Conclusion

The fictional medium has been effectively used by Mulk Raj Anand to experiment with the functioning of the theory of moderation through the delineation of two types of protagonists: underdeveloped and advanced. The underdeveloped protagonists are characterized by their subalternity either due to their low status of caste or due to their low economic status. Bakha and Bhikhu are Dalits and Munoo and Gangu are have-nots marginalized from the main stream of Indian social structure in the beginning of the 20th century. The Dalits are suppressed by the repressive regime so much that their revolutionary fire gets extinguished in the very hearth of their psyche. The have-nots, in the colonial context of British rule in India are oppressed by the dependency complex. Though the intellectual equipment of the Dalits and the have-nots is underdeveloped due to their lack of education, the intensity of their experience occasionally inspire them to shake off the social shackles which check their inborn potential to react against injustice. Hence the underdeveloped protagonists, if they were capable of defeating the personal goals, could choose the path of protest and revolt. But their revolutionary urge is shown as counterbalanced by love for a dear one compelling them to choose moderation. As it is found in the novels, Anand portrays them as violently protesting against social/personal injustice only once in their lives and then recline to a life of passive suffering. Accordingly, the underdeveloped protagonists too are moderates who choose a middle way between their urge for protest and an imposed submissiveness. Love of all sorts is shown by Anand as cooling down the revolutionary urge in the underdeveloped protagonists. It joins hands with their schizoid experience/dependency complex (whichever is applicable) and pushes the would have been revolutionary heroes into the choice of a moderate stance. The study has identified Bakha, Bhikhu and Gangu as belonging to this category of uninitiated revolutionaries.
Munoo on the other hand is physically incapable of any protest since he is suffering from consumption. Whatever protest he has towards the rampant evil in the society is born and buried in the realm of his mindscape. A phenomenon that recurs in the case of both advanced and underdeveloped heroes is that irrespective of their social or educational status, they fail to effect the change they aspire for. In the case of advanced protagonists, they are shown as making a stray attempt to revolt against the fraudulent system. Considerations push them back to the choice of the middle path—the mean. They are also subalternate in the sense that they are marginalized from the main stream of the social setup. They are also have-nots but they have defeated the dependency complex in consequence of the complete development of their intellectual equipment springing from the education (formal in the cases of Lalu and Maqbool and intuitive in Ananta and Gauri) and the experience they acquire by and large. Thinking has an important role in understanding human experience, viewed from the angle of empiricism. The underdeveloped protagonists fall short of the thinking faculty in comparison with the advanced protagonists.

Anand agrees to Aristotle's view that happiness is the ultimate end of all human activities and the happiness involved in leading a contemplative life is beyond the reach of common man. He acknowledges in Apology for Heroism: "the only thing common to the greatest number of people remains the desire for happiness [..]" (170). As long as it is impossible for the common man to lead a contemplative life, the practical life of moral virtue, which is the second best, can be practised by him. The moral virtue Aristotle speaks of falls within the reach of all men and it can be subdivided into virtues of interior passions and justice which is defined as a virtue of exterior operation. The virtues of interior passions get further classified into two: those of principal passions and those of secondary passions. The former one deals with preservation of life and the latter
one with wealth and honour. In attempting an analysis of the virtues connected with preservation of life, courage attains the primary and temperance the secondary positions. Two more groups of virtues come under the classification of primary passions: liberality and magnificence, and magnanimity and proper pride. Anandian protagonists who are generally have-nots (in the sense that they do not possess even a small holding of land or money) do not practise the latter group of virtues. Hence it is with courage and temperance as the basic scale of values that the investigation of the behaviour of the protagonists has been undertaken in this study.

It is in the second book of The Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle gives his concept of ideal courage. Any attempt to practise courage in the mundane level falls far off from the ideal position. Basically there can be two variants of courage which are ordinary courage and heroic courage meant for ordinary men and supermen respectively. In ordinary life human beings can survive without heroic virtue. The protagonists delineated by Anand are ordinary men and women that the courage they choose to exhibit is ordinary in preference to the heroic. As for temperance, all the advanced protagonists are depicted as observing moderation in the area of “furnitures of fortune”. It is in the love for the mistress or love for a dear sister or love for an expected child that temperance operates on.

The advanced Anandian protagonists are capable of choosing their stance in appropriate fashion at the right time. The choice of action is never delayed. This observation leads to a pertinent question whether these protagonists are profited by their choice in the context of Lal Singh’s loss of freedom, Ananta’s and Maqbool’s loss of lives and Gauri’s loss of family dreams. The critic Myers opines that in a world in which extremists and moderates are segregated, any compromise attained between them dwindles to mere appeasement in due course. Those who make this discovery, in the
critic's view, have to choose either heroic measure against the fanatic or continue the error of appeasement until it becomes nihilism, leading to the protagonists' loss of freedom or loss of lives. In this study, it has been explained in detail how Lal Singh's choice of moderation which invites his loss of freedom is only of transient significance in the novel. He looks forward to a peaceful life with Maya when the novel comes to an end. The optimistic reply which Maya sends back to the jail carries with it the promise of future happiness. Hence compromise allows him length of life and happiness as Aristotle conceives in *The Nicomachean Ethics*.

