). Murry condemned the sexual experience shown in the novel as “the crudest kind of sexuality.” He described the scene in which Birkin is shown as ‘a son of God’ experimenting with an unusual kind of consummation with Ursula as “subhuman and bestial” (Andrews 20-24).

Reviewing *Aaron's Rod* in the same journal in the following year Murry expressed some words of praise for the novel and pointed out without any malice some oversights in what he called “an extremely careless book.” However, failing to see Lawrence retaining the same serious interest in sex as in *Women in Love*, Murry wrote: “but after *Women in Love* we doubted deeply whether he would survive at all. *Women in Love* seemed to show him far sunk in the maelstrom of his sexual obsession.” And with Eliotian sarcasm he wrote: *Aaron's Rod* shows that he has gained the one thing he lacked: serenity” (Andrews 24-25). And in his review of *Fantasia of the Unconscious* written in 1923, he seems to ask relevant questions about Lawrence’s claims about plexus, ganglia etc. and the (reciprocal) human influence on the sun (and the moon). As Andrews observes, Murry “loved and hated Lawrence, and appreciated and reviled his work, merely as his own temporary whims dictated” (Introd. x).

Conrad Aiken’s attack on Lawrence in the *Nation and Athenaeum* in 1924 reveals a total lack of understanding and a confusion over Lawrence’s intents and ideas. He charged him with a behaviour “like a man possessed,” a lack of restraint, “a violent, unthinking outpouring of feelings and perceptions” and “a conscious disregard for
personal dignity.” Having seen all that has happened after Aiken in the criticism of Lawrence, one can have a hearty laugh over the passages from Lawrence which Aiken sought to ridicule. In one of his sample passages, Lawrence remarks of Benjamin Franklin: “O Benjamin! O Binjum! You do NOT suck me any longer” (Studies... 23).

Edwin Muir in 1926 considered The Plumed Serpent as “the most garrulous book” Lawrence had ever written. To him, Lawrence’s descriptions of Mexico were just “travel impressions” (Andrews 31). And Wyndham Lewis considered Lawrence “the most dangerous foe of the West” trying to overthrow the West by what he termed “Oriental Bolshevism.” He wrote in Pale Face (1929): “In contrast to the White Overlord of this world in which we live, Mr Lawrence shows us a more primitive type of consciousness,’ which has been physically defeated by the White ‘consciousness’ and assures us that the defeated ‘consciousness’ is better of the two” (Davies 178).

Among the famous cotemporary novelists, Arnold Bennett, E. M. Forster and Aldous Huxley alone recognized the greatness of Lawrence as an artist. Henry James had merely “trifled with the exordia,” and Virginia Woolf did not fully recognize his genius. Bennett, who greatly admired Lawrence, said: “He tried to fish up sex from the mud into which it has been sunk for several hypocritical and timid English generations past” (Draper 162). Forster in his Aspects of the Novel considered Lawrence as a novelist of “prophecy” along with Dostoevsky, Melville and Emily Bronte (141,146-47). Huxley, “influenced by Lawrence’s diagnosis of the evils of modern civilization,” wrote the novel Point Counter Point, in which Frieda was presented as Mary Rampion and Lawrence as Mark Rampion, a character urging “the need for ‘revolt in favour of life and wholeness’” (Draper 170).

Perhaps the only book on Lawrence to be published during his lifetime was Herbert J. Seligman’s D. H. Lawrence, An American Interpretation, which recognized
the merits of Lawrence's fiction and appreciated his analysis of American literature.

Forster, who gave the “perfectly judged obituary salute” in the *Nation and Athenaeum* to Lawrence, who died on 2 March 1930, referred to the departed genius as “the greatest imaginative novelist of our generation” (Leavis, *D. H. Lawrence . . . 10*). And Huxley’s collection of Lawrence’s letters published after his death and his introduction to the volume are great landmarks in Lawrence studies. Huxley acknowledged that he “had never met, even in his own famous literary family, anyone like Lawrence, who ‘startled and embarrassed’ him with his direct sincerity (Moore, *The Priest . . . 317*).

