Chapter V

The Working Principle of Individuation

The typical Anandian protagonist is caught in a labyrinth of conflicting impulses that can be roughly classified into personal aspirations and sociopolitical commitment. Unlike an individual of sublime heroic dimensions, he is unwilling to sacrifice his personal dreams for profound social goals; unlike an individual governed by selfish impulses or cowardice, he never completely betrays the social tasks entrusted upon him either by the society or a nobler impulse within his own self. Significantly he does not stay oscillating between the undecided forever or for long. At a crucial juncture when he has to choose either, he chooses neither; instead he opts for a middle path betraying neither totally, embracing neither. His choices exhibit the quality of the mean as Aristotle envisaged it. The goal of such a moderate protagonist is to play it safe. He displays his reluctance to risk the goal, if heroism is not inevitably demanded from him. His moderation invites a paradox as it is evident in the fates of Anandian protagonists discussed in the earlier chapters--Lal Singh loses freedom, Ananta and Maqbool lose their lives and Gauri sacrifices family dreams. Henry Alonzo Myers analyzes these paradoxes involved in the exercise of moderation:

What happens to a world in which the lines are sharply drawn between extremists and moderate men? [. . .]. First, the extremist forces his way of life upon his fellows. In pursuit of his goal, whatever it may be, life is a bright coin which he is willing, at any moment, to exchange for glorious death; he scorns those who believe that a long and peaceful life is the only reasonable goal. In dealing with him, moderate men discover that compromise is not true compromise but appeasement. Those who make this discovery have a choice between two equally extreme courses of
action. Either they may themselves take heroic measures against the fanatic who will not compromise or they may persist in the error of appeasement until it becomes nihilism, the denial of heroic in life which men sometimes pay for by losing their freedom and even their lives.

(Tragedy 132-33)

Myers’s theory explains why Lal Singh, Ananta, Maqbool and Gauri lose something substantial in their lives. These protagonists end up, as Myers hold, “pay [ing] for by losing their freedom and even their lives”. The critic argues that there are only two possible choices for a protagonist—either to take a heroic stance and embrace martyrdom or to take a moderate stance and give up life or freedom at the end. But the concept of heroism which emerged to assert its ultimate value during the World War II, led to the tragedy in Hiroshima which drew the world conscience once again to the method of compromise. In the postmodern context too this is the only panacea to prolong the sustenance of life on the planet. Hence these views must be applied to Anandian protagonists to study their effects closely. It is true that Ananta and Maqbool give up their method of compromise (moderation) in the final acts to take heroic measures against the fanatic in the manner of Myers’s first suggestion. Ananta deals the extremist Ralia with his physical powers to invite his tragedy and Maqbool refuses to accept the suggestion of the extremists (Khurshid Anwar and Ahmed Shah) for his defection to their camp, which invites his catastrophe. Their choice of action suggests a shift from the exercise of moderation to that of heroic courage or extremism when the situation demanded it. Had Ananta refused to come back responding to the request of Mengha, or had Maqbool tried for a compromise (tactfully reconciling with them till the Indian army arrived instead of a blatant refusal of their proposal) when he was in their captivity, their fates would have been different. If it so happened, how can the method of compromise
be viewed as futile? In Maqbool's case, if the compromise suggested had been mere appeasement, even the appeasement would have been capable of offering a promising result on the arrival of the Indian army. Myers cannot approve of this method of compromise for he thinks that it is equal to carrying moderation to nihilism, the denial of heroic in life which men sometimes pay for by losing their freedom. He further argues that it involves the risk of even losing life, though moderation is intended to prolong life. Accordingly the critic believes: “No hero ever chose the golden mean in a critical moment, no hero would ever sacrifice his purpose to any part of the ‘iron way’ to the dictates of the kind of reason and virtue which bring length of life” (141). This view springs from Myers’s creed that “hamartia” or tragic flaw that Aristotle identifies in a tragic hero (Poetics) cannot be replaced by virtue of moderation (EN). He believes that it may not be possible for a tragic hero to listen to the voice of reason at a critical juncture. He brings in Nietzsche’s view that life can be eternally justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon to contrast it against Aristotle’s claim of happiness through a long and complete life. Myers thus brings in the point: “Nietzsche was fascinated by the intensity of the tragic hero’s experience but Aristotle was more deeply impressed by its brevity” (135). This is why Nietzsche finds virtue in the tragic hero’s action while Aristotle can find in it only flaw. Hence the views regarding virtues maintained by Nietzsche and Aristotle are in mutual contrast. Nietzsche believes: “Life is worth living only for the Superman, only for the tragic hero who lives dangerously, who risks all to gain all, who touches the heights and depths of experience” (Myers 134). Though Myers does not accept Nietzsche’s view or Aristotle’s view in toto, his preference goes in Nietzsche’s favour. This is why he comments:

Since most men prefer a long life even at the expense of stretches of dullness, the Aristotelian golden mean points to the sensible course of
men and nations most of the time. But if only one issue in a lifetime compels the moderate man to take a heroic stand, that is the one moment that fixes his place in history [. . .]. (147)

Myers thinks that the Aristotelian virtue of moderation cannot resolve the final crisis as the moderate protagonist has to choose heroic action at that juncture. The critic feels that the choice of heroic action will elevate the moderate protagonist to Nietzschean standard which makes him remark: “the fate of the tragic hero is the same as that of the moderate man” (148). Hence, though it is impossible for a tragic hero to convert into a moderate protagonist it is the necessary course for the moderate protagonist to assume the stance of a tragic hero to resolve the ultimate crisis, in Myers’s point of view.