In Gauri's case too there is the promise of future happiness in the company of the child she is expected to give birth to. At the same time, Ananta and Maqbool who meet with tragedy do not invite their loss of lives as a result of their choice of moderation in the final context. Instead it is the shift in their stance from moderation to heroism against the fanatic in the end, which invites the catastrophe. They do not exercise the choice of moderation in resolving their crises at the crucial juncture. Thus the advanced protagonists are of two categories in their choice of stance which determines their destiny. Lal Singh and Gauri choose moderation while Ananta and Maqbool are carried away by violent impulses and meet with their death. It can be observed in the climactic last scenes of these novels how Ananta and Maqbool shift their choice from ordinary to heroic courage and invite the catastrophe. In other words, in the cases of protagonists who preserve ordinary courage in resolving all crises including the final ones, they invariably succeed in attaining length of life. But in cases of those who shift their stance from ordinary to heroic courage in resolving the ultimate crises, the catastrophe becomes inevitable.

Aristotle's theory encompasses in itself sufficient justification for the shift of these protagonists' stance for all of them are moderates until they are compelled to
resolve the final crises and what establishes their distinction is the difference they exhibit in exercising the ultimate choice. In the view of Aristotle, a protagonist who behaves as he ought to in situations inspiring fear is designated as courageous and this courage can be interpreted as heroic or ordinary in accordance with the level of its proximity or distance from the respective ideal levels. Aristotle is aware that death and wounds are always painful to the moderate protagonist for he remarks: when a protagonist is endowed with every virtue, the happier he will be and death appears more sorrowful to him. Hence by this shift from ordinary to heroic level of courage, the protagonist is changing his stance to that of a tragic hero. It requires to be remembered here that the tragic hero, according to Aristotle's view in Poetics, is predominantly virtuous and just but for a single flaw in his character and it is this flaw which invites the catastrophe. In case of a moderate protagonist, the choice of heroic courage will be the result of the application of his deliberation, i.e. the choice will be exercised only if it is inevitably demanded by the critical circumstance. Ananta and Maqbool are convinced of this demand and they shift their stance from ordinary to heroic courage and invite martyrdom. In their sudden shift from a moderate stance to a heroic one, the demand of their circumstance plays a role that is causation. A tragic hero resorts to heroic action without considering whether the moderate stance will suffice. Hence the basic distinction between the tragic hero and the moderate protagonist remains in the latter's exercise of the option in the choice of his stance between heroism and moderation in resolving the ultimate crisis. This is how it can be inferred that the fate of the tragic hero is not similar to that of the moderate protagonist on all occasions. The latter enjoys the freedom to preserve his valuable life, if the circumstances do not press him for heroic action. But Myers raises an objection that no hero chooses the mean in a critical moment, listening to the voice of reason. This opposition can not be relevant here in the
light of the examples of Lal Singh and Gauri, who by their choice of moderation achieve length of life. However, it depends greatly upon one’s conception of heroism to have a positive approach towards this question. As for this critic, it is impossible to approach the problem from the Aristotelian angle. Myers’s view springs from the influence exerted by Nietzsche’s concept of superman who lives dangerously. Nietzsche believes that life is worth living only for a superman. This is why Myers dissents from the Aristotelian virtue of observing moderation in a crucial context. He explains that it is “the sensible course for men and nations most of the time. But if only one issue in a lifetime compels the moderate man to take a heroic stand, that is the one moment that fixes his place in history [...]” (147). Myers believes that it is impossible to stamp the protagonist’s place in history if he replaces Aristotelian tragic flaw by Aristotelian virtue of moderation, as he views everything from Nietzschean angle. But the fact is that Aristotle and Nietzsche view the same concept from opposite angles. In Myers’s own reading, Nietzsche is impressed by the intensity of the tragic hero’s experience while Aristotle is concerned with its brevity. Hence Nietzsche finds virtue in the tragic hero’s experience while Aristotle considers it a flaw. What is remarkable in the study of Anandian protagonists is that all of them are ordinary men instead of supermen and the courage which expresses itself in their behaviour is ordinary in preference to heroic, aiming at duration of their life in lieu of intensity of their experience. Hence they need not fear any loss of values. The prospect for happiness which is Aristotle’s ultimate aim in promulgating the theory of moderation is achieved by Lal Singh and Gauri. Myers’s conclusion documented in the fifth chapter--what the hero gains in intensity, he usually loses in duration and what the moderate man gains in duration he usually loses in intensity—is inapplicable in the case of these Anandian protagonists. Once the option to continue moderation is exercised in the final scene, as Lal Singh and Gauri does, the
moderate protagonists' loss of intensity is insignificant, as he gains the promise of a happy life in future. As already remarked, in cases where protagonists shift their stance from ordinary to heroic courage, tragedy is invited. Hence Aristotelian theory is proved to have built on sound foundation and its glory cannot be underestimated by branding it “golden meanness” as Myers does.

