THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT

It is no secret that the foreign policy of a country, far from being an independent variable, depends on a large number of factors, which especially include domestic concerns, and institutions of that country. As the saying goes, "foreign policy begins and ends at home", it is the domestic context out of which a country's foreign policy arises. The domestic context pertains to those important aspects like the geo-strategic location, historical, socio-cultural and politico-economic environment of the country which prescribe the parameters within which the foreign policy makers of the country have to shape its foreign policy. Needless to add, American foreign policy in general and its policy towards India in particular is no exception to this truism.

On the contrary the United States, being a democratic political system, its leaders cannot afford to ignore domestic pressures in the making of foreign policy. As Walter Lippmann argues:

The people have imposed a veto upon the judgement of the informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the government, which usually, knew what would have been wiser, was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or too appeasing in negotiation or too intransigent. Mass opinion.... has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions when the stakes are life and death."

While the above mentioned view may be exaggerated, no one can deny elements of truth in the above assertion. Surprisingly, however,
hardly any attempt has hardly been made to examine the significance of America’s domestic politics in the making of its foreign policy. In this chapter we, therefore, propose to examine the domestic inputs in the making of U.S. policy towards India during the Reagan administration.

As the linkages between American domestic system and its foreign policy is very complex one and it is not possible to dilate upon these linkages due to constraints of time and space, we do not propose to go into a details of the significance of US domestic politics in the making of its foreign policy. It is also beyond the scope of this dissertation. Interested scholars may turn elsewhere. Instead, we proposed to take up only two aspects of US domestic system, which has a significance bearing on the making of its policy towards India. These two factors are, American Congress and overall American public opinion.

CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES

The role of Congress in the conduct of American policy towards India has increasingly gained significance due to Congressional concerns about nuclear proliferation. The US Congress played a significant role in shaping of US policy towards India during the Reagan era. In 1987, a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee cut off assistance to India, when continued aid to Pakistan was in jeopardy because of that country’s alleged development of nuclear weapons. That episode suggests that although sentiment toward India on Capital Hill varies, there is a latent, if not a deep hostility toward the country that can be tapped by New Delhi’s opponents and supporters of Pakistan. We, therefore, discuss below the Congressional attitude
towards two issues, namely nuclear issue, and the 1987 Pakistani Aid Bill, to illustrate the significance of Congressional input in the tailoring of US policy towards India during the period under review.

The Nuclear Issue

Ever since India's 1974 explosion, the question of that country's possession of nuclear weapons has been the dominant issue in bilateral relations with the United States. Washington sees Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs as major threat to both regional and global stability. To some extent, South Asia, has been "a testing ground" of the global aspects of non-proliferation. The issue has been a principal concern of Congress as well, as that body has been charged with refining administration policy. US policy has been a combination of sanctions in the form of threats to cut off foreign aid and reliable supplies of nuclear materials if international safeguards are violated. Successive administrations have offered India incentives, and Congress has provided the sanctions. In 1974, the Ford administration withheld fuel shipment to the Tarapur installation until it could determine that American materials were not used in Indian explosion. In a move that embarrassed the administration, Congress instructed the U.S. IDA representative not to vote for loans to countries that had exploded nuclear weapons but had not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – a provision that applied exclusively to India. When Prime Minister Morarji Desai, of the short-lived Janata government, promised that India would not develop nuclear weapons or conduct further tests, Congress repealed the prohibition, and aid to India resumed.
In the early years of the Carter presidency, concern about nuclear proliferation peaked in both the executive branch and on Capitol Hill. Congress passed legislation in 1976 stipulating that countries that do not have nuclear weapons but that import material to develop bombs and refuse to put their nuclear installations under international safeguards are not entitled to American assistance. The administration refused to sell Pakistan 110 A-7 attack aircraft, and it encouraged France cancel the sale of a reprocessing system to Pakistan. Congress passed the Symington and Glenn amendments, which obliged Washington D.C. to withhold aid to those countries which deliver or receive nuclear enrichment equipment or technology and do not accept IAEA safeguards. As a result of evidence that Pakistan was engaged in such activities, U.S. aid to that country was terminated in April 1979 for the third time.