It has already been described in the beginning of the third chapter that Aristotle’s concept of courage attains two distinct levels of operation—ordinary and heroic. Nietzsche’s superman assumes a stature which in Aristotelian view is attained through the expression of heroic courage. At the same time, Aristotle attributes to his ordinarily brave man the freedom to choose heroic courage if the circumstance calls for such bravery. Myers thinks that the moment the moderate protagonist chooses to adopt one of the two forms of courage, he “fixes his place in history as either a man or a nonentity” (147). No doubt, Ananta and Maqbool choose to exercise heroic courage at the final juncture instead of continuing the exercise of ordinary courage and Aristotle too approves of this shift “to prefer a swallow to summer” (Myers 136). Aristotle does not attribute the shift to any inconsistency in the moderate protagonist’s behaviour. A protagonist can either remain moderate or prefer heroism even in resolving the final crisis for Aristotle thinks that the moderate protagonist is not a coward to avert the choice of heroic bravery when a situation calls for such an action. At the same time there is the underlying suggestion that the protagonist can continue to choose ordinary bravery
if his preference is suitable that way. Note that this freedom of choice is meant not for
the tragic hero but for the moderate protagonist. Hence a tragic hero fails to listen to the
guidance of reason. But an ordinarily brave protagonist who has always been striving to
observe moderation can easily continue his stance even in resolving the final crisis and
thus attain length of life leading to happiness. A brilliant illustration can be drawn from
the final episode in The Sword and the Sickle. Lal Singh chooses to surrender to the
coloniser’s forces that have opened firing. He is imprisoned in the final scene but there
is hope of his prospects for a calm and peaceful future life with Maya. This is reflected
in the following words towards the close of the novel: “Lalu felt easier now that the night
was over. [ . . . ] He must remember to send a message to Maya to ask her how their new-
born son was getting on, [ . . . ]” (The sword 386). Hence the loss of freedom is only of
transient significance. At the same time the protagonist’s surrender to the police saves
his life and promises him a happy life with his wife and son. This substantiates
the Aristotelian view: “men can live by compromise” (Myers 147). It is further supported by
the example of Gauri who gives up hopes of a life with her husband but makes sure that
she is, by the very act, free from the cruel treatment of the husband and his aunt. Gauri
chooses neither to be a submissive wife enduring the harassment of her husband any
longer nor to be a martyr inviting her own death. Nor is she a revenge heroine seeking
the destruction of the insensitive husband. She adopts a compromising approach--
discard him. Gauri does not lose her life or freedom in consequence. It is true that Lalu
and Gauri fix their place in history only as nonentities. It must be observed that
Aristotle’s ordinarily courageous protagonists never aim to stamp their personality as
heroic figures so long as they do not will to change their stance to that of protagonists
exhibiting heroic courage. Lal Singh and Gauri thus do not replace their ordinary
bravery by heroic bravery and their preservation of moderation in resolving even their
ultimate crises dismisses the second part of Myers's observation: "What the hero gains in intensity, he usually loses in duration. What moderate man gains in duration, he usually loses in intensity" (148). It is noteworthy that the moderate man will lose what he gains in duration only if he chooses heroic action in the final scene. When the option to retain his moderate stance is exercised he does not lose anything but achieves his ultimate goal through duration or length of life. Hence Aristotle's concept of virtue cannot be branded as "golden meanness [. . .]" (143) as Myers does in the light of Lalu's and Gauri's achievements in *The Sword and the Sickle* and *Gauri* respectively. Ananta and Maqbool choose heroic courage to replace their ordinary courage on the final occasions while Lalu and Gauri choose to preserve ordinary bravery even to resolve their final crises. So long as all these advanced protagonists are moderate in their action and feelings until they are equipped to resolve their final crises, there arises a significant question: why do they choose differently at the final critical juncture? It is because in Ananta and Maqbool the worldly ambition for a peaceful life represented by their desire for Janki and Noor is weak in comparison with that of Lalu for Maya. Maya's sway over Lalu's feelings which limits his revolutionary spirit is unparalleled in the whole gamut of Anand's fiction. Accordingly the power with which Maya draws him to her camp causes Lalu's commitment to the revolutionary mission to fall short of the ultimate to a middle position; thus qualifying him to be branded a half-revolutionary or an ordinarily courageous individual. In the same way, the power of the revolutionary pull draws him fall short of his sensual extreme too, to a middle position, qualifying him to be called half-worldly or temperate. The power exerted by these impulses simultaneously in opposite directions is constantly experienced by the protagonist even after the middle positions--ordinary courage and temperance--are achieved. Since these conflicting forces are equal in power and are constantly at work within the mind of the protagonist
throughout the world of the novel, the mean finally settles in a middle position. The mean thus plays a significant part even in the resolution of the final crisis. Hence Lalu does not prefer heroism to moderation which is illustrated by his surrender to the police towards the end of *The Sword and the Sickle*.

In Gauri, the opposition between her love and hate for her husband is equally powerful so that she is a half-loving-wife in her sensual pursuit and half-hating-wife in her protest against the husband's atrocities. Her sensual love is limited to the mean by the hate she feels for her husband and the hate is reduced to the mean by the love she feels. The conflict between these diminished forces that are of equal force remains constant in resolving all crises. Hence Gauri too settles to the middle way and displays only ordinary courage all the time. Gauri chooses to discard Panchi without inviting any tragic end to her self. Thus Gauri ensures a peaceful life leading to happiness in future. The void created by the dismissal of her husband's emotional support is compensated for by the temperate sensuality she expects from the emotional substitute at a symbolic level. The absence of an external conflict is yet another noteworthy factor in the novel. Hence the conflict has been totally internalized as the adversary she has to deal with is none other than her husband. Her protest too is silent bringing only minimum distress to herself and to her husband. It ensures peace for Gauri though it is a sort of troubled peace. When we consider that Gauri is a member of the Indian orthodox tradition-bound rural poor, her final resolve to abandon her relations with her husband assumes glorious dimensions. Gauri is even prophetic of the liberated woman of modern India.

It is evident from this discussion that if the pull of the opposing forces is equal, the middle point will be arithmetic. Hence it is possible for the protagonist to place the mean arithmetically in the middle between these rival impulses. This is the ideal level of exercising moderation. In the cases of Lal Singh and Gauri, the mean attained in this
way is ideal at all levels of compromise between the antagonistic impulses. Hence they succeed in exercising ordinary courage in lieu of heroic courage in resolving every crisis they have to face. Consequently, they successfully resort to moderation to attain length of life and happiness as Aristotle conceives.

In *The Big Heart* the principle operates on with a difference. Janki who is sinking in health fails to offer a counterforce as powerful as Ananta’s revolutionary zest. Hence the power exerted by Janki to draw the protagonist’s choice in her favour is weaker than the power exerted by his revolutionary aspirations, that his revolutionary spirit decisively dominates his domestic inclinations. In consequence, the mean finally settles not in the arithmetic middle but slightly closer to the dominant impulse. This is evident in Ananta’s inclination to spend more time in organising the thathiars’ protest while the responsibility of looking after his mistress is sidelined. But in resolving the ultimate crisis, unlike that of Lal Singh and Gauri, Ananta experiences the power of the unevenly poised impulses once again which test their strength against each other. His revolutionary impulse is still dominant. Mulk Raj Anand makes it clear when Ananta who is on his way to meet Janki gives up his plan in order to give the help sought by the thathiar community. The choice to go back to the factory gates for an active involvement in the political crisis involves giving way for the exercise of heroic courage instead of ordinary courage that the protagonist has been possessing so far. Hence the final choice involves a shift from his earlier stance.

In *Maqbool* too the working principle is almost the same. Here the worldly ambition represented by the sister-love for Noor is not as powerful as the power for protest inspired by Maqbool’s revolutionary mission. As in the former case, when the two impulses test their strength against each other to draw the protagonist’s choice in preference of the powerful one, the force of the revolutionary mission restricts the power
of sister-love in Maqbool. In other words, the revolutionary impulse in Maqbool is not easily quenched by the love for his sister. Hence the mean attained is slightly closer to the revolutionary impulse. This accounts for Maqbool’s choice to bid farewell to his sister to flee to Srinagar to evaluate the situation of Pathan occupation. Later on, in resolving the ultimate crisis the protagonist is once again caught between the opposing impulses. As in the case of Ananta, Maqbool applies his prudence and chooses not to accept the enemy’s conditions for his reprieve from their captivity. Hence the protagonist’s final choice involves a shift in his stance from the exercise of ordinary courage to that of heroic courage.

The personal goals set by Ananta and Maqboöl lack the intensity as seen in that of Lal Singh and even that of Gauri. It may be because Janki, Ananta’s sweetheart is physically incapable of gratifying the love-act due to her ailment and Maqbool’s sister-love does not involve sister fixation leading to libidinal gratification of their love-act. These aspects might have been an indirect impulse to take up risky ventures. Aristotle’s pleasure and pain principle seems operative here. According to Aristotle pleasure attracts one to an activity and pain repels one from it. In enjoying the sensual pleasures there is no pain involved and hence there is no repulsion from that extreme. In Freudian terms the condition of the libidinal energy attaching itself to an object for its gratification is “object-libido”. As there is no scope for the state of object-libido in Ananta and Maqbool, the impulse experienced is absence of sensual pleasure, which nullifies attraction to some extent. Hence these protagonists’ preferences seem slightly inclined towards the mission to organize protest which offers them the pleasures of a warrior.