Middleton Murry continued to have his prejudices against Lawrence even after his death. He wrote in *Son of Woman* (1931): “But he was not a great artist. He was a prophet, a psychologist, a philosopher, what you will – but more than any other single thing, the great life-adventurer of modern times” (qtd. in Sagar 2). As Draper remarks, Murry could not get beyond the man to “the essential artist” (164). So Aldous Huxley could summarize Murry’s criticism in the phrase “destructive hagiography,” in his Introduction to *The Letters of D. H. Lawrence* (x). Probably Murry’s judgement of Lawrence was vitiated by his “complex and messy” friendship with Lawrence (Vivas 21).

T. S. Eliot criticised Lawrence in *After Strange Gods* (1933) in severest terms tinged with characteristic sarcasm. He said there was in Lawrence a “lack of a sense of humour, a certain snobbery, a lack [. . .] of the critical faculties which education should give, and an incapacity for what we ordinarily call thinking.” According to him, Lawrence “commonly drew the wrong conclusions” from his “profound intuition.” And he found in Lawrence “a distinct sexual morbidity.” Eliot also attacked Lawrence in his Foreword to Father William Tiverton’s book on Lawrence, for his impatience,
impulsiveness, lack of ratiocinative powers and for writing "often badly in order to write sometimes well." Eliot the Anglo-Catholic also chose to attack Lawrence's "Congregational upbringing" to which Lawrence was always "grateful." Eliot said Lawrence was a religious heretic, the product of "vague hymn-singing pietism" or decaying Protestantism. He criticised him for having no "restriction of tradition or institution" and "no guidance except the Inner Light, the most untrustworthy and deceitful guide that ever offered itself to wandering humanity" (qtd. in Leavis, D. H. Lawrence . . . 23 f.n.1, 318-19; Spilka, Introd.2). While Eliot attacked him so, I. A. Richards, as Spilka points out, criticised Lawrence "for holding magical beliefs in an age of science instead of plunging into the destructive element of unbelief" (Introd.2). It was Leavis who gave a fitting reply to Eliot and settled the issue once and for all.

There was a considerable lull in Lawrence studies in the thirties and the early forties. Readers "almost completely neglected him during the Second World War, though Lawrence's values were then needed more than ever" (Moore, The Priest . . . 646). However, during this period, several of Lawrence's sketches and critical and other essays, which had remained uncollected and unpublished even after the publication of Twilight in Italy, and other books, were posthumously published in 1936 under the title Phoenix with an introduction by the editor Edward D. McDonald. W. H. Auden and Stephen Spender, both writers belonging to the Leftist camp, greatly admired Lawrence, even though they could not approve of his doctrines. As Baldick points out, Spender in his review of Phoenix in Left Review (Jan. 1937) "made very clear distinctions between Lawrence and Nazism, applauding Lawrence indeed as a great, original revolutionary" (259). W. Y. Tindall's D. H. Lawrence and Susan His Cow, published in 1939, was, as Draper says, "spoiled by its tone of urbane condescension" (166).