The question which commands attention at this juncture is what the philosophic reasons are which determine the advanced protagonists’ preference for one of the two forms of courage in resolving their final crises in the respective novels in which they are presented. It emphasizes the need for a detailed critical analysis of the entire procedure involved in the exercise of the choice of the mean, with special attention on the activity at work in the psyche of these protagonists. This choice is always an outcome of the conflict between the protagonists’ own revolutionary and worldly ambitions where courage and temperance find their respective scopes to struggle with each other. In the primary stage, the ambition for revolutionary extremism is restricted to its arithmetic half, if the protagonists’ worldly ambition is equally potent. Conversely, the protagonists’ commitment to worldly life too is confined to its arithmetic half if they experience equivalence of power for registering extreme protest, which tests its strength against the worldly prospect. Consequently, the protagonist chooses courage and temperance at this stage discarding their respective extremes. In the practical life of the protagonist, therefore, there are two areas where courage and temperance find their expression—in the area of registering protest and in the domain of lovemaking respectively—throughout the world of the novel. Yet there is a subsequent level where the struggle between these restricted forces—courage and temperance—takes place, which equip the protagonist for the choice of a middle way that Aristotle speaks profusely in explaining his ethical theory. In Lal Singh and Gauri, the power exerted by these forces
against each other are equivalent in the primary level, to discharge them to be half-revolutionary and half-worldly protagonists at the same time. In other words, the courage and temperance they observe in their protest and lovemaking fall arithmetically in the middle. In the subsequent struggle between these impeded impulses, the equivalence of these forces in drawing the protagonists’ preferences towards the opposing poles once again equip them for their choice of the mean to be placed arithmetically in the middle. This is the ideal position for the mean in protagonists’ psyche for enjoying the Aristotelian virtue permanently. Hence Lal Singh and Gauri succeed in the choice of moderation in resolving not only their day-to-day crises but also their final ones.

In the second category of Anandian protagonists, worldly ambition is not as potent as their revolutionary ambition. In the case of Ananta, the worldly love which Janki can offer in her aliment is weak. Hence it can restrain his enthusiasm for protest only in a relatively less proportion. While conversely, his worldly ambition to attend to her as a devoted lover is restricted in a relatively greater proportion by his revolutionary mission. Hence the mean is attained not in the arithmetic middle in both these areas of activity. As for the revolutionary ambition, his preference exceeds the arithmetic middle relatively towards the urge for protest. This is why he spends more time in organizing the thathiars for a collective bargain. In the area of lovemaking his preference falls relatively short of the arithmetic middle. As such he spends relatively less time in attending to his mistress. In the subsequent level of conflict between these unevenly restricted forces, the choice of the mean gets placed not arithmetically in the middle position instead it remains slightly inclined towards the urge for protest. Hence, in a moment of intense experience his preferences go against the object of attaining length of life, though he has been observing moderation till then. He becomes convinced of the
demand for exhibiting heroic courage in this context. In Maqbool’s case, the love that
the protagonist feels for his sister is relatively weak as it excludes sister fixation. This
happens because there is no prospect for the libidinal gratification of their love-act unlike
what we find in the love affair of Lal Singh and Maya. So love restricts Maqbool’s
revolutionary extremism only in a lower proportion while the preference for registering
his protest against Pakistani invasion limits his sister-love in a higher proportion. Hence
he prefers to leave his sister under the care of the parents, when he decides to go to
Srinagar to evaluate the political situation and to plan an effective strategy of defence
against the foreign invasion. In the subsequent level of conflict between the uneven
opposing forces, the force exerted to draw the protagonist’s preference towards his
revolutionary ambition is stronger and it positions the mean slightly inclined towards that
extreme. This result is also due to the imbalance of the opposing forces. It explains why
Maqbool too chooses to exchange his moderate stance for a heroic avowal of his
revolutionary ideology, when he is in captivity of the enemies.

From the above discussion it can be inferred that in Ananta and Maqbool the
worldly ambition is not equally powerful as the revolutionary ambition, to effect an
arithmetically equivalent restraint on the opposing urges at the same time. Instead the
mean is attributed slightly inclined towards their revolutionary ambition due to the
weaker force of worldly love which attempts to counterbalance its opposing pull. The
observation can be summed up as follows: there are two categories of Anandian
protagonists. In the former category the mean remains arithmetic all the time due to the
equivalence of powers of the opposing impulses. They permanently observe moderation
in these novels. In the latter category the mean occupies a position slightly inclined
towards their impulse for registering protest due to the relative weaker force of worldly
lovemaking which fails to counterbalance the comparative greater strength exerted by the
revolutionary impulse to draw the protagonist’s preference in favour of it. The moderation achieved by them has only transient effect. In a moment of ultimate intensity of experience, their prudence is influenced by the relative stronger preference to choose extreme protest. Hence they prefer heroism in resolving their final crises. Thus it is concluded that moderate courage is illustrated in resolving all the crises by the protagonists in whom the mean is arithmetic and moderate courage is replaced by heroic courage in resolving the final crises by the protagonists in whom the mean is relative. This principle explains why Lal Singh and Gauri resort to the method of compromise permanently while Ananta and Maqbool shift their stance from moderation to heroism in the final juncture.