This observation is supported by the fact that Janki who is dying of consumption and Noor whose love for the brother never crosses the limits of ethical code can influence the protagonists’ choice only at a subordinate level. It is to be kept in mind
that Noor is drawn to Maqbool’s physique “more ardently than she might, at this age, have been drawn to any lover” (Death 94). As illustrated in chapter IV, there is no textual evidence to trace any sister fixation in his relationship with her. Even though the mean remains slightly closer to these protagonists’ revolutionary prospects in resolving their day-to-day problems (ordinary crises), their practical intelligence enables them to choose only ordinary courage in preference to heroic courage. But in resolving the ultimate crises, their prudence is convinced of the need for heroic action that the protagonists are compelled to shift their stance from the choice of ordinary courage to heroic courage. Anandian advanced protagonists can thus be classified into two categories: those in whom the mean is arithmetic or ideal and those in whom the mean is slightly closer to the heroic impulse. The protagonists belonging to the former category prefer choice of moderation throughout their career. But the latter group of heroes shifts their choice from moderation to heroism in resolving their final crises. Thus Lal Singh and Gauri fall in the former group and Ananta and Maqbool in the latter group. Though this explanation can illustrate the difference they exhibit in their choice of action, the complexity of its operation calls for further explanation in an advanced philosophical and psychoanalytical light. As this study is undertaken at a philosophical rather than psychological plane, an analysis pertaining to the latter level is postponed to the concluding part. In an advanced philosophical ground it is possible to explain this mechanism drawing support from Nietzsche’s concepts of Apollonian and Dionysian artistic impulses exerting their impact in the psyche of the protagonist.

In The Birth of Tragedy (hereafter abbreviated as BT) Nietzsche brings in the idea of the Apollonian and Dionysian duality in works of art “just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations” (951). Apollo is the deity of the art of sculpture and Dynesus that of the
nonimagistic art of singing and revelry. Apollo, as Mary observes: “meant many things to the Greeks, [. . .] including health, light, the law and protection against evil”. Apollo is also the soothsaying God, while Dionysus is the patron God of drama, the vegetative God and the God of wine [Bacchus]. Accordingly, she quotes Nietzsche: “the word ‘Dionysian’ means ‘an ecstatic affirmation of the total character of life’” (1). Wimsatt significantly records that certain forms of art exist relatively pure even today:

For instance, the painter, the sculptor, and the epic poet are characteristically Apollonian: they work under special patronage of the God of light, of vision and dream. And the actor, the dancer, the musician, and the lyric poet are characteristically devotees of Dionysus. They follow a wilder prompting, and create dynamic patterns out of ecstasy and incantation. (563)

In classical tragedy the struggle between these diverse energies creates perpetual conflict between the Dionysian chorus and Apollonian tragic hero and subsequently in modern plays and in novels depicting the drama of human predicament, this conflict has “become ‘internalized’ [. . .]. Terms like ‘struggle’, ‘tension’ and ‘resolution’ shifted their meanings with the new conception of the problem” (Wimsatt 556). This inner conflict of the protagonist poses certain psychological and philosophical questions as the conflict between the Apollonian and the Dionysian elements influence the behaviour of the protagonist to a very complex extent. So long as the origin of tragedy is traced to be in the dithyrambs (choral music), the satyrs enact the ecstasy of their God in their drunken revelry, to be one with Him and to transcend the “division between self and world [. . .]” (Stern, Nietzsche 41) to celebrate the instinctive and intuitive knowledge that they share with their God. This merriment has its roots in the ancient myth which Nietzsche quotes:
King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the wise ‘Silenus’, the companion of Dionysus, without capturing him. When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: ‘[...]. What is best of all is beyond your reach forever: not to be born, not to ‘be’, to be ‘nothing’. But the second best for you--is quickly to die’. (BT 961-62)

Faced with this ghastly wisdom of the ephemeral state of man, they strive to hide it from themselves “by turning their apprehension of truth into an ecstatic show, a drama” (Stern, Nietzsche 42). The chorus thus attempts to make their knowledge “bearable and the god who helps them to fashion it into a bearable--indeed a beautiful--form is the sun god Apollo (42). This tragic wisdom shared by the satyrs’ king comes out of the cerebrum of the wise demigod. In fact Apollo is the God of light who stands as the symbol of wisdom and this cerebral wisdom of Silenus is appropriate to be branded Apollonian in every sense. But Apollo has no independent existence in tragedy which has a “Dionysian foundation [. . .]” with “Apolline [Apollonian] order imposed upon it” (44). This Apollonian impulse in a protagonist makes easy “the control of Dionysian frenzy by the Apollonian reason” (Bhadra 244). At the same time, the artistic impulse representing the Dionysian frenzy is allowed to reinforce its power when Apollonian element is convinced that the circumstance demands heroic action from the protagonist.

The wisdom of the demigod Silenus is shared intuitively and instinctively by a protagonist, side by side with an opposite wisdom that is also intuitive and instinctive. Silenus’s wisdom is branded Apollonian and it inspires the protagonist to embrace tragedy:
In Dionysian ecstasy, in being-outside-oneself, one transgresses the limits that ordinarily would delimit one's self, one's individuality, one's subjectivity. These limits separating man from man and man from nature would be annihilated and man would be reunited with both man and nature. (Sallis 5)

In other words the protagonist escapes from Maya, as Nietzsche puts it, which has so far prevented him from being one with nature. At the same time, there is the opposite wisdom which can be branded Dionysian attained by "reversing the wisdom of Silenus [. . .] 'to die early is worst of all for them, the next worst--someday to die at all!'" (Nietzsche, BT 963). This wisdom enables the protagonist to forget the tragic intensity of Silenus's wisdom to strive for length of life.

Nietzsche further observes that the Dionysian mood remains to be fundamental to a tragic hero for: "The Dionysian is the ecstasy bursting forth from nature itself, would be a deconstruction indeed of subjectivity" (Sallis 4) to invite tragedy. It is a generally accepted fact that lyric originates from a musical mood and the musical mood has its foundation in a mood of pathos which is testified even by Shelley when he writes: "Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thoughts" (34). The Greek tragedy has taken its origin from this musical mood, this mood of pathos, inspired by the ghastly wisdom shared by the Greek chorus which has been originally constituted with a group of priests to sing and dance out the dithyramb in the worship service of their God, Dionysus. As the worship service became more sophisticated, the dithyramb developed into dialogue in verses chanted alternatively by the leader who emerged from them and the remaining members of the chorus. Once Aeschylus and Sophocles have introduced the second and third characters respectively, the leader emerged as the tragic hero retaining his fundamental mood to be that of Dionysian chorus who enacted the drunken revelry of
their God. This is how the Dionysian mood assumed to be fundamental to the Apollonian tragic hero. Hence Nietzsche identifies the tragic hero as a Dionysian speaking Apollonian wisdom.

When the protagonist recognizes his necessary oneness with Nature, the deconstruction of subjectivity is essentially demanded of him. But the Apollonian element which can be interpreted as the voice of reason within him, tries to limit the deconstruction of subjectivity. "Principium individuationis" is the term used by Nietzsche to indicate the conflict in the protagonist’s mind, which is not externalized in modern tragedy. The process of limiting the Dionysian frenzy which leads to the extinction of the protagonist’s individuality by drawing a thin veil of Apollonian reason to make the protagonist aware of the existence of his "self" is the principle at work. Hence he has to choose some means that will bring only minimum casualty to his self in resolving the crisis. Accordingly, in the conflict between the rival artistic impulses within the protagonist "we comprehend their necessary interdependence" (Nietzsche, BT 966) resulting in "a fraternal union of the two deities: Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo; Apollo however finally speaks the language of Dionysus; [. . .]" (1071).