There was a revival of interest in Lawrence after the war. "Readers began to see
that he had written more trenchantly than most authors about the causes of modern evils, and that his books were an important statement about the problems of modern man" (Roberts and Moore x). The fullest recognition of Lawrence's creative genius and his contribution to the great tradition of English Literature and the most powerful defence of Lawrence against the attacks of those who failed to understand his greatness came from the Cambridge don F. R. Leavis. Leavis, through his close analysis of Lawrence's novels and tales in *D. H. Lawrence: Novelist* (1955), establishes Lawrence not only as "our last great novelist" but also as "the great writer of our own phase of civilization" (9). Leavis finds in Lawrence's fictional work "a profound assertion of life and wholeness" by a "creative genius" manifesting itself "as supreme intelligence" (245). However, George Steiner, who makes a rather rigorous appraisal of Leavis, says Leavis has become "obsessive" in his relation to Lawrence and hence is blind to certain faults and deficiencies of the writer. Mark Spilka finds in Leavis a shift from the "puristic formalism" of the older new critics to a "morally committed formalism" (Introd. 6). Leavis called the series of essays in *Scrutiny*, which included the Lawrence essays, "The Novel as Dramatic Poem." As Spilka points out, in considering the novel a dramatic poem, Leavis had obvious advantages. On the one hand, he could have a close scrutiny of the novel as the New Critics did in their analysis of poems. On the other, "by insisting on the dramatic nature of such fiction, he could keep fidelity with rendered life." And one cannot but agree with Spilka when he says Leavis was "the ablest of Lawrence critics and the progenitor of his revival" (4-5).

In the fifties there appeared three important biographies that gave a fillip to Lawrence studies: *Portrait of a Genius, But . . .* (1950) by Richard Aldington, *The Life and Works of Lawrence of D. H. Lawrence* (1951) by Harry T. Moore (A second biography, *The Intelligent Heart*, was published by Moore in 1954 with new material on
Lawrence’s youth; it was revised and renamed as *The Priest of Love* in 1974) and *D. H. Lawrence, A Composite Biography* (1957-59) edited by Edward Nehls. In addition, there were also several important books and essays of criticism on Lawrence in this period by scholars like Father William Tiverton, Moore, F. J. Hoffman, Spilka, Graham Hough, Dorothy Van Ghent, Marvin Mudrick, Mark Schorer, Monroe Engel, W. D. Snodgrass, Roger Sale and Mary Freeman.

Mark Schorer, who was “a great critic and an industrious scholar,” at first attacked Lawrence in his famous essay “Technique as Discovery” “for failing to allow technique to fathom meaning in *Sons and Lovers*, for using it instead in confused and contradictory ways, in his private attempt to master sickness.” But subsequently he modified those charges and arrived at “friendlier judgements” (Spilka, Introd. 6).

Mark Spilka’s most important book *The Love Ethic of Lawrence* published in 1955 reveals him as “a disciple” of Lawrence, and his criticism is mainly a “sympathetic illumination of Lawrence’s message” (Draper 167). As Spilka observes in his introduction to *D. H. Lawrence: A Collection of Critical Essays*, F. R. Leavis has been responsible for “the creation of new hierarchies” of the accepted texts of Lawrence. “Largely through Leavis’s efforts, *Women in Love* and *The Rainbow* are now recognized as Lawrence’s great novels; *Sons and Lovers* has slipped to third place, *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* to fourth, and *The Plumed Serpent* makes a dubious fifth (Leavis himself dislikes the last two novels); then come the longer tales – *The Captain’s Doll, The Fox, St Mawr, The Man Who Died, The Virgin and the Gipsy* – in what constitutes an impressive body of major fiction” (4).

The sixties made several significant contributions to Lawrencian scholarship. In his *D. H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art* (1960), Eliseo Vivas accepts the hierarchy given by Leavis, and says in novels such as *Aaron’s Rod, Kangaroo*, and
The Plumed Serpent “the artist fails to digest his experience aesthetically” (qtd. in Draper 168). Unlike Spilka, Vivas is not a disciple of Lawrence. David Holbrook, “an energetic Leavisite educationist,” in his sequence of books, English for Maturity (1961), The Secret Places (1964) and The Exploring Word (1967), repeatedly invokes Lawrence’s books “as sources of an emotional ‘wholeness’ urgently required by children and their teachers in a dangerous modern world of commercialised insincerity.” Following Leavis, Holbrook regretted Lady Chatterley’s Lover as a “false” work, but promoted Lawrence “not only as ‘the century’s greatest imaginative writer,’ but as a healthy antidote to the mechanical and selfish models of sexuality offered to young people by comic-strips, Hollywood movies and skiffle bands” (Baldick 264).