It is important to observe that necessary interdependence of rival artistic impulses which Nietzsche explains in The Birth of Tragedy establishes a striking correlation to the principle which has already been explained hither to. Nietzsche has explored the phenomenon at work making use of an entirely different terminology. A rereading of the mechanism applying Nietzschean terms provides deeper understanding. Nietzsche names these artistic impulses after Apollo and Dionysus, the God of Light and Reason and the God of Ecstasy and Promise of Life respectively. The conflict between these impulses remains internalized in a protagonist dramatizing human predicament in a modern drama or novel. The Apollonian impulse in a protagonist’s psyche shares the tragic wisdom of Silenus to die as early or quickly as possible while the Dionysian impulse reverses the wisdom to believe in preservation of life. The struggle between these preferences influences the protagonist’s behaviour to a very complex extent. But the Apollonian impulse is always subsumed under the Dionysian impulse due to the fact that the fundamental mood of a tragic hero is Dionysian. Once these protagonists share the Apollonian wisdom, there is always an intuitive and instinctive attempt to reverse the
wisdom and to forget the ephemeral state of man, inviting a new wisdom into the orbit—the Dionysian wisdom. It is in this mood that the protagonist attempts to dispel his individuality and strives to be one with Nature or one with his God (patron God of Drama). But the Apollonian impulse of reason makes him aware of the existence of his self. This process of defending the Dionysian frenzy leading to the extinction of the protagonist’s individuality from attaining its extreme by drawing a thin veil of Apollonian reason, to make the protagonist aware of the need for the existence of his self in this world, is defined by Nietzsche as the principle of individuation. This conflict results in the fraternal union of the two deities. The rival deity to Dionysus is identified as Christ by Nietzsche in the last notes composed in 1888 to The Will to Power. The former stands here for the promise of life and the latter for martyrdom, yet Dionysus too is a tragic figure to be torn to pieces by Maenads. Hence martyrdom and promise of life are two phases of Dionysus himself. It is significant that the origin of tragedy can be traced to a musical mood which has its foundation in a mood of pathos. This mood is inspired by the ghastly wisdom of the Greek chorus originally constituted to sing and dance out the dithyramb in the worship service of Dionysus. In due course a leader emerged for this chorus of priests who enacted the drunken revelry of their God. It was this leader who became the tragic hero from the point where dialogue ensued between the leader and the rest of the members of the chorus. It is the point of origin of drama in Greece. This is the major reason why Dionysian is regarded as the fundamental mood of the tragic hero. Christ is thus brought in simply to explain the contrast between a curse on life as against a promise of life. The Apollonian element suggests the influence of reason between the extremes to control the excessive Dionysian ecstasy aimed to merge with Nature into a reasonable way of living. If the attempt achieves success, Apollo shares the wisdom of Dionysus and if the attempt fails ultimately, Dionysus shares the
wisdom of Apollo. In a tussle between the Dionysian urge and Christian urge of the protagonist, which are of equal strength, Apollo succeeds in preventing the Dionysian ecstasy from attaining the ultimate goal of merging with the patron God, drawing necessary support from the Christian counterforce. This triumph in individuating the protagonist’s self invites Apollo’s friendly unity with Dionysus to share the wisdom of Dionysus—a wisdom emphasizing length of life. In other words, the process of individuation involves the spreading of the Apollonian veil to defend the deconstruction of the protagonist’s self. Here the possibility of tragedy is ruined and Nietzsche brands him tragico-Dionysian protagonist. Nietzsche disapproves of this protagonist in The Birth of Tragedy calling him “untragic” or Alexandrian sharing Socratic or scientific reason. If the Dionysian impulse is relatively stronger there is imbalance of the conflicting forces. Then Apollo’s thin veil spread to bring the effect of individuation succeeds in defending the Dionysian force only temporarily. When the Dionysian impulse gets reinforced by the intensity of the protagonist’s experience, Apollo who stands for reason is convinced of the essentiality to withdraw the veil from its defensive position. Dionysus is thus equipped to share the Apollonian wisdom to enact heroic courage to resolve the impending crisis leading to catastrophe. When the protagonist shares the tragic wisdom, he becomes the Nietzschean Dionyso-tragic protagonist who corresponds to Aristotle’s concept of the tragic hero, to the exclusion of an error he commits in judgement. Hence Nietzsche’s concept of “untragic” and tragic heroes and Aristotle’s concept of protagonists sharing ordinary and heroic courage throw light on the fact that both of them are quite close in their functional approach to morality. But their scale of values differs as Nietzsche disapproves of the “untragic” or moderate protagonist and Aristotle approves of the choice of heroic courage when it is essentially demanded of the protagonist when a moderate course will not suffice in resolving the
ultimate crisis. As already remarked, the disagreement between Aristotle and Nietzsche springs from the fact that Aristotle viewed the tragic hero’s experience from the angle of its brevity and Nietzsche from the angle of its intensity. Aristotle’s view in *Poetics* that a tragic hero is predominantly virtuous and just but for an error he commits in judgement explains the fact that the tragic hero is not different from his moderate protagonist, if the tragic flaw is replaced by the virtue (moderation). In *The Nicomachean Ethics*, he gives scope to the virtuous protagonist for the choice of heroic action if such an action is demanded by the need of the moment at which he is exposed to intense experience. In other words, Aristotle disapproves only the lack of prudence in a protagonist’s choice of heroism, which he brands as “hamartia” in *Poetics*. Hence the tragic hero unconditionally overthrows reason in a tragic moment while the moderate protagonist shifts his choice to heroic courage only if reason advises him to do so. Nietzsche approves of this sort (heroically courageous protagonist) but brands the other sort (moderate protagonist) “untragic” because he feels that the moderate protagonist exercises a choice against the dramatization of his tragic experience. Hence it is to these extents that Nietzsche’s views of virtue reconcile and contradict Aristotle’s views. It is possible to illustrate the working of the theory of moderation in Anandian advanced protagonists making use of Nietzschean theoretical framework, to the exclusion of the conflicting preferences of the two thinkers. Aristotle’s functional approach based on pleasure and pain principle which operates itself in the psyche of the protagonists can easily be substantiated with the principle of individuation which Nietzsche has theorized. Nietzsche’s opposing impulses, Dionysian and Christian, afford pleasure and pain respectively to suggest a striking parallelism with Aristotle’s views.