Wimsatt correctly observes that the possibility of a tragedy is ruined, once Apollo begins to talk with "Dionysian wisdom":

When Apollo begins to talk with ‘Dionysian wisdom’, he gives us myth, for tragic myth, as Nietzsche defines it, is ‘a symbolizing of Dionysian wisdom by means of the expedients of Apollonian art’. Science, with optimistic belief in ‘the explicating nature’ destroys myth, and with it, the possibility of tragedy. (564)

Recalling Nietzsche’s last notes written in 1888 to The Will to Power, Stern reminds the readers that there is a rival deity to Dionysus. "Its name is no longer Apollo (the
Apolline [Apollonian] is now subsumed under the Dionysian), but Christ" He further explains that Dionysus is torn to pieces to be reborn while Christ suffers on the cross leading to the ultimate redemption. Stern quotes: "The God on the cross is a curse on life [...] Dionysus torn to pieces is a promise of life [...]" (A Study 180). It emphasizes the fact that the merrymaking Dionysus has a tragic face too. Dionysus cuts his difference from Christ on the fact that Christ has only one passion--suffering. Hence the introduction of Christ as an antagonist figure for Dionysus becomes essential to explain the conflict between the rival artistic impulses. The Dionysian element of ecstasy includes even sexual licentiousness to the point of ultimate consummation. This ecstasy is similar to extreme profligacy from Aristotelian standpoint. Here the opposite extreme is Christian martyrdom which is tragedy resulting from the exercise of Aristotelian heroic courage. Hence the process of individuation involves the application of Apollonian reason to reconcile the antagonistic elements--Dionysian and Christian--from deconstructing the self. This is why when the Christian impulse of martyrdom (tragedy) rivals the Dionysian impulse of merry making, either Dionysus shares Apollonian wisdom or Apollo shares Dionysian wisdom. When both the impulses are sufficiently strong Apollo shares Dionysian wisdom and "the tragic feeling recedes" (Stern, Nietzsche 44). When these opposing impulses test their power with each other to bring in a restriction in their mutual attempt for domination upon the rival, reason has its role to enable the protagonist to choose the method of compromise. Hence the protagonist is prevented from enacting the tragic wisdom. Consequently the protagonist is compelled to remain an Apollonian speaking Dionysian wisdom. This "wisdom" offers the protagonist hope for a longer life through the method of Socratic or scientific reasoning. The reasoning power convinces the protagonist that a longer life is suitable for him because there are some prospects for material happiness in his future life in the modern
world. It creates a “tragico-Dionysian” protagonist who turns out to be untragic (Alexandrian) in Nietzsche’s expression. Nietzsche disapproves of such a protagonist. But in the case of Dionysian speaking Apollonian wisdom, the protagonist becomes Nietzschean “Dionyso-tragic” dramatizing Apollo’s tragic wisdom to invite martyrdom. Here, in a moment of intensity of experience, the Apollonian impulse of reason is convinced of the need for resorting to heroic bravery. As such the Apollonian impulse, which defends the Dionysian motive power in the protagonist’s psyche, withdraws from its defensive position. Hence the Dionysian element reinforces its total power to enact the Apollonian wisdom to invite tragedy.

Two basic possibilities for protagonist-behaviour other than what is expected of a tragic hero which Nietzsche too identified in modern drama can be ultimately categorised as follows: (1) the hero (de) generating into an untragic (moderate) figure due to the lack of tragic intensity and (2) the protagonist transforming into the stature of a tragic hero due to the intensity of his tragic experience. This observation has been made taking into view the two possibilities of protagonists’ behaviour as discussed by Aristotle and Nietzsche in EN and BT respectively. Aristotle’s views on courage based on ordinary and heroic levels of protagonists’ behaviour and Nietzschean concepts of corresponding untragic and tragic levels of them throw light on the fact that the two thinkers looked at the same state of affairs with different perspectives. As Myers has pointed out (135) when Aristotle viewed the tragic hero’s experience from the angle of its brevity, Nietzsche viewed it from the angle of its intensity. As such, Aristotle’s heroically courageous protagonist is Nietzschean Dionyso-tragic protagonist who is acceptable to Aristotle too, if the end justifies his choice of expressing the tragic intensity instead of pertaining to observe the virtue of moderation. To this extent Aristotle’s view of virtue reconciles with Nietzsche’s view, which Bhadra ratifies when he observes that Nietzsche
Nietzsche condemns as an untragic figure. Nietzsche disapproves of this "degeneration" (in Nietzsche's own expression) into the "untragic" due to the fact that the protagonist exercises a choice against the dramatization of the intensity of his tragic experience. Aristotle approves of the protagonist's stance because it is capable of contributing length of life leading to happiness of the protagonist in the long run. This is how the application of the same theoretical basis invokes contradiction in the views of these thinkers.

The working mechanism already explained in this chapter leading to the choice of moderation in Anandian protagonists based on the restrictive force exerted by contrary extremes can be substantiated applying the Nietzschean principle of individuation. It has to be stated at the outset that repetition of ideas becomes inevitable in this process while applying Nietzschean terminology to explain the parallelism. The conflict between the protagonist's sensual/personal and revolutionary ambitions leading to the choice of the mean through the application of prudence is reestimated substituting Nietzschean terms—Dionysian, Christian and Apollonian—in the respective places.

The Dionysian element of ecstasy in Lal Singh is represented by the sensual love for Maya and his ambition for Christian martyrdom, through his urge for revolting against the social setup. In the conflict between the equally powerful Dionysian and Christian impulses, the protagonist's urge for extreme protest is limited to its half and the power for his total commitment to sensual love also gets controlled in the same proportion. Hence the protagonist remains neither a Christ figure nor a Dionysian figure thus making him half-Dionysian and half-Christian at the same time. The pull between
the half-Dionysian and half-Christian impulses remains uniform due to the equality of their force. In this process the Apollonian impulse effects individuation to control the Dionysian impulse which is regarded by Nietzsche as the fundamental mood in a protagonist. In other words, the newly acquired stance of the protagonist is made permanent by the process of individuation. This process, in Aristotelian view, is the application of prudence to arrive at a mean. Nietzsche thinks that the process springs out of the protagonist’s use of Socratic or scientific wisdom (which is Dionysian wisdom). It culminates in the spreading of a thin veil to mark the protagonist’s identity from his possibility of merging with Nature (martyrdom). In fact the Apollonian veil which limits the Dionysian frenzy is possible to be drawn logically only at a point where an equilibrium is attained between the contesting forces. It is done at the arithmetic middle when the forces share equality of power. The Apollonian veil assures the prevention of the dramatization of Dionysian impulse leading to catastrophe. As the Apollonian impulse succeeds in this attempt, the protagonist can be called Apollonian enacting Dionysian wisdom. In Aristotelian standard, it is the mean between the extremes—Christian and Dionysian—attained through the application of prudence qualifying the protagonist to choose moderate courage instead of heroic courage in resolving his crisis. Nietzsche calls him a tragico-Dionysian who degenerates into an untragic figure.