During this period, there were also two important collections of critical essays that dominated Lawrence studies. One was the Twentieth Century Views edited by Spilka and the other was the Case Book on The Rainbow and Women in Love edited by Colin Clarke. The important Lawrencean scholars who made signal contributions to these volumes during this period include Raymond Williams, H. M. Daleski, George H. Ford, S. L. Goldberg, G. Wilson Knight, Julian Moynahan, Ronald Gray and Frank Kermode.

In 1968 James C. Cowan founded the D. H. Lawrence Review, which catered to the needs of all Lawrencean scholars. In the same year Warren Roberts and Harry T. Moore brought out Phoenix II, which contained those stories and articles that had remained uncollected and unpublished even after the publication of Phoenix. Once made available, these hitherto unpublished materials “helped extricate the discussion of Lawrence from the stereo-types suggested by Murry, Eliot and others” (Sitesh 4). By the end of the decade Lawrence was an accepted author in the universities and colleges.

If the sixties were the pinnacle of Lawrence’s popularity as a writer, the
seventies witnessed the feminist attack on Lawrence initiated by the feminist iconoclast Kate Millett in her *Sexual Politics* (1971). The seeds of feminist criticism of Lawrence had already been sown by the French writer and feminist Simone de Beauvoir in her perceptive views on Lawrence’s fiction in the section “D. H. Lawrence or Phallic Pride” in her classic of feminist literature *The Second Sex* (1949). Millett, drawing upon Beauvoir’s criticism of Lawrence, launched a powerful, virulent attack on the novelist’s male-supremacist attitude. She closely examined the major novels of Lawrence, especially *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, and severely criticised, and often ridiculed, Lawrence’s glorification of the phallus. She read “The Woman Who Rode Away” as a demented misogynist’s sadistic attempt to crush the new woman’s will and throw her to the ‘primitives’ to sacrifice her to the phallic god. Millett’s criticism gave a rude shock to Lawrencian scholars and, as Baldick says, “it tended only to stand the idol on his head, merely inverting Leavis’s uniformly life-affirming genius and turning him into a uniformly death-dealing maniac” (265).

Kate Millett’s radical views on sexual politics have greatly changed Lawrence studies, and the battle lines are clearly drawn between the defenders and the attackers of Lawrence. In the 1970s Norman Mailer, who was also a target of Millett’s attack in *Sexual Politics*, engaged himself in a pitched battle with Millet on behalf of Lawrence through his *The Prisoner of Sex* (1971). Harry T. Moore “accused Millett of oversimplifying the texts, missing all the complexities of Lawrence’s symbolism.” There were also other admirers of Lawrence like Paul A. Wood, Peter Balbert and Carol Dix, who wrote in defence of the beleaguered Lawrence. Among the feminists themselves, while Virginia Woolf, Rebecca West, Katherine Ann Porter, Elaine Reuben and Carolyn Heilbrun strongly resented Lawrence’s treatment of women in his fiction, there were Gavriel Ben-Ephraim and Lydia Blanchard who made serious efforts to
rescue Lawrence from feminist antagonism. As Burden points out, in “the most doctrinaire period of radical feminism,” Lydia Blanchard was the lone woman to speak “for Lawrence as ‘extraordinarily sensitive to the problems of women’” (290).

Faith Pullin, taking a post-Millett stand, charges Lawrence with using women for the purpose of examining the male psyche. Hilary Simpson’s *D. H. Lawrence and Feminism* (1982) is a feminist reading of Lawrence against the social and gender contexts. She examines how Lawrence’s attitude to women changed from its liberal pre-war position to its post-war reaction against women. Judith Ruderman in *D. H. Lawrence and the Devouring Mother: The Search for a Patriarchal Ideal of Leadership* (1984) presents a psychological analysis of the causes of Lawrence’s masculinist obsessions in the ‘leadership’ novels. Sheila Macleod, who promoted “sympathetic readings” and got through to “the essence of Lawrence’s writing even while sharing some of the feminist views about the less acceptable, misogynist moments” (Burden 293).