Lal Singh’s preference for enjoying sensual love with Maya suggests the Dionysian extreme and his preference for protest by indulging in Indian freedom struggle
suggests the Christian prospects for martyrdom. These two opposing instincts share
equality in their potential for exerting their pull in opposite directions to result in mutual
retardation of these forces from attaining their ultimate consummation. As such,
Lal Singh is left arithmetically half-Dionysian and half-Christian at the same time. Once
the reasoning power starts its functioning in the protagonist, the Apollonian veil rolls
down to defend the opposing powers from encroaching further upon each other. As the
powers of the antagonistic impulses are arithmetically equal, there is a harmonious
balance in the share of retardation that is effected from achieving both the extremes and
in consequence there is no imbalance of forces experienced in this tussle. Hence the
Apollonian veil is spread arithmetically in the middle suggesting the mean which has
also been observed to be arithmetic in this protagonist’s case. In the ultimate level of
their tussle too, this defence mechanism remains intact due to the equivalence of strength
of these conflicting impulses. Since the fundamental mood of a tragic hero is Dionysian,
the primary attempt of the Apollonian veil is to control the Dionysian impulse at a
psychological level to defend the protagonist from attaining oneness with Nature. As
the Apollonian impulse succeeds in doing so, the protagonist becomes a tragico-
Dionysian or in other words Apollonian speaking Dionysian wisdom. Hence he is able
to attain length of life by choosing to surrender to the police. This happens in the case of
Gauri too. Here the Dionysian impulse functions through the protagonist’s love for the
husband and the Christian impulse, through the protest (she is capable of registering)
against her husband’s atrocities towards her. When she attains mental maturity through
the hospital experience, she succeeds in individuating her self, by managing the
Apollonian prudence to spread the veil almost arithmetically in the middle, between the
equally powerful and equally restricted impulses. Hence, when the half-Dionysian and
half-Christian impulses test their strength against each other in the final level too, the
Apollonian defence mechanism succeeds in preventing the fundamental (Dionysian) impulse from attaining its oneness with Eternity, leading to the protagonist’s choice of the tragico-Dionysian stance. Apollo speaks Dionysian wisdom here also, to offer Gauri a happy and contented life through economic independence. Here the emotional surrogate occupies a prominent role. When she chooses to discard the husband, his place is occupied by her expected child (probably a son) to compensate for the loss and to equate the void of the Dionysian impulse. Hence arithmetic equality of the conflicting impulses is ensured. This leads to the spreading of the Apollonian veil in the position of the mean which is also arithmetic. Thus Gauri too is enabled to share Socratic or scientific wisdom to lead a moderate living.

Ananta and Maqbool come under the heroic category of protagonists. In Ananta, the Dionysian impulse is suggested by his love for Janki and the Christian impulse by his urge for organizing a revolution. Here too the opposing forces struggle with each other. Ananta’s Dionysian spirit for sensual love with Janki is very weak and hence this force can impede the Christian impulse in a relatively lesser proportion only. At the same time the powerful Christ impulse retards the Dionysian spirit in a relatively greater proportion. These values are relative because the comparison is worked in relation to the arithmetic middle between the antagonistic impulses. Hence there is imbalance of artistic forces which leave the protagonist less than a semi-Dionysian and more than a semi-Christian at the same time. This is why Ananta spends only minimum time in attending his ailing mistress and is engaged in organizing the thathiars all the while. The Apollonian veil gets spread in the protagonist’s psyche to chasten the Christian impulse from soaring the heights of its tragic extreme. In consequence the protagonist succeeds in resolving all the ordinary crises in a reasonable way until he is burdened to resolve the final one. This
mechanism explains how Ananta is capacitated in preventing revolutionary violence until the final scene in the novel.