In Guari too, as already explained in the earlier part of this chapter, the conflicting impulses are of equal force after her hospital experience. Here, the Dionysian impulse is suggested by the expectation of an ecstatic sensual love with her husband and the Christian experience through her protest against the husband’s atrocities towards her. Once she acquires the power for protest, she experiences equality in their potential, which tests their strength against each other leaving the protagonist half-Dionysian and half-Christian. In the subsequent level, the impact of the struggle between these equally
restricted forces remains uniform. The protagonist manages to draw the Apollonian veil at the point of equilibrium, as in the former case, to assert her individuality. It permanently equips the protagonist to prevent the possibility of the fundamental Dionysian impulse from establishing dominance over its antagonistic impulse which would result in catastrophe. The point of equilibrium between these equally restricted forces, which pull each other in opposite directions, can fall only at the arithmetic middle between them. Hence in Gauri too, the Apollonian impulse qualifies the protagonist to be called an Apollonian speaking Dionysian wisdom. In other words, Gauri can be called a tragico-Dionysian protagonist. Thus she succeeds in choosing the moderate means of discarding her husband in the final occasion evading an extreme course of action. Once this option is exercised, there is a void created in the place of Dionysian impulse (merrymaking power) and this is conveniently substituted by placing her child as an antagonist to Panchi. The child functions as an emotional surrogate in the present and holds promise of future protection.

These illustrations prove that Lal Singh and Gauri are tragico-Dionysians who are capable of averting their catastrophe through the method of compromise between the rival impulses. It is also beyond doubt that Aristotle and Nietzsche were explaining the same principle at work in different terminology. Nietzschean Dionysian element which bears suggestions of excessive sexual licentiousness is comparable to profligacy in Aristotelian terms and Nietzschean Christ figure stands for Aristotelian reckless or foolhardy protagonist in every sense. The Apollonian element works in the same way as Aristotelian concept of prudence becomes operative in balancing the protagonist in the middle way. Myers too acknowledges the two possible choices for a protagonist in resolving the final crisis as already explained earlier. On the other hand, Ananta and
Maqbool choose heroism over moderation to resolve their ultimate crises which is a Dionyso-tragic stance.

In Ananta, the Dionysian experience is suggested through the love for Janki and his Christian experience through his impetus for organising a revolution. Here too the opposing impulses struggle with each other. Ananta’s Christian spirit is more powerful than his Dionysian spirit that the Dionysian impulse is restricted slightly by the Christian spirit to assume the stance of a less-than-semi-Dionysian protagonist leaving his preferences relatively inclined in favour of the Christian extreme. But he is prevented from choosing martyrdom until the final scene as the Dionysian spirit which functions as a kind of duty consciousness in Ananta to attend the ailing mistress limits the Christian extreme. Hence the protagonist is a more-than-semi-Christian in his ambition for protest and a less-than-semi-Dionysian in his sensual ambition. The Apollonian veil is spread up to a point of equilibrium between the uneven forces. This point is slightly inclined towards the Christian extreme. In resolving the day-to-day crises of the protagonist, the process of individuation takes place as in the former cases. The Apollonian veil prevents the Dionysian impulse from acquiring its tragic intensity. Accordingly the protagonist remains an Apollonian speaking Dionysian wisdom. This fact substantiates why Ananta has been against the revolutionary protest advocated by the extremists throughout the novel. In resolving the final crisis, the Apollonian impulse that shares the Socratic wisdom is convinced of the need for heroic action from the protagonist’s part. Hence the Apollonian veil rolls back allowing opportunity for the Dionysian impulse to assume its total control, to enact the Apollonian wisdom and invite the catastrophe. Hence the protagonist becomes Dionyso-tragic or Dionysian sharing Apollonian wisdom.

This phenomenon is operative in Maqbool too. In Maqbool’s case the Dionysian merry-making experience is suggested through his love for his sister, Noor.
The sister-love is relatively less powerful in contrast to his ambition for Christian martyrdom which is a dominating force at work. The potent Christian spirit limits the Dionysian spirit slightly that the protagonist is left a less-than-half-Dionysian. The Dionysian impulse too restricts the Christian extreme to a certain extent that he is left as a more-than-semi-Christian. In the conflict between these uneven forces in opposite directions, the Apollonian veil rolls down to work out individuation at the point of compromise which is slightly inclined towards the Christian extreme. Hence in solving the day-to-day crises the protagonist resorts to moderation, as he can be branded an Apollonian speaking Dionysian wisdom. When he is put to resolve the final crisis, especially in the captivity of the enemies, the Apollonian impulse which has been sharing Socratic wisdom is convinced of the need for heroic action. Hence the Apollonian veil rolls back to withdraw its defence mechanism and the fundamental Dionysian impulse becomes fully powerful to invite tragedy. As such, the protagonist is incapacitated to share the scientific wisdom which he has been practising till then. Accordingly, as in the case of Ananta, Maqbool becomes a Dionyso-tragic protagonist or a Dionysian sharing Apollonian wisdom to invite the catastrophe.

Thus one category of Anandian protagonists exhibit preference for the choice of moderation while in a second category there is a shift in their stance from moderation to heroic courage in resolving their ultimate crises. Aristotle feels that it is their prudence or practical intelligence under the pressure of the demand of the circumstance that equip the protagonist to determine this shift from the stance of ordinary to heroic level of courage. Nietzsche feels that it is the intensity of the protagonist’s experience which convinces the Apollonian impulse within him (Apollo is the God of reason) the need for the withdrawal of the veil which defends the deconstruction of the protagonist’s subjectivity. Earlier it has been explained from a technical point of view, in cases where
the antagonistic powers exercise equivalence in their potential, the mean is almost arithmetically poised in the middle and moderation prevails throughout. In cases where a compromise is attained between uneven opposing forces, the mean relatively favours the extreme suggesting martyrdom as against its opposite extreme. The moderation resulting from such a compromise can only be of transient significance. When the intensity of the protagonist’s experience disturbs the balance of forces, he is convinced of the need for heroic action. Hence the protagonist shifts his stance from moderation to heroism which brings forth his tragedy. It has been pointed out that the Apollonian veil which is drawn to defend the deconstruction of the protagonist’s self is logically possible to be spread only at a point of equilibrium. The mean attained between the contrary forces also assumes the very same position, i.e. the point of compromise of the rival impulses, estimated from the angle of Aristotelian theorizing. This is how Nietzschean point of view can be used to illustrate and substantiate Aristotle’s theory of moderation.