The climate in Washington changed later that year with the Iran hostage episode and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Global security issues once more overrode regional considerations. Given its dependence on Pakistan to assist the Afghan guerrillas, Washington turned a blind eye to Islamabad’s clandestine development of nuclear weapons. A decision to sell F-16 planes to Pakistan was viewed by New Delhi as providing that country with a potential delivery system. In the meantime, President Carter, feeling that a 1963 American commitment was at stake, in June 1980 approved export licenses for two fuel shipments and spare parts for India’s Tarapur reactor - notwithstanding the fact that India, according to the NRC, did not meet the criteria laid down in the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The decision pitted the commitment of members of Congress to non-proliferation against the importance they attached to relations with India. At the time, commitment to nonproliferation
was stronger in the House, and that body rejected Carter’s decision. The Senate, however, was the real venue, and the President’s decision was sustained by the narrow vote of 48 to 46. In 1982, the Reagan administration helped negotiate an end to the Tarapur dispute by getting the French to assume the obligation to supply fuel. A year later, Secretary of State George Shultz, promised that the United States would be the supplier of last resort. A senate effort to overturn Shultz’s commitment was thwarted in conference by representative solarz, diluted an amendment by Senator Rudolph Boschwitz, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, that could have prohibited the sale of nuclear material to both India and South Africa.

Since 1981, Pakistan has been the target of the nuclear non-proliferators, as the Indian program has been described as "dormant." In that year, the Reagan administration proposed weakening of the Symington amendment in order to permit approval of its $3.2 billion aid package for Pakistan. The proposal was described as a way of enabling that country to meet its security needs with conventional weapons and thus obviate the need for it to embark on a program. Congress declined to weaken the Symington amendment at that time but instead granted Pakistan a six-year exemption in the interest of national security. * In 1984, Senators Alan Cranston and John Glenn persuaded the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to adopt an amendment to the foreign aid bill making assistance conditional on “Presidential certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, and is not acquiring, overtly or covertly, technology, material or equipment for a nuclear explosive device.” Although President Reagan’s intervention succeeded in having the decision reversed by a 9 to 8 vote, the committee put a
warning to Pakistan in the bill. The situation in Afghanistan ensured that the debate would be put on hold. In the meantime, relations with India seemed to be improving. Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, visited Washington in connection with the Festival of India celebration in 1985 and addressed a joint session of Congress. Between that time and 1991, several commercial and technology transfer agreements were negotiated between India and the United States.

The 1987 Pakistani Aid Bill

Public Law 97-113, signed in December 1981, specifically allowed the President to waive the application of the Symington amendment in the case of Pakistan until September 30, 1987, subject to certain conditions that the introduction to section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act made clear pertaining to the continued presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. This provision ensured that aid to Pakistan and that country's nuclear program would reemerge as issues at that time. Early in 1987, the administration proposed raising its level of assistance to Pakistan to $4.02 billion over six years, conditional on certification that Islamabad did not possess nuclear weapons.

As press reports (even those emanating from Pakistani scientists) had been claiming for over a year that the Pakistani bomb was near completion, the State Department immediately found itself on the defensive, unable to reliably assure Congress that Islamabad would not go nuclear. Senator John Glenn, chairman of the Government Operations Committee, wrote President Reagan that evidence "points to the conclusion that all the components and the means for assembling a working nuclear explosive device are in Pakistan's
possession. Even the American Ambassador to Pakistan, Deane Hinton, claimed to be losing patience with Islamabad over its continuing efforts to develop nuclear weapons. As the New York Times put it, the question facing lawmakers was "What to do if Pakistan achieves every technical step needed to produce nuclear weapons without actually making them."  

Representative Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested that this could be done by tying the sale of early warning radar planes to further restrictions of Pakistan's nuclear program, but in the climate over Afghanistan, the administration's financial package remained uncut by his subcommittee. However, the subcommittee reduced the State Department's waiver of the Symington amendment from six to two years. The committee was clearly divided, and the outcome was a compromise. Conservative like Republican Robert J. Lagomarsino of California argued for unconditional security assistance to Pakistan, and moderates like Republican Jim Leach of Iowa succeeded in tying the aid to the continuation of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.  

On the Senate side, Pakistan's status as a frontline state— with 2.5 million refugees — was also the determining factor during markup by the Foreign Relations Committee. An amendment authored by Senators Lugar of Indiana and Daniel Evans of Washington that coupled the administration's monetary package with a two-year waiver of the Symington amendment passed by a vote of 11 to 8. Lobbying by the executive branch among Republican Senators was matched only by the efforts of the Pakistani Embassy on the entire committee.  