In a conflict between two forces a compromise can be attained only at a point of balance between them which is the equilibrium. It has been pointed out that if the opposing powers of these artistic impulses are equal in strength, this point will be the arithmetic middle. If one of the impulses is stronger than the other this point will be slightly inclined towards the stronger side. In the latter case the compromise will be retained until the equilibrium is disturbed. The spreading of the veil is logically possible only at this point of compromise. Hence the veil can discharge its function even when it occupies a slightly inclined position towards the Christian impulse. In the cases of Lal Singh and Gauri, the point of compromise is strictly arithmetic but in Ananta the balancing is achieved between unevenly restricted opposing impulses. Hence the Apollonian veil occupies a slightly inclined position towards the Christian impulse. It is actually the position of the mean between the opposite extremes in Aristotelian standpoint. On the final occasion Ananta undergoes intense tragic experience that his power of reason is convinced of the need for the choice of heroic bravery. The Apollonian veil withdraws from its defensive position facilitating opportunity for the tragic force to get reinforced with its original intensity to shake off the power of the retarding impulse and embrace tragedy. It is to be recalled in this context that Dionysus is also a tragic symbol and that way too it is to be agreed with Nietzsche that the fundamental mood of the tragic hero is nonetheless Dionysian. Hence Dionysus shares the Apollonian wisdom when the need for the catastrophe is emphasized. It is how the protagonist becomes Dionyso-tragic at the end. This view substantiates Ananta’a choice of heroic bravery (unlike Ralia’s other comrades) to bring Ralia under control instead of choosing to remain in moderation until the extremist becomes sober.
In Maqbool the Dionysian impulse is operative in his intense love for his sister. Here too the Dionysian impulse is weaker in comparison with the protagonist's Christian impulse as a revolutionary. At the same time the Christian impulse to defend the militants is profound in him, which compels him to move to Srinagar after leaving the sister under the care of the parents. In the conflict between the Dionysian and Christian impulses, the Dionysian impulse is retarded by the Christian impulse in a relatively greater proportion but conversely, the Christian impulse is restricted by the weaker Dionysian impulse in a relatively less proportion. Hence Maqbool is more than a half-Christian and less than a semi-Dionysian at the same time. As in Ananta, the Apollonian veil is spread between these uneven forces at a point where a balancing is attained, which is the relative position of the mean in Aristotelian view. It is estimated that in this position the veil discharges its function remaining slightly inclined towards the Christian extreme, yet it succeeds in chastening the Christian spirit from attaining its ultimate extreme of dramatizing tragedy. Hence, for a reasonable period in the protagonist's struggle, he is made capable of observing a moderate stance to attain length of life as against martyrdom. This is why Maqbool succeeds in finding solutions to all his ordinary crises without losing his life until the enemies capture him. When he is in captivity, Maqbool feels the weight of his intense tragic experience and his Apollonian impulse (prudence) is convinced of the need for heroic action and the veil is withdrawn from its existing position. The tragic spirit assumes the former potential, shakes off the restricting power and makes the hero embrace the catastrophe. As in the case of Ananta the fundamental mood of this protagonist too is Dionysian. The Dionysian impulse shares the Apollonian wisdom and enacts heroism in the final scene of the novel. Maqbool thus refuses to accept the militants' conditions for a reprieve. He becomes a Dionyso-tragic protagonist and turns himself into a martyr.
It is significant to record that the application of the principle of individuation on the behaviour of Anandian protagonsts reaffirms the earlier conclusion: if the conflicting impulses are of equal strength, both are restricted in arithmetically equal proportions. In every subsequent struggle between these evenly impeded impulses the compromise attained will be static. Thus the possibility of tragedy is permanently dispelled. If the protesting impulse is relatively stronger, the restraint they impose upon each other will be uneven. In a conflict between the unequally restricted impulses the point of compromise attained will be slightly inclined towards the protagonist's urge for protest. Hence the possibility of tragedy is only temporarily dispelled. When the protagonist is convinced of the need for heroic action in the climax of the novel, he readily chooses his own catastrophe.

Thus the difference of opinion between Aristotle and Nietzsche in their speculation on this topic is with regard to their outlook on life. Nietzsche feels that life is eternally justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon (BT 974) and for him the protagonist who gives up life for a heroic cause alone is acceptable. But to Aristotle this is acceptable only when moderation cannot justify the cause. What Aristotle brings in to justify his stand is the truth that the ultimate aim of life is happiness and this can be achieved only through a long and complete life. The two thinkers with contrary preferences have chosen to illustrate the functioning of human mind in their attempt to explain the psyche of a protagonist burdened to solve the immediate problems within the respective work of art. Aristotle remarks in The Nicomachean Ethics that the irrational and rational parts struggle with each other and in an incontinent man the irrational part succeeds as his impulses run against reason. He further records, the continent man
submits to reason while the temperate man and the courageous man are in harmony with reason. Aristotle’s classification of rational and irrational parts is also significant. The tree diagram included under will illustrate it.