But what differentiates Nietzsche’s approach from that of Aristotle’s is the fact that he disapproves of the Apollonian speaking Dionysian wisdom as he brands such protagonists to be “untragic” producing the theoretical man with Alexandrian culture, possessing Socratic or scientific reasoning power. Myers’s condemnation of the protagonists’ exercise of Aristotelian moderation as “untragic” also draws its support from this Nietzschean point of view. But Anand’s attitude to the choice of these alternatives is built on certain theoretical structures attracting critical attention. One group of Anandian novels conclude with a promise of life. The readers feel an affirmation in these protagonists’ faith and they are not left in a state of absurdity to feel “nausea” when they complete their reading. In the Indian context, choice of moderation has been the mark of simplicity under the influence of Gandhian teaching--a major strategy that has been practised in the Freedom Struggle. As it has proved its success in
fighting the British, it will continue to illustrate its power in the arena of individual and social life of the nation. The value of moderation is getting globally accepted under the threat of an impending nuclear war. Radhakrishnan emphasizes the need for cultivating this Socratic reasoning when he argues: “We should develop a new flexibility, new power of creative adaptation” (9). Hence Anand’s attempt in the first group of novels is to explain its value in the Indian setting and to prove therein that a protagonist can preserve moderation even in a crucial juncture in striving to achieve the target of a happy life in future. In the second group of novels, the author illustrates how a protagonist transforms himself into heroic dimensions in resolving the final crisis, though he has been assuming moderation until that occasion. Through the illustrations of the moderate protagonist shifting his stance from ordinary courage to heroic courage in a final juncture or preserving moderation throughout—even in resolving a final crisis—Mulk Raj Anand disproves Myers’s theorizing: “Aristotle’s golden mean seems to be a kind of ‘golden meanness’, [. . .]”. The moderate protagonists (Lal Singh and Gauri) do not really shrink from “farther reaches of experience, [. . .]” (143) for they have never tasted the depth of family-love. Had their prudence been convinced of the need for an alternate choice, they would have done that as in the cases of Ananta and Maqbool. It must be concluded that the protagonists’ choice of action to resort to one of these means depends primarily upon the force of the contrary urges which leaves them in a position either in the middle, or relatively inclined to the revolutionary extreme. It is not to be forgotten that the demand of the circumstance is a dominant influence in this regard. The exercise of moderation thus does not limit these protagonists in a watertight compartment. Aristotle’s theory provides for freedom of choice to these protagonists to behave either in the manner of the ordinarily courageous or the heroically courageous protagonists in the final scene subject to the equivalence or imbalance of powers exerted by their contrary
preferences. The provision for choice gives these protagonists opportunity either to establish a historic record through martyrdom or prospects for enjoying the pleasantries in life. Both Aristotle and Nietzsche are aware of the possibilities for these two choices and the only difference of opinion between these thinkers, as discussed earlier, lies in the fact that Nietzsche stamps this moderate life “untragic” while Aristotle brands it “virtuous”. It may be noted that Anand’s achievement through the brilliant portrayal of these two kinds of protagonists announces his success in refuting Myers’ point of view, in the level of artistic creation. Myers’s point has been that the fate of a tragic hero is the same as that of the moderate protagonist and unless it is so the moderate protagonist demonstrates himself to be a nonentity. But the case study of Lal Singh and Gauri affirms that there is the promise of a better future life for both of them. Their entire attempt in these novels has been to set right their living conditions and to start anew peaceful lives. In Lal Singh’s case the compromise attained is capable of bringing far-reaching results in his life. It rules out Myers’ view that there cannot be a true compromise in a world in which there is demarcation between extremists and moderates.

In Anandian underdeveloped protagonists, the scope for voluntariness in their activities is very limited. Aristotle’s theory stresses the fact that there cannot be any opportunity for choice or purpose in involuntary or compulsory acts. These underdeveloped protagonists remain marginalized from the main stream of Indian social life. This sidelining springs from the fact that they are either Dalits or have-nots, condemned to work for meagre wages in the caste-ridden and colonial Indian context. These underdogs have been denied even school education either due to the fact that they are lowborn or because they are too poor to bear the expenses of education. It results in the malnourishment of their intellectual faculties that deny them the power for the exercise of voluntariness in their activities that otherwise could have initiated a
sea-change in the social order. In consequence they are condemned to resign themselves to their lot unlike the members of the privileged classes. The primary reason for the passive endurance of their burden is that they do not possess the potential for extreme protest for it has been pointed out in chapter I how the Dalits have reacted violently against unjust situations. In exigencies they have exchanged the passive stance for violence to find solutions to their problems. It has been recognized that in the caste discriminated Indian society, the majority of Dalits suffer from the characteristic schizoid experience and this accounts for the passive endurance of the insults to which the majority of Dalits are condemned. The Dalits secretly wish to react against the untouchability to which they are burdened but are not able to come out of the religious taboos, as the “communal structure within which we live is a repressive regime [...] by ‘preventing’ individual and collective desires from being allowed their freedom” (Woods 31). The condition results from the pull exerted between the two opposing forces springing from the Dalit’s divided self as originally observed in a schizophrenic patient. Laing explains that the experience of the divided self can happen in sane and psychotic positions termed “schizoid” and “schizophrenic” respectively (61). In the Dalit, the experience is that of a schizoid where dissociation of self and body can be experienced while dealing with the basic underlying insecurity. The process is caused by the involvement of the repressive regime which makes the Dalit protagonist behave in accordance with the dictates of religion/society. Hence he is left without any scope for exercising voluntariness in his activities. The decision to keep his will in subservience to the social code can be branded compulsory. But in certain moments of intense experience the Dalit is capable of surpassing the force of the repressive regime to exercise their choice in registering their protest as shown in Chapter I.
In analysing Anandian underdeveloped protagonists, it is noteworthy that Bakha and Bhikhu are Dalits and Munoo and Gangu are of high-caste, but have-nots. These four characters are the only undeveloped protagonists delineated by Anand in his novels. Each of them has at least a single episode in these novels which provides them with the opportunity for a voluntary act of protest against the social setup. It is this solitary act which calls for detailed investigation to draw the inference whether these protagonists too are capable of observing mean or moderation in choosing the nature of their protest.

In *Untouchable*, Bakha’s schizoid experience can be observed throughout the novel, especially when he touches the highborn Hindu merchant unawares and defiles him. When the caste Hindu gives a slap publicly, Bakha loses “all his humility and he would have lost his temper too [...]” (*Untouchable* 57) but he remained passive, enduring the insult, not daring to retaliate. The awareness of his low communal status has been functioning as a repressive force to suppress his potential for retaliation to the level of passive endurance in the characteristic manner of an ordinary Dalit of the thirties. It is this attitude which makes Hubel remark:

> Bakha endures one incident of oppression after another, and although his reaction is initially outrage mixed with a desire for revenge, he eventually adopts the submissive demeanor expected of him and ends up affirming the very values and customs that demand his subservience. (164)

The reaction of the protagonist in the final scene also is very significant from this point of view. Three solutions are suggested to bring an end to untouchability. Bakha is reluctant to follow the first suggestion—conversion to Christianity—for “He didn’t like the idea of being called a sinner” (*Untouchable* 145). He dismisses the idea without hesitation. Secondly Gandhi wants the “harijans” to continue their profession, at the same time give up evil habits like drinking and eating carrion so that they will not be
looked down upon by the caste Hindus. Bakha’s comment is “That is not fair” (165). Finally when the poet Iqbal Nath Sarshar puts forward a radical solution to the problem through the implementation of the flush system in toilets, the idea appears incomprehensible to Bakha. When he decides to go home to tell Lakha what he has heard and if possible to get more information about the flush system he displays his lack of guts to try and put an end to the evil system. In Kaushik’s observation too, “The sweeper boy, therefore, is confined to ideational protest [...] in his failure to act [...]” (qtd. in Hubel 165) allowing the customary schizoid experience to overtake the protagonist once again. It is due to this reason that the problem of untouchability remained unsolved even after a lapse of twenty-six years from the date of publication of the novel, compelling the author to take up the problem once again in The Road.

It is significant that there will be ultimately one moment of intensity in the life of all these protagonists, which makes them capable of voluntary action. In Bakha’s case it is the event of the Brahmin priest’s attempt to molest Sohini which Bakha learns from her complaint in sobs and tears: “when I was bending down to work, he came and held me by my breasts!” As documented in chapter I, when the untouchable girl refuses to yield to his desires, the priest shouts that she has polluted him to keep his position safe. Bakha is possessed by a feeling of rage and he exclaims: “Brahmin dog! [...] I will go and kill him” (Untouchable 71). In fact Bakha has always cherished in his mind deep love for his sister inspired by a sort of pride to own her, owing to her beauty, “a pride not altogether that of a brother for a sister”(26). This love is similar to that of Maqbool for Noor and powerful enough to provoke him to attack the priest. Before this incident he was even scared to enter a temple being afraid of the anger of Gods. But driven by his love for his sister and indignation at the priest’s attempt at her honour, he sheds his inherent fear and gets ready for revenge. Sohini however comes between him and his
rage and prevents him from any misadventure "by dragging hard at the lapel of his overcoat" (71). But Bakha moves forward with intentions of revenge. When he is in front of the temple, the principal power that checks his rage is the fraternal love for Sohini: "I could have sacrificed myself for Sohini. Everyone will know about her. My poor sister! How can she show her face to the world after this? But why didn't she let me go and kill that man?" (73-74). The last line in the above passage makes it clear that it is his love for his sister and his concern for her that make him bridle his rage. Hence he chooses to give up the feeling of revenge in the crucial juncture. Thus Bakha too is capable of choosing the mean or moderation in a critical context like that of all the advanced protagonists delineated by Anand.