The defections of Senators Christopher Dodd of Connecticut and John Kerry of Massachusetts from the Democratic ranks defeated a
proposal to withhold $100 million of the $625 million in assistance to Pakistan in fiscal 1988 unless Pakistan stopped producing nuclear weapons-grade material. As both Senators had been critics of the Reagan policy in Central America, it was believed that they were seeking to bolster their anti-Communist credentials on South Asia. Three Republican Senators regarded as nonproliferators also changed their votes under pressure from the Reagan administration. As Senator Alan Cranston of California put it, "When you have two global concerns like this in conflict, anti-Communism will always overwhelm and drown non-proliferation."

Because of Pakistan's importance to the Afghan resistance effort, it was aid to India that was cut by nearly one-third instead. When the full House Foreign Affairs Committee considered the AID authorization against the backdrop of mobilization on the Indo-Pakistani border, the occasion became an opportunity to demonstrate Congressional displeasure with New Delhi's alleged pro-Soviet foreign policy. An amendment by Representative William Broomfield succeeded by a vote of 18 to 14 in cutting developmental assistance to New Delhi from $50 million to $35 million per year. Broomfield, a conservative Republican from Michigan and ranking minority member on the committee, had been an opponent of aid to New Delhi for a generation, arguing that in return for $1.7 billion in American assistance since 1980, the United States had received nothing but ingratitude. According to him, India has "been one of the most persistent anti-United States members" in the United Nations, endorsing Soviet positions on Cuba, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, and, especially, Afghanistan. Several Democrats, resentful of India's support of the Soviet backed regime in Kabul, joined Republicans to punish India over the Afghan issue. This development clearly
caught the State Department and the Indian Embassy off guard. Both had been outmaneuvered by the skilful Pakistani legation. Although the administration wanted to use the Afghan issue to help Pakistan, it did not expect the cost to be damaged to its relations with India, which were seen as improving. The Indians, expecting a cut in U.S. security assistance for Pakistan, instead had to work to restore their own American economic assistance.

Developments outside Congress reversed the fortunes of India and Pakistan in Washington. In mid-July, a Pakistani-born Canadian citizen, Arsahd Pervez, was arrested for allegedly trying to purchase and export to Pakistan 25 tons of a special steel alloys used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Following a June 1984 incident in which another Pakistani citizen, Nazir Vaid, was arrested in Houston trying to smuggle krytons – electronic switches that trigger nuclear bombs – Congress passed a measure in 1985 jointly introduced by Representative Solarz and Senator Larry Pressler stipulating that American assistance should immediately be cut off if the President found that a country had tried to illegally acquire American material for making nuclear weapons. By 1987, members of Congress of all political persuasions were indignant over what they regarded as a Pakistani outrage, but most were reluctant to suspend aid to the chief conduit for the Afghan resistance. Nevertheless, Representative Solarz and Senator Glenn immediately pushed for an aid cut off, and Chairman Dante Fascell of the House Foreign Affairs Committee wrote to President Reagan proposing suspension of military assistance until the issue could be resolved. When Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost was unable to get Pakistani agreement for verifiable nuclear inspections in August, Congress in late September suspended aid for six weeks.
when the existing waiver expired. The gesture was at once a symbolic expression of Congressional indignation over the violation of American law by a foreign power and a reflection of strong disagreement about how to work out a compromise that would enable aid to Pakistan to continue. 15

As a result, several different approaches were offered. Senator Glenn's proposal called for a six-year waiver of the Symington amendment on the condition that there be no production or import of bomb-grade nuclear materials. Under the provisions of Glenn's proposal, failure to submit annual reports and intelligence estimates to appropriate Congressional committees would trigger a suspension of military aid that could be resumed only by presidential waiver on national security or nonproliferation grounds if approved by a joint resolution. Representative Solarz's plan are also called for a six-year waiver on the condition that there be no production of bomb-grade nuclear materials. Under his proposal, however, both economic and military aid were to be dependent on the determination of the Pervez case and six-month reports on uranium enrichment production. The president was given the responsibility for determining that a violation would cut off aid. Assistance could then be resumed only if a joint resolution upheld a presidential recommendation. The House Appropriations Committee was compelled to get into the act when aid to Pakistan expired on September 30. Chaired by Democratic Representative, David Obey, the committee called for an eight and one-half month waiver of the Symington amendment without conditions except for a single report on past Pakistani production of enriched uranium. The administration stood by its six-year waiver, conditional only on Pakistan's not conducting a nuclear test or assembling a nuclear device and did not address any other
procedures or requirements. In an atmosphere of almost total uncoordination, neither the House Foreign Affairs nor the Senate Foreign Relations committees came forth with proposals.