The rational part has two divisions (1) the part possessing reason and (2) the part listening to reason. In Nietzschean standpoint, Apollonian impulse can be substituted for the part possessing reason and Dionysian impulse for the faculty of appetite or desire, which takes a share of reason. The irrational part remains as the store-house of arboreal urges and animal impulses which man integrated into the mind before he became civilized, leading to the development of the rational part to take control over the irrational part. The concept of Dionysian impulse with its ecstatic assertion leading even to sexual licentiousness can take a share of reason. This results when Apollonian impulse tries to work out individuation to prevent the protagonist’s Dionysian enthusiasm from attaining a state of total intoxication and forgetfulness. Apollo commands and Dionysus obeys in a temperate and courageous man who prefers
moderation. He is the tragico-Dionysian or Apollonian speaking Dionysian wisdom. But in a Dionysus-tragic protagonist or in Aristotelian concept, heroically courageous protagonist, Apollonian element (reason) becomes convinced of the need for the shift of the protagonist’s stance from ordinary to heroic courage in resolving the final crisis. Hence Apollo withdraws from the commanding position to that of obedience to Dionysian (tragic) impulse. This is how Dionysus speaks Apollonian wisdom. This happens only in the case of the moderate protagonist for, as explained earlier, a tragic hero will not try to estimate whether a moderate stance will suffice in resolving his crisis and this is the tragic flaw in him, viewed from Aristotelian standpoint. The moderate protagonist’s virtue remains in his ability to estimate the demand for ordinary or heroic courage in resolving every crisis. Hence the question whether Apollo should command or withdraw from the commanding position to that of obedience to Dionysian impulse is always determined by the estimation of the requirement by the protagonist’s practical wisdom. Bohlman remarks: “The relationship between command and obedience [...] is essentially one of the contenders hostile to each other” (21) and accordingly, when both the artistic impulses share equality of powers, there is no need for heroic bravery. Apollo commands and Dionysus obeys. Where artistic impulses share imbalance of forces, tragic wisdom commands and Apollo obeys. Since Dionysus stands for the tragic experience too, the fraternal unity between Apollo and Dionysus based on the command and obedience principle results either in Apollo’s sharing of Dionysian wisdom or in Dionysus’s sharing of Apollonian wisdom to result in the protagonist’s choice of moderation or heroism as the case may be. Wimsatt significantly comments: “To the modern reader imbued with Freud, Nietzschean association of ‘dream’ with the Apollonian serenity may appear puzzling, even perverse. The modern reader will be tempted to regard Nietzsche’s Apollonian art as that of conscious mind and Dionysian as
that of Freudian unconscious” (563). What Nietzsche associates with “dream” is the artist’s “vision” and hence there need not be any confusion to associate the Apollonian element with conscious mind. What Freud means by unconscious is the “mind-body process that remains outside our linguistic capacities” (Mary 2). Mary further explains that ideas are unconscious when they cannot be given expression in words and Freudian concept of id “is composed of such wordless activities”. She adds: “Consciousness is emphatically verbal. [. . .] Freud believed that the power of id would gradually diminish”. The critic then observes that the egos of the modern man are scarcely developed and “the unconscious was regarded by Freud as a territory to be increasingly and profitably annexed” (2). Hence Dionysus stands for the psychic domain of the “unknowable” (id) while Apollo stands for the civic experience of reason which individuates one’s ego to limit the unreasonable urges of the unconscious. This is why she concludes: “Dionysus means the world ‘as it is’ outside human reckoning and Apollo means what we humanly make the world” (3). Hence the conflict between ego and id is what Aristotle as well as Nietzsche has tried to explain through their independent views already discussed. It is understood from this discourse that Dionysus stands for “promise of life” and martyrdom at the same time and it is interesting to watch how Nietzsche has illustrated the latter aspects more clear through the employment of the image of Christ.

What seems to be suggestive is the castration mechanism. It appears to operate in a symbolic level in the conflict between the contrary urges in an Anandian protagonist. In consequence the rival impulses are restricted from achieving their extremes, which in an ultimate level of conflict equips the protagonist for the choice of the mean to be observed either arithmetically in the middle or slightly inclined to one extreme, as the case may be.

In Nietzschean philosophical framework the conflict between Dionysian and Christian artistic impulses provides ground for Apollonian individuation to activate
itself. It has been observed in an earlier context that in The Sword and the Sickle, the revolutionary leaders as well as Maya are equally dissatisfied with Lal Singh’s commitment to the respective sides. In all the advanced protagonists these opposing impulses impose mutual restriction from attaining either extreme in the primary level. This process can be interpreted as symbolic castration. It is possible to substantiate this view using Lacan’s observation: “castration complex has the function of a knot” (281), which prevents the growth of these contrary urges from attaining their respective zeniths.

In the four advanced protagonists created by Anand the conflict between these symbolically castrated impulses implied in resolving their final crises, determine their choice of heroism or moderation in the end. The mechanism exhibits its working in the underdeveloped protagonists too but there it is only simpler and a one-way-affair. In them, love functions as a symbolic castrating power over their urge for protest. But this capacity for protest is limited only to a single occasion in the respective novel. For this sole reason they do not exhibit any scope for full-length development in this study, for the illustration of the functioning of the principle, the way it is possible with advanced protagonists.

In attempting psychoanalysis of the advanced Anadian protagonists on these lines, the term castration requires explanation in a broader sense. Biologically it applies to the removal of genitalia of male animals like oxen which were used for pulling carts. The animals lost their sexual potency completely while in modern man the process is applied scientifically to prevent childbirth. Here, seminal duct is artificially blocked to prevent ejaculation of semen. The ultimate castration effect, the prevention of childbirth, can also be attained in women by sterilization, i.e. by preventing the ovum from reaching the fertile regions by blocking its passage artificially. The term castration cannot be applied to this process, yet from the point of the ultimate effect attained, it is viewed as
symbolic castration for the purpose of this study. Hence men and women are conditioned to enjoy conjugal bliss, though they fall short of achieving the ultimate fruition as Nature conceived. Applying the principle in literature, the protagonist is symbolically castrated from attaining the ultimate extreme both in the areas of worldly and revolutionary life at the same time. This is how the Dionysian and the Christian impulses tie symbolic castration knot against each other in their tussle. The resultant symbolic castration of these contrary preferences in the psyche of the protagonist leads to the protagonist's failure to enact the Dionysian spirit or the Christian spirit in toto. In other words, both the worldly ambition and the revolutionary ambition which symbolize Dionysian and Christian impulses undergo symbolic castration separately in their respective spheres, in an equivalent ratio or in a slightly inequivalent ratio in the initial level, in accordance with the power of these symbolically castrating forces. As already illustrated in detail, the ultimate level of conflict happens between these symbolically castrated impulses leading to the choice of moderation or heroism according to the equivalence or imbalance of their powers. This illustration draws scientific support from some significant studies documented below.