One of the important perspectives of Lawrence that had its beginnings in the sixties was the Marxist criticism of Lawrence pioneered by Raymond Williams, “one of the leading theoreticians of the British New Left” (Lodge, *20th Century* . . . 580). Widdowson finds in his theory “strong signs of Left-Leavisism” (13). Terry Eagleton’s *Criticism and Ideology* (1976) “indicates how a new Marxist critic ‘re-reads’ a canonic author.” Graham Martin, who belongs to the tradition of British Marxist humanism, and Graham Holderness, one of the younger generation of Marxist critics, “work from a materialist base and reconsider class and history in Lawrence’s work” (Widdowson 13). However, as Baldick observes, most of Holderness’s work concentrates on “the ‘rooted’ Lawrence of the Nottinghamshire coalfields, and not enough on the exiled Lawrence of the post-war pilgrimage” (267).
Since the eighties, post-structuralist, deconstructionist and post-modernist tendencies have begun to appear in Lawrencean criticism. As Widdowson suggests, these tendencies are evident in the "indeterminacy, inconclusiveness and uncertainty" of the present condition of criticism, "which makes the ascription of meaning, the sense of a future and political belief difficult." Among those who represent post-structuralism, there are critics like Gamini Salgado, Daniel J. Schneider and Daniel O'Hara, whose "emphasis is on Lawrence's language and its unstable self-deconstructing dynamic," and like Alistair Davies, whose attempt is to destabilize "the critical 'figure' of Lawrence which occurs after when he is removed from behind the dominant image [created] by Leavis." With the post-modernists the reader's gaze is shifted "from what Lawrence may be to what the critical discourse makes of him" (17). In his recently published *Radicalizing Lawrence: Critical Interventions in the Reading and Reception of D. H. Lawrence's Narrative Fiction* (200), Robert Burden attempts a Foucauldian reading of *The Rainbow* and a Bakhtinian analysis of *Women in Love, The Lost Girl* and the unfinished *Mr Noon* in terms of the carnivalesque and the dialogic.

**Methods of Approach**

In the present study the fictional works of Lawrence are approached with the purpose of understanding his concept of the self and its relationships within the broad framework provided by the notions of wholeness of life. The first task in the analysis is to arrive at Lawrence's own concept of the self after a close reading of the primary and the secondary sources dealing with various aspects of the self. The next task is to make a broad hypothetical division of the possible relationships the human self can enter into (e.g., self and society, self and nature etc.). This is followed by a modification of the division by verifying it against the chief concerns of the writer as seen in his works. Once the division is confirmed, the works are arranged chronologically and a scrutiny is
made under each head in order to find out the development of the major concerns of the author from the beginning to the end of his creative period. One of the problems encountered here is the difficulty of sorting various aspects of the creative works under different heads, because no organic creation yields itself to compartmentalization. For example, the early story “Odour of Chrysanthemums” can at once be studied in terms of the relation of the self with another individual self, with members of the family, with society, with nature and with the phenomena that lie beyond understanding such as the creative force, life and death. So the division is not applied mechanistically; it is used with the recognition of the possibility of reading the same work, the same event or the same character in different ways.

As for the question of approach to the text, the present study does not limit itself to any particular approach. It is eclectic in that it adopts different approaches such as biographical, sociological, psychological, philosophical, anthropological, etc. as demanded by the context. Sometimes more than one approach is adopted, as, for example, in the analysis of the mother-son relationship in Sons and Lovers both biographical and psychological approaches are found to be appropriate, and in the interpretation of the human sacrifice in “The Woman Who Rode Away,” there is scope for psychological, historical, anthropological and sociological approaches. Among the recent approaches such as post-structuralism, deconstructionism, post-modernism, post-colonialism, new historicism and feminism, the present study deals at length with feminism, but only takes occasional glances at the others.