As a result of the multiplicity of plans and the failure of anyone on the authorization committees to coordinate an approach to the matter, the Senate Appropriations Committee became the principal actor in the process. It complicated matters with a provision denying assistance to any South Asian country that produced weapons-grade nuclear material. The inclusion of India appealed to those in Congress who preferred a regional approach to the problem of nonproliferation and was attractive to those who wanted to punish New Delhi but presented a dilemma to nonproliferators partial to India rather than Pakistan. As Representative Solarz stated, "This bill gives us the worst of both possible worlds. It constitutes a formula for continuing our aid to Pakistan notwithstanding its interest in producing nuclear weapons, while simultaneously creating an irritant in our relations with India." The legislation emanating from the Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee authored by Democrat Daniel Inouye, and Republican Robert Kasten, was replicated in the House Rules Committee by Republican James Leach and Democrat Charles Wilson Leach was a believer in balanced regional approaches to non-proliferation; Wilson was wheeler-dealer with pro Pakistani sympathies, who took advantage of the power vacuum on Capitol Hill to play a major role in South Asia policy. Given the intensity of disagreement among prominent players, the foreign policy leadership of the House agreed to drop all amendments pertaining to nuclear weapons development in South Asia during debates on the foreign aid bill.
Consequently, the issue was decided in the Senate in the form of an omnibus appropriations bill that was passed under the pressure of end-of-session deadlines and the impending Christmas recess. Once more, the Indians and the authorization committees were caught napping, and the State Department sent mixed signals to both Congress and New Delhi. Both the Americans and the Pakistan governments emphatically denied that Islamabad was engaged in a nuclear weapons program. Indian officials, including Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, who had held cordial discussions with President Reagan in October, reacted sharply at what was regarded as a "misguided quid pro quo." Washington Post pointed out the implications to the Middle East of extending a regional approach to atomic weapons sanctions, where Israel had the bomb and Arab states did not. Nevertheless, the contest was uneven. Most staffers considered the Pakistani lobbying operation in Washington, headed by Ambassador Jamshed Marker, to be second in effectiveness only to Israel's. Although few connected with the appropriations committees had contact with Indian officials, most were familiar with Pakistani diplomats. Moreover, both Sikh groups and the Defense Department were aligned with Pakistan. In comparison, India's apparatus was feeble. It appeared that India, a Parliamentary democracy, had yet to learn how to lobby in a Congressional system. While India had an aged retainer of the Nehru family as its principal lobbyist in Washington, Pakistan employed Neill and Company, a well-connected lobbying firm of former Congressional staffers, State Department, and Pentagon Officials.

The Pakistani campaign succeeded in changing the venue from the authorization committees to the appropriation committees and the issue from non-proliferation to aid to Afghanistan. As Senator Glenn
told his colleagues, "the choice .... is not between a free Afghanistan and a nuclear armed Pakistan. If we choose to orient U.S. South Asian policy entirely around Afghanistan, we will paradoxically end up with what we most fear: a regionally destabilizing arms race between two nations that have fought three bloody wars in the last four decades." As the result of a compromise worked out at eleven o'clock at night on December 11 among Senators Inouye, Kasten, Moynihan, and Pell, the Senate adopted a revised amendment to Continu ing Resolution H.J. Res.395. Introduced by Senator Glenn, it dropped all references to India and effectively gave Pakistan a six-year waiver of the Symington and Glenn amendments on the condition that the president certify annually that termination of assistance to that country would damage the national security interests of the United States.