The psychology of castration, Devlin explains, involves the Lacanian view that two alternate positions emerge between two sexes, “to be’ the phallus and ‘to have’ the phallus [...]. He associates ‘being’ the phallus with demand for love and ‘having’ the phallus with desire for recognition [...].” (118). Devlin says that the phallus is always symbolic, “a signifier, an arbitrary mark that produces difference [...].” (122), and accordingly the castrator and the castrated can assume the positions of a slave and a master respectively. The critic further explains: “The theory of an unconscious castration complex attempts to offer a psychoanalytic explanation for the castrating but connected feelings of insecurity and aggression that plague the self’s irrevocable bond to
The feeling of insecurity which arises in the psyche of the protagonist can be identified as the Dionysian impulse which provokes him to transcend the cult of Maya into a feeling of oneness with Nature to forget the ghastly wisdom of the ephemeral state of man in the protagonist’s ecstatic state of existence. The feeling of aggression, on the other hand, is the protesting aspect in him to resort to violence and bloodshed involving self-sacrifice suggested through the Christian impulse in the protagonist. It is the conflict between these two antagonistic impulses, which result in their mutual castration in the symbolic level, proportionate to the equivalence or imbalance of these forces in the normal and ultimate levels. The process invites in to its orbit the application of the theory of moderation in Aristotelian standard and the principle of individuation in Nietzschean parameters. It is to be recognized here, though Nietzsche dismisses the ordinary courageous protagonist who prefers moderation to heroism as “untragic”, his theorizing is basically an extension of Aristotle’s concepts

practised by a protagonist in an advanced scientific light, which has been explained psycho-analytically with theories which postdate both the thinkers. The disagreement between these thinkers due to the emphasis they gave on contrary aspects—length of life to avoid brevity of experience and intensity of experience to exchange length of life—do not call for further critical attention at this level. The prominent question which emerges in this context is how Anand has carried out these preferences simultaneously in two groups of advanced protagonists whom he has delineated in the four successive novels beginning with Lalu trilogy, taken for granted the trilogy is a single work.

When Anand has been attempting to write these works centred on a pre-independent Indian environment, Gandhian ideology has been the major influence upon the contemporary Indian public, especially the vast majority of freedom fighters. The author, who has been in jail responding to the call of Mahatma Gandhi before he
went abroad for higher studies, failed to give up his commitment to the ideology even when he has been exposed to leftist propaganda in the West. Hence the author was torn between these ideological pulls in his private life. This is why he exhibited vacillation just as Hamlet, with his contrary preferences to choose. But in the delineation of the protagonist, the author has maintained artistic detachment at all levels. Though the protagonists were chosen from the real life people with whom Anand had acquaintance in the Indian villages, he allowed their psyche to develop independently in the process of building up their individuality in these novels. The challenges these protagonists had to face and the strategy they adopted to resolve them, always expressed their distinction from the dilemma the author faced in his private life. Once the characters were chosen from life itself, the way how they managed their trying situations was affording scope for the novelist to work out his detachment more efficiently. This is how he managed to delineate them totally free from the Hamletian dilemma in exercising their choice of action while the author failed to defeat the Hamletian flaw in his personal life. Accordingly, as illustrated earlier, the advanced protagonists fall under two categories in their choice of stance in resolving the ultimate crises. In the protagonists in whom the symbolic castration effect of the opposing impulses is almost arithmetic, length of life is attained in the tussle between the equally castrated forces in the ultimate level and in the protagonists in whom the revolutionary impulse is symbolically castrated in a slightly lesser proportion tragedy results in the struggle between these unequal forces in the final level.

Through the realistic illustration of the contrary preferences opted by two categories of protagonists the author upholds the view that the civil society can survive without military virtue, if heroism is not essentially demanded in the ultimate sense. As these advanced protagonists represent the culmination of the development of the hero
concept of the author, Nicomachean mean can be established as the guiding motto which
governs the behaviour of the protagonists in Anand’s world of fiction. As a novelist
conversant with the contemporary Indian sociopolitical realities as they were, Anand
could not create Utopias where heroes like Prometheus take up the daunting task of
challenging rampant evil and putting an end to it. By portraying characters who
compromise their fiery ideology in favour of individual aspirations, Anand is advocating
Aristotle’s “mean” as preferable to Nietzsche’s “intensity” in the context of the native
evil—the zamindari system—and the political servility under colonial rule. He is against
the impractical individual heroism and suggests the need for necessary prudence in the
choice of action. His message is implicit: rise, strike and spill your blood when it
is essentially required. It is to be remembered in this context that Aristotle gives
supreme importance to the application of prudence in the choice of virtue. Being a
liberal humanist, Anand also might have felt that “man should develop his rational
faculty; his every action should be guided by commonsense and wisdom.” (Roy 162)
Anand does not orally verbalize his message because he did not want to write
propagandist literature. He wanted to be a social realist, and his portrayal of men and
women involved in a moderate struggle to save the natives from their plight might have
added a lot of fuel in the choice of Gandhian moderation in the Indian freedom struggle.
To conclude, through the illustration of the multidimensional technique in dismissing
extremism in the affairs of men, Anand has opened up a way of life for the ordinary folk
to free themselves from the unnecessary tensions in the postmodern India, far from the
avaricious rat race of the western world for more and more wealth and more and
more power.