Chapter Division and Preview of Contents

The present study, apart from the Introduction and the Conclusion, contains seven chapters, each taking up for discussion one major relationship of the self as seen in the fictional oeuvre of Lawrence. As conceived in the study, the relationship widens
from chapter to chapter, from individual relationships to the familial and the societal and then on to the relations with Nature, the world of art and what lies beyond the conscious self.

The second chapter “Lawrence’s Concept of Self” arrives at Lawrence’s holistic concept of self through an analysis of his views on the usual divisions one encounters in the human self, the conflict between spontaneity and mental consciousness, the opposition between the notions of change and fixity in life, the importance of the body and the unconscious in the realization of the self in its wholeness, and the possible relationship the whole self can achieve with the circumambient universe.

The third chapter “Self and Individuals,” in dealing with the individual’s self and the relationship the individual can have with other individuals, divides the whole range of individual relationships into man-woman, man-man, and woman-woman relationships. Within man-woman relationship, to which Lawrence attaches the greatest importance, a detailed study is made of Lawrence’s views on love, sex and marriage, of the feminist encounter with Lawrence and of the search for the roots of his favourite ideas of male power and leadership.

The fourth chapter “Self and Family” views the vast movement of life in generations as seen in Lawrence’s fiction and takes up for detailed study the relationships the child has with the adult world in the family and the familial inter-relationships of the individuals as sons and daughters with their parents and as husbands and wives within the conjugal circle.

The fifth chapter “Self and Society” makes an attempt to deal with what interests Lawrence in human relationships within the larger, social unit. In the analysis of Lawrence’s view of human life within the historical process of industrialization, a study is made of the utilitarian concept of the greatest good of the greatest number, the
contrast between the old and the new industrial England brought up by rapid mechanization, the working conditions in the factories, the encounter between man and the machine, the growth of industrialism and capitalism, the class-divide between the entrepreneurs and the workers, and the domestic and social life of the working class people. Under class consciousness, which is a very important aspect of the life shown in Lawrence’s fiction, the role of physical labour, ‘ideas’, sex, and language in the social dynamics of class, the prejudices and conflicts between classes and the sad process of social-climbing are discussed. In the chapter there is also an analysis of Lawrence’s views on education and political doctrines like democracy and socialism and of the charge of fascist tendency levelled against him. Then, under wider issues involving nations and races, Lawrence’s attitude to war, nationalism, racism and colonialism is discussed.

The sixth chapter “Self and Nature” examines the different kinds of relationships men and women establish either directly with Nature in their lives or imaginatively as the novelist does in his use of the natural imagery in interpreting human life. In the chapter there is also a discussion of Lawrence’s habit of seeing Nature in terms of human, sexual relationships, of his belief in the spirit of place determining the basic characteristics of human life in different places, of the exploitation of Nature by human beings and of Nature’s response to the on-going human drama on earth.

The seventh chapter “Self and Art” studies the various aspects of the relationships an individual can have with the world of art either as a creative artist or as one responding to art. After examining the relationships between the self and the creative act, between the artist and the creative source or energy, and between the artist and his creation (which is a tale in the case of the novelist), a few portraits of the artists
who appear in Lawrence’s fiction are presented, and at the end, an analysis is made of the way Lawrence uses the medium of language in the art of fiction.

The eighth chapter “Self and the Beyond” is an attempt to study the relationship between human self and what lies beyond life or death or consciousness either as a supreme power or as ‘the unknown’ or as the ‘dark god’ revealed in blood consciousness. Besides Lawrence’s attitude to religion and religious imagery, the conflict between reason and faith in religion, the question of life and death, and man’s place in the macrocosmic phenomenon of the universe, the study also discusses Lawrence’s belief in the centres of primal consciousness in the human body, his dark god and the religion of blood, and his attitude to the Supreme Being or the Unknown.