Ultimately the legislation was settled on December 17 not by the authorization committees but by a Senate-House conference committee composed of members of the Obey and Inouye panels. The conferees, as part of the omnibus continuing appropriations bill, granted Pakistan a two and half a year waiver from U.S. nuclear non-proliferation laws and provided $260 million in foreign military sales assistance and $220 million in economic assistance for the ensuing fiscal year — several years and $ 60 million less than the administration had initially requested. The revised legislation was passed by both houses of Congress on December 22 and signed into Public Law 100-202 by President Reagan the same day. Earlier, on December 17, the president has certified "that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device." As is the case with most legislative compromises, few in Congress were pleased with the outcome. Pakistan once again had to settle
for less aid than was promised by the State Department. The non-proliferators remained wary of Islamabad's activities. India had its assistance restored but was resentful over being brought into the debate. Some Senators and their staffers on the authorization committees were outraged at the usurpation by the appropriations committees of their authority to make foreign policy. Yet until they find a quarterback, such as Senator Moynihan, to manage the process, it is possible that the scenario could be repeated.

The 1987 legislation expired in 1990, bringing the issue of waiving the Glenn-Symington amendments in order to fund Pakistan before the U.S. Congress again three years later. The 1987 episode demonstrated that Pakistani assistance to the Afghan rebels overrode Congressional concern about that country's clandestine nuclear activities. However, the end of the Cold War and the winding down of the conflict in Afghanistan have resulted in a dramatic deterioration of U.S. Pakistani ties (as of 1991) and a corresponding improvement in U.S. Indian relations. Increasingly, critics of India have cited Sikh-human rights issues rather than Cold War-Afghan issues in their complaints about New Delhi's behaviour. Although Pakistan lost the advantage of the Afghanistan issue, the election of Benazir Bhutto, a popular figure in Washington, temporarily negated India's claim to be the region's sole democratic state. However, in October 1990, following her removal from office, President George Bush refused to certify that Pakistan did "not possess a nuclear explosive device." Congress responded by invoking the Solarz-Pressler amendment of 1985 suspending aid to that country; future assistance to Islamabad was to be cut by more than half—from $564 to $208 million a year. If Pakistan could have again used latent Congressional hostility toward India to deflect its own
problems, then New Delhi's difficulties on Capitol Hill could have been considered more than structural. With a non-Congress government in power in New Delhi after Rajiv Gandhi's November 1989 defeat and Benazir Bhutto's removal from power and subsequent electoral defeat in Pakistan, prospects for better U.S.-Indian relations in the 1990s were enhanced.

The above discussion shows that despite its lack of institutional memory and its turnover of personnel, Congress — ever more than the executive branch — has consistently viewed New Delhi's international position as being contrary to American interests. India has been perceived on Capitol Hill as needy but unworthy of assistance. The Cold War enabled India's principal rival, Pakistan, to exploit New Delhi's negative image in Washington. The choices that members of Congress faced have involved in supporting India at the expense of non-proliferation or terminating assistance to the Afghan rebels if they did not back Pakistan. Given the latent hostility to India even those sympathetic to New Delhi have been unwilling to jeopardize their influence on other important matters by advocating India's position. As the case study demonstrated, in 1987 Islamabad was able to use the Afghan issue to punish India and deflect attention from its own clandestine nuclear program. Moreover, the increasingly fragmented and budget-driven legislative process has worked to New Delhi's disadvantage. This research therefore reinforces Norman Palmer's finding that the U.S. Congress has often been a major impediment to good relations with India. As palmer observed whether it is conscious or not, members of Congress have often given offense to India and damaged bilateral relations by their outspoken criticisms of India's leaders, policies and way of life.28
PUBLIC OPINION

In addition to Congress, over all American public opinion including various lobbies have influenced U.S. policy towards India. In his memoirs Henry Kissinger refers on more than one occasion to the sympathy that India, as the World's most populous democracy, enjoys among opinion-making groups in the United States. The message is clear that these "emotional ties", in addition to the lack of a "geopolitical tradition" ran counter to what he was trying to accomplish on the subcontinent in 1971. His account raises an interesting question concerning the role of public opinion in shaping American foreign policy toward India.

Before examining these avenues of influence, a preliminary question must be asked: who is the public? How does one go about making distinctions among a population so diverse as that in the United States? We do not propose to discuss these questions. These have been discussed elsewhere. It may however be said that though public opinion is expressed through various mediums such as phrase and electronics media, legislative debates, political parties, etc., but the most reliable research tool for this purpose is the public opinion poll. This method of measuring the pulse of the people has its limitations, but its main virtue is that it obtains responses from systematically selected sample that is reasonable represent of the entire population.