In extending the problem of untouchability in *The Road*, Anand highlights the protagonist Bhikhu's schizoid experience throughout the novel. It substantiates the reason for Bhikhu's passive endurance of the atrocities committed against his family by the caste Hindus. Even when the houses of untouchable including that of his own are set ablaze, he fails to free himself from the repressive regime imposed by the communal structure. In the end, when Bhikhu attempts to escape from the evil along the newly constructed road to Delhi, he explicitly expresses his failure to defeat this repressive force by changing the social structure. The escapist tendency exhibited here seems to be characteristic of the majority of Dalits in colonial India who failed to shake off their schizoid experience to question the system. Yet, as illustrated in the life of Bakha, there is one single occasion which affords him intensity of experience to exercise voluntariness in his activity. It is when he accompanies his mother to God Vishnu's temple in the beginning of the novel with an intention to protect her from the caste Hindus who will forbid her entry. When they attempt to break the religious prohibition of temple-entry to untouchables, under the leadership of the landlord Thakur Singh's son
(Sajnu), the caste Hindus block their way near the temple gates. "Don't bar my way" (The Road 6), Bhikhu shouts with his face reddened and attempts to push them aside. Sajnu retorts: "if you push me aside I will murder you" (6). The mother realizes the consequences and tries to passify and dissuade Bhikhu from his attempt. She cautions: "son, we are at fault [...] obey them don't fight" (6). When Bhikhu has been unwilling to withdraw, she turns back and calls him from behind: "Bhikhu, son, come back" (7). When Bhikhu refuses to do so in the midst of mounting tension, the mother appeals to Lambardar Dholi Singh, Bhikhu's employer, to save her son. Once he interferes and restores order, his enthusiasm to break the religious code at all costs is restricted to moderation and Bhikhu chooses to withdraw from the scene. Here it is his mother's intervention and thrusting some practical sense into his head by her that cools his urge for protest and after that he is only a submissive figure till the end of the novel. It was for the mother that Bhikhu chose to break the Hindu religious code which prevented them from entering the temple and when his mother herself withdraws from the attempt to do so, Bhikhu experiences a gradual decline of his enthusiasm in breaking the prohibition. In the end when Dholi Singh's commanding power is also utilized by the mother as a tool, the power of her love in limiting Bhikhu's extremism to moderation is clear. Hence Bhikhu too shares the ability for exercising the mean as that of the other protagonists discussed so far.

Munoo and Gangu, the remaining two underdeveloped protagonists are not Dalits for Munoo belongs "to the second highest order" (Coolie 6) of the Hindu religion and Gangu is a Rajput, a clan famous for its bravery in the battlefield. The predicament of these protagonists is that both of them are economically backward, if not communally (one an orphan and the other a plantation labourer), marginalized from enjoying the privileges of their upper caste in the context of British Raj in India. Hence the
psychology which expresses its operation in these protagonists cannot be that of the schizoid experience as in the Dalits discussed so far, instead the one which governs the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer “under the extreme ambivalence inherent in the colonial situation” (Fanon 59). Fanon further identifies this complexity as dependency complex and authority complex respectively. The colonizer acts “in obedience to an authority complex [. . .]” while the colonized “obeys a dependency complex. Everyone is satisfied” (70). Munoo obeys the orders in the bank sub-accountant’s house with abject humility, serves Prabha and his wife with ultimate devotion, and finds a kind of satisfaction in the exploitation of him by Mrs. Mainwaring, primarily due to the dependency complex. In the first two instances, it is the force of circumstance that compels the protagonist to an escape and it is only with Mrs. Mainwaring that he exercises a wilful choice for effecting voluntariness in his activity. It must be understood at this level that Munoo’s Bombay experience offers him opportunity for physical and mental maturity. Physically he has sex with Lakshmi (Hari’s wife) and mentally his awareness of the class structure in society gets authenticated with his exposure to Marxian theory of class struggle when he comes in contact with trade union movement. It is towards the end of the novel that Munoo becomes aware of the fact that he is not even given rest which is enjoyed by other coolies employed in the service of Mrs. Mainwaring. The realization of the exploitation becomes complete when the knowledge of death confronts him as he begins to bleed (a symptom of consumption). It is at this turn that Munoo’s hate expresses itself in the novel. As documented in chapter I the novelist comments: “death confronted him, he had hated her [. . .]” (Coolie 316). There is a conflict between love and hate for Mrs. Mainwaring in Munoo’s mind at this level. Though his hate is expressive only at this juncture, the growth of his love for her starts from the moment he reaches Simla.
True, he had felt strange, inexplicable urges in his being about little Sheila at Sham Nagar, and enjoyed sitting in the lap of Prabha’s wife and loved Lakshmi but what he felt in response to the pinching patting and the coquettish smiles of the Memsahib [Mrs. Mainwaring] was something different. (290)

As for her approach towards Munoo, she felt: “Why can’t I give myself up to the boy?” [. . .]. The regular curves of his young body, its sudden flashes of movement stirred the chords of her being in a strangely disturbing manner” (294). Yet, she never gives herself up to the boy, but arouses “fire in his blood, [. . .]” (295) which he finds difficult to control. Since their affair is devoid of sex, it remains temperate. But the fire of this exuberant feeling controls the hate he has against Mrs. Mainwaring, which he feels when he recognizes the gravity of the exploitation he has been condemned to. But he resorts only to moderate protest which is conveyed by his option to discard her and leave for Bombay after getting well.

Munoo felt he would go. And, since the spell of warm weather lasted and the flies and the mosquitoes were not too troublesome, he began to feel stranger everyday and looked forward to testing his powers for the journey to Bombay by a walk. (317)