In order to obtain some picture of the American public's foreign policy preferences regarding India, we have examined some of the surveys in the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research that have included a question on India. The role of American public opinion in conditioning of US policy towards India can be identified especially
on two issues, namely US economic assistance to India and US relationship with Pakistan. But since India did not require much economic assistance during the Reagan period, this issue need not detain us here. We, therefore, propose to examine only the issue of US relationship with Pakistan.

The US- Pakistan Relations

No other event has complicated the course of U.S. -India relations more than the U.S. decision in 1954 to embark on a major program of military aid to Pakistan in return for its commitment to participate in a regional defense structure among the Northern Tier states (Pakistan Turkey, Iran and Iraq). This military commitment to Pakistan was part of an evolving global policy of containing Soviet expansion; it was a means of extending the containment umbrella to the Middle East. There were never any doubts on the part of those involved in this decision that India would object vehemently. The British Foreign Office had discouraged the United States from creating a regional security system that would antagonize India. From the end of 1952, the U.S. Ambassador in India, Chester Bowles, had repeatedly warned that a U.S. Pakistani arms deal would have a disastrous effect on U.S. Indian relations, on regional stability, and on American influence in the region. His successor, George Allen, and most other American officials who had direct responsibilities regarding India conveyed similar concerns. When a report appeared in the New York Times on November 1, 1953, that the United States was about to begin talks with Pakistan about an alliance, Nehru publicized his opposition and ordered demonstrations throughout India against such a move.
For the top policy makers in the White House, Pentagon, and State Department, global security considerations outweighed these concerns. Hence, in their view, the risk simply had to be taken that India would get over it, and they believed that India would. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote to Eisenhower in his final recommendation on military assistance to Pakistan that this move would undoubtedly create "quite a storm" in India, but he predicted that "we can ride out the storm without a fatal effect on U.S. Indian relations." 33 John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, wrote in an article explaining the decision that after considering carefully India's objections it seemed clear to people in the State Department that the consequences India feared would not develop. "Indeed", he wrote confidently, "we believe that as time passes India herself will see that her apprehensions on the subject were not justified." 34 The impact of the US decision may not have been "fatal" to U.S.-Indian relations, as Dulles predicted, but history has proven Bowles's warnings about the impact to be closer to the mark. The decision to provide military assistance to Pakistan as part of a global security strategy constituted a major policy orientation with long-term effects on policy choices in South Asia. It is therefore notable how little public debate accompanied the decision. From November 1, 1953, when the news was leaked to the New York Times that serious discussions about a military alliance with Pakistan were commencing, to February 25, 1954, when the official announcement was made that the United States intended to embark upon a major program of military aid to Pakistan, officials in Washington remained silent. A contemporary account by James W. Spain for an academic journal attempted to explain why it was desirable for this to be an "expert" decision, that
is, one made by the "professionals" in the State Department and the Pentagon, "rather than the 'great debate' usually accorded to broader foreign policy proposals." The main reasons were, he maintained, the general lack of knowledge about Pakistan and the pressures that were building up from Pakistan and India for and against the alliance that threatened to get out of hand.

A "great debate," or at least, a small one, would undoubtedly have occurred if a request for military aid to Pakistan had been submitted to Congress. The decision was made, however, under the authority of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951; it was deemed by the policy makers not to require Congressional approval. There was apparently no attempt whatsoever to consult with Congress on this matter. Indeed, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, made it very clear that the committee was not asked for advice and that it was informed about the decision by an assistant secretary of the state after the decision had already been made and only a few days before the official announcement. In a speech devoted to the decision to supply arms to Pakistan, which was addressed to the president and delivered before the Senate, Fulbright stated in no certain terms: "I disapprove of this move, and I wish the Record to show very clearly my disapproval, because in the future when the results of this policy are evident to all I want it to be clear where the responsibility rests."

According to Spain's contemporary account, the rumors that a pact with Pakistan was in the making produced a "groundswell of public opposition" at the urging of a group of influential Americans, including Adlai Stevenson, Representative Emanuel Celler of New
York, Eleanor Roosevelt, W. Norman Brown, and E. Stanley Jones, as well as Chester Bowles. Spain estimated that the expressions of opinion that came from the general public were predominantly opposed to military aid to Pakistan and that Senator William Knowland was the only public figure strongly advocating it. It should be pointed out, however, that New York Times supported the military aid program and gave the issue considerable coverage.

An objective measure of public opinion may be found in the responses to a question about military aid to Pakistan that was asked in a survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center during January 1954. Rumors had been circulating for more than two months, Indian protests had been reported, and various prominent individuals in the United States had spoken out against the idea. The question asked, "As you may know, the government of India is objecting to our idea of giving military aid to her neighbor Pakistan. In view of India's feelings about this, should we go ahead and give Pakistan military aid, or not?"

**TABLE 1:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Should (%)</th>
<th>Should not (%)</th>
<th>Don't know (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/54</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Opinion Research Centre Surveys

We go ahead and give Pakistan military aid, or not? The above Table shows that no less than 41 percent gave a "don't know" answer.
The high level of uncertainty may be attributable at least in part to the complexity of the issue and especially to the official silence in Washington. Among those who committed themselves one way or the other, 33 percent indicated that the United States should not oppose India's wishes, and 26 percent felt that the United States should give the aid regardless of what India thought. Considering the wording here, the fact that more respondent opposed aid to Pakistan than favored it is notable, as the average respondents opposed aid to Pakistan than favored it is notable, as the average respondent might construe the question to mean that India was trying to dictate American Policy. After the United States and Pakistan had signed a formal Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, under which the military aid was provided, Pakistan joined SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (which became CENTO), thus becoming a participant in the U.S. alliance system. There is no evidence: however, in the survey data from the years since these agreements were signed that the majority of Americans were aware that Pakistan had aligned itself with the United States.

A Roper organization survey conducted in 1985 suggests that, if anything, India was at that time perceived to be more friendly toward the United States than was Pakistan. Table 2 shows the responses to the following question: "I'd like to have your impressions about the overall positions that some countries have taken toward the U.S. Would you read down that list, for each country, tell me if you believe that country has acted as a close ally of the U.S., has acted as a friend but not a close ally, has been more or less neutral toward the U.S., has been mainly unfriendly toward the U.S. but not an enemy, or has acted as an enemy of the U.S." Pakistan and India were both included in this list. The question was asked again in 1988, but
Pakistan was not included at that time. Table 2 shows that the responses for India in 1985 and 1988 and for Pakistan in 1985. It indicates that 30 percent of the respondents in 1985 considered India to be either a close ally or a friend compared to 10 percent for Pakistan. And 32 percent thought Pakistan was mainly unfriendly or an enemy compared to the 10 percent who put India in one of those two categories. By 1988, the percentage who saw India as friendly increased to constitute a majority of the respondents, probably Reflecting the positive impressions of Rajiv Gandhi and the disposition of the Reagan administration to improve relations.

TABLE 2

Responses to the question, "I'd like to have your impressions about the overall positions that some countries have taken toward the U.S. would you read down that list, [and] for each country, tell me if you believe that has acted as a close ally of the U.S., has acted as a friend but not a close ally, has been more or less neutral toward the U.S., has been mainly unfriendly toward the U.S. but not an enemy, or has acted as an enemy of the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Pakistan 12/1985 (%)</th>
<th>India 12/1985 (%)</th>
<th>India 12/1985 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close ally</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend not ally</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly unfriendly</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1988 wording: Close ally, friendly but not close ally, not friendly but an enemy, or is unfriendly and an enemy.