Munoo’s proposed choice of moderate protest resembles that of Gauri who discards her husband in the final scene. The hate for Mrs. Mainwaring which ought to have provoked the protagonist to a typical Marxian protest is limited to moderation by the opposing power exerted by the feeling of love he has always reserved for the Memsahib. Thus Munoo too chooses the mean at a critical juncture like the other protagonists though he fails to translate it into action due to his ill health.
The dependency complex finds its fuller expression in Gangu from the moment he is compelled by Buta Ram (the recruiting agent) to accept the job of a worker in Macpherson tea estate. He does not protest against the management when they negate the offer of land to Gangu which was promised to him by contract. Nor does he react against the inhuman treatment of him by Croft Cooke, the manager of the estate, when he approaches him for a loan to bury the dead body of his wife who dies of Malaria. In the final episode, when Gangu rushes home responding to the call for help from his children, Reggie Hunt's obedience to the authority complex--in shooting Gangu--is unpardonably quick. The quickness of this act denies the protagonist even an opportunity for the choice of a voluntary act, at least to save his life, conquering the force of the dependency complex operative in his psyche. As already hinted at in chapter I, there is a single occasion in his life also when he shakes off the dependency complex like the other underdeveloped protagonists, to exercise voluntariness in his activity. The coolie woman Chamberli who used to be the concubine of Reggie Hunt, the assistant planter, quarreled with the wife of Neogi Sardar, the warder, leading to a fight between them. In fact the assistant planter has currently replaced Neogi's wife for Chamberli to gratify his lust and the coolies gather around the two fighting women to separate them. When coolies from other parts of the plantation also interfere in the affair, Neogi Sardar and others begin to wield their clubs. Finally Reggie Hunt comes and rides his horse on the coolies to bring in order. One coolie is dead and several are wounded. When the coolies realize their incompetence in protesting against the authorities, Gangu suggests that they ought to go and present their grievance before the estate-doctor, de la Havre, who has always been kind towards them. This is the point where the protagonist defeats the force of the dependency complex to resort to a courageous action. The coolies move to the doctor's bungalow and Gangu takes their leadership to present their ordeal. The doctor has to
attend his duties and he directs the mob to present their plight to the Burra Sahib (the manager) to save themselves from the anger of the Raja Sahib (the assistant planter). When the crowd marches forward, Gangu withdraws from their leadership by allowing the coolies to overtake him. The novelist presents it realistically: “Gangu grew lonelier and lonelier and he saw the crowd jumping over impediments and rushing eagerly forward” (204). When the Burra Sahib, Raja Sahib and five riflemen at the bungalow find the organized coolies rushing forward towards their abode in a mutiny, orders are given to drive the coolies back with the barrel ends of their rifles. The mutiny is suppressed and the coolies turn back.

The major question which interests an investigator in this context is why Gangu withdrew from the leadership when the mob is directed to submit the case to the Burra Sahib. The answer is simple. In Gangu’s own words: “I am stricken with fear” [. . .]” (203). It is his conscious fear that he would be singled out as their leader, to be noticed by Reggie Hunt who knows that he has a grown-up daughter. He has also been aware that no coolie woman is safe in the plantation and in the event of his being brought to limelight, the situation will be precarious for him and for his daughter. Consequently he feels: “I shouldn’t die till Leila is married, [. . .]” (83). He is fully aware that she has been Sajani’s (his wife) “gift” to me [him], to tend me [him] in my [his] old age” (146). Gangu’s love for Leila is temperate yet potential, arising out of the father’s responsibility towards her. It is this force that controls Gangu’s urge for protest by withdrawing him from carrying out “the Rajput code--murder” (173). Hence the choice to back off from the leadership of the mutineers points to the fact that Gangu is capable of exercising mean or moderation even after his inborn potential for violence gets free from the clutches of his repressive dependency complex. This is a deliberate choice demanded by the force of love to avert a catastrophe.
The underdeveloped protagonists—Bakha, Bhikku, Munoo and Gangu—demand themselves to be placed in a subordinate position to the advanced protagonists—Lal Singh, Ananta, Gauri and Maqbool—with regard to their inability to defeat the force of their inherent repressive regime/dependency complex permanently. Since they exhibit their capacity for violent protest only once in their lives, their resignation to their lot is often taken for their submissiveness. But their case is one in which they easily realize the risks involved in sustained protest and hence after a one-time attempt they choose the course of moderation.

The conflict between the opposing forces is simple in the underdeveloped protagonists. It is interesting to note that love that restricts the opposite extreme remains in a temperate level in them. In advanced protagonists, both the opposing forces are dynamic exerting their pulls in the most forceful fashion to result in their mutual restriction. In the subsequent conflict between the restricted forces, the mean takes position either arithmetically in the middle or slightly inclined towards the revolutionary extreme in accordance with the equivalence or imbalance of forces involved in this tussle. In the underdeveloped protagonists, the revolutionary spirit inspired in them by the intensity of their experience on a single occasion activates their one-time urge for protest. This power enables them to temporarily surpass the force of the repressive regime in Bakha and Bhikhu and dependency complex in Munoo and Gangu. When they are freed from the clutches of these forces they ought to be able to protest violently against the injustice in question. But the temperate force of love exerts its pull in the contrary direction to control the possibility of extremism. In Bakha and Bhikku, when the dynamism of the revolutionary impulse is bridled by love or caution or a related rationalism which amounts to the awareness of the futility of protest on the one hand and further losses on the other, they easily resign to a moderate stance till the end. The
repressive regime, which has been defeated only temporarily, acquires its former power. The consolidation of its power once again in the psyche of the protagonists permanently prevents them from such protest on subsequent occasions and the protagonists are retained in subservience to this force as of earlier occasions. Hence there is no further attempt from their part in registering their protest throughout the respective novel. This inability for even moderate protest against the social evils sets their difference from the advanced protagonists. In Gangu too the realization of the fact “The mutiny has been crushed” (227) brings a feeling of defeat. He gets back to his children and resigns himself to his lot. “Life settled once more to its ordinary routine of dullness for Gangu [...] he had accepted everything else without even so much as a gesture of complaint” (246). In other words, the dependency complex which has been defeated temporarily by the intensity of Gangu’s experience once again acquires its earlier force as soon as he chooses to resort to a moderate way which crushes Gangu’s Rajput enthusiasm for protest on all subsequent occasions. Hence Gangu is compelled to “accept their servitude as part of the business of life” (253). The tragedy that befalls him results out of his involuntary and unconscious act of responding to the call for help from his children. It is a kind of reflex action on the part of Gangu and not a decision reached after due consideration. Munoo is an exception to this pattern. After the one time conquest the dependency complex does not revitalise its power in Munoo’s case. This happens because Munoo fails to get the opportunity to strive for executing his choice in his practical life. He dies of consumption before he could attempt it. Hence his protest remains in the realm of his mindscape.

Analyzed from Nietzschean perspective, the underdeveloped protagonists enjoy only a one time opportunity to practise individuation. Once the process starts functioning, the tragic force (Christian force) of these protagonists represented by their
revolutionary enthusiasm gets restricted from growing to the Christian extreme by the Dionysian counterforce of love. Through the Dionysian impulse is only a temporary force in comparison with the Christian impulse experienced at this juncture, it succeeds in restricting the Christian impulse with the support of the temporarily defeated repressive regime or dependency complex as is applicable in their cases. Hence these protagonists exercise individuation. It is noteworthy that they are portrayed in these contexts as more than semi-Christians. In other words, the point of equilibrium where the rival impulses compromise occupies a position closer towards the Christian extreme. The veil spreads itself at this point to prevent the protagonist from inviting tragedy. Hence they remain Apollonians speaking Dionysian wisdom or tragico-Dionysian protagonists. But this stance is retained only for a brief period of time. Love for the sister or love for the mother or love for the Memsahib or love for the children exerts considerable pressure upon the protagonist's preference for protest and the attitude is disturbed soon by the revitalisation of the inherent suppressive forces. In Bakha and Bhikhu, the repressive regime and in Gangu the dependency complex get revitalised and the chance for continuing the process of individuation gets ruined. The veil rolls back and these forces crush down the protagonist's power for registering protest. It has already been stated specifically that Gangu's death is not the outcome of any voluntary act from his part. In Munoo, the process of individuation happens only at a psychic level as he is incapable of enacting it in his practical life. His tragico-Dionysian stance is overtaken by death which is not an outcome of his choice. What is attempted through this discussion of the underdeveloped protagonists is simply to establish that they are forerunners in the exercise of moderation which finds its fuller development in the advanced protagonists delineated in Anand's subsequent novels.