The responses must be approached with caution, however, and too much should not be made of this one question. Pakistan's role as a formal ally changed when it withdrew from SEATO in 1973, and it is to be expected that Americans would be hazy on the history of the relationship. Nevertheless, Pakistan was at the time the key to U.S. support of rebels against the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan and had been rewarded with military assistance, whereas India had shown very little interest in cooperating with the United States to bring about the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Some clue to this puzzle may be found in the responses to a question on arms transfers to Pakistan, which was asked six times from 1980 to 1985 with variations in the wording. Table 3 presents these responses. Variation A asked at the end of January 1980 about large-scale military aid to Pakistan, and variation B asked a month later about a resumption in the sale of arms to Pakistan. In both cases, the action was linked to the situation in Afghanistan, and in both cases a large majority (62 percent) provided an affirmative response. A little more than one year later, in March-April 1981, only 34 percent favoured sharply increasing military aid to Pakistan when there was no reference to Afghanistan. Table 3 shows a similar unenthusiastic response to selling arms to Pakistan when it was simple included in a list of countries to whom arms might be sold (variation C.). That question was asked three times — in August 1980, August 1981 and October-November 1985 — with 50 percent, 58 percent, and 59 percent of the respondents, respectively, opposing the sale of arms to Pakistan. Despite the fact that the policies of Pakistan and the United States were mutually supportive in this area for the entire decade, it appears from the survey data that the positive impact of these efforts on American
public opinion was limited to the months immediately following the Soviet invasion and came into play only when the specter of Afghanistan was invoked.

Table 3 Responses to questions on military aid to Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pollster</th>
<th>Wording</th>
<th>Favour (%)</th>
<th>Oppose (%)</th>
<th>Not sure (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-23-24/80</td>
<td>Yankelovich, Skelly &amp; White</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9-23/80</td>
<td>Roper</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16-23/80</td>
<td>Roper</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/27-4/2/81</td>
<td>Louis Harris</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/15-22/81</td>
<td>Roper</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/26-11/2/85</td>
<td>Roper</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These responses to the questions in the Roper archives on military aid to Pakistan and on the "overall positions" that India and Pakistan have taken toward the United States, appear to confirm Henry Kissinger's assumption that there is a pro-Indian bias in the American public "Pakistan had never found the sympathy in America that India enjoyed at least among opinion making groups," Kissinger wrote in his memoirs. "It [Pakistan] did not represent principles with which Americans could identify as readily as with the 'progressive' slogans and pacifist-sounding morality of the world's largest democracy." Similarly, James Spain, in his account of the U.S decision to extend military assistance to Pakistan, claimed that "India has always had more appeal in the United States than has Pakistan."

The above assumption raises the question that if this assumption is correct, why has this bias not been translated into U.S.- India
friendship. An examination of relevant foreign policy questions concerning India and Pakistan in this database indicates that India is more likely to receive favourable responses than Pakistan, but the difference is not very great. More significant is the proportion of non-committal responses, which tends to very high for example, on the question in 1985 that tapped impression of disposition of India and Pakistan toward the United States. 31 percent of the respondents could provide no answer for Pakistan and 21 percent could not answer for India.

However, when this slightly more favourable American public support for India as compared to Pakistan, got reinforcement by favourable international and other domestic factors during the 1980s, the Reagan administration moved towards an accommodative approach to India. That is why, President Reagan was able to blunt the edges of US-India divide over the nuclear issue. The next chapter explains this attempt to bridge U.S-India differences in this regard.
END NOTES


10 Ibid., March 6, 1987.

11 India Abroad, March 27, 1987.


14 Text provided by a staffer in Broomfield's office. Cited in Rubinoff, n.5, p.169.


18 According to the New York Times, January 3 1988, Wilson, was angry over the fact that the Defence Intelligence Agency denied a seat on a flight to Pakistan to a female traveling companion, slashed that agency's budget in the appropriation bill under discussion. Senator Inouye inserted several million dollars of aid to assist the children of Tunisian Jews being educated in France.


20 The Hindu (Madras), December 12, 1987.


22 New York Times, September 1, 1988, described Marker as "tough, shrewd and cultivated".

23 In 1969 when she closed some USIA centres, Mrs. Gandhi expelled the Asia Foundation, which as part of its mandate in Washington promotes contact between Congressional personnel and Asian diplomats.

24 India Abroad, December 11, 1987, maintains that the firm participated in the drafting of the Inouye - Kasten bill.


30 N.K. Jha, Domestic Imperatives in India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: 2000), Chapter-1.

31 These survey reports have been obtained from Elizabeth Grump Hanson "Public Opinion and Policy Choices in U.S. Relations with India", in Harold A. Gould and Summit Ganguly, eds., The Hope and The Reality: US – Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan (Boulder, Colorado, 1992), pp 179-198.


33 Ibid., p.837.


36 Ibid., p.747.


38 Spain, n.35, pp.744-746.

38 Kissinger, n.29, p.849.

39 Spain, n.35, pp.744.